"
Now, Antwerp, Belgium, is the fifth greatest port
in the world.
Now, Antwerp, Belgium, is the fifth greatest port
in the world.
Soviet Union - 1931 - Fighting the Red Trade Menace
hathitrust.
org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 71
Soviet relations is suggested among others by Gaston
Bergery, secretary of the so-called Russo-French
Parliamentary Group in the Chamber, a loose organi-
zation composed of deputies from various parties who
believe that the Russian problem is perhaps the most
important one facing Europe today, but who are not
at all unanimous in their views as to its solution.
This proposal, apparently simple but in reality full
of thorns, is to resume the Franco-Soviet negotia-
tions over the debt question where they were left off
five years ago.
Chief objection to this proposal is the fact that
the Soviet Government has grown not less, but more
hard in its attitude since 1926 when the negotiations
were broken off upon Moscow's insistence that before
it pay a cent on the Czarist bonds, the Soviet Union
would have to have a considerable money credit. The
debt at that time was reckoned at 6,738,000,000 gold
francs, $1,347,000,000. The average Frenchman has
not yet entirely abandoned hope of getting something
back on this huge sum and the bonds are occasion-
ally traded in at a fraction of 1 per cent to 4 or 5
per cent on days when assassinations in the Kremlin
are particularly numerous.
But another prime difficulty in the way of solu-
tion of the debt question is the lack of a Soviet
representative here whom the French can under-
stand and who understands the French. In this re-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 72 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
spect the Trotzky-Stalin controversy in the Russian
Communist Party is still making its effects felt, for
Christian RakovsLy, stanch friend of Trotzky and
one of the few who have held out without capitula-
tion for four years in the exile to which he was sent
by Stalin, was perhaps the one Soviet representative
who could match French diplomacy.
But it is the French this time who are anxious to
remedy the stagnation in Franco-Russian relations.
The fourth and last proposal to this end, most sweep-
ing of all, is made by Senator Anatole de Monzie.
He, one of the original proponents of French recog-
nition of the Soviet Union, and in this sense com-
parable to our own Senator Borah, is in favor of
negotiating a trade agreement with the Soviet Union
and postponing consideration of the debt question
to a "more convenient time. "
It is difficult to forecast what will be the solution
finally evolved. Perhaps it will be one different from
any of those listed, but these are all that are being
discussed at present. Important for the outside world
is the observation that of all the solutions suggested
the outer limit of aggressiveness is represented by the
Caillaux-Berenger project for control, but not ces-
sation of trade with the Soviet Union. This is from
the country that suffered most heavily from the
Bolshevik revolution. For France that revolution
meant not only the loss of the huge amount of money
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 73
in Czarist bonds distributed almost literally among
every French family. It meant prolongation of the
war with Germany and might have meant its loss had
not America intervened. It meant after the war that
Germany, friendly to the Soviet Union for its own
reasons, could be much more independent than if she
had been bordered by Czarist Russia. Nevertheless
France recognized the Soviet Union in October,
1924, nine months after the British Labor Govern-
ment showed the way.
Today France views with distrust and a vague
growing uneasiness, the climb to power of the Soviet
Union, friend from expedience, but nevertheless
friend of Germany and Italy. French courts make
trouble for the Soviet trade representatives, her
press fumes at the disappearance of a General Kutie-
poff, the flight of a Bolshevik diplomat from the
"Claws of the Cheka. " But the French business man
is making trouble for the French Foreign Office, and
through the rattle of persistent popular agitation
against the Soviet Union penetrates to governmental
chambers only the clear cold voice of business: "We
want our Soviet orders back. "
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? CHAPTER VIII
Brussels:
It was in Antwerp. I asked a newspaper vendor:
"Ou se trouve-t-il le consul Am? ricain? "
No answer. A sullen look.
"Wo ist der amerikanische Konsul? "
Instantly came the reply, shot back in Flemish so
like German it was easy to understand.
"Don't you speak French? " I asked the Antwerp
citizen.
"Oh, yes," he replied, "but we prefer German if
we have to speak a foreign tongue. "
French a foreign tongue in Belgium! German pre-
ferred in the land that suffered the yoke of German
military rule the whole long length of the war!
But Antwerp is Flemish, Brussels Walloon, and
their differences, so easily forgotten by the outside
world, are playing a curious role today in the rela-
tion of Belgium to the Soviet Union. The Walloon-
Flemish, Brussels-Antwerp conflict, interminable and
never settled, has helped make it impossible for Bel-
gium to achieve any satisfactory results in its efforts
to protect itself against Soviet imports, has helped
make this sector of the "anti-Soviet front" illusory.
In this country, in miniature, for convenient in-
spection, as on a small-scale model of a Continental
74
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 75
map, may be observed in classic form the nationalis-
tic, local patriotic, commercial reasons why Europe,
though partly convinced that the economic expan-
sion of the Soviet Union means trouble, and wholly if
vaguely convinced that it is undesirable, has done
nothing effective to check that expansion.
Seldom can one find conflicting interests in such
profusion as exist here, and each has its bearing on
Belgo-Soviet relations. The traditional conflicts ex-
istent everywhere are here between industry and ag-
riculture; between producer and consumer; between
those who want to buy Soviet goods because they
are cheaper, and those who want to keep Soviet
goods out because they compete with their own prod-
ucts; between those industrials who long for Soviet
orders and those who fear Soviet industrial competi-
tion. And to these conflicts are added the uniquely
Belgian conflict between the Walloons and the Flem-
ish. Looming over all is the Belgian national rivalry
with the old antagonist, Holland.
The Walloon-Flemish controversy must surprise
any observer coming in from the outside with the
war-time American picture in his mind of the hotly
patriotic nation of Belgians, united as a monolith
under the aegis of Albert.
To learn that radicals in the Flemish party agi-
tate for separation from Belgium, that moderates in
the same party, in very considerable numbers demand
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 76 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
a revision of the constitution and organization of a
sort of dual, federal state, and that the police fre-
quently have to use their clubs to quell the treason-
able public demonstrations of the secessionists, is to
realize that the Walloon-Flemish conflict has more
serious aspects than the mere fact that it requires
knowledge of two languages to get a place in the pub-
lic service.
This is an aspect of Belgium that has more sig-
nificance as an illustration of one of Europe's most
acute post-war ailments than for its importance in
itself. And particularly in any study of the relation-
ship of Europe to the Soviet Union is it desirable
correctly to estimate the part played by the astonish-
ing growth since the war of the spirit of nationalism,
of sectional patriotism. Upon these centrifugal
forces the Soviet Union is depending in large part
for the undisturbed execution of its ambition to erect
an economically independent, militarily potent Com-
munist state, in a world of capitalist enemies too
busy hating each other to band against a common foe.
