No More Learning

All hopes of success were, how-
ever, extinguished by the action of a Hindu member who, though
opposed by his leader, moved a resolution on 24 January, 1911, in the
imperial legislative council, asking the government to abolish separate
representation, whether in the councils, or in local bodies. This
attempt to reduce the security of their political influence embittered
the Muslims so much that even their disappointment at the reversal
•
1 Indian National Congress Report, Calcutta, 1907, pp. 87-9.
: “A bitter jest ‘No bombs no boons' was passed round among Mahomedans at Delhi. ”
Sir R. Craddock, The Dilemma in India, p. 147.


## p. 577 (#617) ############################################

KHILAFAT AGITATION
577
of the partition was not immediately sufficient to make them combine
with the Hindus. A marked change was, however, noticeable in their
attitude towards the government, and especially in their public utter-
ances and in their newspapers. No Muslim had taken the place of Sir
Sayyid Ahmad who had died in 1898, and the younger men educated
at his college were beginning to chafe at the restraints imposed by
those who remembered his teachings of moderation and sobriety.
Their influence in the college was disruptive, and made it impossible
for the Government of India to accept the proposals framed to raise
its status to that of a university. Affairs in Europe and in Persia had
also excited them. The war between Italy and Turkey, the agreement
between Russia and England regarding Persia, and still more the
Balkan War, had combined to arouse fears that independent Islamic
powers were in danger. Muslim opinion varies as to the right to
recognition as khalifa, or representative of Muhammad, since the
Mongols overthrew the Abbasid line of Baghdad in 1258, and when
Selim I of Turkey assumed the title in 1517 Indian Muslims hardly
recognised it. When the Moghul Empire of India had been ex-
tinguished, however, the fact that a khalifa must enjoy temporal as
well as spiritual power led some sections of the Indian Muslims to
accept the khilafat of the sultan, and this increased their natural
sympathy with co-religionists during the Crimean War, though even
devout Sunnis, like Sir Sayyid Ahmad held that the institution had
lapsed in 1258. 1 Twenty years later, Lord Lytton wrote to warn
Lord Salisbury, after the conference at Constantinople which took
place shortly before war broke out between Turkey and Russia, that
Indian Muslims were by no means indifferent to the fate of Turkey. 2
In October, 1912, war broke out between Turkey and the Balkan
states, and a medical mission composed of Indians was organised at
Delhi and dispatched to help the Turks, while the Red Crescent
(corresponding to the Red Cross) movement also received support.
A society was formed called the Khuddam-i-Kaaba, or servants of
the Kaaba, which aimed at arousing interest in maintaining the
integrity of the Turkish kingdom as responsible for the safety of the
sacred places of Islam. Drawing inspiration perhaps from the success
of the Salvation Army, it addressed its efforts to the humbler classes
of the community, who were invited to become members on payment
of a very small subscription, and were excited by inflammatory
addresses on the dangers besetting their co-religionists abroad.
An opportunity of testing the powers of agitation soon occurred.
Some street improvements at Cawnpore involved the removal of
buildings. It was found possible to avoid the demolition of a Hindu
temple standing in the middle of a new road which was being opened.
Close to it stood a small mosque, and it was proposed to remove an
1 Sir Verney Lovett, History of the Nationalist Movement in India, pp. 282-4.
2 Lady Betty Balfour, Letlers of the Earl of Lytton, 11, 64.
CHI VI
37


## p. 578 (#618) ############################################

578
POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, 1909–1917
addition to the original building containing a room and a platform
on which ceremonial ablutions were performed. Religious jealousy.
led to a demand that this should also be spared. Similar constructions,
and even whole mosques, had been demolished in the past without
complaint, but an agitation was fostered from outside and rapidly
grew. Stories of tortures inflicted on Muslims by the Balkan powers
were published, and the reoccupation of Adrianople by the Turks in
July, after Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria had begun to fight among
themselves, encouraged boldness in India. More than a month after
the room had been pulled down, a violent mob, after listening to a
sermon, rushed to the spot and began to pile up bricks. They attacked
the police, who were compelled to fire, causing some loss of life.
Agitation in the press was redoubled, especially in Calcutta and
Lahore and false rumours were circulated about the facts. Though
local feeling had calmed down, these narratives, as is not uncommon,
continued to excite people in distant parts of India. Lord Hardinge,
the governor-general, was so impressed by reports he received that he
decided to visit Cawnpore. There he announced a settlement of the
affair, which was in fact in accordance with the original plans for
improvement, viz. that the room should be rebuilt over an arcade
which extended along the street.
While the rearrangement of Bengal had contributed to the new
political activities of the Muslims, its effect on Hindus had not been
as sedative as had been hoped. Bengali politicians were gratified,
while the lawyers and traders of Calcutta, who had anticipated
material loss from the constitution of a new capital at Dacca, felt
relief. But to the virus of sedition, spread by the press, and by revolu-
tionaries in some of the private educational institutions with ill-paid
staffs, no antidote was afforded by a measure which did not affect the
persons engaged in spreading the poison. In December, 1912, a bomb
was thrown in Delhi at Lord Hardinge who narrowly escaped with
his life, and throughout the next year revolutionary crime in Eastern
Bengal was marked by murderous brutality in dacoities committed
in order to obtain funds for revolutionary purposes. It has been
observed that between 1906 and 1910 prices rose to an extent which
had not been known since the Mutiny, and that the literate classes
who furnished revolutionary recruits were hit harder than the agri-
culturists.
In other parts of India the influence of the Bengali revolutionaries
showed itself, partly by imitation, and partly by direct incitement.
A club modelled on thé Anusilan Samiti (society for the promotion of
culture and training) at Dacca was started at Benares in the United
Provinces in 1908 by young Bengali students who are numerous in
that city. Its founder aimed at making it a school of sedition, and was
instigated by members of the revolutionary party in Bengal. The
i Sir Bampfylde Fuller in United Empire, 1910, p. 559.


