No More Learning

Dante has expressed a grand philosophical
thought by this verse :--
A guisa del ver primo che l'uom crede*.
We must believe certain truths as we believe
our own existence; it is the soul which re-
veals them to us; and reasonings of every
kind are never more than feeble streams de-
rived from this fountain.
The Theodicea of Leibnitz treats of the
divine prescience, and of the cause of good
and evil: it is one of the most profound and
argumentative works upon the theory of the
infinite; the author, however, too often ap-
plies to that which is without bounds, a sort
* " It is thus that man believes in primitive truth. "
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? GERMAN PHILOSOPHY. 65
of logic to which circumscribed objects alone
are amenable. Leibnitz was a perfectly re-
ligious character; but, from this very cir-
cumstance, he believed it a duty to ground
the truths of religion upon mathematical rea-
soning, in order to support them on such
foundations as are admitted within the em-
pire of experience: this error proceeds from
a respect, oftener felt than acknowledged,
for men of cold and arid minds ; we attempt
to convince them in their own manner; we
acknowledge that arguments in a logical form
have more certainty than a proof from senti-
ment; and it is not true.
In the region of intellectual and religious
truths, of which Leibnitz has treated, we
must use consciousness in the room of de-
monstration. Leibnitz, wishing to adhere to
abstract reasoning, demands a sort of stretch
of attention which few minds can support.
Metaphysical works, that are founded neither
upon experience nor upon sentiment, singu-
larly fatigue the thinking power; and we
may imbibe from them a physical and moral
pain, so great, that by our obstinate en-
deavours to conquer it, we may shatter the
organs of reason in our heads. A poet,
Baggesen, has made Vertigo a divinity--we
VOL. III. p
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? 66 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
should recommend ourselves to the favour of
that goddess, when we are about to study
these works, which place us in such a man-
ner at the summit of ideas, that we have no
longer any ladder-steps to re-descend into
life.
The metaphysical and religious writers,
who are eloquent and feeling at the same
time (such as we have seen in some exam-
ples), are much better adapted to our nature.
Far from requiring the suppression of our
faculties of feeling, in order to make our fa-
culty of abstraction more precise, they bid
us think, feel, and wish, that all the strength
of our souls may aid us to penetrate into the
depths of heaven; but to cling close to ab-
straction is such an effort, that it is natural
enough for the generality of men to have
renounced the attempt, and to have thought
it more easy to admit nothing beyond what
is visible.
The experimental philosophy is complete
in itself; it is a whole, sufficiently vulgar,
tout compact, circumscribed, argumentative;
and while we adhere to the sort of reasoning
which is received in the commerce of the
world, we ought to be contented with it;
the immortal and the infinite are only felt
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? GE11MAN PHILOSOPHY. r 67
through the medium of the soul; the soul
alone can diffuse an interest over the higher
sort of metaphysics. We are very wrong to
persuade ourselves that the more abstract a
theory is, the more likely it is to guard us
against all illusion; for it is exactly by these
means that it may lead us into error. We
take the connexion of ideas for their proof;
we arrange our rank and file of chimeras with
precision; and we fancy that they are an
army. There is nothing but the genius of
sentiment that arises above experimental,
as well as above speculative philosophy;
there is no other genius but that, which can
carry conviction beyond the limits of human
reason.
It appears then to me, that, notwithstand-
ing my entire admiration for the strength of
mind and depth of genius in Leibnitz, we
should wish, in his writings upon questions
of metaphysical theology, more imagination
and sensibility; that we might repose from
thought by the indulgence of our feelings.
Leibnitz almost made a scruple of recurring
to it, fearing that he should have the ap-
pearance of using seductive arts in favour of
the truth: he was wrong; for sentiment is
truth itself in questions of this nature.
f2
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? 68 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
The objections which I have allowed my-
self to make to those works of Leibnitz,
which aim at the solution of truths insoluble
by reasoning, do not at air apply to his
writings on the formation of ideas in the
human mind; those writings are of a most
luminous clearness; they refer to a mystery
which man, to a certain degree, can pene-
trate; for he knows more of himself than of
the universe. The opinions of Leibnitz in
this respect tend, above all, to our moral
perfection, if it be true, as the German phi-
losophers have attempted to prove, that free-
will rests upon the doctrine which delivers
the soul from external objects, and that
virtue cannot exist without the perfect in-
dependence of the will.
Leibnitz has opposed, with admirable force
of logical reasoning, the system of Locke,
who attributes all our ideas to our sensations.
