No More Learning

Consequently, granted that the subtlety of a glorified body hindered it
from filling a place, nevertheless it would not follow that for this
reason it is able to be in the same place with another body, since the
removal of the lesser does not involve the removal of the greater.

Accordingly we must say that the obstacle to our body's being now in
the same place with another body can nowise be removed by the gift of
subtlety. For nothing can prevent a body from occupying the same place
together with another body, except something in it that requires a
different place: since nothing is an obstacle to identity, save that
which is a cause of distinction. Now this distinction of place is not
required by any quality of the body, because a body demands a place,
not by reason of its quality: wherefore if we remove from a body the
fact of its being hot or cold, heavy or light, it still retains the
necessity of the aforesaid distinction, as the Philosopher proves
(Phys. iv), and as is self-evident. In like manner neither can matter
cause the necessity of the aforesaid distinction, because matter does
not occupy a place except through its dimensive quantity. Again neither
does form occupy a place, unless it have a place through its matter. It
remains therefore that the necessity for two bodies occupying each a
distinct place results from the nature of dimensive quantity, to which
a place is essentially befitting. For this forms part of its
definition, since dimensive quantity is quantity occupying a place.
Hence it is that if we remove all else in a thing from it, the
necessity of this distinction is found in its dimensive quantity alone.
Thus take the example of a separate line, supposing there to be two
such lines, or two parts of one line, they must needs occupy distinct
places, else one line added to another would not make something
greater, and this is against common sense. The same applies to surfaces
and mathematical bodies. And since matter demands place, through being
the subject of dimension, the aforesaid necessity results in placed
matter, so that just as it is impossible for there to be two lines, or
two parts of a line, unless they occupy distinct places, so is it
impossible for there to be two matters, or two parts of matter, without
there be distinction of place. And since distinction of matter is the
principle of the distinction between individuals, it follows that, as
Boethius says (De Trin. ), "we cannot possibly conceive two bodies
occupying one place," so that this distinction of individuals requires
this difference of accidents. Now subtlety does not deprive the
glorified body of its dimension; wherefore it nowise removes from it
the aforesaid necessity of occupying a distinct place from another
body. Therefore the subtlety of a glorified body will not enable it to
be in the same place together with another body, but it will be
possible for it to be together with another body by the operation of
the Divine power: even as the body of Peter had the power whereby the
sick were healed at the passing of Peter's shadow (Acts 5:15) not
through any inherent property, but by the power of God for the
upbuilding of the faith. Thus will the Divine power make it possible
for a glorified body to be in the same place together with another body
for the perfection of glory.

Reply to Objection 1: That Christ's body was able to be together with
another body in the same place was not due to its subtlety, but
resulted from the power of His Godhead after His resurrection, even as
in His birth [*Cf. [5083]TP, Q[28], A[2], ad 3]. Hence Gregory says
(Hom. xxvi in Evang. ): "The same body went into His disciples the doors
being shut, which to human eyes came from the closed womb of the Virgin
at His birth. " Therefore there is no reason why this should be
befitting to glorified bodies on account of their subtlety.

Reply to Objection 2: Light is not a body as we have said above (Sent.
ii, Q[13], A[3]; [5084]FP, Q[67], A[2]): hence the objection proceeds
on a false supposition.

Reply to Objection 3: The glorified body will pass through the heavenly
spheres without severing them, not by virtue of its subtlety, but by
the Divine power, which will assist them in all things at will.

Reply to Objection 4: From the fact that God will come to the aid of
the blessed at will in whatever they desire, it follows that they
cannot be surrounded or imprisoned.

Reply to Objection 5: As stated in Phys. iv, 5, "a point is not in a
place": hence if it be said to be in a place, this is only accidental,
because the body of which it is a term is in a place. And just as the
whole place corresponds to the whole body, so the term of the place
corresponds to the term of the body. But it happens that two places
have one term, even as two lines terminate in one point. And
consequently though two bodies must needs be in distinct places, yet
the same term of two places corresponds to the two terms of the two
bodies. It is in this sense that the bounds of contiguous bodies are
said to coincide.
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Whether it is possible, by a miracle, for two bodies to be in the same
place?

Objection 1: It would seem that not even by a miracle is it possible
for two bodies to be in the same place. For it is not possible that, by
a miracle, two bodies be at once two and one, since this would imply
that contradictions are true at the same time. But if we suppose two
bodies to be in the same place, it would follow that those two bodies
are one. Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is
proved thus. Suppose two bodies A and B to be in the same place. The
dimensions of A will either be the same as the dimensions of the place,
or they will differ from them. If they differ, then some of the
dimensions will be separate: which is impossible, since the dimensions
that are within the bounds of a place are not in a subject unless they
be in a placed body. If they be the same, then for the same reason the
dimensions of B will be the same as the dimensions of the place. "Now
things that are the same with one and the same thing are the same with
one another. " Therefore the dimensions of A and B are the same. But two
bodies cannot have identical dimensions just as they cannot have the
same whiteness. Therefore A and B are one body and yet they were two.
Therefore they are at the same time one and two.

Objection 2: Further, a thing cannot be done miraculously either
against the common principles---for instance that the part be not less
than the whole; since what is contrary to common principles implies a
direct contradiction---or contrary to the conclusions of geometry which
are infallible deductions from common principles---for instance that
the three angles of a triangle should not be equal to two right angles.
In like manner nothing can be done to a line that is contrary to the
definition of a line, because to sever the definition from the defined
is to make two contradictories true at the same time. Now it is
contrary to common principles, both to the conclusions of geometry and
to the definition of a line, for two bodies to be in the same place.
Therefore this cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved as
follows: It is a conclusion of geometry that two circles touch one
another only at a point. Now if two circular bodies were in the same
place, the two circles described in them would touch one another as a
whole. Again it is contrary to the definition of a line that there be
more than one straight line between two points: yet this would be the
case were two bodies in the same place, since between two given points
in the various surfaces of the place, there would be two straight lines
corresponding to the two bodies in that place.

