No More Learning

After properly
cleaning up his portion, the culprit is to be immediately hanged.
But Neill, who had told his chief that his retreat had destroyed the
prestige of England, was compelled to appeal to him for help; for
four thousand rebels were threatening to overwhelm his little force.
Havelock, resolved to show that he was undismayed, first advanced
again and routed them, then recrossed the Ganges and re-entered
Cawnpore. The talukdars of Oudh, who, with a few exceptions, had
hitherto remained passive, now began for the most part, under
pressure from the rebel durbar, to send their retainers into the field.
>


## p. 189 (#225) ############################################

HAVELOCK
189
Three days after his return Havelock defeated the force which had
threatened Neill, but on the next day learned that he had been super-
seded by Sir James Outram, who, moreover, was appointed chief
commissioner of Oudh. Reinforcements were by this time coming up
the Ganges. On 15 September Outram reached Cawnpore, and on
the following day issued the famous order in which he announced his
intention of leaving to Havelock the honour of relieving Lucknow
and of serving under him as a volunteer. But in the emotional nature
of Outram generosity was not quite unalloyed: he intended to be not
only a volunteer, but a counsellor with a decisive voice.
Havelock's force, now more than doubled, numbered about three
thousand two hundred men. A floating bridge was thrown across the
Ganges; and on 21 September the final advance began. Havelock
had learned from Angad that if the defenders of the residency were not
relieved before the end of the month, they would have no meat left.
Driving the rebels before them, the troops on the 23rd captured the
Alambagh, a strong place two miles from Lucknow, where they were
heartened by the announcement that Delhi had been taken by
assault. Next day, while they were resting, Havelock and Outram
considered what plan they should adopt on the morrow. Although
rains had made the open country impassable for the heavy guns,
Havelock argued that the best course would be to cross the Gumti,
then, after a detour, to recross it by a bridge north of the residency,
and, thus relieved from the perils of street-fighting, to traverse the
narrow space that separated the bridge from the entrenchment.
Outram dissented from this view, and, though he had resigned the
command, dictated to a staff-officer the orders for the advance. The
troops were to cross the canal by the Charbagh bridge, south of the
city, then, avoiding the direct road, where the rebels were prepared to
resist, turn to the right along the bank, and, keeping outside the city,
move past the palace to their goal. Havelock, who had been made
apparently responsible for what he did not approve, was obliged to
give way.
The morning of the 25th was beautifully fine. Havelock rose early
and spent some time in prayer. The column advanced under fire to
the bridge, which was commanded by sharpshooters and defended
on the farther side by five guns. The Madras Fusiliers carried it with
a rush. While the 78th Highlanders held the bridge-head, the rest of
the column crossed, and pushed on almost unopposed till they came
within three-quarters of a mile from the residency, when they were
met with a heavy fire from the Kaisar Bagh; but, replying as best they
could, they soon found shelter in a court beneath the walls of the
Chattar Manzil. The Highlanders, who had diverged by a shorter
road, presently appeared and found themselves at the head of the
column. While soldiers, camels, guns and litters bearing wounded
men were thronging into the court, Outram and Havelock were


## p. 190 (#226) ############################################

190
THE MUTINY
observed in animated discussion. Outram, arguing that the enemy
would expect the column to advance through the streets, desired to
halt for the night, thus allowing the rear-guard to close up, and to
move on next morning through the successive courts: Havelock,
seeing that the enemy would then have time to occupy the courts,
sharing in the ardour of the soldiers, and fearing that the rebels might
succeed by a desperate effort in overpowering the garrison, implored
him to push on. The discussion waxed warm. Outram lost his temper;
but he gave way. “Let us on then”, he cried, “in God's name.
Highlanders, Sikhs, and Madras Fusiliers moved successively out of
the court; Neill fell from his horse at the exit, shot through the head;
but the column, plunging under a hail of bullets from adjoining
houses through trenches which had been cut across the road, and
descrying the flag waving on the roof of the residency, struggled un-
falteringly on till they entered the entrenchment. But though the
garrison had been reinforced, they had still to wait for the relief that
would enable the non-combatants to be removed to a place of safety.
Even more important were the events that occurred at Delhi, the
head-centre of revolt, and in the Panjab, with which it was throughout
connected. The officers whom Dalhousie had selected to administer
that province were a harmonious brotherhood. Except in the Pesha-
war valley, which was exposed to the raids of turbulent borderers, the
people had been disarmed; but in the matter of land-revenue they
had been generously treated. 1 Between Sikhs and Hindustanis there
was a national, between Sikhs and Muhammadans a religious, anti-
pathy. A perennial danger had been removed when Herbert Edwardes
won the consent of Dost Muhammad, the amir of Afghanistan, to a
treaty of alliance. The sepoys numbered thirty-six thousand: but ten
thousand British soldiers were quartered in the province; and the
Panjabi Irregulars, some thirteen thousand strong, next to the Gurkhas
the finest native troops in India, were an additional source of strength.
When the telegram announcing the seizure of Delhi reached Lahore,
John Lawrence was away; but the judicial commissioner, Robert
Montgomery, was a man of action, and the military officers supported
him. The sepoys at the neighbouring cantonment of Mianmir,
though they outnumbered the Europeans by eight to one, were
adroitly disarmed; the native portion of the garrison of Lahore was
treated likewise; and on the same day Montgomery sent letters of
warning and instruction to the principal civil officers, nearly all of
whom justified his confidence. Though a mutiny broke out at Feroze-
pore, where the commandant failed to follow the example of Mian-
mir, three important stations-Amritsar, where the rural population
were thoroughly loyal, Kangra, which dominated the hill-country on
the north, and Phillaur, commanding the Grand Trunk Road-were
instantly secured.
1 Cf. Holmes, op. cit. pp. 33-4; also p. 91, supra.


