No More Learning

Objection 4: Further, this would seem to follow from the words of 1
Cor. 15:29, "If the dead rise not again at all, why are they then
baptized for them? " Therefore Baptism avails as suffrage for the dead.

Objection 5: Further, in different Masses there is the same Sacrifice
of the altar. If, therefore, sacrifice, and not the Mass, be reckoned
among the suffrages, it would seem that the effect would be the same
whatever Mass be said for a deceased person, whether in honor of the
Blessed Virgin or of the Holy Ghost, or any other. Yet this seems
contrary to the ordinance of the Church which has appointed a special
Mass for the dead.

Objection 6: Further, the Damascene (Serm. : De his qui in fide
dormierunt) teaches that candles and oil should be offered for the
dead. Therefore not only the offering of the sacrifice of the altar,
but also other offerings should be reckoned among suffrages for the
dead.

I answer that, The suffrages of the living profit the dead in so far as
the latter are united to the living in charity, and in so far as the
intention of the living is directed to the dead. Consequently those
whose works are by nature best adapted to assist the dead, which
pertain chiefly to the communication of charity, or to the directing of
one's intention to another person. Now the sacrament of the Eucharist
belongs chiefly to charity, since it is the sacrament of ecclesiastical
unity, inasmuch as it contains Him in Whom the whole Church is united
and incorporated, namely Christ: wherefore the Eucharist is as it were
the origin and bond of charity. Again, chief among the effects of
charity is the work of almsgiving: wherefore on the part of charity
these two, namely the sacrifice of the Church and almsgiving are the
chief suffrages for the dead. But on the part of the intention directed
to the dead the chief suffrage is prayer, because prayer by its very
nature implies relation not only to the person who prays, even as other
works do, but more directly still to that which we pray for. Hence
these three are reckoned the principal means of succoring the dead,
although we must allow that any other goods whatsoever that are done
out of charity for the dead are profitable to them.

Reply to Objection 1: When one person satisfies for another, the point
to consider, in order that the effect of his satisfaction reach the
other, is the thing whereby the satisfaction of one passes to another,
rather than even the punishment undergone by way of satisfaction;
although the punishment expiates more the guilt of the one who
satisfies, in so far as it is a kind of medicine. And consequently the
three aforesaid are more profitable to the departed than fasting.

Reply to Objection 2: It is true that fasting can profit the departed
by reason of charity, and on account of the intention being directed to
the departed. Nevertheless, fasting does not by its nature contain
anything pertaining to charity or to the directing of the intention,
and these things are extrinsic thereto as it were, and for this reason
Augustine did not reckon, while Gregory did reckon, fasting among the
suffrages for the dead.

Reply to Objection 3: Baptism is a spiritual regeneration, wherefore
just as by generation being does not accrue save to the object
generated, so Baptism produces its effect only in the person baptized,
as regards the deed done: and yet as regards the deed of the doer
whether of the baptizer or of the baptized, it may profit others even
as other meritorious works. On the other hand, the Eucharist is the
sign of ecclesiastical unity, wherefore by reason of the deed done its
effect can pass to another, which is not the case with the other
sacraments.

Reply to Objection 4: According to a gloss this passage may be
expounded in two ways. First, thus: "If the dead rise not again, nor
did Christ rise again, why are they baptized for them? i. e. for sins,
since they are not pardoned if Christ rose not again, because in
Baptism not only Christ's passion but also His resurrection operates,
for the latter is in a sense the cause of our spiritual resurrection. "
Secondly, thus: There have been some misguided persons who were
baptized for those who had departed this life without baptism, thinking
that this would profit them: and according to this explanation the
Apostle is speaking, in the above words, merely according to the
opinion of certain persons.

Reply to Objection 5: In the office of the Mass there is not only a
sacrifice but also prayers. Hence the suffrage of the Mass contains two
of the things mentioned by Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xviii), namely
"prayer" and "sacrifice. " As regards the sacrifice offered the Mass
profits equally the departed, no matter in whose honor it be said: and
this is the principal thing done in the Mass. But as regards the
prayers, that Mass is most profitable in which the prayers are
appointed for this purpose. Nevertheless, this defect may be supplied
by the greater devotion, either of the one who says Mass, or of the one
who orders the Mass to be said, or again, by the intercession of the
saint whose suffrage is besought in the Mass.

Reply to Objection 6: This offering of candles or oil may profit the
departed in so far as they are a kind of alms: for they are given for
the worship of the Church or for the use of the faithful.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the indulgences of the Church profit the dead?

Objection 1: It would seem that the indulgences granted by the Church
profit even the dead. First, on account of the custom of the Church,
who orders the preaching of a crusade in order that some one may gain
an indulgence for himself and for two or three and sometimes even ten
souls, both of the living and of the dead. But this would amount to a
deception unless they profited the dead. Therefore indulgences profit
the dead.

Objection 2: Further, the merit of the whole Church is more efficacious
than that of one person. Now personal merit serves as a suffrage for
the departed, for instance in the case of almsgiving. Much more
therefore does the merit of the Church whereon indulgences are founded.

Objection 3: Further, the indulgences of the Church profit those who
are members of the Church. Now those who are in purgatory are members
of the Church, else the suffrages of the Church would not profit them.
Therefore it would seem that indulgences profit the departed.