The advocates of this system had vaunted of
that well-known axiom, that there is nothing
in the intellect which has not first been in
the senses; and Leibnitz added to it this
sublime restriction--" Except the intellect
"itself*. " From this principle all the new
philosophy is derived, which so much influ-
* Nihil est in intdketu quod non fuerit in sensu, nisi iii-
teUectui ipse.
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? GERMAN PHILOSOPHY. 69
ences the men of genius in Germany . This
philosophy also is experimental; for it en-
deavours to learn what is passing within
ourselves. It only substitutes the observation
of internal feeling for that of our external
sensations.
The doctrine of Locke gained many par-
tisans in Germany among those who endea-
voured, like Bonnet at Geneva, and many
other philosophers in England, to reconcile
this doctrine with the religious sentiments
which Locke himself always professed. The
genius of Leibnitz foresaw all the conse-
quences of this sort of metaphysics; and
that which has built his glory on an ever-
lasting foundation, is his having maintained
in Germany the philosophy of moral liberty
against that of sensual fatalism. While the
rest of Europe adopted those principles which
make the soul be considered as passive,
Leibnitz, with unshaken constancy, was the
defender of the ideal philosophy, such as his
genius had conceived it. It had no con-
nexion with the system of Berkeley; nor
with the reveries of the Greek sceptics upon
the non-existence of matter; but it main-
tained the moral being in his independence
and in his rights.
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? 70 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
CHAPTER VI.
*? I
Kant.
Ka NT lived even to a very advanced age,
and never quitted Konigsberg;--there, in the
midst. of northern ice, he passed his whole
life in meditation upon the laws of human
intelligence. An indefatigable ardour for
study enabled him to acquire stores of
knowledge without number. Sciences, lan-
guages, literature, all were familiar to him;
and without seeking for glory, which he did
not enjoy till a very late period (not having
heard the noise of his renown before his old
age), he contented himself with the silent
pleasure of reflection. In solitude he con-
templated his mind with close attention;
the examination of his thoughts lent him
new strength to support his virtue; and
although he never intermeddled with the ar-
dent passions of men, he knew how to forge
arms for those who should be summoned to
combat those passions.
Except among the Greeks, we have hardly
any example of a life so strictly philosophi-
l^lIMISttlltbSMiai'Eia'nnii^^.
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? KANT. IX
cal; and that life itself answers for the sin-
cerity of the writer. To such an unstained
sincerity, we must further add an acute and
exact understanding, which served for a
corrector to his genius, when he suffered it
to carry him too far. This is enough, it
seems to me, to make us judge at least im-
partially of the persevering labours of such
a man. .
Kant first published several works on the
natural sciences; and he showed, in this
branch of study, so great a sagacity, that it
was he who first foresaw the existence of
the planet Uranus. Herschel himself, after
having discovered it, acknowledged that it
was Kant who announced the future event.
His treatise upon the nature of the human
understanding, entitled the " Examination of
"pure Reason," appeared near thirty years
ago, and this work was for some time un-
known; but when at length the treasures of
thought, which it contains, were discovered,
it produced such a sensation in Germany,
that almost all which has been accomplished
since, in literature as well as in philosophy,
has flowed from the impulse given by this
performance.
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? 72 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
To this treatise upon the human under-
standing succeeded the " Examination of
"practical Reason," which related to morals;
and the " Examination of'Judgment," which
had the nature of the beautiful for its object.
The same theory serves for a foundation to
these three treatises, which embrace the
laws of intellect, the principles of virtue,
and the contemplation of the beauties of
nature and of the arts.
I shall endeavour to give a sketch of the
principal ideas which this doctrine contains;
--whatever care I may take to explain it
clearly, I do not dissemble the necessity
there is of incessant attention to comprehend
it. A prince, who was learning mathema-
tics, grew impatient of the labour which
that study demanded. "It is indipensable,"
said his instructor, " for your highness to
M take the pains of studying, in order to
"learn the science; for there is no royal
"road in mathematics. " The French pub-
lic, which has so many reasons to fancy it-
self a prince, will allow me to suggest that
there is no royal road in metaphysics; and
that, to attain a conception of any theory
whatever, we must pass through the inter-
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? KANT. 73
mediate ways which conducted the author
himself to the results he exhibits.
The philosophy of materialism gave up
the human understanding to the empire of
external objects, and morals to personal in-
terest; and reduced the beautiful to the
agreeable. Kant wished to re-establish pri-
mitive truths and spontaneous activity in
the soul, conscience in morals, and the ideal
in the arts. Let us now examine in what
manner he has fulfilled these different under-
takings.