## p. 579 (#619) ############################################

WORKING OF THE NEW COUNCILS
579
methods followed, however, alienated a number of members who did
not approve its political activities and hostility to the government.
Subsequently the more active members seceded and formed a fresh
association, which throughout 1913 was in close touch with Bengal.
In the Panjab the deportations of 1907 had been followed by calm
for some time, but the bomb manual prepared in Bengal was received
there, and a Panjabi student, who had been in England and had
come under the influence of Krishnavarma, started propaganda and
then left for America, whence he subsequently attempted to organise
ghadr (mutiny) in India. Some of his pupils got into touch with a
Bengali employed in the United Provinces and organised the spread
of seditious literature extolling the attempt on Lord Hardinge's life.
A bomb placed by this association near the European Club at Lahore
caused the death of an Indian in May, 1913. In Bihar a particularly
revolting murder was committed to obtain funds for revolutionary
purposes by two youths from Bombay, who had been excited by the
inflammatory journals of the Bombay Brahman clique, and by lectures
on the Bengal “martyrs”.
The working of the new legislative councils was examined in
chapter iv of the Montagu-Chelmsford report. One unforeseen
result of the enlargement of the non-official element was that it was
found necessary to curb the criticism of government measures by
officials within the councils, and to prevent provincial governors from
using their councils to question orders passed by the secretary of state.
Non-official members were able to influence legislation, not so much
by debate when bills were actually before the councils, as in the
previous discussions, or in select committees. In India it had been
customary to publish proposals for legislation as widely as possible
and obtain criticisms of these before bills were introduced, and in
one province special provision was made to employ members of the
council in this manner. The right to move resolutions was freely used
and its effect on government action may be estimated by the fact that
out of 168 resolutions moved in the imperial council to the end of
1917 about seventy-three were fructuous. Questions were also freely
put, though many of these were to elicit information alrcady easily
available or statistical information of no real public value.
During this period an attempt was made to constitute an executive
council in the United Provinces. 3 Sir John Hewett, the lieutenant-
governor, had reported in 1909 that the work coming before him in
the United Provinces was not sufficiently heavy to justify the con-
stitution of such a body, and that it would be difficult to obtain
suitable Indian nominees, as non-official Indians had little experience
of administrative business, though capable men were available. He
i Cd. 910g of 1918.
2 Lord Curzon (Ronaldshay, Life of Lord Curzon, 11, 104) disliked this system, as different
from what he was accustomed to.
: Parl. Papers (House of Lords), 1914-16, sessional no. 49 (VIII, 5 $99. ).
37-2


## p. 580 (#620) ############################################

580
POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, 1909–1917
did not agree with the considerations pressed upon him by the Govern-
ment of India, which regarded the secretary of state's views as final.
The new councils would increase work in some directions, but should
relieve it in others, and it was premature to anticipate future needs.
After a long experience in the Government of India he could not say
that public business was discussed with more discrimination by a
governor in council than by a lieutenant-governor without one.
Executive councils were desired by Indian politicians for several
reasons. They wished the heads of provinces to be selected from men
in public life in England rather than from the Indian Civil Service,
and the Decentralisation Commission had pointed out that councils
would be necessary if this change was made. i Government by council
was considered a superior form, and in any case the constitution of a
council would admit one or two Indians to new high offices. In reply
to a resolution moved in the imperial legislative council, 24 January,
1911, the Home Member said that the practical test was whether the
head of the province could cope with the work and the Government of
India would not move in the matter while Sir John Hewett was
lieutenant-governor.
Two years later a similar resolution was moved in the local council
and Sir James (now Lord) Meston, who had followed Sir John Hewett,
declined to accept it on the formal ground that his views could not be
published until the Government of India and secretary of state had
considered the question. In forwarding a report of the debate he took
the same view of the state of work as Sir John Hewett. But he thought
it advisable to meet the demand on the ground that it would steadily
grow and was bound to be conceded in time. Opinion in the Govern-
ment of India was divided. Three of the civilian members, and (at the
time the decision was taken) the commander-in-chief were opposed.
One of them pointed out
that Sir Edward Baker, who was the only lieutenant-governor (in 1909) in favour
of having a council, sent up proposals for the distribution of work, which reduced
his council to a position subordinate to himself and struggled to retain in his
hands powers which the Government of India considered incompatible with
council government.
The dissentients were all impressed by the bitterness of feeling between
Hindu and Muslim in northern India and by the lack of experience
of council government in provinces under lieutenant-governors. The
majority considered that council government was a natural conse-
quence of the increase in work and greater complication in adminis-
tration, and, impressed by Sir James Meston's advice, supported the
proposal. This was accepted by Lord Crewe, the secretary of state,
and a draft proclamation was laid before both houses of parliament.
An address to the crown was, however, carried against it in the House
of Lords on 16 March, 1915.
1 Report, pp. 154-5.
2 Minute of Dissent by Sir Harcourt Butler.