On the contrary, In order that indulgences may avail a person, there
must be a fitting cause for granting the indulgence [*Cf. [5039] Q[25],
A[2]]. Now there can be no such cause on the part of the dead, since
they can do nothing that is of profit to the Church, and it is for such
a cause that indulgences are chiefly granted. Therefore, seemingly,
indulgences profit not the dead.

Further, indulgences are regulated according to the decision of the
party who grants them. If, therefore, indulgences could avail the dead,
it would be in the power of the party granting them to release a
deceased person entirely from punishment: which is apparently absurd.

I answer that, An indulgence may profit a person in two ways: in one
way, principally; in another, secondarily. It profits principally the
person who avails himself of an indulgence, who, namely, does that for
which the indulgence is granted, for instance one who visits the shrine
of some saint. Hence since the dead can do none of those things for
which indulgences are granted, indulgences cannot avail them directly.
However, they profit secondarily and indirectly the person for whom one
does that which is the cause of the indulgence. This is sometimes
feasible and sometimes not, according to the different forms of
indulgence. For if the form of indulgence be such as this: "Whosoever
does this or that shall gain so much indulgence," he who does this
cannot transfer the fruit of the indulgence to another, because it is
not in his power to apply to a particular person the intention of the
Church who dispenses the common suffrages whence indulgences derive
their value, as stated above ([5040]Q[27], A[3], ad 2). If, however,
the indulgence be granted in this form: "Whosoever does this or that,
he, his father, or any other person connected with him and detained in
purgatory, will gain so much indulgence," an indulgence of this kind
will avail not only a living but also a deceased person. For there is
no reason why the Church is able to transfer the common merits, whereon
indulgences are based, to the living and not to the dead. Nor does it
follow that a prelate of the Church can release souls from purgatory
just as he lists, since for indulgences to avail there must be a
fitting cause for granting them, as stated above ([5041]Q[26], A[3]).
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the burial service profits the dead?

Objection 1: It would seem that the burial service profits the dead.
For Damascene (Serm. : De his qui in fide dormierunt) quotes Athanasius
as saying: "Even though he who has departed in godliness be taken up to
heaven, do not hesitate to call upon God and to burn oil and wax at his
tomb; for such things are pleasing to God and receive a great reward
from Him. " Now the like pertain to the burial service. Therefore the
burial service profits the dead.

Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Cura pro mort. iii),
"In olden times the funerals of just men were cared for with dutiful
piety, their obsequies celebrated, their graves provided, and
themselves while living charged their children touching the burial or
even the translation of their bodies. " But they would not have done
this unless the tomb and things of this kind conferred something on the
dead. Therefore the like profit the dead somewhat.

Objection 3: Further, no one does a work of mercy on some one's behalf
unless it profit him. Now burying the dead is reckoned among the works
of mercy, therefore Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii): "Tobias, as
attested by the angel, is declared to have found favor with God by
burying the dead. " Therefore such like burial observances profit the
dead.

Objection 4: Further, it is unbecoming to assert that the devotion of
the faithful is fruitless. Now some, out of devotion, arrange for their
burial in some religious locality. Therefore the burial service profits
the dead.

Objection 5: Further, God is more inclined to pity than to condemn. Now
burial in a sacred place is hurtful to some if they be unworthy:
wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv): "If those who are burdened with
grievous sins are buried in the church this will lead to their more
severe condemnation rather than to their release. " Much more,
therefore, should we say that the burial service profits the good.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii): "Whatever
service is done the body is no aid to salvation, but an office of
humanity. "

Further, Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iii; De Civ. Dei i): "The
funereal equipment, the disposition of the grace, the solemnity of the
obsequies are a comfort to the living rather than a help to the dead. "

Further, Our Lord said (Lk. 12:4): "Be not afraid of them who kill the
body, and after that have no more that they can do. " Now after death
the bodies of the saints can be hindered from being buried, as we read
of having been done to certain martyrs at Lyons in Gaul (Eusebius,
Eccl. Hist. v, 1). Therefore the dead take no harm if their bodies
remain unburied: and consequently the burial service does not profit
them.

I answer that, We have recourse to burial for the sake of both the
living and the dead. For the sake of the living, lest their eyes be
revolted by the disfigurement of the corpse, and their bodies be
infected by the stench, and this as regards the body. But it profits
the living also spiritually inasmuch as our belief in the resurrection
is confirmed thereby. It profits the dead in so far as one bears the
dead in mind and prays for them through looking on their burial place,
wherefore a "monument" takes its name from remembrance, for a monument
is something that recalls the mind [monens mentem], as Augustine
observes (De Civ. Dei i; De Cura pro Mort. iv). It was, however, a
pagan error that burial was profitable to the dead by procuring rest
for his soul: for they believed that the soul could not be at rest
until the body was buried, which is altogether ridiculous and absurd.

That, moreover, burial in a sacred place profits the dead, does not
result from the action done, but rather from the action itself of the
doer: when, to wit, the dead person himself, or another, arranges for
his body to be buried in a sacred place, and commends him to the
patronage of some saint, by whose prayers we must believe that he is
assisted, as well as to the suffrages of those who serve the holy
place, and pray more frequently and more specially for those who are
buried in their midst. But such things as are done for the display of
the obsequies are profitable to the living, as being a consolation to
them; and yet they can also profit the dead, not directly but
indirectly, in so far as men are aroused to pity thereby and
consequently to pray, or in so far as the outlay on the burial brings
either assistance to the poor or adornment to the church: for it is in
this sense that the burial of the dead is reckoned among the works of
mercy.