Hardly a nation in Europe is free from the dis-
integrating element of national minorities, bent on
having their independence even if they have to tear
up the Continent into scraps of States. Poland has its
Ukrainians, its Germans and its Jews; Germany has
its Poles; Czecho-Slovakia has its Slovaks; Jugo-
slavia its Croats; Rumania its Hungarians; Italy its
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 77
Austrians; France its Germans, and the Spanish rev-
olution has shown what the Basques and the Cata-
lonians thought of Spain.
These are by no means all. There are many more
groups of peoples dissatisfied and bitter against
their Governments. It may be remarked that of the
examples named, all except the Spanish dissenters
blame their troubles on the Versailles peace treaty
that rearranged Europe's boundaries with awkward
hand. For that very reason it was interesting to find
in Belgium a "national minority" problem that had
nothing to do with the Versailles peace treaty.
The Belgians have had 100 years since the founda-
tion of their present nation in 1830 in which to
reconcile the differences between the Flemish inhabit-
ants of the coast and the Walloon inhabitants of the
interior. The conflict still exists; the Flemish lan-
guage was given equal official rights with the French
in 1898; in 1923 the formerly French speaking uni-
versity at Ghent was converted to the Flemish tongue,
and today in Antwerp it is easier to get a civil an-
swer from a man on the street by speaking German
than by speaking French.
The Flemish, proud masters of the Port of Ant-
werp, claim that the Walloons pre-empt the plums
of government. The Walloons propose to continue the
pre-empting. Thus when Brussels takes a step toward
checking Soviet imports, Antwerp is urged by no
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 78 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
exaggerated feelings of friendliness toward the capi-
tal to refrain from pressing its local claims to con-
sideration. Brussels is forced to compromise; Mos-
cow profits.
How Antwerp actually behaved when Brussels tried
to curb Soviet imports, and the role played by Rot-
terdam, and the dramatic circumstances of the rift in
Belgo-Soviet trade will be discussed in another chap-
ter. Here it is necessary to record the formal course
of events.
Belgium has no diplomatic relations with the So-
viet Union. This is one of the few important in-
stances in which Brussels has failed to follow the lead
of Paris. Belgium industrial investments in Czarist
Russia are estimated to have been worth around
$800,000,000. This was all lost when the Soviet
Government nationalized property and not a penny
has been recovered.
Feeling over this loss is still strong and the pre-
dominance in politics here of the clerical Catholic ele-
ment has made the assumption of diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union an academic question. So far
Belgo-Soviet diplomatic relations consist of an agree-
ment for the return of citizens, signed April 20,1920.
Despite the lack of diplomatic relations, Belgium
and the Soviet Union by last year had developed a
trade that, though small in itself, made Belgium
seventh largest taker of Soviet goods. In 1930 Bel-
gium imported Soviet grain, flax, oil, lumber and a
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 79
few other products to the value of $12,800,000. She
exported to the Soviet Union, however, only $3,750,-
000 worth of machines, tools and boilers.
The Belgo-Russian balance of trade was distinctly
unfavorable to Belgium but not large enough in itself,
out of a total Belgian foreign trade of $1,700,000,-
000, to worry about so long as prosperity was abroad
in the land. Last autumn the flood of Soviet grain
disturbed Belgian farmers, the general economic de-
pression made even the small unfavorable trade bal-
ance with Russia irritating and the action of the
French in establishing their license system for Soviet
imports convinced Belgium she should do the same.
The license system, it was hoped, would throttle Rus-
sian "dumping" and improve the trade balance.
France decreed its license system October 4, 1930.
Belgium followed on October 26. Less extensive even
than the French, the Belgian list of Soviet products
requiring a license for import included only cereals
and cereal products, wine, glue and oleic and stearic
acid. The results of the French experiment have been
described. The Belgian findings have been if any-
thing even more discouraging.
Although Soviet grain has ceased to come into the
country legally, it is conceded by the Government
that it comes in in large quantities illegally, smuggled
by Belgian, Dutch and French traders. Petroleum
and timber were not put on the license list because
they are products not produced in Belgium, and, as
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 80 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
in France, the Government had no interest in pro-
tecting American, Canadian or Scandinavian oil and
timber interests. Flax was not put on the list for
reasons given later.
Leaving grain entirely out of account, official Bel-
gium statistics show that in the first two months of
this year, after two months of operation of the license
system, Belgian imports of Soviet petroleum, lumber
and flax have averaged a little over a million dollars
a month, almost precisely as much as last year, while
Soviet imports of Belgian goods had fallen off from
a monthly average in 1930 of $300,000 to a monthly
average in 1931 of $100,000.
As in France the trade balance is now considerably
worse. As in France, Moscow had peremptorily cut
off orders from Belgium while Belgian desire for
cheap Soviet goods not competing with their own had
induced her traders to continue buying nearly as
much as they had before the license system.
As in France the Soviet export trade had suffered
very little, while that of America and the other great
producers of the Soviet staples, oil and lumber, con-
tinues to meet the pressure of Soviet competition
here. In both these products America competes di-
rectly with the Soviet Union for the Belgian mar-
ket, the United States having sold to Belgium in 1929
more than $15,000,000 of petroleum and petroleum
products, and $3,200,000 of timber.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 81
The Belgian Government is admittedly uncertain
what to do. It is sure of but one thing: that its license
system has failed to accomplish the ends for which it
was created. The opinion in governmental circles is
that nothing can be done effectively against Soviet
economic expansion by one state acting alone, that
only united action can avail, but that the possibility
of united action appears remote as a dream.
Only a few objective Belgians realize that the rea-
sons why Europe cannot unite against the Soviet
Union are contained in substance in Belgium itself,
where not even within its own boundaries can the
citizens agree to carry out loyally the policy of the
Government.
While members of militant anti-Bolshevik organi-
zations speak of Briand's Pan-Europe as the coming
cure for Communism, Belgian smugglers ship quan-
tities of unlicensed Soviet grain across the border,
others falsify bills of lading and forward freight car-
loads of unlicensed Soviet timber into France, still
others buy Soviet flax, oil, and timber in preference
to the more expensive products of non-Soviet coun-
tries, and Antwerp, anxious over her port fees, steve-
dore wages and her trade rivalry with Rotterdam,
presses hard for complete abolition of all checks on
Soviet trade.
Moscow worries over the "anti-Soviet front" in
Europe. One wonders why.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? CHAPTER IX
Antwerp:
Miles of brilliant flower beds, tulips, crocuses,
scarlet yellow, purple, lie between the tiny states of
Belgium and Holland. Spring makes their frontier
the pleasantest in Europe. But a great deal more
than flowers divides the Belgians from the Dutch
and to their many grounds for mutual national an-
tagonism has been added today the question of trade
with the Soviet Union.
Twenty-nine ships flying the red flag with the So-
viet hammer and sickle approached the port of Ant-
werp. Two million bushels of grain were in their
holds.
