No More Learning

I answer that, It is impossible for the action of an angel, or of any
creature, to be its own substance. For an action is properly the
actuality of a power; just as existence is the actuality of a substance
or of an essence. Now it is impossible for anything which is not a pure
act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to be its own
actuality: because actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God alone
is pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the same as His
existence and His action.

Besides, if an angel's act of understanding were his substance, it
would be necessary for it to be subsisting. Now a subsisting act of
intelligence can be but one; just as an abstract thing that subsists.
Consequently an angel's substance would neither be distinguished from
God's substance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting in
itself, nor from the substance of another angel.

Also, if the angel were his own act of understanding, there could then
be no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly; for this comes
about through the diverse participation of the act of understanding.

Reply to Objection 1: When the active intellect is said to be its own
action, such predication is not essential, but concomitant, because,
since its very nature consists in act, instantly, so far as lies in
itself, action accompanies it: which cannot be said of the passive
intellect, for this has no actions until after it has been reduced to
act.

Reply to Objection 2: The relation between "life" and "to live" is not
the same as that between "essence" and "to be"; but rather as that
between "a race" and "to run," one of which signifies the act in the
abstract, and the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow, if
"to live" is "to be," that "life" is "essence. " Although life is
sometimes put for the essence, as Augustine says (De Trin. x), "Memory
and understanding and will are one essence, one life": yet it is not
taken in this sense by the Philosopher, when he says that "the act of
the intellect is life. "

Reply to Objection 3: The action which is transient, passing to some
extrinsic object, is really a medium between the agent and the subject
receiving the action. The action which remains within the agent, is not
really a medium between the agent and the object, but only according to
the manner of expression; for it really follows the union of the object
with the agent. For the act of understanding is brought about by the
union of the object understood with the one who understands it, as an
effect which differs from both.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether in the angel to understand is to exist?

Objection 1: It would seem that in the angel to understand is to exist.
For in living things to live is to be, as the Philosopher says (De
Anima ii, text. 37). But to "understand is in a sense to live" (De
Anima ii, text. 37). Therefore in the angel to understand is to exist.

Objection 2: Further, cause bears the same relation to cause, as effect
to effect. But the form whereby the angel exists is the same as the
form by which he understands at least himself. Therefore in the angel
to understand is to exist.

On the contrary, The angel's act of understanding is his movement, as
is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But to exist is not movement.
Therefore in the angel to be is not to understand.

I answer that, The action of the angel, as also the action of any
creature, is not his existence. For as it is said (Metaph. ix, text.
16), there is a twofold class of action; one which passes out to
something beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and cutting; and
another which does not pass outwards, but which remains within the
agent, as to feel, to understand, to will; by such actions nothing
outside is changed, but the whole action takes place within the agent.
It is quite clear regarding the first kind of action that it cannot be
the agent's very existence: because the agent's existence is signified
as within him, while such an action denotes something as issuing from
the agent into the thing done. But the second action of its own nature
has infinity, either simple or relative. As an example of simple
infinity, we have the act "to understand," of which the object is "the
true"; and the act "to will," of which the object is "the good"; each
of which is convertible with being; and so, to understand and to will,
of themselves, bear relation to all things, and each receives its
species from its object. But the act of sensation is relatively
infinite, for it bears relation to all sensible things; as sight does
to all things visible. Now the being of every creature is restricted to
one in genus and species; God's being alone is simply infinite,
comprehending all things in itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).
Hence the Divine nature alone is its own act of understanding and its
own act of will.

Reply to Objection 1: Life is sometimes taken for the existence of the
living subject: sometimes also for a vital operation, that is, for one
whereby something is shown to be living. In this way the Philosopher
says that to understand is, in a sense, to live: for there he
distinguishes the various grades of living things according to the
various functions of life.

Reply to Objection 2: The essence of an angel is the reason of his
entire existence, but not the reason of his whole act of understanding,
since he cannot understand everything by his essence. Consequently in
its own specific nature as such an essence, it is compared to the
existence of the angel, whereas to his act of understanding it is
compared as included in the idea of a more universal object, namely,
truth and being. Thus it is evident, that, although the form is the
same, yet it is not the principle of existence and of understanding
according to the same formality. On this account it does not follow
that in the angel "to be" is the same as 'to understand. '
__________________________________________________________________

Whether an angel's power of intelligence is his essence?