Objection 3: Further, it would seem impossible that by a miracle a body
which is enclosed within another should not be in a place, for then it
would have a common and not a proper place, and this is impossible. Yet
this would follow if two bodies were in the same place. Therefore this
cannot be done by a miracle. The minor is proved thus. Supposing two
bodies to be in the same place, the one being greater than the other as
to every dimension, the lesser body will be enclosed in the greater,
and the place occupied by the greater body will be its common place;
while it will have no proper place, because no given surface of the
body will contain it, and this is essential to place. Therefore it will
not have a proper place.

Objection 4: Further, place corresponds in proportion to the thing
placed. Now it can never happen by a miracle that the same body is at
the same time in different places, except by some kind of
transformation, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore it can
nowise happen by a miracle that two bodies be together in the same
place.

On the contrary, The Blessed Virgin gave birth to her Son by a miracle.
Now in this hallowed birth it was necessary for two bodies to be
together in the same place, because the body of her child when coming
forth did not break through the enclosure of her virginal purity.
Therefore it is possible for two bodies to be miraculously together in
the same place.

Further, this may again be proved from the fact that our Lord went in
to His disciples, the doors being shut (Jn. 20:19, 26).

I answer that, As shown above [5085](A[2]) the reason why two bodies
must needs be in two places is that distinction in matter requires
distinction in place. Wherefore we observe that when two bodies merge
into one, each loses its distinct being, and one indistinct being
accrues to the two combined, as in the case of mixtures. Hence it is
impossible for two bodies to remain two and yet be together unless each
retain its distinct being which it had hitherto, in so much as each of
them was a being undivided in itself and distinct from others. Now this
distinct being depends on the essential principles of a thing as on its
proximate causes, but on God as on the first cause. And since the first
cause can preserve a thing in being, though the second causes be done
away, as appears from the first proposition of De Causis, therefore by
God's power and by that alone it is possible for an accident to be
without substance as in the Sacrament of the Altar. Likewise by the
power of God, and by that alone, it is possible for a body to retain
its distinct being from that of another body, although its matter be
not distinct as to place from the matter of the other body: and thus it
is possible by a miracle for two bodies to be together in the same
place.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument is sophistical because it is based
on a false supposition, or begs the question. For it supposes the
existence, between two opposite superficies of a place, of a dimension
proper to the place, with which dimension a dimension of the body put
in occupation of the place would have to be identified: because it
would then follow that the dimensions of two bodies occupying a place
would become one dimension, if each of them were identified with the
dimension of the place. But this supposition is false, because if it
were true whenever a body acquires a new place, it would follow that a
change takes place in the dimensions of the place or of thing placed:
since it is impossible for two things to become one anew, except one of
them be changed. Whereas if, as is the case in truth, no other
dimensions belong to a place than those of the thing occupying the
place, it is clear that the argument proves nothing, but begs the
question, because according to this nothing else has been said, but
that the dimensions of a thing placed are the same as the dimensions of
the place; excepting that the dimensions of the thing placed are
contained within the bounds of the place, and that the distance between
the bounds of a place is commensurate with the distance between the
bounds of the thing placed, just as the former would be distant by
their own dimensions if they had them. Thus that the dimensions of two
bodies be the dimensions of one place is nothing else than that two
bodies be in the same place, which is the chief question at issue.

Reply to Objection 2: Granted that by a miracle two bodies be together
in the same place, nothing follows either against common principles, or
against the definition of a line, or against any conclusions of
geometry. For, as stated above [5086](A[2]), dimensive quantity differs
from all other accidents in that it has a special reason of
individuality and distinction, namely on account of the placing of the
parts, besides the reason of individuality and distinction which is
common to it and all other accidents, arising namely from the matter
which is its subject. Thus then one line may be understood as being
distinct from another, either because it is in another subject (in
which case we are considering a material line), or because it is placed
at a distance from another (in which case we are considering a
mathematical line, which is understood apart from matter). Accordingly
if we remove matter, there can be no distinction between lines save in
respect of a different placing: and in like manner neither can there be
a distinction of points, nor of superficies, nor of any dimensions
whatever. Consequently geometry cannot suppose one line to be added to
another, as being distinct therefrom unless it be distinct as to place.
But supposing by a Divine miracle a distinction of subject without a
distinction of place, we can understand a distinction of lines; and
these are not distant from one another in place, on account of the
distinction of subjects. Again we can understand a difference of
points, and thus different lines described on two bodies that are in
the same place are drawn from different points to different points; for
the point that we take is not a point fixed in the place, but in the
placed body, because a line is not said to be drawn otherwise than from
a point which is its term. In like manner the two circles described in
two spherical bodies that occupy the same place are two, not on account
of the difference of place, else they could not touch one another as a
whole, but on account of the distinction of subjects, and thus while
wholly touching one another they still remain two. Even so a circle
described by a placed spherical body touches, as a whole, the other
circle described by the locating body.

Reply to Objection 3: God could make a body not to be in a place; and
yet supposing this, it would not follow that a certain body is not in a
place, because the greater body is the place of the lesser body, by
reason of its superficies which is described by contact with the terms
of the lesser body.