Strung out along the ocean track from the Black
to the North Seas the twenty-nine ships steamed for-
ward oblivious of world events, their twenty-nine cap-
tains busy only with the chart, course, Antwerp.
That forenoon there met in Brussels twelve men,
the Belgian Cabinet. They reflected on the "Red
Trade Menace," the falling price of wheat, on the
protests of their farmers, on the example set by
France. They framed a law, and thenceforth Soviet
grain required a license to enter Belgium.
That afternoon there met in Moscow nine men,
82
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 83
the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party.
That night the twenty-nine captains of the Soviet
grain fleet simultaneously by radio received one la-
conic message: "Pass Antwerp; dock Rotterdam.
"
Now, Antwerp, Belgium, is the fifth greatest port
in the world. Rotterdam, Dutch, is the fourth. Ant-
werp hates Rotterdam; Rotterdam hates Antwerp.
For Antwerp the menace is not Red; it is Rotterdam.
For Rotterdam the menace is not Moscow, it is
Antwerp.
It took the Antwerp Chamber of Commerce just
twenty-four hours to awake, but in twenty-four
hours a long and burning telegram was laid before
the Belgian Cabinet.
"For the sake of this, for the sake of that you
cripple our trade, you help our rival. The Soviet
Government has ordered its Antwerp cargoes to Rot-
terdam, has boycotted our port. We are even going to
lose the Soviet transit trade. Help! "
Not in these words, but in this sense, the Antwerp
Chamber of Commerce framed its protest.
Before the Belgian Cabinet loomed the threat to
Antwerp. It had been forgotten in the larger threat
to Belgium. Now it nearly dimmed the "Red Trade
Menace. " Embarrassed, unable incontinently to
withdraw a royal edict, the Cabinet compromised and
two days after its first decree, issued another that
the license law did not apply to transit grain. Too
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 84 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
late, for the Soviet Government announced its boy-
cott on Antwerp as port of transit would be main-
tained so long as the Belgian Government kept any
license system discriminating against the import into
Belgium of Soviet goods. The Antwerp Chamber of
Commerce has reckoned that it will lose in a year
on the transit of Soviet grain alone around 200,000
tons of traffic and from 800,000 to 1,000,000 tons of
imports.
The nine men in Moscow happily observed that
the twenty-nine ships were hospitably received in
Rotterdam; they observed the indignation in Ant-
werp, not against Moscow but against Brussels, and
summing up their observations they noted that the
Five-Year Export Plan was holding up nicely.
To the many reasons why the bourgeois world has
not been able to unite against Soviet economic ex-
pansion, to the reasons of European national rivalry,
mistrust and fear, to the reasons of individual busi-
nessmen's desire for profit from Soviet trade, the
Moscow observers were able to add as a curiosity the
special reasons of local patriotism operating in two
of the greatest ports of the world.
Rotterdam and Antwerp are favored in almost
equal degree by nature. Both have canal systems
reaching deep into the heart of Europe, and because of
these canal systems and their excellent harbor facil-
ities, the two cities, though belonging to the smallest
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 85
of continental nations, have developed into world
ports behind only New York, London, Hamburg and
Los Angeles. Their natural advantages being equal
the two ports can only compete through their hos-
pitality to trade.
The two ports covet each other's shipping to such
a degree that consideration of international scope re-
cede behind the foreground of their local ambitions.
Antwerp has made it hard for the Belgian Govern-
ment to maintain any sort of control system on So-
viet imports; Holland has made it virtually im-
possible.
The license system was established in late October.
Since that time sufficient has transpired to confirm
the impression that it has been unsuccessful. Bel-
gium's experience is worth attention as an example of
the difficulties that must be met by any bourgeois
nation that attempts individually to exert measures
of control over trade with the Soviet Union. For the
history of the Belgian license system on Soviet im-
ports is the history of the development of a new boot-
legging racket, the business of smuggling Soviet
wares under false certificates of origin.
It is not so picturesque a racket as the business of
liquor dealing in the United States, nor is it as profit-
able, but it is profitable enough. Its methods afford an
instructive view of a sort of individual disloyalty of
citizens to their state during its attempt at trade war
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 86 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
with the Soviet Union--a disloyalty that Marxists
contend is inseparable from the private capitalist
system.
Bootlegging Soviet grain into Belgium is made
easier by the fact that the canal systems of the two
countries interlace and frequently a Belgian canal
passes for a short distance through Dutch territory.
One spot where this occurs has been exploited heav-
ily by the grain smugglers. Down in the extreme
southern tip of Holland a little tongue of Dutch ter-
ritory runs in between Germany and Belgium.
Through this tongue of Holland runs the Belgian
"Zuid-Willems" canal. It runs from Liege to Ant-
werp and save for the few mileo on Dutch territory
is exclusively Belgian.
In the little strip of Dutch territory through
which the canal passes it touches the Dutch town of
Maastricht. Boats coming up the canal had been long
accustomed to carry wheat from Antwerp to Liege.
After the Belgian Government subjected Soviet
wheat to an import license, Belgian customs author-
ities remarked an extraordinary increase in the canal
traffic from Antwerp to Liege. Dutch importers of
the Soviet grain that had been refused admittance to
Belgium had sold quantities of it to Belgian brokers
and shipped it to Maastricht.
As the Belgian canal boats came through they
were loaded with the contraband wheat and provided
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 87
with false bills of lading attesting that the grain was
of American or Canadian origin, pursued their dig-
nified way on back into Belgium. In this way many
thousands of tons of Soviet grain have entered the
country. Other thousands, also on false bills of lad-
ing, have been brought on lighters from Rotterdam
into Antwerp. One Antwerp business man told me he
estimated that more Soviet grain had been brought
into the country in this illegal manner than before the
license system was passed.
"It's like trying to dam a river with a fish net;
like trying to sweep the tide back with a broom," he
exclaimed. "There is no use in any one country try-
ing to keep out the cheap products of the Soviet
Union. So long as any nation in the world takes
Soviet goods, those goods will eventually find their
way into all the other nations. How can you identify
Soviet wheat, oats, rye, barley; how can you spot
Soviet timber, coal or oil? It is not as though you
put up a tariff on all grain, timber, coal or oil. That
is easy to enforce. But when you put up restrictions
only against Soviet products, you have to be able to
identify the stuff as coming from the Soviet Union.
How can you do it? We have not been able to find
out. "
He shrugged his shoulders.
As a matter of fact the Belgian Government is now
trying the experiment of requiring importers of
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 88 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
grain from all countries to show samples as well as
produce certificates of origin, and it is hoped that ex-
pert grain men may be able to distinguish the Rus-
sian growths if they continue to be offered under false
bills of lading.
Worth noting is the fact that the smugglers of
Soviet wares are never the Soviet trade representa-
tives but always citizens of the country that has laid
down the restrictions, or of neighboring countries.
So for the last several months there has been a
heavy traffic in Soviet timber through Belgium into
France.
