No More Learning

Objection 1: It would seem that divination is not a sin. Divination is
derived from something "divine": and things that are divine pertain to
holiness rather than to sin. Therefore it seems that divination is not
a sin.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 1): "Who dares to
say that learning is an evil? " and again: "I could nowise admit that
intelligence can be an evil. " But some arts are divinatory, as the
Philosopher states (De Memor. i): and divination itself would seem to
pertain to a certain intelligence of the truth. Therefore it seems that
divination is not a sin.

Objection 3: Further, there is no natural inclination to evil; because
nature inclines only to its like. But men by natural inclination seek
to foreknow future events; and this belongs to divination. Therefore
divination is not a sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): "Neither let there be
found among you . . . any one that consulteth pythonic spirits, or
fortune tellers": and it is stated in the Decretals (26, qu. v, can.
Qui divinationes): "Those who seek for divinations shall be liable to a
penance of five years' duration, according to the fixed grades of
penance. "

I answer that, Divination denotes a foretelling of the future. The
future may be foreknown in two ways: first in its causes, secondly in
itself. Now the causes of the future are threefold: for some produce
their effects, of necessity and always; and such like future effects
can be foreknown and foretold with certainty, from considering their
causes, even as astrologers foretell a coming eclipse. Other causes
produce their effects, not of necessity and always, but for the most
part, yet they rarely fail: and from such like causes their future
effects can be foreknown, not indeed with certainty, but by a kind of
conjecture, even as astrologers by considering the stars can foreknow
and foretell things concerning rains and droughts, and physicians,
concerning health and death. Again, other causes, considered in
themselves, are indifferent; and this is chiefly the case in the
rational powers, which stand in relation to opposites, according to the
Philosopher [*Metaph. viii, 2,5,8]. Such like effects, as also those
which ensue from natural causes by chance and in the minority of
instances, cannot be foreknown from a consideration of their causes,
because these causes have no determinate inclination to produce these
effects. Consequently such like effects cannot be foreknown unless they
be considered in themselves. Now man cannot consider these effects in
themselves except when they are present, as when he sees Socrates
running or walking: the consideration of such things in themselves
before they occur is proper to God, Who alone in His eternity sees the
future as though it were present, as stated in the [3106]FP, Q[14],
A[13]; [3107]FP, Q[57], A[3]; [3108]FP, Q[86], A[4]. Hence it is
written (Is. 41:23): "Show the things that are to come hereafter, and
we shall know that ye are gods. " Therefore if anyone presume to
foreknow or foretell such like future things by any means whatever,
except by divine revelation, he manifestly usurps what belongs to God.
It is for this reason that certain men are called divines: wherefore
Isidore says (Etym. viii, 9): "They are called divines, as though they
were full of God. For they pretend to be filled with the Godhead, and
by a deceitful fraud they forecast the future to men. "

Accordingly it is not called divination, if a man foretells things that
happen of necessity, or in the majority of instances, for the like can
be foreknown by human reason: nor again if anyone knows other
contingent future things, through divine revelation: for then he does
not divine, i. e. cause something divine, but rather receives something
divine. Then only is a man said to divine, when he usurps to himself,
in an undue manner, the foretelling of future events: and this is
manifestly a sin. Consequently divination is always a sin; and for this
reason Jerome says in his commentary on Mic. 3:9, seqq. that
"divination is always taken in an evil sense. "

Reply to Objection 1: Divination takes its name not from a rightly
ordered share of something divine, but from an undue usurpation
thereof, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: There are certain arts for the foreknowledge of
future events that occur of necessity or frequently, and these do not
pertain to divination. But there are no true arts or sciences for the
knowledge of other future events, but only vain inventions of the
devil's deceit, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 8).

Reply to Objection 3: Man has a natural inclination to know the future
by human means, but not by the undue means of divination.
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Whether divination is a species of superstition?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination is not a species of
superstition. The same thing cannot be a species of diverse genera. Now
divination is apparently a species of curiosity, according to Augustine
(De Vera Relig. xxxviii) [*Cf. De Doctr. Christ. ii, 23,24; De Divin.
Daem. 3]. Therefore it is not, seemingly, a species of superstition.

Objection 2: Further, just as religion is due worship, so is
superstition undue worship. But divination does not seem to pertain to
undue worship. Therefore it does not pertain to superstition.

Objection 3: Further, superstition is opposed to religion. But in true
religion nothing is to be found corresponding as a contrary to
divination. Therefore divination is not a species of superstition.

