Duration
is capable of making that which lasts last indefinitely.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-1-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
' The ayus is of the first category for beings in Kamadhatu who are not in one of the two absorptions (asamjnisamdpatti and nirodhasamapatti)\ but it is of the second category for beings in Kamadhatu who are in the two absorptions, and for beings in Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu.
"
What is the meaning of this passage?
If the ayus is killed when the body is killed, then the ayus is "bound to the body-series. " If the body cannot be damaged, then the ayus lasts all the time for which it has been produced, and one says that the ayus
The Indriyas 235
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273 lasts once it has arisen.
The Masters of Ka^mir say that the first type of dyus is "subject to obstruction," but that the second is not subject to obstruction. .
274 Thus there is premature death.
275 According to the Sutra, there are four modes of existence:
276 existence that can be destroyed by oneself and not by another, etc.
Four alternatives: 1. existence destroyed by oneself: certain beings in
Kamadhatu, namely the Krldapradusika gods and the Manahpradusika
276
gods destroy their own existence through their excess of joy or
anger; we must also add the Buddhas who enter into Nirvana; 2.
existences destroyed by others: beings in the womb and in eggs; 3.
existences destroyed by oneself and by others: beings in Kamadhatu in
general; we must exclude beings in hell, beings in the intermediate
state (iii. 12), etc. ; 4. existences that are neither destroyed by oneself nor
by others: beings in the intermediate state, all beings in Rupadhatu and
Arupyadhatu, and a part of the beings in Kamadhatu: beings in hell
(iii. 82), the inhabitants of Uttarakuru (iii. 78c), persons in the absorp-
tion of kindness (vii. 29), persons in the non-conscious absorption
(ii. 42, Kathavatthu, xv. 9); the Rajarsi, that is, the Cakravartin who has 278
left the householders^ life; a messenger of the Buddha; persons
279
280
Dharmila, Uttara, Gangila, the son of the merchant Yasas, Kumara,
JFvaka, etc. ; the Bodhisattva in his last existence; the mother of the Bodhisattva pregnant with the Bodhisattva; the Cakravartin; the mother of the Cakravartin pregnant with the Cakravartin.
[Objection:] The Sutra tells us of a question by Sariputra and the Blessed One's answer to it: "'Lord, What are the beings whose existence cannot be destroyed either by themselves, or by others? ' 'Sariputra, beings who are born in Naivasamjnanasamjnayatana
that is, in the highest sphere of Arupyadhatu, Bhavagra. How can you say, in the light of this passage, that the existence of all beings in Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu is protected from all destruction, either by themselves or others?
The School (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 772a29) explains, "Beings in Rupadhatu and the first three stages of Arupyadhatu can destroy their
whom the Buddha prophesized would live a certain length of time:
? existence 'by themselves,'" that is, by a course of action within their own realm, and 'by others,' namely by a course of action belonging to the preliminary stages of a higher stage (vi. 48, viii. 22). But in the last stage of Arupyadhatu a course of action belonging to this stage and also of actions of a superior stage are both absent; hence the existence of beings who reside therein cannot be modified either by themselves or by others.
This answer appears weak to us; in fact, one can, in the last stage of Arupyadhatu practice a course of action belonging to the im- mediately lower stage {akincanydyatana, viii. 20). One must then admit another explanation {Vibhdsd, ibid. ). In his response to Sariputa, the Buddha, by naming the beings of Naivasamjnanasamjnayatana, in- tends to designate all beings in Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu, for in naming the last one designates the first. We can demonstrate that such is the usage. Sometimes Scripture names the first term of a list the totality of which is alluded to, for example, "The first sukhopapatti
(iii. 72), namely {tadyathd) the Brahmakayika gods. " We should then also understand, "the Brahmakayikas, the Brahmapurohitas, and the Mahabrahmas. " Sometimes Scripture names the last term, "The second sukhopapatti, namely the Abhasvara gods. " We should then understand, "the Parittabhas, the Apramanabhas, and the Abhasvaras. "
But one can contest this explanation. In the two passages given above the word tadyathd is used to introduce an example. We must translate tadyathd not as "namely" but as "for example. " It is a rule concerning examples that when one names one case one designates all similar cases. And we admit that, in the two above passages on the sukhopapattis, the Scripture designated all the terms of the list by naming pnly the first and the last. However the answer of the Blessed One to Sariputra does not contain the word tadyathd.
We would say that this explanation does not introduce an example, for we find it in Sutras that give a complete enumeration, "Material beings, diverse of body, diverse of ideas, namely {tadyathd) human beings and part of the gods . . . " (iii. 6). Thus the word tadyathd introduces a definition {upadarsandrtha). Hence the Blessed One, in his answer to Sariputra, designates the beginning by naming the end,
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281 that is, he is speaking of the totality of the two higher spheres.
***
What are the characteristics of conditioned dharmas?
45c-d. Their characteristics are arising, old age, duration, and
282 impermanence.
These four dharmas, arising, old age, duration, and impermanance,
are the characteristics of conditioned things. A dharma in which these
characteristics are found is conditioned; a dharma in which they are not 283
found is unconditioned.
Arising produces or causes to produce conditioned things; duration
stablizes them or causes them to last; old age makes them deteriorate; and impermanence destroys them.
Does not the Sutra teach the existence of some three "conditioned
characteristics" of conditioned things? The Sutra says, in fact, "There
are, oh Bhiksus, three characteristics of conditioned things, which are
themselves conditioned. What are these three? The production or
origin of conditioned things is an object of consciousness; its dis-
appearance and also its duration-modification is an object of
284 consciousness. "
[The Vaibhasikas:] The Sutra should enumerate four character- istics. The charaaeristic that it omits is the characteristic of duration or sthiti. Truth to tell, it does use sthiti in the compound, sthityanyathdtva, "duration-modification;" but sthityanyathdtva is an expression that signifies "old age. " As the Sutra says "production" (utpdda) in place of "arising" (jati) and "disappearance" (vyaya) in place of "imperma- nence" (anityatd), in this same way it also says sthityanyathdtva in place of "old age" (jara).
If the Sutra specifies only three characteristics, it is because, with a view to rousing disgust among believers, it points out as the characteristics of conditioned things those dharmas which cause conditioned things to pass through the three time periods: the power
? of its arising causes it to pass from the future into the present; old age and impermanence cause it to pass from the present into the past, and, after old age has weakened it, impermanence finishes it. The School gives a comparision (Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 201b7): Suppose there is a man in a dark forest, and there are three enemies there who wish to kill him. The first causes this man to leave the forest; the second weakens him, and the third destroys his vital principle. Such is the role
285 of the three characteristics with regard to conditioned things.
Duration, on the contrary, sustains conditioned things and causes them to last; this is why the Sutra does not count it among the character- istics. Further, the unconditioned lasts eternally in its own nature: the charaaeristic of duration is not without resemblance to the persistence of the unconditioned. So in order to avoid any confusion, the Sutra does not indicate duration as a characteristic of conditioned things.
[The Sautrantikas think that] the Sutra does name duration; it names it by associating it with old age: sthityanyathatva, that is to say, "sthiti and anyathatva. "
What advantage is there, would you say, in making one single charaaeristic out of these two charaaeristics?
Persons are attracted to duration: in order to incite disgust with
respea to duration, the Sutra names it together with old age, like
286 prosperity associated with black ears.
Conclusion: there are four charaaeristics.
***
The arising, duration, etc. , of any sort of dharma is also condi- tioned. They should also arise, last, grow old, and perish; they should then, in their turn, possess four charaaeristics: arising-of-arising, etc. , which will be the secondary charaaeristics (anulaksana) of the dharma under consideration. These secondary charaaeristics, being condi- tioned, have in their turn four characteristics, and so we have infinite progression.
There is no infinite progression.
The Indriyas 239
? 240 Chapter Two
46a. They have in their turn characteristics termed arising-of- arising, duration-of-duration, etc. ;
Four primary characteristics are as described above.
The four secondary charaaeristics (anulaksana) are arising-of- arising, duration-of-duration, old age-of-old age, and impermanence- of-impermanence.
All conditioned things are conditioned by these primary charac- teristics; these, in their turn, are conditioned by the four secondary characteristics.
