No More Learning

44 references to Zen-texts, Japanese culture and oriental practices vary from casual remarks to more systematic elaborations. see: henk oosterling, 'scheinheiligkeit oder heiligkeit der schein. subjektkritische bescha? ftigungen mit Japan', in: Das Multiversum der Kulturen, heinz Kimmerle (ed. ) Amsterdam/Atlanta: rodopi elementa 1996, pp. 103-122.
45 robert magliola, Derrida on the Mend, indiana: Purdue university Press, 1984, p. 89.
? avoiding nihilism by affirming nothing 77
tari. deleuze's affinity with buddhism is made explicit in Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962). he redefines spinoza's immanence as praxis of expres- sion in which substance is co-existential with the actual and possible expressions of its modes. 46 this 'transcendental empiricism' is further elaborated in The Logic of Sense (1969). there the Zen riddle comes to the fore as a constituent 'superficiality' that breaks with the opposition of deep and superficial: "returned to the surface, the sage discovers objects- events, all of them communicating in the void which constitutes their substance. (. . . ) the event is the identity of form and void. (. . . ) the void is the site of sense. "47 A comparison with nishida's 'pure experience' as a constituting immanence is at hand. this 'immanence' persists in deleuze's cooperation with fe? lix guattari. in What is Philosophy? (1991) they situate "thought-nature, that logic can only show, according to a famous phrase, without ever being able to grasp it in propositions or relate it to a ref- erence. then logic is silent. Paradigm for paradigm, it is then in agree- ment with a kind of Zen buddhism. "48 there is "no doubt that the orient thought, but it thought the object in itself as pure abstraction, the empty universality identical to simple particularity. "49
is there still an all encompassing whole from which all particulars are 'sensed'? in one of his lasts last texts, deleuze refers to spinoza stating that immanence is not immanence to substance--as hegel would have it--but that substance and modes are in immanence: "We will say of pure immanence that it is A life, and nothing else". life is singularized as a life, yet this is all encompassing. "it is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life". life is a transcendental field, that can only be grasped through its immanence. "A life is the imma- nence of immanence, absolute immanence (. . . ) to the degree that is goes beyond the aporias of the subject and the object that Johann fichte, in his last philosophy, presents the transcendental field as a life, no longer dependent on a being or submitted to an Act--it is an absolute immedi- ate consciousness whose very activity no longer refers to a being but is ceaselessly posed in a life. "50
46 see: gilles deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, new york: Zone books 1997 (orig. 1968).
47 gilles deleuze, The Logic of Sense, london: Continuum 2001 (orig. 1969), p. 155.
48 gilles deleuze & fe? lix guattari, What is Philosophy? , london/new york: verso 1994 (orig. 1991), p. 140.
49 deleuze & guattari, What is Philosophy? , p. 94.
50 gilles deleuze, Pure Immanence. Essays on A Life, new york: Zone books 2001 (orig. 1995), p. 27. my italics.
? The religions of Persia, syria and egyPT:
The TransiTion from The naTural To The sPiriTual
herman van erp
1. introduction
hegel's philosophy of determinate religion contains the development of religions as successively more adequate conceptions of god. The essence of religion develops itself logically and historically in conformity to neces- sary moments. religion acquires in this process an increasingly adequate concept of itself as a specific form of absolute knowledge. Though the idea of the absolute spirit is present from the beginning, its presentation within the immediate religions is still unformed; their level of reflection is simple and misses the depth of speculative thought. religious thinking moves anyway in the sphere of presentation and is not aimed at rational understanding or conceptual knowledge of its content, which is the task of philosophy. The general truth of the concept of god--the proof that god is and what this means--is considered by hegel as the culminat- ing point of his philosophy as such and is, as the result from that course, legitimately presumed within the philosophy of religion. in this chapter, i shall give a brief survey of hegel's conception of the most important religions of the ancient middle east, except the Jewish one. as i do not have much information about these religions from other sources, i cannot give a judgement concerning the adequacy of this hegelian conception from a more empirical point of view and i will not discuss whether his approach of these religions is correct. however, hegel's expositions are in themselves interesting enough for being a rich source for understanding and evaluating the meaning of religious representations of today.