Reply to Objection 1: By bringing oil and candles to the tombs of the
dead we profit them indirectly, either as offering them to the Church
and as giving them to the poor, or as doing this in reverence of God.
Hence, after the words quoted we read: "For oil and candles are a
holocaust. "

Reply to Objection 2: The fathers of old arranged for the burial of
their bodies, so as to show that "the bodies of the dead" are the
object of Divine providence, not that there is any feeling in a dead
body, but in order to confirm the belief in the resurrection, as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 13). Hence, also, they wished to be
buried in the land of promise, where they believed Christ's birth and
death would take place, Whose resurrection is the cause of our rising
again.

Reply to Objection 3: Since flesh is a part of man's nature, man has a
natural affection for his flesh, according to Eph. 5:29, "No man ever
hated his own flesh. " Hence in accordance with this natural affection a
man has during life a certain solicitude for what will become of his
body after death: and he would grieve if he had a presentiment that
something untoward would happen to his body. Consequently those who
love a man, through being conformed to the one they love in his
affection for himself, treat his body with loving care. For as
Augustine says (De Civ. Dei i, 13): "If a father's garment and ring,
and whatever such like is the more dear to those whom they leave behind
the greater their affection is towards their parents, in no wise are
the bodies themselves to be spurned which truly we wear in more
familiar and close conjunction than anything else we put on. "

Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. iv), the
devotion of the faithful is not fruitless when they arrange for their
friends to be buried in holy places, since by so doing they commend
their dead to the suffrages of the saints, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 5: The wicked man dead takes no harm by being buried
in a holy place, except in so far as he rendered such a burial place
unfitting for him by reason of human glory.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether suffrages offered for one deceased person profit the person for whom
they are offered more than others?

Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages offered for one deceased
person are not more profitable to the one for whom they are offered,
than to others. For spiritual light is more communicable than a
material light. Now a material light, for instance of a candle, though
kindled for one person only, avails equally all those who are gathered
together, though the candle be not lit for them. Therefore, since
suffrages are a kind of spiritual light, though they be offered for one
person in particular, do not avail him any more than the others who are
in purgatory.

Objection 2: Further, as stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45),
suffrages avail the dead "in so far as during this life they merited
that they might avail them afterwards" [*St. Augustine, Enchiridion
cx]. Now some merited that suffrages might avail them more than those
for whom they are offered. Therefore they profit more by those
suffrages, else their merits would be rendered unavailing.

Objection 3: Further, the poor have not so many suffrages given them as
the rich. Therefore if the suffrages offered for certain people profit
them alone, or profit them more than others, the poor would be worse
off: yet this is contrary to our Lord's saying (Lk. 6:20): "Blessed are
ye poor, for yours is the kingdom of God. "

On the contrary, Human justice is copied from Divine justice. But if a
person pay another's debt human justice releases the latter alone.
Therefore since he who offers suffrages for another pays the debt, in a
sense, of the person for whom he offers them, they profit this person
alone.

Further, just as a man by offering suffrages satisfies somewhat for a
deceased person, so, too, sometimes a person can satisfy for a living
person. Now where one satisfies for a living person the satisfaction
counts only for the person for whom it is offered. Therefore one also
who offers suffrages profits him alone for whom he offers them.

I answer that, There have been two opinions on this question. Some,
like Praepositivus, have said that suffrages offered for one particular
person do avail chiefly, not the person for whom they are offered, but
those who are most worthy. And they instanced a candle which is lit for
a rich man and profits those who are with him no less than the rich man
himself, and perhaps even more, if they have keener sight. They also
gave the instance of a lesson which profits the person to whom it is
given no more than others who listen with him, but perhaps profits
these others more, if they be more intelligent. And if it were pointed
out to them that in this case the Church's ordinance in appointing
certain special prayers for certain persons is futile, they said that
the Church did this to excite the devotion of the faithful, who are
more inclined to offer special than common suffrages, and pray more
fervently for their kinsfolk than for strangers.

Others, on the contrary, said that suffrages avail more those for whom
they are offered. Now both opinions have a certain amount of truth: for
the value of suffrages may be gauged from two sources. For their value
is derived in the first place from the virtue of charity, which makes
all goods common, and in this respect they avail more the person who is
more full of charity, although they are not offered specially for him.
In this way the value of suffrages regards more a certain inward
consolation by reason of which one who is in charity rejoices in the
goods of another after death in respect of the diminution of
punishment; for after death there is no possibility of obtaining or
increasing grace, whereas during life the works of others avail for
this purpose by the virtue of charity. In the second place suffrages
derive their value from being applied to another person by one's
intention. In this way the satisfaction of one person counts for
another, and there can be no doubt that thus they avail more the person
for whom they are offered: in fact, they avail him alone in this way,
because satisfaction, properly speaking, is directed to the remission
of punishment. Consequently, as regards the remission of punishment,
suffrages avail chiefly the person for whom they are offered, and
accordingly there is more truth in the second opinion than in the
first.