## p. 191 (#227) ############################################

THE PANJAB
191
Meanwhile momentous decisions were formed at Peshawar.
Herbert Edwardes, the commissioner, John Nicholson, the deputy-
commissioner, who had so tamed the lawless frontiersmen of Bannu
that in the closing year of his rule there was not a single attempt at
crime, Sydney Cotton, the brigadier, and Neville Chamberlain, the
commander of the Panjabi Irregulars, met in a council of war. The
principal resolutions, confirmed in due course by Lawrence, were that
a movable column should be formed to repress mutiny wherover it
might occur, and that recruits should be enlisted from the province
and the frontier, te absorb and utilise the lawless. During the next
few days Nicholson, in the absence of Edwardes, who had been sum-
moned to confer with Lawrence, set a watch over every ferry on the
Indus; but before Edwardes returned treasonable letters addressed to
sepoys were intercepted, and when Nicholson tried to persuade the
chiefs of the valley to raise their followers, the answer was significant:
"Show us that you are the stronger, and there shall be no lack of aid”.
At midnight on 21 May Edwardes and Nicholson heard that the
55th Native Infantry at Naushahra had mutinied. It seemed probable
that a detachment of the same regiment at Mardan had followed their
example, and that the troops at Peshawar would soon be infected.
The two friends instantly awakened Cotton, who agreed with them
that the infantry regiments must be disarmed; and in the morning
all, except those who were needed to carry on the work of the station,
were forced, despite the protests of their officers, to pile arms. Imme-
diately afterwards a multitude of men, protesting their loyalty, eagerly
offered to enlist. It was now possible to act against the 55th at
Mardan, who had been joined by the mutineers from Naushahra.
Flying before the force that marched against them, they were hunted
by Nicholson, who with his mounted police was alone able to overtake
them, into the hills adjoining Kashmir, where the survivors were
destroyed by the hill-men, or enslaved, or executed after they sur-
rendered in despair. Meanwhile Edwardes and Cotton, compelling
the disarmed sepoys to attend, were hanging or blowing from guns
deserters and mutineers; and, having proved themselves the stronger,
they had no difficulty in enlisting the recruits whom they required.
Not every station, however, was so firmly held. At Jalandhar, in
the opposite extremity of the province, the brigadier neglected to
disarm his sepoys, and when they mutinied delayed to pursue them;
but the deputy-commissioner of Ludhiana, through whose district
they passed on their way to Delhi, did all that one man could to repair
the error, and speedily put a stop to the commotion which their
presence caused. Lawrence, fearing that the sepoys at Multan would
rise as soon as they heard of the mutiny, and knowing that the loss of
that station would'involve the loss of the Southern Panjab, determined
to disarm the garrison, although, for want of an adequate British force,
he had hitherto shrunk from the attempt. Major Crawford Chamber-


## p. 192 (#228) ############################################

192
THE MUTINY
>
lain, in whom he had more confidence than in the commandant, was
entrusted with the duty, which he successfully performed. “The dis-
arming at Mooltan”, said Lawrence, “was a turning point in the
Punjab crisis, second only in importance to the disarmings at Lahore
and Peshawar. "
Lawrence was thinking not only how he could save the Panjab, but
how he could contribute to the recovery of Delhi. As soon as he saw
that the Panjabi soldiers had no fellow-feeling with the Hindustanis,
he resolved to compensate for the losses entailed by mutiny and de-
sertion by augmenting their numbers; and from first to last thirty-four
thousand Panjabi troops were raised. A 6 per cent. loan, to be repaid
within one year, first opened by the commissioner of the Cis-Satlej
states, was soon extended to the whole province; and though bankers
and merchants were chary in contributing, the chiefs who had helped
the government with their arms subscribed liberally. The police, loyal
from the outset, were strengthened. Criminals were ruthlessly
punished, and every plunderer who was caught was forced to make
restitution; but there was no great increase in violent crime. The
treasure in the various stations was secured with the loss of not more
than ten thousand pounds. Some districts remained absolutely tranquil
throughout, and the comparatively few disturbances that arose,
generally from distrust of the stability of British rule, were mostly
traceable to the machinations of Hindustanis, large numbers of whom
were expelled. Nearly all the civil courts remained open; the revenue
was paid almost in full; and attendance at the government schools
was but little diminished. In the Cis-Satlej states, where it was not
less important to maintain order than in Peshawar in order to repel
the influx of mutiny from the east, the task was exceptionally difficult.
The mixed population, more akin to the Hindustanis than to the
Panjabis, sympathised with the mutineers, and violent crimes in-
creased alarmingly: but the commissioner, Barnes, supported by the
rajas of Patiala, Nabha and Jhind, and by the Sikh portion of the
inhabitants, stamped out every symptom of revolt; and by the end of
July the crisis was over. So successfully, in short, was the Panjab
ruled that Lawrence, loyally aided by Bartle Frere, the commissioner
of Sind, who sent battalion after battalion to support him, was able
to supply the army at Delhi with stores of every kind and to reinforce
it by troops of all arms, British and Panjabi. The Guides, that famous
corps of frontiersmen which left Mardan when the seizure of Delhi
was announced, marched for three weeks at the rate of twenty-seven
miles a day, encamped on the Ridge on the day after Barnard arrived,
and within three hours engaged the mutineers. Twenty-eight years
later a civilian, himself destined to rule the Panjab, listened in his
novitiate to Sikhs who proudly related how they had fought for the
raj in the days of Nicholson. 1
1 O'Dwyer, India as I knew it, p. 40.


## p. 193 (#229) ############################################

THE SIEGE OF DELHI
193
But when Barnard took command, his army, far too small to invest
Delhi, could not attempt without siege artillery to breach the walls.
All that he could do was to cling to the Ridge; and with this object
he posted piquets at various buildings, the most important of which
were Hindu Rao's house on the right and the Flagstaff Tower on the
left. On the fourth day Metcalfe House, between the Ridge and the
city, was captured and placed in communication with the Flagstaff
Tower, and Barnard was persuaded to sanction a plan for a coup-de-
main; but an accident prevented it from being attempted, and an
amended plan was so strongly opposed by his advisers that he declined
to accept it. In the next week, however, the assailants made some
progress. The possession of Metcalfe House had made it impossible
to turn their left; successive attempts to capture Hindu Rao's house
were repulsed; and although the mutineers made a great effort on the
centenary of
Plassey, they were expelled from an important building
in the suburb of Sabzi-Mandi, south-west of the Ridge, the loss of
which prevented them from attacking the British rear without a long
detour. Reinforcements had already begun to arrive; and Colonel
Baird Smith, who on 3 July took over the post of chief engineer,
destroyed several bridges over canals on the rear and the south-west
of the Ridge, and thus made the position comparatively secure. But
the mutineers also had been reinforced; many British soldiers had
fallen or succumbed to disease; and on the 5th Barnard, who, though
he failed to inspire confidence, had won the affectionate respect of all,
died of cholera. A few days later his successor, General Reed, who
had long been in poor health, resigned in favour of Wilson.
Some weeks earlier Lawrence had informed Edwardes that he
intended, if the army at Delhi should appear in danger of failing, to
send the British troops in the Peshawar valley to help them and invite
the amir of Afghanistan to occupy the valley on the understanding
that, if he proved faithful, it should be ceded in perpetuity. Edwardes
was amazed. The amir, he insisted, would regard the offer as signi-
fying the end of the British raj, and would follow the retreating troops
as an enemy. To cede Peshawar would involve the loss of the Panjab;
but all would be well if we maintained the capitals on the sea and the
frontiers, for “Between the two it is all a family quarrel, an insurrec-
tion in our own house". Finally he declared that rather than obey an
order to abandon Peshawar, he would feel bound by conscience to
resign and explain his reason to the government. Canning, to whom
Lawrence appealed, saw that to abandon territory would be fatal,
and decided, just before Wilson took command, in favour of Edwardes.
Meanwhile fresh bands of sepoys had been streaming from all
quarters into Delhi. Their officers were unable to control them.
Hindus quarrelled with Muhammadans; both plundered the shops,
i Cf. Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, 11, 49 sqq. ; Cunningham, Earl Canning,
pp. 122-4.
CHI VI
13


