No More Learning

. . libellous”,3
proposed and carried his resolution that it should be burnt by the
common hangman. When, in after years, he was confronted with his
action at the time, he declared that it was due to the fact that he
"feared for Clavering's safety, not knowing to what length those
judges, who had dipped their hands in blood to answer a political
purpose, might proceed on the same principle”.
All the circumstances in regard to this document are somewhat
mysterious. When it was presented, Hastings proposed that it should
be sent to the judges, but the majority opposed him and accepted
3 and
1 Siephen, Nuncomar and Impey, 1, 233.
3 Idem, p. 239.
Idem, o, 94.
8


## p. 240 (#268) ############################################

240
WARREN HASTINGS AND HIS COLLEAGUES
Francis's resolution that it should be destroyed with all copies. All
this took place in the secret department of the council on 14 August.
On 28 August the judges asked to be furnished with a copy of the
libel. The council declined their request, and on the motion of Francis
a letter was sent to them asking them to say “from whom you receive
the imputed information, which appears to have been conveyed to
you on this and other occasions, of the proceedings of this Board in
our secret department”. The judges were also informed that the
petition and all copies had been destroỳed. In spite of this, Hastings
gave a copy of the document to Impey under an oath of secrecy that
he should not disclose it except to his fellow-judges. This fact was
revealed twelve years later, when Impey produced a copy at the time
of his impeachment. Three deductions follow from this incident. In
the first place, it is clear that Hastings went behind the decision of the
council, a highly unconstitutional act, and also violated his oath of
office. In regard to this his staunch defender Stephen can only say:
Oaths of such a nature never bind closely, and it is one of the great ob-
jections to their use that, if they are rigidly enforced they often do cruel
injustice, and that, if tacit exceptions to them are admitted, they not only
become useless for the immediate purposes for which they are imposed, but
are also snares to the honesty of those who take them. Whether in the parti-
cular case there was any moral guilt in the breach of the oath of secrecy, and
whether its terms. were, or were not, subject to exceptions express or implied,
are points on which I express no opinion. 2
Secondly, the facts reveal a certain lack of straigntforwardness, which,
however much we may excuse it, owing to the fiendish persecution to
which he was often subject, sometimes characterises Hastings's con-
duct. As Stephen admits, he was "a curiously cautious secret man"
_"of his conduct to his colleagues I will only say that, if he had
acted openly, he would have done better than he did”. 3 Lastly, we
cannot shut our eyes to the fact that the incident implies, as Francis
noted and Stephen agrees, a very strong intimacy between Hastings
and the Chief Justice, and "it greatly weakens Impey's argument
that he had no means of knowing the particulars of Nandakumar's
accusations against. Hastings, because they were made in the secret
department under an oath of secrecy”. 4
)
No part of Lord Macaulay's essay is so prejudiced as the famous
passage on the terror in Bengal caused by the action of the Supreme
Court, and the corrupt nature of the bargain or sale by which in the
end Hastings is alleged to have bought or bribed the Chief Justice.
The question is a very difficult one and much of the evidence is
contradictory. Before considering it in detail, we may perhaps lay
down the following points :
1 Stephen, Nuncomar and Impey, 1, 251.
3 Idem, p. 116.
2 Idem, u, 115.
4 Idem, p. 115.


## p. 241 (#269) ############################################

THE SUPREME COURT
241
(i) A conflict of jurisdiction was inevitable; it was inherert in
the charter establishing the court and in the clauses of the Regulating
Act. The framers of that act shrank from the logical course of pro-
claiming the king of England sovereign in Bengal, but that sovereignty
was really implied in the very constitution of the court. And, as
Macaulay said, they "had established two independent powers, the
one judicial, and the other political; and with the carelessness
scandalously common in English legislation, had omitted to define
the limits of either".
(ii) It cannot be denied that the court caused much disturbance
and discontent by exercising its powers too rigidly and too pedanti-
cally. But the point is, what classes were aggrieved and offended? If
it can be shown that the zamindar class and the European inhabitants
of Bengal objected to the court because it restrained oppressive
practices against Indians, then the agitation is highly honourable to
the judges, and this is as a matter of fact the claim put forward by
Impey's son and largely accepted by so impartial and exact an
enquirer as Sir James Stephen.
(iii) We must in any case entirely discard the overcharged and
overheated language of Macaulay. All we know of Sir Elijah Impey's
life makes it impossible that he could ever have been the monster of
iniquity described by Macaulay. We must remember that the worst
charge against Impey-and it may not be true—is that he harried
and distressed the population by exercising too meticulously the legal
powers given him, and that, in accepting the new office offered him
by Hastings, he was not careful enough to think out all the conse-
quences, or to visualise the manner in which the affair would strike
hostile observers. The whole incident casts a serious slur on the
literary and historical integrity of Macaulay.
There were many points in dispute as between the council and
the court; for instance, the court admittedly had jurisdiction over
British subjects but the words had not been carefully defined.
“In one sense”, says Ste en, “the whole population of Bengal, Behar, and
Orissa were British subjects. In another sense, no one was a British subject
who was not an Englishman born. In a third sense, inhabitants of Calcutta
might be regarded as British subjects, though the general population of Bengal
were not. " 1
Secondly, had the court jurisdiction over the provincial councils?
Thirdly, had it jurisdiction over the zamindars? .
Something must now be said of the progress and gradual growth
of the dispute. Hastings obviously looked forward to the advent of
the court with dread, but hoped that his friendship with Impey might
prevent the worst consequences. In 1774 he wrote to a friend: "The
court of justice is a dreadful clog on the government, but I thank
God, the head of it is a man of sense and moderation”. 2 Clearly, if
1 Idem, p. 126.
2 Gleig, op. cit. 1, 471.
16