France, it may be remembered, last October in-
cluded timber on its list of Soviet products requiring
special import licenses. But French timber brokers,
operating through Rotterdam agents, buy their
quantities of Soviet timber and, shipping it through
Belgium, send it across the French frontier on false
bills of lading, alleging its origin in Finnland, Swe-
den, Poland, or some other non-Soviet timber pro-
ducing country. The Soviets would not permit this,
for they have refused to send any more transit
through Belgium. Nevertheless the Soviets profit
thereby.
All of the familiar aspects of capitalist inter-
necine contention are present in Belgium to par-
alyze the efforts of the few who believe that Soviet
economic expansion is not a threat merely to the in-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 89
dividual producers now feeling the pinch of Soviet
state capitalist competition, but a threat to the en-
tire structure of private capitalism in Europe. So
far, in Belgium as in France, the only capitalists who
react are those immediately hit, and there are al-
ways to be found other capitalists whose profits from
Soviet trade make them active in counteracting the
efforts of their injured countrymen to defend them-
selves.
Flax in Belgium provides a useful example. Rus-
sian flax dominates the world market and under the
Five-Year Plan the Soviet production has already
outstripped the pre-war output. In 1913 Russia
grew 330,000 tons of flax; in 1929, 4-27,700 tons,
out of a total world production of 689,100 tons.
About two-thirds of all the world's flax is grown in
Russia, and last year the Soviet Union exported 71,-
583 tons of it. After Russia come Poland with 67,500
tons annual production, Latvia with 34<,600 tons and
Belgium fourth with 27,400 tons. In Belgium the
flax industry is especially important, for the plant
is not only grown there, but is worked up into linen.
But the Belgian flax industry is sharply divided
between the growers and the weavers. The growers
suffer under Russian competition, the weavers profit
by it. When the Government was considering its im-
port license plan for Soviet products, the flax grow-
ers asked that Russian flax be put on the list. The
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 90 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
weavers demanded that it be kept off the list. It was
kept off, and today even under the bad relations ex-
isting between Belgium and the Soviet Union, exports
of flax into Belgium have increased enormously. In
the first two months this year they amounted to
2,746 tons against 836 tons in the same period the
year before, or an increase of more than 300 per cent.
The Flemish fight the Walloons, they both fight
the Dutch; Belgian industry fights Belgian agricul-
ture while Moscow marks triumphant red the North
Sea sector of the "Anti-Soviet Front. "
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? CHAPTER X
Amsterdam:
Twenty-nine ships carrying Soviet cargoes passed
Antwerp in a huff last October when the Belgian
Government decreed a license law for Soviet imports.
The twenty-nine ships went to Rotterdam instead.
Today the twenty-nine ships have been followed by
307 more.
With wide outstretched arms Holland eagerly has
received the Soviet trade that Belgium denied its
doors and the Netherlands are doing an import busi-
ness from the Soviet Union that for volume and va-
riety is nothing short of phenomenal, and in rela-
tionship to American trade with Holland is most
instructive.
Three hundred and seven steamships carrying
Soviet cargoes have discharged in Holland during
the seven months up to May 1, 1931. Three hundred
and seven merchant vessels can carry a great deal
of goods. So much, in fact, that not only has the
Dutch import from the Soviet Union risen by far
above that of the same period in the previous year,
but it has exceeded the combined Belgian and Dutch
imports from the Soviet Union for the same period
91
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 92 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
in the previous year. If any evidence were needed
that Soviet exports are on the sharp upgrade, it is
offered by an examination of the contents of this Red
armada.
Furthermore, although it is impossible to establish
a causal connection between the decline in American
exports to Holland and the increase in Soviet ex-
ports to Holland, the statistical record of this move-
ment nevertheless is more interesting than statistics
are wont to be.
In blunt terms, the United States lost $5,000,000
worth of exports to Holland and the Soviet Union
gained precisely $5,000,000 worth of exports to
Holland in the three months, January to March,
1931, as compared with the same period in 1930.
American exports to Holland in the first three months
of 1931 were just one-half as much as they were in
the first three months of 1929, and Soviet exports to
Holland in the first three months of 1931 were just
nine times more than in the first three months of
1929.
Wheat, corn, lumber and petroleum are the prin-
cipal products in which the United States competes
with the Soviet Union for the Dutch market.
The movement of trade thus indicated is so ex-
traordinarily violent that it had better be fully
documented. The official figures are:
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 93
(Last three ciphers omitted)
--In First Three Months of--
1929 1930 1931
Total Dutch imports $250,400 $259,200 $197,600
From U. S 32,400 21,600 16,409
From Soviet Union. . . 800 2,644 7,600
American exports to Holland sank from $32,400,-
000 in the first quarter of 1929 to $16,400,000 in
1931, while Soviet exports to Holland rose from
$800,000 to $7,600,000. America's share of total
Dutch imports sank from 13 per cent in 1929, March
quarter, to 8. 45 per cent in the corresponding quar-
ter this year, while the Soviet Union's share in all
Netherlands imports rose from . 37 per cent in 1929
to nearly 4 per cent in 1931.
If one has no taste for statistics but is skeptical
still of the ability of the Soviet Union to export any
considerable quantities of the copious assortment of
goods observed as for sale in the Soviet pavilion of
the Milan Fair, there could be no more easy and en-
lightening reading than the ships' manifests of the
Soviet armada.
Here on the docks of capacious Dutch ports may
be seen in bulk the items displayed to the public in
the samples in Milan. In bales, blocks, sacks, cases,
tons, standards, barrels, from Archangel, Leningrad,
?
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 94 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
Kherson, Mariupol, Murmansk, Nicolaieff, Novoros-
sik, Odessa, Poti, Sevastopol, Theodosia and Vladi-
vostock, "a great variety of commodities," as the
official report says, arrived. They came in ships flying
flags of virtually every maritime nation, British and
Italian companies leading and Soviet ships of
"Sovtorgflot" carrying perhaps 40 per cent of the
cargoes. To be quite exact about it, there arrived
goods in more than 200 different categories from
Russia, most of them either not mentioned at all in
the ships' manifests of 1929 and 1930 or appearing
in small volume. The list is much too long to repro-
duce. Alphabetically, it ranges from four cases of
"advertising-printed matter," to fifteen barrels of
"zinc ash. "
Grain men will be interested to observe that in
these first three months of 1931 there entered Hol-
land from the Soviet Union 85,222 tons of barley,
1,920 tons of buckwheat, 18,741 of corn, 58,970 of
oats, 23,799 of rye and 46,117 of wheat.
