No More Learning

He came out as the exponent of the views of others, and the
study of his correspondence gives one the impression that, while he
undoubtedly made mistakes, his own opinions, had he dared to assert
them, were in the main more sensible and acute than those which
were dictated from home or pressed upon him by men whom he
trusted, too much in some cases, in India. The dispatch of 25 June,
1836, which was sent to him by the Secret Committee has sometimes
been forgotten, and yet it was the guide of his conduct throughout,
even perhaps when he questioned its wisdom. Attention was first
drawn to it by Sir Auckland Colvin's apologia for his father. "
Dost Muhammad already had a grievance against the English
for countenancing Shuja in 1834. Ranjit Singh, too, the ally of the
English, still kept Peshawar; the wish of the Afghan king to recover
this city is often considered unreasonable, but it was a natural object
of Afghan ambition, and Dost Muhammad had sent a protest on the
subject to Lord William Bentinck. It was no doubt this too which
induced him to send his agent to St Petersburg, whose visit sub-
sequently resulted in the mission of Vitkevich.
It must be remembered that we had an agent named Masson at
Kabul in 1836, though his position was not publicly recognised.
1 Sir Auckland Colvin, John Russell Colvin, p. 86.


## p. 491 (#519) ############################################

BURNES'S MISSION
491
Information that he gave is preserved in the India Office. Dost
Muhammad, however, in May, 1836, sent a formal ietter to Auckland
congratulating him on his arrival, speaking frankly of his difficulties
with the Sikhs, and saying that he would be guided by what Auckland
advised. In reply Auckland said that he hoped that Afghanistan
would be a flourishing and united nation; he mentioned the project
for the navigation of the Indus; and while he spoke of his intention
to send some one to discuss commercial questions at Kabul he asserted
his neutrality as to the Sikh dispute. The idea of a commercial
niission (proposed by the Secret Committee) was not new. Kaye
thinks it was suggested to Lord William Bentinck by Sir John
Malcolm, and in February, 1836, it had been mentioned at Ludhiana.
As long before as 1832 Alexander Burnes, an Indian officer of great
intelligence and enterprise, had made a famous journey through
Afghanistan and Persia, and on his return to India had been sent on
a mission to the amirs of Sind whom he persuaded to agree to a
survey of the Indus. While busy about this matter he was instructed
to undertake the commercial mission to Afghanistan.
In November, 1836, Burnes started from Bombay on his mission.
He passed through Sind and at Dehra Ghazi Khan he heard of the
battle of Jamrud, which made the task of the English more difficult
owing to their relations with Ranjit Singh; Dost Muhammad, as we
know by a letter of 30 January, 1837, had begged for English inter-
vention. Burnes journeyed through the Khaibar and on 20 September,
1837, the mission arrived at Kabul and lodged in the Bala Hissar, a
combination of palace and fortress afterwards to become so famous.
How far the idea of a commercial mission was sincere may be judged
from the correspondence that has come down to us. For instance
Auckland's letter of 6 January, 1838, is purely political, and on 26
July, 1837, Colvin had written to Burnes warning him as regards
ficace between the Sikhs and the Afghans not to enter into any
negotiations which would commit the government after the death of
Ranjit Singh or Dost Muhammad, and he adds in strange contras:
to Auckland's recent letter :
A consolidated and powerful Mahommedan State on our frontier might be
anything rather than safe and useful to us. The existing division of strength
seems far preferable, excepting as it adds to the risk of Herat's being attacked
by Persia.
Auckland's real views are to be found in a letter of 8 February, 1838,
where he favours the then divided state of Central Asia, though he
would like to see Kandahar and Herat on friendly terms. It is only
fair to add that Colvin had written to Burnes on 13 September, 1837,
to the effect that Auckland entirely approved of Burnes determination
1 Kaye, Afghan War, I, 170.
2 Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, 283 (I, 273).


## p. 492 (#520) ############################################

492
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
not to allow Dost Muhammad to play off any other power against
the British.
But Burnes could not get very far. Dost Muhammad was anxious
to recover Peshawar with the aid of the British, and this Auckland
would not hear of; Burnes could only offer help in making peace.
He said that he thought that Ranjit Singh intended to make some
change in the arrangements for the control of the city; that this change
would be the work of Ranjit Singh and not of the British; and that it
would probably take the form of the city being given over to Sultan
Muhammad, Dost Muhammad's brother, to be held under the control
of the Sikhs. But, as he frankly wrote, the Afghan king would as soon
have Peshawar in the hands of the Sikhs as in those of his brother.
What he wished was to hold it himself even if he held it nominally
by paying tribute under Lahore. The British, however, were cer-
tainly not going to support Dost Muhammad as against Ranjit Singh,
and the importance of this attitude when a Russian agent arrived in
December, 1837, can readily be realised. We must not forget Burnes'
opinion expressed in his letter of 26 January, 1838, that Dost Muham-
mad was merely acting on the defensive, and that his views deserved
serious consideration. The whole letter is full of wise foresight.
There was another matter. Mr Moriarty has suggested that it was
as a counterstroke to Russian activity in Teheran that Auckland sent
Burnes to Kabul, and on his way Burnes had written to the British
minister in Persia to the effect that he would try and stop the
intrigues between the Kandahar chieftains and the Russians; he soon
found it necessary to threaten Kohan Dil Khan on the subject. Here
he had the support of Dost Muhammad, who really would have
preferred the British alliance to any other. Burnes showed this in
his letter of 23 December, 1837. 4
As Kohan Dil Khan altered his attitude and grew afraid of the
Persians Burnes hoped for a more friendly relation. So he wrote and
offered British help, to the extent of money at least, in case of attack
by the Persians, who were now, it must be remembered, besieging
Herat. Dost Muhammad was in a difficult position with regard to
Herat. The blood feud prevented his going to the rescue of Kamran,
who on the other hand talked of recovering Afghanistan if he were
successful. The Persians, too, made no secret of regarding Herat as
the first step towards the acquisition of the domain of Nadir Shah.
Burnes also said that in case of need he would go with Dost Muham-
mad to the rescue of Kandahar, and he . sent over Lieutenant Leech
who had accompanied him about the end of December, 1837.
To all this Auckland could not agree, and Macnaghten, on
2 Idem, p. 130.
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, 43.
3
Cam. Hist. For. Pol. 11, 204.
* Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, 99.