## p. 242 (#270) ############################################

242
WARREN HASTINGS AND HIS COLLEAGUES
the question had only lain between the governor-general and the
Chief Justice, a modus vivendi would have been arrived at.
Hastings, therefore, did everything in his power to smooth the
path for the judges, and was determined if possible to put the best
construction on all their actior. s. He would, of course, in writing to
Lord North, naturally avoid speaking ill of the court, but we find
him definitely committing himself to the statement that the protection
which it affords to the weak against oppression had already been felt
by many. In 1776 he wrote:
The conduct of all the judges has been directed by the principles of mode-
ration, and a scrupulous attention to the just authority of government, and to
the laws and customs of the people. I am afraid that to this prudent caution
alone it must be ascribed, that the undefined state of the powers of the Gov-
ernor-General and Council and of the Supreme Court of Judicature have not
been productive of ill consequences both to the company and to the country. 1
He foresees difficulties, because it will scarcely be found possible in
practice "to make the distinction intended by the Act and Charter,
between such persons as are employed in the service of the Company,
or of British subjects and other native inhabitants”. He suggests, to
further a good understanding between court and council, that the
Chief Justice should have "a fixed or occasional seat” at the council
board, and that the Company's courts should subsist by delegated
powers from the Supreme Court and be dependent upon it. ?
In 1776 he worked out and sent home a plan for amalgamating
the Supreme and the Company's courts-a scheme which would have
-a
in part anticipated that which he effected less constitutionally on his
own initiative in 1780. His plan was, first, to extend the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction to all parts of the province, that is, to do away
with the nawab's shadowy authority and ensure "that the British
sovereignty, through whatever channels it may pass into these prc-
vinces, should be all in all”. 3 Secondly, to unite the judges of the
Supreme Court with members of the council in control of the Sadr
diwanni adalat, or the Company's chief civil court of appeal. Thirdly,
to give the provincial councils a legal authority in the internal govern-
ment of the country and in the collection of revenue. Of this plan
Hastings writes : “All the judges approve of it, and I like it myself,
which is not always the case with my own productions". The plan
was of course opposed by the majority of the council, who showed
their usual controversial ability and lack of real statesmanship (for
it was impossible to act as though a tabula rasa lay before them),
saying:
It is proposed to give the Supreme Court a complete control over every part
of the country. . . . The complaint is that they have assumed more than they
have a right to; the redress proposed is to set no limits to their power. 5
1 Idem, II, 16. 2. Idem, I, 541-2. 3 Idem, , 14, 50. 4 Idem, p. 35.
6. Forrest, Selections from . . . State Papers in the Foreign Department of
the Government of India, II, 540.


## p. 243 (#271) ############################################

DISPUTES WITH THE COURT
213
At first Hastings attributed the disputes, when they came, mainly
to the majority on the council : "It seems to have been a maxim of
the Board to force the court into extremities for the purpose of finding
fault with them”, and he admits that there have been “glaring acts
of oppression committed by the Board, which would have produced
the ruin of the parties over whom they were exercised, but for the
protection of the court”. At this time, too, Hastings agreed that it
was necessary to bring before the court persons who were eventually
excluded from its jurisdiction in order to establish their exemption :
“their right to this exemption must be tried to be known". 1 Of
himself he says with truth : "On every occasion which was likely to
involve the Board in contests with the court, I have taken a moderate
and conciliating part”. ? But the plan of 1776 not having been
accepted, the position gradually became worse and Hastings and
Impey drifted apart.
The trouble centred round two famous cases. The first was the
Patna case, 1777-9. The question at issue was the right of the Supreme
Court to try actions brought against the Indian judicial servants of
the Company for acts done in their official capacity. The Supreme
Court cast in heavy damages the Muhammadan law officers of the
Patna council. Sir James Stephen has exhaustively analysed the
whole case, and shows pretty conclusively that the Supreme Court
was mainly in the right. The provincial councils were worthless
bodies and had allowed their Indian officials far too much power :
If the Patna council was a fair specimen of the rest, the provincial councils,
considered as courts of justice, were absolutely worthless, and no system for the
administration of justice, which deserved the name, existed at that time out of
Calcutta. 3
The second case was the Kasijora case, 1779-80. The question at
issue here was whether the Supreme Court had the right to exercise
jurisdiction over everyone in Bengal, Behar and Orissa, and especially
over the zamindars. Hyde had issued a writ against the raja of
Kasijora, a zamindar of the Company. The council told the raja he
was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and, when
the Supreme Court sent sheriff's officers to apprehend him, the council
sent some companies of sepoys to arrest the sheriff's officers and bring
them back to Calcutta. Hastings might well say: "We are upon the
eve of an open war with the court”. 4 Even now he did his best to
look at the question fairly. He still felt doubtful about the legal
point, though he was convinced of the practical inconveniences arising
from the court's action. Referring to the danger to the public revenues
and to the quiet of the provinces, and to the irregular and illegal
nature of the writ, he says : “God knows how far we are right on the
last conclusion. I am sure of the former”. 5 But he now came to agree
2 Idem, p. 248.
1 Gleig, op. cit. u, 36.
3 Stephen, Nuncomar and Imphey, u, 178.
* Gleig, op. cit. 1, 244:
5 Idem, p. 245.


