information on buddhism became ready at hand only after the exploration of the
transhimalayan
regions of nepal and tibet in the second half of the 19th century.
Hegels Philosophy of the Historical Religions
it is devoid of negativity, at least in a dialectical sense, because its substance has not been objectified.
the divine substance is not negated, made abstractly conscious in a for-itself.
the divine rests fully in-itself.
As one critic of hegel phrased it in a quasi- mystical wordplay: "Are swallower and swallowee the same.
Are they different?
this indeterminacy is structural, not epiphenomenal.
subject, object and abject are smeared across one another unrecognizably.
"1 for hegel awareness of human limitedness is a necessary step to an identi- fication, a union and uniting, with divine power and a precondition for
1 timothy morton, 'romanticism and buddhism. hegel on buddhism', Praxis series 20, par. 14. see: http://www. rc. umd. edu/praxis/buddhism/morton/morton.
? 52 henk oosterling
subjectivity. in buddhism this essential rupture with immediacy has not taken place.
this 'thinking posture' bears witness to an incomprehensible intimacy that not so much represents meditation--it is not a symbol--as it con- cretely embodies immediacy. the image triggers all sorts of associations that, psycho-analytically, can divert, pervert and subvert the hegelian texture in different directions. hegel positions all world religions within a hierarchy of collective consciousness that realize their essence in Chris- tianity as the consummate religion with the father, the son and the holy ghost as the exemplary triad. retrospectively this power play is criticized as an ideological construct that favors Western metaphysics and politi- cally legitimizes Western expansionism. hegel's negative evaluation of buddhism's nirvana can even be understood as an articulation of the Western 'horor vacui', the fear for emptiness. i will however concentrate on other aspects in hegel's texture. i draw only one thread out of the hegelian tapestry: the evaluation of buddhist emptiness as the void and nothingness. in spite of the fact that hegel's positioning of buddhism is in itself not nihilistic, his identification of buddhism as a religion that is focused on nothingness has determined the modern debate on nihilism that even persists in the 21st century.
the dialectician slavoj Z? iz? ek still qualifies nirvana as a 'primordial void'. he frequently cites from brian victoria's Zen at War to illustrate the fascist, nihilistic mentality of Zen followers and criticizes the nai? ve hippy mentality of Western buddhism as a perfect legitimization for late capitalism. its adherers are accused of refusing to take a stand against capitalist consumerism. their refusal of revolutionary commitment to truthful political action, due to their quietism, is contrasted by Z? iz? ek in a quasi-ironical hegelian gesture with the revolutionary activist mentality of the man that institutionalized the Christian Church: st. Paul. 2 but is Z? iz? ek's disqualification of buddhism as one of the modes of postmodern nihilism the only option?
2 see: henk oosterling, 'radikale mediokrita? t oder revolutiona? re Akte? U? ber funda- mentales inter-esse', in: e. vogt, h. J. silverman (hrgs. ), U? ber Z? iz? ek. turia+Kant, vienna 2004, pp. 42-62; 'from russia with love: Avoiding the subject. Why is Z? iz? ek's st Paul a leninist? ' in International Journal in Philosophy and Theology, 2009, pp. 236-253.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 53
Within the dialectical tradition the accusation of nihilism is very per- sistent. 3 When we follow the trace back to the days of hegel, the problem already starts with the very image that startled him: the toe sucking bud- dha. the choice of this image is already a mistake. hegel found this weird picture of what he thought was the buddha in one of the books he con- sulted frequently for his analysis of buddhism: friedrich Creutzer's Sym- bolik und Mythologie der alten Vo? lker (leipzig and darmstadt, 1819). this plate however does not represent the buddha, it refers to a hindu subject: brahma? nara? yana in the context of one of the canonical texts, the Laws of Manu. hegel was even mistaken--in retrospect--as to the specific nature of buddhism, because he relied mainly on sources that focused on the life of the tibetan lamas. the difference between buddhism and lamaism, he states in the lectures of 1824, "is only superficial". (l2 24, 307/211)
these 'mistakes' are exemplary for hegel's research on what enabled him indirectly to position himself in the controversy on pantheism as atheism. f. h. Jacobi thematized a proto-nihilist atheism in a book on spi- noza in 1785. together with schelling and ho? lderlin hegel read this book as a student and discussed the hen kai pan (one and all) principle, but the controversy haunted his thoughts till his very last days. his treatment of this controversy foreshadowed the nihilism debate that was installed as a philosophical topic by nietzsche and still resonates in Z? iz? ek's disquali- fications of buddhism in the Western hemisphere as 'new Age spiritual- ity' and 'Pop buddhism'. Z? iz? ek lifts hegel's parti pris over the turn of the century into the first decade of the 21st century.
is it possible to revalue hegel's analysis of buddhism on a more affirma- tive basis? Can the tight chain that connects nirvana, void and nothing- ness be broken? in order to throw some light on a different understanding of nothingness--and by implication to redirect the 'nihil' in nihilism-- i will firstly clarify how hegel applied his sources on buddhism for the positioning of this determinate phase of religious consciousness in his systematic philosophy (? 2) and why he kept shifting its position in the different series of lectures. (? 3) then i will turn the tables by focusing on buddhism's interpretation of hegel's philosophy. i will briefly describe the way Kyoto school based buddhist thinkers try to reconcile Zen bud- dhism with hegelian philosophy (? 4) and how they interpret nirvana
3 Adorno's remarks on nihilism in Negative Dialectics (1973, orig. 1966) scorn the possi- bility of 'believing in nothing' and qualify 'the image of nirvana' positively as 'nothingness as something' (380).
? 54 henk oosterling
as emptiness. this will enable me to formulate an affirmative approach to the void that favors relationality over identity, and affirmation over negation. (? 5) returning to Z? iz? ek's accusations i will counter these with current philosophical projects that have integrated the Kyoto affirmative approach to the void in their philosophy: french philosophy of differ- ences, especially in the works Jacques derrida and the cooperative works of gilles deleuze and fe? lix guattari. (? 6)
2. historical Context
Was hegel a religious man? there has been much debate on this issue. during his lifetime hegel frequently balanced on the edge of what was tolerable for the authorities. 4 An accusation of atheism would have been the end of his career as a university professor. it happened to fichte in the 1790's at the university of Jena. if atheism starts with the proclamation of the death of god then hegel is a suspect too. god's death was not for the first time proclaimed by nietzsche's madman on the marketplace in The Gay Science (section 108/125/343) and more prominently in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Kant had already spoken about faith within the limits of rea- son, proposing that we speak about morality as if god does not exist. the 'internalizing' effect of this denial was appreciated by hegel: methodologi- cally sublation (Aufhebung) focuses on internalization after the necessary alienation from one's self. the result of this rupture, i. e. of transcending of one's limits and realizing one is always part of a more encompassing whole, is called subjectivity.
nevertheless hegel criticized Kant's enlightenment aporia: the con- tradictory or antinomical conclusions of the systematic analytics of self consciousness. hegel concluded that this 'unhappy consciousnes' of the skeptic or cynic had to be overcome by reidentification with an all encom- passing totality, and in doing this becoming infinite in our finitude. in this context hegel raised the issue of the death of god several times in Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). 5 he had stated this already at the end of 'believing and Knowing' that was published in the Critical Journal of Philosophy of 1802. this urged some commentators to call him the first
4 terry Pinkard, Hegel: A biography, Cambridge/new york: Cambridge university Press, 2000, p. 577.