Reply to Objection 1: Suffrages avail, after the manner of a light, in
so far as they reach the dead, who thereby receive a certain amount of
consolation: and this is all the greater according as they are endowed
with a greater charity. But in so far as suffrages are a satisfaction
applied to another by the intention of the offerer, they do not
resemble a light, but rather the payment of a debt: and it does not
follow, if one person's debt be paid, that the debt of others is paid
likewise.

Reply to Objection 2: Such a merit is conditional, for in this way they
merited that suffrages would profit them if offered for them, and this
was merely to render themselves fit recipients of those suffrages. It
is therefore clear that they did not directly merit the assistance of
those suffrages, but made themselves fit by their preceding merits to
receive the fruit of suffrages. Hence it does not follow that their
merit is rendered unavailing.

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing hinders the rich from being in some
respects better off than the poor, for instance as regards the
expiation of their punishment. But this is as nothing in comparison
with the kingdom of heaven, where the poor are shown to be better off
by the authority quoted.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether suffrages offered for several are of as much value to each one as if
they had been offered for each in particular?

Objection 1: It would seem that suffrages offered for several are of as
much value to each one as if they had been offered for each in
particular. For it is clear that if one person receives a lesson he
loses nothing if others receive the lesson with him. Therefore in like
manner a person for whom a suffrage is offered loses nothing if some
one else is reckoned together with him: and consequently if it be
offered for several, it is of as much value to each one as if it were
offered for each in particular.

Objection 2: Further, it is to be observed that according to the common
practice of the Church, when Mass is said for one deceased person,
other prayers are added for other deceased persons. Now this would not
be done, if the dead person for whom the Mass is said were to lose
something thereby. Therefore the same conclusion follows as above.

Objection 3: Further, suffrages, especially of prayers, rely on the
Divine power. But with God, just as it makes no difference whether He
helps by means of many or by means of a few, so it differs not whether
He assists many or a few. Therefore if the one same prayer be said for
many, each one of them will receive as much assistance as one person
would if that same prayer were said for him alone.

On the contrary, It is better to assist many than one. If therefore a
suffrage offered for several is of as much value to each one as if it
were offered for one alone, it would seem that the Church ought not to
have appointed a Mass and prayer to be said for one person in
particular, but that Mass ought always to be said for all the faithful
departed: and this is evidently false.

Further, a suffrage has a finite efficiency. Therefore if it be divided
among many it avails less for each one than if it were offered for one
only.

I answer that, If the value of suffrages be considered according as it
is derived from the virtue of charity uniting the members of the Church
together, suffrages offered for several persons avail each one as much
as if they were offered for one alone, because charity is not
diminished if its effect be divided among many, in fact rather is it
increased; and in like manner joy increases through being shared by
many, as Augustine says (Confess. viii). Consequently many in purgatory
rejoice in one good deed no less than one does. On the other hand, if
we consider the value of suffrages, inasmuch as they are a kind of
satisfaction applied to the dead by the intention of the person
offering them, then the suffrage for some person in particular avails
him more than that which is offered for him in common with many others;
for in this case the effect of the suffrages is divided in virtue of
Divine justice among those for whom the suffrages are offered. Hence it
is evident that this question depends on the first; and, moreover, it
is made clear why special suffrages are appointed to be offered in the
Church.

Reply to Objection 1: Suffrages considered as works of satisfaction do
not profit after the manner of an action as teaching does; for
teaching, like any other action, produces its effect according to the
disposition of the recipient. But they profit after the manner of the
payment of a debt, as stated above (A[12], ad 1); and so the comparison
fails.

Reply to Objection 2: Since suffrages offered for one person avail
others in a certain way, as stated [5042](A[1]), it follows that when
Mass is said for one person, it is not unfitting for prayers to be said
for others also. For these prayers are said, not that the satisfaction
offered by one suffrage be applied to those others chiefly, but that
the prayer offered for them in particular may profit them also.

Reply to Objection 3: Prayer may be considered both on the part of the
one who prays, and on the part of the person prayed: and its effect
depends on both. Consequently though it is no more difficult to the
Divine power to absolve many than to absolve one, nevertheless the
prayer of one who prays thus is not as satisfactory for many as for
one.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether general suffrages avail those for whom special suffrages are not
offered, as much as special suffrages avail those for whom they are offered
in addition to general suffrages?

Objection 1: It would seem that general suffrages avail those for whom
special suffrages are not offered, as much as special suffrages avail
those for whom they are offered in addition to general suffrages. For
in the life to come each one will be rewarded according to his merits.
Now a person for whom no suffrages are offered merited to be assisted
after death as much as one for whom special suffrages are offered.
Therefore the former will be assisted by general suffrages as much as
the latter by special and general suffrages.

Objection 3: Further, the Eucharist is the chief of the suffrages of
the Church. Now the Eucharist, since it contains Christ whole, has
infinite efficacy so to speak. Therefore one offering of the Eucharist
for all in general is of sufficient value to release all who are in
purgatory: and consequently general suffrages alone afford as much
assistance as special and general suffrages together.

On the contrary, Two goods are more eligible than one. Therefore
special suffrages, together with general suffrages, are more profitable
to the person for whom they are offered than general suffrages alone.