## p. 493 (#521) ############################################

BURNES'S FAILURE
493
20 January, 1838, told Burnes so. " He was to get out of his difficụlt
position in the best way he could, and if necessary, he was to tell the
chiefs that he had exceeded his instructions; and Colvin's letter of
the following day explains the position.
In the end it is said that Auckland thought that Burnes was right,
and Hobhouse, it would appear from one of his letters, thought the
same. But the result of the policy of the government of India was to
alienate all parties in Afghanistan. Dost Muhammad said that if
Sultan Muhammad held Peshawar it meant his own ruin, for he
knew that the latter was trying to arrange a combination with Shah
Shuja and the Kandahar chiefs against him. A proposal that was
put forward with the amir's consent that there should be joint rule
on the part of the amir and Sultan Muhammad over Peshawar was
rejected. Peshawar must be left to the Sikhs. And all that Auckland
had to offer in the way of restraining Ranjit Singh from attacking
Afghanistan was regarded as worth little in exchange, as it was, for
a request that Dost Muhammad would promise not to connect
himself with any other state. On 5 March, 1838, a list of demands
from the amir including a promise to protect Kabul and Kandahar
from Persia, the surrender of Peshawar by Ranjit Singh, and the
protection by the British Government of those who might return
there, supposing it were restored to Sultan Muhammad Khan, was
declined by Burnes, and after further fruitless talk Burnes left on
26 April, 1838. 2 This threw the amir into closer relations with the
Russians with whom the Kandahar brothers had agreed on terms
assuring them Ghorian as well as Herat. The Russian envoy even
hoped to open negotiations with Ranjit Singh. But Dost Muhammad
was far from satisfied.
For the moment things looked gloomy, for McNeill had found
the Russian agent, Simonich, too strong for him, and had not been
able to prevent or stop the siege of Herat. Muhammad Shah's expedi-
tion had started with the approval of the sirdars of Kandahar, and
many of the people of Herat, being Shiahs like the Persians, might
have welcomed a change of masters on religious grounds. The ruler,
Kamran Shah, was the last of the Sadozai princes to retain a throne;
but he was old and degraded, and the power was in the hands of the
wazir, Yar Muhammad Khan, one of the vilest wretches in Asia. In
the summer of 1837, then, the forces of the state had to hurry back
from Sistan because it was reported that, far from helping in the
conquest of Kandahar and Kabul for the Sadozais, the Persians were
going to begin by taking Herat for themselves. Ghorian fell into
their hands on 15 November, 1837, and on the 23rd of the same
month the famous siege of Herat began.
Eldred Pottinger, who had been sent by his uncle, the well-known
resident in Sind, was in the city, and by his energetic assistance the
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, 121.
2 For Auckland's account see idem, p. 293 sqq.


## p. 494 (#522) ############################################

494
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
>
defence was maintained for many months. McNeill, the English
envoy, reached the camp on 6 April, 1838, and said that this war was
a violation of the treaty between England and Persia. His mediation
proved useless and the promises from Russia and Kandahar raised
the Persian hopes. McNeill's influence declined, and Herat was all
but taken on 24 June. Meanwhile, on 19 June, a British naval force
appeared before Karrak in the Persian Gulf and landed troops there.
McNeill at once sent word to the shah that the occupation of Herat
by the Persians would be considered as a hostile act by the English.
Colonel Stoddart, who arrived in the Persian camp on 11 August,
1838, bore the message, and the siege was raised, and by 9 September
the Persian army was on its march westward. The Russian agents
had encouraged the shah in this undertaking, but they were duly
disowned, and one of them committed suicide when he reached
St Petersburg. On 20 October, 1838, Count Nesselrode in a dispatch
to Count Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian ambassador in London, dealt
with the Persian question and the English apprehensions as to the
part Russia was playing in the matter. And Palmerston sent a very
characteristic dispatch to him on 20 December, 1838,2 followed by
a note on the whole question, to be presented to Nesselrode by Lord
Clarendon. It has been urged with some force that it was rather
difficult for England to claim the monopoly of intrigue in Central
Asia.
In India there was general unrest. Auckland was worried; he
grumbled that he had to manage affairs which ranged from Canton
to Suez, and though he was a man of peace he made the unfortunate
choice of a strong forward policy. How much the fault lay with
Macnaghten, Torrens and Colvin, whom he chiefly relied upon, will
probably never be settled, but he slowly came to a decision. Though
in 1837 he had written to Metcalfe that he had not a thought of
interfering between the Afghans and the Sikhs, by 12 May, 1838, he
had come to hold very different views. If Persia should succeed before
Herat and advance upon Eastern Afghanistan he thought that there
would be three possible courses open to him : 3
The first to confine our defensive measures to the line of the Indus, and to
leave Afghanistan to its fate; the second to attempt to save Afghanistan by
granting, succour to the existing chiefships of Caubul and Candahar; the third
to permit or to encourage the advance of Ranjit Singh's armies upon Caubul,
under counsel and restriction, and as subsidiary to his advance to organise an
expedition headed by Shah Shooja, such as I have above explained. The first
course would be absolute defeat, and would leave a free opening to Russia and
Persian intrigue upon our frontiers. The second would be only to give power
to those who feel greater animosity against the Sikhs, than they do against the
Persians, and who would probably use against the former the means placed at
their disposal; and the third course, which, in the event of the successful
resistance of Herat would appear to be 'most expedient, would, if the State
were to fall into the hands of the Persians, have yet more to recommend it,
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1839, XI,
501.
? Idem, p. 512. .
3 Kaye, I, 320.