5 hegel, Werke in 20 Ba? nden, bd. 3, frankfurt am main: suhrkamp verlag 1999, pp. 547/572.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 55
'death of god' theologian. 6 but we have to be aware of the fact that this conclusion was less an existential outcry--as with nietzsche--than an epistemological necessity.
in hegel's days atheism was supposed to be disguised as pantheism and for many a critical commentator of spinoza spinozism was synony- mous with pantheism. 7 hegel owed a lot to spinoza: 'omnis determinatio negatio est', everything is determined by negation, is a key clause to his systematic exploration of thought. hegel's interpretation of spinozism as a philosophy that differed from pantheism was thus indirectly politically motivated. As a university professor in the Prussian state hegel did not like to be unclear about this issue. "nonetheless, it is quite clear that in hegel's own mind, the philosophy of religion was crucial to his enterprise". 8 Philosophy, not religion was hegel's project.
formal-ontologically being progresses from a given position via nega- tion and contradiction to sublation that positions subjectivity as col- lective consciousness (World spirit) on more articulated levels of truth. self-consciousness of being limited--finite--and the realization of infi- niteness through coming to realize that one is always part of all encom- passing totality is the bottom line of hegel's exposition of religious faith. this subject constituting rupture even counts for god. Without man as his negation--Jesus--and the redeemer--Christ--as the upbeat to the holy ghost, even god would have been unaware of his existence. this is a rather blasphemous conclusion. it kept haunting hegel's efforts to ward off accusations of atheism.
At a certain stage of the historic unfolding of the religious truth--or the truth of religion--buddhism is dealt with. A biographical detail is instructive. hegel was motivated to lecture on the philosophy of reli- gion after being asked by his former student hermann friedrich Wilhelm hinrichs to write a preface to hinrichs' book on the philosophy of religion from a hegelian standpoint. "hegel used the opportunity of the preface
6 see Charles taylor, Hegel. Cambridge/new york: Cambridge university Press, 1975, p. 495.
7 there is a link between spinozism and Chinese religion that was used by spinozists who wanted to stay under cover in order not to be accused of atheism. this was for the first time thematized by Pierre bayle: "bayle's identification of spinozism with oriental thought exemplifies a need to come to terms with new and potentially dangerous ideas by locating them in a geographically remote part of the world". see: thijs Weststeijn, 'spinoza sinicus: An Asian Paragraph in the history of the radical enlightenment', in Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 68, number 4 (october, 2007), p. 561.
8 Pinkard, Hegel, p. 578.
? 56 henk oosterling
to articulate his basic position on what he saw as the key modern issues in the philosophy of religion and to take some swipes at those who he thought had taken the wrong turn in the debate. "9 he is dealing here with post-Kantian thinkers as reinhold, Jacobi, friedrich von schlegel, and before all schleiermacher. for the latter the core business of religion is the feeling of absolute dependence. hegel's polemical and provocative moods and his acidic sarcasm flare up in this text. to shock his romantic adversaries he compared the feeling of absolute dependence with that of a totally dependent dog that wags its tail when it gets its bone. An endur- ing academic and personal hostility towards the romantics influenced hegel's interpretation of oriental philosophy.
since knowing and understanding are hegel's core business, what sources did he consult for an adequate, up to date understanding of buddhism? given the sporadic and biased knowledge that was available in his days, he was relatively well informed and his writings were well- researched. 10 he consulted records of Jesuit missionaries, travel reports and translations of eastern philosophical texts. he frequently returned to henry thomas Colebrooke's Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society for Chinese and Indian history, culture, and religion. for buddhism hegel's main sources were the sixth and seventh volumes of the encyclopedic Allgemeine Historie der Reisen zu Wasser und zu Lande; oder, Sammlung aller Reisebeschreibungen that was published in 1750. next to this ency- clopedia the work of samuel turner had great influence on his system- atic explorations. 11 turner had visited the court of the dalai lama and the Panchen lama. his reports informed hegel about lamas or high teachers as reincarnations of previous lamas, i. e. about humans that-- like animals in hinduism's pantheon--are worshiped as particular beings because they incarnate a universal divine substance. not as a symbol, but unmediated.
9 idem, p. 498.
10 As to the subject of oriental religions his main sources are analyzed by reinhard leuze's Die ausserchristlichen Religionen bei Hegel, go? ttingen: vandenhoeck und ruprecht 1975).
11 samuel turner, 'Copy of an Account given by mr. turner, of his interview with the teshoo lama at the monastery of terpaling, enclosed in mr. turner's letter to the honourable the governor general, dated Patna, 2d march, 1784,' in Asiatic Researches 1: 197-205; 'An Account of a Journey in tibet' in Asiatic Researches 1: 207-220; An Account of an embassy to the Court of the teshoo lama, in Tibet: Containing a Narrative of a Jour- ney through Bootan, and Part of Tibet (london, 1800).
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 57
in contrast to buddhism, records on and texts of hinduism were already available in the 18th century. from the days of herodotus, strabo and marco Polo historians and explorers had written down their experi- ences and observations. due to the long occupation of great parts of india by the british empire written observations of officials of the east indian Company determined the view on eastern religion. of course their colo- nial interests biased these observations and influenced their judgment on the ideas and behavior of the indigenous people and their rituals. images of yogis were printed in travel reports. because buddhism was mentioned by John toland as "the religion of fo"--the Chinese name for buddha-- hegel refers to buddhism also as the religion of the fo. he is however mainly focusing on lamaism.
translations of religious Chinese texts--i Ching and tao te Ching-- and hindu texts--laws of manu, bhagavadgi? ta? --were already published in hegel's lifetime. by that time publications were at hand on the struc- tural relations between sanskrit and european languages. franz bopp's analyses, published in 1816, enabled hegel to analyze hinduism more ade- quately than buddhism. yet his knowledge on buddhism was inaccurate, not being able to distinguish between the different schools of hi? naya? na, maha? ya? na, vajraya? na and following his scientific sources in situating bud- dha's life around 1000 b. C. this explains his historical estimation of bud- dhism as preceding hinduism. on top of that he mixed up the life time of siddhartha gautama--supposed to be only one of many buddha's-- varying from "some forty years before Christ" (l2 24, 308/211) to the intro- duction of buddhism in China around 67 A. d. 12
in contrast to hinduism buddhism was less known. this has a 'geo- political' background too. buddhism was driven from its homeland in northern india, as a result of which texts of the dharma were shattered and dispersed across languages as Pali, sanskrit, tibetan, and some Chi- nese dialects.
information on buddhism became ready at hand only after the exploration of the transhimalayan regions of nepal and tibet in the second half of the 19th century. by then systematic insights in linguistic orientalism had deepened. new research provided both tools and infor- mation to acknowledge and evaluate the importance of buddhism, as was done by schopenhauer and nietzsche, two fierce critics of hegel.
12 hegel's major source on this is francis buchanan's article on burmese buddhism in Asiatic Researches. buchanan also suggests the existence of several buddhas.
? 58 henk oosterling
so by the time hegel gave his first series of lectures in 1824 scientific analyses of buddhism were not yet vast and far less accurate than in the second half of the 19th century. it was mainly maha? ya? na buddhism with hi? naya? na elements through the tibetan lama accounts of turner that provided hegel with information on a particular sect of tibetan bud- dhism: the gelugpa that was headed by the dalai lama. 13
3. systematical incorporation in the system
notwithstanding the simplistic qualifications by critics of hegelian thought as to the forced incorporation of all available knowledge into his dialectical system, sequential reading of the different versions of hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religions bears witness to the fact that he 'updated' his knowledge and diversified positions continuously. in retro- spect his categorization of buddhism might seem inadequate, but given the limited and biased knowledge that was available to him his inquisitive shifting and rephrasing show a keen awareness of aspects that still are relevant today. however, his philosophy was still metaphysically rooted in the Western tradition that emphasizes being rather than becoming, and interprets nothing as a privation of being. hegel's evaluation of the eastern notion of emptiness is influenced by this tradition. in the final foundation of his systematic philosophy in Science of Logic the notion of nothing appears at the very beginning as the negation of absolute being. this being is historically anchored in the texts of Parmenides. its nega- tion--nothing--leads to the systematic conclusion that the contradiction between something instead of either being or not being is first and for all an instance of becoming: growth and decay, progress and decadence, these are all manifestations of this dialectical configuration. becoming is historically anchored in the philosophy of heraclites. but how is nothing situated historically? that is where buddhism enters the world stage as a methodologically necessary, transitional state of mind.