## p. 244 (#272) ############################################

244
WARREN HASTINGS AND HIS COLLEAGUES
with the majority of his council, that zamindars were neither British
subjects nor the servants of British subjects, and that the court could
not be allowed to drag “the descendants of men who once held the
rights of sovereignty in this country, like felons, to Calcutta on the
affidavit of a Calcutta banyan or the complaint of a court serjeant”.
The justice of the whole matter is very difficult to decide. It has
generally been assumed that Hastings was in the right, especially
as he was normally so loth to infringe the powers of the court. But
Sir James Stephen declares that in the Kasijora case “the council
acted haughtily, quite illegaliy, and most violently”? There could,
at any rate, be no doubt that Impey was acting in good faith and he
felt bitterly the burden of taking on his shoulders all the unpopula-
rity. He felt bound to protect, as he thought, the peasant and the
poorer classes against the European magistrates, "who never appeared
themselves" but oppressed the ryots through native agents. We
find him saying in a private letter at this time : "We are beginning
to make the vultures of Bengal to disgorge their prey”. 4
At the same time it must be admitted that the position in Bengal
was rapidly becoming deplorable. The proceedings of the court were
extremely vexatious to a large class of people, and there was no doubt
that the judges were becoming very unpopular. The memory of this
long lingered in Bengal. Cornwallis, who was one of the most tolerant
of men and who could never be induced to speak against his col-
leagues or predecessors unless it were necessary, wrote in 1786: "I
trust you will not send out Sir Elijah Impey. All parties and descrip-
tions of men agree about him”. 5 Further, though the evidence from
this source is probably largely vitiated by partiality, the ninth report
of the select committee of 1781 declared that they had been able to
discover very few instances of relief given to the natives against the
corruptions or oppressions of British subjects. “So far as your com-
mittee has been able to discover,” they wrote, “the court has been
generally terrible to the natives, and has distracted the government
of the company without substantially reforming any one of its
abuses. ” 6
In any case Hastings naturally and rightly desired to put an end
to the deadlock, and in 1780 he hit upon the ingenious scheme of
offering Impey the presidency of the Sadr diwanni adalat. It is
important to realise exactly what this meant. Impey was already at
the head of the Supreme Court, sent out in the name of the king to
exercise jurisdiction over all British subjects, and especially to deal
with complaints against the Company's servants. He was now placed
at the head of the judicial system of the Company, which was largely
1 Gleig, op. cit. II, 248. 2 Stephen, Nuncomar and Impey, II, 220.
3 E. B. Impey, Memoirs of Sir Elijah Impey, p. 134. 4 Idem, p. 148.
5 Ross, Correspondence of . . . Cornwallis, I, 238.
Report from Committees of the House of Commons, VI, 48.


## p. 245 (#273) ############################################

IMPEY AND THE SADR COURT
245
staffed by those very servants. Macaulay's accusation is that Impey
accepted a bribe, compromised the independence of the Supreme
Court and finally became "rich, quiet, and infamous". 1 Contemporary
opinion in England, especially after Francis had returned home to fan
the flame, was not much more favourable. In May, 1782, the court
of directors and the House of Commons petitioned the crown for
Impey's recall. He left India in 1783 to answer the charge
of having accepted an office granted by, and tenable at the pleasure of, the
servants of the East India Company, which has a tendency to create a depend-
ence in the said Supreme Court upon those over whose actions the said court
was intended as a control. 2
It is difficult to understand the warmth of feeling aroused. The
practical advantages of the plan were great. A real control was now
exercised by a trained and expert judge, through an appeal court
which was at last a reality, over weak provincial courts which badly
needed guidance. The old Sadr diwanni adalat had been a shadowy
body, and, in practice, says Sir James Stephen, never sat at all
because the governor-general, its nominal president, had no time
to undertake judicial duties. Hastings himself could describe it in
1776 as “having been long since formally abolished". The plan also
did away with the friction between the judicature and the executive.
It enabled Impey to introduce his code of procedure at the cost of eight
months' severe labour—that code of which Sir James Stephen writes :
"It is not a work of genius like Macaulay's penal code . . . but it is
written in vigorous, manly English, and is well arranged”. 4
At the same time some tactical mistakes were undoubtedly made.
It was an unfortunate circumstance that the salary attached to the
new office was revocable at the will of the governor-general and
council, but it was almost certainly inevitable in the conditions. The
Company's government had no power to create an office independent
of itself. Still, it enabled the East India Company's legal adviser to
say : “Impey is found one day summoning the Governor-General and
the council before his tribunal for acts done as council, and the next
accepting emoluments nearly equal to his original appointment to be
held during the pleasure of the same council”. 5 All this, unhappily,
gave the impression that Impey was compromising his dispute with
the council for a money consideration. Secondly, since the Supreme
Court had been especially created to be independent of the council, it
looked as though the spirit of the Regulating Act was being violated.
Sir James Stephen himself, Impey's strenuous champion, thinks that
the Chief Justice had put himself in an invidious position.
He did undoubtedly weaken, if it is too much to say that he forfeited, his
judicial independence. He exposed himself to a temptation to which no
1 Lord Macaulay, Essays, p. 624. 2 Parliamentary History, XXII, 1411.
3 Gleig, op. cit. II, 29. 4 Stephen, Nuncomar and Impey, II, 246.
6 Reports from Committees of the House of Commons, v, 422.