I answer that, The reply to this question depends on that which is
given to the twelfth inquiry [5043](A[12]): for if the suffrages
offered for one person in particular avail indifferently for all, then
all suffrages are common; and consequently one for whom the special
suffrages are not offered will be assisted as much as the one for whom
they are offered, if he be equally worthy. On the other hand, if the
suffrages offered for a person do not profit all indifferently, but
those chiefly for whom they are offered, then there is no doubt that
general and special suffrages together avail a person more than general
suffrages alone. Hence the Master, in the text (Sent. iv, D, 45),
mentions two opinions: one, when he says that a rich man derives from
general, together with special suffrages, an equal profit to that which
a poor man derives from special suffrages alone; for although the one
receives assistance from more sources than the other, he does not
receive a greater assistance: the other opinion he mentions when he
says that a person for whom special suffrages are offered obtains a
more speedy but not a more complete release, because each will be
finally released from all punishment.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above (A[12], ad 2) the assistance
derived from suffrages is not directly and simply an object of merit,
but conditionally as it were: hence the argument does not prove.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the power of Christ Who is contained in
the Sacrament of the Eucharist is infinite, yet there is a definite
effect to which that sacrament is directed. Hence it does not follow
that the whole punishment of those who are in purgatory is expiated by
one sacrifice of the altar: even so, by the one sacrifice which a man
offers, he is not released from the whole satisfaction due for his
sins, wherefore sometimes several Masses are enjoined in satisfaction
for one sin. Nevertheless, if any thing from special suffrages be left
over for those for whom they are offered (for instance if they need
them not) we may well believe that by God's mercy this is granted to
others for whom those suffrages are not offered, if they need them: as
affirmed by Damascene (Serm. : De his qui in fide dormierunt) who says:
"Truly God, forasmuch as He is just will adapt ability to the disabled,
and will arrange for an exchange of deficiencies": and this exchange is
effected when what is lacking to one is supplied by another.
__________________________________________________________________

OF PRAYERS WITH REGARD TO THE SAINTS IN HEAVEN (THREE ARTICLES)

We must now consider prayer with regard to the saints in heaven. Under
this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the saints have knowledge of our prayers?

(2) Whether we should beseech them to pray for us?
(3) Whether the prayers they pour forth for us are always granted?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the saints have knowledge of our prayers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the saints have no knowledge of our
prayers. For a gloss on Is. 62:16, "Thou art our father and Abraham
hath not known us, and Israel hath been ignorant of us," says that "the
dead saints know not what the living, even their own children, are
doing. " This is taken from Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), where he
quotes the aforesaid authority, and the following are his words: "If
such great men as the patriarchs knew not what was happening to the
people begotten of them, how can the dead occupy themselves in watching
and helping the affairs and actions of the living? " Therefore the
saints cannot be cognizant of our prayers.

Objection 2: Further, the following words are addressed to King Joas (4
Kings 22:20): "Therefore" (i. e. because thou hast wept before Me), "I
will gather thee to thy fathers . . . that thy eyes may not see all the
evils which I will bring upon this place. " But Joas would have gained
no such advantage from his death if he were to know after death what
was happening to his people. Therefore the saints after death know not
our actions, and thus they are not cognizant of our prayers.

Objection 3: Further, the more perfect a man is in charity, the more he
succors his neighbor when the latter is in danger. Now the saints, in
this life, watch over their neighbor, especially their kinsfolk, when
these are in danger, and manifestly assist them. Since then, after
death, their charity is much greater, if they were cognizant of our
deeds, much more would they watch over their friends and kindred and
assist them in their needs: and yet, seemingly, they do not. Therefore
it would seem that our deeds and prayers are not known to them.

Objection 4: Further, even as the saints after death see the Word, so
do the angels of whom it is stated (Mat. 18:10) that "their angels in
heaven always see the face of My Father. " Yet the angels through seeing
the Word do not therefore know all things, since the lower angels are
cleansed from their lack of knowledge by the higher angels [*Cf.
[5044]FP, Q[106], A[1] ], as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. vii).
Therefore although the saints see the Word, they do not see therein our
prayers and other things that happen in our regard.

Objection 5: Further, God alone is the searcher of hearts. Now prayer
is seated chiefly in the heart. Therefore it belongs to God alone to
know our prayers. Therefore our prayers are unknown to the saints.

On the contrary, Gregory, commenting on Job 14:21, "Whether his
children come to honor or dishonor, he shall not understand," says
(Moral. xii): "This does not apply to the souls of the saints, for
since they have an insight of Almighty God's glory we must nowise
believe that anything outside that glory is unknown to them. " Therefore
they are cognizant of our prayers. Further, Gregory says (Dial. ii):
"All creatures are little to the soul that sees God: because however
little it sees of the Creator's light, every created thing appears
foreshortened to it. " Now apparently the chief obstacle to the souls of
the saints being cognizant of our prayers and other happenings in our
regard is that they are far removed from us. Since then distance does
not prevent these things, as appears from the authority quoted, it
would seem that the souls of the saints are cognizant of our prayers
and of what happens here below.

Further, unless they were aware of what happens in our regard they
would not pray for us, since they would be ignorant of our needs. But
this is the error of Vigilantius, as Jerome asserts in his letter
against him. Therefore the saints are cognizant of what happens in our
regard.