References in Hegel's Other Texts
in order to pinpoint and evaluate buddhism's positioning it is instructive to briefly locate hegel's incorporation of buddhist's thought in the publica-
13 this the main thesis of morton's article. Within this specific perspective buddhism turns out to be a mixture of asceticism with a limited philosophical view of the absolute as the void, shot through with xenophobic superstition. see ? ? 3 and 8.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 59
tions that precede the period of his lectures on philosophy of religion. in a long chapter on religion at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) little details about oriental philosophies can be found. the chapter (b) on the 'religion of the plant and the animal', in which he refers to ideas and rituals of the indian hindu-religion, is systematically positioned between the religion of the light in Persia (a) and that of creation by craftsmen in egypt and in greece (c). buddhism is not mentioned.
in the first publication of Science of Logic (1812-1816) a reference to bud- dhism is made in a remark added to paragraphs in book i: the doctrine of being. As already referred to, there is no equivalent for the fundamental notion of nothing in the european history of philosophy. in referring to buddhism hegel can instantiate the nothing as an articulation of the void or nothingness found in buddhism: "As we know in the oriental systems, principally in buddhism, nothing, the void, is the absolute principle. "14 but this void--hegel refers to it with this english term--is voided of any sub- jectivity. there is no discursive self reflection. negativity has come to a standstill in buddhism. At the very end of book i in the paragraphs on measure a new remark is added in the second edition of 1832 on the rela- tion between spinoza and hinduism and buddhism within the context of pantheism. i will return to this remark at the end of my exposition of the lectures.
in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy the exposition of oriental Philosophy is a prelude to Western philosophy that was inaugurated by the Pre-socratics. hegel mentions Confucius, the i Ching, and daoism as elements of Chinese Philosophy. under the heading of indian Philosophy he deals with the samkhya-philosophy and the philosophy of gautama and Kanade. samkhya is one of the six schools of classical indian phi- losophy, categorized under hinduism but originally a buddhist doctrine based on a dual ontology: the dialectical tension between purusha (con- sciousness) and prakriti (phenomenal realm of matter). the dialectical force of oriental thought--Chinese philosophy with its duality of yin and yang, the trimurti of brahma? , vishnu, and shiva in hinduism--must have intrigued hegel, because it was proof for his dialectical insights in the formal-ontological foundation of the World and of history. 15
in 1827 hegel reviewed humboldt's book on the bhagavadgi? ta? in the Jahrbu? cher fu? r wissenschaftliche Kritik. "We must now recognize in regard
14 see Science of Logic, trans. A. v. miller, george Allen & unwin ltd. , london/new york: humanities Press, 1969/2002, p. 83.
15 see for the following passage hegel, Werke, bd. 11, pp. 131-204.
? 60 henk oosterling
to hindu mythology that it does in fact contain these basic determina- tions of the concept, the development of the concept. this trinity is the basic form, the abstract basic form of spirit; this is what the hindus rep- resent as trimurti" (l2 24, 327/230). for hegel this is the ultimate proof of the universal validity of his dialectic ontology. hegel even qualified gautama's philosophy of nyaya, i. e. a 'method' of reasoning and inves- tigation, as 'a very articulated dialectic. '16 And he refers to Kanada, a hindu sage who lived either around the 6th or 2nd century b. C. , and who founded the philosophical school of vaisheshika. Kanada developed a theory of physics, based on dvyanuka (biatomic molecule) and tryanuka (triatomic molecule). his belief that all living beings are composed of five elements--water, fire, earth, air, ether--strongly suggested a transition to eleatic thinkers and Pre-socratics.
in the second and third edition of 1827 and 1830 of hegel's Encyclopedia (1817) references are made to animal worshiping in indian religion and to the reincarnation of lamas within the context of atheism and pantheism. hegel cites from the bhagavadgi? ta? in an 1823 published latin translation by the writer, literature critic and translator August Wilhelm von schlegel (1767-1845), brother of the earlier mentioned friedrich von schlegel. he lets Krishna explain the omnipresence in all beings, which enables him to sort out some misunderstandings on spinozism as pantheism. A reference to Colebrooke's remark on indian religion as being monotheistic due to the abstract universality of the brahman principle is valued in a typical dialectical turn of phrase: "this positioning is not incorrect". 17
in sum, we may conclude that in hegel's work buddhism is sporadi- cally referred to and that the scarcely available information initially had to meet the formal criteria of the hegelian system. hegel applies inter- nal and external categories. the triad of internal categorization of any religion always contains 1) the metaphysical concept of a divinity, 2) its concrete representation in texts and symbols, and 3) a practical cultus. the external categories are derived from the dialectical division of the Sci- ence of Logic: being, essence, and Concept, but now in the mode of deter- minateness and finitude. in the oriental religions--and by implication in buddhism--being is therefore qualified as prereflective immediacy or
16 eastern thinking already developed a vast tradition of dialectical thinking. hegel, Werke, bd. 18, p. 164.
17 hegel, Werke, bd. 10, p. 385.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 61
undifferentiated substance. the divine substance is completely enveloped in itself, like a toe-sucking 'buddha'.
in this positing of the in-itself the experience of religion is not yet articulated discursively as for-itself, let alone exhaustively conceptualized, the realization of which finally culminates in full internalization as the in-and-for-itself. or in terms of the Lectures on the History of Philosophy: intellectual substantiality is in india the end, while in Philosophy it is in general the true commencement; intellectual substantiality is the oppo- site of the reflection, understanding, and the subjective individuality of the european. 18 oriental religions primarily deal with substance as unme- diated immediacy on a practical basis. the buddhist truth is fully realized in the act, as is mirrored in hegel's mistaken choice for the hindu image. originally buddhism lacks institutions, is even anti-institutional per defi- nition given gautama's resistance against the sophistry of brahmanic tra- dition. in short, it also lacks the societal articulations of subjectivity.
4. revised series of the lectures
in hegel's manuscript only a few general remarks are made on oriental religions: "in general it is [in] the orient [that we find this] undivided intuition, this intuition of god in all things without distinction; god is all things, hen kai pan" (m 99/5). obviously pantheism is an issue from the start. starting with the general category of religion of nature in which man is not yet aware of his free subjectivity and divine power is an asset of human beings, hegel categorizes Chinese, indian, Persian and egyp- tian religion according to their ability to externalize and internalize the representation of a divine entity. buddhism remains unmentioned. none of these religions do yet acknowledge the Absolute as free spirit. it is either an empirical entity like the wind, the sky, cows, apes, bulls or human beings or a pure abstraction. magic as the power of the individual to directly influence nature is negated in the formal objectification of the divine power in Chinese religion that worships human beings, like the emperor and genii (Shen). not as symbols, but in actuality. in hinduism on the one hand a multitude of beings such as elephants and cows are venerated, but on the other an impersonal metaphysical substance, i. e. a supernatural divine power as brahman enters the stage of world history.
18 hegel, Werke 18, p. 167.
