Now there
are two rules of the human will: one is proximate and homogeneous, viz.
are two rules of the human will: one is proximate and homogeneous, viz.
Summa Theologica
Consequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease;
even as virtue extends to more things than health; for health itself is
reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17). Consequently vice is
reckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or
disease.
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Whether vice is contrary to nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. Because
vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above [1684](A[1]). Now virtue is
in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as stated above
(Q[63], AA[1] ,2,3). Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
Objection 2: Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that
which is contrary to nature: thus "a stone never becomes habituated to
upward movement" (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated to
vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
Objection 3: Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in
the greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice is
found in the greater number of men; for it is written (Mat. 7:13):
"Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who
go in thereat. " Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
Objection 4: Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as
stated above [1685](A[1]). Now sin is defined as "a word, deed, or
desire, contrary to the Law of God," as Augustine shows (Contra Faust.
xxii, 27). But the Law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say
that vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): "Every vice,
simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature. "
I answer that, As stated above [1686](A[1]), vice is contrary to
virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed
in a manner befitting its nature, as stated above [1687](A[1]). Hence
the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not
befitting its nature, and for this reason is that thing "vituperated,"
which word is derived from "vice" according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb.
iii, 14).
But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form
from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his species
from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the
order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man,
as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the
nature of man, as man. Now "man's good is to be in accord with reason,
and his evil is to be against reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom.
iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good,
is in accord with man's nature, for as much as it accords with his
reason: while vice is contrary to man's nature, in so far as it is
contrary to the order of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the virtues are not caused by nature as
regards their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which
accords with reason, i. e. with the order of reason. For Cicero says (De
Inv. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit in accord with reason, like a
second nature": and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in
accord with nature, and on the other hand that vice is contrary to
nature.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing
being against nature, in so far as "being against nature" is contrary
to "being from nature": and not in so far as "being against nature" is
contrary to "being in accord with nature," in which latter sense
virtues are said to be in accord with nature, in as much as they
incline us to that which is suitable to nature.
Reply to Objection 3: There is a twofold nature in man, rational
nature, and the sensitive nature. And since it is through the operation
of his senses that man accomplishes acts of reason, hence there are
more who follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than who
follow the order of reason: because more reach the beginning of a
business than achieve its completion. Now the presence of vices and
sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his
sensitive nature against the order of his reason.
Reply to Objection 4: Whatever is irregular in a work of art, is
unnatural to the art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is
compared to the order of human reason, as art to a work of art.
Therefore it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the
order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law.
Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 6) that "every nature, as such,
is from God; and is a vicious nature, in so far as it fails from the
Divine art whereby it was made. "
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Whether vice is worse than a vicious act?
Objection 1: It would seem that vice, i. e. a bad habit, is worse than a
sin, i. e. a bad act. For, as the more lasting a good is, the better it
is, so the longer an evil lasts, the worse it is. Now a vicious habit
is more lasting than vicious acts, that pass forthwith. Therefore a
vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.
Objection 2: Further, several evils are more to be shunned than one.
But a bad habit is virtually the cause of many bad acts. Therefore a
vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.
Objection 3: Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But a
habit produces its actions both as to their goodness and as to their
badness. Therefore a habit is more potent than its act, both in
goodness and in badness.
On the contrary, A man is justly punished for a vicious act; but not
for a vicious habit, so long as no act ensues. Therefore a vicious
action is worse than a vicious habit.
I answer that, A habit stands midway between power and act. Now it is
evident that both in good and in evil, act precedes power, as stated in
Metaph. ix, 19. For it is better to do well than to be able to do well,
and in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do evil, than to be able
to do evil: whence it also follows that both in goodness and in
badness, habit stands midway between power and act, so that, to wit,
even as a good or evil habit stands above the corresponding power in
goodness or in badness, so does it stand below the corresponding act.
This is also made clear from the fact that a habit is not called good
or bad, save in so far as it induces to a good or bad act: wherefore a
habit is called good or bad by reason of the goodness or badness of its
act: so that an act surpasses its habit in goodness or badness, since
"the cause of a thing being such, is yet more so. "
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders one thing from standing above
another simply, and below it in some respect. Now a thing is deemed
above another simply if it surpasses it in a point which is proper to
both; while it is deemed above it in a certain respect, if it surpasses
it in something which is accidental to both. Now it has been shown from
the very nature of act and habit, that act surpasses habit both in
goodness and in badness. Whereas the fact that habit is more lasting
than act, is accidental to them, and is due to the fact that they are
both found in a nature such that it cannot always be in action, and
whose action consists in a transient movement. Consequently act simply
excels in goodness and badness, but habit excels in a certain respect.
Reply to Objection 2: A habit is several acts, not simply, but in a
certain respect, i. e. virtually. Wherefore this does not prove that
habit precedes act simply, both in goodness and in badness.
Reply to Objection 3: Habit causes act by way of efficient causality:
but act causes habit, by way of final causality, in respect of which we
consider the nature of good and evil. Consequently act surpasses habit
both in goodness and in badness.
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Whether sin is compatible with virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that a vicious act, i. e. sin, is
incompatible with virtue. For contraries cannot be together in the same
subject. Now sin is, in some way, contrary to virtue, as stated above
[1688](A[1]). Therefore sin is incompatible with virtue.
Objection 2: Further, sin is worse than vice, i. e. evil act than evil
habit. But vice cannot be in the same subject with virtue: neither,
therefore, can sin.
Objection 3: Further, sin occurs in natural things, even as in
voluntary matters (Phys. ii, text. 82). Now sin never happens in
natural things, except through some corruption of the natural power;
thus monsters are due to corruption of some elemental force in the
seed, as stated in Phys. ii. Therefore no sin occurs in voluntary
matters, except through the corruption of some virtue in the soul: so
that sin and virtue cannot be together in the same subject.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2,3) that "virtue is
engendered and corrupted by contrary causes. " Now one virtuous act does
not cause a virtue, as stated above ([1689]Q[51], A[3]): and,
consequently, one sinful act does not corrupt virtue. Therefore they
can be together in the same subject.
I answer that, Sin is compared to virtue, as evil act to good habit.
Now the position of a habit in the soul is not the same as that of a
form in a natural thing. For the form of a natural thing produces, of
necessity, an operation befitting itself; wherefore a natural form is
incompatible with the act of a contrary form: thus heat is incompatible
with the act of cooling, and lightness with downward movement (except
perhaps violence be used by some extrinsic mover): whereas the habit
that resides in the soul, does not, of necessity, produce its
operation, but is used by man when he wills. Consequently man, while
possessing a habit, may either fail to use the habit, or produce a
contrary act; and so a man having a virtue may produce an act of sin.
And this sinful act, so long as there is but one, cannot corrupt
virtue, if we compare the act to the virtue itself as a habit: since,
just as habit is not engendered by one act, so neither is it destroyed
by one act as stated above ([1690]Q[63], A[2], ad 2). But if we compare
the sinful act to the cause of the virtues, then it is possible for
some virtues to be destroyed by one sinful act. For every mortal sin is
contrary to charity, which is the root of all the infused virtues, as
virtues; and consequently, charity being banished by one act of mortal
sin, it follows that all the infused virtues are expelled "as virtues. "
And I say on account of faith and hope, whose habits remain unquickened
after mortal sin, so that they are no longer virtues. On the other
hand, since venial sin is neither contrary to charity, nor banishes it,
as a consequence, neither does it expel the other virtues. As to the
acquired virtues, they are not destroyed by one act of any kind of sin.