## p. 495 (#523) ############################################

THE TRIPARTITE TREATY
496
and I cannot hesitate to say that the inclination of my opinion is, for the reasons
which will be gathered from this paper, very strongly in favour of it. . . .
With these views, as their dispatches of 24 October and 9 Novem-
ber, 1838, show, the home authorities were in accord, and though there
is little enthusiasm in their letter of 27 October to the governor-
general, they speak of the necessity of his recovering his influence.
Three days later than the date of Auckland's minute, Macnaghten
on proceeding to Lahore received instructions which suggested two
alternative courses as possible. The one was that the Sikhs should
advance on Kabul accompanied by British agents, whilst a demonstra-
tion should be made by a division of the British army occupying
Shikarpur with the Shah Shuja in their company; the British Gov-
ernment advancing him money and lending him officers. The other
was that the maharaja should take his own course against Dost
Muhammad, only using Shah Shuja if success seemed certain, and if
Shah Shuja was agreeable. The governor-general thought the former
plan the more efficient, but the second the simpler, and on the whole.
the more expedient.
There was a good deal of reconsideration, but in the end Ranjit
Singh seems to have got the better of Macnaghten. He agreed to
recognise the independence of the amirs of Sind, and withdrew his
claim to Shikarpur on receiving a money compensation. The inde-
pendence of Herat as a principle was also agreed to. But he clearly
showed that as to Afghanistan he wished to act with the British
Government and not independently. But while it seems clear that
.
Auckland had never contemplated taking the leading part in the
proceedings which were to fcllow, it is equally clear that Ranjit Singh
gradually forted him to do so; thus the Sikh secured the greatest
advantage from the bargain. We do not know all that Macnaghten
did say, but he gave it to be understood that the English would in
certain circumstances advance with their own troops in support cf
Shah Shuja. The point is a very delicate one, but it seems that
Macnaghten told Ranjit Singh, not that if Ranjit Singh would not
co-operate with Shah Shuja the English would restore him then-
selves, but that they might find it necessary to do so. This brought
Ranjit Singh round, and when he ceased to press for Jallalabad,
which he did not really want, the way was open for the famous
"Tripartite. Treaty", signed by the maharaja on 26 June, 1838. "
This treaty, which was a new and enlarged version of that made
between Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja in 1833, confirmed the maha-
raja in the possessions which he held on the banks of the Indus wi.
their dependencies, thus assuring to him Kashmir, Peshawar, Bannu,
Dehra Ismail Khan, Dehra Ghazi Khan, and Multan No one was
to cross the Indus or the Satlej without the maharaj $ permission.
As to Shikarpur and the Sind territory lying on the right bank of the
$
112 May, 1838.
2 Aitchison, op. cit. VIII, 154.