You say that each of the primary charaaeristics should have, exactly as the dharma that it charaaerizes, four charaaeristics, and thus following: you do not understand that these are the activity, the operation {vrtti-dhatTrmkantra-purusakara, iv. 58) of the different characteristics.
46b. The primary characteristic refers to eight dharmas, the 21
secondary charaaeristic to one dharma. *
When a dharma arises--which we will term the principle dharma or muladharma, a mind or a mental state--nine dharmas, including it, arise together: the principal dharma, four primary charaaeristics, and four secondary charaaeristics. The first primary characteristic, primary arising causes the principle dharma, plus three primary charaaeristics (duration, old age, and impermanence), plus the four secondary characteristics to arise: in all eight dharmas. It does not cause itself to be produced: it arises through the secondary charaaeristic arising-of- arising {jati-jati). In the same way a hen lays many eggs and each egg causes the birth of only one other chicken (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 200cl9); in the same way primary arising causes eight dharmas to arise, whereas arising-of-arising causes only one dharma to arise, namely primary arising.
It is the same for the other primary and secondary charaaeristics. Duration-of-duration causes primary duration to last, which in turn causes the principal dharma to last, as well as the three primary charaaeristics and the four secondary charaaeristics comprising duration-of-duration. The same for primary old age and imperma-
? nence which causes eight dharmas to age and to perish, and which age and perish themselves through the secondary characteristics which correspond to them, old age-of-old age and impermanence-of- impermanence.
Hence the characteristics themselves have characteristics called anulaksanas\ they are four in number and not sixteen, and there is no infinite progression.
The Sautrantikas say:
***
288
i. All this is to analyze emptiness!
entities, separate things in and of themselves. We know things either through direct perception, through inference, or through the testi- mony of Scripture: these three means of correct knowledge (pramana) are missing with respect to these characteristics.
But, [reply the Sarvastivadins,] the Sutra says "The production of
289 conditioned things is an object of consciousness . . . "
Ignorant! You are attached to the words and err with regard to
their meaning. The Blessed One however said that it is the meaning,
290
and not the letter, that is the recourse. As for the sense of this Sutra,
it is obvious.
Blinded by ignorance, foolish persons imagine that the series of
conditioned phenomena (samskdras) is a "self or belongs to a "self," and, as a consequence, they are attached to this series. The Blessed One wanted to put an end to this erroneous imagination and to the attachment which results from it: he wanted to show that the series is conditioned, that is to say, "produced through sucessive causes"
(pratttyasamutpanna)\ and he taught the three marks of that which is produced through successive causes, saying that "Three sarhskrtalak- sanas of the samskrta are the object of consciousness. " It is the series that the Blessed One means to designate as conditioned, for, quite clearly, he does not attribute the three marks to each moment of the series, since he says that these marks are the object of consciousness: in fact, the production of the moment, its aging, and its disappearance,
The lndriyas 241
Arising, duration, etc. , are not
? 242 Chapter Two
are not the objects of consciousness; whatever is not the object of consciousness cannot be a mark.
If the Sutra uses the word samskrta twice, "There are three samskrtalaksanas of the samskrta" this is in order that one should know that these three marks are not marks showing the presence of the samskrtas, as herons indicate the nearness of water; nor are they qualitative signs of the samskrta, as the marks of a young girl permit one to say that she is good or bad; no, when these marks are found on a thing, they show that this thing is a samskrta. [Hence we would translate this canonical text as "Conditioned things possess three visible marks which show that it is conditioned, that is, produced through successive causes. These marks are its arising, its duration- modification, and its impermanence. "]
ii. According to us, what one should understand by production or arising is the fact that the series begins; disappearance or imperma- nence is the end or cessation of the series; duration is the series continuing from its beginning until its end; evolution or old age is the modification of the continuous series, the difference between its successive states. It is from this point of view--that is, by considering arising, enduring, prolonging itself, and modifying itself--that the Blessed One says to Sundarananda, who is perpetually attentive to his states of mind, "Fine, my man! You know that your sensations arise,
291 last, end, and disappear. "
292 We would then say,
"Arising is the beginning of the series, disappearance is its rupture; duration is the series itself; evolution is the difference between its successive states/'
And again,
"Arising is existence following upon non-existence; duration is the series; impermanence is the rupture of the series; and evolution is supposed to be the difference between the successive states of the series. "
"Since the dharmas are momentary, would you say that the dharmas will perish [immediately] if duration is lacking? But [if the dharmas are momentary], they perish spontaneously: in vain you
? 295 attribute duration to a momentary dharma"
Consequently it is the series that the Sutra refers to when it speaks of duration, and the definition of the Abhidharma (Prakaranapdda, TD, p. 694a26) is justified, "What is duration? The samskdras arisen and not destroyed" The nature of the "moment" (ksanadharmatd) cannot be "arisen and not be destroyed. "
Yet the Jndnaprasthdna (TD 26, p. 926b21) says, "Relative to one mind, what is production? It is arising. What is disappearance? It is death. What is evolution? It is old age. "
But this passage of the Sastra does not refer to a moment of the mind, but to the mind of a homogeneous existence (nikdyasabhd- gacitta). [In a homogeneous existence (ii. 41) the minds are multiple, but this multiplicity can be designated as being one mind]
iii. However, since one cannot consider characteristics as things in and of themselves, one can say that each moment taken separately possesse the four characterisitcs.
In fact, (1) each moment exists after having been non-existent: its existence, following upon its non-existence, is its arising; (2) after having existed, it does not exist anymore: this is its disappearance; (3) the duration of the moment is the concatenation or the process of successive moments: in fact, if the subsequent moment resembles the previous moment, it is then its substitute: the previous moment still exists or still lasts. Thus the subsequent moment can be considered as the duration of the previous moment; (4) the dissimilitude of duration is its transformation.
Would you say that there is no dissimilitude when the successive moments are similar (sadrsa)?
There is dissimilitude, as this results from the difference in time of the slower or faster falling of a vajra that is or is not projected, and which is projected with or without force: difference due in each case to a transformation or a difference of the primary elements of the vajra. When the dharmas succeed themselves in a homogeneous series, the difference is small; that is why, although they differ, they are considered as similar.
[The Sarvastivadins object:] Your definition of characteristics does
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not hold for all conditioned dharmas. In fact, your definition of duration supposes a subsequent moment: but such a moment does not exist for the last moment of the mind of an Arhat. Hence the last moment of a sound, a flame, or an Arhat, has neither duration nor transformation.
We do not attribute duration to all conditioned dharmas\ We say rather, that all duration is subject to transformation. The Blessed One teaches three characteristics, because, in certain cases, there are three characteristics. But, for the last moment of a flame, there is only producation and disappearance, and no duration or transformation.
In short, conditioned dharmas exist after having existed; after having existed, they no longer exist; the series of dharmas is their duration; dissimilarity of the series is their transformation. Such is the teaching that the Blessed One gives in the Sutra of the Three Characteristics. This has nothing to do with things in and of themselves, arising, etc.
[iv. The Vaibhasikas object:] According to you, arising is the dharma itself in so far as it exists after having been non-existent. The dharma which is the "thing characterized" {laksya), would then be the characteristic (laksana) also.
What is wrong with that? The marks of a Mahapurusa are not different or distinct from the Mahapurusa himself. The horns, the hump, the fetlock, the hoof, and the tail of a cow, which are its marks, are not different from the cow. The primary elements do not exist apart from their individual characteristics, solidity, etc. (i. l2d). In this same way, for the Vaibhasikas who affirm the "momentariness" of the
294 dharmas, the rising of smoke is none other than the smoke itself
Let us look at this a bit closer. Although I grasp the individual
nature of visible things, etc. , which are conditioned, yet as long as I do
not know the fact that they did not exist previously, that they will not
exist later, and that their series transforms itself, then I shall not know
their quality of being conditioned. Consequently, the quality of being
conditioned does not have for a mark the quality of being conditioned,
295
but rather previous non-existence, etc. And there do not exist
characteristics, things in and of themselves, distinct from visible things
? and other conditioned things.
v. If we admit the reality of characteristics, then since they are
given as simultaneous, we would have to admit that one dharma arises, lasts, grows old and perishes at one and the same time.