## p. 581 (#621) ############################################

INDIANS IN THE COLONIES
581
Another matter which engaged public attention was the treatment
of Indians in the dominions and crown colonies, which had long been
a source of grievance, and the position in South Africa was particularly
complained of. Before the Boer War it had been the cause of re-
monstrance with the Boer government. In 1900 and again in 1901
the congress passed resolutions calling attention to the matter, but
even after the war crown colony administrations did nothing to
remedy the disabilities, which were indeed increased. Restrictions
were most severe in the Free State which had completely excluded
Indians, and in the Transvaal where they were not permitted to own
land and had to live in special localities. In Natal, where the largest
population of Indians was found, a licence fee had been imposed on
İndians who had entered the colony as-indentured labourers, if they
remained at the end of their term of service, and on their children as
they became adolescent. Political franchise was taken away in 1896
on the ground that it was not enjoyed in India, and there were
proposals to abolish the municipal franchise, and to stop licences in
order to get rid of all Indians. Cape Colony was more reasonable,
and Indians there had fewer grievances though these were still
appreciable. In 1907 the new responsible government in the Trans-
vaal passed acts to prevent the ingress of Indians not already domiciled
there and to compel registration of all Indian residents.
Mr M. K. Gandhi, an Indian barrister, who had visited South
Africa on legal business in 1893 and had remained there to assist his
fellow-countrymen in resisting oppressive measures, organised a move-
ment of passive resistance, which he was later to repeat in India.
Sympathetic agitation began in India where the discussion of ad-
ministrative reforms was already exciting men's minds, and the
Indian government supported the claims for more liberal treatment.
The home government found it difficult to reconcile the undoubted
rights of Indians as British subjects, and those of South Africans to
whom the Union Act of 1909 gave full powers of self-government.
Colonies like Natal had found Indian labour useful in agriculture and
unskilled occupations. But the Indian labourer at the end of his term
of service was engaging in trade (usually as a small shopkeeper) and
in market-gardening where he came into competition with the lower
classes of European origin. There was some apprehension of large
numbers of competitors arriving, if all restrictions were removed.
Most important of all, it was feared that if Indians were admitted
freely and obtained the franchise, it could not in time be refused to
the indiger ous races who would then swamp the predominating
influence of the white population.
In 1910 the Government of India decided to stop the recruitment
of indentured labour for Natal from the following year. The British
1 See Keith, Imperial Unity and the Doncinions, 1916, pp. 202 599. , where full references
are given.
2 Doke, M. K. Gandhi, 1909.


## p. 582 (#622) ############################################

582
POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, 1909-1917
government then pressed the Union to repeal the Transvaal Act of
1907 and to conrider milder legislation, which was introduced and
passive resistance ceased in 1911. There was, however, long delay and
in 1913 Lord Hardinge, the governor-general, spoke publicly on the
undoubted grievances of Indians in a manner which was resented,
though unreasonably, in South Africa. The same year an act was
passed which made admission subject to the ability to read and write
in a European language, though it was still possible to declare any
person or class of persons unsuitable on economic grounds or on
account of the standard or habits of life. There were also limits on the
admission of wives or offspring of persons not following a rule of
monogamy. Some discussions in 1912 had been attended by Mr G. K.
Gokhale, a prominent Indian politician, and the Indians believed
that the repeal of the licence tax in Natal had been promised, but this
was not in the act. A fresh resort to passive resistance led to serious
riots and many prosecutions, followed by a commission of enquiry,
which led to some remedial measures.
At the outbreak of the war in 1914 revolutionary activity was still
continuing in Bengal, though slightly checked by the active police
measures taken against it. Muslims, especially in northern India, had
been worked up to oppose thegovernment, and their younger politicians
showed a disposition to identify their aims with those of the congress.
In March, 1913, indeed, the All-India Muslim League had adopted
as its ideal the attainment of self-government of a kind suitable to
India, and had been pressed by some members, though without success,
to adopt the congress formula of a "system of government similar to
that enjoyed by the self-governing members of the British Empire and
a participation by them in the rights and responsibilities of the empire
on equal terms with those members”. ? The first important event,
however, was connected with an agitation differing from these. The
ghadr movement in America3 had been widely advertised among
Indians in that country by a newspaper bearing the same title as the
movement. From the United States it spread among the Sikhs and
other Indians in British Columbia, who had a grievance arising from
the local immigration rules. Some of them visited the Panjab and at
public meetings obtained the passing of resolutions of protest against
the rules. Early in 1914 a Sikh who had been in business in Singapore
and the Malay states chartered a ship and conveyed 373 Indians to
Vancouver. As most of them had not complied with the rules, the
authorities forbade their landing. Revolutionary literature which had
been conveyed on board added to the resentment caused by the
failure of the plan, and the passengers were landed ner Calcutta, in
September, 1914, in an angry and rebellious spirit. The government had
Mr Gokhale's speech. Bankipur Congress Report, 1912, p. 53, gives an excellent account
of the Indian side of the controversy.
· Appendix B, Congress Report of 1908, Madras, 1909.
: Cf. p. 579, supra.


## p. 583 (#623) ############################################

SEDITION IN THE PANJAB
583
enacted an ordinance to regulate the ingress into India of emigrants
of this description, and provided a train to take the passengers to the
Panjab. They refused to enter it, and a riot with loss of life occurred,
a
as many of the rioters were armed with revolvers. Some of those who
had escaped, joining emigrants who returned later, then committed
a series of violent offences, mainly designed to obtain funds for revo-
lutionary purposes. A Bombay Brahman reached the Panjab in
December with offers of Bengali co-operation (including a bomb
expert), and a general rising was planned to take place in February,
1915. This was frustrated. By this time forty-five serious crimes had
been committed in five months. There was evidence that most of the
conspirators were ignorant peasants, who had been corrupted by the
movement in America. The Defence of India Act was passed and rules
made under it for the summary trial of revolutionary offences by a
strong bench of judges, with no preliminary commitment and no
appeal, and for the internment of suspects. Though a few offences
were committed later, firm action soon had its due effect, and the
leading Sikhs, proud of the achievements of their caste fellows at the
front, co-operated with the government to restore confidence. Con-
nected with the main conspiracy in the Panjab was a similar movement
at Benares, which grewout of the revolutionary club described above,
and aimed at co-operation in the general rising planned in the Panjab.
It was detected and some of the chief conspirators were convicted.
Just as the political movements in Bengal and Bombay had produced
undercurrents of violent crime and sedition owing to the manner ir.
which they had been pushed, so did the ill-balanced khilafat agitation.
War against the allies had been declared by Turkey, but even this
had no sobering effect on the wilder spirits in India. Their devotion
to the khilafat of the sultan was strengthened by the revolt of the
Sharif of Mecca, which became known in June, 1915, and they were
not moved by his explanation that he had been impelled to it by the
action of the young Turks. The allies had guaranteed the sanctity of
the sacred places of Islam, but a section of Indian Muslims professed
to believe that these were in danger, and the government found it
necessary to warn their leaders.
A number of young students left their colleges at Lahore in February,
1915, and crossed the border to join a small body of fanatics in tribal
territory who had for nearly a century maintained a spirit of opposi-
tion to the British. Some months later a Sikh convert to Islam, who
had been attempting to promote sedition in a Muslim religious school
in the United Provinces, also visited the fanatics and then proceeded
to Kabul. With the help of a Turco-German mission he hatched an
absurd plot for overthrowing the British government in India and
setting up an alternative government, in which some of the students
were to hold high rank. More serious than this was a conspiracy set
1 Cf. p. 578, supra.