## p. 246 (#274) ############################################

246
WARREN HASTINGS AND HIS COLLEAGUES
judge ought to expose himself. (His action] was wrong, though I do not
think it was actually corrupt. 1
Thirdly, it is perhaps reasonable to ask whether such sweeping
changes ought to have been made without approval first gained from
home.
We have, however, to remember certain further circumstances in
Impey's favour. He wrote at once to the Attorney-General in London,
offering to refund the salary, if ministers thought the acceptance of
it improper; and apparently he did afterwards refund it. He claims
to have told Hastings that his assumption of the office would not in
the least affect his conduct in regard to the question at issue between
the council and the court. He wrote in 1782 with some truth :
I have undergone great fatigue, compiled a laborious code, restored con-
fidence to the suitors and justice and regularity to the courts of justice, and
settled the internal quiet of a great empire and for my recompense shall
have lost my office, reputation, and peace of mind for ever. 2
Finally, to some extent, as Impey declared in his speech at the bar
of the House of Commons, the judges reaped all the odium of the
violent struggle of parties. One faction bitterly attacked the judges
as being partisans of the opposite faction. That opposite faction, cautious to
avoid the imputation of undue connection with the judges, found it in their
interests not to defend them. Neutral men (if such there were) took no part,
and the judges, who really were (as they ought to have been) of no party,
were left undefended. 3
Impey on his return to England was left undisturbed for four
years, but in 1787 he was impeached by Sir Gilbert Elliot, afterwards
Governor-General of India and Earl of Minto.
Six charges were
brought against him, namely Nandakumar's case, the Patna case,
the illegal extension of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the
Kasijora case, the acceptance of the office of judge of the Sadr diwanni
adalat, and the taking of the affidavits in-Oudh in relation to the
Chait Singh business. The impeachment was frankly made a party
affair. Almost all the prominent Whig leaders were associated with
it. It broke down completely and humiliatingly. Only the first
charge was proceeded with. Summoned to the bar of the House of
Commons, Impey made an eloquent and triumphant defence. He
spoke extemporaneously and without the aid of notes. His speech,
which lasted two days, gives a striking impression of his ability. No
one can read it without feeling that it is the work of a capable and
sincere man. It is far franzer and more spontaneous than the laboured
and confused paper read as an apologia by Hastings.
The thorough unfairness of the Whig attitude is shown by the fact
that Burke and Fox made it a matter of complaint that Impey had
2 Idem, p. 245.
1 Stephen, Nuncomar and Impey, u, 238.
3 Parliamentary History, XXVI, 1347.


## p. 247 (#275) ############################################

REFORM OF THE SUPREME COURT
247
delivered an unprepared speech and had not submitted a written docu-
ment, whereas, when Hastings presented a written defence, it was
alluded to contemptuously by Burke as that "indecent and unbecoming
paper which lies on our table". 1 Impey's masterly speech really
shattered the case. Pitt declared that, after hearing it, he could say
that he never gave any vote with less hesitation than the one he was
going to give against the impeachment. The division on the first charge
was 73-55 against the impeachment. A half-hearted attempt was made
later to raise the second charge, the Patna case, but it was negatived
without a division. It would seem that few men have met with
less justice from history and the verdict of their own contemporaries
than Sir Elijah Impey.
In the meantime the question between the council and the court
had been definitely settled by statute, and, as Sir Courtney Ilbert
says, the decision of parliament was substantially in favour of the
council and against the court on all points. Two petitions had been
sent home, one by the governor-general and council, and the other
ky 648 British subjects resident in Bengal. The first dealt mainly with
the Kasijora case. The council claimed that it was bound to protect
the people against "the control of a foreign law, and the terrors of a
new and usurped dominion”. If the court prevailed, "these pro-
vinces, and the British dominion in India, must fall a certain sacrifice
to the ultimate effects of the exercise of an impolitic, unnatural and
lawless authority":3 Finally, they declared that they had no alter-
native but public ruin, if they submitted to the jurisdiction assumed
by the Supreme Court, or personal ruin, if they opposed it. The
second petition protested against the danger of "giving to the
voluminous and intricate laws of England a boundless retrospective
power in the midst of Asia". !
These petitions were the real cause of the appointment of the
Select Committee of 1781, to which reference has been already made,
and the result was the act of that year amending the constitution of
the Supreme Court. The most important of its provisions was that
the governor-general and council were not to be subject to the court
for anything committed, ordered, or done by them in their public
capacity, but this exemption did not apply to orders affecting British
subjects. The Supreme Court was to have no jurisdiction in matters
of revenue or its collection. No Indian was to be liable to the court's
jurisdiction by reason of being a landholder or a farmer of rents. The
court was again definitely given jurisdiction over all inhabitants of
Calcutta, but Hindu or Muhammadan laws were to be administered
in cases of inheritance, contract and successions.
3
1 Bond, Speeches in the Trial of Warren Hastings, I, 6.
2 Parliamentary History, XXI, 1170.
3 Idem, p. 1173.
4 Idem, p. 1174.
5 Idem, p. 1178.


## p. 248 (#276) ############################################

248
WARREN HASTINGS AND HIS COLLEAGUES
We must on the whole then conclude that the verdict of the British
in India, of Lord Cornwallis and of parliament, was a triumph for
the council's view of the controversy as against the court, on the
question of fact, and by fact is meant the vexatious and harassing
nature of the court's procedure. But, turning from the objective to
the subjective aspect of the case, and considering the motives of the
parties concerned, we can only conclude that hard measure was
dealt out both to Impey and his colleagues.


