"Triplicity" signifies a
proportion of inequality; for it is a species of unequal proportion,
according to Boethius (Arithm.
proportion of inequality; for it is a species of unequal proportion,
according to Boethius (Arithm.
Summa Theologica
and answer, A
fish. So to those who ask, Three what? we answer, Three persons.
Reply to Objection 3: In God the individual---i. e. distinct and
incommunicable substance---includes the idea of relation, as above
explained.
Reply to Objection 4: The different sense of the less common term does
not produce equivocation in the more common. Although a horse and an
ass have their own proper definitions, nevertheless they agree
univocally in animal, because the common definition of animal applies
to both. So it does not follow that, although relation is contained in
the signification of divine person, but not in that of an angelic or of
a human person, the word "person" is used in an equivocal sense. Though
neither is it applied univocally, since nothing can be said univocally
of God and creatures ([254]Q[13], A[5]).
__________________________________________________________________
THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We are now led to consider the plurality of the persons: about which
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are several persons in God?
(2) How many are they?
(3) What the numeral terms signify in God?
(4) The community of the term "person. "
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Whether there are several persons in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several persons in God.
For person is "the individual substance of a rational nature. " If then
there are several persons in God, there must be several substances;
which appears to be heretical.
Objection 2: Further, Plurality of absolute properties does not make a
distinction of persons, either in God, or in ourselves. Much less
therefore is this effected by a plurality of relations. But in God
there is no plurality but of relations ([255]Q[28], A[3]). Therefore
there cannot be several persons in God.
Objection 3: Further, Boethius says of God (De Trin. i), that "this is
truly one which has no number. " But plurality implies number. Therefore
there are not several persons in God.
Objection 4: Further, where number is, there is whole and part. Thus,
if in God there exist a number of persons, there must be whole and part
in God; which is inconsistent with the divine simplicity.
On the contrary, Athanasius says: "One is the person of the Father,
another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost. " Therefore the Father,
and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are several persons.
I answer that, It follows from what precedes that there are several
persons in God. For it was shown above ([256]Q[29], A[4]) that this
word "person" signifies in God a relation as subsisting in the divine
nature. It was also established ([257]Q[28], A[1]) that there are
several real relations in God; and hence it follows that there are also
several realities subsistent in the divine nature; which means that
there are several persons in God.
Reply to Objection 1: The definition of "person" includes "substance,"
not as meaning the essence, but the "suppositum" which is made clear by
the addition of the term "individual. " To signify the substance thus
understood, the Greeks use the name "hypostasis. " So, as we say, "Three
persons," they say "Three hypostases. " We are not, however, accustomed
to say Three substances, lest we be understood to mean three essences
or natures, by reason of the equivocal signification of the term.
Reply to Objection 2: The absolute properties in God, such as goodness
and wisdom, are not mutually opposed; and hence, neither are they
really distinguished from each other. Therefore, although they subsist,
nevertheless they are not several subsistent realities---that is,
several persons. But the absolute properties in creatures do not
subsist, although they are really distinguished from each other, as
whiteness and sweetness; on the other hand, the relative properties in
God subsist, and are really distinguished from each other ([258]Q[28],
A[3]). Hence the plurality of persons in God.
Reply to Objection 3: The supreme unity and simplicity of God exclude
every kind of plurality of absolute things, but not plurality of
relations. Because relations are predicated relatively, and thus the
relations do not import composition in that of which they are
predicated, as Boethius teaches in the same book.
Reply to Objection 4: Number is twofold, simple or absolute, as two and
three and four; and number as existing in things numbered, as two men
and two horses. So, if number in God is taken absolutely or
abstractedly, there is nothing to prevent whole and part from being in
Him, and thus number in Him is only in our way of understanding;
forasmuch as number regarded apart from things numbered exists only in
the intellect. But if number be taken as it is in the things numbered,
in that sense as existing in creatures, one is part of two, and two of
three, as one man is part of two men, and two of three; but this does
not apply to God, because the Father is of the same magnitude as the
whole Trinity, as we shall show further on ([259]Q[42], AA[1], 4).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are more than three persons in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are more than three persons in
God. For the plurality of persons in God arises from the plurality of
the relative properties as stated above [260](A[1]). But there are four
relations in God as stated above ([261]Q[28], A[4]), paternity,
filiation, common spiration, and procession. Therefore there are four
persons in God.
Objection 2: The nature of God does not differ from His will more than
from His intellect. But in God, one person proceeds from the will, as
love; and another proceeds from His nature, as Son. Therefore another
proceeds from His intellect, as Word, besides the one Who proceeds from
His nature, as Son; thus again it follows that there are not only three
persons in God.
Objection 3: Further, the more perfect a creature is, the more interior
operations it has; as a man has understanding and will beyond other
animals. But God infinitely excels every creature. Therefore in God not
only is there a person proceeding from the will, and another from the
intellect, but also in an infinite number of ways. Therefore there are
an infinite number of persons in God.
Objection 4: Further, it is from the infinite goodness of the Father
that He communicates Himself infinitely in the production of a divine
person. But also in the Holy Ghost is infinite goodness. Therefore the
Holy Ghost produces a divine person; and that person another; and so to
infinity.
Objection 5: Further, everything within a determinate number is
measured, for number is a measure. But the divine persons are immense,
as we say in the Creed of Athanasius: "The Father is immense, the Son
is immense, the Holy Ghost is immense. " Therefore the persons are not
contained within the number three.
On the contrary, It is said: "There are three who bear witness in
heaven, the father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost" (1 Jn. 5:7). To those
who ask, "Three what? " we answer, with Augustine (De Trin. vii, 4),
"Three persons. " Therefore there are but three persons in God.
I answer that, As was explained above, there can be only three persons
in God. For it was shown above that the several persons are the several
subsisting relations really distinct from each other. But a real
distinction between the divine relations can come only from relative
opposition. Therefore two opposite relations must needs refer to two
persons: and if any relations are not opposite they must needs belong
to the same person. Since then paternity and filiation are opposite
relations, they belong necessarily to two persons. Therefore the
subsisting paternity is the person of the Father; and the subsisting
filiation is the person of the Son. The other two relations are not
opposed to each other; therefore these two cannot belong to one person:
hence either one of them must belong to both of the aforesaid persons;
or one must belong to one person, and the other to the other. Now,
procession cannot belong to the Father and the Son, or to either of
them; for thus it would follows that the procession of the intellect,
which in God is generation, wherefrom paternity and filiation are
derived, would issue from the procession of love, whence spiration and
procession are derived, if the person generating and the person
generated proceeded from the person spirating; and this is against what
was laid down above ([262]Q[27] , AA[3],4). We must frequently admit
that spiration belongs to the person of the Father, and to the person
of the Son, forasmuch as it has no relative opposition either to
paternity or to filiation; and consequently that procession belongs to
the other person who is called the person of the Holy Ghost, who
proceeds by way of love, as above explained. Therefore only three
persons exist in God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: Although there are four relations in God, one of
them, spiration, is not separated from the person of the Father and of
the Son, but belongs to both; thus, although it is a relation, it is
not called a property, because it does not belong to only one person;
nor is it a personal relation---i. e. constituting a person. The three
relations---paternity, filiation, and procession---are called personal
properties, constituting as it were the persons; for paternity is the
person of the Father, filiation is the person of the Son, procession is
the person of the Holy Ghost proceeding.
Reply to Objection 2: That which proceeds by way of intelligence, as
word, proceeds according to similitude, as also that which proceeds by
way of nature; thus, as above explained ([263]Q[27], A[3]), the
procession of the divine Word is the very same as generation by way of
nature. But love, as such, does not proceed as the similitude of that
whence it proceeds; although in God love is co-essential as being
divine; and therefore the procession of love is not called generation
in God.
Reply to Objection 3: As man is more perfect than other animals, he has
more intrinsic operations than other animals, because his perfection is
something composite. Hence the angels, who are more perfect and more
simple, have fewer intrinsic operations than man, for they have no
imagination, or feeling, or the like. In God there exists only one real
operation---that is, His essence. How there are in Him two processions
was above explained ([264]Q[27], AA[1],4).
Reply to Objection 4: This argument would prove if the Holy Ghost
possessed another goodness apart from the goodness of the Father; for
then if the Father produced a divine person by His goodness, the Holy
Ghost also would do so. But the Father and the Holy Ghost have one and
the same goodness. Nor is there any distinction between them except by
the personal relations. So goodness belongs to the Holy Ghost, as
derived from another; and it belongs to the Father, as the principle of
its communication to another. The opposition of relation does not allow
the relation of the Holy Ghost to be joined with the relation of
principle of another divine person; because He Himself proceeds from
the other persons who are in God.
Reply to Objection 5: A determinate number, if taken as a simple
number, existing in the mind only, is measured by one. But when we
speak of a number of things as applied to the persons in God, the
notion of measure has no place, because the magnitude of the three
persons is the same ([265]Q[42], AA[1],4), and the same is not measured
by the same.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the numeral terms denote anything real in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the numeral terms denote something real
in God. For the divine unity is the divine essence. But every number is
unity repeated. Therefore every numeral term in God signifies the
essence; and therefore it denotes something real in God.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is said of God and of creatures, belongs
to God in a more eminent manner than to creatures. But the numeral
terms denote something real in creatures; therefore much more so in
God.