Objection 1: It would seem that in an angel the power or faculty of
understanding is not different from his essence. For, "mind" and
"intellect" express the power of understanding. But in many passages of
his writings, Dionysius styles angels "intellects" and "minds. "
Therefore the angel is his own power of intelligence.

Objection 2: Further, if the angel's power of intelligence be anything
besides his essence, then it must needs be an accident; for that which
is besides the essence of anything, we call it accident. But "a simple
form cannot be a subject," as Boethius states (De Trin. 1). Thus an
angel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been
previously said ([488]Q[50], A[2]).

Objection 3: Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says, that God made the
angelic nature "nigh unto Himself," while He made primary matter "nigh
unto nothing"; from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler
nature than primary matter, as being closer to God. But primary matter
is its own power. Therefore much more is an angel his own power of
intelligence.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that "the angels are
divided into substance, power, and operation. " Therefore substance,
power, and operation, are all distinct in them.

I answer that, Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power or
operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident thus.
Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the
diversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account
it is said that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in
every creature the essence differs from the existence, and is compared
to it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been
already said ([489]Q[44], A[1]). Now the act to which the operative
power is compared is operation. But in the angel to understand is not
the same as to exist, nor is any operation in him, nor in any other
created thing, the same as his existence. Hence the angel's essence is
not his power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its
power of operation.

Reply to Objection 1: An angel is called "intellect" and "mind,"
because all his knowledge is intellectual: whereas the knowledge of a
soul is partly intellectual and partly sensitive.

Reply to Objection 2: A simple form which is pure act cannot be the
subject of accident, because subject is compared to accident as
potentiality is to act. God alone is such a form: and of such is
Boethius speaking there. But a simple form which is not its own
existence, but is compared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the
subject of accident; and especially of such accident as follows the
species: for such accident belongs to the form---whereas an accident
which belongs to the individual, and which does not belong to the whole
species, results from the matter, which is the principle of
individuation. And such a simple form is an angel.

Reply to Objection 3: The power of matter is a potentiality in regard
to substantial being itself, whereas the power of operation regards
accidental being. Hence there is no comparison.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there is an active and a passive intellect in an angel?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is both an active and a passive
intellect in an angel. The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 17)
that, "in the soul, just as in every nature, there is something whereby
it can become all things, and there is something whereby it can make
all things. " But an angel is a kind of nature. Therefore there is an
active and a passive intellect in an angel.

Objection 2: Further, the proper function of the passive intellect is
to receive; whereas to enlighten is the proper function of the active
intellect, as is made clear in De Anima iii, text. 2,3,18. But an angel
receives enlightenment from a higher angel, and enlightens a lower one.
Therefore there is in him an active and a passive intellect.

On the contrary, The distinction of active and passive intellect in us
is in relation to the phantasms, which are compared to the passive
intellect as colors to the sight; but to the active intellect as colors
to the light, as is clear from De Anima iii, text. 18. But this is not
so in the angel. Therefore there is no active and passive intellect in
the angel.

I answer that, The necessity for admitting a passive intellect in us is
derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in
potentiality, and not actually. Hence there must exist some power,
which, previous to the act of understanding, is in potentiality to
intelligible things, but which becomes actuated in their regard when it
apprehends them, and still more when it reflects upon them. This is the
power which is denominated the passive intellect. The necessity for
admitting an active intellect is due to this---that the natures of the
material things which we understand do not exist outside the soul, as
immaterial and actually intelligible, but are only intelligible in
potentiality so long as they are outside the soul. Consequently it is
necessary that there should be some power capable of rendering such
natures actually intelligible: and this power in us is called the
active intellect.

But each of these necessities is absent from the angels. They are
neither sometimes understanding only in potentiality, with regard to
such things as they naturally apprehend; nor, again, are their
intelligible in potentiality, but they are actually such; for they
first and principally understand immaterial things, as will appear
later ([490]Q[84], A[7]; [491]Q[85], A[1]). Therefore there cannot be
an active and a passive intellect in them, except equivocally.

Reply to Objection 1: As the words themselves show, the Philosopher
understands those two things to be in every nature in which there
chances to be generation or making. Knowledge, however, is not
generated in the angels, but is present naturally. Hence there is not
need for admitting an active and a passive intellect in them.