2. The representations of natural or immediate religion
The subject of the philosophy of religion is how the idea of god develops itself both in respect to the content (in itself) as well to the form (for the religious conscience). "To educe the concept of religion and make it the object of consciousness has been the labour of spirit over thousands of years. " (l2 27, 514/412) logically, this development implies three stages:
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a) the starting point of the process, i. e. , the not yet developed and there- fore abstract principle, which hegel indicates as the soil (Boden) of the religion, its substance or substantiality,1 b) the genuine process of the development, or the further determination of the principle, c) the result or the end to which the development is directed. The concept of god as spirit belongs to the starting point of the philosophy of religion. Therefore, the whole development is a process of gods manifestation. spirit mani- fests itself in concrete forms and reveals itself for another that can have an inner relationship with it: "spirit bears witness to spirit. This witness is spirit's own inner nature. "2 This process of becoming manifest for the human mind is the second stage of the development. it is the stage in which spirit is "activity of self-determining, of entering into existence, of being for an other, of bringing its moments into mutual distinction and spreading itself out. "3 in the Phenomenology of Spirit, hegel analyses the development of the human mind in relation to the absolute spirit. in his philosophy of religion, the subject of development is the idea of god him- self: god determines himself as the absolute spirit in the way he comes out of and returns to himself through the other (creation, human mind), that can not remain totally different from him. 4
The religions of the part Determinate Religion are the particular forms in which this development of the idea of god is present in a not only sub- stantive but also subjective way, theoretically and practically, in religious representations and cultus. The representation can be called the theoreti- cal or objective aspect of religion; cultus, as the elevation of the subject toward god, its practical or subjective aspect. 5 The determinate religions are determined as finite, transitory in principle, and ethnically bound as religion of peoples. The end or result of the progress is universality: the reconciliation of spirit with itself and the other, which will be achieved finally in Christianity. Therefore, Christianity, as The Consummate Reli- gion, is placed outside this second part of the philosophy of religion.
it is important to be aware that, according to hegel, not only the rep- resentation of the spirit and the philosophical concept of it pass through this process of development, but god himself as spirit too. spirit executes its own process of development, is essentially self-realization and takes
1 for instance: l1 24, 314/218; l1 27, 444/332. 2 l1 27, 413/307.
3 l1 27, 182/90.
4 l1 m, 228/138.
5 l1 24, 328/230, 336/237; l1 27, 396/291, 441/330.
? the religions of persia, syria and egypt 81
particular shapes in this process. god does not remain closed within an abstract unity, but determines himself necessarily in relation to another, which is distinct from the abstract unity in the original being. The deter- minate religions differ in the way this otherness is determined and rep- resented. in the natural religions, nearly all natural entities can figure as immediate presentations of the divinity, without much distance or reflection. in this immediacy, there is no room for representations of a positive relationship between god and the other because such a relation presupposes the negativity of a distinction. it is a kind of natural panthe- ism without reflection concerning the distinct moments of the concept. (l2 27, 532-533/430)6 on a higher level of development, the religions become conscious of the distinction between nature and spirit and, later on, they develop representations of divine activity as being the origin of this distinction. Those latter representations imply some notion of god in the form of free activity, which is the essence of subjectivity. The idea that god determines himself in that distinction and that the relationship between god and the other originates from god himself is lacking within the natural religions. here, god is not yet represented as a free subject and spirit remains something merely substantial, something abstract like the principle of life, cosmic soul, of which particular entities (natural powers, animals, particular human beings) count as immediate representatives. a contingent natural shape is the sensible form in which that substantiality is immediately present. (l2 24, 379/280) The notion of god as not only a substance but as a free subject is arising in the transition from natural religion to the religions of spiritual individuality. 7
The idea of god as Trinity is the fundamental idea of Christianity, the consummate religion. differentiation within and through itself is, accord- ing to hegel, the most essential determination of spirit, as the absolute having a relation to itself through the other. Without this relationship, the absolute remains an empty abstraction, representation without specific content, or--because it cannot be without any content--its content is characterised as spiritless and dead. hegel criticizes the bent of his con- temporary philosophers to deism. a purely subjective religion of mere feeling and inner sensibility is accused for falling back into this empti- ness. (l2 27, 569/464-65) "as modern theology says that we cannot know
6 spinozism is also accused of pantheism, but is of an entirely different form. for a discussion on this point, see in particular l1 24, 343-344/244; l1 27, 370/269, and 373-377/272-74, also l2 27, 572/469 ff.
7 This name is used by hegel in the lectures of 1824.
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god, that he does not have further determinations in himself, it knows only that he is, as an abstraction without content; and thus, god is faded away into this hollow abstractum. "8 We witness this empty entity in the abstract god Brahm of indian religion (identified by hegel with hindu reli- gion), although there it is still accompanied (though very inconsistently) by a motley collection of gods. We shall see that, for hegel, the religions of the transition are fundamentally different; liberated, that is, from a con- sciousness that is still captured in the opposition between abstraction and sensibility.