## p. 194 (#230) ############################################

194
THE MUTINY
debauched the wives and daughters of respectable citizens, and treated
the aged king with gross disrespect; while all who had anything to lose
lamented the downfall of the British raj. " It was the custom that each
successive band should go into action after its arrival; and fighting
on the Ridge was maintained without a pause. In six weeks there
were more than twenty combats. The British troops cheerfully en-
dured the discomfort of water-logged tents, kept up their spirits by
riding pony-races or playing cricket, and, though many of them treated
the camp-followers with a cruelty which Wilson could not wholly
check, fraternised cordially with their gallant comrades, the Gurkhas
and the Guides. Foot by foot they added to their ground until Sabzi-
Mandi was completely in their power; and by the end of July in-
variable defeat was weakening the confidence of the enemy. Still,
Delhi remained in their possession; and the Panjabis were losing
confidence in the British power.
Nicholson, who had taken command of the Movable Column,
almost immediately found it necessary to disarm two of the regiments.
On 8 July, hearing at Amritsar that an outbreak had occurred at
Jehlam, he disarmed a third; and two days later, learning that the
garrison of Sialkot had broken loose, he disarmed a body of his own
cavalry belonging to one of the mutinous corps. His remaining force
consisted of no more than one untried British regiment, a few Panjabis
and undisciplined police sowars, and nine guns; but within the next
two days, after covering forty-four miles in a single march, he defeated
the Sialkot murineers on the Ravi, near Gurdaspur. Four days later
he annihilated the survivors, who had sought refuge on an island in the
river, and on the 24th set out for Delhi. On the last day of the month
a body of sepoys who had murdered four of their officers at Lahore
was beaten on the Ravi by native police and villagers; and on the
following day Frederick Cooper, the deputy-commissioner of Amritsar,
who had captured the survivors, put them all to death, and thus
(Montgomery declared) saved the Lahore division.
Other dangers were not less successfully overcome. Edwardes
compelled the capitalists of Peshawar, who shrank from supporting
a government which they no longer trusted, to contribute four
hundred thousand rupees to the loan; disturbances on the border
were suppressed, partly by force, partly by tactful management; and
at Peshawar, where one of the disarmed regiments, stimulated by a
fanatic, seized the weapons belonging to newly raised irregulars, seven
hundred mutineers were either slain in pursuit or summarily executed.
Nevertheless, disbelief in the vitality of British power was begetting
disaffection in the Panjab, now denuded of so many troops.
About a fortnight after Nicholson arrived at Delhi it became known
that the siege-train was at last approaching. A strong body of sepoys
1 Cf. Metcalfe, Two Native Narratives of the Mutiny in Delhi; Press List of Mutiny Papers,
1857.


## p. 195 (#231) ############################################

THE STORM OF DELHI
195
marched to intercept it; but Nicholson signally defeated them, and
on 4 September the train arrived. Wilson was ill and overwrought,
but, influenced by Baird Smith, who, though he was suffering intense
pain from a neglected wound, and was weakened by chronic dysentery,
had established an ascendancy over him, he consented to prepare for
the assault. The mutineers were still twice as numerous as their
opponents, and only the lack of a directing mind, who would have
concentrated on the decisive point forces that were wasting th ir
strength elsewhere, prevented the disparity from being overwhelming.
Within the next few days the engineers, protected by the fire of field-
guns on the Ridge, constructed four siege batteries opposite the
northern face of the city; and the gunners, working under a galling
fire of musketry (for the hostile guns were soon silenced), destroyed
the bastions and breached the curtain. On the 13th Wilson and Baird
Smith arranged the plan of operations. The first and second columns
were to storm the breaches, the third to penetrate the city through
the Kashmir gate, after it had been blown open, the fourth to expel
the enemy from the western suburbs and then to enter the city by the
Kabul gate, opened by their comrades from within. The command
of the operations was entrusted to Nicholson. The breaches, examined
under the starlit night, were reported practicable; and Wilson,
accepting the advice of Baird Smith, ordered the assault to be de-
livered at dawn.
About three o'clock the whole camp was astir. Sikhs, Pathans,
Gurkhas and Kashmiris stood side by side with Englishmen. The
mutineers had filled up the breaches in the night, and it was necessary
for the batteries to reopen; but at length the impatient troops were
permitted to advance. The first two columns under a fire of musketry
and an avalanche of loosened stones, by which many of the ladder-
men were killed, fought their way into the city; the third, followed
by the reserve, achieved its aim; but the fourth, disorganised and
disheartened by the disablement of their commander, failed, and
Hindu Rao's house, threatened by their emboldened opponents, was
with difficulty saved. Meanwhile Nicholson, seeing that the mutineers
in the city were regaining courage, attempted, despite the failure of
the fourth column, to assault the Lahore bastion, which the com-
mander of the second had neglected, in default of express orders, to
attack; but the cannonade which he encountered was so appalling
that his men shrank from the final rush, and while he was appealing
to them he fell mortally wounded. The result of the day's fighting, in
which about one-fourth of the attacking force had fallen, was that the
space between the north-eastern angle of the city and the Kabul gate
was in British hands. Wilson was so dissatisfied that he spoke of with-
drawing the troops altogether; but Baird Smith and Neville Chamber-
lain induced him to hold on.
i Cr. Vibart, Richard Baird Smith, pp. 49 599. , 121 599.
a
13-2