Objection 3: Further, if the numeral terms do not denote anything real
in God, and are introduced simply in a negative and removing sense, as
plurality is employed to remove unity, and unity to remove plurality;
it follows that a vicious circle results, confusing the mind and
obscuring the truth; and this ought not to be. Therefore it must be
said that the numeral terms denote something real in God.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "If we admit
companionship"---that is, plurality---"we exclude the idea of oneness
and of solitude;" and Ambrose says (De Fide i): "When we say one God,
unity excludes plurality of gods, and does not imply quantity in God. "
Hence we see that these terms are applied to God in order to remove
something; and not to denote anything positive.
I answer that, The Master (Sent. i, D, 24) considers that the numeral
terms do not denote anything positive in God, but have only a negative
meaning. Others, however, assert the contrary.
In order to resolve this point, we may observe that all plurality is a
consequence of division. Now division is twofold; one is material, and
is division of the continuous; from this results number, which is a
species of quantity. Number in this sense is found only in material
things which have quantity. The other kind of division is called
formal, and is effected by opposite or diverse forms; and this kind of
division results in a multitude, which does not belong to a genus, but
is transcendental in the sense in which being is divided by one and by
many. This kind of multitude is found only in immaterial things.
Some, considering only that multitude which is a species of discrete
quantity, and seeing that such kind of quantity has no place in God,
asserted that the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God, but
remove something from Him. Others, considering the same kind of
multitude, said that as knowledge exists in God according to the strict
sense of the word, but not in the sense of its genus (as in God there
is no such thing as a quality), so number exists in God in the proper
sense of number, but not in the sense of its genus, which is quantity.
But we say that numeral terms predicated of God are not derived from
number, a species of quantity, for in that sense they could bear only a
metaphorical sense in God, like other corporeal properties, such as
length, breadth, and the like; but that they are taken from multitude
in a transcendent sense. Now multitude so understood has relation to
the many of which it is predicated, as "one" convertible with "being"
is related to being; which kind of oneness does not add anything to
being, except a negation of division, as we saw when treating of the
divine unity ([266]Q[11], A[1]); for "one" signifies undivided being.
So, of whatever we say "one," we imply its undivided reality: thus, for
instance, "one" applied to man signifies the undivided nature or
substance of a man. In the same way, when we speak of many things,
multitude in this latter sense points to those things as being each
undivided in itself.
But number, if taken as a species of quantity, denotes an accident
added to being; as also does "one" which is the principle of that
number. Therefore the numeral terms in God signify the things of which
they are said, and beyond this they add negation only, as stated (Sent.
i, D, 24); in which respect the Master was right (Sent. i, D, 24). So
when we say, the essence is one, the term "one" signifies the essence
undivided; and when we say the person is one, it signifies the person
undivided; and when we say the persons are many, we signify those
persons, and their individual undividedness; for it is of the very
nature of multitude that it should be composed of units.
Reply to Objection 1: One, as it is a transcendental, is wider and more
general than substance and relation. And so likewise is multitude;
hence in God it may mean both substance and relation, according to the
context. Still, the very signification of such names adds a negation of
division, beyond substance and relation; as was explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Multitude, which denotes something real in
creatures, is a species of quantity, and cannot be used when speaking
of God: unlike transcendental multitude, which adds only indivision to
those of which it is predicated. Such a kind of multitude is applicable
to God.
Reply to Objection 3: "One" does not exclude multitude, but division,
which logically precedes one or multitude. Multitude does not remove
unity, but division from each of the individuals which compose the
multitude. This was explained when we treated of the divine unity
([267]Q[11], A[2]).
It must be observed, nevertheless, that the opposite arguments do not
sufficiently prove the point advanced. Although the idea of solitude is
excluded by plurality, and the plurality of gods by unity, it does not
follow that these terms express this signification alone. For blackness
is excluded by whiteness; nevertheless, the term whiteness does not
signify the mere exclusion of blackness.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether this term "person" can be common to the three persons?
Objection 1: It would seem that this term "person" cannot be common to
the three persons. For nothing is common to the three persons but the
essence. But this term "person" does not signify the essence directly.
Therefore it is not common to all three.
Objection 2: Further, the common is the opposite to the incommunicable.
But the very meaning of person is that it is incommunicable; as appears
from the definition given by Richard of St. Victor ([268]Q[29], A[3],
ad 4). Therefore this term "person" is not common to all the three
persons.
Objection 3: Further, if the name "person" is common to the three, it
is common either really, or logically. But it is not so really;
otherwise the three persons would be one person; nor again is it so
logically; otherwise person would be a universal. But in God there is
neither universal nor particular; neither genus nor species, as we
proved above ([269]Q[3], A[5]). Therefore this term 'person' is not
common to the three.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4) that when we ask,
"Three what? " we say, "Three persons," because what a person is, is
common to them.
I answer that, The very mode of expression itself shows that this term
"person" is common to the three when we say "three persons"; for when
we say "three men" we show that "man" is common to the three. Now it is
clear that this is not community of a real thing, as if one essence
were common to the three; otherwise there would be only one person of
the three, as also one essence.
What is meant by such a community has been variously determined by
those who have examined the subject. Some have called it a community of
exclusion, forasmuch as the definition of "person" contains the word
"incommunicable. " Others thought it to be a community of intention, as
the definition of person contains the word "individual"; as we say that
to be a "species" is common to horse and ox. Both of these
explanations, however, are excluded by the fact that "person" is not a
name of exclusion nor of intention, but the name of a reality. We must
therefore resolve that even in human affairs this name "person" is
common by a community of idea, not as genus or species, but as a vague
individual thing. The names of genera and species, as man or animal,
are given to signify the common natures themselves, but not the
intentions of those common natures, signified by the terms "genus" or
"species. " The vague individual thing, as "some man," signifies the
common nature with the determinate mode of existence of singular
things---that is, something self-subsisting, as distinct from others.
But the name of a designated singular thing signifies that which
distinguishes the determinate thing; as the name Socrates signifies
this flesh and this bone. But there is this difference---that the term
"some man" signifies the nature, or the individual on the part of its
nature, with the mode of existence of singular things; while this name
"person" is not given to signify the individual on the part of the
nature, but the subsistent reality in that nature. Now this is common
in idea to the divine persons, that each of them subsists distinctly
from the others in the divine nature. Thus this name "person" is common
in idea to the three divine persons.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is founded on a real community.
Reply to Objection 2: Although person is incommunicable, yet the mode
itself of incommunicable existence can be common to many.
Reply to Objection 3: Although this community is logical and not real,
yet it does not follow that in God there is universal or particular, or
genus, or species; both because neither in human affairs is the
community of person the same as community of genus or species; and
because the divine persons have one being; whereas genus and species
and every other universal are predicated of many which differ in being.
__________________________________________________________________
OF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY OR PLURALITY IN GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider what belongs to the unity or plurality in God; which
gives rise to four points of inquiry:
(1) Concerning the word "Trinity";
(2) Whether we can say that the Son is other than the Father?
(3) Whether an exclusive term, which seems to exclude otherness, can be
joined to an essential name in God?
(4) Whether it can be joined to a personal term?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there is trinity in God?
Objection 1: It would seem there is not trinity in God. For every name
in God signifies substance or relation. But this name "Trinity" does
not signify the substance; otherwise it would be predicated of each one
of the persons: nor does it signify relation; for it does not express a
name that refers to another. Therefore the word "Trinity" is not to be
applied to God.
Objection 2: Further, this word "trinity" is a collective term, since
it signifies multitude. But such a word does not apply to God; as the
unity of a collective name is the least of unities, whereas in God
there exists the greatest possible unity. Therefore this word "trinity"
does not apply to God.
Objection 3: Further, every trine is threefold. But in God there is not
triplicity; since triplicity is a kind of inequality. Therefore neither
is there trinity in God.
Objection 4: Further, all that exists in God exists in the unity of the
divine essence; because God is His own essence. Therefore, if Trinity
exists in God, it exists in the unity of the divine essence; and thus
in God there would be three essential unities; which is heresy.
Objection 5: Further, in all that is said of God, the concrete is
predicated of the abstract; for Deity is God and paternity is the
Father. But the Trinity cannot be called trine; otherwise there would
be nine realities in God; which, of course, is erroneous. Therefore the
word trinity is not to be applied to God.
On the contrary, Athanasius says: "Unity in Trinity; and Trinity in
Unity is to be revered. "
I answer that, The name "Trinity" in God signifies the determinate
number of persons. And so the plurality of persons in God requires that
we should use the word trinity; because what is indeterminately
signified by plurality, is signified by trinity in a determinate
manner.
Reply to Objection 1: In its etymological sense, this word "Trinity"
seems to signify the one essence of the three persons, according as
trinity may mean trine-unity. But in the strict meaning of the term it
rather signifies the number of persons of one essence; and on this
account we cannot say that the Father is the Trinity, as He is not
three persons. Yet it does not mean the relations themselves of the
Persons, but rather the number of persons related to each other; and
hence it is that the word in itself does not express regard to another.
Reply to Objection 2: Two things are implied in a collective term,
plurality of the "supposita," and a unity of some kind of order. For
"people" is a multitude of men comprehended under a certain order. In
the first sense, this word "trinity" is like other collective words;
but in the second sense it differs from them, because in the divine
Trinity not only is there unity of order, but also with this there is
unity of essence.
Reply to Objection 3: "Trinity" is taken in an absolute sense; for it
signifies the threefold number of persons.
"Triplicity" signifies a
proportion of inequality; for it is a species of unequal proportion,
according to Boethius (Arithm. i, 23). Therefore in God there is not
triplicity, but Trinity.