? 62 henk oosterling
Lectures of 1824: Migration of the Soul into the 'Nothing'
this initial categorization is expanded in the lectures of 1824, which are mainly based on the notes written down by students after the lectures. now buddhism comes to the fore as a transitional stage within the religion of magic that also includes religious consciousness of the African, eskimo, and Chinese. All these are stepping stones to hinduism, the religion of fantasy that precedes the religion of the good (Persian light religion) and the religion of the riddle (egyptian religion). in Chinese religion magic as power over nature is objectified in human beings like the emperor and the spirits or genii. the cultus is embedded in daily life ceremonies, agri- cultural rites and ancestor veneration. A general power that overrules the emperor is not introduced, because the principle of heaven (Tian) is not yet grasped as a general principle in relation to the power of the emperor. hegel mainly stresses the institutionalized power of the emperor, posi- tioning him as a prototype of an objectified form of divine power: "thus in China the emperor's lordship over nature is a fully organized monarchy" (l2 24, 303/207).
next to this 'secular power' a 'spiritual power' (l2 24, 307/211) unfolds itself. this first formalization is the key stage in the transition from magic to more properly defined religion: "religion begins here" (l2 24, 305/209). the raw immediacy of magic reflects within itself: "Prima facie the advance is that the infinite aspect, the essential aspect, is comprehended in a deeper, more genuine way than heretofore--or that another spiri- tual moment becomes objective for consciousness, for subjective spirit, [at this stage] as compared with what we have been considering up to this point" (l2 24, 304/208). this objectification constitutes the second phase of religious 'awareness', to use a less articulated term than consciousness: "thought comes to itself" as "what rests and abides within itself, namely spirit" (l2 24, 305/209). objectification is no longer formal but actual, be it "still immediate, consisting initially in the fact that it is a singular self- consciousness" (l2 24, 306-7/210). religious substance becomes an affirma- tive relationship with this power: being-Within-self as "thought itself, and this is the distinctive essentiality of self-consciousness" (l2 24, 306/209). Consciousness contemplates and meditates.
hegel then positions buddhism. it is described as 'the religion of the fo' (l2 24, 307/211). this religion "comes from China, and in historical fact it is somewhat later than the form in which power is the dominant element" (l2 24, 311/214). originally, hegel remarks, buddhism came from burma, india and Ceylon, "their god buddha is venerated as gautama", "depicted
avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 63
in the attitude of self-absorption with head bent and arms folded over his breast" (l2 24, 314/217). no toe-sucking yet. gautama is not identified as the secular person that later becomes the buddha. he is one of a series of deceased buddhas that are contrasted with living lamas as the dalai lama. the fact that hindu brahmans see gautama as the ninth incarna- tion of vishnu, explains partly this hindu image. then a second shift is made. Chinese, mongols, tibetans, burmese, and Ceylonese all practice a "religion we know under the form of lamaism" (l2 24, 307/211). As men- tioned before, these mistakes reflect the scientific insights of hegel's days. to him the difference between the fo and lamaism is only superficial. lamaism deals with living people through which the divine power trans- migrates, while the fo is concerned with a (re)capturing of buddhahood for salvation.
lamaism practices tranquility, repose and contemplation. "this is where the theoretical attitude begins" (l2 24, 309/211). Practical power and desire are negated by "peaceful being-within-self" (l2 24, 309/212). this cultus has institutional manifestations, but it is individualized since an individ- ual can unify himself with 'theoretical substantiality' whenever he wants. still a thin discursive line links it to the transmigration of souls as a char- acteristic of magic religions, but "immortality of the soul (in the broadest sense) is what now for the first time emerges" (l2 24, 309/212). this is not yet spiritual in an objectified way, being encapsulated in "immediacy, i. e. , a bodily, sensuous shape" (l2 24, 310/213).
more than the immortality of the soul another doctrine is explored and explained by hegel: the constituting principle of 'nothing': "however var- ied people and things may be, there is thus only one principle from which they stem, in which they are, through which they subsist, and to which they revert--this one principle is the nothing, completely unqualified, simple and pure" (l2 24, 312/215). hegel emphasizes that this 'nothing' should not be understood as not being. he suggests that, since it is purely identical with itself, being thought itself, it is 'a substantive being' (l2 24, 312/215) eternally at rest, free of determinations. the souls do no longer wander "for they become completely identical with the god fo" (l2 24, 313/215-216). free of desires the goal is reached as nirvana, being identi- cal with god, but conceptualized as nothing, as the void of the Science of Logic.
in positioning nirvana this way hegel implicitly subscribes a maha? ya? na view that he found in the Allgemeine Historie der Reisen. hegel's sources do mention the difference between the hi? naya? na and maha? ya? na 'method' of attaining nirvana, respectively by getting free from all worldly misery
64 henk oosterling
and by denying desires in order to attain buddhahood, but hegel's treat- ment of buddhism does not explore these modalities. Although in retro- spect he fails to grasp the specific non-Western articulation of emptiness or the void, i. e. of nirvana, he does not present 'nothing' as a mere priva- tion of being. Wordings like 'annihilation of self' come to the fore in the lectures of 1831 which are only known by their publication in an edition of hegel's works done by his friends shortly after his death.
Lectures of 1827
in the 1827 lectures, again mainly based on students' notes, hegel returns to the theme that he, in his student years in tu? bingen discussed with schelling and ho? lderlin: one and all, hen kai pan. in this series of lectures Chinese religion of the state is conceived as an intermediate phase. in hegel's account of how the emperor performs his divine powers he comes to speak of 'the sect of the dao'. (l2 27, 555/453) this sect was allowed to withdraw in self established monasteries into the mountains in order for the shen to attain immortality. the principle of the Way (Dao) lifts the religion of magic up to the being-within-self that in the next phase of religious consciousness is articulated in buddhism and lamaism. An exploration of daoism, in which hegel referred to a book on lao-zi (551-479 b. C. ) that was published in 1823 and that deals with the life and speeches of lao-zi, sets an in between: dao "is a distinctive god, reason" (l2 27, 548/446-447). hegel focuses on 'measure' as the core concept of reason, acknowledging dao as 'the return of consciousness into itself' (l2 27, 557/454). fo and dao are not explicitly connected. records on Chan buddhism or Zen buddhism were not yet available.
in this version of the lectures the religion of heaven (Tian) "is acknowl- edged as the highest ruling power" (l2 27, 548/446) that transcends magic and power but while governing moral conduct is still bound to empiri- cal consciousness. it remains formal and abstract. referring to the Papal reproach of Catholic orders in China for their inadequate translation of tian as 'god', hegel agrees with his sources that "tian designates wholly indeterminate and abstract universality; it is the wholly indeterminate sum of the physical and the moral nexus as a whole" (l2 27, 549/446). in the final analysis it is still the emperor who rules nature, be it under the guidance of tian. "the heaven of the Chinese or tian, by contrast, is some thing totally empty" (l2 27, 550/447). emptiness is interpreted 'empirically': the Chinese tian is not populated like the Christian heaven. emptiness is conceived as a privation, as space in which something is lacking, in short as negation.
avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 65
A dialectical structure of reasoning always attracts hegel's attention. in the margin of his notes on the 26th of June 1827 he writes: "it is quite note- worthy that the determination 'three' immediately comes into play to the extent that dao is something rational and concrete" (l2 27, 558/455), fol- lowed by the opening sentences of the Tao Te Ching: dao (reason) produc- ing the one, the one producing the two, the two producing the three and the three the whole universe. hegel concludes: "unless three determina- tions are recognized in god, 'god' is an empty word" (l2 27, 559/456). dao stays abstract as long as self-consciousness is not ruptured: "thus lao-zi is also a shen, or he has appeared as buddha" (l2 27, 560/456). in this way emptiness connects daoism and buddhism in hegel's conclusion.
in this series of lectures buddhism/lamaism is positioned beyond the realm of magic as the religion of being-Within-self. hegel's exposition has become more developed and balanced with buddhism still preceding hin- duism, but now as an autonomous phase that expands the abstract uni- versality and theoretical substantiality of the dao and tian. buddhism is even "the most widespread religion on earth" (l2 27, 563/460). the tricky topic of pantheism--and by implication of atheism--is gradually woven into his explanation. "here we find the form of substantiality in which the absolute is a being-within-self, the one substance; but it is not grasped just as a substance for thought and in thought (as it is in spinoza); instead it has at the same time existence in sensible presence, i. e. in singular human beings" (l2 27, 564/460).
it is against this background that the mistaken image of the toe-sucking 'buddha' suddenly appears, followed by the statement that "the ultimate of highest [reality] is therefore nothing or not-being" (l2 27, 565/461). in contrast to the 1824 lectures hegel now rephrases buddhist nothing- ness in Western ontological categories as not-being. this state of being is paradoxically strived for "through ceaseless internal mindfulness, to will nothing, to want [nothing], and to do nothing.
