No More Learning

ot what is right or wroug in all possible caset ; otherwise, the idea of obligation or duty would be utterly null, for we cannot have any obligation to that, which we cannot know. On the other hand, in our investigations of the phenomena of nature, much must remain uncertain, and many questions continue insoluble ; because what we know of nature is far from being sufficient to explain all the phenomena that are presented to our observation. Now the question is : Whether there is in transcendental philosophy any question, relating to an object presented to pure reason, which is un
answerable by this reason ; and whether we must regard the subject of the question as quite uncertain --so far as our knowledge extends, and must give it a place among those
subjects, of which we have just so much conception a* is sufficient to enable us to raise a question --faculty or materials failing us, however, when we attempt an answer.
Now 1 maintain, that among all speculative cognition, the peculiarity of transcendental philosophy that there
no question, relating to an object presented to pure reason, which insoluble this reason and that the profession
of unavoidable ignorance --the problem being alleged to be
the reach of our faculties --cannot free us from th<<
? beyond
obligation to present complete and satisfactory answer. For the very conception, which enables us to raise the question,
must give us the power of answering object, as in the case of right and wrong, covered out of the conception.
But, in transcendental philosophy,
logical questions, to which we can demand a satisfactory answer in relation to the constitution of their object; and the
philosopher not permitted to avail himself of the pretext of necessary ignorance and impenetrable obscurity. These questions relate solely to the cosmological ideas. For the object, must be given in experience, and the question relates to the adequateness of the object to an idea. If the object
transcendental, and therefore itself unknown the question, for example, whether the object --the something, the phsenomenon of which ^internal --in ourselves^ thought --that to say, the soul, in itself simple being or whether there cause of all things, which absolutely ne cessaiy,-- in such cases we arc seeking for our idea an object.
inasmuch as the not to be dis
only the cosmo-
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of which we may confess, that it is unknown to us, though we must not on that account assert that it is impossible. * The cosmological ideas alone possess the peculiarity, that wc can presuppose the object of then and the empirical synthesis
requisite for the conception of that object to be given; and the question, which arises from these ideas, relates merely to the progress of this synthesis, in so far as it must contain absolute totality, -- which, however, is not empirical, as it cannot be given in any experience. Now, as the question here is solely in regard to a thing as the object of a possible experience, and not as a thing in itself, the answer to the transcendental cosmological question need not be sought out of the idea, for the question does not regard an object in itself. The question in relation to a possible experience, is not, what ran be given in an experience in concreto, --but, what is contained in the idea, to which the empirical syn thesis must approximate. The question must therefore be capable of solution from the idea alone. For the idea is a creation of reason itself, which therefore cannot disclaim the obligation to answer or refer us to the unknown object.
It is not so extraordinary as it at first sight appears, that a science should demand and expect satisfactory answers to all the questions that may arise within its own sphere (questiones domestical), although, up to a certain time, these answers may not have been discovered. There are, in ad dition to transcendental philosophy, only two pure sciences of reason ; the one with a speculative, the other with a prac tical content --pure mathematics and pure ethics. Has any
? The question, what is the constitution of a transcendental object, is unanswerable -- we are unable to say what it it ; but we can perceive that the question itself it nothing ; becauss it does not relate to any object that can be presented to us. For this reason, we must consider all the questioni raised in transcendental psychology as answerable, and as really answered ; for they relate to the transcendental subject of all internal phenomena, which is not itself phenomenon, and consequently rot given as an object, in which, moreover, none of the categories --and it is to them that the question is properly directed -- find any conditions of its application. Here, therefore, is a case where no answer is the only proper answer. For a question regarding the constitution of a something,
pletely beyond the sf here of objects and experience, is perfectly nul! and void.
? which cannot be cogitated by any determined predicate--being com
? ? ? OF TRAU8CENDENTAL PBOBLftKB. 301
oue ever heard it alleged that, from our complete and ne cessary ignorance of the conditions, it is uncertain what exact relation the diameter of a circle bears to the circle in rational or irrational numbers ? By the former the sum cannot be given exactly, by the latter only approximately ; and therefore we decide, that the impossibility of a solution of the question is evident. Lambert presented us with a demonstration of this. In the general principles of morals there can be nothing uncertain, for the propositions are either utterly without meaning, or must originate solely in our rational conceptions. On the other hand, there must be in physical science an infinite number of conjectures, which can never become certainties ; because the phsenomena of
nature are not given as objects dependent on our conceptions. The key to the solution of such questions cannot therefore be found in our conceptions or in pure thought, but must lie without us, and for that reason is in many cases not to be discovered ; and consequently a satisfactory explanation can not be expected. The quest'ons of transcendental analytic, which relate to the deduction of our pure cognition, are not to be regarded as of the same kind as those mentioned above ; for we are not at present treating of the certainty of judg ments in relation to the origin of our conceptions, but only of that certainty in relation to objects.