Reply to Objection 4: In the divine Trinity is to be understood both
number and the persons numbered. So when we say, "Trinity in Unity," we
do not place number in the unity of the essence, as if we meant three
times one; but we place the Persons numbered in the unity of nature; as
the "supposita" of a nature are said to exist in that nature. On the
other hand, we say "Unity in Trinity"; meaning that the nature is in
its "supposita. "
Reply to Objection 5: When we say, "Trinity is trine," by reason of the
number implied, we signify the multiplication of that number by itself;
since the word trine imports a distinction in the "supposita" of which
it is spoken. Therefore it cannot be said that the Trinity is trine;
otherwise it follows that, if the Trinity be trine, there would be
three "supposita" of the Trinity; as when we say, "God is trine," it
follows that there are three "supposita" of the Godhead.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the Son is other than the Father?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not other than the Father.
For "other" is a relative term implying diversity of substance. If,
then, the Son is other than the Father, He must be different from the
Father; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. vii), that
when we speak of three persons, "we do not mean to imply diversity. "
Objection 2: Further, whosoever are other from one another, differ in
some way from one another. Therefore, if the Son is other than the
Father, it follows that He differs from the Father; which is against
what Ambrose says (De Fide i), that "the Father and the Son are one in
Godhead; nor is there any difference in substance between them, nor any
diversity. "
Objection 3: Further, the term alien is taken from "alius" [other]. But
the Son is not alien from the Father, for Hilary says (De Trin. vii)
that "in the divine persons there is nothing diverse, nothing alien,
nothing separable. " Therefore the Son is not other that the Father.
Objection 4: Further, the terms "other person" and "other thing" [alius
et aliud] have the same meaning, differing only in gender. So if the
Son is another person from the Father, it follows that the Son is a
thing apart from the Father.
On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i. ] says:
"There is one essence of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, in which
the Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost
another; although the Father is one person, the Son another, and the
Holy Ghost another. "
I answer that, Since as Jerome remarks [*In substance, Ep. lvii. ], a
heresy arises from words wrongly used, when we speak of the Trinity we
must proceed with care and with befitting modesty; because, as
Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3), "nowhere is error more harmful, the
quest more toilsome, the finding more fruitful. " Now, in treating of
the Trinity, we must beware of two opposite errors, and proceed
cautiously between them---namely, the error of Arius, who placed a
Trinity of substance with the Trinity of persons; and the error of
Sabellius, who placed unity of person with the unity of essence.
Thus, to avoid the error of Arius we must shun the use of the terms
diversity and difference in God, lest we take away the unity of
essence: we may, however, use the term "distinction" on account of the
relative opposition. Hence whenever we find terms of "diversity" or
"difference" of Persons used in an authentic work, these terms of
"diversity" or "difference" are taken to mean "distinction. " But lest
the simplicity and singleness of the divine essence be taken away, the
terms "separation" and "division," which belong to the parts of a
whole, are to be avoided: and lest quality be taken away, we avoid the
use of the term "disparity": and lest we remove similitude, we avoid
the terms "alien" and "discrepant. " For Ambrose says (De Fide i) that
"in the Father and the Son there is no discrepancy, but one Godhead":
and according to Hilary, as quoted above, "in God there is nothing
alien, nothing separable. "
To avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the term "singularity,"
lest we take away the communicability of the divine essence. Hence
Hilary says (De Trin. vii): "It is sacrilege to assert that the Father
and the Son are separate in Godhead. " We must avoid the adjective
"only" [unici] lest we take away the number of persons. Hence Hilary
says in the same book: "We exclude from God the idea of singularity or
uniqueness. " Nevertheless, we say "the only Son," for in God there is
no plurality of Sons. Yet, we do not say "the only God," for the Deity
is common to several. We avoid the word "confused," lest we take away
from the Persons the order of their nature. Hence Ambrose says (De Fide
i): "What is one is not confused; and there is no multiplicity where
there is no difference. " The word "solitary" is also to be avoided,
lest we take away the society of the three persons; for, as Hilary says
(De Trin. iv), "We confess neither a solitary nor a diverse God. "
This word "other" [alius], however, in the masculine sense, means only
a distinction of "suppositum"; and hence we can properly say that "the
Son is other than the Father," because He is another "suppositum" of
the divine nature, as He is another person and another hypostasis.
Reply to Objection 1: "Other," being like the name of a particular
thing, refers to the "suppositum"; and so, there is sufficient reason
for using it, where there is a distinct substance in the sense of
hypostasis or person. But diversity requires a distinct substance in
the sense of essence. Thus we cannot say that the Son is diverse from
the Father, although He is another.
Reply to Objection 2: "Difference" implies distinction of form. There
is one form in God, as appears from the text, "Who, when He was in the
form of God" (Phil. 2:6). Therefore the term "difference" does not
properly apply to God, as appears from the authority quoted. Yet,
Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 5) employs the term "difference" in the
divine persons, as meaning that the relative property is signified by
way of form. Hence he says that the hypostases do not differ from each
other in substance, but according to determinate properties. But
"difference" is taken for "distinction," as above stated.
Reply to Objection 3: The term "alien" means what is extraneous and
dissimilar; which is not expressed by the term "other" [alius]; and
therefore we say that the Son is "other" than the Father, but not that
He is anything "alien. "
Reply to Objection 4: The neuter gender is formless; whereas the
masculine is formed and distinct; and so is the feminine. So the common
essence is properly and aptly expressed by the neuter gender, but by
the masculine and feminine is expressed the determined subject in the
common nature. Hence also in human affairs, if we ask, Who is this man?
we answer, Socrates, which is the name of the "suppositum"; whereas, if
we ask, What is he? we reply, A rational and mortal animal. So, because
in God distinction is by the persons, and not by the essence, we say
that the Father is other than the Son, but not something else; while
conversely we say that they are one thing, but not one person.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the exclusive word "alone" should be added to the essential term in
God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the exclusive word "alone" [solus] is
not to be added to an essential term in God. For, according to the
Philosopher (Elench. ii, 3), "He is alone who is not with another. " But
God is with the angels and the souls of the saints. Therefore we cannot
say that God is alone.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is joined to the essential term in God
can be predicated of every person "per se," and of all the persons
together; for, as we can properly say that God is wise, we can say the
Father is a wise God; and the Trinity is a wise God. But Augustine says
(De Trin. vi, 9): "We must consider the opinion that the Father is not
true God alone. " Therefore God cannot be said to be alone.
Objection 3: Further if this expression "alone" is joined to an
essential term, it would be so joined as regards either the personal
predicate or the essential predicate. But it cannot be the former, as
it is false to say, "God alone is Father," since man also is a father;
nor, again, can it be applied as regards the latter, for, if this
saying were true, "God alone creates," it would follow that the "Father
alone creates," as whatever is said of God can be said of the Father;
and it would be false, as the Son also creates. Therefore this
expression "alone" cannot be joined to an essential term in God.
On the contrary, It is said, "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible,
the only God" (1 Tim. 1:17).
I answer that, This term "alone" can be taken as a categorematical
term, or as a syncategorematical term. A categorematical term is one
which ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given "suppositum"; as, for
instance, "white" to man, as when we say a "white man. " If the term
"alone" is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way be joined to any
term in God; for it would mean solitude in the term to which it is
joined; and it would follow that God was solitary, against what is
above stated [270](A[2]). A syncategorematical term imports the order
of the predicate to the subject; as this expression "every one" or "no
one"; and likewise the term "alone," as excluding every other
"suppositum" from the predicate. Thus, when we say, "Socrates alone
writes," we do not mean that Socrates is solitary, but that he has no
companion in writing, though many others may be with him. In this way
nothing prevents the term "alone" being joined to any essential term in
God, as excluding the predicate from all things but God; as if we said
"God alone is eternal," because nothing but God is eternal.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the angels and the souls of the saints
are always with God, nevertheless, if plurality of persons did not
exist in God, He would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not
removed by association with anything that is extraneous in nature; thus
anyone is said to be alone in a garden, though many plants and animals
are with him in the garden. Likewise, God would be alone or solitary,
though angels and men were with Him, supposing that several persons
were not within Him. Therefore the society of angels and of souls does
not take away absolute solitude from God; much less does it remove
respective solitude, in reference to a predicate.
Reply to Objection 2: This expression "alone," properly speaking, does
not affect the predicate, which is taken formally, for it refers to the
"suppositum," as excluding any other suppositum from the one which it
qualifies. But the adverb "only," being exclusive, can be applied
either to subject or predicate. For we can say, "Only Socrates"---that
is, no one else---"runs: and Socrates runs only"---that is, he does
nothing else. Hence it is not properly said that the Father is God
alone, or the Trinity is God alone, unless some implied meaning be
assumed in the predicate, as, for instance, "The Trinity is God Who
alone is God. " In that sense it can be true to say that the Father is
that God Who alone is God, if the relative be referred to the
predicate, and not to the "suppositum. " So, when Augustine says that
the Father is not God alone, but that the Trinity is God alone, he
speaks expositively, as he might explain the words, "To the King of
ages, invisible, the only God," as applying not to the Father, but to
the Trinity alone.
Reply to Objection 3: In both ways can the term "alone" be joined to an
essential term. For this proposition, "God alone is Father," can mean
two things, because the word "Father" can signify the person of the
Father; and then it is true; for no man is that person: or it can
signify that relation only; and thus it is false, because the relation
of paternity is found also in others, though not in a univocal sense.