Accordingly, mortal sin is incompatible with the infused virtues, but
is consistent with acquired virtue: while venial sin is compatible with
virtues, whether infused or acquired.
Reply to Objection 1: Sin is contrary to virtue, not by reason of
itself, but by reason of its act. Hence sin is incompatible with the
act, but not with the habit, of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin
to virtuous act: and so vice excludes virtue, just as sin excludes acts
of virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: The natural powers act of necessity, and hence so
long as the power is unimpaired, no sin can be found in the act. On the
other hand, the virtues of the soul do not produce their acts of
necessity; hence the comparison fails.
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Whether every sin includes an action?
Objection 1: It would seem that every sin includes an action. For as
merit is compared with virtue, even so is sin compared with vice. Now
there can be no merit without an action. Neither, therefore, can there
be sin without action.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De
Vera Relig. xiv. ]: So "true is it that every sin is voluntary, that,
unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all. " Now nothing can be
voluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore every sin implies
an act.
Objection 3: Further, if sin could be without act, it would follow that
a man sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought. Now he who never
does something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he
ought. Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; and this is
untrue. Therefore there is no sin without an act.
On the contrary, It is written (James 4:17): "To him . . . who knoweth
to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin. " Now "not to do" does
not imply an act. Therefore sin can be without act.
I answer that, The reason for urging this question has reference to the
sin of omission, about which there have been various opinions. For some
say that in every sin of omission there is some act, either interior or
exterior---interior, as when a man wills "not to go to church," when he
is bound to go---exterior, as when a man, at the very hour that he is
bound to go to church (or even before), occupies himself in such a way
that he is hindered from going. This seems, in a way, to amount to the
same as the first, for whoever wills one thing that is incompatible
with this other, wills, consequently, to go without this other: unless,
perchance, it does not occur to him, that what he wishes to do, will
hinder him from that which he is bound to do, in which case he might be
deemed guilty of negligence. On the other hand, others say, that a sin
of omission does not necessarily suppose an act: for the mere fact of
not doing what one is bound to do is a sin.
Now each of these opinions has some truth in it. For if in the sin of
omission we look merely at that in which the essence of the sin
consists, the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act,
as when a man wills "not to go to church": while sometimes it will be
without any act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man, at
the time that he is bound to go to church, does not think of going or
not going to church.
If, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also the causes, or
occasions of the omission, then the sin of omission must of necessity
include some act. For there is no sin of omission, unless we omit what
we can do or not do: and that we turn aside so as not to do what we can
do or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion, either
united with the omission or preceding it. Now if this cause be not in
man's power, the omission will not be sinful, as when anyone omits
going to church on account of sickness: but if the cause or occasion be
subject to the will, the omission is sinful; and such cause, in so far
as it is voluntary, must needs always include some act, at least the
interior act of the will: which act sometimes bears directly on the
omission, as when a man wills "not to go to church," because it is too
much trouble; and in this case this act, of its very nature, belongs to
the omission, because the volition of any sin whatever, pertains, of
itself, to that sin, since voluntariness is essential to sin.
Sometimes, however, the act of the will bears directly on something
else which hinders man from doing what he ought, whether this something
else be united with the omission, as when a man wills to play at the
time he ought to go to church---or, precede the omission, as when a man
wills to sit up late at night, the result being that he does not go to
church in the morning. In this case the act, interior or exterior, is
accidental to the omission, since the omission follows outside the
intention, and that which is outside the intention is said to be
accidental (Phys. ii, text. 49,50). Wherefore it is evident that then
the sin of omission has indeed an act united with, or preceding the
omission, but that this act is accidental to the sin of omission.
Now in judging about things, we must be guided by that which is proper
to them, and not by that which is accidental: and consequently it is
truer to say that a sin can be without any act; else the circumstantial
acts and occasions would be essential to other actual sins.
Reply to Objection 1: More things are required for good than for evil,
since "good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil results
from each single defect," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): so that
sin may arise from a man doing what he ought not, or by his not doing
what he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man do willingly
what he ought to do: wherefore there can be no merit without act,
whereas there can be sin without act.
Reply to Objection 2: The term "voluntary" is applied not only to that
on which the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that which
we have the power to do or not to do, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. Hence
even not to will may be called voluntary, in so far as man has it in
his power to will, and not to will.
Reply to Objection 3: The sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative
precept which binds always, but not for always. Hence, by omitting to
act, a man sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept
binds him to act.
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Whether sin is fittingly defined as a word, deed, or desire contrary to the
eternal law?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying:
"Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law. " Because
"Word," "deed," and "desire" imply an act; whereas not every sin
implies an act, as stated above [1691](A[5]). Therefore this definition
does not include every sin.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. xii): "Sin is the
will to retain or obtain what justice forbids. " Now will is comprised
under desire, in so far as desire denotes any act of the appetite.
Therefore it was enough to say: "Sin is a desire contrary to the
eternal law," nor was there need to add "word" or "deed. "
Objection 3: Further, sin apparently consists properly in aversion from
the end: because good and evil are measured chiefly with regard to the
end as explained above ([1692]Q[1], A[3];[1693] Q[18], AA[4],6;[1694]
Q[20], AA[2],3): wherefore Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i) defines sin in
reference to the end, by saying that "sin is nothing else than to
neglect eternal things, and seek after temporal things": and again he
says (Qq. lxxxii, qu. 30) that "all human wickedness consists in using
what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we should use. " Now the
definition is question contains no mention of aversion from our due
end: therefore it is an insufficient definition of sin.
Objection 4: Further, a thing is said to be forbidden, because it is
contrary to the law. Now not all sins are evil through being forbidden,
but some are forbidden because they are evil. Therefore sin in general
should not be defined as being against the law of God.
Objection 5: Further, a sin denotes a bad human act, as was explained
above [1695](A[1]). Now man's evil is to be against reason, as
Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore it would have been better to
say that sin is against reason than to say that it is contrary to the
eternal law.
On the contrary, the authority of Augustine suffices (Contra Faust.
xxii, 27).
I answer that, As was shown above [1696](A[1]), sin is nothing else
than a bad human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to its
being voluntary, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]), whether it be voluntary,
as being elicited by the will, e. g. to will or to choose, or as being
commanded by the will, e. g. the exterior actions of speech or
operation. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with
its due measure: and conformity of measure in a thing depends on a
rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommensurate.
Now there
are two rules of the human will: one is proximate and homogeneous, viz.
the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law,
which is God's reason, so to speak. Accordingly Augustine (Contra
Faust. xxii, 27) includes two things in the definition of sin; one,
pertaining to the substance of a human act, and which is the matter, so
to speak, of sin, when he says "word," "deed," or "desire"; the other,
pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were, of
sin, when he says, "contrary to the eternal law. "
Reply to Objection 1: Affirmation and negation are reduced to one same
genus: e. g. in Divine things, begotten and unbegotten are reduced to
the genus "relation," as Augustine states (De Trin. v, 6,7): and so
"word" and "deed" denote equally what is said and what is not said,
what is done and what is not done.
Reply to Objection 2: The first cause of sin is in the will, which
commands all voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found: and
hence it is that Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the
will alone. But since external acts also pertain to the substance of
sin, through being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in
defining sin to include something referring to external action.