We cannot, therefore, escape the responsibility of at least a critical solution of the questions of reason, by complaints of the limited nature of our faculties, and the seemingly hum ble confession that it is beyond the power of our reason to decide, whether the world has existed from all eternity or had a beginning. --whether it is infinitely extended, or enclosed within certain limits, -- whether anything in the world is simple, or whether everything must be capable of infinite divisibility, -- whether freedom can originate phsenomena, or whether everything is absolutely dependent on the laws and order of nature -- and, finally, whether there exists a being that is com pletely unconditioned and necessary, or whether the existence of everything is conditioned and consequently dependent on something external to itself, and therefore in its own nature
contingent. For all these questions relate to an object, which can be given no where else than in thought. This object is the absolutely unconditioned totality of the synthesis of pha>
? ? ? ? 302 TRAN8CEKDENTAL DIALRf/TTO.
nomena. If the conceptions in our minds do not assist us to some certain result in regard to these problems, we must not defend ourselves on the plea that the object itself remains nidden from and unknown to us. For no such thing or object can be given -- it is not to be found out of the idea in our minds. We must seek the cause of our failure in our idea itself, which is an insoluble problem, and in regard to which we obstinately assume that there exists a real object corre sponding and adequate to it. A clear explanation of the dialectic which lies in our conception, will very soon enable us to come to a satisfactory decision in regard to such a question.
The pretext, that we are unable to arrive at certainty in regard to these problems, may be met with this question, which requires at least a plain answer : From what source do the ideas originate, the solution of which involves you in such difficulties ? Are you seeking for an explanation of certain phenomena ; and do you expect these ideas to give you the principles or the rules of this explanation ? Let it be granted, that all nature was laid open before you ; that nothing was hid from your senses and your consciousness. Still, you could not cognize ta eoncreto the object of your ideas in any
For what is demanded, is, not only this full and complete intuition, but also a complete synthesis and the consciousness of its absolute totality; and this is not possible by meansof any empirical cognition. It follows that your question --your idea is by no means necessary for the explanation of any phsenomenon ; and the idea cannot have been in anysense given by the object itself. For such an object cau never be pre sented to us, because it cannot be given by any possible expe rience. Whatever perceptions you may attain to, you are still surrounded by conditions --in space, or in time, and you can not discover anything unconditioned ; nor can you decide whether this unconditioned is to be placed in an absolute beginning of the synthesis, or in an absolute totality of the series without beginning. A whole, in the empirical signifi cation of the term, is always merely comparative. The absolute whole of quantity (the universe), of division, of derivation, of the condition of existence, with the question -- whether it is to be produced by a finite or infinite synthesis, no possible experience can instruct us concerning. You will not, foi
? experience.
? ? ? OF THE COSMOLOGIC1LL PROBLEMS.
303
example, be able to explain the phenomena of a body in ths
least degree better, whether you believe it to consist of simple,
or of composite parts ; for a simple phenomenon -- and just as little an infinite series of composition--can never be presented to your perception. Phenomena require and admit of ex planation, only in so far as the conditions of that explanation are given in perception ; but the sum-total of that which is given in phsenomena, considered as an absolute whole, is itself a perception --and we cannot therefore seek for exp1a>> nations of this whole beyond itself, in other perceptions. Tin explanation of this whole is the proper object of the trans cendental problems of pure reason.
Although, therefore, the solution of these problems is un attainable through experience, we must not permit ourselves to say, that it is uncertain how the object of our inquiries is constituted. For the object is in our own mind, and cannot be discovered in experience ; and we have only to take care that our thoughts are consistent with each other, and to avoid falling into the amphiboly of regarding our idea as a repre sentation of an object empirically given, and therefore to be cognized according to the laws of experience. A dogmatical solution is therefore not only unsatisfactory, but impossible. The critical solution, which may be a perfectly certain one, does not consider the question objectively, but proceeds by inquiring into the basis of the cognition upon which the question rests.
ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON. Section Fifth.
Sceptical Exposition of the Cotmological Problems presented in the/our Transcendental Ideas.
We should he quite willing to desist from the demand of a dog matical answer to our questions, if we understood beforehand 'hat, be the answer what it may, it would only serve to increase our ignorance, to throw us from one incomprehensibility into another, from one obscurity into another still greater, and perhaps lead us into irreconcilable contradictions. If a dog matical affirmative or negative answer is demanded, fs it at all prudent, to set aside the provable grounds of a solution wl\icl>>
? ? ? ? 304 TBAS8CBNDJKTAL BIALECTIC.
lie before us, and to take into consideration, what advaulagc we ahull gain, if the answer is to favour the one side or the
If it
more easily exposed in its application and consequences, than in the mere representation of its content. This is the great utility of the sceptical mode of treating the questions addressed by pure reason to itself. By this method we easily rid ourselves of the confusions of dogmatism, and establish in its place a temperate criticism, which, as a genuine cathartic, will successfully remove the presumptuous notions of philo sophy and their consequence --the vain pretension to universal science.
that in both cases the answer is mere
other ?