Within religious representations, divine spirit comes to appearance, reveals itself, bears witness of itself to another spirit, even if a particu- lar religion is not aware of this relationship and does not represent the divine as something essentially spiritual. natural religions are of this kind. The most undeveloped forms of natural religion are not aware of any distinction between the essential content of the concept of god or his substance and the representations, which religion makes thereof for itself. The moments of reflection and self-consciousness have not yet come to a positive form. Therefore, for this religious consciousness, the divinity does not have a necessary form, but may take any possible shape that can be found in nature--necessity being a category of conceptual thinking--, without any question about the adequacy between represen- tation and conceptual content. "even within natural religions, we will find an elevating of thought above mere natural powers, above the dominion of the natural. But this elevation is carried out inconsistently," the concept of god collapses in an amalgam of representations, a mixture of spiritual and natural powers. (l2 27, 521/418) The abstract and indeterminate char- acter of the notion of god makes it possible to take all kind of natural entities as an immediate expression of it.
3. The Transition from natural religion to higher levels
a fundamental proposition of hegel's philosophy of religion is that god can be known, that he has revealed himself. all religions are the actual proof of it in their representations of the absolute. on this point, hegel is engaged in a constant polemic against the agnosticism and subjectivism of contemporary philosophers and theologians. in the Encyclopedia, he
8 l1 24, 127/43 (translation h. e. ).
? the religions of persia, syria and egypt 83
compares the opinion that god is unknowable with blaming him as envi- ous, and in the lectures of 1827 he says: "When the name of god is taken seriously, it is already the case for Plato and aristotle that god is not jeal- ous to the point of not communicating himself. "9 Thus, hegel's approach of religion is to a large extent nourished by a presumed a priori knowl- edge about the object and essence of religion. he tried to expound the metaphysical concept of religion in such a way that it could explain the development of the determinate religions in the form of both a strongly logical as well historical succession. This schema never succeeded com- pletely, but the theory that the development of religious consciousness passed over from east to West is a constant element in hegel's approach. The middle east is considered as the place where natural religion under- goes its transition to the higher forms of spiritual religion. Thus, hegel's considerations concerning particular religious representations and phe- nomena are repeatedly interwoven with comparisons that could support the differences in the level of development. Therefore, it is not possible to understand hegel's exposition of a particular religion without knowing something about the beginning and the end of the process that is deter- mining the development as he understands of it.
hegel thinks there is also a development at the level of natural reli- gions. important details in the parallel of the logical and historical devel- opment and in the ordering of these religions were changed during the successive lectures. in the 1831 lectures the term natural religion is con- fined to the religion of magic, of which hegel frequently noticed that it could hardly be considered as a genuine religion, although elements of magic can indeed be found in many religions. The 1831 lectures treat the religions of east asia as religions, within which the tension between the finite and infinite is represented and the movement toward the infinite of spirit has started off. 'The cleavage of the religious consciousness within itself ' (die Entzweiung des religio? sen Bewusstseins in sich) is the title, under which these religions there are subsumed and the next stage is called 'religion of freedom', a category that encompasses the religions of transi- tion. (l2 31, 725/615) notwithstanding many shifts within the classifica- tion, the general structure of a tripartite development, together with its geographic complement, has been maintained, comparable to the distinc- tion between a) natural or immediate religions--an expression used until 1827 for all religions of east asia--, b) Jewish, greek and roman religions,
9 l1 27, 382/279, cf. Enzykopa? die (1830), ? 564.
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within which spiritual individuality and freedom are beginning to play an important role, and c) Christianity as the consummate religion.
The religions of Persia, syria and egypt, which will be treated in this chapter, belong to the first category, but in the form of a transition to the second. The lecture manuscript of 1821 treats of these religions only inci- dentally. in the Phenomenology of Spirit, the religion of light is conceived of by hegel as the first form of natural religion, worship of plants and animals as the second form; the religion of egypt is the third form, charac- terised as the religion of the artificer or foreman (Werkmeister, builder of pyramids and temples). Through his labour, the artificer brings, in stone, the external reality together with an obscure inner. Thus, he unites them both in a mixture of the natural shape and the self-conscious form. 10 in the 1824 lectures, the natural religions are distinguished in four catego- ries: a) magic, including the religions of China, Buddhism and lamaism, b) the religion of phantasy, particularly the religion of india (hinduism), c) the religion of the good or the Persian religion of light, and d) egyptian religion as the religion of the enigma (riddle, Ra? tsel). The transition from hinduism to the religion of the Parsees is broadly explained as a move- ment toward an abstract, but physical, unity: light as the representation of spirit in a natural form. The abstract notion of the good (or the light) brings together what was totally dispersed in the former religions and particularly in hinduism. (l2 24, 351-353/253-254, 381/281) But only the egyptian religion is explicitly exposed as a transition toward the religions of spiritual individuality (l2 24, 358/259), as the religion, within which substantiality and subjectivity are brought together in a mixture of them both. (l2 24, 381/281)
in the 1827 lectures, hegel chooses for another subdivision in four stages, in which the religions of China get their own place. (l2 27, 531-535/429-33) magic and the religions of China and india are character- ised as genuine natural religions. hinduism is nearly unaltered described as a motley collection of representations, in which notions of unity and universality stay in a totally external relation to concrete reality, which is disintegrating into a multitude of forms and powers. The fourth stage is for the religions of the transition toward the second level, containing the religions of freedom and subjectivity. This stage has two distinct forms in the religions of Persia and egypt, but in between there is also room for a transitional form, which connects them both: religious representations of