Reply to Objection 3: The eternal law first and foremost directs man to
his end, and in consequence, makes man to be well disposed in regard to
things which are directed to the end: hence when he says, "contrary to
the eternal law," he includes aversion from the end and all other forms
of inordinateness.
Reply to Objection 4: When it is said that not every sin is evil
through being forbidden, this must be understood of prohibition by
positive law. If, however, the prohibition be referred to the natural
law, which is contained primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily
in the natural code of the human reason, then every sin is evil through
being prohibited: since it is contrary to natural law, precisely
because it is inordinate.
Reply to Objection 5: The theologian considers sin chiefly as an
offense against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary
to reason. Hence Augustine defines sin with reference to its being
"contrary to the eternal law," more fittingly than with reference to
its being contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs
us in many things that surpass human reason, e. g. in matters of faith.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS (NINE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the distinction of sins or vices: under which head
there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects?
(2) Of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins;
(3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes?
(4) Whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against?
(5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment?
(6) Whether they differ in regard to omission and commission?
(7) Whether they differ according to their various stages?
(8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency?
(9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances?
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Whether sins differ in species according to their objects?
Objection 1: It would seem that sins do not differ in species,
according to their objects. For acts are said to be good or evil, in
relation, chiefly, to their end, as shown above ([1697]Q[1],
A[3];[1698] Q[18], AA[4],6). Since then sin is nothing else than a bad
human act, as stated above ([1699]Q[71], A[1]), it seems that sins
should differ specifically according to their ends rather than
according to their objects.
Objection 2: Further, evil, being a privation, differs specifically
according to the different species of opposites. Now sin is an evil in
the genus of human acts. Therefore sins differ specifically according
to their opposites rather than according to their objects.
Objection 3: Further, if sins differed specifically according to their
objects, it would be impossible to find the same specific sin with
diverse objects: and yet such sins are to be found. For pride is about
things spiritual and material as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 18); and
avarice is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins do not
differ in species according to their objects.
On the contrary, "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against God's law. "
Now words, deeds, and desires differ in species according to their
various objects: since acts differ by their objects, as stated above
([1700]Q[18], A[2] ). Therefore sins, also differ in species according
to their objects.
I answer that, As stated above ([1701]Q[71], A[6]), two things concur
in the nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its inordinateness,
which consists in departing from God's law. Of these two, one is
referred essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act in
such and such matter; while the other, viz. the inordinateness of the
act, is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, for "no
one acts intending evil," as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). Now it
is evident that a thing derives its species from that which is
essential and not from that which is accidental: because what is
accidental is outside the specific nature. Consequently sins differ
specifically on the part of the voluntary acts rather than of the
inordinateness inherent to sin. Now voluntary acts differ in species
according to their objects, as was proved above ([1702]Q[18], A[2]).
Therefore it follows that sins are properly distinguished in species by
their objects.
Reply to Objection 1: The aspect of good is found chiefly in the end:
and therefore the end stands in the relation of object to the act of
the will which is at the root of every sin. Consequently it amounts to
the same whether sins differ by their objects or by their ends.
Reply to Objection 2: Sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived
of its due order: hence sins differ specifically according to their
objects of their acts rather than according to their opposites,
although, even if they were distinguished in reference to their
opposite virtues, it would come to the same: since virtues differ
specifically according to their objects, as stated above ([1703]Q[60],
A[5]).
Reply to Objection 3: In various things, differing in species or genus,
nothing hinders our finding one formal aspect of the object, from which
aspect sin receives its species. It is thus that pride seeks excellence
in reference to various things; and avarice seeks abundance of things
adapted to human use.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether spiritual sins are fittingly distinguished from carnal sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual sins are unfittingly
distinguished from carnal sins. For the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): "The
works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness,
immodesty, luxury, idolatry, witchcrafts," etc. from which it seems
that all kinds of sins are works of the flesh. Now carnal sins are
called works of the flesh. Therefore carnal sins should not be
distinguished from spiritual sins.
Objection 2: Further, whosoever sins, walks according to the flesh, as
stated in Rom. 8:13: "If you live according to the flesh, you shall
die. But if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall
live. " Now to live or walk according to the flesh seems to pertain to
the nature of carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins should not be
distinguished from spiritual sins.
Objection 3: Further, the higher part of the soul, which is the mind or
reason, is called the spirit, according to Eph. 4:23: "Be renewed in
the spirit of your mind," where spirit stands for reason, according to
a gloss. Now every sin, which is committed in accordance with the
flesh, flows from the reason by its consent; since consent in a sinful
act belongs to the higher reason, as we shall state further on
([1704]Q[74], A[7]). Therefore the same sins are both carnal and
spiritual, and consequently they should not be distinguished from one
another.
Objection 4: Further, if some sins are carnal specifically, this,
seemingly, should apply chiefly to those sins whereby man sins against
his own body. But, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), "every sin
that a man doth, is without the body: but he that committeth
fornication, sinneth against his own body. " Therefore fornication would
be the only carnal sin, whereas the Apostle (Eph. 5:3) reckons
covetousness with the carnal sins.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) says that "of the seven
capital sins five are spiritual, and two carnal. "
I answer that, As stated above [1705](A[1]), sins take their species
from their objects. Now every sin consists in the desire for some
mutable good, for which man has an inordinate desire, and the
possession of which gives him inordinate pleasure. Now, as explained
above (Q[31], A[3]), pleasure is twofold. One belongs to the soul, and
is consummated in the mere apprehension of a thing possessed in
accordance with desire; this can also be called spiritual pleasure,
e. g. when one takes pleasure in human praise or the like. The other
pleasure is bodily or natural, and is realized in bodily touch, and
this can also be called carnal pleasure.
Accordingly, those sins which consist in spiritual pleasure, are called
spiritual sins; while those which consist in carnal pleasure, are
called carnal sins, e. g. gluttony, which consists in the pleasures of
the table; and lust, which consists in sexual pleasures. Hence the
Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:1): "Let us cleanse ourselves from all
defilement of the flesh and of the spirit. "
Reply to Objection 1: As a gloss says on the same passage, these vices
are called works of the flesh, not as though they consisted in carnal
pleasure; but flesh here denotes man, who is said to live according to
the flesh, when he lives according to himself, as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 2,3). The reason of this is because every failing in the
human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: Even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act,
viz. the act of reason: but the end of these sins, from which they are
named, is carnal pleasure.
Reply to Objection 4: As the gloss says, "in the sin of fornication the
soul is the body's slave in a special sense, because at the moment of
sinning it can think of nothing else": whereas the pleasure of
gluttony, although carnal, does not so utterly absorb the reason. It
may also be said that in this sin, an injury is done to the body also,
for it is defiled inordinately: wherefore by this sin alone is man said
specifically to sin against his body. While covetousness, which is
reckoned among the carnal sins, stands here for adultery, which is the
unjust appropriation of another's wife. Again, it may be said that the
thing in which the covetous man takes pleasure is something bodily, and
in this respect covetousness is numbered with the carnal sins: but the
pleasure itself does not belong to the body, but to the spirit,
wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that it is a spiritual sin.
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Whether sins differ specifically in reference to their causes?
Objection 1: It would seem that sins differ specifically in reference
to their causes. For a thing takes its species from that whence it
derives its being. Now sins derive their being from their causes.
Therefore they take their species from them also. Therefore they differ
specifically in reference to their causes.
