Fabius, to
direct him to take his legion into the territory of the Atrebates, which
Cæsar would cross, and where their junction was to be effected.
direct him to take his legion into the territory of the Atrebates, which
Cæsar would cross, and where their junction was to be effected.
Napoleon - History of Julius Caesar - b
or otherwise, if we
consider that the reflux begins there about four hours and a half after
the hour of high tide at Dover,[417] what day of the month of July in
the year 700 it was high tide at Dover towards half-past eleven o’clock
at night?
By following a train of reasoning similar to that which we applied to
determine the day of Cæsar’s first landing in Britain, and remarking
that the tides of the days preceding the full moon of the month of July,
700, which fell on the 21st, correspond to those of the days which
preceded the full moon of the 26th of July, 1858, we find that it was
either fifteen days or one day before the 21st of July of the year 700,
that is, the 6th or the 20th of July, that it was high tide at Dover
towards half-past eleven at night. Cæsar, therefore, landed on the 7th
or on the 21st of July. We adopt the second date, because, according to
Cicero’s letter cited above, he received, before the 26th of July, at
Rome news of his brother, which must have been of the 6th of the same
month, as the couriers were twenty days on the road. In this letter
Quintus announced his approaching departure for Britain.
This date, according to which the Roman army would have landed on the
eve of the day of the full moon, is the more probable, as Cæsar,
immediately on his arrival in Britain, made a night march, which would
have been impossible in complete darkness. The passage of the sea had
taken fifteen hours. In the return, it only took nine hours, since
Cæsar started at nine o’clock in the evening (_secunda inita cum
solvisset vigilia_), and arrived at Boulogne at daybreak (_prima luce_),
which, in the middle of September, is at six o’clock in the
morning. [418]
The date of his return is nearly fixed by a letter of Cicero, who
expresses himself thus: “On the 11th of the Calends of November (17th of
October), I received letters from my brother Quintus, and from Cæsar;
the expedition was finished, and the hostages delivered. They had made
no booty. They had only imposed contributions. The letters, written from
the shores of Britain, are dated on the 6th of the Calends of October
(21st of September), at the moment of embarking the army, which they are
bringing back. ”[419] This information accords with the date of the
equinox, which fell on the 26th of September, and which, according to
the “Commentaries,” was close at hand (_quod equinoctium suberat_).
Cæsar had, then, remained in Britain about sixty days.
[Sidenote: Presumed Dates of the Second Campaign in Britain. ]
X. Departure of Cæsar from Lodi[420] May 22.
Arrival at the army, in the
country of the Belgæ (in
12 days) June 2.
Inspection of the fleet and of the winter
quarters; junction of the four legions
in the country of the Remi, on the
Meuse, towards Sedan. From June 2 to June 7.
Passage from Sedan to the country of
the Treviri (80 kilometres, 3 days),
From June 8 to June 10.
Occurrences among the Treviri,
From June 10 to June 15.
Passage from Treviri to Boulogne (330
kil. , 12 days) From June 15 to June 26.
Delay of 25 days at Boulogne,
From June 26 to July 20.
Embarkment July 20.
Landing July 21.
Combat July 22.
Cæsar returns to his fleet July 23.
Ten days of reparations, From July 24 to August 2.
New march against the Britons August 3.
Combat August 4.
March towards the Thames (from the
Little Stour to Sunbury, 140 kilomètres)
From August 5 to August 11.
March from the Thames to the _oppidum_
of Cassivellaunus, From August 12 to August 15.
Time employed in negotiations and receiving
hostages (8 days),
From August 16 to August 23.
Return of Cæsar (in person) towards
the sea-coast. The 28th of August,
on his arrival at the fleet, he writes
to Cicero. --(_Epist. ad Quintum_, III.
1. ) August 28.
March of his army to the coast,
From August 24 to Sept. 10.
Embarkation of the last convoy Sept. 21.
[Sidenote: Distribution of the Legions in their Winter Quarters. ]
XI. Cæsar had no sooner arrived on the continent than he caused his
ships to be brought on ground, and then held at Samarobriva, (_Amiens_)
the assembly of Gaul. The defective harvest, caused by the dryness of
the season, obliged him to distribute his winter quarters differently
from the preceding years, by spreading them over a greater extent. [421]
The number of his legions was eight and a half, because, independent of
the eight legions brought together at Boulogne before the departure for
Britain, he had no doubt formed five cohorts of soldiers and sailors
employed on his fleet. The troops were distributed in the following
manner: he sent one legion into the country of the Morini (_to Saint
Pol_), under the orders of C. Fabius; another to the Nervii (_at
Charleroy_), with Quintus Cicero;[422] a third to the Essuvii (_at Sées,
in Normandy_), under the command of L. Roscius; a fourth, under T.
Labienus, to the country of the Remi, near the frontier of the Treviri
(_at Lavacherie, on the Ourthe_). [423] He placed three in Belgium,[424]
one at Samarobriva itself (_Amiens_), under the orders of Trebonius; the
second in the country of the Bellovaci, under M. Crassus, his questor,
at twenty-five miles from Amiens (_Montdidier_); the third under L.
Munatius Plancus, near the confluence of the Oise and the Aisne (_at
Champlieu_). The legion last raised[425] among the Transpadans repaired
with five cohorts, under the orders of Titurius Sabinus and Aurunculeius
Cotta, to the Eburones, whose country, situated in great part between
the Meuse and the Rhine, was governed by Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. It
occupied a fortress named Aduatuca (_Tongres_). [426] This distribution
of the army appeared to Cæsar a more easy manner to supply it with
provisions. Moreover, these different winter quarters, with the
exception of that of M. Roscius, who occupied the most peaceable part of
Gaul, were all included within a circle of a hundred miles radius (148
kil. ). It was Cæsar’s intention not to leave them until he knew that the
legions were firmly established and their quarters fortified. (_See
Plate 14_, the sites of the winter quarters. )
There was among the Carnutes (_country of Chartres_) a man of high
birth, named Tasgetius, whose ancestors had reigned over that nation. In
consideration of his valour and of his important military services,
Cæsar had replaced him, during three years, in the rank held by his
forefather, when his enemies publicly massacred him. The men who had
participated in this crime were so numerous, that there was reason for
fearing that the revolt would spread over the whole country. To prevent
it, Cæsar despatched in the greatest haste L. Plancus at the head of his
legion, with orders to establish his quarters in the country of the
Carnutes, and to send him the accomplices in the murder of
Tasgetius. [427]
[Sidenote: Defeat of Sabinus at Aduatuca. ]
XII. He received at the same period (the end of October), from the
lieutenants and the questor, the news that the legions had arrived and
retrenched in their quarters. They had indeed been established in them
about a fortnight, when suddenly a revolt took place at the instigation
of Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. These chiefs had at first repaired to the
limits of their territory to meet Sabinus and Cotta, and had even
furnished them with provisions; but soon after, urged on by the Treviran
Indutiomaras, they raise the country, fall unexpectedly on the soldiers
occupied in seeking wood, and attack the camp of Sabinus with
considerable forces. Immediately the Romans run to arms and mount on the
_vallum_. The Spanish cavalry makes a successful sortie, and the enemies
retire, deceived in their hope of carrying the retrenchments by storm.
Having then recourse to stratagem, they utter, according to their
custom, loud cries, and demand to enter into negotiations and deliberate
on their common interests, C. Arpineius, a Roman knight and the friend
of Sabinus, and the Spaniard Q. Junius, who had been employed on several
missions to Ambiorix, were sent to them. Ambiorix declared that he had
not forgotten the numerous benefits he had received from Cæsar, but that
he was forced to follow the movement of Gaul, which had conspired in a
common effort to recover its liberty. That very day, according to his
statement, the various quarters were to be attacked at the same time, so
as to hinder them from lending each other mutual succour; the Germans
had passed the Rhine, and would arrive in two days; Sabinus had no
other chance of safety but by abandoning his camp and rejoining Cicero
or Labienus, who were at a distance of fifty miles. In the end, Ambiorix
promised under an oath to give him a free passage. The envoys reported
to Sabinus and Cotta what they had heard. Troubled at this news, and the
more disposed to put faith in it because it was hardly credible that so
small a people as the Eburones would have dared alone to brave the Roman
power, the two lieutenants submitted the affair to a council of war: it
became the subject of warm disputes. Cotta, and with him several of the
tribunes and centurions of the first class, were of opinion that they
should not act hastily, but wait for orders from Cæsar. Their camp was
strong enough to resist all the forces of the Germans; they were not
pressed by want of food; they might receive succours, and, under
circumstances of so much gravity, it would be disgraceful to take their
counsel from the enemy.
Sabinus replied with force that it would be too late to decide when the
number of the assailants would be increased by the arrival of the
Germans, and when the neighbouring quarters would have experienced some
disaster. “The movement requires a prompt decision. Cæsar has, no doubt,
started for Italy: otherwise, would the Carnutes have dared to slay
Tasgetius, and the Eburones to attack the camp with so much boldness? We
must consider the counsel itself, and not him who gives it: the Rhine is
at a short distance; the Germans are irritated by the death of
Ariovistus, and by their preceding defeats; Gaul is in flames; she
supports with impatience the Roman yoke, and the loss of her ancient
military glory. Would Ambiorix have engaged without powerful motives in
such an enterprise? It is safest, therefore, to follow his counsel, and
to gain as quickly as possible the nearest quarters. ”
Cotta and the centurions of the first class earnestly maintained the
contrary opinion. “Let it then be as you will! ” said Sabinus; and then,
raising his voice to be heard by the soldiers, he shouted: “Death does
not terrify me; but behold, Cotta, those who will require of thee a
reckoning for the misfortunes which thou art preparing for them. After
to-morrow, if you would agree to it, they could have rejoined the
nearest legion, and, united with it, incur together the chances of war;
they will know that thou hast preferred leaving them, far from their
companions, exposed to perish by the sword or by famine. ”
When the council was ended, the lieutenants are surrounded and implored
not to compromise the safety of the army by their misunderstanding; let
them go or remain, provided they are agreed, everything will be easy.
The debate is prolonged into the middle of the night; at last, Cotta,
moved, yields to the opinion of Sabinus, and agrees to repair to Cicero,
encamped in the country of the Nervii; the departure is fixed for
daybreak. The rest of the night is passed in the midst of preparations;
the soldier chooses what articles of his winter equipment he will carry
with him. And, as if the danger were not sufficiently great, he seems as
if he wished to increase it by fatigue and watching. At daybreak, the
troops, in full security, begin their march in a long column,
encumbered with a numerous baggage.
At the distance of three kilomètres (_a millibus passuum circiter
duobus_) from the town of Tongres is the vale of Lowaige, closed in
between two hills, and forming a great defile of about 2,500 mètres in
length (_magnam convallem_). It is traversed by a stream, the Geer. The
hills, now denuded, were, only a century ago, covered with wood;[428] it
was there that the Eburones lay in wait for the Roman army.
Informed of the intended retreat by the noise and tumult, they had
divided themselves into two bodies, on the right and left of the vale,
and placed themselves in ambush in the middle of the woods. When they
saw the greater part of the Roman troops engaged in the defile, they
attacked them in rear and in front, profiting by all the advantages of
the locality.
Then Sabinus, like a man who had shown no foresight, becomes troubled,
hurries hither and thither, hesitates in all his measures--as happens to
him who, taken by surprise, is obliged to act decisively in the middle
of danger. Cotta, on the contrary, who had calculated the fatal chances
of the departure which he had opposed, neglects nothing for the general
safety. He encourages the troops, combats in the ranks--a general and a
soldier at the same time. As the length of the column prevented the
lieutenants from seeing all and ordering all themselves, they caused the
soldiers to pass on from mouth to mouth the order to abandon the baggage
and form the circle. This resolution, though justified by the
circumstances, had, nevertheless, a disastrous effect; it diminished the
confidence of the Romans, and increased the ardour of the Eburones, who
ascribed so desperate a resolution to fear and discouragement. There
resulted from it, too, an inevitable inconvenience: the soldiers quitted
their ensigns in crowds to run to the baggage, and take their more
valuable effects; and on all parts there was nothing but shouts and
confusion.