On the contrary, Origen says in his Peri Archon [*The quotation is from
his sixteenth homily on the Book of Numbers]: "There is an operation of
the demons in the administering of foreknowledge, comprised, seemingly,
under the head of certain arts exercised by those who have enslaved
themselves to the demons, by means of lots, omens, or the observance of
shadows. I doubt not that all these things are done by the operation of
the demons. " Now, according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 20,23),
"whatever results from fellowship between demons and men is
superstitious. " Therefore divination is a species of superstition.

I answer that, As stated above [3109](A[1]; QQ[92],94), superstition
denotes undue divine worship. Now a thing pertains to the worship of
God in two ways: in one way, it is something offered to God; as a
sacrifice, an oblation, or something of the kind: in another way, it is
something divine that is assumed, as stated above with regard to an
oath (Q[89], A[4], ad 2). Wherefore superstition includes not only
idolatrous sacrifices offered to demons, but also recourse to the help
of the demons for the purpose of doing or knowing something. But all
divination results from the demons' operation, either because the
demons are expressly invoked that the future may be made known, or
because the demons thrust themselves into futile searchings of the
future, in order to entangle men's minds with vain conceits. Of this
kind of vanity it is written (Ps. 39:5): "Who hath not regard to
vanities and lying follies. " Now it is vain to seek knowledge of the
future, when one tries to get it from a source whence it cannot be
foreknown. Therefore it is manifest that divination is a species of
superstition.

Reply to Objection 1: Divination is a kind of curiosity with regard to
the end in view, which is foreknowledge of the future; but it is a kind
of superstition as regards the mode of operation.

Reply to Objection 2: This kind of divination pertains to the worship
of the demons, inasmuch as one enters into a compact, tacit or express
with the demons.

Reply to Objection 3: In the New Law man's mind is restrained from
solicitude about temporal things: wherefore the New Law contains no
institution for the foreknowledge of future events in temporal matters.
On the other hand in the Old Law, which contained earthly promises,
there were consultations about the future in connection with religious
matters. Hence where it is written (Is. 8:19): "And when they shall say
to you: Seek of pythons and of diviners, who mutter in their
enchantments," it is added by way of answer: "Should not the people
seek of their God, a vision for the living and the dead? [*Vulg. : 'seek
of their God, for the living of the dead? ']"

In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit
of prophecy, who foretold many things about future events.

In the New Testament, however, there were some possessed of the spirit
of prophecy, who foretold many things about future events.
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Whether we ought to distinguish several species of divination?

Objection 1: It would seem that we should not distinguish several
species of divination. Where the formality of sin is the same, there
are not seemingly several species of sin. Now there is one formality of
sin in all divinations, since they consist in entering into compact
with the demons in order to know the future. Therefore there are not
several species of divination.

Objection 2: Further, a human act takes it species from its end, as
stated above ([3110]FS, Q[1], A[3]; [3111]FS, Q[18], A[6]). But all
divination is directed to one end, namely, the foretelling of the
future. Therefore all divinations are of one species.

Objection 3: Further, signs do not vary the species of a sin, for
whether one detracts by word writing or gestures, it is the same
species of sin. Now divinations seem to differ merely according to the
various signs whence the foreknowledge of the future is derived.
Therefore there are not several species of divination.

On the contrary, Isidore enumerates various species of divination
(Etym. viii, 9).

I answer that, As stated above [3112](A[2]), all divinations seek to
acquire foreknowledge of future events, by means of some counsel and
help of a demon, who is either expressly called upon to give his help,
or else thrusts himself in secretly, in order to foretell certain
future things unknown to men, but known to him in such manners as have
been explained in the [3113]FP, Q[57], A[3]. When demons are expressly
invoked, they are wont to foretell the future in many ways. Sometimes
they offer themselves to human sight and hearing by mock apparitions in
order to foretell the future: and this species is called
"prestigiation" because man's eyes are blindfolded [praestringuntur].
Sometimes they make use of dreams, and this is called "divination by
dreams": sometimes they employ apparitions or utterances of the dead,
and this species is called "necromancy," for as Isidore observes (Etym.
viii) in Greek, {nekron} "means dead and {manteia} divination, because
after certain incantations and the sprinkling of blood, the dead seem
to come to life, to divine and to answer questions. " Sometimes they
foretell the future through living men, as in the case of those who are
possessed: this is divination by "pythons," of whom Isidore says that
"pythons are so called from Pythius Apollo, who was said to be the
inventor of divination. " Sometimes they foretell the future by means of
shapes or signs which appear in inanimate beings. If these signs appear
in some earthly body such as wood, iron or polished stone, it is called
"geomancy," if in water "hydromancy," if in the air "aeromancy," if in
fire "pyromancy," if in the entrails of animals sacrificed on the
altars of demons, "aruspicy. "