Reply to Objection 4: It is impossible for one body to be miraculously
in two places locally (for Christ's body is not locally on the altar),
although it is possible by a miracle for two bodies to be in the same
place. Because to be in several places at once is incompatible with the
individual, by reason of its having being undivided in itself, for it
would follow that it is divided as to place. on the other hand, to be
in the same place with another body is incompatible with the individual
as distinct from aught else. Now the nature of unity is perfected in
indivision (Metaph. v), whereas distinction from others is a result of
the nature of unity. Wherefore that one same body be locally in several
places at once implies a contradiction, even as for a man to lack
reason, while for two bodies to be in the same place does not imply a
contradiction, as explained above. Hence the comparison fails.
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Whether one glorified body can be in the same place together with another
glorified body?

Objection 1: It would seem that a glorified body can be in the same
place together with another glorified body. Because where there is
greater subtlety there is less resistance. If then a glorified body is
more subtle than a non-glorified body, it will offer less resistance to
a glorified body: and so if a glorified body can be in the same place
with a non-glorified body, much more can it with a glorified body.

Objection 2: Further, even as a glorified body will be more subtle than
a non-glorified body, so will one glorified body be more subtle than
another. Therefore if a glorified body can be in the same place with a
non-glorified body, a more subtle glorified body can be in the same
place with a less subtle glorified body.

Objection 3: Further, the body of heaven is subtle, and will then be
glorified. Now the glorified body of a saint will be able to be in the
same place with the body of heaven, since the saints will be able at
will to travel to and from earth. Therefore two glorified bodies will
be able to occupy the same place.

On the contrary, The glorified bodies will be spiritual, that is like
spirits in a certain respect. Now two spirits cannot be in the same
place, although a body and a spirit can be in the same place, as stated
above (Sent. i, D, 37, Q[3], A[3]; [5087]FP, Q[52], A[3]). Therefore
neither will two glorified bodies be able to be in the same place.

Further, if two bodies occupy the same place, one is penetrated by the
other. But to be penetrated is a mark of imperfection which will be
altogether absent from the glorified bodies. Therefore it will be
impossible for two glorified bodies to be in the same place.

I answer that, The property of a glorified body does not make it able
to be in the same place with another glorified body, nor again to be in
the same place with a non-glorified body. But it would be possible by
the Divine power for two glorified bodies or two non-glorified bodies
to be in the same place, even as a glorified body with a non-glorified
body. Nevertheless it is not befitting for a glorified body to be in
the same place with another glorified body, both because a becoming
order will be observed in them, which demands distinction, and because
one glorified body will not be in the way of another. Consequently two
glorified bodies will never be in the same place.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument supposes that a glorified body is
able by reason of its subtlety to be in the same place with another
body: and this is not true.

The same answer applies to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3: The body of heaven and the other bodies will be
said equivocally to be glorified, in so far as they will have a certain
share in glory, and not as though it were becoming for them to have the
gifts of glorified human bodies.
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Whether by virtue of its subtlety a glorified body will no longer need to be
in an equal place?

Objection 1: It would seem that by virtue of its subtlety, a glorified
body will no longer need to be in an equal place. For the glorified
bodies will be made like to the body of Christ according to Phil. 3:21.
Now Christ's body is not bound by this necessity of being in an equal
place: wherefore it is contained whole under the small or great
dimensions of a consecrated host. Therefore the same will be true of
the glorified bodies.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. iv, 6), that two
bodies are not in the same place, because it would follow that the
greatest body would occupy the smallest place, since its various parts
could be in the same part of the place: for it makes no difference
whether two bodies or however many be in the same place. Now a
glorified body will be in the same place with another body, as is
commonly admitted. Therefore it will be possible for it to be in any
place however small.

Objection 3: Further, even as a body is seen by reason of its color, so
is it measured by reason of its quantity. Now the glorified body will
be so subject to the spirit that it will be able at will to be seen,
and not seen, especially by a non-glorified eye, as evidenced in the
case of Christ. Therefore its quantity will be so subject to the
spirit's will that it will be able to be in a little or great place,
and to have a little or great quantity at will.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 30) that
"whatever is in a place occupies a place equal to itself. " Now the
glorified body will be in a place. Therefore it will occupy a place
equal to itself.

Further, the dimensions of a place and of that which is in that place
are the same, as shown in Phys. iv, text. 30,76,77. Therefore if the
place were larger than that which is in the place the same thing would
be greater and smaller than itself, which is absurd.