At the time the "Examination of pure
"Reason" made its appearance, there ex-
isted only two systems concerning the hu-
man understanding among thinking men:
the one, that of Locke, attributed all our
ideas to our sensations; the other, that of
Descartes and Leibnitz, endeavoured to de-
monstrate the spirituality and the activity of
the soul, free-will, in short, the whole doc-
trine of Idealism; but these two philoso-
phers rested their opinions upon proofs
purely speculative. I have exposed, in the
preceding. chapter, the inconveniences which
result from these efforts of abstraction, that
arrest, if we may use the expression, the
very blood in our veins, until our intellectual
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? 74 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
faculties alone reign within us. The alge-
braic method, applied to objects that we
cannot embrace by mere reasoning, leaves no
durable trace in the mind. While we are in
the act of perusing these writings upon high
philosophical conceptions, we believe that
we comprehend them; we think that we
believe them; but the arguments which have
appeared most convincing, very soon escape
from the memory.
If man, wearied with these efforts, con-
fines himself to the knowledge which he
gains by his senses, all will be melancholy
indeed for his soul. Will he have any idea
of immortality, when the forerunners of
destruction are engraven so deeply on the
countenance of mortals, and living nature
falls incessantly into dust? When all the
senses talk of death, what feeble hope can
we entertain of a resurrection? If man only
consulted his sensations, what idea would he
form of the supreme goodness? So many
afflictions dispute the mastery over our life;
so many hideous objects disfigure nature,
that the unfortunate created being curses his
existence a thousand times before the last
convulsion snatches it away. Let man, on
the contrary, reject the testimony of his
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? SAKT,<' '. >'. :? ? 75
senses, how will he guide himself on the
earth? and yet, if he trusts to them alone,
what enthusiasm, what morals, what religion
will be able to resist the repeated assaults
to which pain and pleasure alternately expose
him? ; i
Reflection wandered oyer this vast region
of uncertainty, when Kant endeavoured to
trace the limits of the two empires, that of
the senses and that of the soul; of external
and of intellectual nature. The strength of
thinking, and the wisdom with which he
marked these limits, were perhaps never
exhibited before: he did not lose himself
among the new systems concerning the
creation of the universe; he recognised
the bounds which the eternal mysteries set
to the human understanding, and (what will
be new perhaps to those who have only
heard Kant spoken of) there is no phi-
losopher more adverse, in numerous respects,
to metaphysics; he made himself so deeply
learned in this science, only to employ
against it the means it afforded him to
demonstrate its own insufficiency. We
might say of him, that, like a new Curtius,
he threw himself into the gulf of abstrac-
tion, in order to fill it up. ?
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? 76 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
Locke had victoriously combated the
doctrine of innate ideas in man; because he
has always represented ideas as making a
part of our experimental knowledge. The
examination of pure reason, that is to say
of the primitive faculties of which the in-
tellect is composed, did not fix his attention.
Leibnitz, as we have said above, pronounced
this sublime axiom : --" There is nothing
"in the intellect which does not come by
"the senses, except the intellect itself. "
Kant has acknowledged, as well as Locke,
that there are no innate ideas; but he has
endeavoured to enter into the sense of the
above axiom, by examining what are the
laws and the sentiments which constitute the
essence of the human soul, independently of
all experience. The "Examination of pure
"Reason" strives to show in what these
laws consist, and what are the objects upon
which they can be exercised.
Scepticism, to which materialism almost
always leads, was carried so far, that Hume
finished by overturning the foundation of all
reasoning, in his search after arguments
against the axiom, "that there is no effect
"without a cause. " And such is the unstea-
diness of himan nature when we do not
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? KANT. 77
place the principle of conviction in the centre
of the soul, that incredulity, which begins
by attacking the existence of the moral
world, at last gets rid of the material world
also, which it first used as an instrument to
destroy the other.
Kant wished to know whether absolute
certainty was attainable by the human un-
derstanding; and he only found it in our
necessary notions--that is to say, in all the
laws of our understanding, which are of such
a nature that we cannot conceive any thing
otherwise than as those laws represent it.
In the first class of the imperative forms
of our understanding are space and time.
Kant demonstrates that all our perceptions
are submitted to these two forms; he con-
cludes, from hence, that they exist in us, and
not in objects; and that, in this respect, it is
our understanding which gives laws to ex-
ternal nature, instead of receiving them from
it. Geometry, which measures space, and
arithmetic, which divides time, are sciences
of perfect demonstration, because they rest
upon the necessary notions of our under-
standing.