The divination which is practiced without express invocation of the
demons is of two kinds. The first is when, with a view to obtain
knowledge of the future, we take observations in the disposition of
certain things. If one endeavor to know the future by observing the
position and movements of the stars, this belongs to "astrologers," who
are also called "genethliacs," because they take note of the days on
which people are born. If one observe the movements and cries of birds
or of any animals, or the sneezing of men, or the sudden movements of
limbs, this belongs in general to "augury," which is so called from the
chattering of birds [avium garritu], just as "auspice" is derived from
watching birds [avium inspectione]. These are chiefly wont to be
observed in birds, the former by the ear, the latter by the eye. If,
however, these observations have for their object men's words uttered
unintentionally, which someone twist so as to apply to the future that
he wishes to foreknow, then it is called an "omen": and as Valerius
Maximus [*De Dict. Fact. Memor. i, 5] remarks, "the observing of omens
has a touch of religion mingled with it, for it is believed to be
founded not on a chance movement, but on divine providence. It was thus
that when the Romans were deliberating whether they would change their
position, a centurion happened to exclaim at the time:
'Standard-bearer, fix the banner, we had best stand here': and on
hearing these words they took them as an omen, and abandoned their
intention of advancing further. " If, however, the observation regards
the dispositions, that occur to the eye, of figures in certain bodies,
there will be another species of divination: for the divination that is
taken from observing the lines of the hand is called "chiromancy," i. e.
divination of the hand (because {cheir} is the Greek for hand): while
the divination which is taken from signs appearing in the
shoulder-blades of an animal is called "spatulamancy. "

To this second species of divination, which is without express
invocation of the demons, belongs that which is practiced by observing
certain things done seriously by men in the research of the occult,
whether by drawing lots, which is called "geomancy"; or by observing
the shapes resulting from molten lead poured into water; or by
observing which of several sheets of paper, with or without writing
upon them, a person may happen to draw; or by holding out several
unequal sticks and noting who takes the greater or the lesser. or by
throwing dice, and observing who throws the highest score; or by
observing what catches the eye when one opens a book, all of which are
named "sortilege. "

Accordingly it is clear that there are three kinds of divination. The
first is when the demons are invoked openly, this comes under the head
of "necromancy"; the second is merely an observation of the disposition
or movement of some other being, and this belongs to "augury"; while
the third consists in doing something in order to discover the occult;
and this belongs to "sortilege. " Under each of these many others are
contained, as explained above.

Reply to Objection 1: In all the aforesaid there is the same general,
but not the same special, character of sin: for it is much more
grievous to invoke the demons than to do things that deserve the
demons' interference.

Reply to Objection 2: Knowledge of the future or of the occult is the
ultimate end whence divination takes its general formality. But the
various species are distinguished by their proper objects or matters,
according as the knowledge of the occult is sought in various things.

Reply to Objection 3: The things observed by diviners are considered by
them, not as signs expressing what they already know, as happens in
detraction, but as principles of knowledge. Now it is evident that
diversity of principles diversifies the species, even in demonstrative
sciences.
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Whether divination practiced by invoking the demons is unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination practiced by invoking the
demons is not unlawful. Christ did nothing unlawful, according to 1
Pet. 2:22, "Who did no sin. " Yet our Lord asked the demon: "What is thy
name? " and the latter replied: "My name is Legion, for we are many"
(Mk. 5:9). Therefore it seems lawful to question the demons about the
occult.

Objection 2: Further, the souls of the saints do not encourage those
who ask unlawfully. Yet Samuel appeared to Saul when the latter
inquired of the woman that had a divining spirit, concerning the issue
of the coming war (1 Kings 28:8, sqq. ). Therefore the divination that
consists in questioning demons is not unlawful.

Objection 3: Further, it seems lawful to seek the truth from one who
knows, if it be useful to know it. But it is sometimes useful to know
what is hidden from us, and can be known through the demons, as in the
discovery of thefts. Therefore divination by questioning demons is not
unlawful.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): "Neither let there be
found among you . . . anyone that consulteth soothsayers . . . nor . .
. that consulteth pythonic spirits. "

I answer that, All divination by invoking demons is unlawful for two
reasons. The first is gathered from the principle of divination, which
is a compact made expressly with a demon by the very fact of invoking
him. This is altogether unlawful; wherefore it is written against
certain persons (Is. 28:15): "You have said: We have entered into a
league with death, and we have made a covenant with hell. " And still
more grievous would it be if sacrifice were offered or reverence paid
to the demon invoked. The second reason is gathered from the result.
For the demon who intends man's perdition endeavors, by his answers,
even though he sometimes tells the truth, to accustom men to believe
him, and so to lead him on to something prejudicial to the salvation of
mankind. Hence Athanasius, commenting on the words of Lk. 4:35, "He
rebuked him, saying: Hold thy peace," says: "Although the demon
confessed the truth, Christ put a stop to his speech, lest together
with the truth he should publish his wickedness and accustom us to care
little for such things, however much he may seem to speak the truth.
For it is wicked, while we have the divine Scriptures, to seek
knowledge from the demons. "