Objection 2: Further, of all the causes the material cause seems to
have least reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like
its material cause. Since, therefore, sins differ specifically
according to their objects, it seems that much more do they differ in
reference to their other causes.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 79:17, "Things set
on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to fear
inducing false humility, or to love enkindling us to undue ardor. " For
it is written (1 Jn. 2:16) that "all that is in the world, is the
concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg. : 'and'] the concupiscence of the
eyes, or [Vulg. : 'and'] the pride of life. " Now a thing is said to be
in the world on account of sin, in as much as the world denotes lovers
of the world, as Augustine observes (Tract. ii in Joan. ). Gregory, too
(Moral. xxxi, 17), distinguishes all sins according to the seven
capital vices. Now all these divisions refer to the causes of sins.
Therefore, seemingly, sins differ specifically according to the
diversity of their causes.
On the contrary, If this were the case all sins would belong to one
species, since they are due to one cause. For it is written (Ecclus.
10:15) that "pride is the beginning of all sin," and (1 Tim. 6:10) that
"the desire of money is the root of all evils. " Now it is evident that
there are various species of sins. Therefore sins do not differ
specifically according to their different causes.
I answer that, Since there are four kinds of causes, they are
attributed to various things in various ways. Because the "formal" and
the "material" cause regard properly the substance of a thing; and
consequently substances differ in respect of their matter and form,
both in species and in genus. The "agent" and the "end" regard directly
movement and operation: wherefore movements and operations differ
specifically in respect of these causes; in different ways, however,
because the natural active principles are always determined to the same
acts; so that the different species of natural acts are taken not only
from the objects, which are the ends or terms of those acts, but also
from their active principles: thus heating and cooling are specifically
distinct with reference to hot and cold. On the other hand, the active
principles in voluntary acts, such as the acts of sins, are not
determined, of necessity, to one act, and consequently from one active
or motive principle, diverse species of sins can proceed: thus from
fear engendering false humility man may proceed to theft, or murder, or
to neglect the flock committed to his care; and these same things may
proceed from love enkindling to undue ardor. Hence it is evident that
sins do not differ specifically according to their various active or
motive causes, but only in respect of diversity in the final cause,
which is the end and object of the will. For it has been shown above
([1706]Q[1], A[3];[1707] Q[18], AA[4],6) that human acts take their
species from the end.
Reply to Objection 1: The active principles in voluntary acts, not
being determined to one act, do not suffice for the production of human
acts, unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the end,
as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. ix, text. 15,16), and consequently
sin derives both its being and its species from the end.
Reply to Objection 2: Objects, in relation to external acts, have the
character of matter "about which"; but, in relation to the interior act
of the will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to this
that they give the act its species. Nevertheless, even considered as
the matter "about which," they have the character of term, from which
movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4; Ethic. x, 4); yet even
terms of movement specify movements, in so far as term has the
character of end.
Reply to Objection 3: These distinctions of sins are given, not as
distinct species of sins, but to show their various causes.
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Whether sin is fittingly divided into sin against God, against oneself, and
against one's neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin
against God, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that
which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the
division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against God: for it
is stated in the definition of sin that it is "against God's law," as
stated above ([1708]Q[66], A[6]). Therefore sin against God should not
be reckoned a part of the division of sin.
Objection 2: Further, every division should consist of things in
opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not opposed
to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins against
himself and against God. Therefore sin is not fittingly divided into
these three.
Objection 3: Further, specification is not taken from things external.
But God and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are not
distinguished specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin is
unfittingly divided according to these three.
On the contrary, Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of
sins, says that "man is said to sin against himself, against God, and
against his neighbor. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1709]Q[71], AA[1],6), sin is an
inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold order in man: one in
relation to the rule of reason, in so far as all our actions and
passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason: another order
is in relation to the rule of the Divine Law, whereby man should be
directed in all things: and if man were by nature a solitary animal,
this twofold order would suffice. But since man is naturally a civic
and social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2, hence a third order is
necessary, whereby man is directed in relation to other men among whom
he has to dwell. Of these orders the second contains the first and
surpasses it. For whatever things are comprised under the order of
reason, are comprised under the order of God Himself. Yet some things
are comprised under the order of God, which surpass the human reason,
such as matters of faith, and things due to God alone. Hence he that
sins in such matters, for instance, by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy,
is said to sin against God. In like manner, the first order includes
the third and surpasses it, because in all things wherein we are
directed in reference to our neighbor, we need to be directed according
to the order of reason. Yet in some things we are directed according to
reason, in relation to ourselves only, and not in reference to our
neighbor; and when man sins in these matters, he is said to sin against
himself, as is seen in the glutton, the lustful, and the prodigal. But
when man sins in matters concerning his neighbor, he is said to sin
against his neighbor, as appears in the thief and murderer. Now the
things whereby man is directed to God, his neighbor, and himself are
diverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their
objects, according to which the species of sins are diversified: and
consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different
species of sins: because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed,
differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from
what has been said ([1710]Q[62], AA[1],2,3) that by the theological
virtues man is directed to God; by temperance and fortitude, to
himself; and by justice to his neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: To sin against God is common to all sins, in so
far as the order to God includes every human order; but in so far as
order to God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a
special kind of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: When several things, of which one includes
another, are distinct from one another, this distinction is understood
to refer, not to the part contained in another, but to that in which
one goes beyond another. This may be seen in the division of numbers
and figures: for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure
not in respect of its being contained thereby, but in respect of that
in which it is surpassed thereby: and the same applies to the numbers
three and four.
Reply to Objection 3: Although God and our neighbor are external to the
sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are
related to it as to its object.
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Whether the division of sins according to their debt of punishment
diversifies their species?
Objection 1: It would seem that the division of sins according to their
debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, when sin is
divided into "mortal" and "venial. " For things which are infinitely
apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even to the same genus.
But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since temporal
punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal punishment to mortal sin;
and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the gravity of the
fault, according to Dt. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin
shall the measure be also of the stripes be. " Therefore venial and
mortal sins are not of the same genus, nor can they be said to belong
to the same species.
Objection 2: Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species
[*"Ex genere," genus in this case denoting the species], as murder and
adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in an idle
word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial and mortal sins differ
specifically.
Objection 3: Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its
reward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward is
the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of sin.
Now sins differ specifically in relation to their ends, as stated above
(A[1], ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically distinct according
to the debt of punishment.
On the contrary, Those things that constitute a species are prior to
the species, e. g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin as
the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according
to the debt of punishment.
I answer that, In things that differ specifically we find a twofold
difference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to be
found save in different species, e. g. "rational" and "irrational,"
"animate," and "inanimate": the other difference is consequent to
specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may be consequent to
specific diversity, yet, in others, it may be found within the same
species; thus "white" and "black" are consequent to the specific
diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within the
one species of man.
We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal
sin, or any other difference is respect of the debt of punishment,
cannot be a difference constituting specific diversity. For what is
accidental never constitutes a species; and what is outside the agent's
intention is accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is evident that
punishment is outside the intention of the sinner, wherefore it is
accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless it
is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, viz.
even as virtue extends to more things than health; for health itself is
reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17). Consequently vice is
reckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or
disease.