It is in vain that the Sarvastivadins pretend that the characteristics do not exercise their activity at one and the same time; that arising engenders before being born itself, being still in a future state, and that once it is born it does not engender any longer; that duration, old age, and impermanence exercise their activity when they are present and not in a future state; and that, consequently, the last three character- istics are active in a moment when the first is no longer active, so the four characteristics can be simultaneous without contradiction.
Let us first consider arising which, being future, engenders. One must examine whether a future dharma, supposing that it does exist, can be active. If future arising produces the operation of engendering, how can one say that it is future? In fact, according to the Vaibhasikas, a future dharma is one that does not exercise its activity. You would have to define future. On the other hand, when a dharma has arisen, has been engendered, and the operation of arising is past, how can you say that arising is then of the present? You would have to define present.
And either the activity of the other characteristics is exercised simultaneously, or their activity is exercised in succession. In the first hypothesis, whereas duration makes a dharma last, old age makes it age and impermanence destroys it: the dharma lasts, ages and perishes at the same time. As for the second hypothesis, to admit that the activity of these characteristics is not simultaneous is to admit three
296 moments, and this is to renounce the doctrine of momentariness.
time during which the characteristics have achieved their operation. Then explain why, in this hypothesis, duration, arising at the same time as old age and impermanence, accomplishes its operation of "making last that which should last" before old age and impermanence accomplish their operation of making things age and destroying them. If you answer that duration, being stronger, accomplishes its operation
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] For us, the ksana or moment is the 297
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first, then we would ask how duration is weakened later in such a manner that, encountering old age and impermanence, it ages and perishes, not alone, but with the dharma that it should have made last.
You say perhaps that duration, having achieved its task, cannot perform it again, in the same way that arising, having engendered something, engenders no more. The comparison is not legitimate. The operation of arising consists of attracting the dharma that it should engender from the future and causing it to enter into the present; once the dharma has entered into the present, arising is incapable of making it enter therein again. But the operation of duration is to make the dharma "which should be made to last" last, of hindering the dharma which makes old age and perishing last.
Duration is capable of making that which lasts last indefinitely. Consequently, duration is capable of repeating its operation.
By reason of what obstacle or from what adverse forces would the activity of duration cease once it has begun? Would these forces be old age and impermanence, old age weakening duration which imperma- nence then kills? Since, in this hypothesis, old age and impermanence are stronger than duration, it is proper then that they exercise their activity first. Further, according to your conception of duration and its role, it is through the activity of duration that, not only the principal dharma, but also old age and impermanence, last. Hence, when the activity of duration ends, the principal dharma, as well as old age and impermanence, cease their duration. We ask how, and with regard to what object, old age and impermanence exercise their activity of aging and causing to perish?
We do not see what it is that old age and impermanence have to do. It is through duration that one dharma, once it arises, does not perish for a certain time, does not perish as soon as it arises. If duration, its task completed, neglects the dharma, it will quite certainly not last any longer; that is to say, it perishes in and of itself.
We well understand the duration and impermanence of the dharma, "A dharma, after having arisen, does not perish," "A dharma, after having lasted, perishes. " But how can one attribute old age to a dharma} Old age is a transformation, a dissimilarity between two
? states. Now, can one say of a single dharma that it becomes different from itself?
"If it remains this, it is not that; if it is transformed, it is no longer this. Hence the transformation of a dharma is impossible. "
298
According to another School,
external causes of destruction, fire or a hammer, etc. , that the characteristics of impermanence causes certain dharmas to perish, as wood or a pot.
This is a theory as absurd as a sick person, who, after having taken a medicine, begs the gods to render it efficacious! In the logic of this system, it is the external causes of destruction which destroy, and the characteristic of impermanence serves no function.
The same School admits that the mind and its mental states, like sound or a flame, perish immediately, without any foreign causes intervening, through the chacteristic of impermanence. Impermanence and duration accomplish their operation at one and the same time: a dharma lasts and perishes at the same time. This is inadmissable.
We conclude that it is with regard to the series that the Blessed One teaches the characteristics of conditioned things. Thus understood, the Sutra does not invite criticism, "There are three characteristics that show that the conditioned is conditioned, that it is produced through
2 successive causes . . . " "
***
If arising engenders, in a future state, the dharma that it should engender, why do not all future dharmas arise at one and the same
300
time?
46c-d. Arising engenders the dharma that it should engender, 301
but not without the cooperation of causes and conditions.
Isolated arising does not have the force of engendering the dharma that it should engender independent of the cooperation of causes and conditions.
[1. Objection of the Sautrantikas:] If this is the case, we rather
The Indriyas 247
it is with the cooperation of
? 248 Chapter Two
believe that it is the cause that engenders, and not arising; this characteristic accompanies the dhanna since the beginning of time and causes the dharma to arise when, finally, the cause of this dharma encounters another! When the causes are completed, the dharma arises; when they are not completed, it does not arise: what efficacy can
302 we attribute to arising?
[2. The Sarvastivadins answer:] Do you pretend to know all the 303
dharmas that exist? The nature of dharmas is subtle! Even though one sees them, one does not know their nature.
Moreover, in the absence of the characteristic "arising," the idea of 304
"birth" (jatabuddhi = jata iti) would be absent. And if arising is nothing other than the dharma itself exisitng after having been non- existent, the genitive "the arising of warmth" or "the arising of sensation" would not be justified; for this amounts to saying "the warmth of warmth" or "the sensation of sensation. " This is the same for duration, old age, and extinction.
[3. Reply of the Sautrantikas:] This theory leads you very far afield: in order to justify the idea of empty (sunya), or the idea of the impersonal, you would admit the existence of an entity called "emptiness" or the existence of an entity called "non-self. " And ag^in, in order to justify the ideas of one and two, large and small, separate, associated and disassociated, this and that, existant, etc. , you would admit, in agreement with the Vaisesikas, a long series of entities: number, extension, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, quality of being that, quality of being this, existence, etc. It obliges you to create a "pot-ness" in order to justify the idea of a pot.
As for the genitive, you do not admit that the individual nature of warmth and warmth are different things, and yet you speak of the individual nature of warmth.
Hence you have not proven that "arising" is a thing in and of itself; you have not proven that this is not merely a designation of a dharma in so far as it exists after having been non-existent.
When I want to teach someone that a certain dharma exists which formerly did not exist, I say to him, "This dharma has arisen," and I designate this dharma as being born. Many dharmas,--warmth,
? sensation, etc. ,--arise, that is to say, "exist after having been non- existent. " Hence there are many arisings, that is, many dharmas arising. Since arising is multiple, in order to distinguish it from other arisings, so that my questioner knows that it refers to an arising having the name "warmth" and not to an arising having the name "sensa- tion," I will employ the genitive, "the arising of warmth," or "the arising of sensation," although the arising of warmth is only the warmth arising. In the same way one says, in the world, "the odor of sandalwood," although sandalwood is only odor, or "the body of the
305 bust," although a bust is only its body.
[4. The Sarvastivadins answer:] We hold to the existence of the characteristic "arising," which belongs to conditioned things and does not belong to unconditioned things, and we can easily explain this by virtue of the fact that unconditioned things do not arise. But if conditioned things arise without "arising," why do unconditioned things, space, etc. , not arise?
We say that conditioned things arise, for they exist after having been non-existent. But how can unconditioned things arise, since they are eternal? You explain that certain dharmas,--the unconditioned dharmas,--are devoid of the characteristic "arising," because, you say, such is the nature of things (dharmata): we say, rather, that by virtue of the nature of things, none of the dharmas are susceptible of arising. Moreover, according to you, all conditioned things equally possess the characteristic "arising" that you refuse to unconditioned things: yet you admit that certain causes are capable of producing warmth but incapable of producing sensation. In the same way, according to you, since conditioned and unconditioned things are equally devoid of the characteristic of "arising," all causes that produce conditioned things are ineffacacious with regard to unconditioned things.
[5. The Vaibhasikas say that] the four characteristics, arising, etc. ,
306 are things in and of themselves.
Why?