## p. 249 (#277) ############################################

CHAPTER XIV
THE FIRST CONFLICT OF THE COMPANY
WITH THE MARATHAS, 1761-82
FROM 1750 to 1761 it was an open question whether the Marathas
or the Afghans would become the masters of India. The answer was
given by the battle of Panipat fought in January, 1761, between the
Marathas and the Durani, Ahmad Shah, which resulted in the total
defeat of the Hindu confederacy, and the end of the Moghul Empire,
save as a mere name. It is worthy of note, that contrary to the
ordinary sequence of events in Asiatic countries, no change of dynasty
occurred at Delhi, where the effete descendant of the house of Timur
remained seated on the throne. Had Ahmad Shah retained his hold
on Northern India, the consolidation of the English power would
have been far less easy of accomplishment. For the Maratha con-
federacy, although it had the great binding force of a common racial
origin as its foundation, was rent by internal jealousies, while it
depended for its aggrandisement on a system of brigandage, which
ultimately drove many other Indian states into the arms of the
English.
The very growth of its power, indeed, carried in it the seeds of
dissolution. As the area in which the confederacy operated expanded,
its military commanders, prosecuting campaigns far from head-
quarters, rapidly lost much of their respect. for the central power at
Poona, a respect which the characters of the Peshwas who succeeded
Madhu Rao did nothing to maintain. Holkar, Sindhia, The Gaekwad,
the Bhonsle and others, in consequence, worked more and more in
their own private interests to the neglect of those of the Peshwa and
of the Marathas as a whole.
The Peshwa, Baji Rao, his spirit broken by the defeat at Panipat,
died in June, 1761, his son Madhu Rao being installed Peshwa in
September by the raja at Satara, whither he proceeded for the
ceremony accompanied by his uncle Raghunath Rao. For the transfer
of power from the descendants of Sivaji to the family of one of the
ministers did not displace the occupant of the throne at Satara or
abolish his nominal rule. Madhu Rao was, however, only seventeen
years of age and his uncle kept the reins of the administration in
his . wn hands.
The Nizam of Hyderabad, who saw the chance of profiting by the
changes at Poona, prepared to attack the Marathas, upon which
Raghunath Rao made overtures to Crommelin, then governor at
Bombay. The Bombay Council were most anxious to strengthen the
defences of their harbour by securing possession of Bassein Fort


## p. 250 (#278) ############################################

250
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
Salsette and the islands in that neighbourhood, and were quite ready
to negotiate. Raghunath Rao, however, anxious as he was to obtain
military assistance, was not as yet prepared to surrender such im-
portant places. At this juncture the Nizam's Maratha troops deserted
him and obliged him to come to terms, whereupon Raghunath Rao
promptly broke off his negotiations with Bombay. The incident is
important. It deliberately introduced the English as arbiters in
Maratha affairs, and, as later events will show, brought them into
that personal association with Raghunath Rao which was to become
a deciding factor in the consolidation of the British power in Western
India.
So far Raghunath Rao had kept all the power in his own hands.
But his nephew was not of the metal long to brook control, and early
in 1762 insisted on asserting his independence. His uncle and his
diwan Sakharam Bapu thereupon resigned and the young Peshwa
appointed his own officers. Among them was one who played a
conspicuous part in the history of Western India, Balaji Janardhan,
better known as Nana Phadnavis, from the office of phadnavis or
chief accountant which he held from 1763. His family came from
the Ratnagiri district. His grandfather had been employed by the
Peshwa Balaji Vishvanath, whose son, Nana's father, was appointed
phadnavis, a post that became hereditary in the family.
The changes at Poona did not make for peace. Raghunath Rao
and his officials were annoyed at the loss of power, and this jealousy
was fanned by the strong personal animosity which existed between
Gopika Bai. the Peshwa's mother, and Anandi Bai, the wife of
Raghunath Rao. Anandi Bai, to whom Raghunath Rao was devoted,
was a woman of very violent character, and exercised absolute control
over her husband, much of whose subsequent misfortunes were due
to the sinister influence of his wife.
At her instigation Raghunath Rao now proceeded to make over-
tures to the Nizam, who readily responded, and, rapidly gathering
a body of Maratha and Moghul troops, they advanced together on
Poona, an unfortified city, defeating a force sent to oppose them.
Madhu Rao, driven into a corner, in order to save the situation and
preserve the integrity of the Maratha state, went personally to his
uncle and submitted. He was placed in confinement but was treated
with all respect.
Assumption of control by Raghunath Rao inevitably led to a
spread of discontent. The Nizam, ever on the watch for such oppor-
tunities in hope of reducing the Maratha power, in 1763 adopted the
cause of Janoji Bhonsle of Berar who claimed to act as regent for
the young Peshwa. Raghunath Rao was wholly unprepared, but his
nephew, by using his great personal influence, induced Holkar and
the Gaekwad to assist his uncle. The Maratha army, avoiding an
.
encounter with the Nizam, ravaged the Bhonsle's districts in Berar