Likewise it is true to say God alone creates; nor, does it follow,
"therefore the Father alone creates," because, as logicians say, an
exclusive diction so fixes the term to which it is joined that what is
said exclusively of that term cannot be said exclusively of an
individual contained in that term: for instance, from the premiss, "Man
alone is a mortal rational animal," we cannot conclude, "therefore
Socrates alone is such. "
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Whether an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term?
Objection 1: It would seem that an exclusive diction can be joined to
the personal term, even though the predicate is common. For our Lord
speaking to the Father, said: "That they may know Thee, the only true
God" (Jn. 17:3). Therefore the Father alone is true God.
Objection 2: Further, He said: "No one knows the Son but the Father"
(Mat. 11:27); which means that the Father alone knows the Son. But to
know the Son is common (to the persons). Therefore the same conclusion
follows.
Objection 3: Further, an exclusive diction does not exclude what enters
into the concept of the term to which it is joined. Hence it does not
exclude the part, nor the universal; for it does not follow that if we
say "Socrates alone is white," that therefore "his hand is not white,"
or that "man is not white. " But one person is in the concept of
another; as the Father is in the concept of the Son; and conversely.
Therefore, when we say, The Father alone is God, we do not exclude the
Son, nor the Holy Ghost; so that such a mode of speaking is true.
Objection 4: Further, the Church sings: "Thou alone art Most High, O
Jesus Christ. "
On the contrary, This proposition "The Father alone is God" includes
two assertions---namely, that the Father is God, and that no other
besides the Father is God. But this second proposition is false, for
the Son is another from the Father, and He is God. Therefore this is
false, The Father alone is God; and the same of the like sayings.
I answer that, When we say, "The Father alone is God," such a
proposition can be taken in several senses. If "alone" means solitude
in the Father, it is false in a categorematical sense; but if taken in
a syncategorematical sense it can again be understood in several ways.
For if it exclude (all others) from the form of the subject, it is
true, the sense being "the Father alone is God"---that is, "He who with
no other is the Father, is God. " In this way Augustine expounds when he
says (De Trin. vi, 6): "We say the Father alone, not because He is
separate from the Son, or from the Holy Ghost, but because they are not
the Father together with Him. " This, however, is not the usual way of
speaking, unless we understand another implication, as though we said
"He who alone is called the Father is God. " But in the strict sense the
exclusion affects the predicate. And thus the proposition is false if
it excludes another in the masculine sense; but true if it excludes it
in the neuter sense; because the Son is another person than the Father,
but not another thing; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost. But
because this diction "alone," properly speaking, refers to the subject,
it tends to exclude another Person rather than other things. Hence such
a way of speaking is not to be taken too literally, but it should be
piously expounded, whenever we find it in an authentic work.
Reply to Objection 1: When we say, "Thee the only true God," we do not
understand it as referring to the person of the Father, but to the
whole Trinity, as Augustine expounds (De Trin. vi, 9). Or, if
understood of the person of the Father, the other persons are not
excluded by reason of the unity of essence; in so far as the word
"only" excludes another thing, as above explained.
The same Reply can be given to OBJ 2. For an essential term applied to
the Father does not exclude the Son or the Holy Ghost, by reason of the
unity of essence. Hence we must understand that in the text quoted the
term "no one" [*Nemo = non-homo, i. e. no man] is not the same as "no
man," which the word itself would seem to signify (for the person of
the Father could not be excepted), but is taken according to the usual
way of speaking in a distributive sense, to mean any rational nature.
Reply to Objection 3: The exclusive diction does not exclude what
enters into the concept of the term to which it is adjoined, if they do
not differ in "suppositum," as part and universal. But the Son differs
in "suppositum" from the Father; and so there is no parity.
Reply to Objection 4: We do not say absolutely that the Son alone is
Most High; but that He alone is Most High "with the Holy Ghost, in the
glory of God the Father. "
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THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the divine persons;
and this involves four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the divine persons can be known by natural reason?
(2) Whether notions are to be attributed to the divine persons?
(3) The number of the notions?
(4) Whether we may lawfully have various contrary opinions of these
notions?
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Whether the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the trinity of the divine persons can
be known by natural reason. For philosophers came to the knowledge of
God not otherwise than by natural reason. Now we find that they said
many things about the trinity of persons, for Aristotle says (De Coelo
et Mundo i, 2): "Through this number"---namely, three---"we bring
ourselves to acknowledge the greatness of one God, surpassing all
things created. " And Augustine says (Confess. vii, 9): "I have read in
their works, not in so many words, but enforced by many and various
reasons, that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God,
and the Word was God," and so on; in which passage the distinction of
persons is laid down. We read, moreover, in a gloss on Rom. 1 and Ex. 8
that the magicians of Pharaoh failed in the third sign---that is, as
regards knowledge of a third person---i. e. of the Holy Ghost ---and
thus it is clear that they knew at least two persons. Likewise
Trismegistus says: "The monad begot a monad, and reflected upon itself
its own heat. " By which words the generation of the Son and procession
of the Holy Ghost seem to be indicated. Therefore knowledge of the
divine persons can be obtained by natural reason.
Objection 2: Further, Richard St. Victor says (De Trin. i, 4): "I
believe without doubt that probable and even necessary arguments can be
found for any explanation of the truth. " So even to prove the Trinity
some have brought forward a reason from the infinite goodness of God,
who communicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the divine
persons; while some are moved by the consideration that "no good thing
can be joyfully possessed without partnership. " Augustine proceeds (De
Trin. x, 4; x, 11,12) to prove the trinity of persons by the procession
of the word and of love in our own mind; and we have followed him in
this ([271]Q[27] , AA[1],3). Therefore the trinity of persons can be
known by natural reason.
Objection 3: Further, it seems to be superfluous to teach what cannot
be known by natural reason. But it ought not to be said that the divine
tradition of the Trinity is superfluous. Therefore the trinity of
persons can be known by natural reason.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. i), "Let no man think to reach
the sacred mystery of generation by his own mind. " And Ambrose says (De
Fide ii, 5), "It is impossible to know the secret of generation. The
mind fails, the voice is silent. " But the trinity of the divine persons
is distinguished by origin of generation and procession ([272]Q[30],
A[2]). Since, therefore, man cannot know, and with his understanding
grasp that for which no necessary reason can be given, it follows that
the trinity of persons cannot be known by reason.
I answer that, It is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the
Trinity by natural reason. For, as above explained ([273]Q[12],
AA[4],12), man cannot obtain the knowledge of God by natural reason
except from creatures. Now creatures lead us to the knowledge of God,
as effects do to their cause. Accordingly, by natural reason we can
know of God that only which of necessity belongs to Him as the
principle of things, and we have cited this fundamental principle in
treating of God as above ([274]Q[12], A[12]). Now, the creative power
of God is common to the whole Trinity; and hence it belongs to the
unity of the essence, and not to the distinction of the persons.
Therefore, by natural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of
the essence, but not what belongs to the distinction of the persons.
Whoever, then, tries to prove the trinity of persons by natural reason,
derogates from faith in two ways. Firstly, as regards the dignity of
faith itself, which consists in its being concerned with invisible
things, that exceed human reason; wherefore the Apostle says that
"faith is of things that appear not" (Heb. 11:1), and the same Apostle
says also, "We speak wisdom among the perfect, but not the wisdom of
this world, nor of the princes of this world; but we speak the wisdom
of God in a mystery which is hidden" (1 Cor. 2:6,7). Secondly, as
regards the utility of drawing others to the faith. For when anyone in
the endeavor to prove the faith brings forward reasons which are not
cogent, he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers: since they
suppose that we stand upon such reasons, and that we believe on such
grounds.
Therefore, we must not attempt to prove what is of faith, except by
authority alone, to those who receive the authority; while as regards
others it suffices to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible.
Hence it is said by Dionysius (Div. Nom. ii): "Whoever wholly resists
the word, is far off from our philosophy; whereas if he regards the
truth of the word"---i. e. "the sacred word, we too follow this rule. "
Reply to Objection 1: The philosophers did not know the mystery of the
trinity of the divine persons by its proper attributes, such as
paternity, filiation, and procession, according to the Apostle's words,
"We speak the wisdom of God which none of the princes of the
world"---i. e. the philosophers---"knew" (1 Cor. 2:6). Nevertheless,
they knew some of the essential attributes appropriated to the persons,
as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Ghost;
as will later on appear. So, when Aristotle said, "By this number,"
etc. , we must not take it as if he affirmed a threefold number in God,
but that he wished to say that the ancients used the threefold number
in their sacrifices and prayers on account of some perfection residing
in the number three. In the Platonic books also we find, "In the
beginning was the word," not as meaning the Person begotten in God, but
as meaning the ideal type whereby God made all things, and which is
appropriated to the Son. And although they knew these were appropriated
to the three persons, yet they are said to have failed in the third
sign---that is, in the knowledge of the third person, because they
deviated from the goodness appropriated to the Holy Ghost, in that
knowing God "they did not glorify Him as God" (Rom. 1); or, because the
Platonists asserted the existence of one Primal Being whom they also
declared to be the father of the universe, they consequently maintained
the existence of another substance beneath him, which they called
"mind" or the "paternal intellect," containing the idea of all things,
as Macrobius relates (Som. Scip. iv). They did not, however, assert the
existence of a third separate substance which might correspond to the
Holy Ghost. So also we do not assert that the Father and the Son differ
in substance, which was the error of Origen and Arius, who in this
followed the Platonists. When Trismegistus says, "Monad begot monad,"
etc.
fish. So to those who ask, Three what? we answer, Three persons.