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Whether vice is contrary to nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. Because
vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above [1684](A[1]). Now virtue is
in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as stated above
(Q[63], AA[1] ,2,3). Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
Objection 2: Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that
which is contrary to nature: thus "a stone never becomes habituated to
upward movement" (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated to
vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
Objection 3: Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in
the greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice is
found in the greater number of men; for it is written (Mat. 7:13):
"Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who
go in thereat. " Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
Objection 4: Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as
stated above [1685](A[1]). Now sin is defined as "a word, deed, or
desire, contrary to the Law of God," as Augustine shows (Contra Faust.
xxii, 27). But the Law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say
that vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): "Every vice,
simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature. "
I answer that, As stated above [1686](A[1]), vice is contrary to
virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed
in a manner befitting its nature, as stated above [1687](A[1]). Hence
the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not
befitting its nature, and for this reason is that thing "vituperated,"
which word is derived from "vice" according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb.
iii, 14).
But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form
from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his species
from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the
order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man,
as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the
nature of man, as man. Now "man's good is to be in accord with reason,
and his evil is to be against reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom.
iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man good, and his work good,
is in accord with man's nature, for as much as it accords with his
reason: while vice is contrary to man's nature, in so far as it is
contrary to the order of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: Although the virtues are not caused by nature as
regards their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which
accords with reason, i. e. with the order of reason. For Cicero says (De
Inv. Rhet. ii) that "virtue is a habit in accord with reason, like a
second nature": and it is in this sense that virtue is said to be in
accord with nature, and on the other hand that vice is contrary to
nature.
Reply to Objection 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing
being against nature, in so far as "being against nature" is contrary
to "being from nature": and not in so far as "being against nature" is
contrary to "being in accord with nature," in which latter sense
virtues are said to be in accord with nature, in as much as they
incline us to that which is suitable to nature.
Reply to Objection 3: There is a twofold nature in man, rational
nature, and the sensitive nature. And since it is through the operation
of his senses that man accomplishes acts of reason, hence there are
more who follow the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than who
follow the order of reason: because more reach the beginning of a
business than achieve its completion. Now the presence of vices and
sins in man is owing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his
sensitive nature against the order of his reason.
Reply to Objection 4: Whatever is irregular in a work of art, is
unnatural to the art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is
compared to the order of human reason, as art to a work of art.
Therefore it amounts to the same that vice and sin are against the
order of human reason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law.
Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 6) that "every nature, as such,
is from God; and is a vicious nature, in so far as it fails from the
Divine art whereby it was made. "
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Whether vice is worse than a vicious act?
Objection 1: It would seem that vice, i. e. a bad habit, is worse than a
sin, i. e. a bad act. For, as the more lasting a good is, the better it
is, so the longer an evil lasts, the worse it is. Now a vicious habit
is more lasting than vicious acts, that pass forthwith. Therefore a
vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.
Objection 2: Further, several evils are more to be shunned than one.
But a bad habit is virtually the cause of many bad acts. Therefore a
vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.
Objection 3: Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But a
habit produces its actions both as to their goodness and as to their
badness. Therefore a habit is more potent than its act, both in
goodness and in badness.
On the contrary, A man is justly punished for a vicious act; but not
for a vicious habit, so long as no act ensues. Therefore a vicious
action is worse than a vicious habit.
I answer that, A habit stands midway between power and act. Now it is
evident that both in good and in evil, act precedes power, as stated in
Metaph. ix, 19. For it is better to do well than to be able to do well,
and in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do evil, than to be able
to do evil: whence it also follows that both in goodness and in
badness, habit stands midway between power and act, so that, to wit,
even as a good or evil habit stands above the corresponding power in
goodness or in badness, so does it stand below the corresponding act.
This is also made clear from the fact that a habit is not called good
or bad, save in so far as it induces to a good or bad act: wherefore a
habit is called good or bad by reason of the goodness or badness of its
act: so that an act surpasses its habit in goodness or badness, since
"the cause of a thing being such, is yet more so. "
Reply to Objection 1: Nothing hinders one thing from standing above
another simply, and below it in some respect. Now a thing is deemed
above another simply if it surpasses it in a point which is proper to
both; while it is deemed above it in a certain respect, if it surpasses
it in something which is accidental to both. Now it has been shown from
the very nature of act and habit, that act surpasses habit both in
goodness and in badness. Whereas the fact that habit is more lasting
than act, is accidental to them, and is due to the fact that they are
both found in a nature such that it cannot always be in action, and
whose action consists in a transient movement. Consequently act simply
excels in goodness and badness, but habit excels in a certain respect.
Reply to Objection 2: A habit is several acts, not simply, but in a
certain respect, i. e. virtually. Wherefore this does not prove that
habit precedes act simply, both in goodness and in badness.
Reply to Objection 3: Habit causes act by way of efficient causality:
but act causes habit, by way of final causality, in respect of which we
consider the nature of good and evil. Consequently act surpasses habit
both in goodness and in badness.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sin is compatible with virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that a vicious act, i. e. sin, is
incompatible with virtue. For contraries cannot be together in the same
subject. Now sin is, in some way, contrary to virtue, as stated above
[1688](A[1]). Therefore sin is incompatible with virtue.
Objection 2: Further, sin is worse than vice, i. e. evil act than evil
habit. But vice cannot be in the same subject with virtue: neither,
therefore, can sin.
Objection 3: Further, sin occurs in natural things, even as in
voluntary matters (Phys. ii, text. 82). Now sin never happens in
natural things, except through some corruption of the natural power;
thus monsters are due to corruption of some elemental force in the
seed, as stated in Phys. ii. Therefore no sin occurs in voluntary
matters, except through the corruption of some virtue in the soul: so
that sin and virtue cannot be together in the same subject.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2,3) that "virtue is
engendered and corrupted by contrary causes. " Now one virtuous act does
not cause a virtue, as stated above ([1689]Q[51], A[3]): and,
consequently, one sinful act does not corrupt virtue. Therefore they
can be together in the same subject.
I answer that, Sin is compared to virtue, as evil act to good habit.
Now the position of a habit in the soul is not the same as that of a
form in a natural thing. For the form of a natural thing produces, of
necessity, an operation befitting itself; wherefore a natural form is
incompatible with the act of a contrary form: thus heat is incompatible
with the act of cooling, and lightness with downward movement (except
perhaps violence be used by some extrinsic mover): whereas the habit
that resides in the soul, does not, of necessity, produce its
operation, but is used by man when he wills. Consequently man, while
possessing a habit, may either fail to use the habit, or produce a
contrary act; and so a man having a virtue may produce an act of sin.
And this sinful act, so long as there is but one, cannot corrupt
virtue, if we compare the act to the virtue itself as a habit: since,
just as habit is not engendered by one act, so neither is it destroyed
by one act as stated above ([1690]Q[63], A[2], ad 2). But if we compare
the sinful act to the cause of the virtues, then it is possible for
some virtues to be destroyed by one sinful act. For every mortal sin is
contrary to charity, which is the root of all the infused virtues, as
virtues; and consequently, charity being banished by one act of mortal
sin, it follows that all the infused virtues are expelled "as virtues. "
And I say on account of faith and hope, whose habits remain unquickened
after mortal sin, so that they are no longer virtues. On the other
hand, since venial sin is neither contrary to charity, nor banishes it,
as a consequence, neither does it expel the other virtues. As to the
acquired virtues, they are not destroyed by one act of any kind of sin.
Accordingly, mortal sin is incompatible with the infused virtues, but
is consistent with acquired virtue: while venial sin is compatible with
virtues, whether infused or acquired.