Reply to Objection 1: According to Bede's commentary on Lk. 8:30, "Our
Lord inquired, not through ignorance, but in order that the disease,
which he tolerated, being made public, the power of the Healer might
shine forth more graciously. " Now it is one thing to question a demon
who comes to us of his own accord (and it is lawful to do so at times
for the good of others, especially when he can be compelled, by the
power of God, to tell the truth) and another to invoke a demon in order
to gain from him knowledge of things hidden from us.

Reply to Objection 2: According to Augustine (Ad Simplic. ii, 3),
"there is nothing absurd in believing that the spirit of the just man,
being about to smite the king with the divine sentence, was permitted
to appear to him, not by the sway of magic art or power, but by some
occult dispensation of which neither the witch nor Saul was aware. Or
else the spirit of Samuel was not in reality aroused from his rest, but
some phantom or mock apparition formed by the machinations of the
devil, and styled by Scripture under the name of Samuel, just as the
images of things are wont to be called by the names of those things. "

Reply to Objection 3: No temporal utility can compare with the harm to
spiritual health that results from the research of the unknown by
invoking the demon.
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Whether divination by the stars is unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination by the stars is not
unlawful. It is lawful to foretell effects by observing their causes:
thus a physician foretells death from the disposition of the disease.
Now the heavenly bodies are the cause of what takes place in the world,
according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore divination by the
stars is not unlawful.

Objection 2: Further, human science originates from experiments,
according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 1). Now it has been discovered
through many experiments that the observation of the stars is a means
whereby some future events may be known beforehand. Therefore it would
seem not unlawful to make use of this kind of divination.

Objection 3: Further, divination is declared to be unlawful in so far
as it is based on a compact made with the demons. But divination by the
stars contains nothing of the kind, but merely an observation of God's
creatures. Therefore it would seem that this species of divination is
not unlawful.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 3): "Those astrologers
whom they call mathematicians, I consulted without scruple; because
they seemed to use no sacrifice, nor to pray to any spirit for their
divinations which art, however, Christian and true piety rejects and
condemns. "

I answer that, As stated above ([3114]AA[1],2), the operation of the
demon thrusts itself into those divinations which are based on false
and vain opinions, in order that man's mind may become entangled in
vanity and falsehood. Now one makes use of a vain and false opinion if,
by observing the stars, one desires to foreknow the future that cannot
be forecast by their means. Wherefore we must consider what things can
be foreknown by observing the stars: and it is evident that those
things which happen of necessity can be foreknown by this mean,: even
so astrologers forecast a future eclipse.

However, with regard to the foreknowledge of future events acquired by
observing the stars there have been various opinions. For some have
stated that the stars signify rather than cause the things foretold by
means of their observation. But this is an unreasonable statement:
since every corporeal sign is either the effect of that for which it
stands (thus smoke signifies fire whereby it is caused), or it proceeds
from the same cause, so that by signifying the cause, in consequence it
signifies the effect (thus a rainbow is sometimes a sign of fair
weather, in so far as its cause is the cause of fair weather). Now it
cannot be said that the dispositions and movements of the heavenly
bodies are the effect of future events; nor again can they be ascribed
to some common higher cause of a corporeal nature, although they are
referable to a common higher cause, which is divine providence. on the
contrary the appointment of the movements and positions of the heavenly
bodies by divine providence is on a different principle from the
appointment of the occurrence of future contingencies, because the
former are appointed on a principle of necessity, so that they always
occur in the same way, whereas the latter are appointed on a principle
of contingency, so that the manner of their occurrence is variable.
Consequently it is impossible to acquire foreknowledge of the future
from an observation of the stars, except in so far as effects can be
foreknown from their causes.
Now two kinds of effects escape the causality of heavenly bodies. In
the first place all effects that occur accidentally, whether in human
affairs or in the natural order, since, as it is proved in Metaph. vi
[*Ed. Did. v, 3], an accidental being has no cause, least of all a
natural cause, such as is the power of a heavenly body, because what
occurs accidentally, neither is a "being" properly speaking, nor is
"one"---for instance, that an earthquake occur when a stone falls, or
that a treasure be discovered when a man digs a grave---for these and
like occurrences are not one thing, but are simply several things.
Whereas the operation of nature has always some one thing for its term,
just as it proceeds from some one principle, which is the form of a
natural thing.