## p. 251 (#279) ############################################

ENGLISH VIEWS
251
and then entered Hyderabad territory. The Nizam, finding he could
not stop the Marathas, marched to Poona, which he plundered.
Raghunath Rao in the meantime had contrived to buy off Janoji
Bhonsle, who agreed to desert the Moghuls when occasion offered.
At Rakshasbhavan, on the Godavari river, the two armies met; the
Bhonsle quietly withdrew and the Nizam was defeated with severe
loss. But the Nizam, always a consummate actor, went personally
to Raghunath Rao, and by working on his feelings and appealing to
their old friendship, induced his conqueror to pay him ten lakhs of
rupees. This curious arrangement was characteristic of Raghunath
Rao's vacillating disposition.
Madhu Rao again offended his uncle by insisting in commanding
the army which was sent, in 1764, against Hyder 'Ali of Mysore, but
the offence was to some extent mitigated by the completion of the
campaign being left to Raghunath Rao. Nephew and uncle were now
on friendly terms and possibly might have continued so, for some time
at least, but for Anandi Bai's violent conduct which induced Gopika
Bai to advise her son to place his uncle under some restraint, a step
which Madhu Rao, who could easily control his uncle when away
from his wife's influence, was most averse to taking.
The English, although not as yet definitely drawn into the intri-
gues and squabbles of Maharashtra, were fully aware of the trend
of events. Lord Clive had, in 1765, restored to Shuja-ud-daula, the
nawab of Oudh, the territories taken from him after the battle of
Baksar (October, 1764) except the two districts of Kora and Allaha-
bad assigned to the emperor Shah 'Alam, who was at that time
dependent on British charity. His reason for adopting this policy was
his aversion to adding to the Company's territory, as he clearly fore-
saw that the Company must either confine its activities to the area
it already possessed, or go forward as a conqueror, which, in his
opinion, was a scheme so extravagantly ambitious and absurd that
it could not be considered for a moment, unless the whole system of
the Company's interest was entirely remodelled. It was, therefore,
not because the directors and administrators of the Company failed
to see whither events were leading them, that constant attempts were
made to limit the area of activities, but because the inevitable results
of such expansion were only too fully appreciated. The collapse of
the house of Timur had opened the road of conquest to any strong
integral power, a position the English alone could claim, but it meant
exchanging the role of a merchant for that of a military adventurer.
Clive, writing in 1765, summed up the situation in these words:
We have at last arrived at that critical conjuncture, which I have long
foreseen, I mean that conjuncture which renders it necessary for us to deter-
mine whether we can or shall, take the whole to ourselves
it is scarcely
hyperbole to say, that the whole Mogul empire is in our hands. The inhabit-
ants of the country . . . have no attachment to any Nabob whatever, their
1 Forrest, Clive, , 176.


## p. 252 (#280) ############################################

262
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
troops are neither disciplined nor commanded nor paid as ours are. Can it
be doubted that a large army of Europeans would effectually preserve to us
the sovereignty not only by keeping in awe the ambitions of any country
prince, but rendering us so truly formidable that no French, Dutch or other
enemy will presume to molest us? 1
Although the English had in 1766 made a treaty with the Nizam
against Hyder 'Ali they had not yet definitely entered into the strug-
gle in Maharashtra, but the events which took place there between
1765 and 1772 paved the way for the dénouement of 1782.
The Peshwa in 1766 decided to punish Janoji Bhonsle of Berar,
who was intriguing against him, and in order to do so formed an
alliance with the Nizam, an instance of the kaleidoscopic interchanges
between friends and foes which is so characteristic of the history of
Western India.
It must be mentioned that Malharji Holkar, the founder of the
present Indore ruling family, who had accompanied the force under
Raghunath Rao, died on his way home at 'Alampur on 20 May, 1766.
He had been one of the Peshwa's foremost adherents, and his death,
which left Indore under the rule of his daughter-in-law Ahalya Bai,
with Tukoji Holkar as her military commander, considerably weak-
ened the support obtainable from the house of Holkar, while it
finally gave Sindhia an ascendancy which his house has retained
ever since.
In 1767 Madhu Rao, fearing the rapidly rising power of Hyder
'Ali in Mysore, attacked and defeated him. The growing power of
Madhu Rao, whose strong personality had now fully asserted itself,
soon engaged the attention of the Bombay Council and they began
to court the Peshwa officially, Mostyn being sent to Poona to ascertain
and report on the actual state of affairs there, and to endeavour,
without committing himself to a treaty, to prevent the Peshwa from
contracting an alliance with the rulers of Mysore or Hyderabad. This
increasing power of the Marathas under Madhu Rao's direction was
indeed a matter of so much concern to the council that in their orders
to Mostyn they laid stress on the fact that no means should be
omitted to check it. But nothing resulted from this embassy.
Raghunath Rao had, in pursuit of his own ends, for some time
been gathering a force together with the assistance of the Gaekwad
and Holkar. He now marched to the Tapti river where he hoped
to be joined by Janoji Bhonsle. But Madhu Rao gave him no time,
attacking him and making him prisoner. The Peshwa then advanced
against Janoji (1769), forced him to come to terms, and also made
cvertures of friendship to the Nizam.
A force was this year sent into Hindustan under the command of
Visaji Kishan, accompanied by Sindhia and Holkar, to operate
against the Rajputs, Rohillas and Jats.
1 Forrest, Clive, II, 256.


## p. 253 (#281) ############################################

DEATH OF MADHU RAO
253
In 1770 the Peshwa's health began to fail. He was consumptive,
and the severe strain of the last few years had told upon him. He
was unable to take command in a campaign against Hyder 'Ali, who
was attacked and defeated by Trimbak Rao. This defeat was viewed
with alarm by the councils of both Bombay and Madras, as the
territory of Mysore formed a barrier against Maratha aggression into
the southern presidency, but Hyder would not listen to any overtures
from Bombay, while the Madras authorities were prevented from
acting by the ill-advised interference of Sir John Lindsay. "
The Peshwa's illness increased and he died on 18 November,
1772, at the age of twenty-eight. His death had long been expected
and caused no immediate upheaval; but the ultimate effect was tre-
mendous, and it has been truly said that the battle of Panipat was
scarcely more fatal to the solidarity of the Maratha Empire than the
early death of Madhu Rao. He was a man of unusually fine character,
an invariable supporter of the weak against the strong, of the poor
against the tyranny of the rich; he stood for justice and equity in all
things, and fought vigorously, if with but little result, against the
rampant corruption of his day. His death swept away the only barrier
which restrained the floods of political intrigue, and they now rushed
forward to undermine what was left of the foundations of Maratha
ascendancy laid by the great Sivaji.
Mention was made of the expedition sent into Hindustan, under
Visaji Kishan, in 1769. After exacting tribute from the Rajput
princes, the Rohillas and the Jats, the Marathas removed the aged
emperor from Allahabad, where he had been residing since 1764
under British protection, and installed him once more at Delhi, at
the end of December, 1771. ' 'Further exploits were prevented by
Madhu Rao's death, and the force returned to the Deccan.
From 1772 onwards the English began to find themselves drawn
more immediately into Maratha affairs, and rapidly assumed the rôle
of a protagonist.
The events from 1772 to 1782 are apt to be rendered confusing by
the number of actors who appear upon the scene, and by the kaleido-
scopic interchanges between friend and foe. It is, however, possible
to grasp the trend of events if attention is concentrated on the prota-
gonists, and upon the central figure in the drama, that of Raghunath
Rao.
Raghunath Rao, more familiarly known by the shortened form of
his name as Raghoba, or, as he is almost invariably styled by Indian
writers, Dada Sahib, was the second son of the Peshwa Baji Rao Balal
(1720-40), and was thus brother of Balaji Baji Rao (1740-61); uncle
of the two Peshwas Madhu Rao and Narayan Rao; great uncle of
Madhu Rao Narayan; and father of the last of the Peshwas, Baji Rao.
Round Raghunath Rao, a man of great personal bravery but of
1 Cf. p. 297; infra.