Reply to Objection 1: Sin is contrary to virtue, not by reason of
itself, but by reason of its act. Hence sin is incompatible with the
act, but not with the habit, of virtue.
Reply to Objection 2: Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin
to virtuous act: and so vice excludes virtue, just as sin excludes acts
of virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: The natural powers act of necessity, and hence so
long as the power is unimpaired, no sin can be found in the act. On the
other hand, the virtues of the soul do not produce their acts of
necessity; hence the comparison fails.
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Whether every sin includes an action?
Objection 1: It would seem that every sin includes an action. For as
merit is compared with virtue, even so is sin compared with vice. Now
there can be no merit without an action. Neither, therefore, can there
be sin without action.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De
Vera Relig. xiv. ]: So "true is it that every sin is voluntary, that,
unless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all. " Now nothing can be
voluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore every sin implies
an act.
Objection 3: Further, if sin could be without act, it would follow that
a man sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought. Now he who never
does something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he
ought. Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; and this is
untrue. Therefore there is no sin without an act.
On the contrary, It is written (James 4:17): "To him . . . who knoweth
to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin. " Now "not to do" does
not imply an act. Therefore sin can be without act.
I answer that, The reason for urging this question has reference to the
sin of omission, about which there have been various opinions. For some
say that in every sin of omission there is some act, either interior or
exterior---interior, as when a man wills "not to go to church," when he
is bound to go---exterior, as when a man, at the very hour that he is
bound to go to church (or even before), occupies himself in such a way
that he is hindered from going. This seems, in a way, to amount to the
same as the first, for whoever wills one thing that is incompatible
with this other, wills, consequently, to go without this other: unless,
perchance, it does not occur to him, that what he wishes to do, will
hinder him from that which he is bound to do, in which case he might be
deemed guilty of negligence. On the other hand, others say, that a sin
of omission does not necessarily suppose an act: for the mere fact of
not doing what one is bound to do is a sin.
Now each of these opinions has some truth in it. For if in the sin of
omission we look merely at that in which the essence of the sin
consists, the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act,
as when a man wills "not to go to church": while sometimes it will be
without any act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man, at
the time that he is bound to go to church, does not think of going or
not going to church.
If, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also the causes, or
occasions of the omission, then the sin of omission must of necessity
include some act. For there is no sin of omission, unless we omit what
we can do or not do: and that we turn aside so as not to do what we can
do or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion, either
united with the omission or preceding it. Now if this cause be not in
man's power, the omission will not be sinful, as when anyone omits
going to church on account of sickness: but if the cause or occasion be
subject to the will, the omission is sinful; and such cause, in so far
as it is voluntary, must needs always include some act, at least the
interior act of the will: which act sometimes bears directly on the
omission, as when a man wills "not to go to church," because it is too
much trouble; and in this case this act, of its very nature, belongs to
the omission, because the volition of any sin whatever, pertains, of
itself, to that sin, since voluntariness is essential to sin.
Sometimes, however, the act of the will bears directly on something
else which hinders man from doing what he ought, whether this something
else be united with the omission, as when a man wills to play at the
time he ought to go to church---or, precede the omission, as when a man
wills to sit up late at night, the result being that he does not go to
church in the morning. In this case the act, interior or exterior, is
accidental to the omission, since the omission follows outside the
intention, and that which is outside the intention is said to be
accidental (Phys. ii, text. 49,50). Wherefore it is evident that then
the sin of omission has indeed an act united with, or preceding the
omission, but that this act is accidental to the sin of omission.
Now in judging about things, we must be guided by that which is proper
to them, and not by that which is accidental: and consequently it is
truer to say that a sin can be without any act; else the circumstantial
acts and occasions would be essential to other actual sins.
Reply to Objection 1: More things are required for good than for evil,
since "good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil results
from each single defect," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): so that
sin may arise from a man doing what he ought not, or by his not doing
what he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man do willingly
what he ought to do: wherefore there can be no merit without act,
whereas there can be sin without act.
Reply to Objection 2: The term "voluntary" is applied not only to that
on which the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that which
we have the power to do or not to do, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. Hence
even not to will may be called voluntary, in so far as man has it in
his power to will, and not to will.
Reply to Objection 3: The sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative
precept which binds always, but not for always. Hence, by omitting to
act, a man sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept
binds him to act.
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Whether sin is fittingly defined as a word, deed, or desire contrary to the
eternal law?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying:
"Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law. " Because
"Word," "deed," and "desire" imply an act; whereas not every sin
implies an act, as stated above [1691](A[5]). Therefore this definition
does not include every sin.
Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. xii): "Sin is the
will to retain or obtain what justice forbids. " Now will is comprised
under desire, in so far as desire denotes any act of the appetite.
Therefore it was enough to say: "Sin is a desire contrary to the
eternal law," nor was there need to add "word" or "deed. "
Objection 3: Further, sin apparently consists properly in aversion from
the end: because good and evil are measured chiefly with regard to the
end as explained above ([1692]Q[1], A[3];[1693] Q[18], AA[4],6;[1694]
Q[20], AA[2],3): wherefore Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i) defines sin in
reference to the end, by saying that "sin is nothing else than to
neglect eternal things, and seek after temporal things": and again he
says (Qq. lxxxii, qu. 30) that "all human wickedness consists in using
what we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we should use. " Now the
definition is question contains no mention of aversion from our due
end: therefore it is an insufficient definition of sin.
Objection 4: Further, a thing is said to be forbidden, because it is
contrary to the law. Now not all sins are evil through being forbidden,
but some are forbidden because they are evil. Therefore sin in general
should not be defined as being against the law of God.
Objection 5: Further, a sin denotes a bad human act, as was explained
above [1695](A[1]). Now man's evil is to be against reason, as
Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore it would have been better to
say that sin is against reason than to say that it is contrary to the
eternal law.
On the contrary, the authority of Augustine suffices (Contra Faust.
xxii, 27).
I answer that, As was shown above [1696](A[1]), sin is nothing else
than a bad human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to its
being voluntary, as stated above (Q[1], A[1]), whether it be voluntary,
as being elicited by the will, e. g. to will or to choose, or as being
commanded by the will, e. g. the exterior actions of speech or
operation. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with
its due measure: and conformity of measure in a thing depends on a
rule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommensurate.
Now there
are two rules of the human will: one is proximate and homogeneous, viz.
the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz. the eternal law,
which is God's reason, so to speak. Accordingly Augustine (Contra
Faust. xxii, 27) includes two things in the definition of sin; one,
pertaining to the substance of a human act, and which is the matter, so
to speak, of sin, when he says "word," "deed," or "desire"; the other,
pertaining to the nature of evil, and which is the form, as it were, of
sin, when he says, "contrary to the eternal law. "
Reply to Objection 1: Affirmation and negation are reduced to one same
genus: e. g. in Divine things, begotten and unbegotten are reduced to
the genus "relation," as Augustine states (De Trin. v, 6,7): and so
"word" and "deed" denote equally what is said and what is not said,
what is done and what is not done.
Reply to Objection 2: The first cause of sin is in the will, which
commands all voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found: and
hence it is that Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the
will alone. But since external acts also pertain to the substance of
sin, through being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in
defining sin to include something referring to external action.
Reply to Objection 3: The eternal law first and foremost directs man to
his end, and in consequence, makes man to be well disposed in regard to
things which are directed to the end: hence when he says, "contrary to
the eternal law," he includes aversion from the end and all other forms
of inordinateness.