## p. 496 (#524) ############################################

496
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
Indus, Shah Shuja would agree to what might be determined between
the maharaja and the British. Should the maharaja require any of
the shah's troops to carry out the object of the treaty they were to
be sent, and in the same way Muhammadan troops were to be sent
by the maharaja as far as Kabul. The shah was to give up all claim
on Sindh, which was to belong to the amirs for ever, on such money
payment being made by the amirs as should be decided by the British
and handed over to the maharaja. Payment was to be made by the
shah to the maharaja of two lakhs a year under the guarantee of the
British Government in return for the assistance furnished. When the
shah should have established his authority in Afghanistan he would
not molest his nephew in Herat. The shah bound himself and his
successors not to enter into any negotiations with any foreign state
without the consent of the British and the Sikh governments.
Such was the treaty Auckland before signing it sent it to Shah
Shuja at Ludhiana by the hands of Macnaghten, Wade and Mackeson,
who arrived there on 15 July, 1838. The shah objected to various
articles. He secured, however, various assurances from the British
Government, and on 17 July, 1838, the mission left Ludhiana with
the signed treaty.
Kaye has pointed out that there were three different ideas as to
the projected invasion. Auckland originally wished it to be under-
taken by the Sikhs, aided perhaps by some Afghan levies. Even in the
negotiations with Shah Shuja the project only took the form of an
alliance which the British guaranteed, Shah Shuja, and the Sikhs
each marching into the country his own way. And Shah Shuja
evidently thought that he would take the leading part himself. But
when the matter was finally deliberated at Simla, it was settled,
possibly against the better judgment of Auckland, that the British
should do the work. There was to be a great army employed and it
was to be the force that would set Shah Shuja on the throne. Probably
Macnaghten knew that the maharaja wished to do as little as possible
in the matter; Auckland did not want to displease the maharaja.
We do not know what Burnes advised. He joined Macnaghten at
Lahore when it was too late to oppose the policy of the treaty, and
he certainly told Ranjit Singh that the restoration of Shah Shuja
would be to his advantage. His real opinion is probably to be found
in his well-known letter of 2 June, 1838 :
It remains to be reconsidered why we cannot act with Dost Mahomed.
He is a man of undoubted ability, and has at heart high opinions of the British
nation; and if half you must do for others were done for him, and offers made
which he could see conduced to his interests, he would abandon Persia and
Russia tomorrow. It may be said that that opportunity has been given to him;
but I would rather discuss this in person. with you, for I think there is much
to be said for him. Government have admitted that at best he had but a
hoice of difficulties; and it should not be forgotten that we promised nothing,
and Persia and Russia held out a great deal. 1
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, 251.


## p. 497 (#525) ############################################

THE ARMY OF THE INDUS
497
And on 22 July he wrote to his brother, "I am not sorry to see Dost
Mahomed ousted by another hand than mine". He was not like Wade
in favour of a turbulent Afghanistan where tribe. constantly fought
with tribe :
"Divide et iinpera”, he wrote, “is a temporising creed at any time; and if
the Afghans are united, we and they bid defiance to Persia, and instead of
distant relations we have everything under our eye, and a steadily progressing
influence all along the Indus. ”
Sir Henry Fane, the commander-in-chief, had given very sensible
advice in 1837 :
Every advance you might make beyond the Sutlej to the Westward in my
opinion adds to your military weakness. . . . If you want your Empire to expand,
expand it over Oudh or over Gwalior, and the remains of the Mahratta Empire.
Make yourselves completely sovereigns of all within your bounds. But let
alone the far West.
The selection of Shah Shuja overlooked the claims of Kamran
Shah and made it certain that if Afghanistan was to be a buffer state
of any value we should have to help in reducing Herat also. And
there were not wanting far-seeing critics who realised that active
interference in Afghanistan must necessarily involve the taking of the
Punjab, at all events on the death of Ranjit Singh if not earlier.
However, the decision was taken; it was justified to the directors in
the dispatch of 13 August; and orders were issued for the assembling
of a great army to march upon Kandahar in the ensuing cold weather.
Auckland's frame of mind may be judged from his letter to Hobhouse
of 23 August, 1838 :
I am sensible that my trans-Indus arrangements are in many points open
to objection but I had no time to pause, there was no choice but between them
and the more objectionable danger of remaining passive and a friendly power
and intimate connection in Afghanistan, a peaceful alliance with Lahore and
an established influence in Sinde are objects for which some hazard may well
be ruin.
In the important letter of 13 August, 1838, Auckland gives a long
and clear account of the negotiations with Ranjit Singh. ”
The army of the Indus, which was to rendezvous at Karnal, was
to consist of a brigade of artillery, a brigade of cavalry, and five
brigades of infantry. It was to assemble under Sir Henry Fane with
whom were to serve many officers of great distinction. Another army
under Sir John Keane was to proceed via Bombay and Sind. The
shah's army was being raised at Ludhiana, and it was rapidly losing
its importance. The Sikh force was to move by Peshawar. Mac-
naghten, an unfortunate choice, was the political officer, and under
him, not wholly to his own satisfaction, was Burnes, who now went
away to arrange for the passage of troops through Sind, for the main
army as well as that from Bombay was to go that way. It ought to
1 Brit, Mus. Add. MSS, 37694, f. 21.
2 Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, 294.
32