nonsense, we have in this an irresistible summons, to institute a critical investigation of the question, for the purpose of discovering whether it is based on a groundless presup position, and relates to an idea, the falsity of which would be
happens
? If, then, I could understand the nature of a cosmological idea, and perceive, before I entered on the discussion of the subject at all, that, whatever side of the question regarding the unconditioned of the regressive synthesis of phenomcna it favoured, it must either be too great or too small for every conception of the understanding ; -- I would be able to compre hend how the idea, which relates to an object of experience --an experience which must be adequate to and in accordance with a possible conception of the understanding -- must be completely void and without significance, inasmuch as its object is inade quate, consider it as we may. And this is actually the case with all cosmological conceptions, which, for the reason above- mentioned, involve reason, so long ns it remains attached to them, in an unavoidable antinomy. For suppose :
First, that the world has no beginning, --in this case it is too large for our conception ; for this conception, which consists in a successive regress, cannot overtake the whole eternity that has elapsed. Grant that it has a beginning, it is then too small for the conception of the understanding. For, as a be
a time preceding, it cannot be uncondi tioned ; and the law of the empirical employment of the un derstanding imposes the necessity of looking for a higher con
dition of time ; and the world therefore, evidently too small for this law.
The bmne the case with the duvUe answer to the aueic
ginning presupposes
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? 0? tHE COSMOLOCHCAL PROBLEMS. 305
tifiii regarding the extent, in space, of the world. For, if it is infinite and unlimited, it must be too large for every possi ble empirical conception. If it is finite and limited, we have a right to ask --what determines these limits ? Void space is not a self-subsistent correlate of things, and cannot be a final condition--and still less an empirical condition, forming a part of a possible experience. For how can we have any ex perience or perception of an absolute void ? But the absolute totality of the empirical synthesis requires that the uncondi tioned be an empirical conception. Consequently, a finite world is too small for our conception.
Secondly, if every phenomenon (matter) in space consists of an infinite number of parts, the regress of the division is always too great for our conception ; and if the division of space must cease with some member of the division (the sim ple), it is too small for the idea of the unconditioned. For the member at which we have discontinued our division still admits a regress to many more parts contained in the object.
? Thirdly, suppose that every event in the world happens in accordance with the laws of nature ; the causality of a cause most itself be an event, and necessitates a regi'ess to a still higher cause, and consequently the unceasing prolongation of the series of conditions a parte priori. Operative nature is therefore too large for every conception we can form in the synthesis of cosmical events.
If we admit the existence of spontaneously produced events, that of free agency, we are driven, our search for sufficient reasons, on an unavoidable law of nature, and are compelled to appeal to the empirical law of causality, aud we find that any such totality of connection in our synthesis too small for our necessary empirical conception.
Fourthly,-- we assume the existence of an absolutely neces- nary being whether be the world or something in the world, or the cause of the world we must place in time at an infinite distance from any given moment for, otherwise, must be dependent on some other and higher existence. Such an existence in this case, too large for our empirical concep tion, and unattainable the continued regress of any synthesis.
But we believe that everything in the world --be con* dition or conditioned -- contingent every given existeuce
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too small for our conception. For in this case we are com pelled to seek for some other existence upon which, the former depends.
We have said that in all these cases the cosmological idea is either too great or too small for the empirical regress in a synthesis, and consequently for every possible conception of
the understanding. Why did we not express ourselves in a manner exactly the reverse of this, and, instead of accusing
the cosmological idea of overstepping or of falling short of its true aim -- possible experience, say that, in the first case, the empirical conception is always too small for the idea, and in the second too great, and thus attach the blame of these con tradictions to the empirical regress? The reason is this. Possible experience can alone give reality to our conceptions ; without it a conception is merely an idea, without truth or relation to an object. Hence a possible empirical conception must be the standard by whicli we are to judge whether an idea is anything more than an idea and fiction of thought, orwhether it relates to an object in the world. If we say of a thing that in relation to some other thing it is too large or too small, the former is considered as existing for the sake of the latter, and requiring to be adapted to it. Among the trivial subjects of
discussion in the old schools of dialectics was this question : If a ball cannot pass through a hole, shall we say that the ball is too large or the hole too small ? In this case it is indifferent what expression we employ ; for we do not know which exists for the sake of the other. On the other hand, we cannot say -- the man is too long for his coat, but--the coat is too short foi the man.
We are thus led to the well-founded suspicion, that the cos mological ideas, and all the conflicting sophistical assertions connected with them, are based upon a false and fictitious conception of the mode in which the object of these ideas is
? to us ; and this suspicion will probably direct m how to expose the illusion that has so long led us utray from the truth.
presented
? ? ? Or PUKE COSMOT,OGICAL DIALECTIC.
ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON. Section Sixth.
Transcendental Idealism as the Key to the Solution of Pure Cosmological Dialectic.
In the transcendental esthetic, we proved, that everything intuited in space and time -- all objects of a possible experience,
are nothing but phenomena, that mere representations and that these, as presented to us -- as extended bodies, or as series of changes --have no self-subsistent existence apart from human thought. This doctrine call Transcendental Ideal ism. * The realist in the transcendental sense regards these modifications of our sensibility -- these mere representations, as things subsisting in themselves.