Reply to Objection 4: When it is said that not every sin is evil
through being forbidden, this must be understood of prohibition by
positive law. If, however, the prohibition be referred to the natural
law, which is contained primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily
in the natural code of the human reason, then every sin is evil through
being prohibited: since it is contrary to natural law, precisely
because it is inordinate.
Reply to Objection 5: The theologian considers sin chiefly as an
offense against God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary
to reason. Hence Augustine defines sin with reference to its being
"contrary to the eternal law," more fittingly than with reference to
its being contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs
us in many things that surpass human reason, e. g. in matters of faith.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS (NINE ARTICLES)
We must now consider the distinction of sins or vices: under which head
there are nine points of inquiry:
(1) Whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects?
(2) Of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins;
(3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes?
(4) Whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against?
(5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment?
(6) Whether they differ in regard to omission and commission?
(7) Whether they differ according to their various stages?
(8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency?
(9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sins differ in species according to their objects?
Objection 1: It would seem that sins do not differ in species,
according to their objects. For acts are said to be good or evil, in
relation, chiefly, to their end, as shown above ([1697]Q[1],
A[3];[1698] Q[18], AA[4],6). Since then sin is nothing else than a bad
human act, as stated above ([1699]Q[71], A[1]), it seems that sins
should differ specifically according to their ends rather than
according to their objects.
Objection 2: Further, evil, being a privation, differs specifically
according to the different species of opposites. Now sin is an evil in
the genus of human acts. Therefore sins differ specifically according
to their opposites rather than according to their objects.
Objection 3: Further, if sins differed specifically according to their
objects, it would be impossible to find the same specific sin with
diverse objects: and yet such sins are to be found. For pride is about
things spiritual and material as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv, 18); and
avarice is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins do not
differ in species according to their objects.
On the contrary, "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against God's law. "
Now words, deeds, and desires differ in species according to their
various objects: since acts differ by their objects, as stated above
([1700]Q[18], A[2] ). Therefore sins, also differ in species according
to their objects.
I answer that, As stated above ([1701]Q[71], A[6]), two things concur
in the nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its inordinateness,
which consists in departing from God's law. Of these two, one is
referred essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act in
such and such matter; while the other, viz. the inordinateness of the
act, is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, for "no
one acts intending evil," as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). Now it
is evident that a thing derives its species from that which is
essential and not from that which is accidental: because what is
accidental is outside the specific nature. Consequently sins differ
specifically on the part of the voluntary acts rather than of the
inordinateness inherent to sin. Now voluntary acts differ in species
according to their objects, as was proved above ([1702]Q[18], A[2]).
Therefore it follows that sins are properly distinguished in species by
their objects.
Reply to Objection 1: The aspect of good is found chiefly in the end:
and therefore the end stands in the relation of object to the act of
the will which is at the root of every sin. Consequently it amounts to
the same whether sins differ by their objects or by their ends.
Reply to Objection 2: Sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived
of its due order: hence sins differ specifically according to their
objects of their acts rather than according to their opposites,
although, even if they were distinguished in reference to their
opposite virtues, it would come to the same: since virtues differ
specifically according to their objects, as stated above ([1703]Q[60],
A[5]).
Reply to Objection 3: In various things, differing in species or genus,
nothing hinders our finding one formal aspect of the object, from which
aspect sin receives its species. It is thus that pride seeks excellence
in reference to various things; and avarice seeks abundance of things
adapted to human use.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether spiritual sins are fittingly distinguished from carnal sins?
Objection 1: It would seem that spiritual sins are unfittingly
distinguished from carnal sins. For the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19): "The
works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication, uncleanness,
immodesty, luxury, idolatry, witchcrafts," etc. from which it seems
that all kinds of sins are works of the flesh. Now carnal sins are
called works of the flesh. Therefore carnal sins should not be
distinguished from spiritual sins.
Objection 2: Further, whosoever sins, walks according to the flesh, as
stated in Rom. 8:13: "If you live according to the flesh, you shall
die. But if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall
live. " Now to live or walk according to the flesh seems to pertain to
the nature of carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins should not be
distinguished from spiritual sins.
Objection 3: Further, the higher part of the soul, which is the mind or
reason, is called the spirit, according to Eph. 4:23: "Be renewed in
the spirit of your mind," where spirit stands for reason, according to
a gloss. Now every sin, which is committed in accordance with the
flesh, flows from the reason by its consent; since consent in a sinful
act belongs to the higher reason, as we shall state further on
([1704]Q[74], A[7]). Therefore the same sins are both carnal and
spiritual, and consequently they should not be distinguished from one
another.
Objection 4: Further, if some sins are carnal specifically, this,
seemingly, should apply chiefly to those sins whereby man sins against
his own body. But, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18), "every sin
that a man doth, is without the body: but he that committeth
fornication, sinneth against his own body. " Therefore fornication would
be the only carnal sin, whereas the Apostle (Eph. 5:3) reckons
covetousness with the carnal sins.
On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) says that "of the seven
capital sins five are spiritual, and two carnal. "
I answer that, As stated above [1705](A[1]), sins take their species
from their objects. Now every sin consists in the desire for some
mutable good, for which man has an inordinate desire, and the
possession of which gives him inordinate pleasure. Now, as explained
above (Q[31], A[3]), pleasure is twofold. One belongs to the soul, and
is consummated in the mere apprehension of a thing possessed in
accordance with desire; this can also be called spiritual pleasure,
e. g. when one takes pleasure in human praise or the like. The other
pleasure is bodily or natural, and is realized in bodily touch, and
this can also be called carnal pleasure.
Accordingly, those sins which consist in spiritual pleasure, are called
spiritual sins; while those which consist in carnal pleasure, are
called carnal sins, e. g. gluttony, which consists in the pleasures of
the table; and lust, which consists in sexual pleasures. Hence the
Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:1): "Let us cleanse ourselves from all
defilement of the flesh and of the spirit. "
Reply to Objection 1: As a gloss says on the same passage, these vices
are called works of the flesh, not as though they consisted in carnal
pleasure; but flesh here denotes man, who is said to live according to
the flesh, when he lives according to himself, as Augustine says (De
Civ. Dei xiv, 2,3). The reason of this is because every failing in the
human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense.
This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.
Reply to Objection 3: Even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act,
viz. the act of reason: but the end of these sins, from which they are
named, is carnal pleasure.
Reply to Objection 4: As the gloss says, "in the sin of fornication the
soul is the body's slave in a special sense, because at the moment of
sinning it can think of nothing else": whereas the pleasure of
gluttony, although carnal, does not so utterly absorb the reason. It
may also be said that in this sin, an injury is done to the body also,
for it is defiled inordinately: wherefore by this sin alone is man said
specifically to sin against his body. While covetousness, which is
reckoned among the carnal sins, stands here for adultery, which is the
unjust appropriation of another's wife. Again, it may be said that the
thing in which the covetous man takes pleasure is something bodily, and
in this respect covetousness is numbered with the carnal sins: but the
pleasure itself does not belong to the body, but to the spirit,
wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that it is a spiritual sin.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sins differ specifically in reference to their causes?
Objection 1: It would seem that sins differ specifically in reference
to their causes. For a thing takes its species from that whence it
derives its being. Now sins derive their being from their causes.
Therefore they take their species from them also. Therefore they differ
specifically in reference to their causes.