## p. 254 (#282) ############################################

254
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
weak vacillating character, the events of this period revolve. Occu-
pying at the outset a position of some importance as a claimant to
the Peshwaship, he at length became a mere puppet, to be used for
political ends, and he finally passes, almost unheeded, off the stage,
before the conclusion of the Treaty of Salbai, stricken by disease and
disappointment, to die a few months later.
The two protagonists were the English and the ministers at Poona,
for after Madhu Rao's death, the succeeding Peshwas counted for
little. The dominating personality at Poona was Nana Phadnavis.
The directing hand in the case of the English was that of Warren
Hastings, who, in spite of the continuous opposition in his council,
the imbecility of the local authorities in Bombay and Madras, serious
complications in Oudh, and continuous financial straits, guided events
with a consummate courage and skill that placed the English ten
years later in a position to dominate the situation throughout the
future. Others who played important but subordinate parts, some-
times on one side and sometimes on another, were the Nizam of
Hyderabad, Hyder 'Ali of Mysore, the Gaekwad of Baroda, the Bhonsle
of Berar and the great Maratha sardars, Tukoji Holkar and especially
Mahadji Sindhia, whose rivalry with Holkar became a deciding factor
in Maratha party squabbles. The last by his astute maneuvring
emerged, after the Treaty of Salbai, as the leader in Indian politics,
a position he retained until his death in 1794.
This period from 1772 to 1782 is one of the most important in
history of the British in India. The defeat of the nawab of Oudh at
the battle of Baksar (1764) had brought peace to Bengal, and the
Deccan became the new theatre for the struggle. The Marathas were
at this time the most important power in India, having practically
displaced the Moghul emperor in all but name.
To return to events at Poona, the restraint to which Raghunath
Rao had been subjected by his nephew was not very rigorous, and
no sooner did he perceive that the Peshwa's days were numbered
than he commenced to intrigue with the Nizam and Hyder 'Ali for
support in his claims to the Peshwaship. But Madhu Rao, fully alive
to the weak character of his younger brother, just before his death,
summoned his uncle to his bedside and confided his successor to his
care. Narayan Rao, a weak man given over to sensuality, was duly
invested as Peshwa at Satara, and Sakharam Bapu became minister,
with Nana Phadnavis in his hereditary position. The implacable
enmity that existed between the Peshwa's mother, Gopika Bai, and
Anandi Bai soon led to a rupture between nephew and uncle, and
Raghunath Rao was again placed under restraint and confined in the
Peshwa's palace at Poona.
On 30 August, 1773, symptoms of discontent manifested them-
selves amongst the Peshwa's infantry, and Hari Pant Phadke, the army
commander, was warned to take precautions, which unfortunately
he omitted to do. While the Peshwa was resting at mid-day a com-
1


## p. 255 (#283) ############################################

MURDER OF NARAYAN RAO
255
motion arose and a body of men from the regiment burst into the
palace led by one of the officers, Sumer Singh. Narayan Rao fled to
his uncle's apartments for safety, where Raghunath Rao appears
indeed to have interceded for his life, but Sumer Singh then threat-
ened Raghunath Rao also, and he withdrew, while the conspirators
murdered the young Peshwa with their swords.
There is no doubt that Raghunath Rao was fully cognisant of the
rebellion, but he was attached to his nephew, as far as so egotistical
a nature was capable of affection, and it is probable that the confine-
ment of Narayan Rao was all he had intended, the tragic ending being
due to the sinister intervention of Anandi Bai.
It was agreed that Raghunath Rao's claim to the Peshwaship must
now be recognised, and he was duly invested. But it was fated that
whenever Raghunath Rao was placed in a position of command
troubles should at once commence. He proceeded to appoint as his
ministers new men who were lacking in the necessary qualities, while
his own excessively suspicious nature made him distrust even his
own nominees.
His first troubles arose with the Nizam who, always ready to profit
by events at Poona, prepared to attack the Marathas. Raghunath
Rao, however, defeated him, but once more surrendered any advant-
ages he might have obtained, and characteristically yielding to the
Nizam's flattery and cajolery restored all that was to have been
taken from him.
Raghunath Rao was turning his attention to Hyder 'Ali and the
nawab of the Carnatic, when the dislike with which he was univer-
sally regarded developed into concerted opposition, conducted by
Sakharam Bapu and Nana Phadnavis, and he hastened back to Poona.
At length the plan was made public. A trump card had been placed
in his opponents' hands, for it was found that Ganga Bai, the Peshr
wa's widow, was pregnant. On her husband's death she had proposed
to become sati, but Anandi Bai, knowing her own part in the tragedy
of Narayan Rao's death, contrived to confine her until her husband's
cremation was complete, as she feared a sati's curse. Now Nemesis
was satisfied. The confederates removed Ganga Bai to safety in
Purandhar Fort where she was placed in charge of Parvati Bai, the
widow of Sadashiv Rao Bhao, who had been killed at Panipat. On
18 April, 1774, a son was born to Ganga Bai, and Raghunath Rao's
claims to the Peshwaship were finally extinguished. The confederates
at once formed a council of regency.
Raghunath Rao was in the middle of the campaign against Hyder
'Ali when he received news of the imminent birth of a child to the
late Peshwa, and hastened back to Poona, defeating a force under
Trimbak Rao Mama sent out by the regency to oppose him. In
consequence o. this victory troops, as usual, flocked to his standard,
and consternation reigned in Poona, when, with typical indecision,
he suddenly abandoned his advance on the capital and turned in