I answer that, A body is not related to place save through the medium
of its proper dimensions, in respect of which a located body is
confined through contact with the locating body. Hence it is not
possible for a body to occupy a place smaller than its quantity, unless
its proper quantity be made in some way less than itself: and this can
only be understood in two ways. First, by a variation in quantity in
respect of the same matter, so that in fact the matter which at first
is subject to a greater quantity is afterwards subject to a lesser.
Some have held this to be the case with the glorified bodies, saying
that quantity is subject to them at will, so that when they list, they
are able to have a great quantity, and when they list a small quantity.
But this is impossible, because no movement affecting that which is
intrinsic to a thing is possible without passion to the detriment [*Cf.
[5088]FS, Q[22], A[1]; [5089]FS, Q[41], A[1]] of its substance. Hence
in incorruptible, i. e. heavenly, bodies, there is only local movement,
which is not according to something intrinsic. Thus it is clear that
change of quantity in respect of matter would be incompatible with the
impassibility and incorruptibility of a glorified body. Moreover, it
would follow that a glorified body would be sometimes rarer and
sometimes denser, because since it cannot be deprived of any of its
matter, sometimes the same matter would be under great dimensions and
sometimes under small dimensions, and thus it would be rarefied and
densified, which is impossible. Secondly, that the quantity of a
glorified body become smaller than itself may be understood by a
variation of place; so, to wit, that the parts of a glorified body
insinuate themselves into one another, so that it is reduced in
quantity however small it may become. And some have held this to be the
case, saying that by reason of its subtlety a glorified body will be
able to be in the same place with a non-glorified body: and that in
like manner its parts can be one within the other, so much so that a
whole glorified body will be able to pass through the minutest opening
in another body: and thus they explain how Christ's body came out of
the Virgin's womb; and how it went into His disciples, the doors being
shut. But this is impossible; both because the glorified body will not
be able, by reason of its subtlety, to be in the same place with
another body, and because, even if it were able to be in the same place
with another body, this would not be possible if the other were a
glorified body, as many say; and again because this would be
inconsistent with the right disposition of the human body, which
requires the parts to be in a certain fixed place and at a certain
fixed distance from one another. Wherefore this will never happen, not
even by a miracle. Consequently we must say that the glorified body
will always be in a place equal to itself.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ's body is not locally in the Sacrament of
the Altar, as stated above (Sent. iv, D, 10, Q[1], A[1], ad 5;
[5090]TP, Q[77], A[5]).

Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher's argument is that for the same
reason one part might permeate another. But this permeation of the
parts of a glorified body into one another is impossible, as stated
above. Therefore the objection does not prove.

Reply to Objection 3: A body is seen because it acts on the sight: but
that it does or does not act on the sight causes no change in the body.
Hence it is not unfitting, if it can be seen when it will, and not seen
when it will [*Cf. [5091]TP, Q[55], A[4]]. On the other hand, being in
a place is not an action proceeding from a body by reason of its
quantity, as being seen is by reason of its color. Consequently the
comparison fails.
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Whether the glorified body, by reason of its subtlety, will be impalpable?

Objection 1: It would seem that the glorified body, by reason of its
subtlety, is impalpable. For Gregory says (Hom. xxv in Evang. ): "What
is palpable must needs be corruptible. " But the glorified body is
incorruptible. Therefore it is impalpable.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is palpable resists one who handles it.
But that which can be in the same place with another does not resist
it. Since then a glorified body can be in the same place with another
body, it will not be palpable.

Objection 3: Further, every palpable body is tangible. Now every
tangible body has tangible qualities in excess of the qualities of the
one touching it. Since then in the glorified bodies the tangible
qualities are not in excess but are reduced to a supreme degree of
equality, it would seem that they are impalpable.

On the contrary, our Lord rose again with a glorified body; and yet His
body was palpable, as appears from Lk. 24:39: "Handle, and see; for a
spirit hath not flesh and bones. " Therefore the glorified bodies also
will be palpable.

Further, this is the heresy of Eutychius, Bishop of Constantinople, as
Gregory states (Moral. xxiv): for he said that in the glory of the
resurrection our bodies will be impalpable.

I answer that, Every palpable body is tangible, but not conversely. For
every body is tangible that has qualities whereby the sense of touch
has a natural aptitude to be affected: wherefore air, fire, and the
like are tangible bodies: but a palpable body, in addition to this,
resists the touch; wherefore the air which never resists that which
passes through it, and is most easily pierced, is tangible indeed but
not palpable. Accordingly it is clear that a body is said to be
palpable for two reasons, namely on account of its tangible qualities,
and on account of its resisting that which touches it, so as to hinder
it from piercing it. And since the tangible qualities are hot and cold
and so forth, which are not found save in heavy and light bodies, which
through being contrary to one another are therefore corruptible, it
follows that the heavenly bodies, which by their nature are
incorruptible, are sensible to the sight but not tangible, and
therefore neither are they palpable. This is what Gregory means when he
says (Hom. xxv in Evang. ) that "whatever is palpable must needs be
corruptible. " Accordingly the glorified body has by its nature those
qualities which have a natural aptitude to affect the touch, and yet
since the body is altogether subject to the spirit, it is in its power
thereby to affect or not to affect the touch. In like manner it is
competent by its nature to resist any other passing body, so that the
latter cannot be in the same place together with it: although,
according to its pleasure, it may happen by the Divine power that it
occupy the same place with another body, and thus offer no resistance
to a passing body. Wherefore according to its nature the glorified body
is palpable, but it is competent for it to be impalpable to a
non-glorified body by a supernatural power. Hence Gregory says (Hom.
xxv in Evang. ) that "our Lord offered His flesh to be handled, which He
had brought in through the closed doors, so as to afford a complete
proof that after His resurrection His body was unchanged in nature
though changed in glory.
"

Reply to Objection 1: The incorruptibility of a glorified body does not
result from the nature of its component parts; and it is on account of
that nature that whatever is palpable is corruptible, as stated above.
Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 2: Although in a way it is possible for a glorified
body to be in the same place with another body: nevertheless the
glorified body has it in its power to resist at will any one touching
it, and thus it is palpable.

Reply to Objection 3: In the glorified bodies the tangible qualities
are not reduced to the real mean that is measured according to equal
distance from the extremes, but to the proportionate mean, according as
is most becoming to the human complexion in each part. Wherefore the
touch of those bodies will be most delightful, because a power always
delights in a becoming object, and is grieved by excess.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE AGILITY OF THE BODIES OF THE BLESSED (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the agility of the bodies of the blessed in the
resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the glorified bodies will be agile?

(2) Whether they will move?

(3) Whether they will move instantaneously?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the glorified bodies will be agile?