Truths acquired by experience never carry
absolute certainty with them: when we say,
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? 73 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
"the sun rises every day,"--" all men are
"mortal," &c. the imagination could 6gure
an exception to these truths, which experi-
ence alone makes us consider indubitable;
but Imagination herself cannot suppose any
thing out of the sphere of space and time;
and it is impossible to regard as the result of
custom (that is to say, of the constant repe-
tition of the same phenomena) those forms
of our thought which we impose upon
things: sensations may be doubtful; but
the prism through which we receive them
is immoveable.
To this primitive intuition of space and
time, we must add, or rather give, as a
foundation, the principles of reasoning, with-
out which we cannot comprehend any thing,
and which are the laws of our understanding;
the connexion of causes and effects--unity,
plurality, totality, possibility, reality, neces-
sity, &c*. Kant considers them all as
equally necessary notions; and he only raises
to the rank of real sciences such as are im-
mediately founded upon these notions, be-
cause it is in them alone that certainty can
* Kant gives the name of Category to the different
necessary notions of the understanding, of which he gives
a list.
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? KANT.
79
exist. The forms of reasoning have no
result, excepting when they are applied to
our judgment of external objects, and in
this application they are liable to error;
but they are not the less necessary in them-
selves ;--that is to say, we cannot depart
from them in any of our thoughts: it is
impossible for us to figure any thing out of
the sphere of the relations of causes and
effects, of possibility, quantity, &c. ; and
these notions are as inherent in our conception
as space and time. We perceive nothing ex-
cepting through the medium of the immove-
able laws of our manner of reasoning; there-
fore these 1 ws also are placed within our-
selves, and not without us.
In the German philosophy, those ideas are
called subjective, which grow out of the na-
ture of our understanding and its faculties;
and all those ideas objective, which are excited
by sensations. Whatever may be the deno-
mination which we adopt in this respect, it
appears to me that the examination of our
intellect agrees with the prevailing thought
of Kant; namely, the distinction he esta-
blishes between the forms of our under-
standing and the objects which we know
according to those forms; afld whether
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? 80 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
he adheres to abstract conceptions, or whe-
ther he appeals, in religion and morals, to
sentiments which he also considers as in-
dependent of experience, nothing is more
luminous than the line of demarcation which
he traces between what comes to us by sen-
sation, and what belongs to the spontaneous
action of our souls.
Some expressions in the doctrine of Kant
having been ill interpreted, it has been pre-
tended that he believed in that doctrine of
innate ideas, which describes them as en-
graved upon the soul before we have dis-
covered them. Other German philosophers,
more allied to the system of Plato, have, in
effect, thought that the type of the world
was in the human understanding, and that
man could not conceive the universe if he
had not in himself the innate image of it;
but this doctrine is not touched upon by
Kant: he reduces the intellectual sciences to
three--logic, metaphysics, and mathematics.
Logic teaches nothing by itself; but as it
rests upon the laws of our understanding, it is
incontestable in its principles, abstractedly
considered: this science cannot lead to truth,
excepting in its application to ideas and
things; its principles are innate, its applica-
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? KANT. 81
tion is experimental. In metaphysics, Kant
denies its existence; because he pretends
that reasoning cannot find a place beyond
the sphere of experience. Mathematics alone
appear to him to depend immediately upon
the notion of space and of time--that is to
say, upon the laws of our understanding an-
terior to experience. He endeavours to prove,
that mathematics are not a simple analysis,
but a synthetic, positive, creative science,
and certain of itself, without the necessity of
our recurring to experience to be assured of
its truth. We may study in the work of
Kant the arguments upon which he supports
this way of thinking; but at least it is true,
that there is no man more adverse to what is
called the philosophy of the dreamers; and
that he must rather have had an inclina-
tion for a dry and didactic mode of think-
ing, although the object of his doctrine
be to raise the human species from its de-
gradation, under the philosophy of ma-
terialism.
Far from rejecting experience, Kant con-
siders the business of life as nothing but the
action of our innate faculties upon the se-
veral sorts of knowledge which come. to us
from without. He believed that experience
would be nothing but a chaos without the
VOL. III. G
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? 82 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
laws of the understanding ; but that the laws
of the understanding have no other object
than the elements of thought afforded it by
experience. It follows, that metaphysics
themselves can teach us nothing beyond
these limits; and that it is to sentiment that
we ought to attribute the foreknowledge and
the conviction of every thing that transcends
the bounds of the visible world.