## p. 498 (#526) ############################################

498
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
be remembered that Macnaghten wished Pottinger to be appointed
and only accepted the post himself under pressure.
On 1 October, 1838, the governor-general issued from Simla a
long manifesto dealing with the origin and causes of the war and the
policy of the British Government in regard to the whole business.
It was a clever attempt to justify the action of the government, but
it was open to serious criticism. Its greatest fault was that it made
out no sort of case for attacking Dost Muhammad and did not do
justice to the difficult position in which that ruler was placed. Perfect
frankness would have been better, and Auckland seems to have felt
this as he says to Hobhouse (13 October, 1838) in writing about the
manifesto:
It will be for others to judge of my case and I will say nothing of it except'
that I could have made it stronger if I had not had the fear of Downing Street
before my eyes, and thought it right to avoid any direct allusion to Russia.
But I have no want of sufficient grounds of quarrel with Persia, etc. . . . 1
But however ill-advised Auckland may have been, he was carrying
out, in part at least, the wishes of the home authorities. His letters to
them (e. g. that to the Secret Committee in August, 1838) were
perfectly clear, and they evidently approved of what he was doing;
not, however, without reflections and comments which have hardly
perhaps received sufficient attention. Their letter of 10 May, 1838,
was not quite decisive; 2 the dispatch quoted by Sir Auckland Colvin
of 24 October, 1838, sanctions indeed armed intervention but seems
to see possibilities of avoiding it. Their memorandum of 27 October,
1838, where they lay down general conditions, ought to be carefully
studied. There were many outspoken critics. Elphinstone and Sir
Henry Willock pointed out the difficulties of distance and climate,
and the unwisdom of employing Sikhs whom the Afghans hated and
feared, and then asked how, even if Shah Shuja got the throne, he
could keep it. Hobhouse minuted on Willock's letter that its details
were founded on presumption and that he did not think much of it.
The Duke of Wellington, however, said that the consequences of the
advance into Afghanistan would be a "perennial march into that
country".
The directors of the East India Company woulá no doubt
have been glad to have been out of the business,4 but they, and most
Englishmen who thought about the matter, looked at it as a question
of Central Asian policy, and they were under an entirely false im-
pression as to the power of Russia and Persia to injure British interests
in the East. It has been said that Auckland's council formally
disclaimed responsibility for the manifesto, but the evidence against
such a protest is strongly martialled by Sir Auckland Colvin, and
the probability seems to be that most of them agreed with him.
A more serious point is that the siege of Herat was abandoned nearly
1 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 37694, f. 69, verso.
2 Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, 292 8 Colvin, op. cit. p. 124.
4 Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, 267. 5 Colvin, op. cit. p. 122.
5


## p. 499 (#527) ############################################

HOME POLICY
499
a month before the manifesto appeared. Auckland did not know this
at the time, but when the knowledge came, and one of the chief
reasons for the expedition had vanished, there was time to have
abandoned it. This course strangely enough, considering what we
know of his character, Auckland decided not to adopt, and by a
proclamation (8 November, 1838), in which the raising of the siege
was announced, he declared that he would continue to prosecute with
vigour
the measures which have been announced, with a view to the substitution of
a friendly for a hostile power in the Eastern provinces --of Afghanistan, and of
the establishment of a permanent barrier against schemes of aggression against
the North West Frontier.
In the same sense on 9 February, 1839, he writes to Hobhouse.
Those at the India House were not without misgivings, but public
opinion at home, and to some extent in India, was misled by the
issue of the dishonest blue book in 1839, known as "the garbled
dispatches". This gave an entirely false impression of the views of
both Dost. Muhammad and of Burnes. No defence worth considering
has ever been offered of such an extraordinary performance. The
Thaïveté with which Broughton condemns the “rascality of the Burnes
family in trying to correct the impression made by the government's
own action is almost as incredible as his and Palmerston's denials of
garbling in the House of Commons. A revised edition of the letters
was published in 1859, long after the exposure.
By this time the great expedition was well under weigh. At the
end of November, 1838, the army of the Indus was assembling at
Firozpur where a meeting took place between the governor-general
and Ranjit Singh. Owing to the retreat of the Persians the force
was somewhat reduced, and Sir Henry Fane, who was old and ill,
decided to retire from the command, his place being taken by Sir
John Keane from Bombay. The Bengal column now consisted of some
9500 men of all arms; Shah Shuja's contingent numbered about
6000; the Bombay column would add another 5600. It had been
decided for political reasons (Ranjit Singh did not wish it to traverse
the Panjab) that the march of the force from Firozpur should be by
way of Bahawalpur and Sind, the amirs not having been behaving too
well from Auckland's point of view. Burns, as has been seen, had
gone ahead, and it appears from his correspondence that it had
been already decided to annex Bukkur where the Indus was to be
crossed. The route then to be followed was by Shikarpur and Dadur
to Bolan Pass and so via Quetta to Kandahar. A large money claim
was also to be made upon the amirs, though this claim had been
long abandoned; and it must be remembered that a promise had been
given that no military stores should be conveyed along the Indus.
1Cf. C[abell]'s minute, 14 February, 1839 (Hobhouse MSS); Vernon Smith
to Melvill, 13 April, 1839 (India Office); and Lord Broughton to Fox Maule
(Hobhouse MSS), Cf. Hansard, CLXI, 38 sqq.