1 timothy morton, 'romanticism and buddhism. hegel on buddhism', Praxis series 20, par. 14. see: http://www. rc. umd. edu/praxis/buddhism/morton/morton.
? 52 henk oosterling
subjectivity. in buddhism this essential rupture with immediacy has not taken place.
this 'thinking posture' bears witness to an incomprehensible intimacy that not so much represents meditation--it is not a symbol--as it con- cretely embodies immediacy. the image triggers all sorts of associations that, psycho-analytically, can divert, pervert and subvert the hegelian texture in different directions. hegel positions all world religions within a hierarchy of collective consciousness that realize their essence in Chris- tianity as the consummate religion with the father, the son and the holy ghost as the exemplary triad. retrospectively this power play is criticized as an ideological construct that favors Western metaphysics and politi- cally legitimizes Western expansionism. hegel's negative evaluation of buddhism's nirvana can even be understood as an articulation of the Western 'horor vacui', the fear for emptiness. i will however concentrate on other aspects in hegel's texture. i draw only one thread out of the hegelian tapestry: the evaluation of buddhist emptiness as the void and nothingness. in spite of the fact that hegel's positioning of buddhism is in itself not nihilistic, his identification of buddhism as a religion that is focused on nothingness has determined the modern debate on nihilism that even persists in the 21st century.
the dialectician slavoj Z? iz? ek still qualifies nirvana as a 'primordial void'. he frequently cites from brian victoria's Zen at War to illustrate the fascist, nihilistic mentality of Zen followers and criticizes the nai? ve hippy mentality of Western buddhism as a perfect legitimization for late capitalism. its adherers are accused of refusing to take a stand against capitalist consumerism. their refusal of revolutionary commitment to truthful political action, due to their quietism, is contrasted by Z? iz? ek in a quasi-ironical hegelian gesture with the revolutionary activist mentality of the man that institutionalized the Christian Church: st. Paul. 2 but is Z? iz? ek's disqualification of buddhism as one of the modes of postmodern nihilism the only option?
2 see: henk oosterling, 'radikale mediokrita? t oder revolutiona? re Akte? U? ber funda- mentales inter-esse', in: e. vogt, h. J. silverman (hrgs. ), U? ber Z? iz? ek. turia+Kant, vienna 2004, pp. 42-62; 'from russia with love: Avoiding the subject. Why is Z? iz? ek's st Paul a leninist? ' in International Journal in Philosophy and Theology, 2009, pp. 236-253.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 53
Within the dialectical tradition the accusation of nihilism is very per- sistent. 3 When we follow the trace back to the days of hegel, the problem already starts with the very image that startled him: the toe sucking bud- dha. the choice of this image is already a mistake. hegel found this weird picture of what he thought was the buddha in one of the books he con- sulted frequently for his analysis of buddhism: friedrich Creutzer's Sym- bolik und Mythologie der alten Vo? lker (leipzig and darmstadt, 1819). this plate however does not represent the buddha, it refers to a hindu subject: brahma? nara? yana in the context of one of the canonical texts, the Laws of Manu. hegel was even mistaken--in retrospect--as to the specific nature of buddhism, because he relied mainly on sources that focused on the life of the tibetan lamas. the difference between buddhism and lamaism, he states in the lectures of 1824, "is only superficial". (l2 24, 307/211)
these 'mistakes' are exemplary for hegel's research on what enabled him indirectly to position himself in the controversy on pantheism as atheism. f. h. Jacobi thematized a proto-nihilist atheism in a book on spi- noza in 1785. together with schelling and ho? lderlin hegel read this book as a student and discussed the hen kai pan (one and all) principle, but the controversy haunted his thoughts till his very last days. his treatment of this controversy foreshadowed the nihilism debate that was installed as a philosophical topic by nietzsche and still resonates in Z? iz? ek's disquali- fications of buddhism in the Western hemisphere as 'new Age spiritual- ity' and 'Pop buddhism'. Z? iz? ek lifts hegel's parti pris over the turn of the century into the first decade of the 21st century.
is it possible to revalue hegel's analysis of buddhism on a more affirma- tive basis? Can the tight chain that connects nirvana, void and nothing- ness be broken? in order to throw some light on a different understanding of nothingness--and by implication to redirect the 'nihil' in nihilism-- i will firstly clarify how hegel applied his sources on buddhism for the positioning of this determinate phase of religious consciousness in his systematic philosophy (? 2) and why he kept shifting its position in the different series of lectures. (? 3) then i will turn the tables by focusing on buddhism's interpretation of hegel's philosophy. i will briefly describe the way Kyoto school based buddhist thinkers try to reconcile Zen bud- dhism with hegelian philosophy (? 4) and how they interpret nirvana
3 Adorno's remarks on nihilism in Negative Dialectics (1973, orig. 1966) scorn the possi- bility of 'believing in nothing' and qualify 'the image of nirvana' positively as 'nothingness as something' (380).
? 54 henk oosterling
as emptiness. this will enable me to formulate an affirmative approach to the void that favors relationality over identity, and affirmation over negation. (? 5) returning to Z? iz? ek's accusations i will counter these with current philosophical projects that have integrated the Kyoto affirmative approach to the void in their philosophy: french philosophy of differ- ences, especially in the works Jacques derrida and the cooperative works of gilles deleuze and fe? lix guattari. (? 6)
2. historical Context
Was hegel a religious man? there has been much debate on this issue. during his lifetime hegel frequently balanced on the edge of what was tolerable for the authorities. 4 An accusation of atheism would have been the end of his career as a university professor. it happened to fichte in the 1790's at the university of Jena. if atheism starts with the proclamation of the death of god then hegel is a suspect too. god's death was not for the first time proclaimed by nietzsche's madman on the marketplace in The Gay Science (section 108/125/343) and more prominently in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Kant had already spoken about faith within the limits of rea- son, proposing that we speak about morality as if god does not exist. the 'internalizing' effect of this denial was appreciated by hegel: methodologi- cally sublation (Aufhebung) focuses on internalization after the necessary alienation from one's self. the result of this rupture, i. e. of transcending of one's limits and realizing one is always part of a more encompassing whole, is called subjectivity.
nevertheless hegel criticized Kant's enlightenment aporia: the con- tradictory or antinomical conclusions of the systematic analytics of self consciousness. hegel concluded that this 'unhappy consciousnes' of the skeptic or cynic had to be overcome by reidentification with an all encom- passing totality, and in doing this becoming infinite in our finitude. in this context hegel raised the issue of the death of god several times in Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). 5 he had stated this already at the end of 'believing and Knowing' that was published in the Critical Journal of Philosophy of 1802. this urged some commentators to call him the first
4 terry Pinkard, Hegel: A biography, Cambridge/new york: Cambridge university Press, 2000, p. 577.
5 hegel, Werke in 20 Ba? nden, bd. 3, frankfurt am main: suhrkamp verlag 1999, pp. 547/572.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 55
'death of god' theologian. 6 but we have to be aware of the fact that this conclusion was less an existential outcry--as with nietzsche--than an epistemological necessity.
in hegel's days atheism was supposed to be disguised as pantheism and for many a critical commentator of spinoza spinozism was synony- mous with pantheism. 7 hegel owed a lot to spinoza: 'omnis determinatio negatio est', everything is determined by negation, is a key clause to his systematic exploration of thought. hegel's interpretation of spinozism as a philosophy that differed from pantheism was thus indirectly politically motivated. As a university professor in the Prussian state hegel did not like to be unclear about this issue. "nonetheless, it is quite clear that in hegel's own mind, the philosophy of religion was crucial to his enterprise". 8 Philosophy, not religion was hegel's project.
formal-ontologically being progresses from a given position via nega- tion and contradiction to sublation that positions subjectivity as col- lective consciousness (World spirit) on more articulated levels of truth. self-consciousness of being limited--finite--and the realization of infi- niteness through coming to realize that one is always part of all encom- passing totality is the bottom line of hegel's exposition of religious faith. this subject constituting rupture even counts for god. Without man as his negation--Jesus--and the redeemer--Christ--as the upbeat to the holy ghost, even god would have been unaware of his existence. this is a rather blasphemous conclusion. it kept haunting hegel's efforts to ward off accusations of atheism.