? It would be unjust to accuse us of holding the long-decried theory of empirical idealism, which, while admitting the reality of space, denies, or at least doubts, the existence of bodies extended in and thus leaves us without sufficient criterion of reality and illusion. The supporters of this theory find no difficulty in admitting the reality of the phenomena of the internal sense in time nay, they go the length of maintain ing that this internal experience of itself sufficient proof of the real existence of its object as thing in itself.
Transcendental idealism allows that the objects of external intuition --as intuited in space, and all changes in time --as represented by the internal sense, are real. For, as space the form of that intuition which we call external, and without objects in space, no empirical representation could be given us we can and ought to regard extended bodies in as real. The case the same with representations in time. But time and space, with all phenomena therein, are not in themselves things. They are nothing but representations, and cannot
exist out of and apart from the mind. Nay, the sensuous in. ternal intuition of the mind (as the object of consciousness), the determination of which represented by the succession
have elsewhera termed this theory formal idealism, to distinguish from material idealism, which doubts or denies the existence of externa, things. To avoid ambiguity, seems advisable in many cases to ernploj th's term instead of lliai mentioned in the text.
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? 308 T&UTBUU DM*AX DIALECTIC.
of different state* in time, is not the real, proper self, as Jt exists in itself -- not the transcendental subject, but only a phenomenon, which is presented to the sensibility of this, to
is, unknown being. This internal phenomenon cannot be admitted to be a self-subsisting thing ; for its condition is time, and time cannot be the condition of a thing in itself. But the empirical truth of phenomena in space and time is guaranteed beyond the possibility of doubt, and sufficiently distinguished from the illusion of dreams or^fancy -- although both have a proper and thorough connection in an experience according to empirical laws. The objects of experience then are not things in themselves,* but are given only iu experi ence, and have no existence apart from and independently of experience. That there may be inhabitants in the moon, although no one has ever observed them, must certainly be admitted ; but this assertion means only, that we may in the possible progress of experience discover them at some future time. For that, which stands in counection with a perception according to the laws of the progress of experience, is real. They are therefore really existent, if they stand in empirical connection with my actual or real consciousness, although they are not in themselves real, that apart from the pro gress of experience. --
There nothing actually given we can be conscious of nothing aa real, except perception and the empirical pro gression from to other possible perceptions. For pheno mena, as mere representations, are real only in perception
rod perception iu fact, nothing but the reality of an em pirical representation, that phenomenon. To call phenomenon real thing prior to perception, means either, that we must meet with this phenomenon in the progress of experience, or means nothing at all. For can say only of
thing in itself that exists without relation to the senses
and experience. But we are speaking here merely of pheno mena in space and time, both of which are determinations ot sensibility, and not of things in themselves. follows that phenomena are not things iu themselves, but are mere repre sentations, which, not given iu us--iu perception, are non existent.
The faculty of sensuous intuition properly receptivity-- Dinge so sich, Sacben an sich.
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a capacity of being affected in a certain manner by representa tions, the relation of which to each other is a pore intuition of space and time --the pure forms of sensibility. These repre sentations, in so far as they are connected and determinable in this relation (in space and time) according to laws of the unity of experience, are called objects. The non-sensuous cause of these representations is completely unknown to us, and hence cannot be intuited as an object. For such an ob ject could not be represented either in space or in time ; and without these conditions intuition or representation is impos sible. We may, at the same time, term the non-sensuous cause of phenoraena the transcendental object -- but merely as a mental correlate to sensibility, considered as a receptivity. To this transcendental object we may attribute the whole con nection and extent of our possible perceptions, and say that it ie given and exists in itself prior to all experience. But the phenomeno, corresponding to are not given as things in themselves, but in experience alone. For they are mere representations, receiving from perceptions alone significance and relation to real object, under the condition that this or that perception --indicating an object -- complete connec tion with all others in accordance with the rules of the unity of experience. Thus we can say the things that really existed in past time, are given in the transcendental object of experi ence. But these are to me real objects, only in so far as can represent to my own mind, that regressive series of pos sible perceptions --following the indications of history, or the footsteps of cause and effect--in accordance with empirical laws, -- that, in one word, the course of the world conducts us to an elapsed series of time as the condition of the present time. This series in past time represented as real, not in itself, but only in connection with possible experience. Thus, when say that certain events occurred in past time, merely assert the possibility of prolonging the chain of experience, from the present perception, upwards to the conditions that determine according to time.