Reply to Objection 2: It is the function of the active intellect to
enlighten, not another intellect, but things which are intelligible in
potentiality, in so far as by abstraction it makes them to be actually
intelligible. It belongs to the passive intellect to be in potentiality
with regard to things which are naturally capable of being known, and
sometimes to apprehend them actually. Hence for one angel to enlighten
another does not belong to the notion of an active intellect: neither
does it belong to the passive intellect for the angel to be enlightened
with regard to supernatural mysteries, to the knowledge of which he is
sometimes in potentiality. But if anyone wishes to call these by the
names of active and passive intellect, he will then be speaking
equivocally; and it is not about names that we need trouble.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there is only intellectual knowledge in the angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the knowledge of the angels is not
exclusively intellectual. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii) that in
the angels there is "life which understands and feels. " Therefore there
is a sensitive faculty in them as well.

Objection 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono) that the angels have
learnt many things by experience. But experience comes of many
remembrances, as stated in Metaph. i, 1. Consequently they have
likewise a power of memory.

Objection 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that there is a
sort of "perverted phantasy" in the demons. But phantasy belongs to the
imaginative faculty. Therefore the power of the imagination is in the
demons; and for the same reason it is in the angels, since they are of
the same nature.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. 29 in Ev. ), that "man senses in
common with the brutes, and understands with the angels. "

I answer that, In our soul there are certain powers whose operations
are exercised by corporeal organs; such powers are acts of sundry parts
of the body, as sight of the eye, and hearing of the ear. There are
some other powers of the soul whose operations are not performed
through bodily organs, as intellect and will: these are not acts of any
parts of the body. Now the angels have no bodies naturally joined to
them, as is manifest from what has been said already ([492]Q[51],
A[1]). Hence of the soul's powers only intellect and will can belong to
them.

The Commentator (Metaph. xii) says the same thing, namely, that the
separated substances are divided into intellect and will. And it is in
keeping with the order of the universe for the highest intellectual
creature to be entirely intelligent; and not in part, as is our soul.
For this reason the angels are called "intellects" and "minds," as was
said above (A[3], ad 1).

A twofold answer can be returned to the contrary objections. First, it
may be replied that those authorities are speaking according to the
opinion of such men as contended that angels and demons have bodies
naturally united to them. Augustine often makes use of this opinion in
his books, although he does not mean to assert it; hence he says (De
Civ. Dei xxi) that "such an inquiry does not call for much labor. "
Secondly, it may be said that such authorities and the like are to be
understood by way of similitude. Because, since sense has a sure
apprehension of its proper sensible object, it is a common usage of
speech, when he understands something for certain, to say that we
"sense it. " And hence it is that we use the word "sentence. " Experience
can be attributed to the angels according to the likeness of the things
known, although not by likeness of the faculty knowing them. We have
experience when we know single objects through the senses: the angels
likewise know single objects, as we shall show ([493]Q[57], A[2]), yet
not through the senses. But memory can be allowed in the angels,
according as Augustine (De Trin. x) puts it in the mind; although it
cannot belong to them in so far as it is a part of the sensitive soul.
In like fashion 'a perverted phantasy' is attributed to demons, since
they have a false practical estimate of what is the true good; while
deception in us comes properly from the phantasy, whereby we sometimes
hold fast to images of things as to the things themselves, as is
manifest in sleepers and lunatics.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE MEDIUM OF THE ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE (THREE ARTICLES)

Next in order, the question arises as to the medium of the angelic
knowledge. Under this heading there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Do the angels know everything by their substance, or by some
species?

(2) If by species, is it by connatural species, or is it by such as
they have derived from things?

(3) Do the higher angels know by more universal species than the lower
angels?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the angels know all things by their substance?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels know all things by their
substance. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that "the angels,
according to the proper nature of a mind, know the things which are
happening upon earth. " But the angel's nature is his essence. Therefore
the angel knows things by his essence.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, text.
51; De Anima iii, text. 15), "in things which are without matter, the
intellect is the same as the object understood. " But the object
understood is the same as the one who understands it, as regards that
whereby it is understood. Therefore in things without matter, such as
the angels, the medium whereby the object is understood is the very
substance of the one understanding it.

Objection 3: Further, everything which is contained in another is there
according to the mode of the container. But an angel has an
intellectual nature. Therefore whatever is in him is there in an
intelligible mode. But all things are in him: because the lower orders
of beings are essentially in the higher, while the higher are in the
lower participatively: and therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that
God "enfolds the whole in the whole," i. e. all in all. Therefore the
angel knows all things in his substance.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels are
enlightened by the forms of things. " Therefore they know by the forms
of things, and not by their own substance.