The barbarians acted with intelligence. Their chiefs, fearing that they
would disperse to pillage the baggage of the Romans, sent orders on all
points that every one must keep his rank, declaring that the thing
important was first to assure themselves of the victory, and that
afterwards the booty would fall into their hands.
The Eburones were rough adversaries; but by their number and their
courage, the Romans might have maintained the struggle. Although
abandoned by their chief and by fortune, they relied upon themselves for
everything, and every time that a cohort fell upon the enemies, it made
a great carnage of them. Ambiorix perceived this: he shouted loudly his
commands that his men should throw their missiles from a distance, and
not approach near; that they should retire whenever the Romans rushed
forward, and only attack them in their retreat, when they returned to
their ensigns--a manœuvre easy to the Eburones, practised in such
exercises, and nimble on account of the lightness of their equipment.
The order was faithfully executed. When a cohort quitted the circle to
charge the enemies, they fled with speed; but the cohort, in its
advance, left its right flank (not protected, like the left flank, by
the bucklers) exposed to the missiles; when it resumed its former
position, it was surrounded on all sides both by those who had
retreated, and by those who had remained on its flanks.
If, instead of sending forward their cohorts in succession, the Romans
stood firm in their circle, they lost the advantage of attacking, and
their close ranks made them more exposed to the multitude of missiles.
Meanwhile, the number of the wounded increased every moment. It was two
o’clock; the combat had lasted from sunrise, and yet the Roman soldiers
had not ceased to show themselves worthy of themselves. At this moment
the struggle becomes more desperate. T. Balventius, a brave and
respected man, who, in the previous year, had commanded as primipilus,
has his two thighs transpierced by a javelin; Q. Lucanius, an officer of
the same grade, is killed fighting valiantly to rescue his son, who is
surrounded by enemies. Cotta himself, while he runs from rank to rank to
encourage the soldiers, is wounded in the face by a missile from a
sling.
At this sight, Sabinus, discouraged, sees no other help but to treat
with Ambiorix. Perceiving him at a distance in the act of urging on his
troops, he sends to him his interpreter Cn. Pompeius, to pray him to
spare him and his men. Ambiorix replies that he is quite willing to
enter into negotiations with Sabinus, whose person he undertakes under
the obligation of his oath to cause to be respected; that further, he
hopes to obtain from the Eburones safety of life for the Roman soldiers.
Sabinus communicates this reply to Cotta, who is already wounded, and
proposes that they should go together to confer with Ambiorix; this step
may secure the safety of themselves and the army. Cotta refuses
obstinately, and declares that he will never treat with an enemy in
arms.
Sabinus enjoins to the tribunes of the soldiers who stand round him, and
to the centurions of the first class, to follow him. Arriving near
Ambiorix, he is summoned to lay down his sword: he obeys, and orders his
men to imitate his example. While they discuss the conditions in an
interview which the chief of the Eburones prolongs intentionally,
Sabinus is gradually surrounded and massacred. Then the barbarians,
raising, according to their custom, wild cries, rush upon the Romans and
break their ranks. Cotta and the greatest part of his soldiers perish
with their arms in their hands; the others seek refuge in the camp of
Aduatuca, from whence they had started. The ensign-bearer, L.
Petrosidius, pressed by a crowd of enemies, throws the eagle into the
retrenchments, and dies defending himself bravely at the foot of the
rampart. The unfortunate soldiers strive to sustain the combat till
night, and that very night they kill one another in despair. A few,
however, escaping from the field of battle, cross the forests, and gain
by chance the quarters of T. Labienus, to whom they give information of
this disaster. [429]
[Sidenote: Attack on Cicero’s Camp. ]
XIII. Elated by this victory, Ambiorix immediately repairs with his
cavalry into the country of the Aduatuci, a people adjoining to his
states, and marches without interruption all the night and the following
day: the infantry has orders to follow him. He announces his successes
to the Aduatuci, and urges them to take up arms. Next day he proceeds to
the Nervii, presses them to seize this occasion to avenge their injuries
and deliver themselves for ever from the yoke of the Romans; he informs
them of the death of two lieutenants, and of the destruction of a great
part of the Roman army; he adds that the legion in winter quarters among
them, under the command of Cicero, will be easily surprised and
annihilated; he offers his alliance to the Nervii, and easily persuades
them.
These immediately give information to the Ceutrones, the Grudii, the
Levaci, the Pleumoxii, and the Geiduni, tribes under their dependence:
they collect all the troops they can, and proceed unexpectedly to the
winter quarters of Cicero, before he had learnt the disaster and death
of Sabinus. There, as it had happened recently at Aduatuca, some
soldiers, occupied in cutting wood in the forest, are surprised by the
cavalry. Soon a considerable number of Eburones, Aduatuci, and Nervii,
with their allies and clients, proceed to attack the camp. The Romans
rush to arms, and mount the _vallum_; but that day they make head with
difficulty against an enemy who has placed all his hope in the
promptness of an unforeseen attack, and was convinced that after this
victory nothing further could resist him. [430]
[Sidenote: Cæsar marches to the succour of Cicero. ]
XIV. Cæsar was still at Amiens, ignorant of the events which had just
taken place. Cicero immediately wrote to him, and promised great
recompenses to those who should succeed in delivering his letters to
him; but all the roads were watched, and nobody could reach him. During
the night twenty towers were raised, with an incredible celerity, by
means of the wood which had been already brought for fortifying the
camp,[431] and the works were completed. Next day, the enemies, whose
forces had increased, returned to the attack and began to fill the
fosse. The resistance was as energetic as the day before, and continued
during the following days; among these heroic soldiers constancy and
energy seemed to increase with the peril. Each night they prepare
everything necessary for the defence on the morrow. They make a great
number of stakes hardened by fire, and _pila_ employed in sieges; they
establish with planks the floors of the towers, and by means of hurdles
make parapets and battlements. They work without intermission: neither
wounded nor sick take repose. Cicero himself, though a man of feeble
health, is day and night at work, in spite of the entreaties of his
soldiers, who implore him to spare himself.
Meanwhile, the chiefs and _principes_ of the Nervii proposed an
interview to Cicero. They repeated to him what Ambiorix had said to
Sabinus: “All Gaul is in arms; the Germans have passed the Rhine; the
quarters of Cæsar and his lieutenants are attacked. ” They added:
“Sabinus and his cohorts have perished; the presence of Ambiorix is a
proof of their veracity; Cicero would deceive himself if he reckoned on
the succour of the other legions. As to them, they have no hostile
intention, provided the Romans will discontinue occupying their country.
The legion has full liberty to retire without fear whither it likes. ”
Cicero replied “that it was not the custom of the Roman people to accept
conditions from an enemy in arms; but that, if they consented to lay
them down, he would serve them as a mediator with Cæsar, who would
decide. ”
Deceived in their expectation of intimidating Cicero, the Nervii
surrounded the camp with a rampart nine feet high, and a fosse fifteen
wide. They had observed the Roman works in the preceding campaigns, and
learnt from some prisoners to imitate them. But, as they did not possess
the necessary instruments of iron, they were obliged to cut the turf
with their swords, to take the earth with their hands, and to carry it
in their cloaks. We may judge of their great number by the fact that in
less than three hours they completed a retrenchment of 15,000 feet in
circuit. [432] On the following days, they raised towers to the height of
the _vallum_, prepared hooks (_falces_), and covered galleries
(_testudines_), which they had similarly been taught by the
prisoners. [433]
On the seventh day of the siege, a great wind having arisen, the enemies
threw into the camp fiery darts, and launched from their slings balls of
burning clay (_ferventes fusili ex argilla glandes_). [434] The barracks,
roofed with straw, in the Gaulish manner, soon took fire, and the wind
spread the flames in an instant through the whole camp. Then, raising
great shouts, as though they had already gained the victory, they pushed
forward their towers and covered galleries, and attempted, by means of
ladders, to scale the _vallum_; but such were the courage and steadiness
of the Roman soldiers, that, though surrounded with flames, overwhelmed
with a shower of darts, and knowing well that the fire was devouring
their baggage and their property, not one of them quitted his post, or
even dreamt of turning his head, so much did that desperate struggle
absorb their minds. This was their most trying day. Meanwhile, many of
the enemies were killed and wounded, because, crowding to the foot of
the rampart, the last ranks stopped the retreat of the first. The fire
having been appeased, the barbarians pushed up a tower against the
_vallum_. [435] The centurions of the third cohort, who happened to be
there, drew their men back, and, in bravado, invited, by their gesture
and voice, the enemies to enter. Nobody ventured. Then they drove them
away by a shower of stones, and the tower was burnt. There were in that
legion two centurions, T. Pulio and L. Vorenus, who emulated each other
in bravery by rushing into the midst of the assailants. Thrown down in
turn, and surrounded by enemies, they mutually rescued each other
several times, and returned into the camp without wounds. Defensive arms
then permitted individual courage to perform actual prodigies.
Still the siege continued, and the number of the defenders diminished
daily; provisions began to fall short, as well as the necessaries for
tending the wounded. [436] The frequent messengers sent by Cicero to
Cæsar were intercepted, and some of them cruelly put to death within
view of the camp. At last, Vertico, a Nervian chieftain who had embraced
the cause of the Romans, prevailed upon one of his slaves to take charge
of a letter to Cæsar. His quality of a Gaul enabled him to pass
unperceived, and to give intelligence to the general of Cicero’s danger.
Cæsar received this information at Amiens towards the eleventh hour of
the day (four o’clock in the afternoon). He had only at hand three
legions--that of Trebonius, at Amiens; that of M. Crassus, whose
quarters were at Montdidier, in the country of the Bellovaci, at a
distance of twenty-five miles; and lastly, that which, under C. Fabius,
was wintering in the country of the Morini, at Saint-Pol. [437] (_See
Plate 14. _) He despatched a courier to Crassus, charged with delivering
to him his order to start with his legion in the middle of the night,
and join him in all haste at Amiens, to relieve there the legion of
Trebonius. Another courier was sent to the lieutenant C.
Fabius, to
direct him to take his legion into the territory of the Atrebates, which
Cæsar would cross, and where their junction was to be effected. He wrote
similarly to Labienus, to march with his legion towards the country of
the Nervii, if he could without peril. As to the legion of Roscius and
that of Plancus, which were too far distant, they remained in their
quarters.
Crassus had no sooner received his orders than he began his march; and
next day, towards the third hour (ten o’clock), his couriers announced
his approach. Cæsar left him at Amiens, with one legion, to guard the
baggage of the army, the hostages, the archives, and the winter
provisions. He immediately started in person, without waiting for the
rest of the army, with the legion of Trebonius, and four hundred cavalry
from the neighbouring quarters. He followed, no doubt, the direction
from Amiens to Cambrai, and made that day twenty miles (thirty
kilomètres). He was subsequently joined on his road, probably towards
Bourcies, between Bapaume and Cambrai, by Fabius, who had not lost a
moment in executing his orders. Meanwhile arrived the reply of Labienus.
He informed Cæsar of the events which had taken place among the
Eburones, and of their effect among the Treviri. These latter had just
risen. All their troops had advanced towards him, and surrounded him at
a distance of three miles. In this position, fearing that he should not
be able to resist enemies proud of a recent victory, who would take his
departure for a flight, he thought that there would be danger in
quitting his winter quarters.