I answer that, The Divine essence is a sufficient medium for knowing
all things, and this is evident from the fact that God, by seeing His
essence, sees all things. But it does not follow that whoever sees
God's essence knows all things, but only those who comprehend the
essence of God [*Cf. [5045]FP, Q[12], AA[7],8]: even as the knowledge
of a principle does not involve the knowledge of all that follows from
that principle unless the whole virtue of the principle be
comprehended. Wherefore, since the souls of the saints do not
comprehend the Divine essence, it does not follow that they know all
that can be known by the Divine essence---for which reason the lower
angels are taught concerning certain matters by the higher angels,
though they all see the essence of God; but each of the blessed must
needs see in the Divine essence as many other things as the perfection
of his happiness requires. For the perfection of a man's happiness
requires him to have whatever he will, and to will nothing amiss: and
each one wills with a right will, to know what concerns himself. Hence
since no rectitude is lacking to the saints, they wish to know what
concerns themselves, and consequently it follows that they know it in
the Word. Now it pertains to their glory that they assist the needy for
their salvation: for thus they become God's co-operators, "than which
nothing is more Godlike," as Dionysius declares (Coel. Hier. iii).
Wherefore it is evident that the saints are cognizant of such things as
are required for this purpose; and so it is manifest that they know in
the Word the vows, devotions, and prayers of those who have recourse to
their assistance.

Reply to Objection 1: The saying of Augustine is to be understood as
referring to the natural knowledge of separated souls, which knowledge
is devoid of obscurity in holy men. But he is not speaking of their
knowledge in the Word, for it is clear that when Isaias said this,
Abraham had no such knowledge, since no one had come to the vision of
God before Christ's passion.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the saints, after this life, know what
happens here below, we must not believe that they grieve through
knowing the woes of those whom they loved in this world: for they are
so filled with heavenly joy, that sorrow finds no place in them.
Wherefore if after death they know the woes of their friends, their
grief is forestalled by their removal from this world before their woes
occur. Perhaps, however, the non-glorified souls would grieve somewhat,
if they were aware of the distress of their dear ones: and since the
soul of Josias was not glorified as soon as it went out from his body,
it is in this respect that Augustine uses this argument to show that
the souls of the dead have no knowledge of the deeds of the living.

Reply to Objection 3: The souls of the saints have their will fully
conformed to the Divine will even as regards the things willed. and
consequently, although they retain the love of charity towards their
neighbor, they do not succor him otherwise than they see to be in
conformity with the disposition of Divine justice. Nevertheless, it is
to be believed that they help their neighbor very much by interceding
for him to God.

Reply to Objection 4: Although it does not follow that those who see
the Word see all things in the Word, they see those things that pertain
to the perfection of their happiness, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 5: God alone of Himself knows the thoughts of the
heart: yet others know them, in so far as these are revealed to them,
either by their vision of the Word or by any other means.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether we ought to call upon the saints to pray for us?

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to call upon the saints to
pray for us. For no man asks anyone's friends to pray for him, except
in so far as he believes he will more easily find favor with them. But
God is infinitely more merciful than any saint, and consequently His
will is more easily inclined to give us a gracious hearing, than the
will of a saint. Therefore it would seem unnecessary to make the saints
mediators between us and God, that they may intercede for us.

Objection 2: Further, if we ought to beseech them to pray for us, this
is only because we know their prayer to be acceptable to God. Now among
the saints the holier a man is, the more is his prayer acceptable to
God. Therefore we ought always to bespeak the greater saints to
intercede for us with God, and never the lesser ones.

Objection 3: Further, Christ, even as man, is called the "Holy of
Holies," and, as man, it is competent to Him to pray. Yet we never call
upon Christ to pray for us. Therefore neither should we ask the other
saints to do so.

Objection 4: Further, whenever one person intercedes for another at the
latter's request, he presents his petition to the one with whom he
intercedes for him. Now it is unnecessary to present anything to one to
whom all things are present. Therefore it is unnecessary to make the
saints our intercessors with God.

Objection 5: Further, it is unnecessary to do a thing if, without doing
it, the purpose for which it is done would be achieved in the same way,
or else not achieved at all. Now the saints would pray for us just the
same, or would not pray for us at all, whether we pray to them or not:
for if we be worthy of their prayers, they would pray for us even
though we prayed not to them, while if we be unworthy they pray not for
us even though we ask them to. Therefore it seems altogether
unnecessary to call on them to pray for us.

On the contrary, It is written (Job 5:1): "Call . . . if there be any
that will answer thee, and turn to some of the saints. " Now, as Gregory
says (Moral. v, 30) on this passage, "we call upon God when we beseech
Him in humble prayer. " Therefore when we wish to pray God, we should
turn to the saints, that they may pray God for us.

Further, the saints who are in heaven are more acceptable to God than
those who are on the way. Now we should make the saints, who are on the
way, our intercessors with God, after the example of the Apostle, who
said (Rom. 15:30): "I beseech you . . . brethren, through our Lord
Jesus Christ, and by the charity of the Holy Ghost, that you help me in
your prayers for me to God. " Much more, therefore, should we ask the
saints who are in heaven to help us by their prayers to God.

Further, an additional argument is provided by the common custom of the
Church which asks for the prayers of the saints in the Litany.