I answer that, The medium through which the intellect understands, is
compared to the intellect understanding it as its form, because it is
by the form that the agent acts. Now in order that the faculty may be
perfectly completed by the form, it is necessary for all things to
which the faculty extends to be contained under the form. Hence it is
that in things which are corruptible, the form does not perfectly
complete the potentiality of the matter: because the potentiality of
the matter extends to more things than are contained under this or that
form. But the intellective power of the angel extends to understanding
all things: because the object of the intellect is universal being or
universal truth. The angel's essence, however, does not comprise all
things in itself, since it is an essence restricted to a genus and
species. This is proper to the Divine essence, which is infinite,
simply and perfectly to comprise all things in Itself. Therefore God
alone knows all things by His essence. But an angel cannot know all
things by his essence; and his intellect must be perfected by some
species in order to know things.

Reply to Objection 1: When it is said that the angel knows things
according to his own nature, the words "according to" do not determine
the medium of such knowledge, since the medium is the similitude of the
thing known; but they denote the knowing power, which belongs to the
angel of his own nature.

Reply to Objection 2: As the sense in act is the sensible in act, as
stated in De Anima ii, text. 53, not so that the sensitive power is the
sensible object's likeness contained in the sense, but because one
thing is made from both as from act and potentiality: so likewise the
intellect in act is said to be the thing understood in act, not that
the substance of the intellect is itself the similitude by which it
understands, but because that similitude is its form. Now, it is
precisely the same thing to say "in things which are without matter,
the intellect is the same thing as the object understood," as to say
that "the intellect in act is the thing understood in act"; for a thing
is actually understood, precisely because it is immaterial.

Reply to Objection 3: The things which are beneath the angel, and those
which are above him, are in a measure in his substance, not indeed
perfectly, nor according to their own proper formality---because the
angel's essence, as being finite, is distinguished by its own formality
from other things---but according to some common formality. Yet all
things are perfectly and according to their own formality in God's
essence, as in the first and universal operative power, from which
proceeds whatever is proper or common to anything. Therefore God has a
proper knowledge of all things by His own essence: and this the angel
has not, but only a common knowledge.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the angels understand by species drawn from things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels understand by species drawn
from things. For everything understood is apprehended by some likeness
within him who understands it. But the likeness of the thing existing
in another is there either by way of an exemplar, so that the likeness
is the cause of the thing; or else by way of an image, so that it is
caused by such thing. All knowledge, then, of the person understanding
must either be the cause of the object understood, or else caused by
it. Now the angel's knowledge is not the cause of existing things; that
belongs to the Divine knowledge alone. Therefore it is necessary for
the species, by which the angelic mind understands, to be derived from
things.

Objection 2: Further, the angelic light is stronger than the light of
the active intellect of the soul. But the light of the active intellect
abstracts intelligible species from phantasms.
Therefore the light of
the angelic mind can also abstract species from sensible things. So
there is nothing to hinder us from saying that the angel understands
through species drawn from things.

Objection 3: Further, the species in the intellect are indifferent to
what is present or distant, except in so far as they are taken from
sensible objects. Therefore, if the angel does not understand by
species drawn from things, his knowledge would be indifferent as to
things present and distant; and so he would be moved locally to no
purpose.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the "angels do not
gather their Divine knowledge from things divisible or sensible. "

I answer that, The species whereby the angels understand are not drawn
from things, but are connatural to them. For we must observe that there
is a similarity between the distinction and order of spiritual
substances and the distinction and order of corporeal substances. The
highest bodies have in their nature a potentiality which is fully
perfected by the form; whereas in the lower bodies the potentiality of
matter is not entirely perfected by the form, but receives from some
agent, now one form, now another. In like fashion also the lower
intellectual substances ---that is to say, human souls---have a power
of understanding which is not naturally complete, but is successively
completed in them by their drawing intelligible species from things.
But in the higher spiritual substances---that is, the angels---the
power of understanding is naturally complete by intelligible species,
in so far as they have such species connatural to them, so as to
understand all things which they can know naturally.