## p. 196 (#232) ############################################

196
THE MUTINY
>
Next day many of the British soldiers, finding bottles of beer, wine
and spirits which the mutineers had purposely left in deserted shops and
on the pavements, became helplessly drunk; while of those who were
not exposed to or resisted this temptation many were enticed into dark
alleys and killed. Infuriated by this, their comrades, though they
treated women and children with forbearance, showed no mercy to
the men. By the 19th the city was completely mastered. The king
had been persuaded by a traitor to remain with his family at the tomb
of Humayun outside the city, where he was captured by Hodson, the
famous leader of light horse, who also shot the old man's sons after they
had surrendered. “This sad act was most uncalled for”, wrote Hope
Grant, rejecting the plea of a possible rescue. 1
Though the recovery of Delhi, which, like the relief of Lucknow,
had been accomplished without reinforcements from England, ended
hopes of resuscitating the Moghul Empire, and in the Panjab restored
waning confidence in British power, it was too late to produce all the
results that had been expected. A column, dispatched from Delhi
through the Doab, burned villages, drove mutineers before it, and at
Agra defeated a force which had alarmed the garrison; but the bands
which it had scattered returned after it passed and renewed their
depredations. In the spring of the next year the king of Delhi, found
guilty of rebellion and complicity in murder, was sentenced to im-
prisonment for life: but John Lawrence, pleading with Canning for
the citizens, many of whom had been tried and executed by a merciless
commission, insisted that the great mass were innocent; and the
territory of Delhi was placed under his control. It remained for the
veteran, Sir Colin Campbell, who had been appointed commander-
in-chief, to paralyse the surviving energies of the revolt.
His first aim was to relieve Lucknow. Havelock had been only just
in time to avoid encountering mutineers from Delhi, who reinforced
the besiegers, and to prevent their overwhelming the garrison. Within
two days after his arrival the troops that had not been able to join in
the final advance made their way into the entrenchment. Outram,
in order to accommodate the multitude under his command, seized
and occupied the palaces along the Gumti, and in frequent sorties
destroyed hostile batteries; but his force was not strong enough to
remove the non-combatants, for whom, moreover, he was unable to
procure carriage, and he found that there was enough food to last
several weeks. Lack of vegetables, however, produced scurvy, while
the soldiers had no tobacco, and the cold autumnal air penetrated
their summer clothing. Meantime Sir Colin was providing for the
equipment of his expected reinforcements, securing the road, which
was infested by rebels in Bihar, and, since the railway was open only
as far as Raniganj, arranging for transport thence to Allahabad. On
3 November he reached Cawnpore. Tantia Topi with the Gwalior
i Holmes, op. cit. pp. 384-7.
2 Cf. Metcalfe, op. cit. p. 72.


## p. 197 (#233) ############################################

SIR COLIN CAMPBELL
197
contingent, which Sindhia could no longer restrain, was threatening
that city; but Sir Colin, rejecting the advice of Outram, who urged
him to secure its safety first, resolved to advance, and contented him-
self with leaving a detachment under General Windham to oppose
Tantia. On the 13th his force, numbering about five thousand men,
encamped at the Alambagh. The chief engineer advised him to adopt
the plan which Havelock had proposed—to cross the Gumti and
recross it near the residency. Though this route traversed open ground,
where the heavy guns could act and the enemy were not prepared,
he preferred the advice of Outram, who recommended him to cross
the canal near its junction with the river, and thence to follow the
route by which the main body had advanced in September. On the
16th the army crossed the canal. The enemy, deluded by a recon-
naissance which Sir Colin had made on his left, offered no opposition
till the advanced guard, moving in a narrow lane, was deluged by a
hail of bullets from the Sikandar Bagh on its right. For the moment
the situation seemed almost desperate: but by herculean efforts a
troop of horse artillery clambered up the bank on the side of the lane;
heavy guns were dragged through an opening which the sappers cut;
and within an hour a breach appeared. The defenders, trapped
between the assailants and others who had forced an entrance through
a door, were gradually overpowered, and by sunset the survivors,
crowding into the towers at the angles of the building, were utterly
destroyed. Nearer the residency, the Shah Najif, a large mosque,
standing in a garden surrounded by a wall, withstood the heaviest
artillery, and Sir Colin had ordered the guns to be withdrawn when
a Highland regiment passed through a cleft which had fortunately
been discovered in the wall, and found that the garrison had fled.
Havelock had already captured buildings on the east of the residency:
next day the only remaining strongholds that barred the advance
were stormed; and in the afternoon the relieving army joined the
garrison. Two days later, Sir Colin having secured his left fank, the
women and children, the sick and the wounded, were removed.
Outram and Havelock besought him to seize the Kaisar Bagh and
thus re-establish British supremacy; but, although the formidable
citadel was breached within three days, he refused to leave behind
the small force for which they asked, insisting that his entire army
would be needed to secure Cawnpore. The garrison therefore
evacuated the entrenchment; and two days later Havelock, weakened
by privation, succumbed to dysentery. On the 27th Sir Colin, leaving
Outram at the Alambagh to withstand the rebels until he should
himself return to crush them, marched with the convoy for Cawnpore.
The low tremulous sound which tells that artillery is at work at some
distant place was plainly heard.
Sir Colin had ordered Windham to occupy and strengthen the
entrenchment which Havelock had constructed, to send on to Luck-


## p. 198 (#234) ############################################

198
THE MUTINY
now any British infantry that might join him, and, if Tantia should
threaten to attack him, to extend his force conspicuously in advance
of the entrenchment, but not to assume the offensive unless there
should be no other way of saving the position from bombardment.
Learning that Tantia was near, Windham obtained leave to retain
a portion of the expected reinforcements; but within the next few
days various reports led him to fear that his chief had suffered a
reverse. Knowing that if he himself should be attacked, the defensivo
display prescribed by Sir Colin would be of no avail, he had prepared
and forwarded for approval a plan for destroying iwo of the most
important posts which Tantia occupied; but, owing to the interruption
of communication, he received no reply. Though he shrank from
executing this plan on his own responsibility, he attacked and defeated
a detachment which Tantia personally commanded, but immediately
retreated and selected a more defensible encamping-ground, west of
the town. Hearing that all had gone well at Lucknow, he hoped that
Tantia would not venture to attack him before Sir Colin returned.
Tantia, however, knew that Windham would not have followed up
a victory by retreat if he had not felt anxious; his own force was
enormously superior; and in the next two days he twice defeated
Windham, who failed at the critical moment to support his best
officer, and was ill-served by another. Sir Colin, who received urgent
letters on his march, rode on, fearing that the bridge might have been
destroyed, in advance of the column, and at sunset saw the battle still
raging and flames rushing up above the city. But Windham had pre-
served two vital points: not only the bridge, but also the entrenchment
remained intact. Next morning Tantia opened fire upon the bridge;
but his artillery was overpowered, and Sir Colin's army, with the
convov, safely crossed. For a week he remained on the defensive,
to allow the convoy to get out of danger; but on 6 December he gained
a victory which would
have been decisive if the chief of the staff had
not missed a chance of cutting off the retreat of two-thirds of Tantia's
army.
While Sir Colin, kept inactive by want of carriage, was awaiting
the return of the carts that had transported the convoy to Allahabad,
he thought out his plans for the rest of the campaign. Before he could
reconquer Rohilkhand and Oudh, it was necessary to get control of
the Duab. As three of the important points—Delhi, Agra and Alla-
habad—were already in his possession, it only remained to secure the
fourth, Fatel. garh, on the Ganges, east of Agra. This was accomplished
by converging columns, which drove numbers of reliels into Rohil-
khand, whereon many of the villagers supported the re-established
civil officers. Sir Colin desired to utilise the remaining months of cool
weather for the reconquest of Rohilkhand; for, knowing that the
subjugation of Oudh would require a longer time, he was unwilling
to expose his troops to the hardships of campaigning in the summer,
a