When it is attempted to use* reasoning
alone for the establishment of religious truths,
it becomes a most pliable instrument, which
can equally attack and defend them; be-
cause we cannot, on this occasion, find any
point of support in experience. Kant places
upon two parallel lines the arguments for
and against the liberty of man, the immor-
tality of the soul, the temporary or eternal
duration of the world ; and it is to sentiment
that he appeals to weigh down the balance,
for the metaphysical proofs appear to him of
equal strength on either side *. Perhaps he
was wrong to push the scepticism of rea-
soning to such an extent; but it was to anni-
hilate this scepticism with more certainty,
by keeping certain questions clear from the
abstract discussions which gave it birth.
? These opposite arguments on great metaphysical ques-
tions are called " Antinomies" in Kant's writings.
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? KANT. 83
It would be unjust to suspect the sincere
piety of Kant, because he has maintained
the equality of the reasonings for and against
the great questions in the transcendental
metaphysics. It appears to me, on the con*
trary, that there is candour in this. avowal.
Such few minds are able to comprehend these
reasonings, and those who are able are so
disposed to combat each other, that it is
rendering a great service to religious faith to
banish metaphysics from all questions that
. relate to the existence of God, to freerwilJ,
to the origin of good and evil.
Some respectable persons have said, that
we ought not to neglect any weapon, and
that metaphysical arguments also ought to
be employed, to persuade those . over whom
they have power; but these arguments lead
to discussion, and discussion to doubt upon
every subject.
The best ceras for the race of man have
ever been those, when truths of a certain
class were uncontested in writing or dis-
course. The passions might then seduce
into culpable acts; but no one called in
question the truth of that religion which he
disobeyed. Sophisms of every kind, tlje
abuses of a certain philosophy, have bje-
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? 84 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
stroyed, in different countries and different
ages, that noble firmness of belief, which
was the source of the devotion of heroes.
Then is it not a fine idea, for a philosopher
to shut, even to the science which he pro-
fesses, the door of the sanctuary, and to
employ all the power of abstraction to prove,
that there are regions from which it ought to
be banished?
Despots and fanatics have endeavoured to
prevent human reason from examining cer-
tain subjects, and Reason has ever burst these
unjust fetters. But the limits which she
imposes on herself, far from enslaving her,
give her a new strength--such strength as
always results from the authority. of laws,
which are freely agreed to by those who are
subjected to them.
A deaf and dumb person, before he had
been under the discipline of the Abbe Sicard,
might feel a full conviction of the existence
of the Divinity. Many men are as far re-
moved from those who think deeply, as the
deaf and dumb are from other men, and still
they are not less capable of experiencing (if
the expression may be allowed) within them-
selves primitive truths, because such truths
spring from sentiment.
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? KANT.
Physicians, in the physical study of man,
recognise the principle which animates him,
and yet no one knows what life is; and if
one set about reasoning, it would be easy to
prove to men (as several Greek philosophers
have done), that they do not live at all. 1$
is the same with God, with conscience, and
with free-will. You must believe, because
you feel: all argument will be inferior to
this fact.
The labours of anatomy cannot be prac-
tised on a living body without destroying it;
analysis, when attempted to be applied to
indivisible truths, destroys them, because its
first efforts are directed against their unity.
We must divide our souls in two, in order
that one half of us may contemplate the
other. In whatever way this division takes
place, it deprives our being of that sublime
identity, without which we have not suffi-
cient strength to believe that of which con-
sciousness alone offers us assurance.
Let a great number of men be assembled
at a theatre or public place, and let some
theorem of reasoning, however general, be
proposed to them ;--as many different opi-
nions will immediately be formed as there are
individuals assembled. But, if any actions,
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? 86 PHILOSOFHY AND MORAL5.
displaying greatness of soul, are related, of
the accents of generosity heard, the general
burst will at once proclaim, that you have
touched that instinct of the soul which is as
lively and as powerful in our beings, as the
instinct which preserves our existence.
In referring to sentiment, which does not
admit of doubts, the knowledge of transcend^
ent truths, in endeavouring to prove that rea-
soning avails only when exerted within the
sphere of sensations, Kant is very far from
considering this faculty of sentiment as an
illusion ; on the contrary, he assigns to it the
first rank in human nature; he makes con-
science the innate principle of our moral
existence; and the feeling of right and
Wrong is, according to his ideas, the primi^
tive law of the heart, as space and time are
of the understanding.