At a certain stage of the historic unfolding of the religious truth--or the truth of religion--buddhism is dealt with. A biographical detail is instructive. hegel was motivated to lecture on the philosophy of reli- gion after being asked by his former student hermann friedrich Wilhelm hinrichs to write a preface to hinrichs' book on the philosophy of religion from a hegelian standpoint. "hegel used the opportunity of the preface
6 see Charles taylor, Hegel. Cambridge/new york: Cambridge university Press, 1975, p. 495.
7 there is a link between spinozism and Chinese religion that was used by spinozists who wanted to stay under cover in order not to be accused of atheism. this was for the first time thematized by Pierre bayle: "bayle's identification of spinozism with oriental thought exemplifies a need to come to terms with new and potentially dangerous ideas by locating them in a geographically remote part of the world". see: thijs Weststeijn, 'spinoza sinicus: An Asian Paragraph in the history of the radical enlightenment', in Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 68, number 4 (october, 2007), p. 561.
8 Pinkard, Hegel, p. 578.
? 56 henk oosterling
to articulate his basic position on what he saw as the key modern issues in the philosophy of religion and to take some swipes at those who he thought had taken the wrong turn in the debate. "9 he is dealing here with post-Kantian thinkers as reinhold, Jacobi, friedrich von schlegel, and before all schleiermacher. for the latter the core business of religion is the feeling of absolute dependence. hegel's polemical and provocative moods and his acidic sarcasm flare up in this text. to shock his romantic adversaries he compared the feeling of absolute dependence with that of a totally dependent dog that wags its tail when it gets its bone. An endur- ing academic and personal hostility towards the romantics influenced hegel's interpretation of oriental philosophy.
since knowing and understanding are hegel's core business, what sources did he consult for an adequate, up to date understanding of buddhism? given the sporadic and biased knowledge that was available in his days, he was relatively well informed and his writings were well- researched. 10 he consulted records of Jesuit missionaries, travel reports and translations of eastern philosophical texts. he frequently returned to henry thomas Colebrooke's Transactions of the Royal Asiatic Society for Chinese and Indian history, culture, and religion. for buddhism hegel's main sources were the sixth and seventh volumes of the encyclopedic Allgemeine Historie der Reisen zu Wasser und zu Lande; oder, Sammlung aller Reisebeschreibungen that was published in 1750. next to this ency- clopedia the work of samuel turner had great influence on his system- atic explorations. 11 turner had visited the court of the dalai lama and the Panchen lama. his reports informed hegel about lamas or high teachers as reincarnations of previous lamas, i. e. about humans that-- like animals in hinduism's pantheon--are worshiped as particular beings because they incarnate a universal divine substance. not as a symbol, but unmediated.
9 idem, p. 498.
10 As to the subject of oriental religions his main sources are analyzed by reinhard leuze's Die ausserchristlichen Religionen bei Hegel, go? ttingen: vandenhoeck und ruprecht 1975).
11 samuel turner, 'Copy of an Account given by mr. turner, of his interview with the teshoo lama at the monastery of terpaling, enclosed in mr. turner's letter to the honourable the governor general, dated Patna, 2d march, 1784,' in Asiatic Researches 1: 197-205; 'An Account of a Journey in tibet' in Asiatic Researches 1: 207-220; An Account of an embassy to the Court of the teshoo lama, in Tibet: Containing a Narrative of a Jour- ney through Bootan, and Part of Tibet (london, 1800).
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 57
in contrast to buddhism, records on and texts of hinduism were already available in the 18th century. from the days of herodotus, strabo and marco Polo historians and explorers had written down their experi- ences and observations. due to the long occupation of great parts of india by the british empire written observations of officials of the east indian Company determined the view on eastern religion. of course their colo- nial interests biased these observations and influenced their judgment on the ideas and behavior of the indigenous people and their rituals. images of yogis were printed in travel reports. because buddhism was mentioned by John toland as "the religion of fo"--the Chinese name for buddha-- hegel refers to buddhism also as the religion of the fo. he is however mainly focusing on lamaism.
translations of religious Chinese texts--i Ching and tao te Ching-- and hindu texts--laws of manu, bhagavadgi? ta? --were already published in hegel's lifetime. by that time publications were at hand on the struc- tural relations between sanskrit and european languages. franz bopp's analyses, published in 1816, enabled hegel to analyze hinduism more ade- quately than buddhism. yet his knowledge on buddhism was inaccurate, not being able to distinguish between the different schools of hi? naya? na, maha? ya? na, vajraya? na and following his scientific sources in situating bud- dha's life around 1000 b. C. this explains his historical estimation of bud- dhism as preceding hinduism. on top of that he mixed up the life time of siddhartha gautama--supposed to be only one of many buddha's-- varying from "some forty years before Christ" (l2 24, 308/211) to the intro- duction of buddhism in China around 67 A. d. 12
in contrast to hinduism buddhism was less known. this has a 'geo- political' background too. buddhism was driven from its homeland in northern india, as a result of which texts of the dharma were shattered and dispersed across languages as Pali, sanskrit, tibetan, and some Chi- nese dialects.
information on buddhism became ready at hand only after the exploration of the transhimalayan regions of nepal and tibet in the second half of the 19th century. by then systematic insights in linguistic orientalism had deepened. new research provided both tools and infor- mation to acknowledge and evaluate the importance of buddhism, as was done by schopenhauer and nietzsche, two fierce critics of hegel.
12 hegel's major source on this is francis buchanan's article on burmese buddhism in Asiatic Researches. buchanan also suggests the existence of several buddhas.
? 58 henk oosterling
so by the time hegel gave his first series of lectures in 1824 scientific analyses of buddhism were not yet vast and far less accurate than in the second half of the 19th century. it was mainly maha? ya? na buddhism with hi? naya? na elements through the tibetan lama accounts of turner that provided hegel with information on a particular sect of tibetan bud- dhism: the gelugpa that was headed by the dalai lama. 13
3. systematical incorporation in the system
notwithstanding the simplistic qualifications by critics of hegelian thought as to the forced incorporation of all available knowledge into his dialectical system, sequential reading of the different versions of hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religions bears witness to the fact that he 'updated' his knowledge and diversified positions continuously. in retro- spect his categorization of buddhism might seem inadequate, but given the limited and biased knowledge that was available to him his inquisitive shifting and rephrasing show a keen awareness of aspects that still are relevant today. however, his philosophy was still metaphysically rooted in the Western tradition that emphasizes being rather than becoming, and interprets nothing as a privation of being. hegel's evaluation of the eastern notion of emptiness is influenced by this tradition. in the final foundation of his systematic philosophy in Science of Logic the notion of nothing appears at the very beginning as the negation of absolute being. this being is historically anchored in the texts of Parmenides. its nega- tion--nothing--leads to the systematic conclusion that the contradiction between something instead of either being or not being is first and for all an instance of becoming: growth and decay, progress and decadence, these are all manifestations of this dialectical configuration. becoming is historically anchored in the philosophy of heraclites. but how is nothing situated historically? that is where buddhism enters the world stage as a methodologically necessary, transitional state of mind.