## p. 199 (#235) ############################################

LUCKNOW RETAKEN
199
a
and he believed that it would be safe to wait until the autumn if the
rebels were prevented from invading other provinces.
But Canning
pointed out that military must give place to political reasons. To
restore order in Rohilkhand, which had long been under British rule,
was a matter of police: Oudh represented a deposed dynasty, and all
India was waiting to see whether the British could regain their
sovereignty. Sir Colin loyally obeyed. In order to maintain his hold
upon the Doab and to cover the march of reinforcements to Cawnpore,
where they were to concentrate before advancing against Lucknow,
he retained the position at Fatehgarh, and made an arrangement with
John Lawrence, in accordance with which a force was to hold
Rohilkhand in check until it should be time to reconquer it.
Ever since Sir Colin left Lucknow, Outram had defended the
Alambagh against a force which outnumbered his in the proportion
of thirty to one, thus nullifying the aciivity of a hundred and twenty
thousand rebels, preserving the safety of Cawnpore, and preparing
for Sir Colin's return. On 28 February, 1858, Sir Colin left Cawnpore,
where he had been superintending preparations for the siege of Luck-
now, and marched to Banthira, near the Alambagh, where the whole
army—the most powerful that a British general had ever commanded
in India—was assembled. A Gurkha force, under Jang Bahadur, the
virtual ruler of Nepal, and a column under General Franks, which
had conjointly enabled the civil authorities to resume their work in
the Benares and Allahabad divisions, were coming to take part in the
siege. Lucknow had been strengthened by the destruction of the
bridges over the canal and by three successive entrenchments which
protected the eastern side of the city, the innermost covering the
Kaisar Bagh. But the rebels had made one fatal blunder. As neither
Havelock nor Sir Colin had operated beyond the Gumti, they had
neglected the defence of the northern side. Sir Colin accordingly
adopted a plan devised by the chief engineer, Brigadier Robert
Napier. While he himself crossed the canal and, turning the enemy's
right flank, moved against the Kaisar Bagh along the Hazrat Ganj,
by which the Highlanders had advanced in September, Outram was
to cross the river and take the left flank in reverse. Aided by Outram's
enfilading fire, Sir C-lin's force found the first line of works abandoned,
then, turning the others, sapped through the houses on the left of the
Hazrat Ganj, and finally captured the Kaisar Bagh, the Chattar
Manzil, and other palaces on its right: but three successive oppor-
tunities of cutting off large rebel bands were lost. Outram, who asked
leave to recross the river and attack the rebels while they were de-
moralised by the loss of the citadel, was forbidden to do so unless he
would promise not to lose a single man; and in the next few days some
thirty thousand were allowed through mismanagement to escape.
When, on 21 March, the city was again in British hands, the province
remained in possession of the enemy.


## p. 200 (#236) ############################################

200
THE MUTINY
Meanwhile Canning had committed an error which made re-
conquest still more difficult. Before the siege began he forwarded to
Outram a proclamation, to be addressed after the capture of the city
to the civil population, confiscating all lands except those held by a
few loyalists, offering immunity from disgrace to all who had not
murdered Europeans and who should instantly submit, but warning
them that for any additional boon they must trust to the mercy of the
government. Outram, reminding him that in the original settlement
the talukdars had been unjustly treated, declared that if nothing more
than their lives and freedom from imprisonment were offered, they
would be driven to wage a guerrilla war, whereas if the possession of
their lands were guaranteed to them, they would assist in restoring
order. The only concession which Canning could be induced to make
(though John Lawrence had pleaded for an amnesty to all mutineers
and rebels who had not committed murder) was to insert a clause
promising that those who would support the government immediately
might expect a large measureof indulgence. The promise was generally
disregarded, and the bolder spirits determined to resist to the last.
Before the recovery of Lucknow, Kunwar Singh, undaunted by the
defeat which he had suffered near Arrah, had taken advantage of the
withdrawal of troops, who were needed for the siege, to invade the
Benares division. Sir Colin sent a force to the rescue, and soon after-
wards the old Rajput died; but throughout the summer and the
autumn his followers maintained a guerrilla war in western Bihar.
The lack of the amnesty for which Lawrence pleaded was sorely felt.
"We must cling together”, said a prisoner, “for when we go home we
are hunted down and hanged. ” Detached parties, when they could
be brought to action, were invariably defeated; but the rebels, as a
whole, were too swift to be caught. When they were confined by seven
converging columns within a narrow space, and success seemed
certain, one column was delayed, and the entire body escaped through
the gap. It was not until October, when the younger Havelock per-
suaded his chief to try the effect of mounted infantry, whom he had
himself hastily trained, that they were driven into the Kaimur hills,
where, before the end of the year, their organisation was destroyed.
To understand how Sir Colin was able to undertake securely the
reconquest of Rohilkhand and Oudh, it is necessary to trace the course
of events in the Bombay Presidency and the central provinces. Lord
Elphinstone, the governor of Bombay, equipped a column to support
the Central India Agency, and throughout the Mutiny regarded the
interests of his own charge as subordinate to those of the empire. The
Bombay army, on the whole, was tolerably staunch. In Bombay itself,
though the sepoys were in a mutinous temper, order was preserved
by the skilful management of the superintendent of police. A plot
was discovered in the recently annexed state, Satara, and the con-
spirators were punished. But the principal danger was in the southern