Has not man been led by reasoning to
deny the existence of free-will? and yet he
is so convinced of it* that he surprises him-
self in the act of feeling esteem or dislike
even for the animals that surround him ; so
forcibly does he believe in the spontaneous
choice of good and evil in all beings.
The assurance of our freedom is only the
feeling we have of it; and on this liberty, as
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? KANT.
S7
the comer-stone, is raised the doctrine of
duty; for if man is free, he ought to create
to himself motives powerful enough to com-
bat against the operation of exterior objects,
and to set his will free from the narrow tram-
mels of selfishness. Duty is at once the proof
and the security of the metaphysical inde-
pendence of man.
In the following chapters, we shall exa-
mine Kant's arguments against morality as
founded upon self-interest, and the sublime
theory which he substitutes in the place of
this hypocritical sophism, or perverse doc-
trine. Different opinions may be enter-
tained as to Kant's first work, "The Exa-
**. minalion of pure Reason:" having himself
acknowledged reasoning to be insufficient
and contradictory, he ought to have antici-
pated that it would be made use of against
him; but it appears to me impossible not to
read with respect his "Examination ofprac-
"tical Reason," and the different works that
he has written on morality. ,
Not only are Kant's principles of morality
austere and pure, as might be expected from
the inflexibility of a philosopher, but he al-
ways connects the evidence of the heart with
that of the understanding, and is singularly
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? 88 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
happy in making his abstract theory, as to
the nature of the understanding, serve as a
support to sentiments at once the most
simple and the most powerful.
A conscience acquired by sensations may
be stifled by them; and the dignity of duty
is degraded, in being made to depend on
exterior objects. Kant, therefore, is inces-
santly labouring to show, that a deep sense
of this dignity is the necessary condition of
our moral being, the law by which it exists.
The empire of sensations, and the bad actions,
to the commission of which they lead, can
no more destroy in us the notion of good or
of evil, than the idea of space and time can
be changed by an erroneous application of
it. There is always, in whatever situation
we may be placed, a power of re-action
against circumstances, which springs from
the bottom of the soul; and we cannot but
feel, that neither the laws of the understand-
ing, moral liberty, nor conscience* are the
result of experience.
In his treatise on the sublime and beautiful,
entitled, " The "Examination of the Judgment,"
Kant applies to the pleasures Of the ima-
gination the system from which he has
developed such fruitful deductions in the
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? KANT
89
sphere of intelligence and of sentiment; or
rather it is the same soul which he examines,
and which shows itself in the sciences, in
morality, and in the fine arts. Kant main-
tains, that there are in poetry, and in the arts
which are capable, as poetry is, of painting
sentiments by images, two kinds of beauty:
one which may be referred to time and to
this life; the other, to eternity and infinity.
And so impossible is it to say, that what
is infinite and eternal is intelligible to our
minds, that one is often tempted to take even
what is finite and transient for a dream; for
thought can see no limits to any thing,
neither can being have a conception of non-
existence. We cannot search deeply into
the exact sciences themselves, without meet-
ing, even there, with what is infinite and
eternal; and those things which are the most
completely matters of fact, do, under some
relations, belong to this infinity and eternity,
as much as sentiment and imagination.
From this application of the feeling of
infinity to the fine arts, arises the system
of ideal beauty, that is to say, of beauty con-
sidered, not as the assemblage and imitation
of whatever is most worthy in nature, but
as the realization of that image which is
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? 90 PHILOSOPHY AND MORALS.
constantly present to the soul. Materialists
judge of the beautiful according to the agree-
able impression which it causes, and there-
fore place it in the empire of sensations:
immaterialists, who ascribe every thing to
reason, see in the beautiful what they call
the perfect, and find in it some analogy to
the useful and the good, which they con-
sider to be the first degrees of perfection.
Kant has rejected both these explanations.
Beauty, considered only as an agreeable
thing, would be confined to the sphere of sen-
sations, and consequently subject to the dif-
ference of tastes; it could never claim that
universal acknowledgment, which is the true
character of beaut}': beauty, again, consi-
dered as perfection, would require a sort of
judgment, like that on which esteem isfounded:
the enthusiasm that ought to be inspired by
the beautiful, belongs neither to , sensations
nor to judgment; it is an innate disposition,
like the feeling of duty, and those ideas which
are essential to the understanding; and we
discover beauty when we see it, because it is
the outward image of that ideal beauty, the
type of which exists in our mind. Difference
of tastes may be applied to what is agreeable,
for our sensations are the source of that kind
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? KANT.