10 Pha? nomenologie des Geistes, Ch. Vii, a, c.
? the religions of persia, syria and egypt 85
the death of god, in which the reality of negation is becoming a moment of himself. (l2 27, 621-625/514-18) The lectures of 1831 repeat this sub- division of the first level in four stages, but the last stage is now clearly composed as a group of three different religions, the religion of the good, the religion of sorrow, and the religion of the enigma, which form together the transition to the religions of freedom. Jewish religion is, remarkably, as a kind of counterpart to the Persian religion, subsumed under the reli- gion of the good. 11 We shall take the 1827 subdivision as a guideline for explaining how hegel characterises the three religions of the transition from eastern to western religion.
The identifying mark of natural religions is that they take a sensible shape as an immediate representation of the spiritual and supersensible. hegel does not deny that representations of some form of subjectivity may be found frequently in natural religions; the notion of god as spirit is indeed present, but this determination is not essential: natural things count as immediate manifestations of spirit and something divine. This means that the distinction between nature and spirit, or between the sen- sible and supersensible realm, is not yet present in a form of reflection of the understanding; it does not have yet the meaning of an inner opposi- tion, an opposition of a conceptual character. Therefore, nature and spirit do not pass over into a relationship, but stay together and are mixed in an indifferent way. in these religions, gods frequently take on a human shape, but that is more a contingent fact than a necessary element of the concept of god that they have. The distinction between the subjective consciousness, with its capricious representations, and the objectivity of the concept of god, have not yet come to awareness as well. in the cultus of east asian religions, unity with god is represented, for example, through a human person like the emperor, a Brahman, a yogi, the dalai lama, who counts as a manifestation of the divinity, but these religions lose themselves just as easily in a multitude of representations that can present the divinity without distinction. here, god himself remains indef- inite in a high degree, an abstract unity without subjectivity in and for itself. human beings can indeed appear as representatives or incarnation of god, but god himself does not have yet the definition of a person. The highest determination of the divinity in natural religion is the notion of
11 hegel had apparent difficulties in classifying Jewish religion. already in his early writ- ings, the religion of light is connected with Jewish religion, and, also in 1824, he mentions a comparison between both of them (l2 24, 389/289). strangely enough, he gives hardly attention to islam in the lectures on religion.
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the universe as a living totality or as the universal soul of the cosmos. it is an inadequate concept because it lacks the determination of god as spirit. (l2 24, 267-271/173-76, l2 27, 571-572/468)12
4. religion of the good: The Persian religion of light
richness and depth, but also the deficiencies of natural religion achieve their climax, according to hegel, in hinduism. opposite or next to each other, we find there the motley multitude of gods in finite shapes on the one side and the idea of an indeterminate unity, of the deity as an infinite emptiness into which all finite and sensible things disappear on the other. nevertheless, there is no idea of a divine activity as subjectivity, which is itself producing the unity of this all in and for itself. Thus, only the moment of substantiality appears in this concept of god, as a pure inner substantiality that does not go in operation and, therefore, does not enter into a relationship with the other. The element of subjectivity remains totally external to it. This element is present as well in the unbridled imagination or phantasy as in the strange drive of indian yogis to escape from the concrete world and to eliminate the subject through extreme subjective performances. however, the yogi tries through complete aus- terity and extreme corporeal self-control to reduce his entire existence to a state of inward immobility and indifference toward everything and to obtain a state of mind in which he can say that he is Brahma himself. (l2 27, 595-596/490-91) This identification of the subject with the abstract and empty substance, the achievement of a holy, 'deep absorption in nothing' (l2 27, 600/495) is on the other hand from birth (von Haus aus) the status of the individuals of one particular caste: the Brahmans. "This means that when a Brahman is born, then a powerful god is born.
" (l2 24, 345-347/248-49, l2 27, 599/493) The highest top is the abstract thinking, withdrawn in itself. Therefore, Brahmans constitute a class isolated from other people, in the same way as the universal unity is attained by exclud- ing all concrete particular things.