Reply to Objection 3: In God the individual---i. e. distinct and
incommunicable substance---includes the idea of relation, as above
explained.
Reply to Objection 4: The different sense of the less common term does
not produce equivocation in the more common. Although a horse and an
ass have their own proper definitions, nevertheless they agree
univocally in animal, because the common definition of animal applies
to both. So it does not follow that, although relation is contained in
the signification of divine person, but not in that of an angelic or of
a human person, the word "person" is used in an equivocal sense. Though
neither is it applied univocally, since nothing can be said univocally
of God and creatures ([254]Q[13], A[5]).
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THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We are now led to consider the plurality of the persons: about which
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there are several persons in God?
(2) How many are they?
(3) What the numeral terms signify in God?
(4) The community of the term "person. "
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Whether there are several persons in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are not several persons in God.
For person is "the individual substance of a rational nature. " If then
there are several persons in God, there must be several substances;
which appears to be heretical.
Objection 2: Further, Plurality of absolute properties does not make a
distinction of persons, either in God, or in ourselves. Much less
therefore is this effected by a plurality of relations. But in God
there is no plurality but of relations ([255]Q[28], A[3]). Therefore
there cannot be several persons in God.
Objection 3: Further, Boethius says of God (De Trin. i), that "this is
truly one which has no number. " But plurality implies number. Therefore
there are not several persons in God.
Objection 4: Further, where number is, there is whole and part. Thus,
if in God there exist a number of persons, there must be whole and part
in God; which is inconsistent with the divine simplicity.
On the contrary, Athanasius says: "One is the person of the Father,
another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost. " Therefore the Father,
and the Son, and the Holy Ghost are several persons.
I answer that, It follows from what precedes that there are several
persons in God. For it was shown above ([256]Q[29], A[4]) that this
word "person" signifies in God a relation as subsisting in the divine
nature. It was also established ([257]Q[28], A[1]) that there are
several real relations in God; and hence it follows that there are also
several realities subsistent in the divine nature; which means that
there are several persons in God.
Reply to Objection 1: The definition of "person" includes "substance,"
not as meaning the essence, but the "suppositum" which is made clear by
the addition of the term "individual. " To signify the substance thus
understood, the Greeks use the name "hypostasis. " So, as we say, "Three
persons," they say "Three hypostases. " We are not, however, accustomed
to say Three substances, lest we be understood to mean three essences
or natures, by reason of the equivocal signification of the term.
Reply to Objection 2: The absolute properties in God, such as goodness
and wisdom, are not mutually opposed; and hence, neither are they
really distinguished from each other. Therefore, although they subsist,
nevertheless they are not several subsistent realities---that is,
several persons. But the absolute properties in creatures do not
subsist, although they are really distinguished from each other, as
whiteness and sweetness; on the other hand, the relative properties in
God subsist, and are really distinguished from each other ([258]Q[28],
A[3]). Hence the plurality of persons in God.
Reply to Objection 3: The supreme unity and simplicity of God exclude
every kind of plurality of absolute things, but not plurality of
relations. Because relations are predicated relatively, and thus the
relations do not import composition in that of which they are
predicated, as Boethius teaches in the same book.
Reply to Objection 4: Number is twofold, simple or absolute, as two and
three and four; and number as existing in things numbered, as two men
and two horses. So, if number in God is taken absolutely or
abstractedly, there is nothing to prevent whole and part from being in
Him, and thus number in Him is only in our way of understanding;
forasmuch as number regarded apart from things numbered exists only in
the intellect. But if number be taken as it is in the things numbered,
in that sense as existing in creatures, one is part of two, and two of
three, as one man is part of two men, and two of three; but this does
not apply to God, because the Father is of the same magnitude as the
whole Trinity, as we shall show further on ([259]Q[42], AA[1], 4).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether there are more than three persons in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that there are more than three persons in
God. For the plurality of persons in God arises from the plurality of
the relative properties as stated above [260](A[1]). But there are four
relations in God as stated above ([261]Q[28], A[4]), paternity,
filiation, common spiration, and procession. Therefore there are four
persons in God.
Objection 2: The nature of God does not differ from His will more than
from His intellect. But in God, one person proceeds from the will, as
love; and another proceeds from His nature, as Son. Therefore another
proceeds from His intellect, as Word, besides the one Who proceeds from
His nature, as Son; thus again it follows that there are not only three
persons in God.
Objection 3: Further, the more perfect a creature is, the more interior
operations it has; as a man has understanding and will beyond other
animals. But God infinitely excels every creature. Therefore in God not
only is there a person proceeding from the will, and another from the
intellect, but also in an infinite number of ways. Therefore there are
an infinite number of persons in God.
Objection 4: Further, it is from the infinite goodness of the Father
that He communicates Himself infinitely in the production of a divine
person. But also in the Holy Ghost is infinite goodness. Therefore the
Holy Ghost produces a divine person; and that person another; and so to
infinity.
Objection 5: Further, everything within a determinate number is
measured, for number is a measure. But the divine persons are immense,
as we say in the Creed of Athanasius: "The Father is immense, the Son
is immense, the Holy Ghost is immense. " Therefore the persons are not
contained within the number three.
On the contrary, It is said: "There are three who bear witness in
heaven, the father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost" (1 Jn. 5:7). To those
who ask, "Three what? " we answer, with Augustine (De Trin. vii, 4),
"Three persons. " Therefore there are but three persons in God.
I answer that, As was explained above, there can be only three persons
in God. For it was shown above that the several persons are the several
subsisting relations really distinct from each other. But a real
distinction between the divine relations can come only from relative
opposition. Therefore two opposite relations must needs refer to two
persons: and if any relations are not opposite they must needs belong
to the same person. Since then paternity and filiation are opposite
relations, they belong necessarily to two persons. Therefore the
subsisting paternity is the person of the Father; and the subsisting
filiation is the person of the Son. The other two relations are not
opposed to each other; therefore these two cannot belong to one person:
hence either one of them must belong to both of the aforesaid persons;
or one must belong to one person, and the other to the other. Now,
procession cannot belong to the Father and the Son, or to either of
them; for thus it would follows that the procession of the intellect,
which in God is generation, wherefrom paternity and filiation are
derived, would issue from the procession of love, whence spiration and
procession are derived, if the person generating and the person
generated proceeded from the person spirating; and this is against what
was laid down above ([262]Q[27] , AA[3],4). We must frequently admit
that spiration belongs to the person of the Father, and to the person
of the Son, forasmuch as it has no relative opposition either to
paternity or to filiation; and consequently that procession belongs to
the other person who is called the person of the Holy Ghost, who
proceeds by way of love, as above explained. Therefore only three
persons exist in God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.
Reply to Objection 1: Although there are four relations in God, one of
them, spiration, is not separated from the person of the Father and of
the Son, but belongs to both; thus, although it is a relation, it is
not called a property, because it does not belong to only one person;
nor is it a personal relation---i. e. constituting a person. The three
relations---paternity, filiation, and procession---are called personal
properties, constituting as it were the persons; for paternity is the
person of the Father, filiation is the person of the Son, procession is
the person of the Holy Ghost proceeding.
Reply to Objection 2: That which proceeds by way of intelligence, as
word, proceeds according to similitude, as also that which proceeds by
way of nature; thus, as above explained ([263]Q[27], A[3]), the
procession of the divine Word is the very same as generation by way of
nature. But love, as such, does not proceed as the similitude of that
whence it proceeds; although in God love is co-essential as being
divine; and therefore the procession of love is not called generation
in God.
Reply to Objection 3: As man is more perfect than other animals, he has
more intrinsic operations than other animals, because his perfection is
something composite. Hence the angels, who are more perfect and more
simple, have fewer intrinsic operations than man, for they have no
imagination, or feeling, or the like. In God there exists only one real
operation---that is, His essence. How there are in Him two processions
was above explained ([264]Q[27], AA[1],4).
Reply to Objection 4: This argument would prove if the Holy Ghost
possessed another goodness apart from the goodness of the Father; for
then if the Father produced a divine person by His goodness, the Holy
Ghost also would do so. But the Father and the Holy Ghost have one and
the same goodness. Nor is there any distinction between them except by
the personal relations. So goodness belongs to the Holy Ghost, as
derived from another; and it belongs to the Father, as the principle of
its communication to another. The opposition of relation does not allow
the relation of the Holy Ghost to be joined with the relation of
principle of another divine person; because He Himself proceeds from
the other persons who are in God.
Reply to Objection 5: A determinate number, if taken as a simple
number, existing in the mind only, is measured by one. But when we
speak of a number of things as applied to the persons in God, the
notion of measure has no place, because the magnitude of the three
persons is the same ([265]Q[42], AA[1],4), and the same is not measured
by the same.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the numeral terms denote anything real in God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the numeral terms denote something real
in God. For the divine unity is the divine essence. But every number is
unity repeated. Therefore every numeral term in God signifies the
essence; and therefore it denotes something real in God.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is said of God and of creatures, belongs
to God in a more eminent manner than to creatures. But the numeral
terms denote something real in creatures; therefore much more so in
God.
Objection 3: Further, if the numeral terms do not denote anything real
in God, and are introduced simply in a negative and removing sense, as
plurality is employed to remove unity, and unity to remove plurality;
it follows that a vicious circle results, confusing the mind and
obscuring the truth; and this ought not to be. Therefore it must be
said that the numeral terms denote something real in God.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "If we admit
companionship"---that is, plurality---"we exclude the idea of oneness
and of solitude;" and Ambrose says (De Fide i): "When we say one God,
unity excludes plurality of gods, and does not imply quantity in God. "
Hence we see that these terms are applied to God in order to remove
something; and not to denote anything positive.