Objection 1: It would seem that the glorified bodies will not be agile.
For that which is agile by itself needs not to be carried in order to
move. But the glorified bodies will, after the resurrection, be taken
up by the angels (according to a gloss) in the clouds "to meet Christ,
into the air" (1 Thess. 4:16). Therefore the glorified bodies will not
be agile.

Objection 2: Further, no body that moves with labor and pain can be
said to be agile. Yet the glorified bodies will move thus, since the
principle of their movement, namely the soul, moves them counter to
their nature, else they would always move in the same direction.
Therefore they are not agile.

Objection 3: Further, of all the animal operations sense surpasses
movement in nobility and priority. Yet no property is ascribed to
glorified bodies as perfecting them in sensation. Therefore neither
should agility be ascribed to them as perfecting them in movement.

Objection 4: Further, nature gives different animals instruments of
different disposition according to their different powers: hence she
does not give instruments of the same disposition to slow as to fleet
animals. Now God's works are much more orderly than those of nature.
Since then the glorified body's members will have the same disposition,
shape and quantity as they now have, it would seem that it will have no
agility other than it has now.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:43): "It is sown in weakness,
it shall rise in power," that is, according to a gloss, "mobile and
living. " But mobility can only signify agility in movement. Therefore
the glorified bodies will be agile.

Further, slowness of movement would seem especially inconsistent with
the nature of a spirit. But the glorified bodies will be most spiritual
according to 1 Cor. 15:44. Therefore they will be agile.

I answer that, The glorified body will be altogether subject to the
glorified soul, so that not only will there be nothing in it to resist
the will of the spirit, for it was even so in the case of Adam's body,
but also from the glorified soul there will flow into the body a
certain perfection, whereby it will become adapted to that subjection:
and this perfection is called "the gift of the glorified body. " Now the
soul is united to body not only as its form, but also as its mover; and
in both ways the glorified body must needs be most perfectly subject to
the glorified soul. Wherefore even as by the gift of subtlety the body
is wholly subject to the soul as its form, whence it derives its
specific being, so by the gift of agility it is subject to the soul as
its mover, so that it is prompt and apt to obey the spirit in all the
movements and actions of the soul.

Some, however, ascribe the cause of this agility to the fifth, i. e. the
heavenly essence, which will then be predominant in the glorified
bodies. But of this we have frequently observed that it does not seem
probable ([5092]Q[82], A[1];[5093] Q[83], A[1]). Wherefore it is better
to ascribe it to the soul, whence glory flows to the body.

Reply to Objection 1: Glorified bodies are said to be borne by the
angels and also on the clouds, not as though they needed them, but in
order to signify the reverence which both angels and all creatures will
show them.

Reply to Objection 2: The more the power of the moving soul dominates
over the body, the less is the labor of movement, even though it be
counter to the body's nature. Hence those in whom the motive power is
stronger, and those who through exercise have the body more adapted to
obey the moving spirit, labor less in being moved. And since, after the
resurrection, the soul will perfectly dominate the body, both on
account of the perfection of its own power, and on account of the
glorified body's aptitude resulting from the outflow of glory which it
receives from the soul, there will be no labor in the saints'
movements, and thus it may be said that the bodies of the saints' will
be agile.

Reply to Objection 3: By the gift of agility the glorified body will be
rendered apt not only for local movement but also for sensation, and
for the execution of all the other operations of the soul.

Reply to Objection 4: Even as nature gives to fleeter animals
instruments of a different disposition in shape and quantity, so God
will give to the bodies of the saints a disposition other than that
which they have now, not indeed in shape and quantity, but in that
property of glory which is called agility.
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Whether the saints will never use their agility for the purpose of movement?

Objection 1: It would seem that the saints will never use their agility
for the purpose of movement. For, according to the Philosopher (Phys.
iii, 2), "movement is the act of the imperfect. " But there will be no
imperfection in glorified bodies. Neither therefore will there be any
movement.

Objection 2: Further, all movement is on account of some need, because
whatever is in motion is moved for the sake of obtaining some end. But
glorified bodies will have no need, since as Augustine says (De Spiritu
et Anima, lxiii [*Cf. [5094] Q[70], A[2], ad 1]), "all thou willest will
be there, and nothing that thou willest not. " Therefore they will not
move.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Coelo et Mundo
ii), "that which shares the Divine goodness without movement shares it
more excellently than that which shares it with movement. " Now the
glorified body shares the Divine goodness more excellently than any
other body. Since then certain bodies, like the heavenly bodies, will
remain altogether without movement, it seems that much more will human
bodies remain so.

Objection 4: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii) that the soul
being established in God will in consequence establish its body. Now
the soul will be so established in God, that in no way will it move
away from Him. Therefore in the body there will be no movement caused
by the soul.

Objection 5: Further, the more noble a body is, the more noble a place
is due to it: wherefore Christ's body which is the most exalted of all
has the highest place of all, according to Heb. 7:26, "Made higher than
the heavens," where a gloss [*Gloss on Heb. 1:3: "On the right hand of
the majesty"] says, "in place and dignity. " And again each glorified
body will, in like manner, have a place befitting it according to the
measure of its dignity. Now a fitting place is one of the conditions
pertaining to glory. Since then after the resurrection the glory of the
saints will never vary, neither by increase nor by decrease, because
they will then have reached the final term of all, it would seem that
their bodies will never leave the place assigned to them, and
consequently will not be moved.