Thinking in this religion is, according to hegel, not free and does not make free either, because it does not embark on a relationship with partic- ularity, so that it also lacks the power to bring a moral and ethical order in it. (l2 24, 347-351/250-52) in addition, as beings without freedom, human
12 see also: l1 27, 430/321.
? the religions of persia, syria and egypt 87
beings have no inner self-worth in this religion; they can only negatively obtain value, through negation of self. (l2 27, 602/497) The transition to the religion of the good is that this abstract emptiness of the universal and infinite is superseded. freedom of spirit means that it has the capacity to give content to itself, to take on a relationship with the particular, which it resumes in itself without destroying it or vanishing in it.
The concept of the good functions as the first form in which spirit man- ifests itself as freedom. The good is the universal determinating itself, tak- ing on a particular shape: "a form which is substantial, not only abstract power. " (l2 24, 352/254) in the 1824 lectures, hegel starts with three fur- ther characterizations of this good. firstly, it can be predicated of finite things such that it is not something from beyond ( Jenseits), like Brahma. however, on this level of natural religion the good as such does not have itself a specific, determinate content. especially, it is not a particular end or goal that must be achieved, not a criterion or norm for measuring the goodness of things, situations, events, or actions. Therefore, it must also not be conceived of as wisdom because wisdom presupposes knowledge and choice of ends. in the light of the indeterminate good, all things in their variety are good; the finite things constitute the realm of goodness, without an opposition of good and bad within this realm itself. secondly, there is an opposition, but an external and abstract one, between this realm of goodness and the realm of evil. Both realms are fighting with each other in a continuous struggle. This struggle between good and evil, therefore, is not the opposition between the infinite or universal and the finite things, but an opposition between two abstract principles. This is the dualism of this religion. although evil, as an abstract principle, can- not be sublated into something positive, the struggle has to take place. The good ought to win, but this remains only an 'ought' because it cannot succeed. (l2 24, 353-354/255) Thirdly, the good has a natural form: light, as the manifestation of spirit. (l2 24, 353-355/255-56) hegel says several times, without much explanation, that this light must not be understood as a symbol of the good because they are identical. (l2 27, 615-618/510-11) This is in any case an important difference with the representations of the egyptian religion, which turns all natural things into artistic symbols of something spiritual.
light is another, and more adequate, sensible representation of the uni- versal quality of spirit than space. space can be infinite and empty and may function in this way as a representation of pure abstract thinking (like Brahma in hinduism). light, however, is a physical universal with darkness as its opposite, in opposition with which it makes itself manifest.
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it is as a universal also a unity; as such, it represents the individual uni- versality or singularity of spirit's subjectivity. Contrary to Brahma, light is not excluded from the concrete and real things, but is their soul, bringing them to appearance and life. The essence of the Persian religion of the good is described and understood in this characterisation. The fact that the Parsees give many other shapes to the deity, too, and worship a lot of other natural things, makes no difference for hegel. We will speak about those different shapes later on. Before that, we have to look at the way hegel introduces the transition to the religion of the good in the 1827 and 1831 lectures.
in these lectures, the step from the east asian religions toward the religions of middle east is treated in a more general way. (l2 27, 603-608/498-504) The essence of the asian religions was the immedi- ate unity of subjectivity and substantiality, consciousness going deeply into itself in a way that the subject was no longer needed: Brahma as 'the inwardly absorbed empirical self-consciousness. ' (l2 27, 607/501) This unity must be reached by the subject through an escape from the empiri- cal world, which is placed out of this unity. however, one can say also, that Brahma only exists in the consciousness of the yogi, who has brought himself into this state of mind. The universal lacks objectivity and exists as this finite subject that actually cannot totally empty itself. This contra- diction must be resolved. Two points concerning unification and separa- tion determine the next step in the development. firstly, the externality of the opposition between the real world, with the empirical subject, many powers and determinations on the one side and the transcendent unity on the other is sublated into a true, concrete totality, which is no lon- ger an alternation of origination and perishing. secondly, the empirical self-consciousness is separated from the absolute, its content, such that god now obtains genuine objectivity. The break between subjectivity and objectivity begins. The content becomes an independent object for the conscious self; it is the concrete totality, unity as a relationship between the finite and infinite. from now on, the objectivity deserves the name god properly. The knowledge of the objectivity of spirit is manifest in the way a people is able to bring religion and social life together into an ethi- cal world. The spirit becomes its known object. (l2 24, 379-381/280-81) There, the subject is no longer the consciousness of an isolated individual like a king, lama, yogi or Brahman, but a human being as such, as a free member of a community.