## p. 500 (#528) ############################################

500
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
But Auckland treated the situation as a new one, and threatened the
amirs that serious consequences wou! d follow if they did not co-
operate. This course of proceeding can hardly be defended, and
Colonel Pottinger, the resident at Hyderabad, said that we were in
the wrong, and that the communications with Persia alleged on the
part of one of the amirs hardly justified our action. Burnes secured
unwilling co-operation in Upper Sind, but the Talpur amirs were
very reasonably alarmed at the restoration of Shah Shuja, and at the
passage of troops through their territory, largely at their expense.
However, the great force managed to enter Sind on 14 January,
1839. Burnes had obtained Bukkur, and thus the passage of the Indus,
for as long as was necessary. And meanwhile Keane had landed at
Vikkur at the end of November, and after long delays was marching
up the bank of the Indus; his men grumbling that they were treated
as though they were in an enemy's country. Further delay occurred
while the question of the aititude of the amirs was settled at Hydera-
bad, and the Bengal column could not advance because Sir Willoughby
Cotton came down the Indus with unnecessary reinforcements for
Sir Jonn Keane. Macnaghten, who was with Shah Shuja, was much
annoyed and naturally asked as February advanced what was to
become of the expedition when it got to Afghanistan. However, the
amirs gave way, Cotton returned on 20 February, and four days later
the march to Kandahar began; without, however, the shah's contingent,
which remained behind for lack of transport.
In spite of great difficulties as to provisions and much loss of
transport, Sir Willoughby Cotton pushed on at a fair pace. On 16
March he entered the Bolan Pass and on the 26th after considerable
suffering his force reached Quetta. Rations had to be reduced, and
Burnes was sent off to the khan of Kalat who signed a treaty in
return for a subsidy, promised help in the way of supplies and trans-
port, recognised Shah Shuja, and gave Burnes plenty of good advice
which came too late to be of any practical use.
Keane, the shah, and the Bombay army were moving througlı
Sind under great difficulties. The advance of the columns had caused
great dissatisfaction and the Balochis complained bitterly of the
damage to their crops. By 4 April the force was near Quetta. Fron
Cotton they heard nothing but the most dismal forebodings, as well
they might, for his men were on quarter rations, and he saw, what
Macnaghten refused to see, that Shah Shuja was not likely to be
popular amongst his own people. On 6 April, 1839, Sir John Keane
took over the command of the expedition at Quetta and wisely decided
to push on the next day. Macnaghten thought that we ought to
punish the khan of Kalat by annexing Shal, Mastung and Kachhi tu
Shah Shuja's dominions; his letter is almost comic in its fury :
The Khan of Khelat is our implacable enemy, and Sir John Keane is burn-
ing with revenge. There never was such treatment inflicted on human beings
as we have been subjected to on our progress through the Khan's country


## p. 501 (#529) ############################################

STORM OF GHAZNI
501
a
.
Meanwhile the Barakzai sardars in Kandahar were giving up the
game. When the expedition with the shah at its head entered
Afghan territory they fled from the city, and the money Macnaghten
expended did the rest. On 25 April, 1939, Shah Shuja entered Kan-
dahar. In a letter, written a month later (25 May, 1839) to Hobhouse,
Auckland describes the scene and reviews the situation from a
defensive point of view. 1.
Once in Kandahar the task of the British was but commenced.
Shah Shuja was not popular, and his character was not such as to
win men to his side. The Afghans displayed curiosity but little more,
and the fact that their new ruler came in with English aid, and
obviously under English control, prevented them from regarding his
arrival even as a party, much less as a national, triumph. The
Barakzai sardars were far away across the Helmund, but, as Dost
Muhammad had yet to be conquered, Shah Shuja did his best to
conciliate the Durani leaders who might be expected to give him
their support. Dost Muhammad, seeing that the army paused in
Kandahar, thought it was going against Herat, and therefore sent
his son Akbar Khan against Shah Shuja's sor. Taimur, who was
advancing with Captain Wade by way of Jallalabad. Things were in
a bad way certainly at Herat, where Eldred Pottinger was continually
obstructed and even insulted by the adherents of Yar Muhammad
Wazir. But for the moment Macnaghten had no idea of doir. g more
than send a mission to Shah Kamran, and Major Todd left Kandahar
on that errand on 21 June, 1839, reaching Herat about a month later.
On 27 June, 1839, the army, considerably thinned by sickness and
other misadventures, set out for Ghazni which was reached on 21
July. The heavy guns had strangely enough been left behind but,
seemingly by treachery, a weak point was discovered, the Kabul gate
was blown up, and the fortress hitherto regarded as invulnerable
was taken by storm. It was a notable feat and the naines of Dennie,
Thomson, Durand, Macleod, and Peat will live in connection with
it. 2 Sale was cut down in the great struggle at the gate but managed
to escape with his life. Haidar Khan, the son of Dost Muhammad,
who was in command of the fortress, was captured, and the amir's
brother, the Nawab Jabbar Khan, then came to try and make terms.
A remark he made might well serve as a commentary on the tragedy
that was to follow :
"If”, he said, "Shah Shuja is really a king, and come to the kingdom of his
ancestors, what is the use of your army and name? You have brought him by
your money and arms into Afghanistan, leave him now with us Afghans, and
let him rule us if he can. "
Negotiation was fruitless and Dost Muhammad marched out to meet
the invaders. Finding, however, that he could not rely, upon his
1 Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 37696, f. 31.
2 M. M. Durand, Life of Sir Henry Durand, 1, 52.