307 308
Should we abandon the Agamas for the sole reason
that there are persons who object to them? One does not renounce
sowing for fear of deer, and one does not renounce eating dainties
309
because of flies. One must refute objections and adhere to the
The lndriyas 249
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Doctrine.
***
What is namakaya, padakdya, and vyanjanakdyal
47a-b. Namakaya, etc. , are collections of samjrlas, vdkyas, and
m aksaras.
1. Ndman, "name" or "word" is understood as "that which causes 311
ideas to arise," for example the words "warmth," "sound," "odor," etc.
2. Pada or "phrase" is understood as vakya, a discourse, a phrase 312
allowing the development necessary for a complete sentence, for
example the stanza, "Impermanent are the samskdras . . . " and the 313
rest. Or rather, one should understand pada as that which causes one to comprehend the different modalities of activity, quality, and time which concern a certain person: for example, he cooks, he reads, he
314
goes; it is black, yellow, or red; he cooks, he will cook, or he
315 cooked.
3. Vyanjana is understood as aksara or phoneme (varna), vowels andconsonents,forexample,a,d,[i,/,]etc.
But are not the aksaras the names of the letters?
One does not make or one does not pronounce phonemes with a view to designating, or of giving an idea of the letters; but one makes or one writes the letters with a view to giving an idea of the phonemes, so that, when one does not understand them, one still has an idea of them through writing. Consequently the phonemes are not the names of letters.
4. Kaya or "body" means "collection;" samukti, in fact, has the sense of samavaya according to the Dhdtupdtha, iv. 114.
Hence we have: namakaya = color, sound, odor, etc. ; padakdya = "The samskdras are impermanent, the dharmas are impersonal; Nirvana is tranquil. . . " etc. ; and vyanjanakaya = ka, kha, ga, gha . . .
***
? [1. Objection of the Sautrantikas:] Are not words, phrases, and phonemes (ndman, pada, vyanjana) "voice" (vac) by nature, and consequently "sound" (sabda)? Hence they form part of the mpaskandha\ they are not samskdras disassociated from the mind as the Sarvastivadins believe.
[The Sarvastivadins:] They are not "voice. " Voice is "vocal sound," and a vocal sound only; for example, a cry does not cause one to attain to or comprehend an object. But a word (ndman) which moreover is a function of vocal sound, illumines, causes one to attain to, or signifies the object.
[The Sautrantikas:] What I call "voice" is not merely vocal sound, but a vocal sound that causes one to attain to an object, that is, a vocal sound with regard to which persons who are speaking are in agreement as to what a certain thing signifies. It is thus that the Ancients have invested the sound go with the power to signify nine things: "The sages have established the sound go in nine things, that is, cardinal region, cattle, land, a beam of light, a word, a diamond, an
316
eye, a haven, and water. " The philosopher for whom "it is the word
(ndman) which illumines the object" should admit that the sound go has been endowed by convention with these different meanings. Then if a given object is signified to the hearer by a certain word, it is indeed vocal sound and nothing else, that signifies it. What advantage is there in supposing the existence of an entity you call "word? "
[2. The Sautrantikas continue:] A word is either produced by the
317 318
voice or revealed by the voice.
a. In the first hypothesis, since voice is vocal sound by nature, any vocal sound whatsoever, even the cry of an animal, would produce a word. If you answer that a word is produced solely through a vocal sound of a certain nature--the articulation of sound, varndtmaka--we would say that this sort of vocal sound which is capable of producing a word would be quite capable of designating an object also.
In the second hypothesis, this same criticism holds by replacing the verb "to produce" with the verb "to manifest. "
b. But it is absurd to suppose that the voice produces a word. In fact, sounds do not exist at the same time? one has, for example,
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r-u-p-a--whereas the word, which you define as a dharma, an entity, cannot arise in parts. Then how can the voice, when it produces a word, produce it? You say that the case is analogous to that of avijnapti (iv. 3d): the last moment of the vijnapti, a corporeal or vocal act, creates avijnapti by reason of its previous moments. But, we would say, if the last moment of the sound of the voice creates the word, it would suffice to understand the last sound in order to attain or comprehend the object.
It is not an evasion to suppose that voice engenders the phoneme (vyanjana), that a phoneme engenders a word, and that a word causes comprehension of objects. In fact, the same objection is present, "The phonemes do not exist at the same time, etc. "
For these same reasons, it is absurd to suppose that the voice manifests a word. [Sounds do not exist at the same time, and a dharma, one entity, such as a word, cannot be mainfested in parts . . . and following].
c. [The hypothesis that "voice" engenders a phoneme--a hy- pothesis that we have previously tolerated--calls moreover for some new remarks]. Experts vainly apply their minds but do not discover a phoneme distinct from the voice. Moreover, the voice neither en- genders nor manifests the phoneme, for the same reasons that allow that the voice neither engenders nor manifests a word. [Since the "voice" is vocal sound by nature, all vocal sound would engender or manifest phonemes. If you reply that phonemes are only engendered or manifested by the vocal sound of a certain nature . . . as above ad 2a2. ]
[3. But the Sarvastivadins may suppose that] a word arises with its object, like the characteristic "arising. " The question of knowing whether it is produced or manifested by the voice, disappears.
In this hypothesis, no present word would designate a past or future thing. Moreover, a father, a mother, or other persons arbitrarily fix the word that is the proper name of a son, etc. : how can you admit that the word, like the characteristic "arising," arises simultaneously with the object? Finally, unconditioned things would not have any name, since they do not arise: a consequence that the Sarvastivadins
? cannot admit.
[4. But the Sarvastivadins are warranted by a text. ] The Blessed
One said, "A stanza (gdthd) depends on words, and a poem depends on 319
stanzas. "
[The Sautrantikas answer that] word (ndman) is a sound (sabda)
upon which persons have come to an agreement that it signifies a 32
certain thing. ? A stanza {gdtha) is a certain arrangement of words: it is in this sense that it, according to the Blessed One, depends on words. To admit an entity in and of itself called pada, is a very superfluous hypothesis. You might as well maintain that there exists, distinct from ants and minds, things in and of themselves termed "a row of ants" or
321
"a succession of minds. " Recognize then that only the phonemes
(aksaras), which are sounds, exist in and of themselves.
The Vaibhasikas admit ndmakdya, padakdya, and vyanjanakdya, as
samskdras disassociated from the mind, for, they say, none of these 322
dharmas serve as a gate of understanding. ***
We ask: (1) to which sphere of existence do the phonemes, words, and phrases belong? (2) Do they belong to living beings (sattvdkhya, i. lOb)? (3) Are they of retribution, of accumulation or of out-flowing (i. 37)? and (4) Are they good, bad, or neutral?
47c-d. They exist in Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu; they belong to
323 living beings; they are out-flowing; and they are neutral.
The phonemes, etc. , belong to two spheres of existence. According
to one opinion, they also exist in Arupyadhatu, but there they are
324 "unpronounceable. "
They belong to living beings, being produced through the efforts of living beings and consisting of articulated sounds (varna), etc. In fact, they belong to the person who speaks, not to the things that they designate.
They are an out-flowing, being produced through sabhdgahetu
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(ii. 52); they are not of retribution, since they proceed from the desire of the person who speaks; they are not of accumulation, since they are not material.
325 They are non-defiled-neutral {anivrtdvydkrta, ii. 28).
##*
We shall briefly explain the characteristics, not as yet mentioned, of the other dharmas disassociated from the mind (ii. 35).
47d-48b. The same for "genre," {sabhdgatd) which is also from retribution, and which belongs to the three spheres of existence.
"The same for," that is to say, like phonemes, words, and phrases, sabhdgatd is of the first two spheres of existence; it belongs to living beings; it is from out-flowing; and it is non-defiled-neutral.
But sabhdgatd is not only from out-flowing: it is also of retribution; it not only belongs to the first two spheres of existence, it also belongs to the third.
326 48b. Possession (prapti) is of two types.
It is of out-flowing and of retribution. 48c. Its characteristics also.
Its characteristics, arising, etc. , are of two types, like possession.
48c-d. The absorptions and non-possession (aprdpti) are of out-flowing.
The two absorptions and non-possession are only out-flowings.