I answer that, The Master (Sent. i, D, 24) considers that the numeral
terms do not denote anything positive in God, but have only a negative
meaning. Others, however, assert the contrary.
In order to resolve this point, we may observe that all plurality is a
consequence of division. Now division is twofold; one is material, and
is division of the continuous; from this results number, which is a
species of quantity. Number in this sense is found only in material
things which have quantity. The other kind of division is called
formal, and is effected by opposite or diverse forms; and this kind of
division results in a multitude, which does not belong to a genus, but
is transcendental in the sense in which being is divided by one and by
many. This kind of multitude is found only in immaterial things.
Some, considering only that multitude which is a species of discrete
quantity, and seeing that such kind of quantity has no place in God,
asserted that the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God, but
remove something from Him. Others, considering the same kind of
multitude, said that as knowledge exists in God according to the strict
sense of the word, but not in the sense of its genus (as in God there
is no such thing as a quality), so number exists in God in the proper
sense of number, but not in the sense of its genus, which is quantity.
But we say that numeral terms predicated of God are not derived from
number, a species of quantity, for in that sense they could bear only a
metaphorical sense in God, like other corporeal properties, such as
length, breadth, and the like; but that they are taken from multitude
in a transcendent sense. Now multitude so understood has relation to
the many of which it is predicated, as "one" convertible with "being"
is related to being; which kind of oneness does not add anything to
being, except a negation of division, as we saw when treating of the
divine unity ([266]Q[11], A[1]); for "one" signifies undivided being.
So, of whatever we say "one," we imply its undivided reality: thus, for
instance, "one" applied to man signifies the undivided nature or
substance of a man. In the same way, when we speak of many things,
multitude in this latter sense points to those things as being each
undivided in itself.
But number, if taken as a species of quantity, denotes an accident
added to being; as also does "one" which is the principle of that
number. Therefore the numeral terms in God signify the things of which
they are said, and beyond this they add negation only, as stated (Sent.
i, D, 24); in which respect the Master was right (Sent. i, D, 24). So
when we say, the essence is one, the term "one" signifies the essence
undivided; and when we say the person is one, it signifies the person
undivided; and when we say the persons are many, we signify those
persons, and their individual undividedness; for it is of the very
nature of multitude that it should be composed of units.
Reply to Objection 1: One, as it is a transcendental, is wider and more
general than substance and relation. And so likewise is multitude;
hence in God it may mean both substance and relation, according to the
context. Still, the very signification of such names adds a negation of
division, beyond substance and relation; as was explained above.
Reply to Objection 2: Multitude, which denotes something real in
creatures, is a species of quantity, and cannot be used when speaking
of God: unlike transcendental multitude, which adds only indivision to
those of which it is predicated. Such a kind of multitude is applicable
to God.
Reply to Objection 3: "One" does not exclude multitude, but division,
which logically precedes one or multitude. Multitude does not remove
unity, but division from each of the individuals which compose the
multitude. This was explained when we treated of the divine unity
([267]Q[11], A[2]).
It must be observed, nevertheless, that the opposite arguments do not
sufficiently prove the point advanced. Although the idea of solitude is
excluded by plurality, and the plurality of gods by unity, it does not
follow that these terms express this signification alone. For blackness
is excluded by whiteness; nevertheless, the term whiteness does not
signify the mere exclusion of blackness.
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Whether this term "person" can be common to the three persons?
Objection 1: It would seem that this term "person" cannot be common to
the three persons. For nothing is common to the three persons but the
essence. But this term "person" does not signify the essence directly.
Therefore it is not common to all three.
Objection 2: Further, the common is the opposite to the incommunicable.
But the very meaning of person is that it is incommunicable; as appears
from the definition given by Richard of St. Victor ([268]Q[29], A[3],
ad 4). Therefore this term "person" is not common to all the three
persons.
Objection 3: Further, if the name "person" is common to the three, it
is common either really, or logically. But it is not so really;
otherwise the three persons would be one person; nor again is it so
logically; otherwise person would be a universal. But in God there is
neither universal nor particular; neither genus nor species, as we
proved above ([269]Q[3], A[5]). Therefore this term 'person' is not
common to the three.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4) that when we ask,
"Three what? " we say, "Three persons," because what a person is, is
common to them.
I answer that, The very mode of expression itself shows that this term
"person" is common to the three when we say "three persons"; for when
we say "three men" we show that "man" is common to the three. Now it is
clear that this is not community of a real thing, as if one essence
were common to the three; otherwise there would be only one person of
the three, as also one essence.
What is meant by such a community has been variously determined by
those who have examined the subject. Some have called it a community of
exclusion, forasmuch as the definition of "person" contains the word
"incommunicable. " Others thought it to be a community of intention, as
the definition of person contains the word "individual"; as we say that
to be a "species" is common to horse and ox. Both of these
explanations, however, are excluded by the fact that "person" is not a
name of exclusion nor of intention, but the name of a reality. We must
therefore resolve that even in human affairs this name "person" is
common by a community of idea, not as genus or species, but as a vague
individual thing. The names of genera and species, as man or animal,
are given to signify the common natures themselves, but not the
intentions of those common natures, signified by the terms "genus" or
"species. " The vague individual thing, as "some man," signifies the
common nature with the determinate mode of existence of singular
things---that is, something self-subsisting, as distinct from others.
But the name of a designated singular thing signifies that which
distinguishes the determinate thing; as the name Socrates signifies
this flesh and this bone. But there is this difference---that the term
"some man" signifies the nature, or the individual on the part of its
nature, with the mode of existence of singular things; while this name
"person" is not given to signify the individual on the part of the
nature, but the subsistent reality in that nature. Now this is common
in idea to the divine persons, that each of them subsists distinctly
from the others in the divine nature. Thus this name "person" is common
in idea to the three divine persons.
Reply to Objection 1: This argument is founded on a real community.
Reply to Objection 2: Although person is incommunicable, yet the mode
itself of incommunicable existence can be common to many.
Reply to Objection 3: Although this community is logical and not real,
yet it does not follow that in God there is universal or particular, or
genus, or species; both because neither in human affairs is the
community of person the same as community of genus or species; and
because the divine persons have one being; whereas genus and species
and every other universal are predicated of many which differ in being.
__________________________________________________________________
OF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY OR PLURALITY IN GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)
We now consider what belongs to the unity or plurality in God; which
gives rise to four points of inquiry:
(1) Concerning the word "Trinity";
(2) Whether we can say that the Son is other than the Father?
(3) Whether an exclusive term, which seems to exclude otherness, can be
joined to an essential name in God?
(4) Whether it can be joined to a personal term?
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Whether there is trinity in God?
Objection 1: It would seem there is not trinity in God. For every name
in God signifies substance or relation. But this name "Trinity" does
not signify the substance; otherwise it would be predicated of each one
of the persons: nor does it signify relation; for it does not express a
name that refers to another. Therefore the word "Trinity" is not to be
applied to God.
Objection 2: Further, this word "trinity" is a collective term, since
it signifies multitude. But such a word does not apply to God; as the
unity of a collective name is the least of unities, whereas in God
there exists the greatest possible unity. Therefore this word "trinity"
does not apply to God.
Objection 3: Further, every trine is threefold. But in God there is not
triplicity; since triplicity is a kind of inequality. Therefore neither
is there trinity in God.
Objection 4: Further, all that exists in God exists in the unity of the
divine essence; because God is His own essence. Therefore, if Trinity
exists in God, it exists in the unity of the divine essence; and thus
in God there would be three essential unities; which is heresy.
Objection 5: Further, in all that is said of God, the concrete is
predicated of the abstract; for Deity is God and paternity is the
Father. But the Trinity cannot be called trine; otherwise there would
be nine realities in God; which, of course, is erroneous. Therefore the
word trinity is not to be applied to God.
On the contrary, Athanasius says: "Unity in Trinity; and Trinity in
Unity is to be revered. "
I answer that, The name "Trinity" in God signifies the determinate
number of persons. And so the plurality of persons in God requires that
we should use the word trinity; because what is indeterminately
signified by plurality, is signified by trinity in a determinate
manner.
Reply to Objection 1: In its etymological sense, this word "Trinity"
seems to signify the one essence of the three persons, according as
trinity may mean trine-unity. But in the strict meaning of the term it
rather signifies the number of persons of one essence; and on this
account we cannot say that the Father is the Trinity, as He is not
three persons. Yet it does not mean the relations themselves of the
Persons, but rather the number of persons related to each other; and
hence it is that the word in itself does not express regard to another.
Reply to Objection 2: Two things are implied in a collective term,
plurality of the "supposita," and a unity of some kind of order. For
"people" is a multitude of men comprehended under a certain order. In
the first sense, this word "trinity" is like other collective words;
but in the second sense it differs from them, because in the divine
Trinity not only is there unity of order, but also with this there is
unity of essence.
Reply to Objection 3: "Trinity" is taken in an absolute sense; for it
signifies the threefold number of persons.
"Triplicity" signifies a
proportion of inequality; for it is a species of unequal proportion,
according to Boethius (Arithm. i, 23). Therefore in God there is not
triplicity, but Trinity.