I answer that, According to Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. v) the order
established by God among things is that "the last should be led to God
by those that are midway between. " Wherefore, since the saints who are
in heaven are nearest to God, the order of the Divine law requires that
we, who while we remain in the body are pilgrims from the Lord, should
be brought back to God by the saints who are between us and Him: and
this happens when the Divine goodness pours forth its effect into us
through them. And since our return to God should correspond to the
outflow of His boons upon us, just as the Divine favors reach us by
means of the saints intercession, so should we, by their means, be
brought back to God, that we may receive His favors again. Hence it is
that we make them our intercessors with God, and our mediators as it
were, when we ask them to pray for us.

Reply to Objection 1: It is not on account of any defect in God's power
that He works by means of second causes, but it is for the perfection
of the order of the universe, and the more manifold outpouring of His
goodness on things, through His bestowing on them not only the goodness
which is proper to them, but also the faculty of causing goodness in
others. Even so it is not through any defect in His mercy, that we need
to bespeak His clemency through the prayers of the saints, but to the
end that the aforesaid order in things be observed.

Reply to Objection 2: Although the greater saints are more acceptable
to God than the lesser, it is sometimes profitable to pray to the
lesser; and this for five reasons. First, because sometimes one has
greater devotion for a lesser saint than for a greater, and the effect
of prayer depends very much on one's devotion. Secondly, in order to
avoid tediousness, for continual attention to one thing makes a person
weary; whereas by praying to different saints, the fervor of our
devotion is aroused anew as it were. Thirdly, because it is granted to
some saints to exercise their patronage in certain special cases, for
instance to Saint Anthony against the fire of hell. Fourthly, that due
honor be given by us to all. Fifthly, because the prayers of several
sometimes obtain that which would not have been obtained by the prayers
of one.

Reply to Objection 3: Prayer is an act, and acts belong to particular
persons [supposita]. Hence, were we to say: "Christ, pray for us,"
except we added something, this would seem to refer to Christ's person,
and consequently to agree with the error either of Nestorius, who
distinguished in Christ the person of the son of man from the person of
the Son of God, or of Arius, who asserted that the person of the Son is
less than the Father. Wherefore to avoid these errors the Church says
not: "Christ, pray for us," but "Christ, hear us," or "have mercy on
us. "

Reply to Objection 4: As we shall state further on [5046](A[3]) the
saints are said to present our prayers to God, not as though they
notified things unknown to Him, but because they ask God to grant those
prayers a gracious hearing, or because they seek the Divine truth about
them, namely what ought to be done according to His providence.

Reply to Objection 5: A person is rendered worthy of a saint's prayers
for him by the very fact that in his need he has recourse to him with
pure devotion. Hence it is not unnecessary to pray to the saints.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the prayers which the saints pour forth to God for us are always
granted?

Objection 1: It would seem that the prayers which the saints pour forth
to God for us are not always granted. For if they were always granted,
the saints would be heard especially in regard to matters concerning
themselves. But they are not heard in reference to these things;
wherefore it is stated in the Apocalypse (6:11) that on the martyrs
beseeching vengeance on them that dwell on earth, "it was said to them
that they should rest for a little while till the number of their
brethren should be filled up [*Vulg. : 'till their fellow-servants and
their brethren . . . should be filled up']. " Much less therefore, are
they heard in reference to matters concerning others.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Jer. 15:1): "If Moses and Samuel
shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people. " Therefore,
the saints are not always heard when they pray God for us.

Objection 3: Further, the saints in heaven are stated to be equal to
the angels of God (Mat. 22:30). But the angels are not always heard in
the prayers which they offer up to God. This is evident from Dan.
10:12,13, where it is written: "I am come for thy words: but the prince
of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me one-and-twenty days. " But
the angel who spoke had not come to Daniel's aid except by asking of
God to be set free; and yet the fulfillment of his prayer was hindered.
Therefore neither are other saints always heard by God when they pray
for us.

Objection 4: Further, whosoever obtains something by prayer merits it
in a sense. But the saints in heaven are not in the state of meriting.
Therefore they cannot obtain anything for us from God by their prayers.

Objection 5: Further, the saints, in all things, conform their will to
the will of God. Therefore they will nothing but what they know God to
will. But no one prays save for what he wills. Therefore they pray not
save for what they know God to will. Now that which God wills would be
done even without their praying for it. Therefore their prayers are not
efficacious for obtaining anything.

Objection 6: Further, the prayers of the whole heavenly court, if they
could obtain anything, would be more efficacious than all the petitions
of the Church here below. Now if the suffrages of the Church here below
for some one in purgatory were to be multiplied, he would be wholly
delivered from punishment. Since then the saints in heaven pray for
those who are in purgatory on the same account as for us, if they
obtain anything for us, their prayers would deliver entirely from
punishment those who are in purgatory. But this is not true because,
then the Church's suffrages for the dead would be unnecessary.

On the contrary, It is written (2 Macc. 15:14): "This is he that
prayeth much for the people, and for all the holy city, Jeremias the
prophet of God": and that his prayer was granted is clear from what
follows (2 Macc. 15:15): "Jeremias stretched forth his right hand, and
gave to Judas a sword of gold, saying: Take this holy sword, a gift
from God," etc.

Further, Jerome says (Ep. contra Vigilant. ): "Thou sayest in thy
pamphlets, that while we live, we can pray for one another, but that
when we are dead no one's prayer for another will be heard": and
afterwards he refutes this in the following words: "If the apostles and
martyrs while yet in the body can pray for others, while they are still
solicitous for themselves, how much more can they do so when the crown,
the victory, the triumph is already theirs! "

Further, this is confirmed by the custom of the Church, which often
asks to be assisted by the prayers of the saints.