## p. 584 (#624) ############################################

584
POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, 1909-1917
1
1
1
1
1
A
1
C
0
4
on foot by the ghadr party in America, who sent emissaries through
Bangkok into Burma. There they communicated with two Muslims
who had been members of the Red Crescent Society and had been
helping in medical aid in Turkey during the Balkan War. An
Indian regiment was then corrupted and ready to mutiny, attempts
were made to seduce the large force of military police in Burma, and
other outrages were planned.
German influence had been at work even before war was declared.
As far back as 1911 or earlier, the Indian revolutionaries in America
had been in touch with German agents and had been propagating
the doctrine that Germany would attack England. After war broke
out Indians were employed in propaganda, in attempting to seduce
from their allegiance Indian prisoners of war, and in plotting an
attack on Burma from Siam. They soon made contact with the
Bengali revolutionaries, and schemes were formed to land arms in
the Bay of Bengal, or to smuggle arms from the far East.
The rebellion in Ireland at Easter, 1916, once more directed the
attention of Indian politicians to that country and an agitation for
Home Rule was vigorously pushed by Mrs Besant, the president of
the Theosophical Society, and by Mr Tilak. Her publications caused
the governmen of Madras to require security under the Press Act
for her press, and later this was forfeited. In September she formally
launched a Home Rule League, and the excitement which was caused
by her agitatior led to the issue of orders under the Defence of India
Act, forbidding her to er:ter Bombay and the Central Provinces. Her
movements in Mi dras and political activities were further restricted
in June of the following year.
While the judicious use of the Press Act was effective in stopping
the wide circulation of pernicious literature, and the powers given by
the Defence of India Act enabled the government to check revolu-
tionary crime, its action was subjected to criticism. A press association
for India, which had been constituted in 1915, approached Lord
Chelmsford, the governor-general, in March, 1917, asking for the
repeal of the Press Act. The arguments were that the law had been
enacted as a temporary measure, the necessity for which had passed
away, that the safeguards provided were illusory, and that it was
oppressive and hindered genuine literary enterprise as well as the
proper rights of the press to criticise the acts of the government. 1 Lord
Chelmsford had little difficulty in showing how baseless these claims
were. When the act was introduced, the hope was expressed that
the need for it would not be permanent, but none could predict how
long an interval would elapse before public opinion ceased to tolerate
an intemperate press. A chief justice, who had called attention to the
latitude of discretion allowed to the executive authorities, had also
i Specches by Lord Chelmsford, Simla, 1919, I, 248.
• Idim, p. 266.
1


## p. 585 (#625) ############################################

THE ROWLATT COMMITTEE
585
a
said that “a jurisdiction to pronounce on the wisdom or unwisdom
of executive action has been withheld and rightly withheld”, and
though he had been of opinion that any appeal against forfeiture
must be illusory, another High Court had held that it was qualified
to question the verdict of the local government. The statistics showed
how moderate and efficacious action had been. While 143 newspapers
had been formally warned once, subsequent warnings were needed
less frequently and the security of only three had been forfeited. Of
fifty-five presses warned thirteen had had their first security forfeited
and only one its second. Not a single order of forfeiture had been set
aside by a High Court, though the view taken by the local govern-
ment of specific articles had not always been upheld. During six
years after the act was passed there had been a marked increase in the
number of newspapers, periodicals and presses. Lord Chelmsford
quoted many examples to show that the baser elements were still
extolling political crime in terms which must, in the view of a High
Court judge, encourage excitable young men to commit similar
offences.
At the Lucknow Congress in 1916 a resolution was moved? pro-
testing against the extensive use of the Defence of India Act and the
Regulation of 1818, and asking for further precaution against misuse.
A year later a committee was appointed by the Government of India
A
to report on the revolutionary movement and to advise legislation to
enable the government to deal effectively with it. The committee,
which was presided over by Mr Justice Rowlatt, an English judge, and
included two judges of Indian High Courts, an Indian lawyer, and
a senior executive official, traced the course of criminal conspiracies
in a report? which for the first time brought before the public the
extent to which sedition had been spread.
It showed how in Bombay
the movement had been largely confined to a single caste, while in
Bengal the chief actors had been educated young men of the middle
classes. In most parts of India their efforts to gain recruits had soon
failed, though for a time they had caused death, injury or loss of
property to many Indians, and, if not checked, would have been
dangerous to the state. The committee suggested that the ordinary
law should be strengthened in a few details, and that wider provisions
should be enacted which would cover emergencies, but would not
take effect unless the governor-general in council declared the
existence of a state of affairs justifying such action. Reluctance in the
past to ask the legislative council for unusual powers had allowed
sedition to spread till it became a menace, and it was judged wiser
to prepare for the future. A committee of two High Court judges who
examined in 1918 the records of more than 800 persons detained at
that time without trial under various provisions, found that detention
1 Congress Reporl, Allahabad, 1917, p. 109.
Sedition Committee Report, Calcutta, 1918.