In the second place, acts of the free-will, which is the faculty of
will and reason, escape the causality of heavenly bodies. For the
intellect or reason is not a body, nor the act of a bodily organ, and
consequently neither is the will, since it is in the reason, as the
Philosopher shows (De Anima iii, 4,9). Now no body can make an
impression on an incorporeal body. Wherefore it is impossible for
heavenly bodies to make a direct impression on the intellect and will:
for this would be to deny the difference between intellect and sense,
with which position Aristotle reproaches (De Anima iii, 3) those who
held that "such is the will of man, as is the day which the father of
men and of gods," i. e. the sun or the heavens, "brings on" [*Odyssey
xviii, 135].

Hence the heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause of the free-will's
operations. Nevertheless they can be a dispositive cause of an
inclination to those operations, in so far as they make an impression
on the human body, and consequently on the sensitive powers which are
acts of bodily organs having an inclination for human acts. Since,
however, the sensitive powers obey reason, as the Philosopher shows (De
Anima iii, 11; Ethic. i, 13), this does not impose any necessity on the
free-will, and man is able, by his reason, to act counter to the
inclination of the heavenly bodies.

Accordingly if anyone take observation of the stars in order to
foreknow casual or fortuitous future events, or to know with certitude
future human actions, his conduct is based on a false and vain opinion;
and so the operation of the demon introduces itself therein, wherefore
it will be a superstitious and unlawful divination. On the other hand
if one were to apply the observation of the stars in order to foreknow
those future things that are caused by heavenly bodies, for instance,
drought or rain and so forth, it will be neither an unlawful nor a
superstitious divination.

Wherefore the Reply to the First Objection is evident.

Reply to Objection 2: That astrologers not unfrequently forecast the
truth by observing the stars may be explained in two ways. First,
because a great number of men follow their bodily passions, so that
their actions are for the most part disposed in accordance with the
inclination of the heavenly bodies: while there are few, namely, the
wise alone, who moderate these inclinations by their reason. The result
is that astrologers in many cases foretell the truth, especially in
public occurrences which depend on the multitude. Secondly, because of
the interference of the demons. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii,
17): "When astrologers tell the truth, it must be allowed that this is
due to an instinct that, unknown to man, lies hidden in his mind. And
since this happens through the action of unclean and lying spirits who
desire to deceive man for they are permitted to know certain things
about temporal affairs. " Wherefore he concludes: "Thus a good Christian
should beware of astrologers, and of all impious diviners, especially
of those who tell the truth, lest his soul become the dupe of the
demons and by making a compact of partnership with them enmesh itself
in their fellowship. "

This suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.
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Whether divination by dreams is unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination by dreams is not unlawful.
It is not unlawful to make use of divine instruction. Now men are
instructed by God in dreams, for it is written (Job 33:15,16): "By a
dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, and they
are sleeping in their beds, then He," God to wit, "openeth the ears of
men, and teaching instructeth them in what they are to learn. "
Therefore it is not unlawful to make use of divination by dreams.

Objection 2: Further, those who interpret dreams, properly speaking,
make use of divination by dreams. Now we read of holy men interpreting
dreams: thus Joseph interpreted the dreams of Pharaoh's butler and of
his chief baker (Gn. 40), and Daniel interpreted the dream of the king
of Babylon (Dan. 2, 4). Therefore divination by dreams is not unlawful.

Objection 3: Further, it is unreasonable to deny the common experiences
of men. Now it is the experience of all that dreams are significative
of the future. Therefore it is useless to deny the efficacy of dreams
for the purpose of divination, and it is lawful to listen to them.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10): "Neither let there be found
among you any one that . . . observeth dreams. "

I answer that, As stated above ([3115]AA[2],6), divination is
superstitious and unlawful when it is based on a false opinion.
Wherefore we must consider what is true in the matter of foreknowing
the future from dreams. Now dreams are sometimes the cause of future
occurrences; for instance, when a person's mind becomes anxious through
what it has seen in a dream and is thereby led to do something or avoid
something: while sometimes dreams are signs of future happenings, in so
far as they are referable to some common cause of both dreams and
future occurrences, and in this way the future is frequently known from
dreams. We must, then, consider what is the cause of dreams, and
whether it can be the cause of future occurrences, or be cognizant of
them.

Accordingly it is to be observed that the cause of dreams is sometimes
in us and sometimes outside us. The inward cause of dreams is twofold:
one regards the soul, in so far as those things which have occupied a
man's thoughts and affections while awake recur to his imagination
while asleep. A such like cause of dreams is not a cause of future
occurrences, so that dreams of this kind are related accidentally to
future occurrences, and if at any time they concur it will be by
chance. But sometimes the inward cause of dreams regards the body:
because the inward disposition of the body leads to the formation of a
movement in the imagination consistent with that disposition; thus a
man in whom there is abundance of cold humors dreams that he is in the
water or snow: and for this reason physicians say that we should take
note of dreams in order to discover internal dispositions.