## p. 256 (#284) ############################################

256
FIRST CONFLICT WITH MARATHAS, 1761-82
the direction of Burhanpur. It was at this moment that the birth of
Ganga Bai's son was publicly announced. The child was at once
formally invested as Peshwa. From this time Raghunath Rao
becomes, in fact, a mere pawn in the complicated intrigues and
consequent struggles, in which the Maratha leaders gradually played
more and more for their own individual aggrandisement and but
little for the cause of the Maratha state, thus facilitating the ultimate
supremacy of the English.
Raghunath Rao, finding himself in this desperate case, turned
once more to the English, with whom he had coquetted in 1761. The
Bombay Council had never lost sight of the necessity for acquiring
Bassein, Salsette and the islands of Bombay harbour. Indeed the
directors in London, in their dispatch of April, 1772, had instructed
the council to appoint a regular envoy at Poona, who would endea-
vour to secure such rights and privileges as might be beneficial to
their commerce and the safety of their possessions, and in particular
these coveted places.
On receiving overtures from Raghunath Rao, therefore, although
averse from an alliance with the Marathas, they seized this opening
to renew their demands for Bassein, Salsette and the islands. Raghu-
nath Rao, however, marched away to Indore soon after, in the hope
of enlisting Holkar and Sindhia on his side, but finding that, if not
actually hostile, they were at any rate indifferent to his cause, he
returned. On his return, Gambier, the Company's agent at Surat,
was asked by Raghunath Rao if the English would provide him with
a force sufficient to carry him to Poona and establish him in the
government, in return for which he would defray all costs and make
substantial grants to the Company.
The Bombay Council were uncertain, in view of the passing of the
Regulating Act, whether they had powers to make a treaty without
sanction from Bengal, but, as they had not been notified of the arrival
of the new councillors at Calcutta, they decided to act. Raghunath
Rao, however, positively refused to cede Bassein and Salsette. While
this matter was still under discussion news arrived that the Portu
guese were about to endeavour to recover Bassein, taken from them
by Chimnaji Appa in 1739. The council, faced with this new danger,
decided to obtain possession of Salsette at all costs. An attack was
made on Thana Fort, the key to the district, and it was captured on
31 December, 1774. 1
The council defended this attack in a letter to the governor-
general on the grounds that it would have been fatal to allow the
Portuguese to acquire Salsette, as they would have
had it in their power to obstruct our trade, by being in possession of the prin-
cipal passes to the inland country which, of course, would have been of
1 Forrest, Bombay Selections, Maratha Series, I, 179-208.


## p. 257 (#285) ############################################

TREATY OF SURAT
257
>
infinite prejudice to the trade, revenue and interests of the Company in these
parts, in so much that we should in great measure have been subject to the
caprice of the Portuguese. 1
The council at Calcutta, except Warren Hastings himself, expres-
sed their disapproval of the capture of Salsette, which they held had
seriously damaged the Company's reputation for good faith. The
Poona ministers had in the meantime contrived to bribe Holkar and
Sindhia away from Raghunath Rao, who retired into Gujarat towards
Baroda, leaving his wife Anandi Bai, who was enceinte, in Dhar Fort,
where she gave birth in January, 1775, to Baji Rao, destined to be
the last of the Peshwas. Raghunath Rao's object in moving into
Gujarat was to get into touch with the English and also to obtain
the assistance of Govind Rao Gaekwad, who was engaged in be-
sieging his brother Fateh Singh in Baroda.
This quarrel, into which the English were drawn, arose in 1768
on the death of Damaji
Gaekwad. Damaji
left four sons, Sayaji who
was imbecile, Govind Rao, Manaji and Fateh Singh. Govind Rao
was the son of the senior wife and claimed on that basis. Fateh Singh,
who was manager for Sayaji, supported him. After the murder of
Narayan Rao Peshwa, Govind Rao obtained the support of the Poona
ministers for his cause and was granted the hereditary family title of
Sena Khas Khel.
Negotiations continued between the English and Raghunath Rao
and finally on 7 March, 1775, the Treaty of Surat, as it is called,
was signed. It consisted of sixteen articles of which the most im-
portant provisions were that the earlier treaties of 1739 and 1756 be
confirmed; that the English would assist Raghunath Rao with a force
of 2500 men, he defraying the cost, and undertaking not to side with
enemies of the Company; Salsette, Bassein and the islands were to be
ceded in perpetuity with a share of the revenues of the Broach and
Surat districts," Maratha raids into Bengal and the Carnatic were to
cease; any peace made with Poona was to include the English.