As for their spheres, their relationship with living beings, their moral qualifications (good, etc. ), the explanations have been given above. The characteristics belong to all conditioned things, hence they belong to living beings and to non-living beings. For the dsamjnika and the ayus, see ii. 41d and 45a.
What is the meaning of this passage?
If the ayus is killed when the body is killed, then the ayus is "bound to the body-series. " If the body cannot be damaged, then the ayus lasts all the time for which it has been produced, and one says that the ayus
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273 lasts once it has arisen.
The Masters of Ka^mir say that the first type of dyus is "subject to obstruction," but that the second is not subject to obstruction. .
274 Thus there is premature death.
275 According to the Sutra, there are four modes of existence:
276 existence that can be destroyed by oneself and not by another, etc.
Four alternatives: 1. existence destroyed by oneself: certain beings in
Kamadhatu, namely the Krldapradusika gods and the Manahpradusika
276
gods destroy their own existence through their excess of joy or
anger; we must also add the Buddhas who enter into Nirvana; 2.
existences destroyed by others: beings in the womb and in eggs; 3.
existences destroyed by oneself and by others: beings in Kamadhatu in
general; we must exclude beings in hell, beings in the intermediate
state (iii. 12), etc. ; 4. existences that are neither destroyed by oneself nor
by others: beings in the intermediate state, all beings in Rupadhatu and
Arupyadhatu, and a part of the beings in Kamadhatu: beings in hell
(iii. 82), the inhabitants of Uttarakuru (iii. 78c), persons in the absorp-
tion of kindness (vii. 29), persons in the non-conscious absorption
(ii. 42, Kathavatthu, xv. 9); the Rajarsi, that is, the Cakravartin who has 278
left the householders^ life; a messenger of the Buddha; persons
279
280
Dharmila, Uttara, Gangila, the son of the merchant Yasas, Kumara,
JFvaka, etc. ; the Bodhisattva in his last existence; the mother of the Bodhisattva pregnant with the Bodhisattva; the Cakravartin; the mother of the Cakravartin pregnant with the Cakravartin.
[Objection:] The Sutra tells us of a question by Sariputra and the Blessed One's answer to it: "'Lord, What are the beings whose existence cannot be destroyed either by themselves, or by others? ' 'Sariputra, beings who are born in Naivasamjnanasamjnayatana
that is, in the highest sphere of Arupyadhatu, Bhavagra. How can you say, in the light of this passage, that the existence of all beings in Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu is protected from all destruction, either by themselves or others?
The School (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 772a29) explains, "Beings in Rupadhatu and the first three stages of Arupyadhatu can destroy their
whom the Buddha prophesized would live a certain length of time:
? existence 'by themselves,'" that is, by a course of action within their own realm, and 'by others,' namely by a course of action belonging to the preliminary stages of a higher stage (vi. 48, viii. 22). But in the last stage of Arupyadhatu a course of action belonging to this stage and also of actions of a superior stage are both absent; hence the existence of beings who reside therein cannot be modified either by themselves or by others.
This answer appears weak to us; in fact, one can, in the last stage of Arupyadhatu practice a course of action belonging to the im- mediately lower stage {akincanydyatana, viii. 20). One must then admit another explanation {Vibhdsd, ibid. ). In his response to Sariputa, the Buddha, by naming the beings of Naivasamjnanasamjnayatana, in- tends to designate all beings in Rupadhatu and Arupyadhatu, for in naming the last one designates the first. We can demonstrate that such is the usage. Sometimes Scripture names the first term of a list the totality of which is alluded to, for example, "The first sukhopapatti
(iii. 72), namely {tadyathd) the Brahmakayika gods. " We should then also understand, "the Brahmakayikas, the Brahmapurohitas, and the Mahabrahmas. " Sometimes Scripture names the last term, "The second sukhopapatti, namely the Abhasvara gods. " We should then understand, "the Parittabhas, the Apramanabhas, and the Abhasvaras. "
But one can contest this explanation. In the two passages given above the word tadyathd is used to introduce an example. We must translate tadyathd not as "namely" but as "for example. " It is a rule concerning examples that when one names one case one designates all similar cases. And we admit that, in the two above passages on the sukhopapattis, the Scripture designated all the terms of the list by naming pnly the first and the last. However the answer of the Blessed One to Sariputra does not contain the word tadyathd.
We would say that this explanation does not introduce an example, for we find it in Sutras that give a complete enumeration, "Material beings, diverse of body, diverse of ideas, namely {tadyathd) human beings and part of the gods . . . " (iii. 6). Thus the word tadyathd introduces a definition {upadarsandrtha). Hence the Blessed One, in his answer to Sariputra, designates the beginning by naming the end,
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281 that is, he is speaking of the totality of the two higher spheres.
***
What are the characteristics of conditioned dharmas?
45c-d. Their characteristics are arising, old age, duration, and
282 impermanence.
These four dharmas, arising, old age, duration, and impermanance,
are the characteristics of conditioned things. A dharma in which these
characteristics are found is conditioned; a dharma in which they are not 283
found is unconditioned.
Arising produces or causes to produce conditioned things; duration
stablizes them or causes them to last; old age makes them deteriorate; and impermanence destroys them.
Does not the Sutra teach the existence of some three "conditioned
characteristics" of conditioned things? The Sutra says, in fact, "There
are, oh Bhiksus, three characteristics of conditioned things, which are
themselves conditioned. What are these three? The production or
origin of conditioned things is an object of consciousness; its dis-
appearance and also its duration-modification is an object of
284 consciousness. "
[The Vaibhasikas:] The Sutra should enumerate four character- istics. The charaaeristic that it omits is the characteristic of duration or sthiti. Truth to tell, it does use sthiti in the compound, sthityanyathdtva, "duration-modification;" but sthityanyathdtva is an expression that signifies "old age. " As the Sutra says "production" (utpdda) in place of "arising" (jati) and "disappearance" (vyaya) in place of "imperma- nence" (anityatd), in this same way it also says sthityanyathdtva in place of "old age" (jara).
If the Sutra specifies only three characteristics, it is because, with a view to rousing disgust among believers, it points out as the characteristics of conditioned things those dharmas which cause conditioned things to pass through the three time periods: the power
? of its arising causes it to pass from the future into the present; old age and impermanence cause it to pass from the present into the past, and, after old age has weakened it, impermanence finishes it. The School gives a comparision (Vibhasd, TD 27, p. 201b7): Suppose there is a man in a dark forest, and there are three enemies there who wish to kill him. The first causes this man to leave the forest; the second weakens him, and the third destroys his vital principle. Such is the role
285 of the three characteristics with regard to conditioned things.
Duration, on the contrary, sustains conditioned things and causes them to last; this is why the Sutra does not count it among the character- istics. Further, the unconditioned lasts eternally in its own nature: the charaaeristic of duration is not without resemblance to the persistence of the unconditioned. So in order to avoid any confusion, the Sutra does not indicate duration as a characteristic of conditioned things.
[The Sautrantikas think that] the Sutra does name duration; it names it by associating it with old age: sthityanyathatva, that is to say, "sthiti and anyathatva. "
What advantage is there, would you say, in making one single charaaeristic out of these two charaaeristics?
Persons are attracted to duration: in order to incite disgust with
respea to duration, the Sutra names it together with old age, like
286 prosperity associated with black ears.
Conclusion: there are four charaaeristics.
***
The arising, duration, etc. , of any sort of dharma is also condi- tioned. They should also arise, last, grow old, and perish; they should then, in their turn, possess four charaaeristics: arising-of-arising, etc. , which will be the secondary charaaeristics (anulaksana) of the dharma under consideration. These secondary charaaeristics, being condi- tioned, have in their turn four characteristics, and so we have infinite progression.
There is no infinite progression.
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46a. They have in their turn characteristics termed arising-of- arising, duration-of-duration, etc. ;
Four primary characteristics are as described above.
The four secondary charaaeristics (anulaksana) are arising-of- arising, duration-of-duration, old age-of-old age, and impermanence- of-impermanence.
All conditioned things are conditioned by these primary charac- teristics; these, in their turn, are conditioned by the four secondary characteristics.
You say that each of the primary charaaeristics should have, exactly as the dharma that it charaaerizes, four charaaeristics, and thus following: you do not understand that these are the activity, the operation {vrtti-dhatTrmkantra-purusakara, iv. 58) of the different characteristics.