Rotterdam quotations on wheat as of May 16,
1931 showed Russian wheat selling at only a slight
advantage in price under wheat of similar quality
from other countries, a difference in fact of only five
Dutch cents per hundred weight. Russian rye was
quoted the same day at exactly the same price as rye
from other countries. This bears out the observation
already made that in the grain market the Soviet
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 71
Soviet relations is suggested among others by Gaston
Bergery, secretary of the so-called Russo-French
Parliamentary Group in the Chamber, a loose organi-
zation composed of deputies from various parties who
believe that the Russian problem is perhaps the most
important one facing Europe today, but who are not
at all unanimous in their views as to its solution.
This proposal, apparently simple but in reality full
of thorns, is to resume the Franco-Soviet negotia-
tions over the debt question where they were left off
five years ago.
Chief objection to this proposal is the fact that
the Soviet Government has grown not less, but more
hard in its attitude since 1926 when the negotiations
were broken off upon Moscow's insistence that before
it pay a cent on the Czarist bonds, the Soviet Union
would have to have a considerable money credit. The
debt at that time was reckoned at 6,738,000,000 gold
francs, $1,347,000,000. The average Frenchman has
not yet entirely abandoned hope of getting something
back on this huge sum and the bonds are occasion-
ally traded in at a fraction of 1 per cent to 4 or 5
per cent on days when assassinations in the Kremlin
are particularly numerous.
But another prime difficulty in the way of solu-
tion of the debt question is the lack of a Soviet
representative here whom the French can under-
stand and who understands the French. In this re-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 72 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
spect the Trotzky-Stalin controversy in the Russian
Communist Party is still making its effects felt, for
Christian RakovsLy, stanch friend of Trotzky and
one of the few who have held out without capitula-
tion for four years in the exile to which he was sent
by Stalin, was perhaps the one Soviet representative
who could match French diplomacy.
But it is the French this time who are anxious to
remedy the stagnation in Franco-Russian relations.
The fourth and last proposal to this end, most sweep-
ing of all, is made by Senator Anatole de Monzie.
He, one of the original proponents of French recog-
nition of the Soviet Union, and in this sense com-
parable to our own Senator Borah, is in favor of
negotiating a trade agreement with the Soviet Union
and postponing consideration of the debt question
to a "more convenient time. "
It is difficult to forecast what will be the solution
finally evolved. Perhaps it will be one different from
any of those listed, but these are all that are being
discussed at present. Important for the outside world
is the observation that of all the solutions suggested
the outer limit of aggressiveness is represented by the
Caillaux-Berenger project for control, but not ces-
sation of trade with the Soviet Union. This is from
the country that suffered most heavily from the
Bolshevik revolution. For France that revolution
meant not only the loss of the huge amount of money
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 73
in Czarist bonds distributed almost literally among
every French family. It meant prolongation of the
war with Germany and might have meant its loss had
not America intervened. It meant after the war that
Germany, friendly to the Soviet Union for its own
reasons, could be much more independent than if she
had been bordered by Czarist Russia. Nevertheless
France recognized the Soviet Union in October,
1924, nine months after the British Labor Govern-
ment showed the way.
Today France views with distrust and a vague
growing uneasiness, the climb to power of the Soviet
Union, friend from expedience, but nevertheless
friend of Germany and Italy. French courts make
trouble for the Soviet trade representatives, her
press fumes at the disappearance of a General Kutie-
poff, the flight of a Bolshevik diplomat from the
"Claws of the Cheka. " But the French business man
is making trouble for the French Foreign Office, and
through the rattle of persistent popular agitation
against the Soviet Union penetrates to governmental
chambers only the clear cold voice of business: "We
want our Soviet orders back. "
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? CHAPTER VIII
Brussels:
It was in Antwerp. I asked a newspaper vendor:
"Ou se trouve-t-il le consul Am? ricain? "
No answer. A sullen look.
"Wo ist der amerikanische Konsul? "
Instantly came the reply, shot back in Flemish so
like German it was easy to understand.
"Don't you speak French? " I asked the Antwerp
citizen.
"Oh, yes," he replied, "but we prefer German if
we have to speak a foreign tongue. "
French a foreign tongue in Belgium! German pre-
ferred in the land that suffered the yoke of German
military rule the whole long length of the war!
But Antwerp is Flemish, Brussels Walloon, and
their differences, so easily forgotten by the outside
world, are playing a curious role today in the rela-
tion of Belgium to the Soviet Union. The Walloon-
Flemish, Brussels-Antwerp conflict, interminable and
never settled, has helped make it impossible for Bel-
gium to achieve any satisfactory results in its efforts
to protect itself against Soviet imports, has helped
make this sector of the "anti-Soviet front" illusory.
In this country, in miniature, for convenient in-
spection, as on a small-scale model of a Continental
74
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 75
map, may be observed in classic form the nationalis-
tic, local patriotic, commercial reasons why Europe,
though partly convinced that the economic expan-
sion of the Soviet Union means trouble, and wholly if
vaguely convinced that it is undesirable, has done
nothing effective to check that expansion.
Seldom can one find conflicting interests in such
profusion as exist here, and each has its bearing on
Belgo-Soviet relations. The traditional conflicts ex-
istent everywhere are here between industry and ag-
riculture; between producer and consumer; between
those who want to buy Soviet goods because they
are cheaper, and those who want to keep Soviet
goods out because they compete with their own prod-
ucts; between those industrials who long for Soviet
orders and those who fear Soviet industrial competi-
tion. And to these conflicts are added the uniquely
Belgian conflict between the Walloons and the Flem-
ish. Looming over all is the Belgian national rivalry
with the old antagonist, Holland.
The Walloon-Flemish controversy must surprise
any observer coming in from the outside with the
war-time American picture in his mind of the hotly
patriotic nation of Belgians, united as a monolith
under the aegis of Albert.
To learn that radicals in the Flemish party agi-
tate for separation from Belgium, that moderates in
the same party, in very considerable numbers demand
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 76 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
a revision of the constitution and organization of a
sort of dual, federal state, and that the police fre-
quently have to use their clubs to quell the treason-
able public demonstrations of the secessionists, is to
realize that the Walloon-Flemish conflict has more
serious aspects than the mere fact that it requires
knowledge of two languages to get a place in the pub-
lic service.
This is an aspect of Belgium that has more sig-
nificance as an illustration of one of Europe's most
acute post-war ailments than for its importance in
itself. And particularly in any study of the relation-
ship of Europe to the Soviet Union is it desirable
correctly to estimate the part played by the astonish-
ing growth since the war of the spirit of nationalism,
of sectional patriotism. Upon these centrifugal
forces the Soviet Union is depending in large part
for the undisturbed execution of its ambition to erect
an economically independent, militarily potent Com-
munist state, in a world of capitalist enemies too
busy hating each other to band against a common foe.
Hardly a nation in Europe is free from the dis-
integrating element of national minorities, bent on
having their independence even if they have to tear
up the Continent into scraps of States. Poland has its
Ukrainians, its Germans and its Jews; Germany has
its Poles; Czecho-Slovakia has its Slovaks; Jugo-
slavia its Croats; Rumania its Hungarians; Italy its
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 77
Austrians; France its Germans, and the Spanish rev-
olution has shown what the Basques and the Cata-
lonians thought of Spain.