Reply to Objection 4: In the divine Trinity is to be understood both
number and the persons numbered. So when we say, "Trinity in Unity," we
do not place number in the unity of the essence, as if we meant three
times one; but we place the Persons numbered in the unity of nature; as
the "supposita" of a nature are said to exist in that nature. On the
other hand, we say "Unity in Trinity"; meaning that the nature is in
its "supposita. "
Reply to Objection 5: When we say, "Trinity is trine," by reason of the
number implied, we signify the multiplication of that number by itself;
since the word trine imports a distinction in the "supposita" of which
it is spoken. Therefore it cannot be said that the Trinity is trine;
otherwise it follows that, if the Trinity be trine, there would be
three "supposita" of the Trinity; as when we say, "God is trine," it
follows that there are three "supposita" of the Godhead.
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Whether the Son is other than the Father?
Objection 1: It would seem that the Son is not other than the Father.
For "other" is a relative term implying diversity of substance. If,
then, the Son is other than the Father, He must be different from the
Father; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. vii), that
when we speak of three persons, "we do not mean to imply diversity. "
Objection 2: Further, whosoever are other from one another, differ in
some way from one another. Therefore, if the Son is other than the
Father, it follows that He differs from the Father; which is against
what Ambrose says (De Fide i), that "the Father and the Son are one in
Godhead; nor is there any difference in substance between them, nor any
diversity. "
Objection 3: Further, the term alien is taken from "alius" [other]. But
the Son is not alien from the Father, for Hilary says (De Trin. vii)
that "in the divine persons there is nothing diverse, nothing alien,
nothing separable. " Therefore the Son is not other that the Father.
Objection 4: Further, the terms "other person" and "other thing" [alius
et aliud] have the same meaning, differing only in gender. So if the
Son is another person from the Father, it follows that the Son is a
thing apart from the Father.
On the contrary, Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i. ] says:
"There is one essence of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, in which
the Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost
another; although the Father is one person, the Son another, and the
Holy Ghost another. "
I answer that, Since as Jerome remarks [*In substance, Ep. lvii. ], a
heresy arises from words wrongly used, when we speak of the Trinity we
must proceed with care and with befitting modesty; because, as
Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3), "nowhere is error more harmful, the
quest more toilsome, the finding more fruitful. " Now, in treating of
the Trinity, we must beware of two opposite errors, and proceed
cautiously between them---namely, the error of Arius, who placed a
Trinity of substance with the Trinity of persons; and the error of
Sabellius, who placed unity of person with the unity of essence.
Thus, to avoid the error of Arius we must shun the use of the terms
diversity and difference in God, lest we take away the unity of
essence: we may, however, use the term "distinction" on account of the
relative opposition. Hence whenever we find terms of "diversity" or
"difference" of Persons used in an authentic work, these terms of
"diversity" or "difference" are taken to mean "distinction. " But lest
the simplicity and singleness of the divine essence be taken away, the
terms "separation" and "division," which belong to the parts of a
whole, are to be avoided: and lest quality be taken away, we avoid the
use of the term "disparity": and lest we remove similitude, we avoid
the terms "alien" and "discrepant. " For Ambrose says (De Fide i) that
"in the Father and the Son there is no discrepancy, but one Godhead":
and according to Hilary, as quoted above, "in God there is nothing
alien, nothing separable. "
To avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the term "singularity,"
lest we take away the communicability of the divine essence. Hence
Hilary says (De Trin. vii): "It is sacrilege to assert that the Father
and the Son are separate in Godhead. " We must avoid the adjective
"only" [unici] lest we take away the number of persons. Hence Hilary
says in the same book: "We exclude from God the idea of singularity or
uniqueness. " Nevertheless, we say "the only Son," for in God there is
no plurality of Sons. Yet, we do not say "the only God," for the Deity
is common to several. We avoid the word "confused," lest we take away
from the Persons the order of their nature. Hence Ambrose says (De Fide
i): "What is one is not confused; and there is no multiplicity where
there is no difference. " The word "solitary" is also to be avoided,
lest we take away the society of the three persons; for, as Hilary says
(De Trin. iv), "We confess neither a solitary nor a diverse God. "
This word "other" [alius], however, in the masculine sense, means only
a distinction of "suppositum"; and hence we can properly say that "the
Son is other than the Father," because He is another "suppositum" of
the divine nature, as He is another person and another hypostasis.
Reply to Objection 1: "Other," being like the name of a particular
thing, refers to the "suppositum"; and so, there is sufficient reason
for using it, where there is a distinct substance in the sense of
hypostasis or person. But diversity requires a distinct substance in
the sense of essence. Thus we cannot say that the Son is diverse from
the Father, although He is another.
Reply to Objection 2: "Difference" implies distinction of form. There
is one form in God, as appears from the text, "Who, when He was in the
form of God" (Phil. 2:6). Therefore the term "difference" does not
properly apply to God, as appears from the authority quoted. Yet,
Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 5) employs the term "difference" in the
divine persons, as meaning that the relative property is signified by
way of form. Hence he says that the hypostases do not differ from each
other in substance, but according to determinate properties. But
"difference" is taken for "distinction," as above stated.
Reply to Objection 3: The term "alien" means what is extraneous and
dissimilar; which is not expressed by the term "other" [alius]; and
therefore we say that the Son is "other" than the Father, but not that
He is anything "alien. "
Reply to Objection 4: The neuter gender is formless; whereas the
masculine is formed and distinct; and so is the feminine. So the common
essence is properly and aptly expressed by the neuter gender, but by
the masculine and feminine is expressed the determined subject in the
common nature. Hence also in human affairs, if we ask, Who is this man?
we answer, Socrates, which is the name of the "suppositum"; whereas, if
we ask, What is he? we reply, A rational and mortal animal. So, because
in God distinction is by the persons, and not by the essence, we say
that the Father is other than the Son, but not something else; while
conversely we say that they are one thing, but not one person.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the exclusive word "alone" should be added to the essential term in
God?
Objection 1: It would seem that the exclusive word "alone" [solus] is
not to be added to an essential term in God. For, according to the
Philosopher (Elench. ii, 3), "He is alone who is not with another. " But
God is with the angels and the souls of the saints. Therefore we cannot
say that God is alone.
Objection 2: Further, whatever is joined to the essential term in God
can be predicated of every person "per se," and of all the persons
together; for, as we can properly say that God is wise, we can say the
Father is a wise God; and the Trinity is a wise God. But Augustine says
(De Trin. vi, 9): "We must consider the opinion that the Father is not
true God alone. " Therefore God cannot be said to be alone.
Objection 3: Further if this expression "alone" is joined to an
essential term, it would be so joined as regards either the personal
predicate or the essential predicate. But it cannot be the former, as
it is false to say, "God alone is Father," since man also is a father;
nor, again, can it be applied as regards the latter, for, if this
saying were true, "God alone creates," it would follow that the "Father
alone creates," as whatever is said of God can be said of the Father;
and it would be false, as the Son also creates. Therefore this
expression "alone" cannot be joined to an essential term in God.
On the contrary, It is said, "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible,
the only God" (1 Tim. 1:17).
I answer that, This term "alone" can be taken as a categorematical
term, or as a syncategorematical term. A categorematical term is one
which ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given "suppositum"; as, for
instance, "white" to man, as when we say a "white man. " If the term
"alone" is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way be joined to any
term in God; for it would mean solitude in the term to which it is
joined; and it would follow that God was solitary, against what is
above stated [270](A[2]). A syncategorematical term imports the order
of the predicate to the subject; as this expression "every one" or "no
one"; and likewise the term "alone," as excluding every other
"suppositum" from the predicate. Thus, when we say, "Socrates alone
writes," we do not mean that Socrates is solitary, but that he has no
companion in writing, though many others may be with him. In this way
nothing prevents the term "alone" being joined to any essential term in
God, as excluding the predicate from all things but God; as if we said
"God alone is eternal," because nothing but God is eternal.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the angels and the souls of the saints
are always with God, nevertheless, if plurality of persons did not
exist in God, He would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not
removed by association with anything that is extraneous in nature; thus
anyone is said to be alone in a garden, though many plants and animals
are with him in the garden. Likewise, God would be alone or solitary,
though angels and men were with Him, supposing that several persons
were not within Him. Therefore the society of angels and of souls does
not take away absolute solitude from God; much less does it remove
respective solitude, in reference to a predicate.
Reply to Objection 2: This expression "alone," properly speaking, does
not affect the predicate, which is taken formally, for it refers to the
"suppositum," as excluding any other suppositum from the one which it
qualifies. But the adverb "only," being exclusive, can be applied
either to subject or predicate. For we can say, "Only Socrates"---that
is, no one else---"runs: and Socrates runs only"---that is, he does
nothing else. Hence it is not properly said that the Father is God
alone, or the Trinity is God alone, unless some implied meaning be
assumed in the predicate, as, for instance, "The Trinity is God Who
alone is God. " In that sense it can be true to say that the Father is
that God Who alone is God, if the relative be referred to the
predicate, and not to the "suppositum. " So, when Augustine says that
the Father is not God alone, but that the Trinity is God alone, he
speaks expositively, as he might explain the words, "To the King of
ages, invisible, the only God," as applying not to the Father, but to
the Trinity alone.
Reply to Objection 3: In both ways can the term "alone" be joined to an
essential term. For this proposition, "God alone is Father," can mean
two things, because the word "Father" can signify the person of the
Father; and then it is true; for no man is that person: or it can
signify that relation only; and thus it is false, because the relation
of paternity is found also in others, though not in a univocal sense.