## p. 586 (#626) ############################################

586
POLITICAL MOVEMENTS, 1909–1917
was still justified and were able to recommend the release of only six
persons. A proposal to shelve the report, moved in the imperial
legislative council in September by a non-official member, was
supported by only two members.
In January, 1919, two bills were introduced to carry out the pro-
posals of the Rowlatt committee. These suggestions had been con-
demned by the congress of 1918 at Delhi. The legislation was
strongly opposed by non-official members of the council who pressed
that it should be postponed for consideration by the councils to be
elected under the reforms which are described in the next chapter.
A virulent campaign of misrepresentation was set on foot, and the
wildest rumours were circulated as to the effects of the new laws.
The acts were passed, but release from the strain of war and the
excitement of a new constitution had an unbalancing effect which
led to lamentable riots in Delhi, Ahmadabad, Lahore and Amritsar.
Indian politicians were beginning to forget the history of their own
country, a long tale of autocracy, interrupted only by periods of
anarchy, and in their eagerness to grasp at the share in administration
offered under a milder personal rule, they failed to show the restraints
that characterise successful democracy.
i Congress Report, Delhi, 1919, p. 100.
a


## p. 587 (#627) ############################################

CHAPTER XXXIII
a
THE REFORMS OF 1919
In his presidential address to the congress at Bombay in 1915,
Sir S. P. (afterwards Lord) Sinha brought to a focus the vague
aspirations of Indian politicians which had been quickened by the
disturbances of a year's warfare. Few of the members of the congress
belonged to the castes which supplied recruits or officers to the army,
but all of them admired the deeds of Indian soldiers and pressed for
wider opportunities of enlisting and training. A few years earlier,
a French writer had noted that the attitude of the British govern-
ment towards nationalist desires in India was not clearly defined.
Sir S. P. Sinha urged with eloquence, and at the same time with
moderation, that the goal should be stated, and a reasoned ideal of
the future of India set before its youth who had been educated or, as
Lord Morley put it, “intoxicated with ideas of freedom, nationality
and self-government”. Like Lord Morley he believed that a national
and inspiring ideal would arrest corrupting influences. At the same
time he warned his hearers that the advance towards complete self-
government must be along a path which was long and devious. This
need for caution and patience was repeated by the president of the
All-India Muslim League which in 1915 for the first time met in the
same town as the congress, and exchanged visits. Lord Hardinge,
who had gained the respect of Indian politicians by his bold advocacy
of the claims of Indians to better treatment in the dominions and
colonies, had also advised them to study patience in their aspirations
towards self-government. To some of the congress speakers who had
not yet lost the intoxicating effects of their education these warnings
appeared chilling and unnecessary.
Lord Chelmsford succeeded Lord Hardinge as viceroy a few
months later and appears to have been impressed, as Lord Minto had
been, by reasonable demands made temperately. At the first executive
council he held he propounded two questions: “what is the goal of
British rule in India? ” and “what are the steps on the road to that
goal? ”3 Sir S. P. Sinha, quoting well-known aphorisms of American
and British statesmen, had asked that Indians might look forward to
self-government, and Lord Chelmsford and his advisers speedily came
to the conclusion “that the endowment of British India as an integral
part of the British Empire with self-government was the goal of
British rule". The second question was more difficult of solution.
1 Chailley, Administrative Problems of British India, p. 165.
• Sir Verney Lovett, The Indian Nationalist Movement, p. 103.
• Speeches by Lord Chelmsford, Simla, 1919, 1, 389.


## p. 588 (#628) ############################################

588
THE REFORMS OF 1919
Foremost among the radical changes suggested by the congress was
the grant of provincial autonomy. On the recommendations of the
Decentralisation Commission there had been some relaxation of
control by the secretary of state and by the Government of India. In
their dispatch of 25 August, 1911, recommending the repartition of
Bengal, the Government of India had referred to the first demand of
Indians for a larger share in government and suggested that the
solution would appear to be
gradually to give the provinces a larger measure of self-government, until at last
India would consist of a number of administrations, autonomous in all provincial
affairs, with the Government of India above them all, and possessing power to
interfere in cases of misgovernment, but ordinarily restricting their functions to
matters of Imperial concern.
This momentous suggestion, put forward as an argument to justify
the removal of the Government of India from Calcutta where it was
closely associated with the government of Bengal, was completely
ignored in the reply of the secretary of state. The omission, due no
doubt to the urgency and secrecy with which it was necessary to
dispose of the other large issues, was unfortunate and had to be
remedied later, when Lord Crewe in the House of Lords pointed out
that no decision had been arrived at. 1
Apart from a wish for the abolition or reform of the secretary of
state's council, and reconstruction of relations between the secretary of
state and the Government of India, the other desires expressed by the
congress followed on the lines laid down ten years earlier-expansion,
reform, and reconstruction of legislative and executive councils, and
a liberal measure of local self-government. Lord Ronaldshay (now
Marquis of Zetland) in his Life of Lord Curzon has described the pro-
posals of the Government of India (which have never been published
in full) as follows:
In their representations to the secretary of state the Government of India had
been careful not to commit themselves to any specific form of self-government.
The special circumstances of India, they pointed out, differed so widely from those
of any other part of the empire that they could scarcely expect an Indian con-
stitution to model itself on those of the British dominions. All that they contem-
plated was a larger measure of control by her own people which would ultimately
result in a form of self-government and differing possibly in many ways from that
enjoyed ɔy other parts of the empire, but evolved on lines which had taken into
account India's past history and the special circumstances and traditions of her
component peoples. Their proposals for assisting her towards this goal were,
briefly, to confer greater powers and a more representative character upon
existing local self-governing units such as district (rural) boards and municipal
councils; to increase the proportion of Indians in the higher administrative posts,
and to pave the way for an enlargement of the constitutional powers of the
provincial legislatures by broadening the electorate and increasing the number
of elected members. 3
1 Hansard, 24 and 29 June, 1912.
2 Vol. 11, p. 165.
3 This summary agrees closely with a formula drawn up by Sir Reginald Craddock,
then Home Member of the Government of India, in 1916, printed at p. 262, Cd. 123 of
1919.