Cæsar approved of the resolution taken by Labienus, although it reduced
to two the three legions on which he counted; and, although their
effective force did not amount to more than 7,000 men, as the safety of
the army depended on the celerity of his movements, he proceeded by
forced marches to the country of the Nervii; there he learnt from
prisoners the perilous situation of Cicero. He immediately engaged, by
the promise of great recompenses, a Gaulish horseman to carry a letter
to him: it was written in Greek,[438] in order that the enemy, if he
intercepted it, might not know its meaning. Further, in case the Gaul
could not penetrate to Cicero, he had directed him to attach the letter
to the _amentum_ (see page 37, note 2) of his javelin, and throw it over
the retrenchments. Cæsar wrote that he was approaching in great haste
with his legions, and he exhorted Cicero to persevere in his energetic
defence. According to Polyænus, the despatch contained these words:
θαῥῥεἱν βοἡθειαν προσδἑχου (“Courage! expect succour”). [439]
As soon as he arrived near the camp, the Gaul, not daring to penetrate
to it, did as Cæsar had directed him. By chance his javelin remained two
days stuck in a tower. It was only on the third that it was seen and
carried to Cicero. The letter, read in the presence of the assembled
soldiers, excited transports of joy. Soon afterwards they perceived in
the distance the smoke of burning habitations, which announced the
approach of the army of succour. At that moment, after a five days’
march, it had arrived within twenty kilomètres of Charleroi, near
Binche, where it encamped. The Gauls, when they were informed of it by
their scouts, raised the siege, and then, to the number of about 60,000,
marched to meet the legions.
Cicero, thus liberated, sent another Gaul to announce to Cæsar that the
enemy were turning all their forces against him. At this news, received
towards the middle of the night, Cæsar informed his soldiers, and
strengthened them in their desire of vengeance. At daybreak next day he
raised his camp. After advancing four miles, he perceived a crowd of
enemies on the other side of a great valley traversed by the stream of
the Haine. [440] Cæsar did not consider it prudent to descend into the
valley to engage in combat against so great a number of troops.
Moreover, Cicero once rescued, there was no need for hurrying his march;
he therefore halted, and chose a good position for retrenching--mount
Sainte-Aldegonde. Although his camp, containing hardly 7,000 men,
without baggage, was necessarily of limited extent, he diminished it as
much as possible by giving less width to the streets, in order to
deceive the enemy as to his real strength. At the same time he sent out
scouts to ascertain the best place for crossing the valley.
That day passed in skirmishes of cavalry on the banks of the stream, but
each kept his positions: the Gauls, because they were waiting for
re-enforcements; Cæsar, because he counted on his simulated fear to draw
the enemies out of their position, and compel them to fight on his side
of the Haine, before his camp. If he could not succeed, he obtained time
to reconnoitre the roads sufficiently to pass the river and valley with
less danger. On the morrow, at daybreak, the enemy’s cavalry came up to
the retrenchments, and attacked that of the Romans. Cæsar ordered his
men to give way, and return into the camp; at the same time he caused
the height of the ramparts to be increased, the gates to be stopped up
with mere lumps of turf, and directed his soldiers to execute his
directions with tumultuous haste and all the signs of fear.
The Gauls, drawn on by this feint, passed the stream, and formed in
order of battle in a disadvantageous place. Seeing that the Romans had
even abandoned the _vallum_, they approached nearer to it, threw their
missiles over it from all sides, and caused their heralds to proclaim
round the retrenchments that, until the third hour (ten o’clock), every
Gaul or Roman who should desert to them should have his life saved. At
last, having no hope of forcing the gates, which they supposed to be
solidly fortified, they carried their boldness so far as to begin to
fill up the fosse, and to pull down the palisades with their hands. But
Cæsar held his troops in readiness to profit by the excessive confidence
of the Gauls: at a signal given, they rush through all the gates at
once; the enemy does not resist, but takes to flight, abandoning their
arms, and leaves the ground covered with his dead.
Cæsar did not pursue far, on account of the woods and marshes; he would
not have been able, indeed, to inflict further loss; he marched with his
troops, without having suffered any loss, towards the camp of Cicero,
where he arrived the same day. [441] The towers, the covered galleries,
and the retrenchments of the barbarians, excited his astonishment.
Having assembled the soldiers of Cicero’s legion, nine-tenths of whom
were wounded, he could judge how much danger they had run and how much
courage they had displayed. He loaded with praise the general and
soldiers, addressing individually the centurions and the tribunes who
had distinguished themselves. The prisoners gave him more ample details
on the deaths of Sabinus and Cotta, whose disaster had produced a deep
impression in the army. The next day he reminds the troops convoked for
that purpose of the past event, consoles and encourages them, throws the
fault of this check on the imprudence of the lieutenant, and exhorts
them to resignation the more, because, thanks to the valour of the
soldiers and the protection of the gods, the expiation had been prompt,
and left no further reason for the enemies to rejoice, or for the Romans
to be afflicted. [442]
We see, from what precedes, how small a number of troops, disseminated
over a vast territory, surmounted, by discipline and courage, a
formidable insurrection. Quintus Cicero, by following the principle
invoked by Cotta, _not to enter into negotiations with an enemy in
arms_, saved both his army and his honour. As to Cæsar, he gave proof,
in this circumstance, of an energy and strength of mind which Quintus
Cicero did not fail to point out to his brother when he wrote to
him. [443] If we believe Suetonius and Polyænus, Cæsar felt so great a
grief for the check experienced by Sabinus, that, in sign of mourning,
he let his beard and hair grow until he had avenged his
lieutenants,[444] which only happened in the year following, by the
destruction of the Eburones and the Nervii.
[Sidenote: Cæsar places his Troops in Winter Quarters. Labienus defeats
Indutiomarus. ]
XV. Meanwhile the news of Cæsar’s victory reached Labienus, across the
country of the Remi, with incredible speed: his winter quarters were at
a distance of about sixty miles from Cicero’s camp, where Cæsar had only
arrived after the ninth hour of the day (three o’clock in the
afternoon), and yet before midnight shouts of joy were raised at the
gates of the camp, the acclamations of the Remi who came to congratulate
Labienus. The noise spread in the army of the Treviri, and Indutiomarus,
who had resolved to attack the camp of Labienus next day, withdrew
during the night, and took all his troops with him.
These events having been accomplished, Cæsar distributed the seven
legions he had left in the following manner: he sent Fabius with his
legion to his winter quarters among the Morini, and established himself
in the neighbourhood of Amiens with three legions, which he separated in
three quarters: they were the legion of Crassus, which had remained
stationary, that of Cicero, and that of Trebonius. There are still seen,
along the Somme, in the neighbourhood of Amiens, three camps at a short
distance from each other, which appear to have been those of that
period. [445] Labienus, Plancus, and Roscius continued to occupy the same
positions. The gravity of the circumstances determined Cæsar to remain
all the winter with the army. In fact, on the news of the disaster of
Sabinus, nearly all the people of Gaul showed a disposition to take
arms, sent deputations and messages to each other, communicated their
projects, and deliberated upon the point from which the signal for war
should be given. They held nocturnal assemblies in bye-places, and
during the whole winter not a day passed in which there was not some
meeting or some movement of the Gauls to cause uneasiness to Cæsar. Thus
he learnt from L. Roscius, lieutenant placed at the head of the 13th
legion, that considerable troops of Armorica had assembled to attack
him; they were not more than eight miles from his winter quarters, when
the news of Cæsar’s victory had compelled them to retreat precipitately
and in disorder.
The Roman general called to his presence the _principes_ of each state,
terrified some by letting them know that he was informed of their plots,
exhorted the others to perform their duty, and by these means maintained
the tranquillity of a great part of Gaul. Meanwhile a vexatious event
took place in the country of the Senones, a powerful and influential
nation among the Gauls. They had resolved, in an assembly, to put to
death Cavarinus, whom Cæsar had given them for king. Cavarinus had fled;
upon which they pronounced his deposition, banished him, and pursued him
to the limits of their territory. They had sought to justify themselves
to Cæsar, who ordered them to send him all their senators. They refused.
This boldness on the part of the Senones, by showing to the barbarians
some individuals capable of resisting the Romans, produced so great a
change in their minds, that, with the exception of the Ædui and the
Remi, there was not a people which did not fall under suspicion of
revolt, each desiring to free itself from foreign domination.
During the whole winter, the Treviri and Indutiomarus never ceased
urging the people on the other side of the Rhine to take up arms,
assuring them that the greater part of the Roman army had been
destroyed. But not one of the German nations could be persuaded to pass
the Rhine. The remembrance of the double defeat of Ariovistus and the
Tencteri made them cautious of trying their fortune again. Deceived in
his expectations, Indutiomarus did not discontinue collecting troops,
exercising them, buying horses from the neighbouring countries, and
drawing to him from all parts of Gaul outlaws and condemned criminals.
His ascendency was soon so great, that from all parts people eagerly
sought his friendship and protection.
When he saw some rallying to him spontaneously, others, such as the
Senones and the Carnutes, engaging in his cause through a consciousness
of their fault; the Nervii and the Aduatuci preparing for war, and a
crowd of volunteers disposed to join him as soon as he should have
quitted his country, Indutiomarus, according to the custom of the Gauls
at the beginning of a campaign, called together an assembly in arms. He
pronounced Cingetorix, his son-in-law, who remained faithful to Cæsar,
an enemy of his country; and announced that, in reply to the appeal of
the Senones and Carnutes, he would go to them through the country of the
Remi, whose lands he would ravage; but, above all, he would attack the
camp of Labienus.
The latter, established on the Ourthe, master of a position naturally
formidable, which he had further fortified, was in fear of no attack,
but dreamt, on the contrary, of seizing the first opportunity of
combating with advantage. Informed by Cingetorix of the designs of
Indutiomarus, he demanded cavalry of the neighbouring states, pretended
fear, and, letting the enemy’s cavalry approach with impunity, remained
shut up in his camp.
While, deceived by these appearances, Indutiomarus became daily more
presumptuous, Labienus introduced secretly into his camp during the
night the auxiliary cavalry, and, by keeping a close watch, prevented
the Treviri from being informed of it. The enemy, ignorant of the
arrival of this re-enforcement, advanced nearer and nearer to the
retrenchments, and redoubled his provocations. They were unnoticed, and
towards evening he withdrew in disorder. Suddenly Labienus causes his
cavalry, seconded by his cohorts, to issue by the two gates. Foreseeing
the rout of the enemy, he urges his troops to follow Indutiomarus alone,
and promises great rewards to those who shall bring his head. Fortune
seconded his designs; Indutiomarus was overtaken just at the ford of the
river (the Ourthe), and put to death, and his head was brought into the
camp. The cavalry, in their return, slew all the enemies they found in
their way. The Eburones and the Nervii dispersed. The result of these
events was to give to Gaul a little more tranquillity. [446]
[Sidenote: Observations. ]
XVI. The Emperor Napoleon, in his _Précis des Guerres de César_,
explains in the following manner the advantage the Romans drew from
their camps:--
“The Romans owe the constancy of their successes to the method, from
which they never departed, of encamping every night in a fortified camp,
and of never giving battle without having behind them a retrenched camp,
to serve them as a place of retreat, and to contain their magazines,
their baggage, and their wounded. The nature of arms in those ages was
such that, in these camps, they were not only in safety from the attacks
of an equal army, but even an army which was stronger; they were the
masters to fight or to wait a favourable opportunity. Marius is assailed
by a cloud of Cimbri or Teutones; he shuts himself up in his camp,
remains there until the favourable day or occasion comes, then he issues
with victory before him. Cæsar arrives near the camp of Cicero; the
Gauls abandon the latter, and march to meet the former; they are four
times more numerous. Cæsar takes a position in a few hours, retrenches
his camp, and in it he bears patiently the insults and provocations of
an enemy whom he is not yet willing to combat; but a favourable
opportunity is not long in presenting itself. He then issues through all
his gates; the Gauls are vanquished.
“Why, then, has a rule so wise, so fertile in great results, been
abandoned by modern generals? Because offensive arms have changed its
character; arms for the hand were the principal arms of the ancients; it
was with his short sword that the legionary conquered the world; it was
with the Macedonian pike that Alexander conquered Asia. The principal
arms of modern armies are projectiles; the musket is superior to
anything ever invented by man; no defensive arm is a protection against
it.
“As the principal arm of the ancients was the sword or the pike, their
habitual formation was in deep order. The legion and the phalanx, in
whatever situation they were attacked, either in front, or in right
flank, or in left flank, faced everywhere without disadvantage; they
could encamp on surfaces of small extent, in order to have less labour
in fortifying the line of circuit, and in order to hold their ground
with the smallest detachment possible. The principal arm of the moderns
is the projectile; their habitual order has naturally been narrow order,
the only one which permits them to bring all their projectiles to bear.