If represent to myself all objects existing in all space and time, do not thereby place these in space and time prior to all experience on the contrary, such representation nothing more than the notion of possible experience, in its absolute completeness. In experience alone are those objects,
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which are nothing but representation*, given. But, when I say, they existed prior to my experience ; this means only that I must begin with . the perception present to me, and fol low the track indicated, until I discover them in some part or region of experience. The cause of the empirical condition of this progression --and consequently at what member therein I must stop, and at what point in the regress I am to find
this member --is transcendental, and hence necessarily incog nizable. But with this we have not to do ; our concern is only with the law of progression in experience, in which objects, that phsenomena, are given. matter of indifference,
?
whether say-- may in the progress of experience discover stars, at hundred times greater distance than the most distant of those now visible, or--stars at this distance may be met m space, although no one has, or ever will discover them. For, ifthey are given as things in themselves, without any relation to possible experience they are for me non-existent,
are not objects, for they are not contained in the regressive series of experience. But, these phsenomena must be employed in the construction or support of the cos- mological idea of an absolute whole, --and, when we are dis
cussing question that over-steps the limits of possible ex perience the proper distinction of the different theories of
the reality of sensuous objects of great importance, in order to avoid the illusion which must necessarily arise from the
consequently,
misinterpretation
of our empirical conceptions.
THE ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON. Section Seyiktii.
Critical Solution of the Cotmologteal Problem.
The antinomy of pure reason based upon the following dia lectical argument If that which conditioned given, the whole series of its conditions also given but sensuous ob jects are given as conditioned consequently. . . This syllo gism, the major of which seems so natural and evident, intro duces as many cosmological ideas as there are different kinds of conditions in the synthesis of phsenomena, in so far as theae conditions constitute series. These ideas require absolute totality the series, and thus place reason inextricable em
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? 8OLUTIC. N OF THE OOBMOLOGICAX PROBLEM. 311
barrassmem. Before proceeding to expose the fallacy in this dialectical argument, jt will be necessary to have a correct understanding of certain conceptions that appear in it.
In the first place, the following proposition is evident, a>>J
If the conditioned is given, a regress in the series of all its conditions is thereby imperatively required.
indubitably certain :
For the very conception of a conditioned, is a conception of something related to a condition, and, if this condition is itself conditioned, to another condition -- and so on through all the members of the series. This proposition is, therefore, analytical, and has nothing to fear from transcendental criti cism. It is a logical postulate of reason : to pursue, as far as possible, the connection of a conception with its conditions.
If, in the second place, both the conditioned and the con dition are things in themselves, and if the former is given, not only is the regress to the latter requisite, but the latter is really given with the former. Now, as this is true of all the members of the series, the entire series of conditions, and with them the unconditioned is at the same time given in the very fact of the conditioned, the existence of which is possible only in and through that series, being given. In this case,
the synthesis of the conditioned with its condition, is a syn thesis of the understanding merely, which represents things as they are, without regarding whether and how we can cognize them. But if I have to do with phenomena, which, in their character of mere representations, are not given, if I do not attain to a cognition of them (in other words, to themselves, for they are nothing more than empirical cognitions), I am not entitled to say :
? If the conditioned is all its condi given,
tions (as phsenomena) are also given. I cannot, therefore, from the fact of a conditioned being given, infer the absolute totality of the series of its conditions. For phenomena are nothing but an empirical synthesis in apprehension or percep tion, and are therefore given only in it. Now, in speaking of phasnomena, it does not follow, that, if the conditioned is given, the synthesis which constitutes its empirical condition is also thereby given and presupposed ; such a synthesis can be established only by an actual regress in the series of con
ditions. But we are entitled to say in this case : that a regret* te the conditions of a conditioned, in other words, that ? continuous empirical synthesis is enjoined; that, if the condi
? ? ? 312
TBAKSCENDENTAIi D1ALSCTI0.
tions are not given, they lire at least required; and that wc are certain to discover the conditions in this regress.
We can now see that the major in the above cosmologies]
syllogism, takes the conditioned in the transcendental
cation which it has in the pore category, while the minor speaks of it in the empirical signification which it has in the category as applied to phenomena. There therefore, dia lectical fallacy in the syllogism-- tophisma figura dictionit. But this fallacy not consciously devised one, but per fectly natural illusion of the common reason of man. For, when thing given as conditioned, we presuppose in tlie major its conditions and their series, unperceived, as were, and unseen because this nothing more than the logical requirement of complete and satisfactory premisses for given conclusion. In this case, time altogether left out in the connection of the conditioned with the condition they are supposed to be given in themselves, and contemporaneously.
moreover, just as natural to regard phenomena (in the minor) as things in themselves and as objects presented to the
pure understanding, as in the major, in which complete ab straction was made of all conditions of intuition. But under these conditions alone that objects are given. Now we overlooked remarkable distinction between the conceptions. The synthesis of the conditioned with it. i condition, and the complete series of the latter (in the major) are not limited time, and do not contain the conception of succession. On the contrary, the empirical synthesis, and the series of con ditions in the phenomeual world -- subsumed in the minor -- are necessarily successive, and given in time alone. follows that cannot presuppose in the minor, as did in the major, the absolute totality of the synthesis and of the series therein represented for in the major all the members of the series are given as things in themselves --without any limitations or conditions of time, while in the minor they are possible only in and through successive regress, which cannot exist, ex
cept phenomena.