In like manner the outward cause of dreams is twofold, corporal and
spiritual. It is corporal in so far as the sleeper's imagination is
affected either by the surrounding air, or through an impression of a
heavenly body, so that certain images appear to the sleeper, in keeping
with the disposition of the heavenly bodies. The spiritual cause is
sometimes referable to God, Who reveals certain things to men in their
dreams by the ministry of the angels, according Num. 12:6, "If there be
among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I
will speak to him in a dream. " Sometimes, however, it is due to the
action of the demons that certain images appear to persons in their
sleep, and by this means they, at times, reveal certain future things
to those who have entered into an unlawful compact with them.

Accordingly we must say that there is no unlawful divination in making
use of dreams for the foreknowledge of the future, so long as those
dreams are due to divine revelation, or to some natural cause inward or
outward, and so far as the efficacy of that cause extends. But it will
be an unlawful and superstitious divination if it be caused by a
revelation of the demons, with whom a compact has been made, whether
explicit, through their being invoked for the purpose, or implicit,
through the divination extending beyond its possible limits.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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Whether divination by auguries, omens, and by like observations of external
things is unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination by auguries, omens, and by
like observations of external things is not unlawful. If it were
unlawful holy men would not make use thereof. Now we read of Joseph
that he paid attention to auguries, for it is related (Gn. 44:5) that
Joseph's steward said: "The cup which you have stolen is that in which
my lord drinketh and in which he is wont to divine [augurari]": and he
himself afterwards said to his brethren (Gn. 44:15): "Know you not that
there is no one like me in the science of divining? " Therefore it is
not unlawful to make use of this kind of divination.

Objection 2: Further, birds naturally know certain things regarding
future occurrences of the seasons, according to Jer. 8:7, "The kite in
the air hath known her time; the turtle, the swallow, and the stork
have observed the time of their coming. " Now natural knowledge is
infallible and comes from God. Therefore it seems not unlawful to make
use of the birds' knowledge in order to know the future, and this is
divination by augury.

Objection 3: Further, Gedeon is numbered among the saints (Heb. 11:32).
Yet Gedeon made use of an omen, when he listened to the relation and
interpreting of a dream (Judges 7:15): and Eliezer, Abraham's servant,
acted in like manner (Gn. 24). Therefore it seems that this kind of
divination is not unlawful.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10): "Neither let there be found
among you anyone . . . that observeth omens. "

I answer that, The movements or cries of birds, and whatever
dispositions one may consider in such things, are manifestly not the
cause of future events: wherefore the future cannot be known therefrom
as from its cause. It follows therefore that if anything future can be
known from them, it will be because the causes from which they proceed
are also the causes of future occurrences or are cognizant of them. Now
the cause of dumb animals' actions is a certain instinct whereby they
are inclined by a natural movement, for they are not masters of their
actions. This instinct may proceed from a twofold cause. In the first
place it may be due to a bodily cause. For since dumb animals have
naught but a sensitive soul, every power of which is the act of a
bodily organ, their soul is subject to the disposition of surrounding
bodies, and primarily to that of the heavenly bodies. Hence nothing
prevents some of their actions from being signs of the future, in so
far as they are conformed to the dispositions of the heavenly bodies
and of the surrounding air, to which certain future events are due. Yet
in this matter we must observe two things: first, that such
observations must not be applied to the foreknowledge of future things
other than those which can be foreknown from the movements of heavenly
bodies, as stated above ([3116]AA[5],6): secondly, that they be not
applied to other matters than those which in some way may have
reference to these animals (since they acquire through the heavenly
bodies a certain natural knowledge and instinct about things necessary
for their life---such as changes resulting from rain and wind and so
forth).

In the second place, this instinct is produced by a spiritual cause,
namely, either by God, as may be seen in the dove that descended upon
Christ, the raven that fed Elias, and the whale that swallowed and
vomited Jonas, or by demons, who make use of these actions of dumb
animals in order to entangle our minds with vain opinions. This seems
to be true of all such like things; except omens, because human words
which are taken for an omen are not subject to the disposition of the
stars, yet are they ordered according to divine providence and
sometimes according to the action of the demons.

Accordingly we must say that all such like divinations are
superstitious and unlawful, if they be extended beyond the limits set
according to the order of nature or of divine providence.

Reply to Objection 1: According to Augustine [*QQ. in Genes. , qu.
cxlv], when Joseph said that there was no one like him in the science
of divining, he spoke in joke and not seriously, referring perhaps to
the common opinion about him: in this sense also spoke his steward.