On the contrary, It is written (Is. 40:31): "They shall run and not be
weary, they shall walk and not faint"; and (Wis. 3:7): "(The just)
shall run to and fro like sparks among the reeds. " Therefore there will
be some movement in glorified bodies.

I answer that, It is necessary to suppose that the glorified bodies are
moved sometimes, since even Christ's body was moved in His ascension,
and likewise the bodies of the saints, which will arise from the earth,
will ascend to the empyrean [*The empyrean was the highest of the
concentric spheres or heavens, and was identified by Christian writers
with the abode of God. Cf. [5095]FP, Q[56], A[3]]. But even after they
have climbed the heavens, it is likely that they will sometimes move
according as it pleases them; so that by actually putting into practice
that which is in their power, they may show forth the excellence of
Divine wisdom, and that furthermore their vision may be refreshed by
the beauty of the variety of creatures, in which God's wisdom will
shine forth with great evidence: for sense can only perceive that which
is present, although glorified bodies can perceive from a greater
distance than non-glorified bodies. And yet movement will nowise
diminish their happiness which consists in seeing God, for He will be
everywhere present to them; thus Gregory says of the angels (Hom. xxxiv
in Evang. ) that "wherever they are sent their course lies in God. "

Reply to Objection 1: Local movement changes nothing that is intrinsic
to a thing, but only that which is without namely place. Hence that
which is moved locally is perfect as to those things which are within
(Phys. viii, 7), although it has an imperfection as to place, because
while it is in one place it is in potentiality with regard to another
place, since it cannot be in several places at the same time, for this
belongs to God alone. But this defect is not inconsistent with the
perfection of glory, as neither is the defect whereby a creature is
formed from nothing. Hence such like defects will remain in glorified
bodies.

Reply to Objection 2: A person is said to need a thing in two ways,
namely absolutely and relatively. One needs absolutely that without
which one cannot retain one's being or one's perfection: and thus
movement in glorified bodies will not be on account of a need, because
their happiness will suffice them for all such things. But we need a
thing relatively when without it some end we have in view cannot be
obtained by us, or not so well, or not in some particular way. It is
thus that movement will be in the blessed on account of need, for they
will be unable to show forth their motive power practically, unless
they be in motion, since nothing prevents a need of this kind being in
glorified bodies.

Reply to Objection 3: This argument would prove if the glorified body
were unable even without movement to share the Divine goodness much
more perfectly than the heavenly bodies, which is untrue. Hence
glorified bodies will be moved, not in order to gain a perfect
participation in the Divine goodness (since they have this through
glory), but in order to show the soul's power. On the other hand, the
movement of the heavenly bodies could not show their power, except the
power they have in moving lower bodies to generation and corruption,
which is not becoming to that state. Hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 4: Local movement takes nothing away from the
stability of the soul that is established in God, since it does not
affect that which is intrinsic to a thing, as stated above (ad 1).

Reply to Objection 5: The fitting place assigned to each glorified body
according to the degree of its dignity belongs to the accidental
reward. Nor does it follow that this reward is diminished whenever the
body is outside its place; because that place pertains to reward, not
as actually containing the body located therein (since nothing flows
therefrom into the glorified body, but rather does it receive splendor
therefrom), but as being due to merits. Wherefore, though out of that
place, they will still continue to rejoice in it.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the movement of the saints will be instantaneous?

Objection 1: It would seem that movement of the saints will be
instantaneous. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 30) that "wherever
the spirit listeth there will the body be. " Now the movement of the
will, whereby the spirit wishes to be anywhere, is instantaneous.
Therefore the body's movement will be instantaneous.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. iv, 8) proves that there
is no movement through a vacuum, because it would follow that something
moves instantaneously, since a vacuum offers no resistance whatever to
a thing that is in motion, whereas the plenum offers resistance; and so
there would be no proportion between the velocity of movement in a
vacuum and that of movement in a plenum, since the ratio of movements
in point of velocity is as the ratio of the resistance offered by the
medium. Now the velocities of any two movements that take place in time
must needs be proportional, since any one space of time is proportional
to any other. But in like manner no full place can resist a glorified
body since this can be in the same place with another body, no matter
how this may occur; even as neither can a vacuum resist a body.
Therefore if it moves at all, it moves instantaneously.

Objection 3: Further, the power of a glorified soul surpasses the power
of a non-glorified soul, out of all proportion so to speak. Now the
non-glorified soul moves the body in time. Therefore the glorified soul
moves the body instantaneously.

Objection 4: Further, whatever is moved equally soon to what is near
and what is distant, is moved instantaneously. Now such is the movement
of a glorified body, for however distant the space to which it is
moved, the time it takes to be moved is imperceptible: wherefore
Augustine says (QQ. De Resurrectione, Ep. cii, qu. 1) that "the
glorified body reaches equally soon to any distance, like the sun's
ray. " Therefore the glorified body is moved instantaneously.

Objection 5: Further, whatever is in motion is moved either in time or
in an instant. Now after the resurrection the glorified body will not
be moved in time, since time will not be then according to Apoc. 10:6.
Therefore this movement will be instantaneous.

On the contrary, In local movement space. movement and time are equally
divisible, as is demonstrated in Phys. vi, 4. Now the space traversed
by a glorified body in motion is divisible. Therefore both the movement
and the time are divisible. But an instant is indivisible. Therefore
this movement will not be instantaneous.

Further, a thing cannot be at the same time wholly in one place and
partly in another place, since it would follow that the remaining part
is in two places at the same time, which is impossible. But whatever is
in motion is partly in a term "wherefrom" and partly in a term
"whereto," as is proved in Phys. vi, 6: while whatever has been in
motion is wholly in the term whereto the movement is directed; and it
is impossible at the same time for it to be moved and to have been
moved. Now that which is moved instantaneously is being moved and has
been moved at the same time. Therefore the local movement of a
glorified body cannot be instantaneous.