46b. The primary characteristic refers to eight dharmas, the 21
secondary charaaeristic to one dharma. *
When a dharma arises--which we will term the principle dharma or muladharma, a mind or a mental state--nine dharmas, including it, arise together: the principal dharma, four primary charaaeristics, and four secondary charaaeristics. The first primary characteristic, primary arising causes the principle dharma, plus three primary charaaeristics (duration, old age, and impermanence), plus the four secondary characteristics to arise: in all eight dharmas. It does not cause itself to be produced: it arises through the secondary charaaeristic arising-of- arising {jati-jati). In the same way a hen lays many eggs and each egg causes the birth of only one other chicken (Vibhasa, TD 27, p. 200cl9); in the same way primary arising causes eight dharmas to arise, whereas arising-of-arising causes only one dharma to arise, namely primary arising.
It is the same for the other primary and secondary charaaeristics. Duration-of-duration causes primary duration to last, which in turn causes the principal dharma to last, as well as the three primary charaaeristics and the four secondary charaaeristics comprising duration-of-duration. The same for primary old age and imperma-
? nence which causes eight dharmas to age and to perish, and which age and perish themselves through the secondary characteristics which correspond to them, old age-of-old age and impermanence-of- impermanence.
Hence the characteristics themselves have characteristics called anulaksanas\ they are four in number and not sixteen, and there is no infinite progression.
The Sautrantikas say:
***
288
i. All this is to analyze emptiness!
entities, separate things in and of themselves. We know things either through direct perception, through inference, or through the testi- mony of Scripture: these three means of correct knowledge (pramana) are missing with respect to these characteristics.
But, [reply the Sarvastivadins,] the Sutra says "The production of
289 conditioned things is an object of consciousness . . . "
Ignorant! You are attached to the words and err with regard to
their meaning. The Blessed One however said that it is the meaning,
290
and not the letter, that is the recourse. As for the sense of this Sutra,
it is obvious.
Blinded by ignorance, foolish persons imagine that the series of
conditioned phenomena (samskdras) is a "self or belongs to a "self," and, as a consequence, they are attached to this series. The Blessed One wanted to put an end to this erroneous imagination and to the attachment which results from it: he wanted to show that the series is conditioned, that is to say, "produced through sucessive causes"
(pratttyasamutpanna)\ and he taught the three marks of that which is produced through successive causes, saying that "Three sarhskrtalak- sanas of the samskrta are the object of consciousness. " It is the series that the Blessed One means to designate as conditioned, for, quite clearly, he does not attribute the three marks to each moment of the series, since he says that these marks are the object of consciousness: in fact, the production of the moment, its aging, and its disappearance,
The lndriyas 241
Arising, duration, etc. , are not
? 242 Chapter Two
are not the objects of consciousness; whatever is not the object of consciousness cannot be a mark.
If the Sutra uses the word samskrta twice, "There are three samskrtalaksanas of the samskrta" this is in order that one should know that these three marks are not marks showing the presence of the samskrtas, as herons indicate the nearness of water; nor are they qualitative signs of the samskrta, as the marks of a young girl permit one to say that she is good or bad; no, when these marks are found on a thing, they show that this thing is a samskrta. [Hence we would translate this canonical text as "Conditioned things possess three visible marks which show that it is conditioned, that is, produced through successive causes. These marks are its arising, its duration- modification, and its impermanence. "]
ii. According to us, what one should understand by production or arising is the fact that the series begins; disappearance or imperma- nence is the end or cessation of the series; duration is the series continuing from its beginning until its end; evolution or old age is the modification of the continuous series, the difference between its successive states. It is from this point of view--that is, by considering arising, enduring, prolonging itself, and modifying itself--that the Blessed One says to Sundarananda, who is perpetually attentive to his states of mind, "Fine, my man! You know that your sensations arise,
291 last, end, and disappear. "
292 We would then say,
"Arising is the beginning of the series, disappearance is its rupture; duration is the series itself; evolution is the difference between its successive states/'
And again,
"Arising is existence following upon non-existence; duration is the series; impermanence is the rupture of the series; and evolution is supposed to be the difference between the successive states of the series. "
"Since the dharmas are momentary, would you say that the dharmas will perish [immediately] if duration is lacking? But [if the dharmas are momentary], they perish spontaneously: in vain you
? 295 attribute duration to a momentary dharma"
Consequently it is the series that the Sutra refers to when it speaks of duration, and the definition of the Abhidharma (Prakaranapdda, TD, p. 694a26) is justified, "What is duration? The samskdras arisen and not destroyed" The nature of the "moment" (ksanadharmatd) cannot be "arisen and not be destroyed. "
Yet the Jndnaprasthdna (TD 26, p. 926b21) says, "Relative to one mind, what is production? It is arising. What is disappearance? It is death. What is evolution? It is old age. "
But this passage of the Sastra does not refer to a moment of the mind, but to the mind of a homogeneous existence (nikdyasabhd- gacitta). [In a homogeneous existence (ii. 41) the minds are multiple, but this multiplicity can be designated as being one mind]
iii. However, since one cannot consider characteristics as things in and of themselves, one can say that each moment taken separately possesse the four characterisitcs.
In fact, (1) each moment exists after having been non-existent: its existence, following upon its non-existence, is its arising; (2) after having existed, it does not exist anymore: this is its disappearance; (3) the duration of the moment is the concatenation or the process of successive moments: in fact, if the subsequent moment resembles the previous moment, it is then its substitute: the previous moment still exists or still lasts. Thus the subsequent moment can be considered as the duration of the previous moment; (4) the dissimilitude of duration is its transformation.
Would you say that there is no dissimilitude when the successive moments are similar (sadrsa)?
There is dissimilitude, as this results from the difference in time of the slower or faster falling of a vajra that is or is not projected, and which is projected with or without force: difference due in each case to a transformation or a difference of the primary elements of the vajra. When the dharmas succeed themselves in a homogeneous series, the difference is small; that is why, although they differ, they are considered as similar.
[The Sarvastivadins object:] Your definition of characteristics does
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not hold for all conditioned dharmas. In fact, your definition of duration supposes a subsequent moment: but such a moment does not exist for the last moment of the mind of an Arhat. Hence the last moment of a sound, a flame, or an Arhat, has neither duration nor transformation.
We do not attribute duration to all conditioned dharmas\ We say rather, that all duration is subject to transformation. The Blessed One teaches three characteristics, because, in certain cases, there are three characteristics. But, for the last moment of a flame, there is only producation and disappearance, and no duration or transformation.
In short, conditioned dharmas exist after having existed; after having existed, they no longer exist; the series of dharmas is their duration; dissimilarity of the series is their transformation. Such is the teaching that the Blessed One gives in the Sutra of the Three Characteristics. This has nothing to do with things in and of themselves, arising, etc.
[iv. The Vaibhasikas object:] According to you, arising is the dharma itself in so far as it exists after having been non-existent. The dharma which is the "thing characterized" {laksya), would then be the characteristic (laksana) also.
What is wrong with that? The marks of a Mahapurusa are not different or distinct from the Mahapurusa himself. The horns, the hump, the fetlock, the hoof, and the tail of a cow, which are its marks, are not different from the cow. The primary elements do not exist apart from their individual characteristics, solidity, etc. (i. l2d). In this same way, for the Vaibhasikas who affirm the "momentariness" of the
294 dharmas, the rising of smoke is none other than the smoke itself
Let us look at this a bit closer. Although I grasp the individual
nature of visible things, etc. , which are conditioned, yet as long as I do
not know the fact that they did not exist previously, that they will not
exist later, and that their series transforms itself, then I shall not know
their quality of being conditioned. Consequently, the quality of being
conditioned does not have for a mark the quality of being conditioned,
295
but rather previous non-existence, etc. And there do not exist
characteristics, things in and of themselves, distinct from visible things
? and other conditioned things.
v. If we admit the reality of characteristics, then since they are
given as simultaneous, we would have to admit that one dharma arises, lasts, grows old and perishes at one and the same time.