god, as the objective content of consciousness, is essentially spirit, even if he may still be represented, on this immediate level, by natural forms.
the religions of persia, syria and egypt 89
light is one of these natural forms; because of its universal, abstract and ideal character, it is a more adequate expression for spirit than particular things, animals or even an individual human being. Therefore, in com- parison with lamaism, where an individual human being from his birth is worshipped as god, Persian worship of light does not mean, for hegel, a backfall. 13 The break between objectivity and subjectivity makes god essentially to an object in front of man. however, the break is only begin- ning and not yet completed. Thus, within the religions of the transition, god can have still the shape of natural things, animals and human beings. according to hegel, these shapes do not have any longer an essential but only a superficial meaning. objectivation of spirit has started.
hegel speaks in one sentence of objectivation, distinction, differentia- tion and resumption. (l2 27, 608/503) resumption (Resumtion) means beginning again: the religious subject does not only resume its normal life, but god, too, leaves the empty space, which also means his con- traction out of the motley of representations into an objective, true and universal unity. 14 Chaos and arbitrariness are not passed away, however; the figures of the transition from natural religion to the higher level are still elements within a wild totality. (l2 27, 608/502) This totality has in general two forms: on the one hand, it is portrayed in a pure and simple way, on the other as a 'struggle, the fermenting of these distinct elements into a unity--an impure subjectivity that is the striving toward pure unity itself'. (l2 27, 609/504) fermentation is the metaphor for the first form, used by hegel for the religions of syria and egypt. The resumption in the first mode of the religions of transition, the religion of the good, is mainly characterised by the simple and pure form of the totality. its objective content is the universal, in the shape of light. The many representations of the good are harmoniously united in the concept of light. evil is some- thing external to it, an independent principle. The struggle between good and evil has the form of an abstract dualism.
13 hegel seems to think otherwise in the 1821 manuscript, in which religion of light is considered the first form of natural religion. There, he admits that worship of animals and even of physically present persons is repulsive for us and that we have more sympathy for the Parsees with their religion of light, but he justifies that worship as animals and human beings are figures of greater subjective power than the sun and stars (l2 m, 13-14). religion of light is here still identified with worship of the sun.
14 The expression Resumtion gets a central role since 1827. Probably, it may also be interpreted in opposition to reincarnation, which is connected with mere succession and, therefore, with dispersion and distroying of individuality.
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i wrote above that hegel put forward, in the 1824 lectures, three deter- minations of the good: the world of finite things in their variety, the realm of the good against the realm of evil, and the light as the natural represen- tation of the good. in the 1827 lectures, hegel reformulates the first two in three points. firstly, the good is connected with objectivity, truth and the absolute power of spirit to determine itself as the universal content, without losing its unity. secondly, this power counts as the origin of all things. The emphasis is not on the multitude of separate things, but on something affirmative, the positive connection and coherence of the finite with the absolute: 'it is not the case that only a subset of them are twice- born, as in india, but rather the finite is created from the good and is good'. (l2 27, 612/506)15 Thirdly, the good as such remains still an abstract determination. it does not give answer to questions about what we have to do, in what respect something is good. elsewhere and in other words, hegel says that the good does not have yet negativity in it; because it does not have an intrinsic connection with evil, it is opposed to it in a merely external way. 16
The text continues, not very consistently after these three points, with the sentence: "The third determination is that the good in its universality has at the same time a natural mode [. . . ]--light" (l2 27, 614/508). This sentence is an almost literal quotation from the 1824 text. The change of content in the preceding passages is not completed in a totally logical form, but the importance of it is that the emphasis is laid upon the pure positive character of this notion of the good--and so upon its abstract- ness. The dualism is an external effect of this abstractness and does not belong to the determination of the good itself. The good is the totality that does not accept evil, so that the confrontation never comes into real existence. indeed, there is struggle between good and evil and the latter ought to be conquered, but--as hegel smartly retorts--"what ought to be is not. 'ought' is a force that cannot make itself effective, it is this weak- ness or impotence. " (l2 27, 613/507)
Compared with the power of spirit, it is the impotence of nature, which is manifest in this dualism of light and darkness. according to hegel, the juxtaposition of distinct determinations or their merely external relation
15 however, this must not be understood as the concept of a genuine creation, but more as emanation. Creation presumes a more concrete concept of action as an act of free sub- jectivity. (l2 27, 615/510)
16 an intrinsic relation of the good with evil is, for example, the moral conscience con- cerning good and evil, the good as the negation of sin (in avoidance, victory, forgiveness).