Likewise it is true to say God alone creates; nor, does it follow,
"therefore the Father alone creates," because, as logicians say, an
exclusive diction so fixes the term to which it is joined that what is
said exclusively of that term cannot be said exclusively of an
individual contained in that term: for instance, from the premiss, "Man
alone is a mortal rational animal," we cannot conclude, "therefore
Socrates alone is such. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether an exclusive diction can be joined to the personal term?
Objection 1: It would seem that an exclusive diction can be joined to
the personal term, even though the predicate is common. For our Lord
speaking to the Father, said: "That they may know Thee, the only true
God" (Jn. 17:3). Therefore the Father alone is true God.
Objection 2: Further, He said: "No one knows the Son but the Father"
(Mat. 11:27); which means that the Father alone knows the Son. But to
know the Son is common (to the persons). Therefore the same conclusion
follows.
Objection 3: Further, an exclusive diction does not exclude what enters
into the concept of the term to which it is joined. Hence it does not
exclude the part, nor the universal; for it does not follow that if we
say "Socrates alone is white," that therefore "his hand is not white,"
or that "man is not white. " But one person is in the concept of
another; as the Father is in the concept of the Son; and conversely.
Therefore, when we say, The Father alone is God, we do not exclude the
Son, nor the Holy Ghost; so that such a mode of speaking is true.
Objection 4: Further, the Church sings: "Thou alone art Most High, O
Jesus Christ. "
On the contrary, This proposition "The Father alone is God" includes
two assertions---namely, that the Father is God, and that no other
besides the Father is God. But this second proposition is false, for
the Son is another from the Father, and He is God. Therefore this is
false, The Father alone is God; and the same of the like sayings.
I answer that, When we say, "The Father alone is God," such a
proposition can be taken in several senses. If "alone" means solitude
in the Father, it is false in a categorematical sense; but if taken in
a syncategorematical sense it can again be understood in several ways.
For if it exclude (all others) from the form of the subject, it is
true, the sense being "the Father alone is God"---that is, "He who with
no other is the Father, is God. " In this way Augustine expounds when he
says (De Trin. vi, 6): "We say the Father alone, not because He is
separate from the Son, or from the Holy Ghost, but because they are not
the Father together with Him. " This, however, is not the usual way of
speaking, unless we understand another implication, as though we said
"He who alone is called the Father is God. " But in the strict sense the
exclusion affects the predicate. And thus the proposition is false if
it excludes another in the masculine sense; but true if it excludes it
in the neuter sense; because the Son is another person than the Father,
but not another thing; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost. But
because this diction "alone," properly speaking, refers to the subject,
it tends to exclude another Person rather than other things. Hence such
a way of speaking is not to be taken too literally, but it should be
piously expounded, whenever we find it in an authentic work.
Reply to Objection 1: When we say, "Thee the only true God," we do not
understand it as referring to the person of the Father, but to the
whole Trinity, as Augustine expounds (De Trin. vi, 9). Or, if
understood of the person of the Father, the other persons are not
excluded by reason of the unity of essence; in so far as the word
"only" excludes another thing, as above explained.
The same Reply can be given to OBJ 2. For an essential term applied to
the Father does not exclude the Son or the Holy Ghost, by reason of the
unity of essence. Hence we must understand that in the text quoted the
term "no one" [*Nemo = non-homo, i. e. no man] is not the same as "no
man," which the word itself would seem to signify (for the person of
the Father could not be excepted), but is taken according to the usual
way of speaking in a distributive sense, to mean any rational nature.
Reply to Objection 3: The exclusive diction does not exclude what
enters into the concept of the term to which it is adjoined, if they do
not differ in "suppositum," as part and universal. But the Son differs
in "suppositum" from the Father; and so there is no parity.
Reply to Objection 4: We do not say absolutely that the Son alone is
Most High; but that He alone is Most High "with the Holy Ghost, in the
glory of God the Father. "
__________________________________________________________________
THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS (FOUR ARTICLES)
We proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the divine persons;
and this involves four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the divine persons can be known by natural reason?
(2) Whether notions are to be attributed to the divine persons?
(3) The number of the notions?
(4) Whether we may lawfully have various contrary opinions of these
notions?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the trinity of the divine persons can be known by natural reason?
Objection 1: It would seem that the trinity of the divine persons can
be known by natural reason. For philosophers came to the knowledge of
God not otherwise than by natural reason. Now we find that they said
many things about the trinity of persons, for Aristotle says (De Coelo
et Mundo i, 2): "Through this number"---namely, three---"we bring
ourselves to acknowledge the greatness of one God, surpassing all
things created. " And Augustine says (Confess. vii, 9): "I have read in
their works, not in so many words, but enforced by many and various
reasons, that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God,
and the Word was God," and so on; in which passage the distinction of
persons is laid down. We read, moreover, in a gloss on Rom. 1 and Ex. 8
that the magicians of Pharaoh failed in the third sign---that is, as
regards knowledge of a third person---i. e. of the Holy Ghost ---and
thus it is clear that they knew at least two persons. Likewise
Trismegistus says: "The monad begot a monad, and reflected upon itself
its own heat. " By which words the generation of the Son and procession
of the Holy Ghost seem to be indicated. Therefore knowledge of the
divine persons can be obtained by natural reason.
Objection 2: Further, Richard St. Victor says (De Trin. i, 4): "I
believe without doubt that probable and even necessary arguments can be
found for any explanation of the truth. " So even to prove the Trinity
some have brought forward a reason from the infinite goodness of God,
who communicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the divine
persons; while some are moved by the consideration that "no good thing
can be joyfully possessed without partnership. " Augustine proceeds (De
Trin. x, 4; x, 11,12) to prove the trinity of persons by the procession
of the word and of love in our own mind; and we have followed him in
this ([271]Q[27] , AA[1],3). Therefore the trinity of persons can be
known by natural reason.
Objection 3: Further, it seems to be superfluous to teach what cannot
be known by natural reason. But it ought not to be said that the divine
tradition of the Trinity is superfluous. Therefore the trinity of
persons can be known by natural reason.
On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. i), "Let no man think to reach
the sacred mystery of generation by his own mind. " And Ambrose says (De
Fide ii, 5), "It is impossible to know the secret of generation. The
mind fails, the voice is silent. " But the trinity of the divine persons
is distinguished by origin of generation and procession ([272]Q[30],
A[2]). Since, therefore, man cannot know, and with his understanding
grasp that for which no necessary reason can be given, it follows that
the trinity of persons cannot be known by reason.
I answer that, It is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the
Trinity by natural reason. For, as above explained ([273]Q[12],
AA[4],12), man cannot obtain the knowledge of God by natural reason
except from creatures. Now creatures lead us to the knowledge of God,
as effects do to their cause. Accordingly, by natural reason we can
know of God that only which of necessity belongs to Him as the
principle of things, and we have cited this fundamental principle in
treating of God as above ([274]Q[12], A[12]). Now, the creative power
of God is common to the whole Trinity; and hence it belongs to the
unity of the essence, and not to the distinction of the persons.
Therefore, by natural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of
the essence, but not what belongs to the distinction of the persons.
Whoever, then, tries to prove the trinity of persons by natural reason,
derogates from faith in two ways. Firstly, as regards the dignity of
faith itself, which consists in its being concerned with invisible
things, that exceed human reason; wherefore the Apostle says that
"faith is of things that appear not" (Heb. 11:1), and the same Apostle
says also, "We speak wisdom among the perfect, but not the wisdom of
this world, nor of the princes of this world; but we speak the wisdom
of God in a mystery which is hidden" (1 Cor. 2:6,7). Secondly, as
regards the utility of drawing others to the faith. For when anyone in
the endeavor to prove the faith brings forward reasons which are not
cogent, he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers: since they
suppose that we stand upon such reasons, and that we believe on such
grounds.
Therefore, we must not attempt to prove what is of faith, except by
authority alone, to those who receive the authority; while as regards
others it suffices to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible.
Hence it is said by Dionysius (Div. Nom. ii): "Whoever wholly resists
the word, is far off from our philosophy; whereas if he regards the
truth of the word"---i. e. "the sacred word, we too follow this rule. "
Reply to Objection 1: The philosophers did not know the mystery of the
trinity of the divine persons by its proper attributes, such as
paternity, filiation, and procession, according to the Apostle's words,
"We speak the wisdom of God which none of the princes of the
world"---i. e. the philosophers---"knew" (1 Cor. 2:6). Nevertheless,
they knew some of the essential attributes appropriated to the persons,
as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Ghost;
as will later on appear. So, when Aristotle said, "By this number,"
etc. , we must not take it as if he affirmed a threefold number in God,
but that he wished to say that the ancients used the threefold number
in their sacrifices and prayers on account of some perfection residing
in the number three. In the Platonic books also we find, "In the
beginning was the word," not as meaning the Person begotten in God, but
as meaning the ideal type whereby God made all things, and which is
appropriated to the Son. And although they knew these were appropriated
to the three persons, yet they are said to have failed in the third
sign---that is, in the knowledge of the third person, because they
deviated from the goodness appropriated to the Holy Ghost, in that
knowing God "they did not glorify Him as God" (Rom. 1); or, because the
Platonists asserted the existence of one Primal Being whom they also
declared to be the father of the universe, they consequently maintained
the existence of another substance beneath him, which they called
"mind" or the "paternal intellect," containing the idea of all things,
as Macrobius relates (Som. Scip. iv). They did not, however, assert the
existence of a third separate substance which might correspond to the
Holy Ghost. So also we do not assert that the Father and the Son differ
in substance, which was the error of Origen and Arius, who in this
followed the Platonists. When Trismegistus says, "Monad begot monad,"
etc.