## p. 502 (#530) ############################################

502
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
troops, after a last despairing and not ignoble appeal, he rode away
from Arghandab to the country near the Hindu Kush. This was on
2 August, 1839; on the 7th Shah Shuja entered the capital, and the
Barakzai monarchy for the time had perished. The arrival on 3
September of Prince Taimur and the Sikh contingent who had come
througi the Khaibar seemed to complete the triumph. Those chiefly
concerned were duly rewarded, Auckland being made an earl, Sir
John Keane a baron, and Macnaghten a baronet; these amongst
others. Burnes who had already been knighted was annoyed that
no further honour came to him, and it took all Auckland's tact to
comfort him.
Auckland's minute of 20 August, 1839, made it certain that a
considerable force was to be left in Afghanistan, and what was finally
decided upon was larger than what had at first been thought suffi-
cient. It had become abundantly clear that though the Afghanistan
to which Shah Shuja returned was much smaller than that over
which his father had ruled, it was larger than he could manage
unaided. So though the Bombay column left on 18 September, nearly
all the Bengal troops under Sir Willoughby Cotton remained. Keane
returned with those of the Bengal force who were not required. The
main garrisons were at Kabul, Jallalabad, Ghazni and Kandahar,
but the forces were too widely scattered. A detachment followed
Dost Muhammad, and occupied Bamiyan in the hope of his appearing
there.
The country was distracted, the ministers were worthless, and
the native army which was to support the throne and to which Auck-
land looked with almost pathetic hope and eagerness proved equally
unsatisfactory. So that a double system of government, Afghan and
English, was inevitable. The natural result, the only possible result,
was constant sporadic insurrection, or looting that might become
such, at any turn of events. The road to India through the Khaibar
was never safe, and communication that way was only kept up by
force and hribery. Kalat was taken by General Willshire on 13
November, 1839, as he was marching home, because the English terms
were not accepted. The khan himself, Mihrab, was killed and the new
khan Shah Nawaz, who was set up in his place was anything but
popular, the less so as the provinces of Shal, Mastung and Kachhi
were now handed over to Afghanistan. It may be doubted whether
these proceedings were wise, and it seems certain that they were
unjust
The news now began to filter through of a Russian expedition
under General Peroffsky from Orenburg into Central Asia and parti-
cularly against Khiva. The provocation was the slave trade in Russian
subjects which, there, as at Herat, was actively carried on and had
been so for over a hundred years; this and the constant plundering of
caravans. If proof were needed of the general nervousness as to
Russia, it could be found in a letter from Burnes written in November.
a


## p. 503 (#531) ############################################

THE RUSSIAN EXPEDITION
503
1839. He writes : "Ere 1840 ends, I predict that our frontiers and
those of Russia will touch-that is, the states dependent upon either
of us will—and that is the same thing". Kaye has shown the diffi-
culties of this winter--the Russian scare; trouble at Herat; trouble
with the Uzbegs; trouble in Bokhara where Colonel Stoddart, the
Resident, had been imprisoned under the most humiliating conditions,
and where Dost Muhammad had now found at once a refuge and
a prison; troubles in Kandahar, in Kohistan, and at Kalat; trouble
with the Sikhs who were ceaselessly intriguing with the disturbing
elements in Afghanistan. The tendency in all such cases is to try and
crush the symptoms rather than eradicate the causes of the mischief.
The English officials thought only of expeditions, and Macnaghten
planned one to the Hindu Kush. It is only fair to Auckland to say
that he consistently resisted. all such proposals, and a letter written
by him to Macnaghten on 22 March, 1840, shows what his views
were; 1 there are others of the same nature.
The wisdom of his attitude was shown when, about the middle of
March, 1840, the failure of the Russian expedition was announced.
Auckland had made proper preparations, and he was far from being
blind to the seriousness of the situation, had Russia obtained a hold
on Khiva and still more on Bokhara. But it must be recalled that the
difficulties of the Afghan position had been increased rather than
diminished by the death of Ranjit Singh (27 June, 1839) and the
confusion in the Lahore state which followed it. The matter is alluded
to by Lord Auckland in a letter of 11 May, 1840, to Hobhouse. It
was even suggested that various Sikh magnates were engaged in
treasonable intrigues with various rebels in Afghanistan, and there
is no doubt that the Khalsa and the heir to the throne, Nao Nihal
Singh, were strongly opposed to the passage of British troops through
the Panjab, at which, considering the language of Macnaghten, one
can hardly be surprised. Colvin had written to William Butterworth
Bayley on 23 January, 1840 :
There never was a time when the Sikh Durbar was more dependent upon
us than at present. They are conscious of their many dissensions and real
weakness and are, I imagine, surprised and in some measure distrustful at our
self-denial in taking no advantage of them. A serious quarrel with us at the
present time on the part of the Sikhs I look upon as an impossible thing. 3
With this may be compared his letter to Macnaghten on the following
13 June, which is impressive in its seriousness. There was soon to be
plenty of proof of the correctness of Colvin's suspicions.
The position at Herat was what might have been expected. Major
Todd and his associates did their best to put down the slave trade
there, and Captain Abbot was sent to Khiva with the same end in
view. The latter arranged a treaty which was disavowed, but his
successor, Captain Shakespeare, managed to get 400 Russian slaves
Brit. Mus. Add. MSS, 37698, f. 89, verso.
2 Idem, 37699, f. 76, verso.
3 Idem, 37698, f. 6.