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is the characteristic of nature. 17 nature lacks the capacity to integrate the negative in itself and to sublate it. natural life--nature's highest form of being--is a continuous succession of birth and dying, in which death is not conquered. The dualism also means that darkness cannot be ban- ished completely. Therefore, the idea of god as light or abstract good is still something powerless, having evil as a principle next to it. (l2 27, 616/510) The continuous struggle between good and evil is represented in the personifications of light and darkness as ormazd and ahriman. hegel admits that there are texts, in which ahriman is conquered ultimately by ormazd, but puts against it that this "is not expressed as a present state, it is only something future. god, the essence or the spirit, must be present and contemporary, not relegated to the domain of imagination, into the past or the future. " (l2 27, 622/515)
hegel pays little attention to ahriman, the personification of darkness; probably because this representation does not involve a positive contribu- tion for the development of the concept of spirit. ormazd is the personifi- cation of the highest light, that is 'the energy, spirit, soul, love and bliss' in sensible life. (l2 27, 618/512) he is the personification of substance, which is not yet determined as developed subjectivity, as he represents every- thing that is life and is worshiped. ormazd is also the personification of the sun. Therefore, this representation of ormazd as a person is, according to hegel, only superficial. (l2 27, 616/511) other lights like the stars and seven planets have their own personifications, the amshadspan; they are the companions of ormazd in his realm of light. at the same time, the Persian state 'is portrayed as the realm of righteousness and good. The king was surrounded by seven magnates, too, who formed his council, and were regarded as representatives of the amshaspans, just as the king was thought of as the deputy of ormazd', without being identified with him.
The cultus of this religion is in total conformity with this order: the whole life of the Parsees is cultus and attended to the promotion of life such that the good would prosper and flourish as a light in all regions of nature. (l2 27, 621/514) also, care for the sick and hungry was part of it. (l2 24, 358/259) The contrast to india is clear: Persian cultus is not an escape from the concrete and particular, but directed toward the affirma- tion of a cosmos that is good in itself.
17 Compare the Cartesian definition of matter, as the substance having its parts side by side or separate from each other, in opposition to the unity of thought.
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5. sorrow and death in the religion of syria
light is the representation of the good, coming from heaven and pouring out over the world, without being affected by evil and never dying. as far as it is determined as subject, this subject is a serene unity without nega- tivity, and therefore not coming back to itself from a point of alienation or otherness that it had to overcome. There is also no idea of reconciliation involved in this goodness. however, according to hegel's logic, the subject has to take on the confrontation with the negativity in itself because the subject achieves its spiritual freedom through the annulment of its subor- dination to nature, through the sublation of its natural self. The dialectical development of subjectivity is a struggle with negative powers within the subject itself. This struggle has different moments. on the level of imme- diacy or the natural state, in which the religions of our discourse are still situated, these moments stay side by side in a time sequence, which the one subject passes through. Thus, the subject has a history, in which it is affected by negative vicissitudes. death, an evil that hurts the subject in its essence, is the ultimate negative moment of that natural history. The central theme of the religion, which is situated by hegel as a transition to the next stage of the religion of egypt, has as its central content the death of god and the story of how he after that returns into a higher, spiritual life. (l2 27, 620-624/514-17) it is only in the 1831 lectures that this religion is allotted a proper, modest place in the classification of religions. it is the syrian religion, the religion of the Phoenicians. (l2 24, 369/269, l2 27, 608/503, l2 31, 743/629)
a new principle is realizing itself in the way of life of the Phoenicians, a people of trade and industry: "The human will and activity do have prior- ity here, not nature and its goodness. "18 The biblical prophets detest the religions of their non-Jewish neighbours and describe the cultus of these people as horrible idolatry, in which sensuality and cruelty are rampant. The sacrifice of human beings is explained by hegel as a proof that, for the religious consciousness that practices this cultus, nature counts as the highest and that human beings as such do not have value. This is totally different in Phoenician culture and cultus.
according to herodotus, Phoenicians worship hercules, and hegel com- ments, that hercules becomes a god through human bravery and courage
18 g. W. f. hegel, Werke in 20 Ba? nde, Bd. 12, Vorlesungen u? ber die Philosophie der geschichte, frankfurt: suhrkamp 1970, p. 237.