It is in vain that the Sarvastivadins pretend that the characteristics do not exercise their activity at one and the same time; that arising engenders before being born itself, being still in a future state, and that once it is born it does not engender any longer; that duration, old age, and impermanence exercise their activity when they are present and not in a future state; and that, consequently, the last three character- istics are active in a moment when the first is no longer active, so the four characteristics can be simultaneous without contradiction.
Let us first consider arising which, being future, engenders. One must examine whether a future dharma, supposing that it does exist, can be active. If future arising produces the operation of engendering, how can one say that it is future? In fact, according to the Vaibhasikas, a future dharma is one that does not exercise its activity. You would have to define future. On the other hand, when a dharma has arisen, has been engendered, and the operation of arising is past, how can you say that arising is then of the present? You would have to define present.
And either the activity of the other characteristics is exercised simultaneously, or their activity is exercised in succession. In the first hypothesis, whereas duration makes a dharma last, old age makes it age and impermanence destroys it: the dharma lasts, ages and perishes at the same time. As for the second hypothesis, to admit that the activity of these characteristics is not simultaneous is to admit three
296 moments, and this is to renounce the doctrine of momentariness.
time during which the characteristics have achieved their operation. Then explain why, in this hypothesis, duration, arising at the same time as old age and impermanence, accomplishes its operation of "making last that which should last" before old age and impermanence accomplish their operation of making things age and destroying them. If you answer that duration, being stronger, accomplishes its operation
[The Vaibhasikas answer:] For us, the ksana or moment is the 297
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first, then we would ask how duration is weakened later in such a manner that, encountering old age and impermanence, it ages and perishes, not alone, but with the dharma that it should have made last.
You say perhaps that duration, having achieved its task, cannot perform it again, in the same way that arising, having engendered something, engenders no more. The comparison is not legitimate. The operation of arising consists of attracting the dharma that it should engender from the future and causing it to enter into the present; once the dharma has entered into the present, arising is incapable of making it enter therein again. But the operation of duration is to make the dharma "which should be made to last" last, of hindering the dharma which makes old age and perishing last.
Duration is capable of making that which lasts last indefinitely. Consequently, duration is capable of repeating its operation.
By reason of what obstacle or from what adverse forces would the activity of duration cease once it has begun? Would these forces be old age and impermanence, old age weakening duration which imperma- nence then kills? Since, in this hypothesis, old age and impermanence are stronger than duration, it is proper then that they exercise their activity first. Further, according to your conception of duration and its role, it is through the activity of duration that, not only the principal dharma, but also old age and impermanence, last. Hence, when the activity of duration ends, the principal dharma, as well as old age and impermanence, cease their duration. We ask how, and with regard to what object, old age and impermanence exercise their activity of aging and causing to perish?
We do not see what it is that old age and impermanence have to do. It is through duration that one dharma, once it arises, does not perish for a certain time, does not perish as soon as it arises. If duration, its task completed, neglects the dharma, it will quite certainly not last any longer; that is to say, it perishes in and of itself.
We well understand the duration and impermanence of the dharma, "A dharma, after having arisen, does not perish," "A dharma, after having lasted, perishes. " But how can one attribute old age to a dharma} Old age is a transformation, a dissimilarity between two
? states. Now, can one say of a single dharma that it becomes different from itself?
"If it remains this, it is not that; if it is transformed, it is no longer this. Hence the transformation of a dharma is impossible. "
298
According to another School,
external causes of destruction, fire or a hammer, etc. , that the characteristics of impermanence causes certain dharmas to perish, as wood or a pot.
This is a theory as absurd as a sick person, who, after having taken a medicine, begs the gods to render it efficacious! In the logic of this system, it is the external causes of destruction which destroy, and the characteristic of impermanence serves no function.
The same School admits that the mind and its mental states, like sound or a flame, perish immediately, without any foreign causes intervening, through the chacteristic of impermanence. Impermanence and duration accomplish their operation at one and the same time: a dharma lasts and perishes at the same time. This is inadmissable.
We conclude that it is with regard to the series that the Blessed One teaches the characteristics of conditioned things. Thus understood, the Sutra does not invite criticism, "There are three characteristics that show that the conditioned is conditioned, that it is produced through
2 successive causes . . . " "
***
If arising engenders, in a future state, the dharma that it should engender, why do not all future dharmas arise at one and the same
300
time?
46c-d. Arising engenders the dharma that it should engender, 301
but not without the cooperation of causes and conditions.
Isolated arising does not have the force of engendering the dharma that it should engender independent of the cooperation of causes and conditions.
[1. Objection of the Sautrantikas:] If this is the case, we rather
The Indriyas 247
it is with the cooperation of
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believe that it is the cause that engenders, and not arising; this characteristic accompanies the dhanna since the beginning of time and causes the dharma to arise when, finally, the cause of this dharma encounters another! When the causes are completed, the dharma arises; when they are not completed, it does not arise: what efficacy can
302 we attribute to arising?
[2. The Sarvastivadins answer:] Do you pretend to know all the 303
dharmas that exist? The nature of dharmas is subtle! Even though one sees them, one does not know their nature.
Moreover, in the absence of the characteristic "arising," the idea of 304
"birth" (jatabuddhi = jata iti) would be absent. And if arising is nothing other than the dharma itself exisitng after having been non- existent, the genitive "the arising of warmth" or "the arising of sensation" would not be justified; for this amounts to saying "the warmth of warmth" or "the sensation of sensation. " This is the same for duration, old age, and extinction.
[3. Reply of the Sautrantikas:] This theory leads you very far afield: in order to justify the idea of empty (sunya), or the idea of the impersonal, you would admit the existence of an entity called "emptiness" or the existence of an entity called "non-self. " And ag^in, in order to justify the ideas of one and two, large and small, separate, associated and disassociated, this and that, existant, etc. , you would admit, in agreement with the Vaisesikas, a long series of entities: number, extension, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, quality of being that, quality of being this, existence, etc. It obliges you to create a "pot-ness" in order to justify the idea of a pot.
As for the genitive, you do not admit that the individual nature of warmth and warmth are different things, and yet you speak of the individual nature of warmth.
Hence you have not proven that "arising" is a thing in and of itself; you have not proven that this is not merely a designation of a dharma in so far as it exists after having been non-existent.
When I want to teach someone that a certain dharma exists which formerly did not exist, I say to him, "This dharma has arisen," and I designate this dharma as being born. Many dharmas,--warmth,
? sensation, etc. ,--arise, that is to say, "exist after having been non- existent. " Hence there are many arisings, that is, many dharmas arising. Since arising is multiple, in order to distinguish it from other arisings, so that my questioner knows that it refers to an arising having the name "warmth" and not to an arising having the name "sensa- tion," I will employ the genitive, "the arising of warmth," or "the arising of sensation," although the arising of warmth is only the warmth arising. In the same way one says, in the world, "the odor of sandalwood," although sandalwood is only odor, or "the body of the
305 bust," although a bust is only its body.
[4. The Sarvastivadins answer:] We hold to the existence of the characteristic "arising," which belongs to conditioned things and does not belong to unconditioned things, and we can easily explain this by virtue of the fact that unconditioned things do not arise. But if conditioned things arise without "arising," why do unconditioned things, space, etc. , not arise?
We say that conditioned things arise, for they exist after having been non-existent. But how can unconditioned things arise, since they are eternal? You explain that certain dharmas,--the unconditioned dharmas,--are devoid of the characteristic "arising," because, you say, such is the nature of things (dharmata): we say, rather, that by virtue of the nature of things, none of the dharmas are susceptible of arising. Moreover, according to you, all conditioned things equally possess the characteristic "arising" that you refuse to unconditioned things: yet you admit that certain causes are capable of producing warmth but incapable of producing sensation. In the same way, according to you, since conditioned and unconditioned things are equally devoid of the characteristic of "arising," all causes that produce conditioned things are ineffacacious with regard to unconditioned things.
[5. The Vaibhasikas say that] the four characteristics, arising, etc. ,
306 are things in and of themselves.
Why?
307 308
Should we abandon the Agamas for the sole reason
that there are persons who object to them? One does not renounce
sowing for fear of deer, and one does not renounce eating dainties
309
because of flies. One must refute objections and adhere to the
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Doctrine.