be actually carried into execution in the world
After this proof of the viciousness of the argument com monly employed in maintaining cosmological assertions, both parties may now be justly dismissed, as advancing claims without grounds or title. But the propess has not been
signifi
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? SOLUTION Of TUX COSIIOLOGIOAL PROBLEM. 3] 3
ended, by convincing them that one or both were in the wrong, and had maintained an assertion which was without valid grounds of proof. Nothing seems to be clearer than that, if one maintains : the world has a beginning, and ano ther : the world has no beginning, one of the two must be right. But it is likewise clear, that, if the evidence on both sides is equal, it is impossible to discover on what side the truth lies ; and the controversy oontinucs, although the par ties have been recommended to peace before the tribunal of reason. There remains, then, no other means of settling the question than to convince the parties, who refute each other with such conclusiveness and ability, that they are disputing about nothing, and that a transcendental illusion has been mocking them with visions of reality where there is none. This mode of adjusting a dispute which cannot he decided upon its own merits, we shall uuw proceed to lay before our readers.
Zeno of Elea, a subtle dialectician, was severely reprimanded by Plato as a sophist, who, merely from the base motive of exhibiting his skill in discussion, maintained and subverted the same proposition by arguments as powerful and convinc ing on the one side as on the other. He maintained, for ex ample, that God (who was probably nothing more, in his view, than the world,) is neither finite nor infinite, neither in mo tion nor in rest, neither similar nor dissimilar to any other thing. It seemed to those philosophers who criticised his mode of discussion, that his purpose was to deny completely both of two self-contradictory propositions--which is absurd. But I cannot believe that there is any justice in this accusa tion. The first of these propositions I shall presently con sider in a more detailed manner. With regard to the others, if by the word God he understood merely the Univerte, his meaning must have been, that it cannot be permanently pre sent in one place -- that is, at rest, nor be capable of changing its place-- that of moving, because all places are in the universe, and the universe itself therefore, in no place. Again, the universe contains in itself everything that exists, it cannot be similar or dissimilar to any other thing, becauM
? here it, fact, no other thing with wh>h can be compared.
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? TliANSCENDElfTAL DIALECTIC.
If two opposite judgments presuppose a contingent impot. ? ible, or arbitrary condition, both --in spite of their opposition
however, not properly or really contradiction',-- fall away because the condition, which insured the validity of both, has itself disappeared.
(which
If we say every body has either good or bad smell, we have omitted third possible judgment-- has no' smell at ali ana thus both conflicting statements may be false.
we say either good-smelling or not good-smelling (vel ruateolens vel non-tuaveolens), both judgments are contra dictorily opposed and the contradictory opposite of the former judgment -- some bodies are not good-smelling -- em braces also those bodies which have no smell at all. In the preceding pair of opposed judgments (per disparatd), the contingent condition of the conception of body (smell) at tached to both conflicting statements, instead of having betn omitted in the latter, which consequently not the contra dictory opposite of the former.
accordingly, we say the world either infinite in ex tension, or not infinite (non est injinitus) and --the former proposition false, its contradictory opposite the world not infinite, must be true. And thus should deny the existence of an infinite, without, however, affirming the existence of finite world. But we construct our propo sition thus --the world either infinite or finite (noninfinite), both statements may be false. For, in this case, we cons' der the world as per se determined in regard to quantity, and while, in the one judgment, we deny its infinite and conse quently, perhaps, its independent existence in the other, we append to the world, regarded as thing in itself, certain determination --that of finitude and the latter may be false as well as the former, the world not given as thing itself, and thus neither as finite nor as infinite in quantity. This kind of opposition may be allowed to term dialectical that of contradictories may be called analytical opposition. Thus then, of two dialectically opposed judgments both may be false, from the fact, that the one not mere contradic tory of the other, but actually enounces more than requisite for full and complete contradiction.
When we regard the two propositions Quantity, nrti, the -worl;l finite
? --
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the world infinite
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? SOLUTION OF THE COSMOLOGICAL THOBLEM. SIS dictory opposites, we are assuming that the world -- the com
plete series of phenomena -- is a thing in itself. For
mains as a permanent quantity, whether I deny the infinite or the finite regress in the series of its phenomena. But if we dismiss this assumption --this transcendental illusion, and deny that it is a thing in itself, the contradictory opposition is metamorphosed into a merely dialectical one ; and the world, as not existing in itself--independently af the regressive series of my representations, exists in like manner neither as a whole which is infinite nor as a whole which is finite in itself. The universe exists for me only in the empirical re gress of the series of phenomena, and not per te. If, then, it is always conditioned, it is never given completely or as a whole ; and it therefore, not an unconditioned whole, and does not exist as such, either with an infinite, or with finite quantity. --
What we have here said of the first cosmological idea that of the absolute totality of quantity in phenomena, applies also to the others. The series of conditions discoverable only in the regressive synthesis itself, and not in the phe nomenon considered as a thing in itself--given prior to all re
gress. Hence am compelled to say the aggregate of parts in given phenomenon in itself neither finite nor infinite;
and these parts are given only in the regressive synthesis of decomposition -- synthesis which never given in absolute compUtencu, either as finite, or as infinite. The same the case with the series of subordinated causes, or of the con ditioned up to the unconditioned and necessary existence, which can never be regarded as in itself, and in its totality, either as finite or as infinite because, as series of subor
dinate representations, subsists only in the dynamical re gress, and cannot be regarded as existing previously to this regress, or as self-subsistent series of things.