These are by no means all. There are many more
groups of peoples dissatisfied and bitter against
their Governments. It may be remarked that of the
examples named, all except the Spanish dissenters
blame their troubles on the Versailles peace treaty
that rearranged Europe's boundaries with awkward
hand. For that very reason it was interesting to find
in Belgium a "national minority" problem that had
nothing to do with the Versailles peace treaty.
The Belgians have had 100 years since the founda-
tion of their present nation in 1830 in which to
reconcile the differences between the Flemish inhabit-
ants of the coast and the Walloon inhabitants of the
interior. The conflict still exists; the Flemish lan-
guage was given equal official rights with the French
in 1898; in 1923 the formerly French speaking uni-
versity at Ghent was converted to the Flemish tongue,
and today in Antwerp it is easier to get a civil an-
swer from a man on the street by speaking German
than by speaking French.
The Flemish, proud masters of the Port of Ant-
werp, claim that the Walloons pre-empt the plums
of government. The Walloons propose to continue the
pre-empting. Thus when Brussels takes a step toward
checking Soviet imports, Antwerp is urged by no
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 78 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
exaggerated feelings of friendliness toward the capi-
tal to refrain from pressing its local claims to con-
sideration. Brussels is forced to compromise; Mos-
cow profits.
How Antwerp actually behaved when Brussels tried
to curb Soviet imports, and the role played by Rot-
terdam, and the dramatic circumstances of the rift in
Belgo-Soviet trade will be discussed in another chap-
ter. Here it is necessary to record the formal course
of events.
Belgium has no diplomatic relations with the So-
viet Union. This is one of the few important in-
stances in which Brussels has failed to follow the lead
of Paris. Belgium industrial investments in Czarist
Russia are estimated to have been worth around
$800,000,000. This was all lost when the Soviet
Government nationalized property and not a penny
has been recovered.
Feeling over this loss is still strong and the pre-
dominance in politics here of the clerical Catholic ele-
ment has made the assumption of diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union an academic question. So far
Belgo-Soviet diplomatic relations consist of an agree-
ment for the return of citizens, signed April 20,1920.
Despite the lack of diplomatic relations, Belgium
and the Soviet Union by last year had developed a
trade that, though small in itself, made Belgium
seventh largest taker of Soviet goods. In 1930 Bel-
gium imported Soviet grain, flax, oil, lumber and a
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 79
few other products to the value of $12,800,000. She
exported to the Soviet Union, however, only $3,750,-
000 worth of machines, tools and boilers.
The Belgo-Russian balance of trade was distinctly
unfavorable to Belgium but not large enough in itself,
out of a total Belgian foreign trade of $1,700,000,-
000, to worry about so long as prosperity was abroad
in the land. Last autumn the flood of Soviet grain
disturbed Belgian farmers, the general economic de-
pression made even the small unfavorable trade bal-
ance with Russia irritating and the action of the
French in establishing their license system for Soviet
imports convinced Belgium she should do the same.
The license system, it was hoped, would throttle Rus-
sian "dumping" and improve the trade balance.
France decreed its license system October 4, 1930.
Belgium followed on October 26. Less extensive even
than the French, the Belgian list of Soviet products
requiring a license for import included only cereals
and cereal products, wine, glue and oleic and stearic
acid. The results of the French experiment have been
described. The Belgian findings have been if any-
thing even more discouraging.
Although Soviet grain has ceased to come into the
country legally, it is conceded by the Government
that it comes in in large quantities illegally, smuggled
by Belgian, Dutch and French traders. Petroleum
and timber were not put on the license list because
they are products not produced in Belgium, and, as
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 80 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
in France, the Government had no interest in pro-
tecting American, Canadian or Scandinavian oil and
timber interests. Flax was not put on the list for
reasons given later.
Leaving grain entirely out of account, official Bel-
gium statistics show that in the first two months of
this year, after two months of operation of the license
system, Belgian imports of Soviet petroleum, lumber
and flax have averaged a little over a million dollars
a month, almost precisely as much as last year, while
Soviet imports of Belgian goods had fallen off from
a monthly average in 1930 of $300,000 to a monthly
average in 1931 of $100,000.
As in France the trade balance is now considerably
worse. As in France, Moscow had peremptorily cut
off orders from Belgium while Belgian desire for
cheap Soviet goods not competing with their own had
induced her traders to continue buying nearly as
much as they had before the license system.
As in France the Soviet export trade had suffered
very little, while that of America and the other great
producers of the Soviet staples, oil and lumber, con-
tinues to meet the pressure of Soviet competition
here. In both these products America competes di-
rectly with the Soviet Union for the Belgian mar-
ket, the United States having sold to Belgium in 1929
more than $15,000,000 of petroleum and petroleum
products, and $3,200,000 of timber.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 81
The Belgian Government is admittedly uncertain
what to do. It is sure of but one thing: that its license
system has failed to accomplish the ends for which it
was created. The opinion in governmental circles is
that nothing can be done effectively against Soviet
economic expansion by one state acting alone, that
only united action can avail, but that the possibility
of united action appears remote as a dream.
Only a few objective Belgians realize that the rea-
sons why Europe cannot unite against the Soviet
Union are contained in substance in Belgium itself,
where not even within its own boundaries can the
citizens agree to carry out loyally the policy of the
Government.
While members of militant anti-Bolshevik organi-
zations speak of Briand's Pan-Europe as the coming
cure for Communism, Belgian smugglers ship quan-
tities of unlicensed Soviet grain across the border,
others falsify bills of lading and forward freight car-
loads of unlicensed Soviet timber into France, still
others buy Soviet flax, oil, and timber in preference
to the more expensive products of non-Soviet coun-
tries, and Antwerp, anxious over her port fees, steve-
dore wages and her trade rivalry with Rotterdam,
presses hard for complete abolition of all checks on
Soviet trade.
Moscow worries over the "anti-Soviet front" in
Europe. One wonders why.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? CHAPTER IX
Antwerp:
Miles of brilliant flower beds, tulips, crocuses,
scarlet yellow, purple, lie between the tiny states of
Belgium and Holland. Spring makes their frontier
the pleasantest in Europe. But a great deal more
than flowers divides the Belgians from the Dutch
and to their many grounds for mutual national an-
tagonism has been added today the question of trade
with the Soviet Union.
Twenty-nine ships flying the red flag with the So-
viet hammer and sickle approached the port of Ant-
werp. Two million bushels of grain were in their
holds.
Strung out along the ocean track from the Black
to the North Seas the twenty-nine ships steamed for-
ward oblivious of world events, their twenty-nine cap-
tains busy only with the chart, course, Antwerp.