***
What is namakaya, padakdya, and vyanjanakdyal
47a-b. Namakaya, etc. , are collections of samjrlas, vdkyas, and
m aksaras.
1. Ndman, "name" or "word" is understood as "that which causes 311
ideas to arise," for example the words "warmth," "sound," "odor," etc.
2. Pada or "phrase" is understood as vakya, a discourse, a phrase 312
allowing the development necessary for a complete sentence, for
example the stanza, "Impermanent are the samskdras . . . " and the 313
rest. Or rather, one should understand pada as that which causes one to comprehend the different modalities of activity, quality, and time which concern a certain person: for example, he cooks, he reads, he
314
goes; it is black, yellow, or red; he cooks, he will cook, or he
315 cooked.
3. Vyanjana is understood as aksara or phoneme (varna), vowels andconsonents,forexample,a,d,[i,/,]etc.
But are not the aksaras the names of the letters?
One does not make or one does not pronounce phonemes with a view to designating, or of giving an idea of the letters; but one makes or one writes the letters with a view to giving an idea of the phonemes, so that, when one does not understand them, one still has an idea of them through writing. Consequently the phonemes are not the names of letters.
4. Kaya or "body" means "collection;" samukti, in fact, has the sense of samavaya according to the Dhdtupdtha, iv. 114.
Hence we have: namakaya = color, sound, odor, etc. ; padakdya = "The samskdras are impermanent, the dharmas are impersonal; Nirvana is tranquil. . . " etc. ; and vyanjanakaya = ka, kha, ga, gha . . .
***
? [1. Objection of the Sautrantikas:] Are not words, phrases, and phonemes (ndman, pada, vyanjana) "voice" (vac) by nature, and consequently "sound" (sabda)? Hence they form part of the mpaskandha\ they are not samskdras disassociated from the mind as the Sarvastivadins believe.
[The Sarvastivadins:] They are not "voice. " Voice is "vocal sound," and a vocal sound only; for example, a cry does not cause one to attain to or comprehend an object. But a word (ndman) which moreover is a function of vocal sound, illumines, causes one to attain to, or signifies the object.
[The Sautrantikas:] What I call "voice" is not merely vocal sound, but a vocal sound that causes one to attain to an object, that is, a vocal sound with regard to which persons who are speaking are in agreement as to what a certain thing signifies. It is thus that the Ancients have invested the sound go with the power to signify nine things: "The sages have established the sound go in nine things, that is, cardinal region, cattle, land, a beam of light, a word, a diamond, an
316
eye, a haven, and water. " The philosopher for whom "it is the word
(ndman) which illumines the object" should admit that the sound go has been endowed by convention with these different meanings. Then if a given object is signified to the hearer by a certain word, it is indeed vocal sound and nothing else, that signifies it. What advantage is there in supposing the existence of an entity you call "word? "
[2. The Sautrantikas continue:] A word is either produced by the
317 318
voice or revealed by the voice.
a. In the first hypothesis, since voice is vocal sound by nature, any vocal sound whatsoever, even the cry of an animal, would produce a word. If you answer that a word is produced solely through a vocal sound of a certain nature--the articulation of sound, varndtmaka--we would say that this sort of vocal sound which is capable of producing a word would be quite capable of designating an object also.
In the second hypothesis, this same criticism holds by replacing the verb "to produce" with the verb "to manifest. "
b. But it is absurd to suppose that the voice produces a word. In fact, sounds do not exist at the same time? one has, for example,
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r-u-p-a--whereas the word, which you define as a dharma, an entity, cannot arise in parts. Then how can the voice, when it produces a word, produce it? You say that the case is analogous to that of avijnapti (iv. 3d): the last moment of the vijnapti, a corporeal or vocal act, creates avijnapti by reason of its previous moments. But, we would say, if the last moment of the sound of the voice creates the word, it would suffice to understand the last sound in order to attain or comprehend the object.
It is not an evasion to suppose that voice engenders the phoneme (vyanjana), that a phoneme engenders a word, and that a word causes comprehension of objects. In fact, the same objection is present, "The phonemes do not exist at the same time, etc. "
For these same reasons, it is absurd to suppose that the voice manifests a word. [Sounds do not exist at the same time, and a dharma, one entity, such as a word, cannot be mainfested in parts . . . and following].
c. [The hypothesis that "voice" engenders a phoneme--a hy- pothesis that we have previously tolerated--calls moreover for some new remarks]. Experts vainly apply their minds but do not discover a phoneme distinct from the voice. Moreover, the voice neither en- genders nor manifests the phoneme, for the same reasons that allow that the voice neither engenders nor manifests a word. [Since the "voice" is vocal sound by nature, all vocal sound would engender or manifest phonemes. If you reply that phonemes are only engendered or manifested by the vocal sound of a certain nature . . . as above ad 2a2. ]
[3. But the Sarvastivadins may suppose that] a word arises with its object, like the characteristic "arising. " The question of knowing whether it is produced or manifested by the voice, disappears.
In this hypothesis, no present word would designate a past or future thing. Moreover, a father, a mother, or other persons arbitrarily fix the word that is the proper name of a son, etc. : how can you admit that the word, like the characteristic "arising," arises simultaneously with the object? Finally, unconditioned things would not have any name, since they do not arise: a consequence that the Sarvastivadins
? cannot admit.
[4. But the Sarvastivadins are warranted by a text. ] The Blessed
One said, "A stanza (gdthd) depends on words, and a poem depends on 319
stanzas. "
[The Sautrantikas answer that] word (ndman) is a sound (sabda)
upon which persons have come to an agreement that it signifies a 32
certain thing. ? A stanza {gdtha) is a certain arrangement of words: it is in this sense that it, according to the Blessed One, depends on words. To admit an entity in and of itself called pada, is a very superfluous hypothesis. You might as well maintain that there exists, distinct from ants and minds, things in and of themselves termed "a row of ants" or
321
"a succession of minds. " Recognize then that only the phonemes
(aksaras), which are sounds, exist in and of themselves.
The Vaibhasikas admit ndmakdya, padakdya, and vyanjanakdya, as
samskdras disassociated from the mind, for, they say, none of these 322
dharmas serve as a gate of understanding. ***
We ask: (1) to which sphere of existence do the phonemes, words, and phrases belong? (2) Do they belong to living beings (sattvdkhya, i. lOb)? (3) Are they of retribution, of accumulation or of out-flowing (i. 37)? and (4) Are they good, bad, or neutral?
47c-d. They exist in Kamadhatu and Rupadhatu; they belong to
323 living beings; they are out-flowing; and they are neutral.
The phonemes, etc. , belong to two spheres of existence. According
to one opinion, they also exist in Arupyadhatu, but there they are
324 "unpronounceable. "
They belong to living beings, being produced through the efforts of living beings and consisting of articulated sounds (varna), etc. In fact, they belong to the person who speaks, not to the things that they designate.
They are an out-flowing, being produced through sabhdgahetu
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(ii. 52); they are not of retribution, since they proceed from the desire of the person who speaks; they are not of accumulation, since they are not material.
325 They are non-defiled-neutral {anivrtdvydkrta, ii. 28).
##*
We shall briefly explain the characteristics, not as yet mentioned, of the other dharmas disassociated from the mind (ii. 35).
47d-48b. The same for "genre," {sabhdgatd) which is also from retribution, and which belongs to the three spheres of existence.
"The same for," that is to say, like phonemes, words, and phrases, sabhdgatd is of the first two spheres of existence; it belongs to living beings; it is from out-flowing; and it is non-defiled-neutral.
But sabhdgatd is not only from out-flowing: it is also of retribution; it not only belongs to the first two spheres of existence, it also belongs to the third.
326 48b. Possession (prapti) is of two types.
It is of out-flowing and of retribution. 48c. Its characteristics also.
Its characteristics, arising, etc. , are of two types, like possession.
48c-d. The absorptions and non-possession (aprdpti) are of out-flowing.
The two absorptions and non-possession are only out-flowings.
As for their spheres, their relationship with living beings, their moral qualifications (good, etc. ), the explanations have been given above. The characteristics belong to all conditioned things, hence they belong to living beings and to non-living beings. For the dsamjnika and the ayus, see ii. 41d and 45a.