## p. 589 (#629) ############################################

DECLARATION OF 1917
589
a
а
Sir Austen Chamberlain, who was then secretary of state, was
sceptical of the value of these proposals. He was not prepared to be
more precise in the matter of a formula “than to avow an intention
to foster the gradual development of free institutions with a view to ,
self-government”. In regard to details he criticised the increase in
the number of elected members of a legislative council without giving
them any real control. While discussion of the method of advance was
remitted to committees in India and in England for examination, the
question of a formula was pursued. Mr E. S. Montagu, who had
succeeded Sir Austen Chamberlain, produced a draft resembling his
predecessor's views, and this was redrafted by Lord Curzon in its
final form as follows:
The policy of His Majesty's government, with which the Government of India
are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every
branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing
institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government
in India as an integral part of the British Empire.
The formula continues with a statement that progress can be achieved
only by successive stages, controlled by the British government and
the Government of India, which must be guided by the co-operation
received, and the extent to which it is found that confidence can be
reposed. Immediately after the announcement of this policy in
parliament, a controversy arose as to the interpretation of the phrase
responsible government". Lord Curzon and other statesmen had
always accepted Lord Morley's assertion that the scheme of 1909 was
not intended to lead to a parliamentary form of government in India,
though they feared it would have that effect. A year later, when it was
pointed out to Lord Curzon that his formula led in that direction he
was shocked, but the conclusion was irrésistible. Lord Morley himself,
at a later stage, when the new proposals had been developed, saw no
objection to them on this account, and admitted that his disclaimer
had been due to the difficulty of obtaining the consent of the House
of Lords to his own scheme. 2
While these discussions took place privately at Simla and in
Whitehall, Indian politicians were drafting their own proposals.
A society known as the Madras parliament drafted a “Common-
wealth of India" act which suggested the constitution in provinces
of legislative assemblies. Three members were to be elected in each
district by persons qualified to vote in elections for local bodies; each
chamber of commerce and trades association was to elect two mem-
bers, and landed proprietors paying land-revenue not less than
1 Ronaldshay, Life of Lord Curzon, ii, 167.
See letters to The Ťimes, 3 November, 1928 (Sir R. Burn), 9 November (Sir Theodore
Morison) and 17 November (Sir R. Burn).
3 This was connected with Mrs Besant's Home Rule League (c' ap. xxxii, p. 584),
which subsequently split into three, vide questions 1439, 1692 and 2142, evidence before
Joint Select Committce.
3


## p. 590 (#630) ############################################

590
THE REFORMS OF 1919
Rs. 250 were to send six members. Considerable minorities were to
be represented in proportion to their number. The parliament of
India was to consist of 200 members elected half by members of the
provincial assemblies, and half to represent the landed, trading,
commercial, financial and industrial associations, with a member
from each university. Separate representation was to be provided for
important minorities. After a period of ten years a more democratic
system was to be devised. A cabinet of ten members was to include
five appointed by the viceroy and five elected by parliament. Nine-
teen of the elected members of the Indian legislative council made
similar suggestions in October, 1916. 1 In November representatives
of the Muslim League and the congress came to an agreement at
Calcutta, which was confirmed by meetings of both bodies at Luck-
now a month later. This scheme provided a legislative council of 125
in a major province, or fifty to seventy-five in a minor province, four-
fifths of the members to be elected directly by voters on a wide
franchise. The imperial council was to include 150 members with the
same proportion elected, partly by the elected members of the pro-
vincial councils and partly direct. Except in regard to certain
specified heads of income and expenditure which were reserved as
imperial, the provincial councils were to have full control, though
the imperial council could deal with matters in regard to which
uniform legislation for the whole of India was desirable, and a vague
general power of supervision and superintendence was reserved for
the Government of India. At the head of each province there was to
be appointed a governor who should not ordinarily be a member of
a permanent service. Half of his executive council were to be Indians
elected by the elected members of the provincial council. All legisla-
tive councils were to elect their own president. There was to be more
freedom in the putting of supplementary questions, and motions for
adjournment were to be permitted. Resolutions passed were to bind
the government unless vetoed by the governor in council, and if passed
again after an interval of not less than a year were to be absolutely
binding. The most striking feature of the scheme was, however, an
agreement that Muslims should be represented through special
electorates in certain specified proportions, which substantially ex-
ceeded their share of the population in provinces where they were in
a minority. This was subject to a proviso that they should not, às
they did in the Morley-Minto scheme, also have an opportunity
of obtaining seats in electorates other than their own. Another
qualification was that opposition by three-quarters of the members
of either community (Muslim or non-Muslim) to a bill, a clause of
a bill, or a resolution affecting that community would block it com-
pletely.
A further contribution to the attempts to solve the problem was due
Speeches and documents on Indian Policy, 11, 116.