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and passes his life in labour and supreme effort. he is a human god. The same is true for adonis, who dies as a young man and is the object of a whole cultus of sorrow. life is renewed and regains its value during the holy days of mourning for the death and celebrating the resurrection of this, to a god elevated, adonis. Concrete consciousness is working here in the place of the abstract powers. 19
stories about dying gods are told in hinduism, too. But there, death does not have, according to hegel, the meaning of a negation that pen- etrates into the essence of the subject. Thus, Khrisna rises again and indra may die a thousand deaths and live further as a substance without fun- damental change. These resurrections lack the meaning of a spiritual vic- tory over natural death. (l2 27, 625/518) The representations of death and resurrection in the figure of the Phoenix, however, the bird that reborns from the ashes of his funeral, and of adonis, who rises from death three days after his bones are collected, refer to spiritual life as the sublation of natural death. 20 These representations have their place within a cul- tus of sorrow for life that is passing by, a sorrow that is overcome by joy in the sight of the recovered and rejuvenated life. The adonis cultus is connected with spring and the change of seasons. The natural course is a symbol, in which the awareness breaks through that the transition of death is a general determination and moment of the absolute itself. (l2 31, 743/629) death and resurrection are present in all religions, but they are the central theme of the egyptian religion; a narrow relationship exists between its osiris cultus and the cultus of adonis. 21
6. egypt: The religion of the enigma
The egyptian religion does not possess the abstract dualism, which was characteristic of the Persian. a concept of power connected with subjec- tivity replaces the universal concept of the good: the good is endowed with the power of subjectivity. for the first time, subjectivity is manifest in the form of representation. (l2 27, 629/522) This subjectivity is distinguished
19 hegel, Werke 12, pp. 239-40.
20 Comparisons with Christian representations are obvious, but hegel does also his best to make clear why the representations of the resurrection of Jesus, as god's son, give a deeper insight in the essence of god as spirit.
21 There is also a relationship with the mithra cultus, which is originating in these regions. hegel gives only few attention to it, because he considers the differences as only of historical interest. (cf. l2 27, 629/522)
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from a multitude of further determinations, which are not external or alien to it, but over which it is lord and master. These determinations are independent only in appearance, as they become, within this relation of lordship, for the subject its own otherness in a natural, sensible shape. Because of this lack of independency of the other, there is no place for an intersubjective relationship and subjectivity does not yet come to the free development of its essence; therefore, the relationship between subject and substance, between unity and a diverse multitude is still caught in a mixture of inconsequences, of which the subject has to clean and liberate itself. Thus, the representation of the subject remains a riddle, an enigma. (l2 24, 363-365/264-65) hegel has described the egyptian religion at length. 22 i can give only the outlines and some interesting details.
The negative is immanent to this subjectivity in different ways and on several levels. (l2 24, 365-369/266-69) on the level of the general con- cept, divine power has not yet been completely developed into a genu- ine subject and remains a substance that can be represented in different ways, especially in the worship of animals. on the level of particularity, the good is no longer something abstract, but the specific quality of osiris, principle of life and the most important god, who has been killed by a real opponent: the god Typhon, his enemy, the destructive principle and sym- bol of physical evil. Thus, negativity does not remain external to osiris. negativity is also connected with the will, the awareness of good and bad, and the choice between them. The subject (god, too) can act, and choose or reject particular ends. The good is connected with ethical life: osiris is lawgiver, founder of marriage and judge of the souls in the realm of the dead. on the level of singularity, the individual and spiritual subject, who has to liberate itself from its animal (i. e. natural) form, is coming to the fore. it is the human being, who is confronted with his own death and is guided by a notion of rising from it.
The relationship with negativity is, of course, most clear and concrete in the cultus of the dead. hegel recognizes in it the principle of the nega- tion of negation, the principle of the activity of spirit: death is killed, evil conquered. (l2 24, 368/269) This religion, too, has the representation of the death of god. Typhon defeats and kills osiris initially, but osiris lives further as the mighty lord of the realm of the dead. (l2 24, 370/271, 628/521) Thus, also osiris is twice born, but his second birth has gone through neg- ativity, a coming back to itself in the form of a specific power. The role
22 not only in the 1824 and 1827 lectures but also in other publications and lectures.
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death takes on in this religion is highly esteemed by hegel, because it is no longer the natural destine of the finite, but a determinate moment in the life of spirit and not accidental to the concept of god. This deep negativity is immanent and sublated in spiritual life, within which spirit is returning back to itself by defeating physical evil and natural death. here it becomes clear that the dignity of the human being is in law and ethical life. (l2 24, 369-372/270-72)
all religions have representations of god in the shape of a human fig- ure. in natural religions, those figures are natural, sensible, immediately observed creatures, without fundamental distinction between human and animal. in egypt, consciousness breaks with this immediacy of sen- sible representations. egyptian religious art uses an abundance of natu- ral images, but the nile, the sun, plants, animals and human figures are bestowed with a symbolic meaning, which elevates them above the nat- ural. (l2 24, 632/525) symbolism in egyptian art is carried out into the smallest detail. even the number of columns and steps toward a platform is not determined functionally, but symbolises, for example, the different months or the number of feet the nile has to rise for the irrigation of the land.