The same is evident from the manner of existence of such substances.
The lower spiritual substances---that is, souls---have a nature akin to
a body, in so far as they are the forms of bodies: and consequently
from their very mode of existence it behooves them to seek their
intelligible perfection from bodies, and through bodies; otherwise they
would be united with bodies to no purpose. On the other hand, the
higher substances---that is, the angels---are utterly free from bodies,
and subsist immaterially and in their own intelligible nature;
consequently they attain their intelligible perfection through an
intelligible outpouring, whereby they received from God the species of
things known, together with their intellectual nature. Hence Augustine
says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8): "The other things which are lower than the
angels are so created that they first receive existence in the
knowledge of the rational creature, and then in their own nature. "

Reply to Objection 1: There are images of creatures in the angel's
mind, not, indeed derived from creatures, but from God, Who is the
cause of creatures, and in Whom the likenesses of creatures first
exist. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that, "As the type,
according to which the creature is fashioned, is in the Word of God
before the creature which is fashioned, so the knowledge of the same
type exists first in the intellectual creature, and is afterwards the
very fashioning of the creature. "

Reply to Objection 2: To go from one extreme to the other it is
necessary to pass through the middle. Now the nature of a form in the
imagination, which form is without matter but not without material
conditions, stands midway between the nature of a form which is in
matter, and the nature of a form which is in the intellect by
abstraction from matter and from material conditions. Consequently,
however powerful the angelic mind might be, it could not reduce
material forms to an intelligible condition, except it were first to
reduce them to the nature of imagined forms; which is impossible, since
the angel has no imagination, as was said above ([494]Q[54], A[5]).
Even granted that he could abstract intelligible species from material
things, yet he would not do so; because he would not need them, for he
has connatural intelligible species.

Reply to Objection 3: The angel's knowledge is quite indifferent as to
what is near or distant. Nevertheless his local movement is not
purposeless on that account: for he is not moved to a place for the
purpose of acquiring knowledge, but for the purpose of operation.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the higher angels understand by more universal species than the
lower angels?

Objection 1: It would seem that the higher angels do not understand by
more universal species than the lower angels. For the universal,
seemingly, is what is abstracted from particulars. But angels do not
understand by species abstracted from things. Therefore it cannot be
said that the species of the angelic intellect are more or less
universal.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is known in detail is more perfectly
known than what is known generically; because to know anything
generically is, in a fashion, midway between potentiality and act. If,
therefore, the higher angels know by more universal species than the
lower, it follows that the higher have a more imperfect knowledge than
the lower; which is not befitting.

Objection 3: Further, the same cannot be the proper type of many. But
if the higher angel knows various things by one universal form, which
the lower angel knows by several special forms, it follows that the
higher angel uses one universal form for knowing various things.
Therefore he will not be able to have a proper knowledge of each; which
seems unbecoming.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) that the higher
angels have a more universal knowledge than the lower. And in De Causis
it is said that the higher angels have more universal forms.

I answer that, For this reason are some things of a more exalted
nature, because they are nearer to and more like unto the first, which
is God. Now in God the whole plenitude of intellectual knowledge is
contained in one thing, that is to say, in the Divine essence, by which
God knows all things. This plenitude of knowledge is found in created
intellects in a lower manner, and less simply. Consequently it is
necessary for the lower intelligences to know by many forms what God
knows by one, and by so many forms the more according as the intellect
is lower.

Thus the higher the angel is, by so much the fewer species will he be
able to apprehend the whole mass of intelligible objects. Therefore his
forms must be more universal; each one of them, as it were, extending
to more things. An example of this can in some measure be observed in
ourselves. For some people there are who cannot grasp an intelligible
truth, unless it be explained to them in every part and detail; this
comes of their weakness of intellect: while there are others of
stronger intellect, who can grasp many things from few.

Reply to Objection 1: It is accidental to the universal to be
abstracted from particulars, in so far as the intellect knowing it
derives its knowledge from things. But if there be an intellect which
does not derive its knowledge from things, the universal which it knows
will not be abstracted from things, but in a measure will be
pre-existing to them; either according to the order of causality, as
the universal ideas of things are in the Word of God; or at least in
the order of nature, as the universal ideas of things are in the
angelic mind.

Reply to Objection 2: To know anything universally can be taken in two
senses. In one way, on the part of the thing known, namely, that only
the universal nature of the thing is known. To know a thing thus is
something less perfect: for he would have but an imperfect knowledge of
a man who only knew him to be an animal. In another way, on the part of
the medium of such knowledge. In this way it is more perfect to know a
thing in the universal; for the intellect, which by one universal
medium can know each of the things which are properly contained in it,
is more perfect than one which cannot.