“A consular army enclosed in its camp, attacked by a modern army of
equal force, would be driven out of it without assault, and without
being able to use their swords; it would not be necessary to fill up the
fosses or to scale the ramparts: surrounded on all sides by the
attacking army, pierced through, enveloped, and raked by the fire, the
camp would be the common drain of all the shots, of all the balls, of
all the bullets: fire, devastation, and death would open the gates and
throw down the retrenchments. A modern army, placed in a Roman camp,
would at first, no doubt, make use of all its artillery; but, though
equal to the artillery of the besieger, it would be taken in _rouage_
and quickly reduced to silence; a part only of the infantry could use
their muskets, but it would fire upon a line less extended, and would be
far from producing an effect equal to the injury it would receive. The
fire from the centre to the circumference is null; that from the
circumference to the centre is irresistible. All these considerations
have decided modern generals in renouncing the system of retrenched
camps, to adopt instead natural positions well chosen.
“A Roman camp was placed independently of localities: all these were
good for armies whose strength consisted in arms used with the hand; it
required neither experienced eye nor military genius to encamp well;
whereas the choice of positions, the manner of occupying them and
placing the different arms, by taking advantage of the circumstances of
the ground, is an art which forms part of the genius of the modern
captain.
“If it were said now-a-days to a general, You shall have, like Cicero,
under your orders, 5,000 men, sixteen pieces of cannon, 5,000 pioneers’
tools, 5,000 sacks of earth; you shall be within reach of a forest, on
ordinary ground; in fifteen days you shall be attacked by an army of
60,000 men, having 120 pieces of cannon; you shall not be succoured till
eighty or ninety-six hours after having been attacked. What are the
works, what are the plans, what are the profiles, which art prescribes?
Has the art of the engineer secrets which can solve this problem? ”[447]
CHAPTER IX.
(Year of Rome 701. )
(BOOK VI. OF THE “COMMENTARIES. ”)
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE NERVII AND THE TREVIRI--SECOND PASSAGE OF THE
RHINE--WAR AGAINST AMBIORIX AND THE TREVIRI.
[Sidenote: Cæsar augments his Army. ]
I. The state of Gaul gave Cæsar cause to anticipate serious agitations,
and he felt convinced of the necessity of new levies. He employed on
this mission his lieutenants M. Silanus, C. Antistius Reginus, and T.
Sextius; at the same time he asked Pompey, who had remained before Rome
with the _imperium_, in order to watch over the public interests, to
recall to their colours and send him the soldiers of Cisalpine Gaul
enlisted under the consulate of the latter in 699. Cæsar attached, with
a view to the present and to the future, great importance to giving the
Gauls a high idea of the resources of Italy, and to proving to them that
it was easy for the Republic, after a check, not only to repair its
losses, but also to bring into the field troops more numerous than ever.
Pompey, through friendship and consideration for the public good,
granted his demand. Thanks to the activity of his lieutenants, before
the end of winter three new legions (or thirty cohorts) were raised and
joined to the army: the 1st, the 14th, which had just taken the number
of the legion annihilated at Aduatuca, and the 15th. In this manner, the
fifteen cohorts lost under Sabinus were replaced by double their number,
and it was seen, by this rapid display of forces, what was the power of
the military organization and resources of the Roman people. It was the
first time that Cæsar commanded ten legions.
[Sidenote: War against the Nervii, General Assembly of Gaul. ]
II. After the death of Indutiomarus, the Treviri took for their chiefs
some members of his family. These in vain urged the nearest peoples of
the right bank of the Rhine to make common cause with them; but they
succeeded with some of the more distant tribes, particularly the Suevi,
and persuaded Ambiorix to enter into their league. From all parts, from
the Rhine to the Scheldt, were announced preparations for war. The
Nervii, the Aduatuci, the Menapii, all the Germans on this side of the
Rhine, were in arms. The Senones persisted in their disobedience, and
acted in concert with the Carnutes and the neighbouring states;
everything urged upon Cæsar the counsel to open the campaign earlier
than usual. Accordingly, without waiting for the end of winter, he
concentrates the four legions nearest to Amiens, his head-quarters
(those of Fabius, Crassus, Cicero, and Trebonius), invades unexpectedly
the territory of the Nervii, gives them time neither to assemble nor to
fly, but carries off the men and cattle, abandons the booty to the
soldiers, and forces this people to submission.
This expedition so rapidly terminated, the legions returned to their
winter quarters. At the beginning of spring, Cæsar convoked, according
to his custom, the general assembly of Gaul, which met, no doubt, at
Amiens. The different peoples sent thither their representatives, with
the exception of the Senones, the Carnutes, and the Treviri. He regarded
this absence as a sign of revolt, and in order to pursue his designs
without neglecting the general affairs, he resolved to transfer the
assembly nearer to the insurrection, to Lutetia. This town belonged to
the Parisii, who bordered on the Senones, and although formerly these
peoples had formed but one, the Parisii do not appear to have entered
into the conspiracy. Cæsar, having announced this decision from the
summit of his prætorium (_pro suggestu pronuntiata_), started the same
day at the head of his legions, and advanced by forced marches towards
the country of the Senones.
At the news of his approach, Acco, the principal author of the revolt,
ordered the population to retire into the _oppida_; but, taken by
surprise by the arrival of the Romans, the Senones employed the Ædui,
once their patrons, to intercede in their favour. Cæsar pardoned them
without difficulty, preferring to employ the fine season in war than in
the search of those who were culpable. A hundred hostages exacted from
the Senones were entrusted to the Ædui. The Carnutes imitated the
example of the Senones, and, by the intermediation of the Remi, whose
clients they were, obtained their pardon. Cæsar pronounced the close of
the assembly of Gaul, and ordered the different states to furnish their
contingents of cavalry. [448]
[Sidenote: Submission of the Menapii. ]
III. Having pacified this part of the country, Cæsar turned all his
thoughts towards the war with the Treviri and with Ambiorix, the chief
of the Eburones. He was, above all, impatient to take a striking
vengeance for the humiliation inflicted on his arms at Aduatuca. Knowing
well that Ambiorix would not hazard a battle, he sought to penetrate his
designs. Two things were to be feared: the first, that Ambiorix, when
his territory was invaded, would take refuge among the Menapii, whose
country, adjoining that of the Eburones, was defended by woods and vast
marshes, and who, alone among the Gauls, had never made an act of
submission; the second, that he might join the Germans beyond the Rhine,
with whom, as was known, he had entered into friendly relations through
the intermediation of the Treviri. Cæsar conceived the plan of first
preventing these two eventualities, in order to isolate Ambiorix.
Wishing, above all, to reduce to submission the Menapii and Treviri, and
carry the war at the same time into the countries of these two peoples,
he undertook in person the expedition against the Menapii, and entrusted
that against the Treviri to Labienus, his best lieutenant, who had
operated against them on several occasions. Labienus, after his victory
over Indutiomarus, had continued in his winter quarters with his legions
at Lavacherie, on the Ourthe. [449] Cæsar sent him all the baggage of
the army and two legions. He marched in person towards the country of
the Menapii, at the head of five legions without baggage. He took with
him Cavarinus and the Senonese cavalry, fearing lest the resentment of
this king against his people, or the hatred which he had drawn upon
himself, might raise some disorders, and, following the general
direction of Sens, Soissons, Bavay, and Brussels, he reached the
frontier of the Menapii. The latter, trusting in the nature of the
ground, had assembled no forces, but took refuge in the woods and
marshes. Cæsar divided his troops with the lieutenant C. Fabius and the
questor M. Crassus, formed them into three columns, and, causing bridges
to be hastily constructed, to cross the marshy water-courses, penetrated
at three points into their territory, which he ravaged. The Menapii,
reduced to extremity, demanded peace: it was granted to them on the
express condition that they should refuse all shelter to Ambiorix or to
his lieutenants. Cæsar left Commius among them with part of the cavalry
to hold them under surveillance, and marched thence towards the country
of the Treviri. [450]
[Sidenote: Success of Labienus against the Treviri. ]
IV. On his part, Labienus had obtained brilliant successes; the Treviri
had marched with considerable forces against his winter quarters. They
were no more than two days’ march from him, when they learnt that he
had been joined by two other legions. Resolving then to wait the succour
of the Germans, they halted at a distance of fifteen miles from the camp
of Labienus. The latter, informed of the cause of their inaction, and
hoping that their imprudence would present an opportunity for giving
battle, left five cohorts to guard the greatest part of the baggage,
and, with the twenty-five others and a numerous cavalry, established his
camp within a mile of the enemy.
The two armies were separated by the river Ourthe, the passage of which
was rendered difficult by the steepness of the banks. Labienus had no
intention of crossing it, but he feared that the enemy might imitate his
prudence until the arrival of the Germans, who were expected
immediately. To draw them to him, he spread a rumour that he should
withdraw on the morrow at break of day, in order to avoid having to
combat the united forces of the Treviri and the Germans. He assembled
during the night the tribunes and centurions of the first class,
informed them of his design, and, contrary to Roman discipline, broke up
his camp with every appearance of disorder and a precipitate retreat.
The proximity of the camps allowed the enemy to obtain information of
this movement by his scouts before daybreak.
The rear-guard of Labienus had no sooner begun its march, than the
barbarians urge each other not to let a prey so long coveted escape
them. They imagine that the Romans are struck with terror, and, thinking
it disgraceful to wait any longer the succour of the Germans, they cross
the river and advance unhesitatingly upon unfavourable ground.
Labienus, seeing the success of his stratagem, continued slowly his
apparent retreat, in order to draw all the Gauls over the river. He had
sent forward, to an eminence, the baggage, guarded by a detachment of
cavalry. Suddenly he orders the ensigns to be turned towards the enemy,
forms his troops in order of battle, the cavalry on the wings, and
exhorts them to display the same valour as if Cæsar were present. Then
an immense cry rises in the ranks, and the _pila_ are thrown from all
sides. The Gauls, surprised at seeing an enemy they believed they were
pursuing turn against them, did not sustain even the first shock, but
fled precipitately into the neighbouring forests. Pressed by the
cavalry, they were slain or captured in great numbers.
Labienus employed those wise tactics to which the Romans owed their
greatest successes. Invincible in their fortified camps, they could, as
the Emperor Napoleon I. has so well remarked, either combat or wait for
the opportune moment. The Gauls, on the contrary, warlike peoples,
carried away by a fiery courage, not understanding the patience and
wiliness of their adversaries, fell always into the snare which was laid
for them. It was enough to feign terror, and inspire them with contempt
for the enemy’s forces, to make them engage instantly in disorderly
attacks, which the Romans, by sudden sorties, easily defeated. This was
the system followed by Sabinus when attacked by the Unelli, by Cæsar on
his way to the relief of Cicero, and by Labienus himself in the previous
year.
A few days afterwards the country submitted; for, on the news of the
defeat of the Treviri, the Germans returned home, followed by the
relatives of Indutiomarus, the author of the revolt. Cingetorix,
constant in his fidelity to the Romans, was replaced at the head of the
nation. The double object proposed by Cæsar was thus attained; for, on
one hand, since the submission of the Menapii, Ambiorix could no longer
dream of finding a refuge among them; and, on the other, the victory of
Labienus, followed by the retreat of the Germans, placed it out of his
power to league with these latter. Nevertheless, to assure this double
result, punish the Germans for their readiness to succour the Treviri,
and cut off Ambiorix from all retreat, Cæsar, after having effected his
junction with Labienus, resolved to pass the Rhine a second time. [451]
[Sidenote: Second Passage of the Rhine. ]
V. He had passed from the country of the Menapii into that of the
Treviri, and had arrived near the locality where now stands the town of
Bonn. He there caused a bridge to be built a little above the spot where
his army had crossed two years before. In consequence of the experience
gained by the processes employed on the former occasion, and of the
extreme zeal of the soldiers, the work was finished in a few days.