## p. 201 (#237) ############################################

CENTRAL INDIA
201
Maratha country, where many landowners had been aggrieved by
the action of the Inam Commission, and the people were excited by
the momentary triumph of the Nana. A mutiny occurred at Kolha-
pur; intercepted letters revealed a Muhammadan conspiracy; and
emissaries from the Nana caused a local rebellion: but order was
restored by Colonel Le Grand Jacob, whom the governor had en-
trusted with discretionary power. 1
In Central India the most important point was Indore, the capital
of the Maratha prince, Holkar, who, in the absence of the agent,
Sir Robert Hamilton, was under the supervision of Colonel Durand.
The only British troops available were the gunners of a single battery
at the neighbouring station of Mhow; but on hearing of the outbreak
at Meerut, Durand summoned a detachment of Bhils and a force
belonging to the contingent that protected the begam of Bhopal,
while Holkar contributed a small force. Towards the end of June
Durand learned that the column which Elphinstone had equipped
could not advance, and on 1 July Holkar’s troops, who were imme-
diately joined by the infantry of the Malwa and Bhopal contingents,
mutinied. The Bhils and the Bhopal cavalry did nothing, and Durand
was forced to retreat with the women and children under the escort
of the cavalry who, though not actively mutinous, refused to remain.
To reach Mhow was impossible, for the approach to the road was
commanded by the mutineers; and the cavalry insisted on going to
Sehore in Bhopal. The commandant at Mhow, however, supported
by Holkar, who, if he had before been half-hearted, now proved him-
self loyal, assumed the duties of the agent and restored order in his
own district, though in the surrounding country anarchy was rampant.
Durand himself, moving southward from Sehore, joined the column
dispatched by Elphinstone, which he thenceforth commanded, at
Asirgarh, and returned to Mhow, where he was kept inactive by stress
of weather. When the dry season began he marched northward,
quelled the insurrection in Malwa, and in December returned to
Indore, where, before transferring his charge to Hamilton, he insisted
that all who had been concerned in the mutiny should be punished. 2
Another Maratha, the widow of the raja of Jhansi whose dominions
Dalhousie had annexed, had already planned revenge. Within a
month of the outbreak at Meerut the garrison mutinied; a general
massacre of Europeans followed; and the rani, buying over the sepoys,
who had threatened to set up a rival, fortified her city, raised an army,
and prepared to defend her country to the last. 3
In Bundelkhand, although many of the chiefs rebelled, Lieutenant
Osborne, the political officer at Rewah, conducted affairs so skilfully
that communication between Bombay and Calcutta remained un-
1 Cf. Jacob, Western India before and during the Mutinies, pp. 148 sqq.
2 Cf. H. M. Durand, Life of Sir isenry Durand, 1, 197. 599:
• Holmes, op. cit. pp. 791 sqq. and references there ciced.


## p. 202 (#238) ############################################

202
THE MUTINY
broken. In the Sagor and Narbada territories, south of Bundel-
khand, disturbances were general, but farther south, in the recently
annexed province of Nagpur, the authorities sternly repressed the
first symptoms of disorder. In Hyderabad, where were congregated
numerous Muslim fanatics, the resident, Major Davidson, supported
by the Nizam's able minister, Salar Jang, kept the peace, despite active
propaganda; and a band of Rohillas, who attacked the residency, was
scattered by a shower of canister from the Madras Horse Artillery,
who, like all the troops of that presidency, were staunch. It was
reserved for Sir Hugh Rose to restore British supremacy in the heart
of the peninsula and to prepare the way for the final efforts of Sir Colin
Campbell
In accordance with a plan formed by Sir Robert Hamilton, a
Bombay column, under Rose, was to march from Mhow by way of
Jhansi to Kalpi, while a Madras column, under General Whitlock,
marched northward across Bundelkhand. Leaving Mhow on
.
6 January, 1858, Rose joined his and brigade at Sehore. Capturing
rebel forts and defeating all whom he encountered in the field while the
ist brigade on his left cleared the great road from Bombay, he was
within a day's march from Jhansi when he received a dispatch from
Sir Colin, ordering him to turn aside and succour a chief who was
besieged by the Gwalior contingent under Tantia Topi. Fortunately
Hamilton, who, as a political officer, ventured to use his own discre-
tion, directed him to disregard this order, and two days later the siege
of Jhansi began. Within the next four days the whole of the ist brigade
and the siege-train arrived. Even at night the besiegers lay on their
arms and by day were dazzled by the glare and half-stifled by the
scorching wind. The besieged never ceased firing except at night, and
even women were seen working in their batteries. The siege had lasted
nine days when Tantia appeared with twenty-two thousand men.
Without suspending the bombardment, Sir Hugh collected all the
men whom he could spare, and on the following day defeated him.
Two days later, after a desperate resistance, the city was taken by
assault, and on the following night the rani, quitting the fort, rode
with a few attendants for Kalpi. After halting for nearly three weeks
to collect supplies and ammunition, Sir Hugh, though the sick list
was daily lengthening, resumed his march, defeated Tantia again in
the battle of Kunch, and prepared to finish the campaign. Whitlock,
partly owing to his own inactivity, was too late to join him; but Sir Colin
sent a force to his support. Half of his own troops were sick, all were
ailing, and he himself had suffered repeatedly from sunstroke; but on
22 May a final victory gave him possession of Kalpi. He was looking
forward to a period of rest which might enable him to recruit his
health when he heard of an event which caused a sensation throughout
India. The rani and Tantia, boldly marching with the remnant of
1 Holmes, op. cit. pp. 498 sqq. Cf. Meadows Tavlor, op. cit. p. 3&? .


## p. 203 (#239) ############################################

ROSE'S CAMPAIGN
203
their force to Gwalior, where Sindhia's army deserted to them, seized
the fortress and proclaimed the Nana as Peshwa. The main artery of
communication between Bombay and the North-Western Provinces
was in danger. Sir Hugh instantly took the field again, won a battle
on the outskirts of Gwalior, in which the rani, whom he esteemed as
“the best and bravest military leader of the rebels”, fell, defeated
Tantia on the following day, and restored Sindhia to his throne.
Tantia with four thousand men fled into Rajputana, and during the
next eight months, crossing and recrossing the Chambal, the Nar-
bada, and other rivers, doubling again and again like a hunted
hare, but still hoping to find support for his master, he contrived,
thanks to the marvellous speed of his followers, to escape the many
columns that pursued him. Early in 1859 the fugitives who had not
dispersed surrendered, and a few weeks later Tantia, betrayed as he
wandered in the jungle by a feudatory of Sindhia, was taken in his
sleep. Condemned by a court-martial on the charge of rebellion, he
was hanged on 18 April at Sipri in the Gwalior state. 1
The campaign of Sir Hugh Rose had relieved Sir Colin Campbell
from anxiety for his rear. After the recapture of Lucknow he pro-
posed to undertake forthwith the reconquest of Oudh, which his own
remissness had made necessary; but Canning replied that the Hindus
of Rohilkhand, who were almost all friendly, might turn against the
government if it delayed to overthrow Khan Bahadur Khan. Three
columns, supported by that which had guarded Fatehgarh, converged
on Bareilly, and by the end of May, although the moulvi of Faizabad,
who had led the assailants of Outram at the Alambagh, gave con-
siderable trouble, Rohilkhand was completely subdued. In Oudh,
where the peasant cultivators, hardly noticing the movements of the
rebels, were busy in the fields, the mutineers, the troops of the deposed
king, the talukdars' clansmen, and the Muhammadan zealots formed
distinct groups. A force which had been detached by Sir Colin did
what was possible, and many talukdars, trusting to the assurances of
Montgomery, who had succeeded Outram, that their land should not
be confiscated, tendered their submission; but the number that re-
mained in arms was still considerable. In October, when the weather
became cool, and the sepoys had mostly dispersed, Sir Colin began
his campaign. Success was less swift than it might have been if he had
followed the advice of Outram, who, pointing to the example of the
younger Havelock, urged him to form a corps of mounted infantry;
but the cordon with which he surrounded the province was of over-
whelming strength, and by the end of December the rebels had been
driven into Nepal. Still, in many parts of the peninsula small columns
were employed in hunting down marauders; and it was not until the
end of 1859 that India was restored to something like its normal state.
It remains to consider certain questions relating to the Mutiny, the
1 Cf. Holmes, op. cit. pp. 503 sqq. and references there cited.