I answer that, Opinion is much divided on this point. For some say that
a glorified body passes from one place to another without passing
through the interval, just as the will passes from one place to another
without passing through the interval, and that consequently it is
possible for the movement of a glorified body like that of the will to
be instantaneous. But this will not hold: because the glorified body
will never attain to the dignity of the spiritual nature, just as it
will never cease to be a body. Moreover, when the will is said to move
from one place to another, it is not essentially transferred from place
to place, because in neither place is it contained essentially, but it
is directed to one place after being directed by the intention to
another: and in this sense it is said to move from one place to
another.

Hence others [*Alexander of Hales, Sum. Th. III, Q[23], mem. 3] say
that it is a property of the nature of a glorified body, since it is a
body, to pass through the interval and consequently to be moved in
time, but that by the power of glory, which raises it to a certain
infinitude above the power of nature, it is possible for it not to pass
through the interval, and consequently to be moved instantaneously. But
this is impossible since it implies a contradiction: which is proved as
follows. Suppose a body which we will call Z to be in motion from A to
B. It is clear that Z, as long as it is wholly in A is not in motion;
and in like manner when it is wholly in B, because then the movement is
past. Therefore if it is at any time in motion it must needs be neither
wholly in A nor wholly in B. Therefore while it is in motion, it is
either nowhere, or partly in A, and partly in B, or wholly in some
other intervening place, say C, or partly in A and C and partly in C
and B. But it is impossible for it to be nowhere, for then there would
be a dimensive quantity without a place, which is impossible. Nor again
is it possible for it to be partly in A and partly in B without being
in some way in the intervening space. for since B is a place distant
from A, it would follow that in the intervening space the part of Z
which is in B is not continuous with the part which is in A. Therefore
it follows that it is either wholly in C, or partly in C, and partly in
some other place that intervenes between C and A, say D, and so forth.
Therefore it follows that Z does not pass form A to B unless first of
all it be in all the intervening places: unless we suppose that it
passes from A to B without ever being moved, which implies a
contradiction, because the very succession of places is local movement.
The same applies to any change whatever having two opposite terms, each
of which is a positive entity, but not to those changes which have only
one positive term, the other being a pure privation, since between
affirmation and negation or privation there is no fixed distance:
wherefore that which is in the negation may be nearer to or more remote
from affirmation, and conversely, by reason of something that causes
either of them or disposes thereto: so that while that which is moved
is wholly under a negation it is changed into affirmation, and "vice
versa"; wherefore in such things "to be changing precedes to be
changed," as is proved in Phys. vi, 5. Nor is there any comparison with
the movement of an angel, because being in a place is predicated
equivocally of a body and an angel. Hence it is clear that it is
altogether impossible for a body to pass from one place to another,
unless it pass through every interval.

Wherefore others grant this, and yet they maintain that the glorified
body is moved instantaneously. But it follows from this that a
glorified body is at the same instant in two or more places together,
namely in the ultimate term, and in all the intervening places, which
is impossible.

To this, however, they reply that, although it is the same instant
really, it is not the same logically, like a point at which different
lines terminate. But this is not enough, because an instant measures
the instantaneous, according to its reality and not according to our
way of considering it. Wherefore an instant through being considered in
a different way is not rendered capable of measuring things that are
not simultaneous in time, just as a point through being considered in a
different way does not make it possible for one point of place to
contain things that are locally distant from one another.

Hence others with greater probability hold that a glorified body moves
in time, but that this time is so short as to be imperceptible; and
that nevertheless one glorified body can pass through the same space in
less time than another, because there is no limit to the divisibility
of time, no matter how short a space we may take.

Reply to Objection 1: That which is little lacking is as it were not
lacking at all (Phys. ii, 5); wherefore we say: "I do so and so at
once," when it is to be done after a short time. It is in this sense
that Augustine speaks when he says that "wheresoever the will shall be,
there shall the body be forthwith. " Or we may say that in the blessed
there will never be an inordinate will: so that they never will wish
their body to be instantaneously where it cannot be, and consequently
whatever instant the will shall choose, at that same instant the body
will be in whatever place the will shall determine.

Reply to Objection 2: Some have demurred to this proposition of the
Philosopher's, as the Commentator thereon observes. They say that the
ratio of one whole movement to another whole movement is not
necessarily as the ratio of one resisting medium to another resisting
medium, but that the ratio of the intervening mediums gives us the
ratio of retardations attending the movements on account of the
resistance of the medium. For every movement has a certain fixed speed,
either fast or slow, through the mover overcoming the movable, although
there be no resistance on the part of the medium; as evidenced in
heavenly bodies, which have nothing to hinder their movement; and yet
they do not move instantaneously, but in a fixed time proportionate to
the power of the mover in comparison with the movable. Consequently it
is clear that even if we suppose something to move in a vacuum, it does
not follow that it moves instantaneously, but that nothing is added to
the time which that movement requires in the aforesaid proportion of
the mover to the movable, because the movement is not retarded.