Having left for the protection of the bridge a strong detachment on the
bank belonging to the Treviri, for fear of some movement on their part,
Cæsar crossed the river with the legions and the cavalry.
consider that the reflux begins there about four hours and a half after
the hour of high tide at Dover,[417] what day of the month of July in
the year 700 it was high tide at Dover towards half-past eleven o’clock
at night?
By following a train of reasoning similar to that which we applied to
determine the day of Cæsar’s first landing in Britain, and remarking
that the tides of the days preceding the full moon of the month of July,
700, which fell on the 21st, correspond to those of the days which
preceded the full moon of the 26th of July, 1858, we find that it was
either fifteen days or one day before the 21st of July of the year 700,
that is, the 6th or the 20th of July, that it was high tide at Dover
towards half-past eleven at night. Cæsar, therefore, landed on the 7th
or on the 21st of July. We adopt the second date, because, according to
Cicero’s letter cited above, he received, before the 26th of July, at
Rome news of his brother, which must have been of the 6th of the same
month, as the couriers were twenty days on the road. In this letter
Quintus announced his approaching departure for Britain.
This date, according to which the Roman army would have landed on the
eve of the day of the full moon, is the more probable, as Cæsar,
immediately on his arrival in Britain, made a night march, which would
have been impossible in complete darkness. The passage of the sea had
taken fifteen hours. In the return, it only took nine hours, since
Cæsar started at nine o’clock in the evening (_secunda inita cum
solvisset vigilia_), and arrived at Boulogne at daybreak (_prima luce_),
which, in the middle of September, is at six o’clock in the
morning. [418]
The date of his return is nearly fixed by a letter of Cicero, who
expresses himself thus: “On the 11th of the Calends of November (17th of
October), I received letters from my brother Quintus, and from Cæsar;
the expedition was finished, and the hostages delivered. They had made
no booty. They had only imposed contributions. The letters, written from
the shores of Britain, are dated on the 6th of the Calends of October
(21st of September), at the moment of embarking the army, which they are
bringing back. ”[419] This information accords with the date of the
equinox, which fell on the 26th of September, and which, according to
the “Commentaries,” was close at hand (_quod equinoctium suberat_).
Cæsar had, then, remained in Britain about sixty days.
[Sidenote: Presumed Dates of the Second Campaign in Britain. ]
X. Departure of Cæsar from Lodi[420] May 22.
Arrival at the army, in the
country of the Belgæ (in
12 days) June 2.
Inspection of the fleet and of the winter
quarters; junction of the four legions
in the country of the Remi, on the
Meuse, towards Sedan. From June 2 to June 7.
Passage from Sedan to the country of
the Treviri (80 kilometres, 3 days),
From June 8 to June 10.
Occurrences among the Treviri,
From June 10 to June 15.
Passage from Treviri to Boulogne (330
kil. , 12 days) From June 15 to June 26.
Delay of 25 days at Boulogne,
From June 26 to July 20.
Embarkment July 20.
Landing July 21.
Combat July 22.
Cæsar returns to his fleet July 23.
Ten days of reparations, From July 24 to August 2.
New march against the Britons August 3.
Combat August 4.
March towards the Thames (from the
Little Stour to Sunbury, 140 kilomètres)
From August 5 to August 11.
March from the Thames to the _oppidum_
of Cassivellaunus, From August 12 to August 15.
Time employed in negotiations and receiving
hostages (8 days),
From August 16 to August 23.
Return of Cæsar (in person) towards
the sea-coast. The 28th of August,
on his arrival at the fleet, he writes
to Cicero. --(_Epist. ad Quintum_, III.
1. ) August 28.
March of his army to the coast,
From August 24 to Sept. 10.
Embarkation of the last convoy Sept. 21.
[Sidenote: Distribution of the Legions in their Winter Quarters. ]
XI. Cæsar had no sooner arrived on the continent than he caused his
ships to be brought on ground, and then held at Samarobriva, (_Amiens_)
the assembly of Gaul. The defective harvest, caused by the dryness of
the season, obliged him to distribute his winter quarters differently
from the preceding years, by spreading them over a greater extent. [421]
The number of his legions was eight and a half, because, independent of
the eight legions brought together at Boulogne before the departure for
Britain, he had no doubt formed five cohorts of soldiers and sailors
employed on his fleet. The troops were distributed in the following
manner: he sent one legion into the country of the Morini (_to Saint
Pol_), under the orders of C. Fabius; another to the Nervii (_at
Charleroy_), with Quintus Cicero;[422] a third to the Essuvii (_at Sées,
in Normandy_), under the command of L. Roscius; a fourth, under T.
Labienus, to the country of the Remi, near the frontier of the Treviri
(_at Lavacherie, on the Ourthe_). [423] He placed three in Belgium,[424]
one at Samarobriva itself (_Amiens_), under the orders of Trebonius; the
second in the country of the Bellovaci, under M. Crassus, his questor,
at twenty-five miles from Amiens (_Montdidier_); the third under L.
Munatius Plancus, near the confluence of the Oise and the Aisne (_at
Champlieu_). The legion last raised[425] among the Transpadans repaired
with five cohorts, under the orders of Titurius Sabinus and Aurunculeius
Cotta, to the Eburones, whose country, situated in great part between
the Meuse and the Rhine, was governed by Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. It
occupied a fortress named Aduatuca (_Tongres_). [426] This distribution
of the army appeared to Cæsar a more easy manner to supply it with
provisions. Moreover, these different winter quarters, with the
exception of that of M. Roscius, who occupied the most peaceable part of
Gaul, were all included within a circle of a hundred miles radius (148
kil. ). It was Cæsar’s intention not to leave them until he knew that the
legions were firmly established and their quarters fortified. (_See
Plate 14_, the sites of the winter quarters. )
There was among the Carnutes (_country of Chartres_) a man of high
birth, named Tasgetius, whose ancestors had reigned over that nation. In
consideration of his valour and of his important military services,
Cæsar had replaced him, during three years, in the rank held by his
forefather, when his enemies publicly massacred him. The men who had
participated in this crime were so numerous, that there was reason for
fearing that the revolt would spread over the whole country. To prevent
it, Cæsar despatched in the greatest haste L. Plancus at the head of his
legion, with orders to establish his quarters in the country of the
Carnutes, and to send him the accomplices in the murder of
Tasgetius. [427]
[Sidenote: Defeat of Sabinus at Aduatuca. ]
XII. He received at the same period (the end of October), from the
lieutenants and the questor, the news that the legions had arrived and
retrenched in their quarters. They had indeed been established in them
about a fortnight, when suddenly a revolt took place at the instigation
of Ambiorix and Catuvolcus. These chiefs had at first repaired to the
limits of their territory to meet Sabinus and Cotta, and had even
furnished them with provisions; but soon after, urged on by the Treviran
Indutiomaras, they raise the country, fall unexpectedly on the soldiers
occupied in seeking wood, and attack the camp of Sabinus with
considerable forces. Immediately the Romans run to arms and mount on the
_vallum_. The Spanish cavalry makes a successful sortie, and the enemies
retire, deceived in their hope of carrying the retrenchments by storm.
Having then recourse to stratagem, they utter, according to their
custom, loud cries, and demand to enter into negotiations and deliberate
on their common interests, C. Arpineius, a Roman knight and the friend
of Sabinus, and the Spaniard Q. Junius, who had been employed on several
missions to Ambiorix, were sent to them. Ambiorix declared that he had
not forgotten the numerous benefits he had received from Cæsar, but that
he was forced to follow the movement of Gaul, which had conspired in a
common effort to recover its liberty. That very day, according to his
statement, the various quarters were to be attacked at the same time, so
as to hinder them from lending each other mutual succour; the Germans
had passed the Rhine, and would arrive in two days; Sabinus had no
other chance of safety but by abandoning his camp and rejoining Cicero
or Labienus, who were at a distance of fifty miles. In the end, Ambiorix
promised under an oath to give him a free passage. The envoys reported
to Sabinus and Cotta what they had heard. Troubled at this news, and the
more disposed to put faith in it because it was hardly credible that so
small a people as the Eburones would have dared alone to brave the Roman
power, the two lieutenants submitted the affair to a council of war: it
became the subject of warm disputes. Cotta, and with him several of the
tribunes and centurions of the first class, were of opinion that they
should not act hastily, but wait for orders from Cæsar. Their camp was
strong enough to resist all the forces of the Germans; they were not
pressed by want of food; they might receive succours, and, under
circumstances of so much gravity, it would be disgraceful to take their
counsel from the enemy.
Sabinus replied with force that it would be too late to decide when the
number of the assailants would be increased by the arrival of the
Germans, and when the neighbouring quarters would have experienced some
disaster. “The movement requires a prompt decision. Cæsar has, no doubt,
started for Italy: otherwise, would the Carnutes have dared to slay
Tasgetius, and the Eburones to attack the camp with so much boldness? We
must consider the counsel itself, and not him who gives it: the Rhine is
at a short distance; the Germans are irritated by the death of
Ariovistus, and by their preceding defeats; Gaul is in flames; she
supports with impatience the Roman yoke, and the loss of her ancient
military glory. Would Ambiorix have engaged without powerful motives in
such an enterprise? It is safest, therefore, to follow his counsel, and
to gain as quickly as possible the nearest quarters. ”
Cotta and the centurions of the first class earnestly maintained the
contrary opinion. “Let it then be as you will! ” said Sabinus; and then,
raising his voice to be heard by the soldiers, he shouted: “Death does
not terrify me; but behold, Cotta, those who will require of thee a
reckoning for the misfortunes which thou art preparing for them. After
to-morrow, if you would agree to it, they could have rejoined the
nearest legion, and, united with it, incur together the chances of war;
they will know that thou hast preferred leaving them, far from their
companions, exposed to perish by the sword or by famine. ”
When the council was ended, the lieutenants are surrounded and implored
not to compromise the safety of the army by their misunderstanding; let
them go or remain, provided they are agreed, everything will be easy.
The debate is prolonged into the middle of the night; at last, Cotta,
moved, yields to the opinion of Sabinus, and agrees to repair to Cicero,
encamped in the country of the Nervii; the departure is fixed for
daybreak. The rest of the night is passed in the midst of preparations;
the soldier chooses what articles of his winter equipment he will carry
with him. And, as if the danger were not sufficiently great, he seems as
if he wished to increase it by fatigue and watching. At daybreak, the
troops, in full security, begin their march in a long column,
encumbered with a numerous baggage.
At the distance of three kilomètres (_a millibus passuum circiter
duobus_) from the town of Tongres is the vale of Lowaige, closed in
between two hills, and forming a great defile of about 2,500 mètres in
length (_magnam convallem_). It is traversed by a stream, the Geer. The
hills, now denuded, were, only a century ago, covered with wood;[428] it
was there that the Eburones lay in wait for the Roman army.
Informed of the intended retreat by the noise and tumult, they had
divided themselves into two bodies, on the right and left of the vale,
and placed themselves in ambush in the middle of the woods. When they
saw the greater part of the Roman troops engaged in the defile, they
attacked them in rear and in front, profiting by all the advantages of
the locality.
Then Sabinus, like a man who had shown no foresight, becomes troubled,
hurries hither and thither, hesitates in all his measures--as happens to
him who, taken by surprise, is obliged to act decisively in the middle
of danger. Cotta, on the contrary, who had calculated the fatal chances
of the departure which he had opposed, neglects nothing for the general
safety. He encourages the troops, combats in the ranks--a general and a
soldier at the same time. As the length of the column prevented the
lieutenants from seeing all and ordering all themselves, they caused the
soldiers to pass on from mouth to mouth the order to abandon the baggage
and form the circle. This resolution, though justified by the
circumstances, had, nevertheless, a disastrous effect; it diminished the
confidence of the Romans, and increased the ardour of the Eburones, who
ascribed so desperate a resolution to fear and discouragement. There
resulted from it, too, an inevitable inconvenience: the soldiers quitted
their ensigns in crowds to run to the baggage, and take their more
valuable effects; and on all parts there was nothing but shouts and
confusion.