Thus the antinomy of pure reason in its cosmological ideas disappears. For the above demonstration has established the tact that merely the product of dialectical and illusory opposition, which arises from the application of the idea absolute totality --admissible only as condition of things in themselves, to phenomena, which exist only in our repre sentations, and -- when constituting series -- in succes sive regress. This antinomy of reason may, however, be
tally profitable to our srv"c<ilative interests, not the way of
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? TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC.
contributing any dogmatical addition, but as presenting to im another material support in our critical investigations. For it furnishes us with an indirect proof of the transcendental ideality of phenomena, if our minds were not completely satisfied with the direct proof set forth in the Transcendental . /Esthetic. The proof would proceed in the following di lemma. If the world is a whole existing in itself, it must be either finite or infinite. But it is neither finite nor infinite -- as has been shown, on the one side, by the thesis, on the other, by the antithesis. Therefore the world -- the content of all phenomena -- is not a whole existing in itself. It fol lows that phenomena are nothing, apart from our representa tions. And this is what we mean by transcendental ideality.
? This remark is of some importance. It enables us to see that the proofs of the fourfold antinomy are not mere sophis tries --are not fallacious, but grounded on the nature of rea son, and valid -- under the supposition that phenomena are things in themselves. The opposition of the judgments which follow make it evident that a fallacy lay in the initial suppo sition, and thus helps us to discover the true constitution of objects of sense. This transcendental dialectic does not fa vour scepticism, although it presents us with a triumphant demonstration of the advantages of the sceptical method, the great utility of which is apparent in the antinomy, where the arguments of reason were allowed to confront each other in undiminished force. And although the result of these con
flicts of reason is not what we expected --although we have ob tained no positive dogmatical addition to metaphysical science, we have still reaped a great advantage in the correction of our
judgments on these subjects of thought.
ANTINOMY OF PURE REASON. Section Eighth.
Regulative Principle of Pure Reason in relation to the Cos- mological Ideas.
The cosmological principle of totality could not give us any certain knowledge in regard to the maximum in the series ol conditions in the world of sense, considered as a thing in itself. The actual regress in the series is the only means of
? ? ? REGUULTIYE PRIWOIPI. E Ot PUBB BEABOH. 317
approaching this maximum. This principle of pure reason, therefore, may still be considered as valid --not as an axiom enabling us to cogitate totality in the object as actual, but as
% problem for the understanding, which requires it to institute and to continue, in conformity with the idea of totality in the mind, the regress in the series of the conditions of a giveu conditioned. For in the world of sense, that is, in space and time, every condition which we discover in our investigation of phenomena is itself conditioned ; because sensuous objects are not things in themselves (in which case an absolutely un conditioned might be reached in the progress of cognition), but are merely empirical representations, the conditions of which must always be found in intuition. -- The principle of reason is therefore properly a mere rule prescribing a re gress in the series of conditions for given phenomena, and prohibiting any pause or rest on an absolutely unconditioned. It is, therefore, not a principle of the possibility of experience or of the empirical cognition of sensuous objects -- consequently not a principle of the understanding ; for every experience is confined within certain proper limits determined by the given iutuition. Still less is it a constitutive principle of reason authorising us to extend our conception of the sensuous world beyond all possible experience. It is merely a prin ciple for the enlargement and extension of experience as far as is possible for human faculties. It forbids us to consider any empirical limits as absolute. It hence, principle of reason, which, as rule, dictates how we ought to proceed in our empirical regress, but unable to anticipate or indicate prior to the empirical regress what given in the object self. have termed for this reason regulative principle of reason while the principle of the absolute totality of the aeries of conditions, as existing in itself and given in the ob
constitutive cosmological principle. This distinction will at once demonstrate the falsehood of the constitutive principle, and prevent us from attributing (by transcen dental subreptio) objective reality to an idea, which valid only as rule.
In order to understand the proper meaning of this rule of pure reason, we must notice first, that cannot tell us what the object is, but only how the empirical regress to be pni- teeded with order to attain to the complete conception
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? 318 tBANSC? NDEHTAL DIALECTIC.
the object. If it gave ua any information in respect to the former statement, it would be a constitutive principle -- a prin ciple impossible from the nature of pure reason. It will not therefore enable us to establish an) such conclusions as--the aeries of conditions for a given conditioned is in itself finite, or, it is infinite. For, in this case, we should be cogitating in the mere idea of absolute totality, an object which is not and cannot be given in experience ; inasmuch as we should be attributing a reality objective and independent of the em pirical synthesis, to a series of phenomena. This idea of reason cannot then be regarded as valid --except as a rule for the regressive synthesis in the series of conditions, according to which we must proceed from the conditioned, through all intermediate and subordinate conditions, up to the uncondi tioned ; although this goal is unattained and unattainable. For the absolutely unconditioned cannot be discovered in the sphere of experience.