That forenoon there met in Brussels twelve men,
the Belgian Cabinet. They reflected on the "Red
Trade Menace," the falling price of wheat, on the
protests of their farmers, on the example set by
France. They framed a law, and thenceforth Soviet
grain required a license to enter Belgium.
That afternoon there met in Moscow nine men,
82
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 83
the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party.
That night the twenty-nine captains of the Soviet
grain fleet simultaneously by radio received one la-
conic message: "Pass Antwerp; dock Rotterdam.
"
Now, Antwerp, Belgium, is the fifth greatest port
in the world. Rotterdam, Dutch, is the fourth. Ant-
werp hates Rotterdam; Rotterdam hates Antwerp.
For Antwerp the menace is not Red; it is Rotterdam.
For Rotterdam the menace is not Moscow, it is
Antwerp.
It took the Antwerp Chamber of Commerce just
twenty-four hours to awake, but in twenty-four
hours a long and burning telegram was laid before
the Belgian Cabinet.
"For the sake of this, for the sake of that you
cripple our trade, you help our rival. The Soviet
Government has ordered its Antwerp cargoes to Rot-
terdam, has boycotted our port. We are even going to
lose the Soviet transit trade. Help! "
Not in these words, but in this sense, the Antwerp
Chamber of Commerce framed its protest.
Before the Belgian Cabinet loomed the threat to
Antwerp. It had been forgotten in the larger threat
to Belgium. Now it nearly dimmed the "Red Trade
Menace. " Embarrassed, unable incontinently to
withdraw a royal edict, the Cabinet compromised and
two days after its first decree, issued another that
the license law did not apply to transit grain. Too
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 84 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
late, for the Soviet Government announced its boy-
cott on Antwerp as port of transit would be main-
tained so long as the Belgian Government kept any
license system discriminating against the import into
Belgium of Soviet goods. The Antwerp Chamber of
Commerce has reckoned that it will lose in a year
on the transit of Soviet grain alone around 200,000
tons of traffic and from 800,000 to 1,000,000 tons of
imports.
The nine men in Moscow happily observed that
the twenty-nine ships were hospitably received in
Rotterdam; they observed the indignation in Ant-
werp, not against Moscow but against Brussels, and
summing up their observations they noted that the
Five-Year Export Plan was holding up nicely.
To the many reasons why the bourgeois world has
not been able to unite against Soviet economic ex-
pansion, to the reasons of European national rivalry,
mistrust and fear, to the reasons of individual busi-
nessmen's desire for profit from Soviet trade, the
Moscow observers were able to add as a curiosity the
special reasons of local patriotism operating in two
of the greatest ports of the world.
Rotterdam and Antwerp are favored in almost
equal degree by nature. Both have canal systems
reaching deep into the heart of Europe, and because of
these canal systems and their excellent harbor facil-
ities, the two cities, though belonging to the smallest
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 85
of continental nations, have developed into world
ports behind only New York, London, Hamburg and
Los Angeles. Their natural advantages being equal
the two ports can only compete through their hos-
pitality to trade.
The two ports covet each other's shipping to such
a degree that consideration of international scope re-
cede behind the foreground of their local ambitions.
Antwerp has made it hard for the Belgian Govern-
ment to maintain any sort of control system on So-
viet imports; Holland has made it virtually im-
possible.
The license system was established in late October.
Since that time sufficient has transpired to confirm
the impression that it has been unsuccessful. Bel-
gium's experience is worth attention as an example of
the difficulties that must be met by any bourgeois
nation that attempts individually to exert measures
of control over trade with the Soviet Union. For the
history of the Belgian license system on Soviet im-
ports is the history of the development of a new boot-
legging racket, the business of smuggling Soviet
wares under false certificates of origin.
It is not so picturesque a racket as the business of
liquor dealing in the United States, nor is it as profit-
able, but it is profitable enough. Its methods afford an
instructive view of a sort of individual disloyalty of
citizens to their state during its attempt at trade war
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 86 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
with the Soviet Union--a disloyalty that Marxists
contend is inseparable from the private capitalist
system.
Bootlegging Soviet grain into Belgium is made
easier by the fact that the canal systems of the two
countries interlace and frequently a Belgian canal
passes for a short distance through Dutch territory.
One spot where this occurs has been exploited heav-
ily by the grain smugglers. Down in the extreme
southern tip of Holland a little tongue of Dutch ter-
ritory runs in between Germany and Belgium.
Through this tongue of Holland runs the Belgian
"Zuid-Willems" canal. It runs from Liege to Ant-
werp and save for the few mileo on Dutch territory
is exclusively Belgian.
In the little strip of Dutch territory through
which the canal passes it touches the Dutch town of
Maastricht. Boats coming up the canal had been long
accustomed to carry wheat from Antwerp to Liege.
After the Belgian Government subjected Soviet
wheat to an import license, Belgian customs author-
ities remarked an extraordinary increase in the canal
traffic from Antwerp to Liege. Dutch importers of
the Soviet grain that had been refused admittance to
Belgium had sold quantities of it to Belgian brokers
and shipped it to Maastricht.
As the Belgian canal boats came through they
were loaded with the contraband wheat and provided
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 87
with false bills of lading attesting that the grain was
of American or Canadian origin, pursued their dig-
nified way on back into Belgium. In this way many
thousands of tons of Soviet grain have entered the
country. Other thousands, also on false bills of lad-
ing, have been brought on lighters from Rotterdam
into Antwerp. One Antwerp business man told me he
estimated that more Soviet grain had been brought
into the country in this illegal manner than before the
license system was passed.
"It's like trying to dam a river with a fish net;
like trying to sweep the tide back with a broom," he
exclaimed. "There is no use in any one country try-
ing to keep out the cheap products of the Soviet
Union. So long as any nation in the world takes
Soviet goods, those goods will eventually find their
way into all the other nations. How can you identify
Soviet wheat, oats, rye, barley; how can you spot
Soviet timber, coal or oil? It is not as though you
put up a tariff on all grain, timber, coal or oil. That
is easy to enforce. But when you put up restrictions
only against Soviet products, you have to be able to
identify the stuff as coming from the Soviet Union.
How can you do it? We have not been able to find
out. "
He shrugged his shoulders.
As a matter of fact the Belgian Government is now
trying the experiment of requiring importers of
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 88 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
grain from all countries to show samples as well as
produce certificates of origin, and it is hoped that ex-
pert grain men may be able to distinguish the Rus-
sian growths if they continue to be offered under false
bills of lading.
Worth noting is the fact that the smugglers of
Soviet wares are never the Soviet trade representa-
tives but always citizens of the country that has laid
down the restrictions, or of neighboring countries.
So for the last several months there has been a
heavy traffic in Soviet timber through Belgium into
France.