Objection 2: Further, of all the causes the material cause seems to
have least reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like
its material cause. Since, therefore, sins differ specifically
according to their objects, it seems that much more do they differ in
reference to their other causes.
Objection 3: Further, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 79:17, "Things set
on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to fear
inducing false humility, or to love enkindling us to undue ardor. " For
it is written (1 Jn. 2:16) that "all that is in the world, is the
concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg. : 'and'] the concupiscence of the
eyes, or [Vulg. : 'and'] the pride of life. " Now a thing is said to be
in the world on account of sin, in as much as the world denotes lovers
of the world, as Augustine observes (Tract. ii in Joan. ). Gregory, too
(Moral. xxxi, 17), distinguishes all sins according to the seven
capital vices. Now all these divisions refer to the causes of sins.
Therefore, seemingly, sins differ specifically according to the
diversity of their causes.
On the contrary, If this were the case all sins would belong to one
species, since they are due to one cause. For it is written (Ecclus.
10:15) that "pride is the beginning of all sin," and (1 Tim. 6:10) that
"the desire of money is the root of all evils. " Now it is evident that
there are various species of sins. Therefore sins do not differ
specifically according to their different causes.
I answer that, Since there are four kinds of causes, they are
attributed to various things in various ways. Because the "formal" and
the "material" cause regard properly the substance of a thing; and
consequently substances differ in respect of their matter and form,
both in species and in genus. The "agent" and the "end" regard directly
movement and operation: wherefore movements and operations differ
specifically in respect of these causes; in different ways, however,
because the natural active principles are always determined to the same
acts; so that the different species of natural acts are taken not only
from the objects, which are the ends or terms of those acts, but also
from their active principles: thus heating and cooling are specifically
distinct with reference to hot and cold. On the other hand, the active
principles in voluntary acts, such as the acts of sins, are not
determined, of necessity, to one act, and consequently from one active
or motive principle, diverse species of sins can proceed: thus from
fear engendering false humility man may proceed to theft, or murder, or
to neglect the flock committed to his care; and these same things may
proceed from love enkindling to undue ardor. Hence it is evident that
sins do not differ specifically according to their various active or
motive causes, but only in respect of diversity in the final cause,
which is the end and object of the will. For it has been shown above
([1706]Q[1], A[3];[1707] Q[18], AA[4],6) that human acts take their
species from the end.
Reply to Objection 1: The active principles in voluntary acts, not
being determined to one act, do not suffice for the production of human
acts, unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the end,
as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. ix, text. 15,16), and consequently
sin derives both its being and its species from the end.
Reply to Objection 2: Objects, in relation to external acts, have the
character of matter "about which"; but, in relation to the interior act
of the will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to this
that they give the act its species. Nevertheless, even considered as
the matter "about which," they have the character of term, from which
movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4; Ethic. x, 4); yet even
terms of movement specify movements, in so far as term has the
character of end.
Reply to Objection 3: These distinctions of sins are given, not as
distinct species of sins, but to show their various causes.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether sin is fittingly divided into sin against God, against oneself, and
against one's neighbor?
Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin
against God, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that
which is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the
division of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against God: for it
is stated in the definition of sin that it is "against God's law," as
stated above ([1708]Q[66], A[6]). Therefore sin against God should not
be reckoned a part of the division of sin.
Objection 2: Further, every division should consist of things in
opposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not opposed
to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins against
himself and against God. Therefore sin is not fittingly divided into
these three.
Objection 3: Further, specification is not taken from things external.
But God and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are not
distinguished specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin is
unfittingly divided according to these three.
On the contrary, Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of
sins, says that "man is said to sin against himself, against God, and
against his neighbor. "
I answer that, As stated above ([1709]Q[71], AA[1],6), sin is an
inordinate act. Now there should be a threefold order in man: one in
relation to the rule of reason, in so far as all our actions and
passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason: another order
is in relation to the rule of the Divine Law, whereby man should be
directed in all things: and if man were by nature a solitary animal,
this twofold order would suffice. But since man is naturally a civic
and social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2, hence a third order is
necessary, whereby man is directed in relation to other men among whom
he has to dwell. Of these orders the second contains the first and
surpasses it. For whatever things are comprised under the order of
reason, are comprised under the order of God Himself. Yet some things
are comprised under the order of God, which surpass the human reason,
such as matters of faith, and things due to God alone. Hence he that
sins in such matters, for instance, by heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy,
is said to sin against God. In like manner, the first order includes
the third and surpasses it, because in all things wherein we are
directed in reference to our neighbor, we need to be directed according
to the order of reason. Yet in some things we are directed according to
reason, in relation to ourselves only, and not in reference to our
neighbor; and when man sins in these matters, he is said to sin against
himself, as is seen in the glutton, the lustful, and the prodigal. But
when man sins in matters concerning his neighbor, he is said to sin
against his neighbor, as appears in the thief and murderer. Now the
things whereby man is directed to God, his neighbor, and himself are
diverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their
objects, according to which the species of sins are diversified: and
consequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different
species of sins: because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed,
differ specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from
what has been said ([1710]Q[62], AA[1],2,3) that by the theological
virtues man is directed to God; by temperance and fortitude, to
himself; and by justice to his neighbor.
Reply to Objection 1: To sin against God is common to all sins, in so
far as the order to God includes every human order; but in so far as
order to God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a
special kind of sin.
Reply to Objection 2: When several things, of which one includes
another, are distinct from one another, this distinction is understood
to refer, not to the part contained in another, but to that in which
one goes beyond another. This may be seen in the division of numbers
and figures: for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure
not in respect of its being contained thereby, but in respect of that
in which it is surpassed thereby: and the same applies to the numbers
three and four.
Reply to Objection 3: Although God and our neighbor are external to the
sinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are
related to it as to its object.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the division of sins according to their debt of punishment
diversifies their species?
Objection 1: It would seem that the division of sins according to their
debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance, when sin is
divided into "mortal" and "venial. " For things which are infinitely
apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even to the same genus.
But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since temporal
punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal punishment to mortal sin;
and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the gravity of the
fault, according to Dt. 25:2: "According to the measure of the sin
shall the measure be also of the stripes be. " Therefore venial and
mortal sins are not of the same genus, nor can they be said to belong
to the same species.
Objection 2: Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species
[*"Ex genere," genus in this case denoting the species], as murder and
adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in an idle
word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial and mortal sins differ
specifically.
Objection 3: Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its
reward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward is
the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of sin.
Now sins differ specifically in relation to their ends, as stated above
(A[1], ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically distinct according
to the debt of punishment.
On the contrary, Those things that constitute a species are prior to
the species, e. g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin as
the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically according
to the debt of punishment.
I answer that, In things that differ specifically we find a twofold
difference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to be
found save in different species, e. g. "rational" and "irrational,"
"animate," and "inanimate": the other difference is consequent to
specific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may be consequent to
specific diversity, yet, in others, it may be found within the same
species; thus "white" and "black" are consequent to the specific
diversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within the
one species of man.
We must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal
sin, or any other difference is respect of the debt of punishment,
cannot be a difference constituting specific diversity. For what is
accidental never constitutes a species; and what is outside the agent's
intention is accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is evident that
punishment is outside the intention of the sinner, wherefore it is
accidentally referred to sin on the part of the sinner. Nevertheless it
is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle, viz.