References in Hegel's Other Texts
in order to pinpoint and evaluate buddhism's positioning it is instructive to briefly locate hegel's incorporation of buddhist's thought in the publica-
13 this the main thesis of morton's article. Within this specific perspective buddhism turns out to be a mixture of asceticism with a limited philosophical view of the absolute as the void, shot through with xenophobic superstition. see ? ? 3 and 8.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 59
tions that precede the period of his lectures on philosophy of religion. in a long chapter on religion at the end of the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) little details about oriental philosophies can be found. the chapter (b) on the 'religion of the plant and the animal', in which he refers to ideas and rituals of the indian hindu-religion, is systematically positioned between the religion of the light in Persia (a) and that of creation by craftsmen in egypt and in greece (c). buddhism is not mentioned.
in the first publication of Science of Logic (1812-1816) a reference to bud- dhism is made in a remark added to paragraphs in book i: the doctrine of being. As already referred to, there is no equivalent for the fundamental notion of nothing in the european history of philosophy. in referring to buddhism hegel can instantiate the nothing as an articulation of the void or nothingness found in buddhism: "As we know in the oriental systems, principally in buddhism, nothing, the void, is the absolute principle. "14 but this void--hegel refers to it with this english term--is voided of any sub- jectivity. there is no discursive self reflection. negativity has come to a standstill in buddhism. At the very end of book i in the paragraphs on measure a new remark is added in the second edition of 1832 on the rela- tion between spinoza and hinduism and buddhism within the context of pantheism. i will return to this remark at the end of my exposition of the lectures.
in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy the exposition of oriental Philosophy is a prelude to Western philosophy that was inaugurated by the Pre-socratics. hegel mentions Confucius, the i Ching, and daoism as elements of Chinese Philosophy. under the heading of indian Philosophy he deals with the samkhya-philosophy and the philosophy of gautama and Kanade. samkhya is one of the six schools of classical indian phi- losophy, categorized under hinduism but originally a buddhist doctrine based on a dual ontology: the dialectical tension between purusha (con- sciousness) and prakriti (phenomenal realm of matter). the dialectical force of oriental thought--Chinese philosophy with its duality of yin and yang, the trimurti of brahma? , vishnu, and shiva in hinduism--must have intrigued hegel, because it was proof for his dialectical insights in the formal-ontological foundation of the World and of history. 15
in 1827 hegel reviewed humboldt's book on the bhagavadgi? ta? in the Jahrbu? cher fu? r wissenschaftliche Kritik. "We must now recognize in regard
14 see Science of Logic, trans. A. v. miller, george Allen & unwin ltd. , london/new york: humanities Press, 1969/2002, p. 83.
15 see for the following passage hegel, Werke, bd. 11, pp. 131-204.
? 60 henk oosterling
to hindu mythology that it does in fact contain these basic determina- tions of the concept, the development of the concept. this trinity is the basic form, the abstract basic form of spirit; this is what the hindus rep- resent as trimurti" (l2 24, 327/230). for hegel this is the ultimate proof of the universal validity of his dialectic ontology. hegel even qualified gautama's philosophy of nyaya, i. e. a 'method' of reasoning and inves- tigation, as 'a very articulated dialectic. '16 And he refers to Kanada, a hindu sage who lived either around the 6th or 2nd century b. C. , and who founded the philosophical school of vaisheshika. Kanada developed a theory of physics, based on dvyanuka (biatomic molecule) and tryanuka (triatomic molecule). his belief that all living beings are composed of five elements--water, fire, earth, air, ether--strongly suggested a transition to eleatic thinkers and Pre-socratics.
in the second and third edition of 1827 and 1830 of hegel's Encyclopedia (1817) references are made to animal worshiping in indian religion and to the reincarnation of lamas within the context of atheism and pantheism. hegel cites from the bhagavadgi? ta? in an 1823 published latin translation by the writer, literature critic and translator August Wilhelm von schlegel (1767-1845), brother of the earlier mentioned friedrich von schlegel. he lets Krishna explain the omnipresence in all beings, which enables him to sort out some misunderstandings on spinozism as pantheism. A reference to Colebrooke's remark on indian religion as being monotheistic due to the abstract universality of the brahman principle is valued in a typical dialectical turn of phrase: "this positioning is not incorrect". 17
in sum, we may conclude that in hegel's work buddhism is sporadi- cally referred to and that the scarcely available information initially had to meet the formal criteria of the hegelian system. hegel applies inter- nal and external categories. the triad of internal categorization of any religion always contains 1) the metaphysical concept of a divinity, 2) its concrete representation in texts and symbols, and 3) a practical cultus. the external categories are derived from the dialectical division of the Sci- ence of Logic: being, essence, and Concept, but now in the mode of deter- minateness and finitude. in the oriental religions--and by implication in buddhism--being is therefore qualified as prereflective immediacy or
16 eastern thinking already developed a vast tradition of dialectical thinking. hegel, Werke, bd. 18, p. 164.
17 hegel, Werke, bd. 10, p. 385.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 61
undifferentiated substance. the divine substance is completely enveloped in itself, like a toe-sucking 'buddha'.
in this positing of the in-itself the experience of religion is not yet articulated discursively as for-itself, let alone exhaustively conceptualized, the realization of which finally culminates in full internalization as the in-and-for-itself. or in terms of the Lectures on the History of Philosophy: intellectual substantiality is in india the end, while in Philosophy it is in general the true commencement; intellectual substantiality is the oppo- site of the reflection, understanding, and the subjective individuality of the european. 18 oriental religions primarily deal with substance as unme- diated immediacy on a practical basis. the buddhist truth is fully realized in the act, as is mirrored in hegel's mistaken choice for the hindu image. originally buddhism lacks institutions, is even anti-institutional per defi- nition given gautama's resistance against the sophistry of brahmanic tra- dition. in short, it also lacks the societal articulations of subjectivity.
4. revised series of the lectures
in hegel's manuscript only a few general remarks are made on oriental religions: "in general it is [in] the orient [that we find this] undivided intuition, this intuition of god in all things without distinction; god is all things, hen kai pan" (m 99/5). obviously pantheism is an issue from the start. starting with the general category of religion of nature in which man is not yet aware of his free subjectivity and divine power is an asset of human beings, hegel categorizes Chinese, indian, Persian and egyp- tian religion according to their ability to externalize and internalize the representation of a divine entity. buddhism remains unmentioned. none of these religions do yet acknowledge the Absolute as free spirit. it is either an empirical entity like the wind, the sky, cows, apes, bulls or human beings or a pure abstraction. magic as the power of the individual to directly influence nature is negated in the formal objectification of the divine power in Chinese religion that worships human beings, like the emperor and genii (Shen). not as symbols, but in actuality. in hinduism on the one hand a multitude of beings such as elephants and cows are venerated, but on the other an impersonal metaphysical substance, i. e. a supernatural divine power as brahman enters the stage of world history.
18 hegel, Werke 18, p. 167.