France, it may be remembered, last October in-
cluded timber on its list of Soviet products requiring
special import licenses. But French timber brokers,
operating through Rotterdam agents, buy their
quantities of Soviet timber and, shipping it through
Belgium, send it across the French frontier on false
bills of lading, alleging its origin in Finnland, Swe-
den, Poland, or some other non-Soviet timber pro-
ducing country. The Soviets would not permit this,
for they have refused to send any more transit
through Belgium. Nevertheless the Soviets profit
thereby.
All of the familiar aspects of capitalist inter-
necine contention are present in Belgium to par-
alyze the efforts of the few who believe that Soviet
economic expansion is not a threat merely to the in-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 89
dividual producers now feeling the pinch of Soviet
state capitalist competition, but a threat to the en-
tire structure of private capitalism in Europe. So
far, in Belgium as in France, the only capitalists who
react are those immediately hit, and there are al-
ways to be found other capitalists whose profits from
Soviet trade make them active in counteracting the
efforts of their injured countrymen to defend them-
selves.
Flax in Belgium provides a useful example. Rus-
sian flax dominates the world market and under the
Five-Year Plan the Soviet production has already
outstripped the pre-war output. In 1913 Russia
grew 330,000 tons of flax; in 1929, 4-27,700 tons,
out of a total world production of 689,100 tons.
About two-thirds of all the world's flax is grown in
Russia, and last year the Soviet Union exported 71,-
583 tons of it. After Russia come Poland with 67,500
tons annual production, Latvia with 34<,600 tons and
Belgium fourth with 27,400 tons. In Belgium the
flax industry is especially important, for the plant
is not only grown there, but is worked up into linen.
But the Belgian flax industry is sharply divided
between the growers and the weavers. The growers
suffer under Russian competition, the weavers profit
by it. When the Government was considering its im-
port license plan for Soviet products, the flax grow-
ers asked that Russian flax be put on the list. The
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 90 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
weavers demanded that it be kept off the list. It was
kept off, and today even under the bad relations ex-
isting between Belgium and the Soviet Union, exports
of flax into Belgium have increased enormously. In
the first two months this year they amounted to
2,746 tons against 836 tons in the same period the
year before, or an increase of more than 300 per cent.
The Flemish fight the Walloons, they both fight
the Dutch; Belgian industry fights Belgian agricul-
ture while Moscow marks triumphant red the North
Sea sector of the "Anti-Soviet Front. "
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? CHAPTER X
Amsterdam:
Twenty-nine ships carrying Soviet cargoes passed
Antwerp in a huff last October when the Belgian
Government decreed a license law for Soviet imports.
The twenty-nine ships went to Rotterdam instead.
Today the twenty-nine ships have been followed by
307 more.
With wide outstretched arms Holland eagerly has
received the Soviet trade that Belgium denied its
doors and the Netherlands are doing an import busi-
ness from the Soviet Union that for volume and va-
riety is nothing short of phenomenal, and in rela-
tionship to American trade with Holland is most
instructive.
Three hundred and seven steamships carrying
Soviet cargoes have discharged in Holland during
the seven months up to May 1, 1931. Three hundred
and seven merchant vessels can carry a great deal
of goods. So much, in fact, that not only has the
Dutch import from the Soviet Union risen by far
above that of the same period in the previous year,
but it has exceeded the combined Belgian and Dutch
imports from the Soviet Union for the same period
91
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 92 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
in the previous year. If any evidence were needed
that Soviet exports are on the sharp upgrade, it is
offered by an examination of the contents of this Red
armada.
Furthermore, although it is impossible to establish
a causal connection between the decline in American
exports to Holland and the increase in Soviet ex-
ports to Holland, the statistical record of this move-
ment nevertheless is more interesting than statistics
are wont to be.
In blunt terms, the United States lost $5,000,000
worth of exports to Holland and the Soviet Union
gained precisely $5,000,000 worth of exports to
Holland in the three months, January to March,
1931, as compared with the same period in 1930.
American exports to Holland in the first three months
of 1931 were just one-half as much as they were in
the first three months of 1929, and Soviet exports to
Holland in the first three months of 1931 were just
nine times more than in the first three months of
1929.
Wheat, corn, lumber and petroleum are the prin-
cipal products in which the United States competes
with the Soviet Union for the Dutch market.
The movement of trade thus indicated is so ex-
traordinarily violent that it had better be fully
documented. The official figures are:
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE 93
(Last three ciphers omitted)
--In First Three Months of--
1929 1930 1931
Total Dutch imports $250,400 $259,200 $197,600
From U. S 32,400 21,600 16,409
From Soviet Union. . . 800 2,644 7,600
American exports to Holland sank from $32,400,-
000 in the first quarter of 1929 to $16,400,000 in
1931, while Soviet exports to Holland rose from
$800,000 to $7,600,000. America's share of total
Dutch imports sank from 13 per cent in 1929, March
quarter, to 8. 45 per cent in the corresponding quar-
ter this year, while the Soviet Union's share in all
Netherlands imports rose from . 37 per cent in 1929
to nearly 4 per cent in 1931.
If one has no taste for statistics but is skeptical
still of the ability of the Soviet Union to export any
considerable quantities of the copious assortment of
goods observed as for sale in the Soviet pavilion of
the Milan Fair, there could be no more easy and en-
lightening reading than the ships' manifests of the
Soviet armada.
Here on the docks of capacious Dutch ports may
be seen in bulk the items displayed to the public in
the samples in Milan. In bales, blocks, sacks, cases,
tons, standards, barrels, from Archangel, Leningrad,
?
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-google
? 94 FIGHTING THE RED TRADE MENACE
Kherson, Mariupol, Murmansk, Nicolaieff, Novoros-
sik, Odessa, Poti, Sevastopol, Theodosia and Vladi-
vostock, "a great variety of commodities," as the
official report says, arrived. They came in ships flying
flags of virtually every maritime nation, British and
Italian companies leading and Soviet ships of
"Sovtorgflot" carrying perhaps 40 per cent of the
cargoes. To be quite exact about it, there arrived
goods in more than 200 different categories from
Russia, most of them either not mentioned at all in
the ships' manifests of 1929 and 1930 or appearing
in small volume. The list is much too long to repro-
duce. Alphabetically, it ranges from four cases of
"advertising-printed matter," to fifteen barrels of
"zinc ash. "
Grain men will be interested to observe that in
these first three months of 1931 there entered Hol-
land from the Soviet Union 85,222 tons of barley,
1,920 tons of buckwheat, 18,741 of corn, 58,970 of
oats, 23,799 of rye and 46,117 of wheat.
Rotterdam quotations on wheat as of May 16,
1931 showed Russian wheat selling at only a slight
advantage in price under wheat of similar quality
from other countries, a difference in fact of only five
Dutch cents per hundred weight. Russian rye was
quoted the same day at exactly the same price as rye
from other countries. This bears out the observation
already made that in the grain market the Soviet
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-06-10 17:25 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/uc1. b3292264 Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.