I answer that, The saints are said to pray for us in two ways. First,
by "express" prayer, when by their prayers they seek a hearing of the
Divine clemency on our behalf: secondly, by "interpretive" prayer,
namely by their merits which, being known to God, avail not only them
unto glory, but also us as suffrages and prayers, even as the shedding
of Christ's blood is said to ask pardon for us. In both ways the
saints' prayers considered in themselves avail to obtain what they ask,
yet on our part they may fail so that we obtain not the fruit of their
prayers, in so far as they are said to pray for us by reason of their
merits availing on our behalf. But in so far as they pray for us by
asking something for us in their prayers, their prayers are always
granted, since they will only what God wills, nor do they ask save for
what they will to be done; and what God wills is always
fulfilled---unless we speak of His "antecedent" will, whereby "He
wishes all men to be saved" [*Cf. [5047]FP, Q[19], A[6], ad 1]. For
this will is not always fulfilled; wherefore no wonder if that also
which the saints will according to this kind of will be not fulfilled
sometimes.

Reply to Objection 1: This prayer of the martyrs is merely their desire
to obtain the robe of the body and the fellowship of those who will be
saved, and their consent to God's justice in punishing the wicked.
Hence a gloss on Apoc. 6:11, "How long, O Lord," says: "They desire an
increase of joy and the fellowship of the saints, and they consent to
God's justice. "

Reply to Objection 2: The Lord speaks there of Moses and Samuel
according to their state in this life. For we read that they withstood
God's anger by praying for the people. And yet even if they had been
living at the time in question, they would have been unable to placate
God towards the people by their prayers, on account of the wickedness
of this same people: and it is thus that we are to understand this
passage.

Reply to Objection 3: This dispute among the good angels does not mean
that they offered contradictory prayers to God, but that they submitted
contrary merits on various sides to the Divine inquiry, with a view of
God's pronouncing sentence thereon. This, in fact, is what Gregory says
(Moral. xvii) in explanation of the aforesaid words of Daniel: "The
lofty spirits that are set over the nations never fight in behalf of
those that act unjustly, but they justly judge and try their deeds. And
when the guilt or innocence of any particular nation is brought into
the debate of the court above, the ruling spirit of that nation is said
to have won or lost in the conflict. Yet the supreme will of their
Maker is victorious over all, for since they have it ever before their
eyes, they will not what they are unable to obtain," wherefore neither
do they seek for it. And consequently it is clear that their prayers
are always heard.

Reply to Objection 4: Although the saints are not in a state to merit
for themselves, when once they are in heaven, they are in a state to
merit for others, or rather to assist others by reason of their
previous merit: for while living they merited that their prayers should
be heard after their death.

Or we may reply that prayer is meritorious on one count, and
impetratory on another. For merit consists in a certain equation of the
act to the end for which it is intended, and which is given to it as
its reward; while the impetration of a prayer depends on the liberality
of the person supplicated. Hence prayer sometimes, through the
liberality of the person supplicated, obtains that which was not
merited either by the suppliant, or by the person supplicated for: and
so, although the saints are not in the state of meriting, it does not
follow that they are not in the state of impetrating.

Reply to Objection 5: As appears from the authority of Gregory quoted
above (ad 3), the saints and angels will nothing but what they see to
be in the Divine will: and so neither do they pray for aught else. Nor
is their prayer fruitless, since as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.
[*De Dono Persever. xxii]): "The prayers of the saints profit the
predestinate, because it is perhaps pre-ordained that they shall be
saved through the prayers of those who intercede for them": and
consequently God also wills that what the saints see Him to will shall
be fulfilled through their prayers.

Reply to Objection 6: The suffrages of the Church for the dead are as
so many satisfactions of the living in lieu of the dead: and
accordingly they free the dead from the punishment which the latter
have not paid. But the saints in heaven are not in the state of making
satisfaction; and consequently the parallel fails between their prayers
and the suffrages of the Church.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE SIGNS THAT WILL PRECEDE THE JUDGMENT (THREE ARTICLES)

We must next consider the signs that will precede the judgment: and
under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether any signs will precede the Lord's coming to judgment?

(2) Whether in very truth the sun and moon will be darkened?

(3) Whether the powers of the heavens will be moved when the Lord shall
come?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether any signs will precede the Lord's coming to judgment?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Lord's coming to judgment will not
be preceded by any signs. Because it is written (1 Thess. 5:3): "When
they shall say: Peace and security; then shall sudden destruction come
upon them. " Now there would be no peace and security if men were
terrified by previous signs. Therefore signs will not precede that
coming

Objection 2: Further, signs are ordained for the manifestation of
something. But His coming is to be hidden; wherefore it is written (1
Thess. 5:2): "The day of the Lord shall come as a thief in the night. "
Therefore signs ought not to precede it.

Objection 3: Further, the time of His first coming was foreknown by the
prophets, which does not apply to His second coming. Now no such signs
preceded the first coming of Christ. Therefore neither will they
precede the second.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 21:25): "There shall be signs in
the sun, and in the moon, and in the stars," etc.

Further, Jerome [*St. Peter Damian, Opuscul. xlix; he quotes St.