## p. 204 (#240) ############################################

204
THE MUTINY
isolated rebellions connected with it, and the disturbances to which it
gave rise among the civil population. Before the story of the greased
cartridges was circulated, there was no definite plot for a general
rising of the Bengal army, and it is improbable that such a plot was
formed even after the first mutinies. For, though Cracroft Wilson,
the judge of Moradabad, collected evidence which convinced him
that 31 May had been fixed for a simultaneous revolt, and that the
plan was marred by the premature outbreak at Meerut, John Lawrence
found in the numerous intercepted letters written by sepoys not the
faintest hint of an organised conspiracy, while none of the faithful
sepoys, none of the condemned mutineers who might have saved their
lives by disclosing it, if it had existed, knew anything about it. In
reply to questions put to prisoners in the North-Western Provinces,
the cartridge, and it alone, was named as a grievance.
While the mutincers lacked a head, many were half-hearted and
fought reluctantly against the leaders whom they had been accus-
tomed to obcy; and between the various groups there was a want of
concert. Sikhs, Panjabis, Gurkhas fought whole-heartedly against
them. Even so, however, the prospects of the British would have been
almost desperate if Indian princes-particularly the rajas of Patiala,
Jhind and Nabha-had not given invaluable aid. Colin Campbell
made serious mistakes and lost precious opportunities; but his critics,
who contrasted him with the men who, without help from England,
had repelled the first onslaught of the mutineers, and complained
that with forces enormously superior he was slow in extinguishing the
revolt, forgot that his task, in itself even harder than theirs, was
rendered still more difficult by the delay in offering an amnesty and
by the confiscation proclaimed by Lord Canning.
Although many whose pride was offended by the domination of an
alien and infidel race, or who had personal objects to gain, desired
the overthrow of the British raj, diversities of race, rank, status, aim
and, above all, religion made it impossible for them to combine.
Aggrieved chiefs, such as Kunwar Singh, dispossessed land-holders,
villagers who objected to taxation, hereditary thieves, budmashes of
every kind took advantage of the prostration of authority to redress
their grievances, to rob, or to gratify private animosities; but civil
disturbances, except in a few isolated regions and on the part of a few
embittered or fanatical groups, never amounted to rebellion. After
the Mutiny broke out, the titular king of Delhi was proclaimed head
of a movement by which Muhammadan zealots hoped to regain
supremacy; but this probably deterred many to whom Muhammadan
rule was abhorrent from supporting the mutineers. The Nana, pro-
fiting by the military rising which he had helped to encourage,
became the representative of those Marathas who desired to restore
the power once exercised by the Peshwa. Among the states which
Dalhousie had annexed rebellion broke out in Jhansi and Oudh
a


## p. 205 (#241) ############################################

DALHOUSIE'S ALLEGED RESPONSIBILITY
205
alone; and in Oudh it was due not to annexation, but to the harshness
with which the talukdars were treated, to the failure of Havelock's
earlier attempts to relieve the residency, to the abandonment of
Lucknow, justifiable though it may have been, by Sir Colin Campbell,
to the errors which he committed during the siege, and to Canning's
impolitic proclamation. These rebellions arose in consequence of the
Mutiny, and there is no evidence that any of the rebels, except the
Nana, conspired before it began.
Dalhousie, except in so far as he had failed to remedy the indisci-
pline of the army, which was rather the business of the commander-
in-chief than of the governor-general, and had neglected to safeguard
Delhi and Allahabad, was unjustly blamed, and has been fully
vindicated. Even the annexation of Jhansi would have been harmless
if it had been supported by armed force; the increase of European
troops, for which he had in vain pleaded, would have at least averted
the worst calamities of the Mutiny; while by the construction of roads
and telegraphs, and by the administration which he bestowed upon
the Panjab, he contributed much to the power by which the Mutiny
was quelled.
Even before the reconquest of Oudh an event had occurred which,
while it marked the restoration of British supremacy, inaugurated a
new period of Indian history. The East India Company, upon which
all political parties in England agreed in throwing the blame of the
Mutiny, was abolished; and India was to be ruled in the name of the
queen. A proclamation, prepared under her direction, announced
that the government of India had been assumed by the queen; that
Lord Canning was to be the first viceroy, and that all officers who had
been in the service of the Company were confirmed in their offices;
that all treaties made by the Company with Indian princes were to
be maintained; that the queen desired no extension of territory,
promised full religious toleration to her Indian subjects, and would
always respect their ancient usages; that she offered pardon to all
rebels and mutineers who had not directly taken part in the murder of
Europeans; and that she would constantly endeavour to promote the
prosperity of her Indian dominions.


## p. 206 (#242) ############################################

CHAPTER XI
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
The government of India is an amazingly complex and dual form of adminis-
tration. It has two chiefs, the secretary of state here, the man at the desk and on
the front bench in this country; and the viceroy, the man on the spot in India. It
is the latter who, at any rate in India, is invested with paramount power; but the
final responsibility rests with the secretary of state. 1
In his British Government in India Lord Curzon further observes :
This dualism has arisen not merely from the simultaneous existence of one half
of the government in England, and the other half in India, for that is a feature of
the administration from a sovereign centre of all dependencies or dominions, but
from the subdivision of that authority both in England and in India. ?
The subject of this chapter is the history of the London branch of
British administration in India from 1858, the memorable year which
was marked by the end of the Mutiny and the proclamation of Lord
Canning as first viceroy and governor-general for the crown, to 1918,
the
year
which
saw the conclusion of the great war.
In February, 1858, a weighty and dignified petition was presented
to both houses of parliament on behalf of the East India Company.
It failed to avert the impending sentence, but certainly influenced
subsequent legislation.
The petitioners assumed that the minister of the crown who would
henceforward conduct the home portion of the administration of
India would be assisted by a council composed of statesmen ex-
perienced in Indian affairs. The knowledge necessary for governing
a foreign country, and in particular a country like India, could not
possibly be possessed by anyone who had not devoted a considerable
portion of his life to the acquisition of it. The council should be
qualified not only to advise the minister, “but also by its advice
to exercise a certain degree of moral check". The minister would
generally be unacquainted with India and would constantly be ex-
posed to solicitations from individuals and bodies
either entirely ignorant of that country or knowing enough of it to imposc on those
who knew still less than themselves and having very frequently objects in view
other than the good government of India.
British public opinion was necessarily unacquainted with Indian
affairs and therefore liable to be misled. The responsible minister's
council should, therefore, derive sufficient weight from its constitution
1 Lord Curzon, Hansard, 13 July, 1917, XXV, 1027-8.
2 11, 67.
3 Hansard, 1858, CXLVIII, Appendix.