Reply to Objection 2: The passage quoted refers to the knowledge that
birds have about things concerning them; and in order to know these
things it is not unlawful to observe their cries and movements: thus
from the frequent cawing of crows one might say that it will rain soon.

Reply to Objection 3: Gedeon listened to the recital and interpretation
of a dream, seeing therein an omen, ordered by divine providence for
his instruction. In like manner Eliezer listened to the damsel's words,
having previously prayed to God.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether divination by drawing lots is unlawful?

Objection 1: It would seem that divination by drawing lots is not
unlawful, because a gloss of Augustine on Ps. 30:16, "My lots are in
Thy hands," says: "It is not wrong to cast lots, for it is a means of
ascertaining the divine will when a man is in doubt. "

Objection 2: There is, seemingly, nothing unlawful in the observances
which the Scriptures relate as being practiced by holy men. Now both in
the Old and in the New Testament we find holy men practicing the
casting of lots. For it is related (Jos. 7:14, sqq. ) that Josue, at the
Lord's command, pronounced sentence by lot on Achan who had stolen of
the anathema. Again Saul, by drawing lots, found that his son Jonathan
had eaten honey (1 Kings 14:58, sqq. ): Jonas, when fleeing from the
face of the Lord, was discovered and thrown into the sea (Jonah 1:7,
sqq. ): Zacharias was chosen by lot to offer incense (Lk. 1:9): and the
apostles by drawing lots elected Matthias to the apostleship (Acts
1:26). Therefore it would seem that divination by lots is not unlawful.

Objection 3: Further, fighting with the fists, or "monomachy," i. e.
single combat as it is called, and trial by fire and water, which are
called "popular" trials, seem to come under the head of sortilege,
because something unknown is sought by their means. Yet these practices
seem to be lawful, because David is related to have engaged in single
combat with the Philistine (1 Kings 17:32, sqq. ). Therefore it would
seem that divination by lot is not unlawful.

On the contrary, It is written in the Decretals (XXVI, qu. v, can.
Sortes): "We decree that the casting of lots, by which means you make
up your mind in all your undertakings, and which the Fathers have
condemned, is nothing but divination and witchcraft. For which reason
we wish them to be condemned altogether, and henceforth not to be
mentioned among Christians, and we forbid the practice thereof under
pain of anathema. "

I answer that, As stated above [3117](A[3]), sortilege consists,
properly speaking, in doing something, that by observing the result one
may come to the knowledge of something unknown. If by casting lots one
seeks to know what is to be given to whom, whether it be a possession,
an honor, a dignity, a punishment, or some action or other, it is
called "sortilege of allotment"; if one seeks to know what ought to be
done, it is called "sortilege of consultation"; if one seeks to know
what is going to happen, it is called "sortilege of divination. " Now
the actions of man that are required for sortilege and their results
are not subject to the dispositions of the stars. Wherefore if anyone
practicing sortilege is so minded as though the human acts requisite
for sortilege depended for their result on the dispositions of the
stars, his opinion is vain and false, and consequently is not free from
the interference of the demons, so that a divination of this kind is
superstitious and unlawful.

Apart from this cause, however, the result of sortilegious acts must
needs be ascribed to chance, or to some directing spiritual cause. If
we ascribe it to chance, and this can only take place in "sortilege of
allotment," it does not seem to imply any vice other than vanity, as in
the case of persons who, being unable to agree upon the division of
something or other, are willing to draw lots for its division, thus
leaving to chance what portion each is to receive.

If, on the other hand, the decision by lot be left to a spiritual
cause, it is sometimes ascribed to demons. Thus we read (Ezech. 21:21)
that "the king of Babylon stood in the highway, at the head of two
ways, seeking divination, shuffling arrows; he inquired of the idols,
and consulted entrails": sortilege of this kind is unlawful, and
forbidden by the canons.

Sometimes, however, the decision is left to God, according to Prov.
16:33, "Lots are cast into the lap, but they are disposed of by the
Lord": sortilege of this kind is not wrong in itself, as Augustine
declares [*Enarr. ii in Ps. xxx, serm. 2; cf. OBJ[1]].