The barbarians acted with intelligence. Their chiefs, fearing that they
would disperse to pillage the baggage of the Romans, sent orders on all
points that every one must keep his rank, declaring that the thing
important was first to assure themselves of the victory, and that
afterwards the booty would fall into their hands.
The Eburones were rough adversaries; but by their number and their
courage, the Romans might have maintained the struggle. Although
abandoned by their chief and by fortune, they relied upon themselves for
everything, and every time that a cohort fell upon the enemies, it made
a great carnage of them. Ambiorix perceived this: he shouted loudly his
commands that his men should throw their missiles from a distance, and
not approach near; that they should retire whenever the Romans rushed
forward, and only attack them in their retreat, when they returned to
their ensigns--a manœuvre easy to the Eburones, practised in such
exercises, and nimble on account of the lightness of their equipment.
The order was faithfully executed. When a cohort quitted the circle to
charge the enemies, they fled with speed; but the cohort, in its
advance, left its right flank (not protected, like the left flank, by
the bucklers) exposed to the missiles; when it resumed its former
position, it was surrounded on all sides both by those who had
retreated, and by those who had remained on its flanks.
If, instead of sending forward their cohorts in succession, the Romans
stood firm in their circle, they lost the advantage of attacking, and
their close ranks made them more exposed to the multitude of missiles.
Meanwhile, the number of the wounded increased every moment. It was two
o’clock; the combat had lasted from sunrise, and yet the Roman soldiers
had not ceased to show themselves worthy of themselves. At this moment
the struggle becomes more desperate. T. Balventius, a brave and
respected man, who, in the previous year, had commanded as primipilus,
has his two thighs transpierced by a javelin; Q. Lucanius, an officer of
the same grade, is killed fighting valiantly to rescue his son, who is
surrounded by enemies. Cotta himself, while he runs from rank to rank to
encourage the soldiers, is wounded in the face by a missile from a
sling.
At this sight, Sabinus, discouraged, sees no other help but to treat
with Ambiorix. Perceiving him at a distance in the act of urging on his
troops, he sends to him his interpreter Cn. Pompeius, to pray him to
spare him and his men. Ambiorix replies that he is quite willing to
enter into negotiations with Sabinus, whose person he undertakes under
the obligation of his oath to cause to be respected; that further, he
hopes to obtain from the Eburones safety of life for the Roman soldiers.
Sabinus communicates this reply to Cotta, who is already wounded, and
proposes that they should go together to confer with Ambiorix; this step
may secure the safety of themselves and the army. Cotta refuses
obstinately, and declares that he will never treat with an enemy in
arms.
Sabinus enjoins to the tribunes of the soldiers who stand round him, and
to the centurions of the first class, to follow him. Arriving near
Ambiorix, he is summoned to lay down his sword: he obeys, and orders his
men to imitate his example. While they discuss the conditions in an
interview which the chief of the Eburones prolongs intentionally,
Sabinus is gradually surrounded and massacred. Then the barbarians,
raising, according to their custom, wild cries, rush upon the Romans and
break their ranks. Cotta and the greatest part of his soldiers perish
with their arms in their hands; the others seek refuge in the camp of
Aduatuca, from whence they had started. The ensign-bearer, L.
Petrosidius, pressed by a crowd of enemies, throws the eagle into the
retrenchments, and dies defending himself bravely at the foot of the
rampart. The unfortunate soldiers strive to sustain the combat till
night, and that very night they kill one another in despair. A few,
however, escaping from the field of battle, cross the forests, and gain
by chance the quarters of T. Labienus, to whom they give information of
this disaster. [429]
[Sidenote: Attack on Cicero’s Camp. ]
XIII. Elated by this victory, Ambiorix immediately repairs with his
cavalry into the country of the Aduatuci, a people adjoining to his
states, and marches without interruption all the night and the following
day: the infantry has orders to follow him. He announces his successes
to the Aduatuci, and urges them to take up arms. Next day he proceeds to
the Nervii, presses them to seize this occasion to avenge their injuries
and deliver themselves for ever from the yoke of the Romans; he informs
them of the death of two lieutenants, and of the destruction of a great
part of the Roman army; he adds that the legion in winter quarters among
them, under the command of Cicero, will be easily surprised and
annihilated; he offers his alliance to the Nervii, and easily persuades
them.
These immediately give information to the Ceutrones, the Grudii, the
Levaci, the Pleumoxii, and the Geiduni, tribes under their dependence:
they collect all the troops they can, and proceed unexpectedly to the
winter quarters of Cicero, before he had learnt the disaster and death
of Sabinus. There, as it had happened recently at Aduatuca, some
soldiers, occupied in cutting wood in the forest, are surprised by the
cavalry. Soon a considerable number of Eburones, Aduatuci, and Nervii,
with their allies and clients, proceed to attack the camp. The Romans
rush to arms, and mount the _vallum_; but that day they make head with
difficulty against an enemy who has placed all his hope in the
promptness of an unforeseen attack, and was convinced that after this
victory nothing further could resist him. [430]
[Sidenote: Cæsar marches to the succour of Cicero. ]
XIV. Cæsar was still at Amiens, ignorant of the events which had just
taken place. Cicero immediately wrote to him, and promised great
recompenses to those who should succeed in delivering his letters to
him; but all the roads were watched, and nobody could reach him. During
the night twenty towers were raised, with an incredible celerity, by
means of the wood which had been already brought for fortifying the
camp,[431] and the works were completed. Next day, the enemies, whose
forces had increased, returned to the attack and began to fill the
fosse. The resistance was as energetic as the day before, and continued
during the following days; among these heroic soldiers constancy and
energy seemed to increase with the peril. Each night they prepare
everything necessary for the defence on the morrow. They make a great
number of stakes hardened by fire, and _pila_ employed in sieges; they
establish with planks the floors of the towers, and by means of hurdles
make parapets and battlements. They work without intermission: neither
wounded nor sick take repose. Cicero himself, though a man of feeble
health, is day and night at work, in spite of the entreaties of his
soldiers, who implore him to spare himself.
Meanwhile, the chiefs and _principes_ of the Nervii proposed an
interview to Cicero. They repeated to him what Ambiorix had said to
Sabinus: “All Gaul is in arms; the Germans have passed the Rhine; the
quarters of Cæsar and his lieutenants are attacked. ” They added:
“Sabinus and his cohorts have perished; the presence of Ambiorix is a
proof of their veracity; Cicero would deceive himself if he reckoned on
the succour of the other legions. As to them, they have no hostile
intention, provided the Romans will discontinue occupying their country.
The legion has full liberty to retire without fear whither it likes. ”
Cicero replied “that it was not the custom of the Roman people to accept
conditions from an enemy in arms; but that, if they consented to lay
them down, he would serve them as a mediator with Cæsar, who would
decide. ”
Deceived in their expectation of intimidating Cicero, the Nervii
surrounded the camp with a rampart nine feet high, and a fosse fifteen
wide. They had observed the Roman works in the preceding campaigns, and
learnt from some prisoners to imitate them. But, as they did not possess
the necessary instruments of iron, they were obliged to cut the turf
with their swords, to take the earth with their hands, and to carry it
in their cloaks. We may judge of their great number by the fact that in
less than three hours they completed a retrenchment of 15,000 feet in
circuit. [432] On the following days, they raised towers to the height of
the _vallum_, prepared hooks (_falces_), and covered galleries
(_testudines_), which they had similarly been taught by the
prisoners. [433]
On the seventh day of the siege, a great wind having arisen, the enemies
threw into the camp fiery darts, and launched from their slings balls of
burning clay (_ferventes fusili ex argilla glandes_). [434] The barracks,
roofed with straw, in the Gaulish manner, soon took fire, and the wind
spread the flames in an instant through the whole camp. Then, raising
great shouts, as though they had already gained the victory, they pushed
forward their towers and covered galleries, and attempted, by means of
ladders, to scale the _vallum_; but such were the courage and steadiness
of the Roman soldiers, that, though surrounded with flames, overwhelmed
with a shower of darts, and knowing well that the fire was devouring
their baggage and their property, not one of them quitted his post, or
even dreamt of turning his head, so much did that desperate struggle
absorb their minds. This was their most trying day. Meanwhile, many of
the enemies were killed and wounded, because, crowding to the foot of
the rampart, the last ranks stopped the retreat of the first. The fire
having been appeased, the barbarians pushed up a tower against the
_vallum_. [435] The centurions of the third cohort, who happened to be
there, drew their men back, and, in bravado, invited, by their gesture
and voice, the enemies to enter. Nobody ventured. Then they drove them
away by a shower of stones, and the tower was burnt. There were in that
legion two centurions, T. Pulio and L. Vorenus, who emulated each other
in bravery by rushing into the midst of the assailants. Thrown down in
turn, and surrounded by enemies, they mutually rescued each other
several times, and returned into the camp without wounds. Defensive arms
then permitted individual courage to perform actual prodigies.
Still the siege continued, and the number of the defenders diminished
daily; provisions began to fall short, as well as the necessaries for
tending the wounded. [436] The frequent messengers sent by Cicero to
Cæsar were intercepted, and some of them cruelly put to death within
view of the camp. At last, Vertico, a Nervian chieftain who had embraced
the cause of the Romans, prevailed upon one of his slaves to take charge
of a letter to Cæsar. His quality of a Gaul enabled him to pass
unperceived, and to give intelligence to the general of Cicero’s danger.
Cæsar received this information at Amiens towards the eleventh hour of
the day (four o’clock in the afternoon). He had only at hand three
legions--that of Trebonius, at Amiens; that of M. Crassus, whose
quarters were at Montdidier, in the country of the Bellovaci, at a
distance of twenty-five miles; and lastly, that which, under C. Fabius,
was wintering in the country of the Morini, at Saint-Pol. [437] (_See
Plate 14. _) He despatched a courier to Crassus, charged with delivering
to him his order to start with his legion in the middle of the night,
and join him in all haste at Amiens, to relieve there the legion of
Trebonius. Another courier was sent to the lieutenant C.
Fabius, to
direct him to take his legion into the territory of the Atrebates, which
Cæsar would cross, and where their junction was to be effected. He wrote
similarly to Labienus, to march with his legion towards the country of
the Nervii, if he could without peril. As to the legion of Roscius and
that of Plancus, which were too far distant, they remained in their
quarters.
Crassus had no sooner received his orders than he began his march; and
next day, towards the third hour (ten o’clock), his couriers announced
his approach. Cæsar left him at Amiens, with one legion, to guard the
baggage of the army, the hostages, the archives, and the winter
provisions. He immediately started in person, without waiting for the
rest of the army, with the legion of Trebonius, and four hundred cavalry
from the neighbouring quarters. He followed, no doubt, the direction
from Amiens to Cambrai, and made that day twenty miles (thirty
kilomètres). He was subsequently joined on his road, probably towards
Bourcies, between Bapaume and Cambrai, by Fabius, who had not lost a
moment in executing his orders. Meanwhile arrived the reply of Labienus.
He informed Cæsar of the events which had taken place among the
Eburones, and of their effect among the Treviri. These latter had just
risen. All their troops had advanced towards him, and surrounded him at
a distance of three miles. In this position, fearing that he should not
be able to resist enemies proud of a recent victory, who would take his
departure for a flight, he thought that there would be danger in
quitting his winter quarters.
Cæsar approved of the resolution taken by Labienus, although it reduced
to two the three legions on which he counted; and, although their
effective force did not amount to more than 7,000 men, as the safety of
the army depended on the celerity of his movements, he proceeded by
forced marches to the country of the Nervii; there he learnt from
prisoners the perilous situation of Cicero. He immediately engaged, by
the promise of great recompenses, a Gaulish horseman to carry a letter
to him: it was written in Greek,[438] in order that the enemy, if he
intercepted it, might not know its meaning. Further, in case the Gaul
could not penetrate to Cicero, he had directed him to attach the letter
to the _amentum_ (see page 37, note 2) of his javelin, and throw it over
the retrenchments. Cæsar wrote that he was approaching in great haste
with his legions, and he exhorted Cicero to persevere in his energetic
defence. According to Polyænus, the despatch contained these words:
θαῥῥεἱν βοἡθειαν προσδἑχου (“Courage! expect succour”). [439]
As soon as he arrived near the camp, the Gaul, not daring to penetrate
to it, did as Cæsar had directed him. By chance his javelin remained two
days stuck in a tower. It was only on the third that it was seen and
carried to Cicero. The letter, read in the presence of the assembled
soldiers, excited transports of joy. Soon afterwards they perceived in
the distance the smoke of burning habitations, which announced the
approach of the army of succour. At that moment, after a five days’
march, it had arrived within twenty kilomètres of Charleroi, near
Binche, where it encamped. The Gauls, when they were informed of it by
their scouts, raised the siege, and then, to the number of about 60,000,
marched to meet the legions.