We now proceed to determine clearly our notion of a synthesis which can never be complete. There are two terms commonly employed for this purpose. These terms are regarded as expressions
able notions, although the ground of the distinction has never been clearly exposed. The term employed by the mathematicians, is progressus in infinitum. The philosophers prefer the expression progressus in indefinitum. Without detaining the reader with an examination of the reasons for such a distinction, or with remarks on the right or wrong use of the terms, I shall endeavour clearly to determine these conceptions, so far as is necessary for the purpose of this Critique.
We may, with propriety, say of a straight line, that it may be produced to infinity. In this case the distinction between a^? ro-
yressus in infinitum and a progresses in indefinitum is a mere pieceof subtlety. For, although when we say, produce a straight line --it is more correct to say in indefinitum than in infinitum ; because the former means, produce it as far as you please, the second, you must not cease to produce it ; the expression in infi
? when we are speaking of the power to do perfectly for we can always make longer we please -- on to And this remark holds good all cases, when wa
nitum
correct,
infinity.
speak of progressus, that an advancement from the coo-
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? ? ? GULATXT? PUINCIPLE OF SVB? lUiASOK. 319
dition to the conditioned ; this possible advancement always proceeds to infinity. We may proceed from n given pair in the descending line of generation from father to son, and cogitate a never-ending line of descendants from it. For in such a case reason does not demand absolute totality in the series, because it does not presuppose it as a condition and as given (datum), but merely as conditioned, and as capable of
being given (dabile). -- Very different is the case with the problem
how far the regress, which ascends from the given conditioned to the conditions, must extend ; whether 1 can say -- it is a regrets
in infinitum, or only in indefinitum ; and whether, for example, setting out from the human beings at present alive in the world, I may ascend in the series of their ancestors, in infinitum --or whether all that can be said that so far as have pro ceeded, have discovered no empirical ground for considering the series limited, so that am justified, and indeed, compelled to search for ancestors still further back, although am not
the idea of reason to presuppose them.
My answer to this question If the series given in empirical intuition as whole, the regress in the series of its internal conditions proceeds in infinitum but, only one member of the series given, from which the regress to proceed to absolute totally, the regress possible only in
indefinitum. For example, the division of portion of matter given within certain limits -- of body, that --proceeds
For, as the condition of this whole its part, and the condition of the part part of the part, and so on, a. :d as in this regress of decomposition an unconditioned indivi sible member of the series of conditions not to be found there are no reasons or grounds in experience for stopping the division, but, on the contrary, the more remote members of the division are actually and empirically given prior to this division:' That to say, the division proceeds to infinity. On the other hand, the series of ancestors of any given human
not given, in its absolute totality, in any experience and yet the regress proceeds from every genealogical member of this series to one still higher, and does not meet with any empirical limit presenting an absolutely unconditioned, member of the series. But as the members of such series are not contained in the empirical intuition of the whole, prior to th<<
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this regress does not proceed to infinity, but Ofllj in indefinitum, that we are called upon to discover other and higher members, which are themselves always conditioned. --
finite or infinite for nothing itself; but, How the empirical regress to be commenced, and how far ought we lo proceed with And here signal distinction in the ap plication of this rule becomes apparent. If the whole
regress,
the regressus in infinitum, nor the regres the series of conditions to be considered
In neither case
sus in indefinitum,
as actually infinite in the object itself. This might be true of things in themselves, but cannot be asserted of pbsenomena, which, as conditions of each other, are only given in the em pirical regress itself. Hence, the question no longer-- What the quantity of this series of conditions in itself
? to recede in the series of its internal conditions to infinity. But the whole not given, aud can only be given by and through the empirical regress,
given empirically, possible
can only say-- possible to infinity to proceed to still higher conditions in the eeries. In the first case am justi fied in asserting that more members are empirically given in the object than attain to in the regress (of decomposition). In the second case, am justified only in saying, that can always proceed further in the regress, because no member of the series given as absolutely conditioned, and thus
higher member possible, and an inquiry with regard to neces
sary. In the one case necessary to find other members of the series, in the other necessary to inquire for others, inasmuch as experience presents no absolute limitation of the regress. For, either you do not possess perception which absolutely limits your empirical regress, and in this case the regress cannot be regarded as complete or, you do possess such limitative perception, in which case not part of your series (for that which limits must be distinct from that which limited it), and incumbent on you to continue your regress up to this condition, and so ou.
These remarks will be placed in their proper light theii application in the following section.
Kant's meaning Infinity, in the first case, quality, or raij be predicated, of the rtgrtts while in the second case, only Ix predicated of the souibilUy of the regress. -- Tr.
? ?