Reply to Objection 3: The same cannot be the proper and adequate type
of several things. But if it be eminent, then it can be taken as the
proper type and likeness of many. Just as in man, there is a universal
prudence with respect to all the acts of the virtues; which can be
taken as the proper type and likeness of that prudence which in the
lion leads to acts of magnanimity, and in the fox to acts of wariness;
and so on of the rest. The Divine essence, on account of Its eminence,
is in like fashion taken as the proper type of each thing contained
therein: hence each one is likened to It according to its proper type.
The same applies to the universal form which is in the mind of the
angel, so that, on account of its excellence, many things can be known
through it with a proper knowledge.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF IMMATERIAL THINGS (THREE ARTICLES)

We now inquire into the knowledge of the angels with regard to the
objects known by them. We shall treat of their knowledge, first, of
immaterial things, secondly of things material. Under the first heading
there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Does an angel know himself?

(2) Does one angel know another?

(3) Does the angel know God by his own natural principles?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether an angel knows himself?

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not know himself. For
Dionysius says that "the angels do not know their own powers" (Coel.
Hier. vi). But, when the substance is known, the power is known.
Therefore an angel does not know his own essence.

Objection 2: Further, an angel is a single substance, otherwise he
would not act, since acts belong to single subsistences. But nothing
single is intelligible. Therefore, since the angel possesses only
knowledge which is intellectual, no angel can know himself.

Objection 3: Further, the intellect is moved by the intelligible
object: because, as stated in De Anima iii, 4 understanding is a kind
of passion. But nothing is moved by or is passive to itself; as appears
in corporeal things. Therefore the angel cannot understand himself.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii) that "the angel knew
himself when he was established, that is, enlightened by truth. "

I answer that, As is evident from what has been previously said
([495]Q[14], A[2]; [496]Q[54], A[2]), the object is on a different
footing in an immanent, and in a transient, action. In a transient
action the object or matter into which the action passes is something
separate from the agent, as the thing heated is from what gave it heat,
and the building from the builder; whereas in an immanent action, for
the action to proceed, the object must be united with the agent; just
as the sensible object must be in contact with sense, in order that
sense may actually perceive. And the object which is united to a
faculty bears the same relation to actions of this kind as does the
form which is the principle of action in other agents: for, as heat is
the formal principle of heating in the fire, so is the species of the
thing seen the formal principle of sight to the eye.

It must, however, be borne in mind that this image of the object exists
sometimes only potentially in the knowing faculty; and then there is
only knowledge in potentiality; and in order that there may be actual
knowledge, it is required that the faculty of knowledge be actuated by
the species. But if it always actually possesses the species, it can
thereby have actual knowledge without any preceding change or
reception. From this it is evident that it is not of the nature of
knower, as knowing, to be moved by the object, but as knowing in
potentiality. Now, for the form to be the principle of the action, it
makes no difference whether it be inherent in something else, or
self-subsisting; because heat would give forth heat none the less if it
were self-subsisting, than it does by inhering in something else. So
therefore, if in the order of intelligible beings there be any
subsisting intelligible form, it will understand itself. And since an
angel is immaterial, he is a subsisting form; and, consequently, he is
actually intelligible. Hence it follows that he understands himself by
his form, which is his substance.

Reply to Objection 1: That is the text of the old translation, which is
amended in the new one, and runs thus: "furthermore they," that is to
say the angels, "knew their own powers": instead of which the old
translation read---"and furthermore they do not know their own powers. "
Although even the letter of the old translation might be kept in this
respect, that the angels do not know their own power perfectly;
according as it proceeds from the order of the Divine Wisdom, Which to
the angels is incomprehensible.

Reply to Objection 2: We have no knowledge of single corporeal things,
not because of their particularity, but on account of the matter, which
is their principle of individuation. Accordingly, if there be any
single things subsisting without matter, as the angels are, there is
nothing to prevent them from being actually intelligible.

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs to the intellect, in so far as if is
in potentiality, to be moved and to be passive. Hence this does not
happen in the angelic intellect, especially as regards the fact that he
understands himself. Besides the action of the intellect is not of the
same nature as the action found in corporeal things, which passes into
some other matter.
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Whether one angel knows another?

Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not know another. For
the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 4), that if the human
intellect were to have in itself any one of the sensible things, then
such a nature existing within it would prevent it from apprehending
external things; as likewise, if the pupil of the eye were colored with
some particular color, it could not see every color. But as the human
intellect is disposed for understanding corporeal things, so is the
angelic mind for understanding immaterial things. Therefore, since the
angelic intellect has within itself some one determinate nature from
the number of such natures, it would seem that it cannot understand
other natures.

Objection 2: Further, it is stated in De Causis that "every
intelligence knows what is above it, in so far as it is caused by it;
and what is beneath it, in so far as it is its cause. " But one angel is
not the cause of another. Therefore one angel does not know another.

Objection 3: Further, one angel cannot be known to another angel by the
essence of the one knowing; because all knowledge is effected by way of
a likeness. But the essence of the angel knowing is not like the
essence of the angel known, except generically; as is clear from what
has been said before ([497]Q[50], A[4]; [498]Q[55], A[1], ad 3). Hence,
it follows that one angel would not have a particular knowledge of
another, but only a general knowledge. In like manner it cannot be said
that one angel knows another by the essence of the angel known; because
that whereby the intellect understands is something within the
intellect; whereas the Trinity alone can penetrate the mind. Again, it
cannot be said that one angel knows the other by a species; because
that species would not differ from the angel understood, since each is
immaterial. Therefore in no way does it appear that one angel can
understand another.

Objection 4: Further, if one angel did understand another, this would
be either by an innate species; and so it would follow that, if God
were now to create another angel, such an angel could not be known by
the existing angels; or else he would have to be known by a species
drawn from things; and so it would follow that the higher angels could
not know the lower, from whom they receive nothing. Therefore in no way
does it seem that one angel knows another.

On the contrary, We read in De Causis that "every intelligence knows
the things which are not corrupted. "

I answer that, As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. lit. ii), such things as
pre-existed from eternity in the Word of God, came forth from Him in
two ways: first, into the angelic mind; and secondly, so as to subsist
in their own natures. They proceeded into the angelic mind in such a
way, that God impressed upon the angelic mind the images of the things
which He produced in their own natural being. Now in the Word of God
from eternity there existed not only the forms of corporeal things, but
likewise the forms of all spiritual creatures. So in every one of these
spiritual creatures, the forms of all things, both corporeal and
spiritual, were impressed by the Word of God; yet so that in every
angel there was impressed the form of his own species according to both
its natural and its intelligible condition, so that he should subsist
in the nature of his species, and understand himself by it; while the
forms of other spiritual and corporeal natures were impressed in him
only according to their intelligible natures, so that by such impressed
species he might know corporeal and spiritual creatures.

Reply to Objection 1: The spiritual natures of the angels are
distinguished from one another in a certain order, as was already
observed ([499]Q[50], A[4], ad 1,2). So the nature of an angel does not
hinder him from knowing the other angelic natures, since both the
higher and lower bear affinity to his nature, the only difference being
according to their various degrees of perfection.

Reply to Objection 2: The nature of cause and effect does not lead one
angel to know another, except on account of likeness, so far as cause
and effect are alike. Therefore if likeness without causality be
admitted in the angels, this will suffice for one to know another.

Reply to Objection 3: One angel knows another by the species of such
angel existing in his intellect, which differs from the angel whose
image it is, not according to material and immaterial nature, but
according to natural and intentional existence. The angel is himself a
subsisting form in his natural being; but his species in the intellect
of another angel is not so, for there it possesses only an intelligible
existence. As the form of color on the wall has a natural existence;
but, in the deferent medium, it has only intentional existence.

Reply to Objection 4: God made every creature proportionate to the
universe which He determined to make. Therefore had God resolved to
make more angels or more natures of things, He would have impressed
more intelligible species in the angelic minds; as a builder who, if he
had intended to build a larger house, would have made larger
foundations. Hence, for God to add a new creature to the universe,
means that He would add a new intelligible species to an angel.
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Whether an angle knows God by his own natural principles?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels cannot know God by their
natural principles. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that God "by His
incomprehensible might is placed above all heavenly minds. " Afterwards
he adds that, "since He is above all substances, He is remote from all
knowledge. "

Objection 2: Further, God is infinitely above the intellect of an
angel. But what is infinitely beyond cannot be reached. Therefore it
appears that an angel cannot know God by his natural principles.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:12): "We see now through
a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face. " From this it appears
that there is a twofold knowledge of God; the one, whereby He is seen
in His essence, according to which He is said to be seen face to face;
the other whereby He is seen in the mirror of creatures. As was already
shown ([500]Q[12], A[4]), an angel cannot have the former knowledge by
his natural principles. Nor does vision through a mirror belong to the
angels, since they do not derive their knowledge of God from sensible
things, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore the angels
cannot know God by their natural powers.