Cicero, thus liberated, sent another Gaul to announce to Cæsar that the
enemy were turning all their forces against him. At this news, received
towards the middle of the night, Cæsar informed his soldiers, and
strengthened them in their desire of vengeance. At daybreak next day he
raised his camp. After advancing four miles, he perceived a crowd of
enemies on the other side of a great valley traversed by the stream of
the Haine. [440] Cæsar did not consider it prudent to descend into the
valley to engage in combat against so great a number of troops.
Moreover, Cicero once rescued, there was no need for hurrying his march;
he therefore halted, and chose a good position for retrenching--mount
Sainte-Aldegonde. Although his camp, containing hardly 7,000 men,
without baggage, was necessarily of limited extent, he diminished it as
much as possible by giving less width to the streets, in order to
deceive the enemy as to his real strength. At the same time he sent out
scouts to ascertain the best place for crossing the valley.
That day passed in skirmishes of cavalry on the banks of the stream, but
each kept his positions: the Gauls, because they were waiting for
re-enforcements; Cæsar, because he counted on his simulated fear to draw
the enemies out of their position, and compel them to fight on his side
of the Haine, before his camp. If he could not succeed, he obtained time
to reconnoitre the roads sufficiently to pass the river and valley with
less danger. On the morrow, at daybreak, the enemy’s cavalry came up to
the retrenchments, and attacked that of the Romans. Cæsar ordered his
men to give way, and return into the camp; at the same time he caused
the height of the ramparts to be increased, the gates to be stopped up
with mere lumps of turf, and directed his soldiers to execute his
directions with tumultuous haste and all the signs of fear.
The Gauls, drawn on by this feint, passed the stream, and formed in
order of battle in a disadvantageous place. Seeing that the Romans had
even abandoned the _vallum_, they approached nearer to it, threw their
missiles over it from all sides, and caused their heralds to proclaim
round the retrenchments that, until the third hour (ten o’clock), every
Gaul or Roman who should desert to them should have his life saved. At
last, having no hope of forcing the gates, which they supposed to be
solidly fortified, they carried their boldness so far as to begin to
fill up the fosse, and to pull down the palisades with their hands. But
Cæsar held his troops in readiness to profit by the excessive confidence
of the Gauls: at a signal given, they rush through all the gates at
once; the enemy does not resist, but takes to flight, abandoning their
arms, and leaves the ground covered with his dead.
Cæsar did not pursue far, on account of the woods and marshes; he would
not have been able, indeed, to inflict further loss; he marched with his
troops, without having suffered any loss, towards the camp of Cicero,
where he arrived the same day. [441] The towers, the covered galleries,
and the retrenchments of the barbarians, excited his astonishment.
Having assembled the soldiers of Cicero’s legion, nine-tenths of whom
were wounded, he could judge how much danger they had run and how much
courage they had displayed. He loaded with praise the general and
soldiers, addressing individually the centurions and the tribunes who
had distinguished themselves. The prisoners gave him more ample details
on the deaths of Sabinus and Cotta, whose disaster had produced a deep
impression in the army. The next day he reminds the troops convoked for
that purpose of the past event, consoles and encourages them, throws the
fault of this check on the imprudence of the lieutenant, and exhorts
them to resignation the more, because, thanks to the valour of the
soldiers and the protection of the gods, the expiation had been prompt,
and left no further reason for the enemies to rejoice, or for the Romans
to be afflicted. [442]
We see, from what precedes, how small a number of troops, disseminated
over a vast territory, surmounted, by discipline and courage, a
formidable insurrection. Quintus Cicero, by following the principle
invoked by Cotta, _not to enter into negotiations with an enemy in
arms_, saved both his army and his honour. As to Cæsar, he gave proof,
in this circumstance, of an energy and strength of mind which Quintus
Cicero did not fail to point out to his brother when he wrote to
him. [443] If we believe Suetonius and Polyænus, Cæsar felt so great a
grief for the check experienced by Sabinus, that, in sign of mourning,
he let his beard and hair grow until he had avenged his
lieutenants,[444] which only happened in the year following, by the
destruction of the Eburones and the Nervii.
[Sidenote: Cæsar places his Troops in Winter Quarters. Labienus defeats
Indutiomarus. ]
XV. Meanwhile the news of Cæsar’s victory reached Labienus, across the
country of the Remi, with incredible speed: his winter quarters were at
a distance of about sixty miles from Cicero’s camp, where Cæsar had only
arrived after the ninth hour of the day (three o’clock in the
afternoon), and yet before midnight shouts of joy were raised at the
gates of the camp, the acclamations of the Remi who came to congratulate
Labienus. The noise spread in the army of the Treviri, and Indutiomarus,
who had resolved to attack the camp of Labienus next day, withdrew
during the night, and took all his troops with him.
These events having been accomplished, Cæsar distributed the seven
legions he had left in the following manner: he sent Fabius with his
legion to his winter quarters among the Morini, and established himself
in the neighbourhood of Amiens with three legions, which he separated in
three quarters: they were the legion of Crassus, which had remained
stationary, that of Cicero, and that of Trebonius. There are still seen,
along the Somme, in the neighbourhood of Amiens, three camps at a short
distance from each other, which appear to have been those of that
period. [445] Labienus, Plancus, and Roscius continued to occupy the same
positions. The gravity of the circumstances determined Cæsar to remain
all the winter with the army. In fact, on the news of the disaster of
Sabinus, nearly all the people of Gaul showed a disposition to take
arms, sent deputations and messages to each other, communicated their
projects, and deliberated upon the point from which the signal for war
should be given. They held nocturnal assemblies in bye-places, and
during the whole winter not a day passed in which there was not some
meeting or some movement of the Gauls to cause uneasiness to Cæsar. Thus
he learnt from L. Roscius, lieutenant placed at the head of the 13th
legion, that considerable troops of Armorica had assembled to attack
him; they were not more than eight miles from his winter quarters, when
the news of Cæsar’s victory had compelled them to retreat precipitately
and in disorder.
The Roman general called to his presence the _principes_ of each state,
terrified some by letting them know that he was informed of their plots,
exhorted the others to perform their duty, and by these means maintained
the tranquillity of a great part of Gaul. Meanwhile a vexatious event
took place in the country of the Senones, a powerful and influential
nation among the Gauls. They had resolved, in an assembly, to put to
death Cavarinus, whom Cæsar had given them for king. Cavarinus had fled;
upon which they pronounced his deposition, banished him, and pursued him
to the limits of their territory. They had sought to justify themselves
to Cæsar, who ordered them to send him all their senators. They refused.
This boldness on the part of the Senones, by showing to the barbarians
some individuals capable of resisting the Romans, produced so great a
change in their minds, that, with the exception of the Ædui and the
Remi, there was not a people which did not fall under suspicion of
revolt, each desiring to free itself from foreign domination.
During the whole winter, the Treviri and Indutiomarus never ceased
urging the people on the other side of the Rhine to take up arms,
assuring them that the greater part of the Roman army had been
destroyed. But not one of the German nations could be persuaded to pass
the Rhine. The remembrance of the double defeat of Ariovistus and the
Tencteri made them cautious of trying their fortune again. Deceived in
his expectations, Indutiomarus did not discontinue collecting troops,
exercising them, buying horses from the neighbouring countries, and
drawing to him from all parts of Gaul outlaws and condemned criminals.
His ascendency was soon so great, that from all parts people eagerly
sought his friendship and protection.
When he saw some rallying to him spontaneously, others, such as the
Senones and the Carnutes, engaging in his cause through a consciousness
of their fault; the Nervii and the Aduatuci preparing for war, and a
crowd of volunteers disposed to join him as soon as he should have
quitted his country, Indutiomarus, according to the custom of the Gauls
at the beginning of a campaign, called together an assembly in arms. He
pronounced Cingetorix, his son-in-law, who remained faithful to Cæsar,
an enemy of his country; and announced that, in reply to the appeal of
the Senones and Carnutes, he would go to them through the country of the
Remi, whose lands he would ravage; but, above all, he would attack the
camp of Labienus.
The latter, established on the Ourthe, master of a position naturally
formidable, which he had further fortified, was in fear of no attack,
but dreamt, on the contrary, of seizing the first opportunity of
combating with advantage. Informed by Cingetorix of the designs of
Indutiomarus, he demanded cavalry of the neighbouring states, pretended
fear, and, letting the enemy’s cavalry approach with impunity, remained
shut up in his camp.
While, deceived by these appearances, Indutiomarus became daily more
presumptuous, Labienus introduced secretly into his camp during the
night the auxiliary cavalry, and, by keeping a close watch, prevented
the Treviri from being informed of it. The enemy, ignorant of the
arrival of this re-enforcement, advanced nearer and nearer to the
retrenchments, and redoubled his provocations. They were unnoticed, and
towards evening he withdrew in disorder. Suddenly Labienus causes his
cavalry, seconded by his cohorts, to issue by the two gates. Foreseeing
the rout of the enemy, he urges his troops to follow Indutiomarus alone,
and promises great rewards to those who shall bring his head. Fortune
seconded his designs; Indutiomarus was overtaken just at the ford of the
river (the Ourthe), and put to death, and his head was brought into the
camp. The cavalry, in their return, slew all the enemies they found in
their way. The Eburones and the Nervii dispersed. The result of these
events was to give to Gaul a little more tranquillity. [446]
[Sidenote: Observations. ]
XVI. The Emperor Napoleon, in his _Précis des Guerres de César_,
explains in the following manner the advantage the Romans drew from
their camps:--
“The Romans owe the constancy of their successes to the method, from
which they never departed, of encamping every night in a fortified camp,
and of never giving battle without having behind them a retrenched camp,
to serve them as a place of retreat, and to contain their magazines,
their baggage, and their wounded. The nature of arms in those ages was
such that, in these camps, they were not only in safety from the attacks
of an equal army, but even an army which was stronger; they were the
masters to fight or to wait a favourable opportunity. Marius is assailed
by a cloud of Cimbri or Teutones; he shuts himself up in his camp,
remains there until the favourable day or occasion comes, then he issues
with victory before him. Cæsar arrives near the camp of Cicero; the
Gauls abandon the latter, and march to meet the former; they are four
times more numerous. Cæsar takes a position in a few hours, retrenches
his camp, and in it he bears patiently the insults and provocations of
an enemy whom he is not yet willing to combat; but a favourable
opportunity is not long in presenting itself. He then issues through all
his gates; the Gauls are vanquished.
“Why, then, has a rule so wise, so fertile in great results, been
abandoned by modern generals? Because offensive arms have changed its
character; arms for the hand were the principal arms of the ancients; it
was with his short sword that the legionary conquered the world; it was
with the Macedonian pike that Alexander conquered Asia. The principal
arms of modern armies are projectiles; the musket is superior to
anything ever invented by man; no defensive arm is a protection against
it.
“As the principal arm of the ancients was the sword or the pike, their
habitual formation was in deep order. The legion and the phalanx, in
whatever situation they were attacked, either in front, or in right
flank, or in left flank, faced everywhere without disadvantage; they
could encamp on surfaces of small extent, in order to have less labour
in fortifying the line of circuit, and in order to hold their ground
with the smallest detachment possible. The principal arm of the moderns
is the projectile; their habitual order has naturally been narrow order,
the only one which permits them to bring all their projectiles to bear.