## p. 207 (#243) ############################################

THE COMPANY'S PETITION
207
to be a substantial barrier against inroads of self-interest and ignorance
in England from which parliament could hardly be expected to afford
a sufficient protection. The council must be so constituted as to be
personallyindependent of the minister, and should feel itself responsible
for recording an opinion on any Indian subject and pressing that
opinion on the minister whether it was agreeable to him or not. The
minister when overruling his council must be bound to record his
views. Thus the council would be a check and not a screen. Otherwise
it would merely serve to weaken the minister's responsibility and “to
give the colourable sanction of prudence and experience to measures
in the framing of which these qualities have had no share”.
A council composed of crown nominees would not preserve the
independence of judgment which had marked the court of directors.
If a substantial portion of the old spirit was to remain, a majority at
least of the council which would assist the new minister for India
should hold their seats independently of his appointment. That body
should not be smaller in numbers than the existing court of eighteen
directors. The petitioners went on to plead for the continuance of
the existing system, to urge that the present home government of India
was not really a double government, as the final word always rested
with the cabinet, and that a new arrangement which in any way
checked the minister's discretion would be liable to a similar reproach.
This reproach, however, originated
in an entire misconception of the functions devolving on the home government of
India, and in the application to it of the principles applicable to purely executive
departments.
The executive government of India was and must be situated in India
itself. The court of directors was not so much an executive as a
deliberative body. Its principal function and that of the home govern-
ment generally was not to direct the details of administration, but to
scrutinise and revise the past acts of the Indian government; to lay
down principles and issue general instructions for their future guidance
and to give or refuse sanction to great political measures which were
referred home for approval. Such functions admitted of and required
the concurrence of more judgments than one. They were more
analogous to the functions of parliament than to those of an executive
board; and it was considered an excellence in parliament to be not
merely a double but a triple government. The petitioners ended by
praying that no change should be made in the constitution of the
Indian government until the conclusion of “the present unhappy
disturbances or without a full previous enquiry into the operations of
the present system”.
But both the great political parties in parliament were resolved
that there should be no delay in completing the process which had
definitely begun in 1853. It was an obvious anachronism that a
a


## p. 208 (#244) ############################################

208
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
chartered company should take part in administering a great empire.
It was wrong that there should be a Company's army and a royal
army, an Indian and a royal navy. In India itself the prestige of the
Company had lately suffered irretrievable damage. 1 Immediately
after the presentation of the Company's petition, Lord Palmerston,
then prime minister, introduced his bill for transferring the govern-
ment of India entirely to the crown. But when the bill had been read
a second time he was turned out of office on the Conspiracy to Murder
Bill, and was succeeded by Lord Derby. Then Disraeli, who came in
as Derby's chancellor of the exchequer, introduced a new bill which
provided the Indian minister with a council composed partly of
crown nominees and partly of persons to be elected by two con-
stituencies, one consisting of men who had served in India or possessed
financial interests in that country, the other made up from the parlia-
mentary electors of the leading commercial cities of the United
Kingdom, London, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow and Belfast.
These proposals, for which Lord Ellenborough, then president of the
Board of Control, was largely responsible, were received with general
ridicules and were dropped. Ellenborough’s dispatch to Canning
regarding the Oudh proclamation caused his own resignation. His
successor, Lord Stanley, piloted certain resolutions through the House
of Commons which formed the basis for a measure destined to regulate
the government of India from London for sixty-two years. Its main
provisions were:
(a) The place of the Board of Control and court of directors would
be taken by a secretary of state in council. The new secretary would
be assisted by a “Council of India” consisting of fifteen members, of
whom eight were to be appointed by the crown and seven were to be
elected by the directors of the East India Company. The majority of
both appointed and elected members were to be persons who had
served or resided in India for ten years at least, and had not left the
country more than ten years before their appointment. Future
appointments or elections were to be so regulated that nine at least
of the members of council should hold these qualifications. Future
vacancies in crown appointments would be filled by crown nominees;
vacancies among the seven members elected by the directors would be
filled by persons co-opted by the council. No member could sit or
vote in parliament. All would hold office during good behaviour and
could be removed only on petition by both houses of parliament.
(6) The council would conduct Indian business transacted in the
United Kingdom and would correspond with the Government of
India, but would not possess the initiative which had all along rested
with the court of directors. It could give its opinion only on questions
1 Martineau, Life of Frere, I, 230.
2 Hansard, 1857-8, CXLVIII, 1276.
3 Idem, cxLix, 1675; cf. also 1677.
• Monypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli, iv, 138, 164-5.
>


## p. 209 (#245) ############################################

THE INDIA ACT OF 1858
209
referred to it by the secretary of state, who would preside over meetings
with power to overrule should he be unable to obtain agreement. In
such an event he might require that his opinion and the reasons for it
should be entered in the minutes of the proceedings, and any member
who had been present at the meeting could exercise the same privilege.
(c) The secretary of state might constitute committees of his council
for the more convenient transaction of business, and might distribute
departments of business among those committees. He would direct
the manner in which all business should be conducted. The council
would meet once at least every seven days and could do no business
without a quorum of five.
(d) Con. munications from the secretary of state to the governor-
general, and orders proposed to bi made in the United Kingdom by
the secretary of state, must, subject to certain provisions, be either
submitted to a meeting of the council or be deposited in the council-
room for seven days before issue. Any member of council might record
his opinion on any such communication or order in a minute-book
kept for the purpose, and a copy of such entry would be sent forth with
to the secretary of state. If a majority minuted against a communica-
tion or order, the secretary of state must, if adhering to such com-
munication or order, record his reasons.
(e) Orders of the secretary of state relating to expenditure and
loans required the concurrence of a majority of the Council of India.
The revenues of India, which would be charged with a dividend on
the Company's stock and with their debts, could only be used for the
purposes of the government of India. Clause 41 of the act provided
that no grant or appropriation of any part of such revenues or of any
property coming into the possession of the secretary of state in council
should be made without the concurrence of a majority of votes at a
meeting of the council. All powers of issuing securities for money in
the United Kingdom vested in the secretary of state in council must
be exercised by the former with concurrence of a majority of votes at
a council meeting.