## p. 591 (#631) ############################################

ROUND TABLE SCHEME
591
a
to the “Round Table" group of students of politics, some of whom
had previously played a part in bringing about the union of South
Africa in 1909. When war broke out in 1914 they had been examining
the question “how a British citizen in the dominions can acquire the
same control of foreign policy as one domiciled in the British Isles”.
In 1915 they began to examine the case of India, and felt that Indians
could not be invested with responsibility for imperial policy until
they had some responsible share in their own government; and early
in 1916 the late Sir William Duke, who had been a member of council
a
in Bengal, and was then on the Council of India, drew up a note as
a basis of discussion. In that he suggested that certain departments
and functions might be administered by some form of responsible as
distinct from merely administrative government. Mr L. Curtis, a
member of the group, arrived in India in the autumn of 1916, and
for a year was engaged actively by correspondence and conference in
examining and testing this suggestion. Though his intention of forming
groups representing all shades of opinion to study the problem was
frustrated by the malicious distortion of a phrase in a private letter
which had been abstracted and published, his studies attracted much
notice. A recent writer has criticised the use of the term "responsible'
in the declaration of August, 1917, as vague and capable of various
interpretations. Mr Curtis pointed out that an alternative expression
‘self-government” was used in India in at least four senses, and early
in 1917 in a published letter to the people of India he expressed his
belief in a policy of the gradual conferment of responsible government,
which he defined as meaning that the final authority in Indian affairs
will have been transferred to an Indian parliament. His proposal for
the immediate future was to begin by constituting elective assemblies
with an executive consisting of members able to command a majority
in the assembly. As existing provinces had taken shape merely
through administrative convenience and contained very large popu-
lations often speaking different languages, and even subject to different
laws, he suggested that smaller, more homogeneous areas should be
carved out, in each of which a responsible government would be
formed. Only certain functions of government, for example, public
works, primary education, local self-government, etc. , would be
entrusted to these bodies, and the rest would remain under the control
of the old provincial governments, to be transferred gradually and
not necessarily at the same rate in all areas. The general outlines of
this scheme were commended in an address from a number of in-
fluential Europeans and Indians to the viceroy and secretary of state,
towards the close of 1917. It was, however, not approved by the
congress, which then met at Calcutta and reaffirmed its desire for
the plan it had passed a year before, with complete provincial
autonomy and half the executive councillors of the viceroy elected.
1 Sir R. Craddock, The Dilemma in India, p. 169.


## p. 592 (#632) ############################################

592
THE REFORMS OF 1919
The resolution urged strongly that while this first instalment should
be granted at once, the statute to be passed should also lay down an
early time-limit within which full responsible government should be
granted, without even the slender precautions included in the
congress plan.
Instead of appointing a royal commission to take evidence and
draft proposals for carrying out the reform briefly announced in
August, 1917, the government deputed Mr E. S. Montagu, secretary
of state, with a small committee (the Earl of Donoughmore, Sir
William Duke, Mr Bhupendranath Basu and Mr Charles Roberts,
M. P. ), to consult the Indian Government and politicians. Such a
method has the obvious defect that it prevents the public discussion
of matters which are complicated and benefit by ventilation, and
criticism, among men of widely different temperaments. On the
other hand it produces a scheme more quickly, and, the ground
having been prepared, a report was signed by Lord Chelmsford and
Mr Montagu within six months from the date on which the latter
arrived in India. It contains an admirable account of political con-
ditions in India, coloured in parts by optimistic hopes of the effects
of democratic experiments on a collection of people divided by race,
sect and religion, who from time immemorial had known no method
of rule but autocracy before the cautious association of Indian with
British legislators which has been described. The report analysed the
meaning of responsible institutions as Mr Curtis had done, and sug-
gested that the first step to be taken was to introduce partial responsi-
bility in the provincial governments. The Government of India was
to remain, as it had been hitherto, responsible through the secretary
of state to the British parliament, though measures were suggested to
give greater opportunities for independent criticism of its actions and
projects. In many respects the congress scheme was held to be
unsuitable. Full provincial autonomy was premature. Election of
members of the executive council by the legislative council was
without any reputable precedent, and their responsibility to the
electors in constituencies could be secured in other ways. The proposal
to give to the councils complete control over provincial finance and
legislation was impossible until the executive was entirely responsible
to them. To make a government amenable to resolutions amounted
to controlling the executive by direct orders on points of detail, and
would lead to confusion.
If responsibility in provincial governments were to be clear from
the beginning, two methods were possible, excluding the congress
scheme, which demanded a complete grant. Mr Curtis's scheme set
up legislatures with executives responsible to them which were to deal
with specified functions in the areas under their control, other func-
tions being performed by the old provincial governments. The report
objected to this as likely to lead to excessive friction and to prejudice.


## p. 593 (#633) ############################################

MONTAGU-CHELMSFORD REPORT
593
It therefore suggested that the head of each province, who was to be
a governor in all cases, should have an executive council consisting
of two members, one of whom should invariably be an Indian. The
governor in council would deal with certain reserved functions of the
government. Other subjects would be transferred to the governor
acting with one or more ministers chosen from the elected members
of the legislative council. It was not intended that in relation to his
ministers the governor should at once occupy the position of a purely
constitutional governor, bound to accept their decision, but he was
expected to refuse assent to their proposals only when the conse-
quences of acquiescence would be serious. A hope was expressed that
the executive would cultivate the habit of associated deliberation, and
would present a united front. Such discussion might in fact be com-
pulsory as a decision on either a reserved or a transferred subject
could affect the part of the government which was not concerned with
the decision. A list attached to the report suggested subjects which
might be transferred, the most important being taxation for provincial
purposes, local self-government, education (except university), medical
and sanitary, agriculture, public works (except major irrigation
works), and excise.
In addition to this vital change in executive government, the report
suggested large increases in the non-official membership of the legis-
lative councils, with direct elections wherever possible. Separate
(communal) representation was condemned as inconsistent with
democratic government, though it was to be tolerated in the special
case of Muslims. Lord Morley's disclaimer of an intention to pave
the way for a parliamentary system in India was haltingly explained
as due to his insistence on the sovereignty of the British parliament
and his acceptance of Lord Minto's advice that only limited con-
stituencies and indirect franchises were possible, and it was admitted
that the reforms of 1909 moved towards the stage at which a question
of responsible government was bound to present itself. More freedom
to local bodies was recommended, and parliament was warned that
the grant of greater freedom to governments in India would involve
a relaxation of its own control.
Published in England and India in July, 1918, this report drew
much criticism. The moderate politicians and the big land-holders
were the only sections to approve of the dual principle in provincial
governments. The former also asked that the same system should be
introduced in the Government of India, and the latter claimed special
representation for themselves, and that further progress should be
directed to changing the status of leading land-holders to that of ruling
chiefs. Extreme politicians held by the congress scheme, and desired
full responsibility in the provinces, with the governor a purely con-
stitutional official in relation to his ministers. Official opinion which
was strongly opposed to the system of dyarchy (a terın revived to
OHI VI
38