## p. 504 (#532) ############################################

504
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
set free. Much money was advanced to the ruler of Herat, but he
was far from loyal, and Macnaghten would have annexed the little
state to Afghanistan and Auckland, who was supported by the com-
mander-in-chief, Sir Jasper Nicolls; agreed. Major Todd we learn
afterwards came round to the same view.
The Ghilzais gave constant trouble; their chiefs had taken refuge
during the winter of 1839 in Peshawar, but, when the warm weather
came, they were in arms again between Kandahar and Kabul, and
took a good deal of repressing. There was failure in Kalat, which,
the same summer, was recaptured by Nasir Khan, the son of the
chief who fell when the British took the place. And when later he
was driven out he was not conquered. Quetta was besieged; and
everywhere there were indications that Shah Shuja inspired no sort
of fear or respect. Yet strangely enough Macnaghten wrote to Colvin :
"I have nothing more to say about His Majesty's character than I
have already said. I believe him to be the best and ablest man in
his Kingdom". Auckland in one of his letters to Hobhouse, when
speaking of the suppression of the Ghilzais, throws a little light on
the causes of the trouble :
But the business was ill and discreditably done. Blunders were made and
harshnesses committed. Our officers quarrelled with, and as is too often the
case counteracted, each other, and what as it appeared to me might have been
a business of ease and graciousness, has been very much the reverse.
Macnaghten could not prevail upon the Indian Government to
go to war with the Sikhs or to annex Herat, but he continued to
dream of the further extension of British influence in Central Asia.
In September, 1840, he sent Captain Arthur Conolly--something of a
visionary but a very gallant one-on a mission to Khiva and Kokand.
He subsequently proceeded to Bokhara where he and Colonel Stoddart
were cruelly murdered.
The brightest circumstance of this uncomfortable summer was
the assurance given by Russia that there would be no further attack
on Khiva. And equally important perhaps was the surrender of Dost
Muhammad. In July, 1840, the Nawab Jabbar Khan gave himself
up to the small force stationed at Bamiyan. Dost Muhammad, having
escaped with some difficulty, had taken refuge with his old ally the
wali of Khuium. He soon had a considerable force under him and
drove back the British outposts, a most distressing feature of the
business being the desertion to the enemy of some of the new national
levies raised to support Shah Shuja. There was evidence, as Torrens
wrote to the Resident at Lahore on 1 October, that the Sikhs were
not altogether neutral in the matter, and the government of India
promised considerable reinforcements as soon as possible. Macnaghten
still thought the remedy to be a forward policy, and characterised
as "drivelling" Auckland's sensible suggestion that we could hardly
expect co-operation from potentates whose territory we were always
talking of annexing.
1


## p. 505 (#533) ############################################

SURRENDER OF DOST MUHAMMAD
505
On 18 September, 1840, however, Brigadier Dennie defeated the.
forces under Dost Muhammad and the wali of Khulum: near Bamiyan,
and though Dost Muhammad and his son, Afzal Khan, escaped, the
wali came to terms on the 28th and promised not to give refuge or.
help to the ex-amir or any member of his family. Dost Muhammad,
Therefore, fled to Kohistan, where he was followed by Sale and
Burnes. There was some hard fighting in which Edward. Conolly,
Lord and others were killed, but Dost Muhammad, after winning an.
important if small success at Parwandurrah on 2 November, 1840,
galloped to Kabul and gave himself up to. Macnaghten. He was
treated honourably and taken to India.
The few months that followed were restless. Macnaghten was still
anxious for movement and for the break-up of the Tripartite Treaty,
to which Auckland, though he had Hobhouse against him, would not
consent. As he once said to the chairman of the East India Company,
the country was one of clans and tribes, and there was war and
lawlessness in one district whilst there was peace and contentment.
in another. The Ghilzais were seldom quiet, and the Duranis about
Kandahar strongly resented taxation. Shah Shuja showed no signs
of becoming either a capable or a popular rụler, and the cost of
Afghanistan to the Indian Government was becoming unbearably
great. Todd could no longer put up with the demands of Yar
Muhammad at Herat and broke up the mission there in February,
1841; but this could not draw Auckland into an attack upon the little
state, though it produced a very bad impression both in India and
in England. Expeditions quelled the Duranis and the Ghilzais, but
only for a time.
Thus the situation as 1841 wore on was critical: No proper system
of government had been established. The native army was unreliable.
and the only form of executive action, that of the tax-gatherer
increased the tension. The English were the only real authority and
they practically retained their hold by force and by the distribution
of money amongst the chiefs. Macnaghten was now appointed gover-
nor of Bombay and Burnes was designated his successor. The forces
were under the command of General Elphinstone, who in April, 1841,.
succeeded Cotton, and his appointment, made against his own wishes,
constitutes one of the most serious mistakes that Auckland committed. .
In a position requiring above all things activity and physical energy;
was placed an elderly invalid, personally brave, but, as he himself
stated, hardly able to walk. Nott, a man of will and resources, if of
strong temper, would have been a better choice. But those who spoke
of the dangers of the situation, like Brigadier Roberts, had no chance
of promotion. There were no doubt many men in the various garrisons
of talent as well as courage. All they required was capable leading,
and that they never got. There was another mistand. The troops
at Kabul had now been moved to the ill-constructed and ill-fortified
cantonments outside the city next to the mission compound but very


## p. 506 (#534) ############################################

516
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
badly placed; whilst the commissariat stores were placed separately
and some distance away. It has always been maintained that the
placing of the troops in this wretched position instead of in the Bala
Hissar was the chief cause of the subsequent disaster, and for that
Cotton, and to some extent Macnaghten, must bear the blame.
As has been indicated one great difficulty was obviously finance.
Afghanistan was going to cost at the lowest estimate a million and
a quarter a year, and the views of the home authorities on the subject
reached India early in 1841. They were beginning to feel that Shah
Shuja was not worth the money he cost.