Yet this may happen to be sinful in four ways. First, if one have
recourse to lots without any necessity: for this would seem to amount
to tempting God. Hence Ambrose, commenting on the words of Lk. 1:8,
says: "He that is chosen by lot is not bound by the judgment of men. "
Secondly, if even in a case of necessity one were to have recourse to
lots without reverence. Hence, on the Acts of the Apostles, Bede says
(Super Act. Apost. i): "But if anyone, compelled by necessity, thinks
that he ought, after the apostles' example, to consult God by casting
lots, let him take note that the apostles themselves did not do so,
except after calling together the assembly of the brethren and pouring
forth prayer to God. " Thirdly, if the Divine oracles be misapplied to
earthly business. Hence Augustine says (ad inquisit. Januar. ii; Ep.
lv): "Those who tell fortunes from the Gospel pages, though it is to be
hoped that they do so rather than have recourse to consulting the
demons, yet does this custom also displease me, that anyone should wish
to apply the Divine oracles to worldly matters and to the vain things
of this life. " Fourthly, if anyone resort to the drawing of lots in
ecclesiastical elections, which should be carried out by the
inspiration of the Holy Ghost. Wherefore, as Bede says (Super Act.
Apost. i): "Before Pentecost the ordination of Matthias was decided by
lot," because as yet the fulness of the Holy Ghost was not yet poured
forth into the Church: "whereas the same deacons were ordained not by
lot but by the choice of the disciples. " It is different with earthly
honors, which are directed to the disposal of earthly things: in
elections of this kind men frequently have recourse to lots, even as in
the distribution of earthly possessions.

If, however, there be urgent necessity it is lawful to seek the divine
judgment by casting lots, provided due reverence be observed. Hence
Augustine says (Ep. ad Honor. ccxxviii), "If, at a time of persecution,
the ministers of God do not agree as to which of them is to remain at
his post lest all should flee, and which of them is to flee, lest all
die and the Church be forsaken, should there be no other means of
coming to an agreement, so far as I can see, they must be chosen by
lot. " Again he says (De Doctr. Christ. xxviii): "If thou aboundest in
that which it behooves thee to give to him who hath not, and which
cannot be given to two; should two come to you, neither of whom
surpasses the other either in need or in some claim on thee, thou
couldst not act more justly than in choosing by lot to whom thou shalt
give that which thou canst not give to both. "

This suffices for the Reply to the First and Second Objections.

Reply to Objection 3: The trial by hot iron or boiling water is
directed to the investigation of someone's hidden sin, by means of
something done by a man, and in this it agrees with the drawing of
lots. But in so far as a miraculous result is expected from God, it
surpasses the common generality of sortilege. Hence this kind of trial
is rendered unlawful, both because it is directed to the judgment of
the occult, which is reserved to the divine judgment, and because such
like trials are not sanctioned by divine authority. Hence we read in a
decree of Pope Stephen V [*II, qu. v. , can. Consuluist i]: "The sacred
canons do not approve of extorting a confession from anyone by means of
the trial by hot iron or boiling water, and no one must presume, by a
superstitious innovation, to practice what is not sanctioned by the
teaching of the holy fathers. For it is allowable that public crimes
should be judged by our authority, after the culprit has made
spontaneous confession, or when witnesses have been approved, with due
regard to the fear of God; but hidden and unknown crimes must be left
to Him Who alone knows the hearts of the children of men. " The same
would seem to apply to the law concerning duels, save that it
approaches nearer to the common kind of sortilege, since no miraculous
effect is expected thereupon, unless the combatants be very unequal in
strength or skill.
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OF SUPERSTITION IN OBSERVANCES (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider superstition in observances, under which head
there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Of observances for acquiring knowledge, which are prescribed by the
magic art;

(2) Of observances for causing alterations in certain bodies;

(3) Of observances practiced in fortune-telling;

(4) Of wearing sacred words at the neck.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether it be unlawful to practice the observances of the magic art?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not unlawful to practice the
observances of the magic art. A thing is said to be unlawful in two
ways. First, by reason of the genus of the deed, as murder and theft:
secondly, through being directed to an evil end, as when a person gives
an alms for the sake of vainglory. Now the observances of the magic art
are not evil as to the genus of the deed, for they consist in certain
fasts and prayers to God; moreover, they are directed to a good end,
namely, the acquisition of science. Therefore it is not unlawful to
practice these observances.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Dan. 1:17) that "to the children"
who abstained, "God gave knowledge, and understanding in every book,
and wisdom. " Now the observances of the magic art consist in certain
fasts and abstinences. Therefore it seems that this art achieves its
results through God: and consequently it is not unlawful to practice
it.

Objection 3: Further, seemingly, as stated above [3118](A[1]), the
reason why it is wrong to inquire of the demons concerning the future
is because they have no knowledge of it, this knowledge being proper to
God. Yet the demons know scientific truths: because sciences are about
things necessary and invariable, and such things are subject to human
knowledge, and much more to the knowledge of demons, who are of keener
intellect, as Augustine says [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 17; De Divin. Daemon.
3,4]. Therefore it seems to be no sin to practice the magic art, even
though it achieve its result through the demons.

On the contrary, It is written (Dt. 18:10,11): "Neither let there be
found among you . . . anyone . . . that seeketh the truth from the
dead": which search relies on the demons' help.