? 62 henk oosterling
Lectures of 1824: Migration of the Soul into the 'Nothing'
this initial categorization is expanded in the lectures of 1824, which are mainly based on the notes written down by students after the lectures. now buddhism comes to the fore as a transitional stage within the religion of magic that also includes religious consciousness of the African, eskimo, and Chinese. All these are stepping stones to hinduism, the religion of fantasy that precedes the religion of the good (Persian light religion) and the religion of the riddle (egyptian religion). in Chinese religion magic as power over nature is objectified in human beings like the emperor and the spirits or genii. the cultus is embedded in daily life ceremonies, agri- cultural rites and ancestor veneration. A general power that overrules the emperor is not introduced, because the principle of heaven (Tian) is not yet grasped as a general principle in relation to the power of the emperor. hegel mainly stresses the institutionalized power of the emperor, posi- tioning him as a prototype of an objectified form of divine power: "thus in China the emperor's lordship over nature is a fully organized monarchy" (l2 24, 303/207).
next to this 'secular power' a 'spiritual power' (l2 24, 307/211) unfolds itself. this first formalization is the key stage in the transition from magic to more properly defined religion: "religion begins here" (l2 24, 305/209). the raw immediacy of magic reflects within itself: "Prima facie the advance is that the infinite aspect, the essential aspect, is comprehended in a deeper, more genuine way than heretofore--or that another spiri- tual moment becomes objective for consciousness, for subjective spirit, [at this stage] as compared with what we have been considering up to this point" (l2 24, 304/208). this objectification constitutes the second phase of religious 'awareness', to use a less articulated term than consciousness: "thought comes to itself" as "what rests and abides within itself, namely spirit" (l2 24, 305/209). objectification is no longer formal but actual, be it "still immediate, consisting initially in the fact that it is a singular self- consciousness" (l2 24, 306-7/210). religious substance becomes an affirma- tive relationship with this power: being-Within-self as "thought itself, and this is the distinctive essentiality of self-consciousness" (l2 24, 306/209). Consciousness contemplates and meditates.
hegel then positions buddhism. it is described as 'the religion of the fo' (l2 24, 307/211). this religion "comes from China, and in historical fact it is somewhat later than the form in which power is the dominant element" (l2 24, 311/214). originally, hegel remarks, buddhism came from burma, india and Ceylon, "their god buddha is venerated as gautama", "depicted
avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 63
in the attitude of self-absorption with head bent and arms folded over his breast" (l2 24, 314/217). no toe-sucking yet. gautama is not identified as the secular person that later becomes the buddha. he is one of a series of deceased buddhas that are contrasted with living lamas as the dalai lama. the fact that hindu brahmans see gautama as the ninth incarna- tion of vishnu, explains partly this hindu image. then a second shift is made. Chinese, mongols, tibetans, burmese, and Ceylonese all practice a "religion we know under the form of lamaism" (l2 24, 307/211). As men- tioned before, these mistakes reflect the scientific insights of hegel's days. to him the difference between the fo and lamaism is only superficial. lamaism deals with living people through which the divine power trans- migrates, while the fo is concerned with a (re)capturing of buddhahood for salvation.
lamaism practices tranquility, repose and contemplation. "this is where the theoretical attitude begins" (l2 24, 309/211). Practical power and desire are negated by "peaceful being-within-self" (l2 24, 309/212). this cultus has institutional manifestations, but it is individualized since an individ- ual can unify himself with 'theoretical substantiality' whenever he wants. still a thin discursive line links it to the transmigration of souls as a char- acteristic of magic religions, but "immortality of the soul (in the broadest sense) is what now for the first time emerges" (l2 24, 309/212). this is not yet spiritual in an objectified way, being encapsulated in "immediacy, i. e. , a bodily, sensuous shape" (l2 24, 310/213).
more than the immortality of the soul another doctrine is explored and explained by hegel: the constituting principle of 'nothing': "however var- ied people and things may be, there is thus only one principle from which they stem, in which they are, through which they subsist, and to which they revert--this one principle is the nothing, completely unqualified, simple and pure" (l2 24, 312/215). hegel emphasizes that this 'nothing' should not be understood as not being. he suggests that, since it is purely identical with itself, being thought itself, it is 'a substantive being' (l2 24, 312/215) eternally at rest, free of determinations. the souls do no longer wander "for they become completely identical with the god fo" (l2 24, 313/215-216). free of desires the goal is reached as nirvana, being identi- cal with god, but conceptualized as nothing, as the void of the Science of Logic.
in positioning nirvana this way hegel implicitly subscribes a maha? ya? na view that he found in the Allgemeine Historie der Reisen. hegel's sources do mention the difference between the hi? naya? na and maha? ya? na 'method' of attaining nirvana, respectively by getting free from all worldly misery
64 henk oosterling
and by denying desires in order to attain buddhahood, but hegel's treat- ment of buddhism does not explore these modalities. Although in retro- spect he fails to grasp the specific non-Western articulation of emptiness or the void, i. e. of nirvana, he does not present 'nothing' as a mere priva- tion of being. Wordings like 'annihilation of self' come to the fore in the lectures of 1831 which are only known by their publication in an edition of hegel's works done by his friends shortly after his death.
Lectures of 1827
in the 1827 lectures, again mainly based on students' notes, hegel returns to the theme that he, in his student years in tu? bingen discussed with schelling and ho? lderlin: one and all, hen kai pan. in this series of lectures Chinese religion of the state is conceived as an intermediate phase. in hegel's account of how the emperor performs his divine powers he comes to speak of 'the sect of the dao'. (l2 27, 555/453) this sect was allowed to withdraw in self established monasteries into the mountains in order for the shen to attain immortality. the principle of the Way (Dao) lifts the religion of magic up to the being-within-self that in the next phase of religious consciousness is articulated in buddhism and lamaism. An exploration of daoism, in which hegel referred to a book on lao-zi (551-479 b. C. ) that was published in 1823 and that deals with the life and speeches of lao-zi, sets an in between: dao "is a distinctive god, reason" (l2 27, 548/446-447). hegel focuses on 'measure' as the core concept of reason, acknowledging dao as 'the return of consciousness into itself' (l2 27, 557/454). fo and dao are not explicitly connected. records on Chan buddhism or Zen buddhism were not yet available.
in this version of the lectures the religion of heaven (Tian) "is acknowl- edged as the highest ruling power" (l2 27, 548/446) that transcends magic and power but while governing moral conduct is still bound to empiri- cal consciousness. it remains formal and abstract. referring to the Papal reproach of Catholic orders in China for their inadequate translation of tian as 'god', hegel agrees with his sources that "tian designates wholly indeterminate and abstract universality; it is the wholly indeterminate sum of the physical and the moral nexus as a whole" (l2 27, 549/446). in the final analysis it is still the emperor who rules nature, be it under the guidance of tian. "the heaven of the Chinese or tian, by contrast, is some thing totally empty" (l2 27, 550/447). emptiness is interpreted 'empirically': the Chinese tian is not populated like the Christian heaven. emptiness is conceived as a privation, as space in which something is lacking, in short as negation.
avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 65
A dialectical structure of reasoning always attracts hegel's attention. in the margin of his notes on the 26th of June 1827 he writes: "it is quite note- worthy that the determination 'three' immediately comes into play to the extent that dao is something rational and concrete" (l2 27, 558/455), fol- lowed by the opening sentences of the Tao Te Ching: dao (reason) produc- ing the one, the one producing the two, the two producing the three and the three the whole universe. hegel concludes: "unless three determina- tions are recognized in god, 'god' is an empty word" (l2 27, 559/456). dao stays abstract as long as self-consciousness is not ruptured: "thus lao-zi is also a shen, or he has appeared as buddha" (l2 27, 560/456). in this way emptiness connects daoism and buddhism in hegel's conclusion.
in this series of lectures buddhism/lamaism is positioned beyond the realm of magic as the religion of being-Within-self. hegel's exposition has become more developed and balanced with buddhism still preceding hin- duism, but now as an autonomous phase that expands the abstract uni- versality and theoretical substantiality of the dao and tian. buddhism is even "the most widespread religion on earth" (l2 27, 563/460). the tricky topic of pantheism--and by implication of atheism--is gradually woven into his explanation. "here we find the form of substantiality in which the absolute is a being-within-self, the one substance; but it is not grasped just as a substance for thought and in thought (as it is in spinoza); instead it has at the same time existence in sensible presence, i. e. in singular human beings" (l2 27, 564/460).
it is against this background that the mistaken image of the toe-sucking 'buddha' suddenly appears, followed by the statement that "the ultimate of highest [reality] is therefore nothing or not-being" (l2 27, 565/461). in contrast to the 1824 lectures hegel now rephrases buddhist nothing- ness in Western ontological categories as not-being. this state of being is paradoxically strived for "through ceaseless internal mindfulness, to will nothing, to want [nothing], and to do nothing.