On the contrary, The angels are mightier in knowledge than men. Yet men
can know God through their natural principles; according to Rom. 1:19:
"what is known of God is manifest in them. " Therefore much more so can
the angels.

I answer that, The angels can have some knowledge of God by their own
principles. In evidence whereof it must be borne in mind that a thing
is known in three ways: first, by the presence of its essence in the
knower, as light can be seen in the eye; and so we have said that an
angel knows himself---secondly, by the presence of its similitude in
the power which knows it, as a stone is seen by the eye from its image
being in the eye---thirdly, when the image of the object known is not
drawn directly from the object itself, but from something else in which
it is made to appear, as when we behold a man in a mirror.

To the first-named class that knowledge of God is likened by which He
is seen through His essence; and knowledge such as this cannot accrue
to any creature from its natural principles, as was said above
([501]Q[12], A[4]). The third class comprises the knowledge whereby we
know God while we are on earth, by His likeness reflected in creatures,
according to Rom. 1:20: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen,
being understood by the things that are made. " Hence, too, we are said
to see God in a mirror. But the knowledge, whereby according to his
natural principles the angel knows God, stands midway between these
two; and is likened to that knowledge whereby a thing is seen through
the species abstracted from it. For since God's image is impressed on
the very nature of the angel in his essence, the angel knows God in as
much as he is the image of God. Yet he does not behold God's essence;
because no created likeness is sufficient to represent the Divine
essence. Such knowledge then approaches rather to the specular kind;
because the angelic nature is itself a kind of mirror representing the
Divine image.

Reply to Objection 1: Dionysius is speaking of the knowledge of
comprehension, as his words expressly state. In this way God is not
known by any created intellect.

Reply to Objection 2: Since an angel's intellect and essence are
infinitely remote from God, it follows that he cannot comprehend Him;
nor can he see God's essence through his own nature. Yet it does not
follow on that account that he can have no knowledge of Him at all:
because, as God is infinitely remote from the angel, so the knowledge
which God has of Himself is infinitely above the knowledge which an
angel has of Him.

Reply to Objection 3: The knowledge which an angel has of God is midway
between these two kinds of knowledge; nevertheless it approaches more
to one of them, as was said above.
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OF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL THINGS (FIVE ARTICLES)

We next investigate the material objects which are known by the angels.
Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the angels know the natures of material things?

(2) Whether they know single things?

(3) Whether they know the future?

(4) Whether they know secret thoughts?

(5) Whether they know all mysteries of grace?
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Whether the angels know material things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not know material things.
For the object understood is the perfection of him who understands it.
But material things cannot be the perfections of angels, since they are
beneath them. Therefore the angels do not know material things.

Objection 2: Further, intellectual vision is only of such things as
exist within the soul by their essence, as is said in the gloss [*On 2
Cor. 12:2, taken from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii. 28)]. But the
material things cannot enter by their essence into man's soul, nor into
the angel's mind. Therefore they cannot be known by intellectual
vision, but only by imaginary vision, whereby the images of bodies are
apprehended, and by sensible vision, which regards bodies in
themselves. Now there is neither imaginary nor sensible vision in the
angels, but only intellectual. Therefore the angels cannot know
material things.

Objection 3: Further, material things are not actually intelligible,
but are knowable by apprehension of sense and of imagination, which
does not exist in angels. Therefore angels do not know material things.

On the contrary, Whatever the lower power can do, the higher can do
likewise. But man's intellect, which in the order of nature is inferior
to the angel's, can know material things. Therefore much more can the
mind of an angel.

I answer that, The established order of things is for the higher beings
to be more perfect than the lower; and for whatever is contained
deficiently, partially, and in manifold manner in the lower beings, to
be contained in the higher eminently, and in a certain degree of
fulness and simplicity. Therefore, in God, as in the highest source of
things, all things pre-exist supersubstantially in respect of His
simple Being itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1). But among other
creatures the angels are nearest to God, and resemble Him most; hence
they share more fully and more perfectly in the Divine goodness, as
Dionysius says (Coel.