## p. 594 (#634) ############################################

594
THE REFORMS OF 1919
apply to the dual form of provincial government) has often been
misrepresented as a reluctance to give up place and power. It was
due to the natural pride of a body of men in charge of a complicated
machine of government to the perfecting of which they had devoted
the best part of their lives, and which they honestly believed to be
endangered if its working were abruptly transferred to inexperienced
hands. Even in the transition stage they believed that the proposals
would establish an oligarchy which would not in the most favourable
conditions work smoothly with the official side. The heads of pro-
vinces, some of whom had severely criticised dyarchy, were summoned
to Delhi to formulate an alternative scheme, and five of them in
January, 1919, signed a minute formulating it. On the vital question
of dyarchy the opinion was expressed that the report had improperly
emphasised the doctrine of responsibility, and that it was more correct
to put an increased association of Indians in the foreground, as could
be inferred from the wording of the announcement of August, 1917,
The alternative suggested was an executive council with an equal
number of officials and non-officials, the latter to be selected from
elected (in the Panjab also from nominated) members. There was to
be no division of functions, and government would thus be unitary,
it being left to the governor to distribute portfolios among the members
of his executive council. Such a scheme, as was admitted in the
minute, fixed no responsibility on individual members. It provided
for later expansion only by increasing the number of functions en-
trusted to non-official members, by increasing the number of the
latter class, and by gradual disuse of the arbitrary powers of over-
ruling his council entrusted to the governor in both schemes during
a transition period. The crux of the problem was thus the meaning
of the announcement. Two heads of provinces (Lord Ronaldshay and
Sir E. A. Gait) felt that to reject the wider interpretation in the report
would be treated as a breach of faith and therefore accepted it as the
most reasonable scheme which had been suggested. Both the Govern-
ment of Indial and the home government, which had issued the
declaration, held strongly that it was essential to begin the fixing of
responsibility, and preferred the dual scheme of the report to the
alternatives suggested.
Vague statements in ancient texts have sometimes been relied on
to show that Indians were not unused to personal representation by
election. Among the lower castes of Hindus social and religious
questions affecting a particular caste, or more often a section of it, are
frequently decided by a small popular assembly of the caste or section.
Headmen of villages, or parts of villages, who in North India
collected the land-revenue and arranged for the necessary expenses,
were also chosen by the people themselves. But the matters thus
arranged were circumscribed and of a personal rather than a civic
1 Cd. 203 of 1919, p. 1.


## p. 595 (#635) ############################################

JOINT SELECT COMMITTEE
595
nature. The caste council is judicial, and the headman the managing
director of a company. In the various systems of government which
the British found working in the eighteenth century, there was no
element of popular government in the occidental sense. Local self-
government had since made a beginning, and the direct election in
a few constituencies under the Morley-Minto scheme, especially those
of Muslims, had given a little experience. In accordance with a sug-
gestion in the report a special committee, presided over by Lord
Southborough, toured in India to enquire into the framing of con-
stituencies and the settlement of franchises. Proposals were placed
before this committee by the local governments, based on the
material conditions of the population and on the facilities for polling
which varied widely. In rural tracts the object was to get the sub-
stantial well-to-do peasant as a voter, and the franchise varied from
province to province or even within a province. For certain classes,
and in particular the lowest castes, it was found impossible to arrange
by election, and one limitation on the franchise was the need for
framing it so that votes could be polled by the staff available.
A bil embodying the scheme of the report was introduced and
examined by a joint select committee of both houses of parliament
from July to October, 1919, presided over by Lord Selborne. It
examined 1 about seventy witnesses representing various shades of
opinion and thus to some extent remedied the previous defect in
publicity. In a report of great value the committee pressed strongly
the argument that a generous opportunity must be given to the people
of India of learning
the actual business of government and of showing,
by their conduct of it, to some future parliament, that the time had
come for further extension of power. The act was quickly passed and
became law on 23 December, 1919. 8 It changed the status of the
heads of the United Provinces, the Panjab, Bihar and Orissa, the
Central Provinces and Assam from that of lieutenant-governor to
governor, and provided an executive council for each. Though no
change was made in the maximum number of members admissible
(four) it was understood that ordinarily there would be only two, and
it was provided that only one instead of two must have been for at
least twelve years in the service of the crown in India, so that the other
could be an Indian. Responsibility was partially introduced in the
provinces, as suggested in the report, by giving the governor power
to appoint from among the elected members of his legislative council
one or more ministers, to hold office during his pleasure. Rules could
be made dividing the functions of government for two purposes. One
was the distinction of subjects into “central”, which were controlled
· Cd. 97 (1919) and Cd. 203 (1919).