But this reply, as the Commentator observes, proceeds from an error in
the imagination; for it is imagined that the retardation resulting from
the resistance of the medium is a part of movement added to the natural
movement, the quantity of which is in proportion to the mover in
comparison with the movable, as when one line is added to another: for
the proportion of one total to the other is not the same as the
proportion of the lines to which an addition has been made. [*The same
applies to mathematical quantities: for instance the ratio 2 + 1 to 4 +
1 is not as 2 to 4. ] And so there would not be the same proportion
between one whole sensible movement and another, as between the
retardations resulting from the resistance of the medium. This is an
error of the imagination, because each part of a movement has as much
speed as the whole movement: whereas not every part of a line has as
much of the dimensive quantity as the whole line has. Hence any
retardation or acceleration affecting the movement affects each of its
parts, which is not the case with lines: and consequently the
retardation that comes to a movement is not another part of the
movement, whereas in the case of the lines that which is added is a
part of the total line.

Consequently, in order to understand the Philosopher's argument, as the
Commentator explains, we must take the whole as being one, that is we
must take not only the resistance of the movable to the moving power,
but also the resistance of the medium through which the movement takes
place, and again the resistance of anything else, so that we take the
amount of retardation in the whole movement as being proportionate to
the moving power in comparison with the resisting movable, no matter in
what way it resist, whether by itself or by reason of something
extrinsic. For the movable must needs always resist the mover somewhat,
since mover and moved, agent and patient, as such, are opposed to one
another. Now sometimes it is to be observed that the moved resists the
mover by itself, either because it has a force inclining it to a
contrary movement, as appears in violent movements, or at least because
it has a place contrary to the place which is in the intention of the
mover; and such like resistance even heavenly bodies offer their
movers. Sometimes the movable resists the power of the mover, by reason
only of something else and not by itself. This is seen in the natural
movement of heavy and light things, because by their very form they are
inclined to such a movement: for the form is an impression of their
generator, which is the mover as regards heavy and light bodies. On the
part of matter we find no resistance, neither of a force inclining to a
contrary movement nor of a contrary place, since place is not due to
matter except in so far as the latter, being circumscribed by its
dimensions, is perfected by its natural form. Hence there can be no
resistance save on the part of the medium, and this resistance is
connatural to their movement. Sometimes again the resistance results
from both, as may be seen in the movements of animals.

Accordingly when in a movement there is no resistance save on the part
of the movable, as in the heavenly bodies, the time of the movement is
measured according to the proportion of the mover to the movable, and
the Philosopher's argument does not apply to these, since if there be
no medium at all their movement is still a movement in time. on the
other hand, in those movements where there is resistance on the part of
the medium only, the measure of time is taken only according to the
obstacle on the part of the medium, so that if the medium be removed
there will be no longer an obstacle; and so either it will move
instantaneously, or it will move in an equal time through a vacuum and
through a plenum, because granted that it moves in time through a
vacuum, that time will bear some proportion to the time in which it
moves through a plenum. Now it is possible to imagine another body more
subtle in the same proportion than the body which filled the space, and
then if this body fill some other equal space it will move in as little
time through that plenum as it did previously through a vacuum, since
by as much as the subtlety of the medium is increased by so much is the
length of time decreased, and the more subtle the medium the less it
resists. But in those other movements where resistance is offered by
both the movable and the medium, the quantity of time must be
proportionate to the power of the mover as compared with the resistance
of both movable and medium together. Hence granted that the medium be
taken away altogether, or that it cease to hinder, it does not follow
that the movement is instantaneous, but that the time is measured
according only to the resistance of the movable. Nor will there be any
inconsistency if it move in an equal time through a vacuum, and through
a space filled with the most subtle body imaginable, since the greater
the subtlety we ascribe to the medium the less is it naturally inclined
to retard the movement. Wherefore it is possible to imagine so great a
subtlety, as will naturally retard the movement less than does the
resistance of the movable, so that the resistance of the medium will
add no retardation to the movement.

It is therefore evident that although the medium offer no resistance to
the glorified bodies, in so far as it is possible for them to be in the
same place with another body, nevertheless their movement will not be
instantaneous, because the movable body itself will resist the motive
power from the very fact that it has a determinate place, as we have
said in reference to the heavenly bodies.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the power of a glorified soul surpasses
immeasurably the power of a non-glorified soul, it does not surpass it
infinitely, because both powers are finite: hence it does not follow
that it causes instantaneous movement. And even if its power were
simply infinite, it would not follow that it causes an instantaneous
movement, unless the resistance of the movable were overcome
altogether. Now although the resistance of the movable to the mover,
that results from opposition to such a movement by reason of its being
inclined to a contrary movement, can be altogether overcome by a mover
of infinite power, nevertheless the resistance it offers through
contrariety towards the place which the mover intends by the movement
cannot be overcome altogether except by depriving it of its being in
such and such a place or position. For just as white resists black by
reason of whiteness, and all the more according as whiteness is the
more distant from blackness, so a body resists a certain place through
having an opposite place and its resistance is all the greater,
according as the distance is greater. Now it is impossible to take away
from a body its being in some place or position, except one deprive it
of its corporeity, by reason of which it requires a place or position:
wherefore so long as it retains the nature of a body, it can nowise be
moved instantaneously, however greater be the motive power. Now the
glorified body will never lose its corporeity, and therefore it will
never be possible for it to be moved instantaneously.

Reply to Objection 4: In the words of Augustine, the speed is said to
be equal because the excess of one over the other is imperceptible,
just as the time taken by the whole movement is imperceptible.

Reply to Objection 5: Although after the resurrection the time which is
the measure of the heaven's movement will be no more, there will
nevertheless be time resulting from the before and after in any kind of
movement.
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OF THE CLARITY OF THE BEATIFIED BODIES (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider the clarity of the beatified bodies at the
resurrection. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there will be clarity in the glorified bodies?

(2) Whether this clarity will be visible to the non-glorified eye?