“A consular army enclosed in its camp, attacked by a modern army of
equal force, would be driven out of it without assault, and without
being able to use their swords; it would not be necessary to fill up the
fosses or to scale the ramparts: surrounded on all sides by the
attacking army, pierced through, enveloped, and raked by the fire, the
camp would be the common drain of all the shots, of all the balls, of
all the bullets: fire, devastation, and death would open the gates and
throw down the retrenchments. A modern army, placed in a Roman camp,
would at first, no doubt, make use of all its artillery; but, though
equal to the artillery of the besieger, it would be taken in _rouage_
and quickly reduced to silence; a part only of the infantry could use
their muskets, but it would fire upon a line less extended, and would be
far from producing an effect equal to the injury it would receive. The
fire from the centre to the circumference is null; that from the
circumference to the centre is irresistible. All these considerations
have decided modern generals in renouncing the system of retrenched
camps, to adopt instead natural positions well chosen.
“A Roman camp was placed independently of localities: all these were
good for armies whose strength consisted in arms used with the hand; it
required neither experienced eye nor military genius to encamp well;
whereas the choice of positions, the manner of occupying them and
placing the different arms, by taking advantage of the circumstances of
the ground, is an art which forms part of the genius of the modern
captain.
“If it were said now-a-days to a general, You shall have, like Cicero,
under your orders, 5,000 men, sixteen pieces of cannon, 5,000 pioneers’
tools, 5,000 sacks of earth; you shall be within reach of a forest, on
ordinary ground; in fifteen days you shall be attacked by an army of
60,000 men, having 120 pieces of cannon; you shall not be succoured till
eighty or ninety-six hours after having been attacked. What are the
works, what are the plans, what are the profiles, which art prescribes?
Has the art of the engineer secrets which can solve this problem? ”[447]
CHAPTER IX.
(Year of Rome 701. )
(BOOK VI. OF THE “COMMENTARIES. ”)
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE NERVII AND THE TREVIRI--SECOND PASSAGE OF THE
RHINE--WAR AGAINST AMBIORIX AND THE TREVIRI.
[Sidenote: Cæsar augments his Army. ]
I. The state of Gaul gave Cæsar cause to anticipate serious agitations,
and he felt convinced of the necessity of new levies. He employed on
this mission his lieutenants M. Silanus, C. Antistius Reginus, and T.
Sextius; at the same time he asked Pompey, who had remained before Rome
with the _imperium_, in order to watch over the public interests, to
recall to their colours and send him the soldiers of Cisalpine Gaul
enlisted under the consulate of the latter in 699. Cæsar attached, with
a view to the present and to the future, great importance to giving the
Gauls a high idea of the resources of Italy, and to proving to them that
it was easy for the Republic, after a check, not only to repair its
losses, but also to bring into the field troops more numerous than ever.
Pompey, through friendship and consideration for the public good,
granted his demand. Thanks to the activity of his lieutenants, before
the end of winter three new legions (or thirty cohorts) were raised and
joined to the army: the 1st, the 14th, which had just taken the number
of the legion annihilated at Aduatuca, and the 15th. In this manner, the
fifteen cohorts lost under Sabinus were replaced by double their number,
and it was seen, by this rapid display of forces, what was the power of
the military organization and resources of the Roman people. It was the
first time that Cæsar commanded ten legions.
[Sidenote: War against the Nervii, General Assembly of Gaul. ]
II. After the death of Indutiomarus, the Treviri took for their chiefs
some members of his family. These in vain urged the nearest peoples of
the right bank of the Rhine to make common cause with them; but they
succeeded with some of the more distant tribes, particularly the Suevi,
and persuaded Ambiorix to enter into their league. From all parts, from
the Rhine to the Scheldt, were announced preparations for war. The
Nervii, the Aduatuci, the Menapii, all the Germans on this side of the
Rhine, were in arms. The Senones persisted in their disobedience, and
acted in concert with the Carnutes and the neighbouring states;
everything urged upon Cæsar the counsel to open the campaign earlier
than usual. Accordingly, without waiting for the end of winter, he
concentrates the four legions nearest to Amiens, his head-quarters
(those of Fabius, Crassus, Cicero, and Trebonius), invades unexpectedly
the territory of the Nervii, gives them time neither to assemble nor to
fly, but carries off the men and cattle, abandons the booty to the
soldiers, and forces this people to submission.
This expedition so rapidly terminated, the legions returned to their
winter quarters. At the beginning of spring, Cæsar convoked, according
to his custom, the general assembly of Gaul, which met, no doubt, at
Amiens. The different peoples sent thither their representatives, with
the exception of the Senones, the Carnutes, and the Treviri. He regarded
this absence as a sign of revolt, and in order to pursue his designs
without neglecting the general affairs, he resolved to transfer the
assembly nearer to the insurrection, to Lutetia. This town belonged to
the Parisii, who bordered on the Senones, and although formerly these
peoples had formed but one, the Parisii do not appear to have entered
into the conspiracy. Cæsar, having announced this decision from the
summit of his prætorium (_pro suggestu pronuntiata_), started the same
day at the head of his legions, and advanced by forced marches towards
the country of the Senones.
At the news of his approach, Acco, the principal author of the revolt,
ordered the population to retire into the _oppida_; but, taken by
surprise by the arrival of the Romans, the Senones employed the Ædui,
once their patrons, to intercede in their favour. Cæsar pardoned them
without difficulty, preferring to employ the fine season in war than in
the search of those who were culpable. A hundred hostages exacted from
the Senones were entrusted to the Ædui. The Carnutes imitated the
example of the Senones, and, by the intermediation of the Remi, whose
clients they were, obtained their pardon. Cæsar pronounced the close of
the assembly of Gaul, and ordered the different states to furnish their
contingents of cavalry. [448]
[Sidenote: Submission of the Menapii. ]
III. Having pacified this part of the country, Cæsar turned all his
thoughts towards the war with the Treviri and with Ambiorix, the chief
of the Eburones. He was, above all, impatient to take a striking
vengeance for the humiliation inflicted on his arms at Aduatuca. Knowing
well that Ambiorix would not hazard a battle, he sought to penetrate his
designs. Two things were to be feared: the first, that Ambiorix, when
his territory was invaded, would take refuge among the Menapii, whose
country, adjoining that of the Eburones, was defended by woods and vast
marshes, and who, alone among the Gauls, had never made an act of
submission; the second, that he might join the Germans beyond the Rhine,
with whom, as was known, he had entered into friendly relations through
the intermediation of the Treviri. Cæsar conceived the plan of first
preventing these two eventualities, in order to isolate Ambiorix.
Wishing, above all, to reduce to submission the Menapii and Treviri, and
carry the war at the same time into the countries of these two peoples,
he undertook in person the expedition against the Menapii, and entrusted
that against the Treviri to Labienus, his best lieutenant, who had
operated against them on several occasions. Labienus, after his victory
over Indutiomarus, had continued in his winter quarters with his legions
at Lavacherie, on the Ourthe. [449] Cæsar sent him all the baggage of
the army and two legions. He marched in person towards the country of
the Menapii, at the head of five legions without baggage. He took with
him Cavarinus and the Senonese cavalry, fearing lest the resentment of
this king against his people, or the hatred which he had drawn upon
himself, might raise some disorders, and, following the general
direction of Sens, Soissons, Bavay, and Brussels, he reached the
frontier of the Menapii. The latter, trusting in the nature of the
ground, had assembled no forces, but took refuge in the woods and
marshes. Cæsar divided his troops with the lieutenant C. Fabius and the
questor M. Crassus, formed them into three columns, and, causing bridges
to be hastily constructed, to cross the marshy water-courses, penetrated
at three points into their territory, which he ravaged. The Menapii,
reduced to extremity, demanded peace: it was granted to them on the
express condition that they should refuse all shelter to Ambiorix or to
his lieutenants. Cæsar left Commius among them with part of the cavalry
to hold them under surveillance, and marched thence towards the country
of the Treviri. [450]
[Sidenote: Success of Labienus against the Treviri. ]
IV. On his part, Labienus had obtained brilliant successes; the Treviri
had marched with considerable forces against his winter quarters. They
were no more than two days’ march from him, when they learnt that he
had been joined by two other legions. Resolving then to wait the succour
of the Germans, they halted at a distance of fifteen miles from the camp
of Labienus. The latter, informed of the cause of their inaction, and
hoping that their imprudence would present an opportunity for giving
battle, left five cohorts to guard the greatest part of the baggage,
and, with the twenty-five others and a numerous cavalry, established his
camp within a mile of the enemy.
The two armies were separated by the river Ourthe, the passage of which
was rendered difficult by the steepness of the banks. Labienus had no
intention of crossing it, but he feared that the enemy might imitate his
prudence until the arrival of the Germans, who were expected
immediately. To draw them to him, he spread a rumour that he should
withdraw on the morrow at break of day, in order to avoid having to
combat the united forces of the Treviri and the Germans. He assembled
during the night the tribunes and centurions of the first class,
informed them of his design, and, contrary to Roman discipline, broke up
his camp with every appearance of disorder and a precipitate retreat.
The proximity of the camps allowed the enemy to obtain information of
this movement by his scouts before daybreak.
The rear-guard of Labienus had no sooner begun its march, than the
barbarians urge each other not to let a prey so long coveted escape
them. They imagine that the Romans are struck with terror, and, thinking
it disgraceful to wait any longer the succour of the Germans, they cross
the river and advance unhesitatingly upon unfavourable ground.
Labienus, seeing the success of his stratagem, continued slowly his
apparent retreat, in order to draw all the Gauls over the river. He had
sent forward, to an eminence, the baggage, guarded by a detachment of
cavalry. Suddenly he orders the ensigns to be turned towards the enemy,
forms his troops in order of battle, the cavalry on the wings, and
exhorts them to display the same valour as if Cæsar were present. Then
an immense cry rises in the ranks, and the _pila_ are thrown from all
sides. The Gauls, surprised at seeing an enemy they believed they were
pursuing turn against them, did not sustain even the first shock, but
fled precipitately into the neighbouring forests. Pressed by the
cavalry, they were slain or captured in great numbers.
Labienus employed those wise tactics to which the Romans owed their
greatest successes. Invincible in their fortified camps, they could, as
the Emperor Napoleon I. has so well remarked, either combat or wait for
the opportune moment. The Gauls, on the contrary, warlike peoples,
carried away by a fiery courage, not understanding the patience and
wiliness of their adversaries, fell always into the snare which was laid
for them. It was enough to feign terror, and inspire them with contempt
for the enemy’s forces, to make them engage instantly in disorderly
attacks, which the Romans, by sudden sorties, easily defeated. This was
the system followed by Sabinus when attacked by the Unelli, by Cæsar on
his way to the relief of Cicero, and by Labienus himself in the previous
year.
A few days afterwards the country submitted; for, on the news of the
defeat of the Treviri, the Germans returned home, followed by the
relatives of Indutiomarus, the author of the revolt. Cingetorix,
constant in his fidelity to the Romans, was replaced at the head of the
nation. The double object proposed by Cæsar was thus attained; for, on
one hand, since the submission of the Menapii, Ambiorix could no longer
dream of finding a refuge among them; and, on the other, the victory of
Labienus, followed by the retreat of the Germans, placed it out of his
power to league with these latter. Nevertheless, to assure this double
result, punish the Germans for their readiness to succour the Treviri,
and cut off Ambiorix from all retreat, Cæsar, after having effected his
junction with Labienus, resolved to pass the Rhine a second time. [451]
[Sidenote: Second Passage of the Rhine. ]
V. He had passed from the country of the Menapii into that of the
Treviri, and had arrived near the locality where now stands the town of
Bonn. He there caused a bridge to be built a little above the spot where
his army had crossed two years before. In consequence of the experience
gained by the processes employed on the former occasion, and of the
extreme zeal of the soldiers, the work was finished in a few days.
Having left for the protection of the bridge a strong detachment on the
bank belonging to the Treviri, for fear of some movement on their part,
Cæsar crossed the river with the legions and the cavalry.
