leaders were aware that an invasion would not be easy or cheap; indeed, Wilson's
diplomatic
efforts were clearly inspired by his de-
92 InMarch1914,Wilsontoldareporterthat"acountryofthesizeandpoweroftheUnited States can afford to wait just as long as it pleases.
92 InMarch1914,Wilsontoldareporterthat"acountryofthesizeandpoweroftheUnited States can afford to wait just as long as it pleases.
Revolution and War_nodrm
, British) sup- port was keeping Huerta in power, and he denounced interference by "for- eign capitalists" in a major speech in October 1913.
78 U.
S.
officials favored the creation of a coalition government because it would maximize U.
S.
leverage, and the decision to extend de facto recognition to Carranza in Oc-
tober 1915 was largely a response to the fear of German influence? 9 The pos- sibility of a German-Mexican rapprochement also influenced the decision to intervene in 1916, and Carranza's occasional efforts to use Germany as a counterweight to the United States remained a major concern for U. S. pol- icy makers until the end of World War I.
These fears were not entirely misplaced, as Germany also tried to exploit the turmoil in Mexico to further its own interests. The Germans' policy in Mexico initiallly aimed at protecting their investments and preserving good relations with the United States; to this end, they tried unsuccessfully to me- diate between Huerta and the United States and proposed joint intervention to restore order in 1913. After Huerta's ouster and the outbreak of World War I, however, Germany began to see the revolution primarily as a means of hindering U. S. support for Britain and France. 80 Germany deflected Car- ranza's initial inquiries about an alliance (to avoid provoking the United States), but when the onset of unrestricted submarine warfare made conflict with the United States virtually inevitable, Germany tried to entice Car-
76 "In the years 1917-18 the British were attempting to fight a three-front war in Mexico against Germany, the United States, and the Mexican nationalists. " Katz, Secret War, 464.
n See Katz, Secret War, 191-93, 222-23, 493-96.
78 The U. S. ambassador in London also warned a group of British businessmen that the United States "will warmly welcome your investments in all parts of ? he Americas on the condition that these investments do not give you control of the country in question. " Quoted in Katz, Secret War, 180; and see also Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution, B-;-9 Haley, Revolu- tion and Intervention, 108-no; and Link, New Freedom, 320.
79 As Lansing put it, "Germany does not wish to have one faction dominant in Mexico, therefore, we must recognize one. . . . Our possible relations with Germany must be our first con- sideration, and all our intercourse with Mexico must be regulated accordingly. " See Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 134 n. 59; and Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution, 3o-31?
80 German state secretary Gottlieb von Jagow remarked i n May, "It would be very desirable that America be drawn into a war and be distracted from Europe, where it tends to be pro- English. " Quoted in Katz, "Pancho Villa and the Attack on Columbus," 126.
? ? Revolution and War
ranza into attacking the United States by offering to help Mexico regain Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. 81 Like Britain and the United States, in short, German policy illustrates how intervention in a revolution can be mo- tivated by the desire to improve a state's position vis-a-vis other powers.
The Mexican case also illustrates revolutionary states' tendency to spiral with foreign powers, as was most apparent in Mexico's relations with the United States. Although leaders in both countries sought to avoid a serious conflict, a combination of legitimate differences and unfortunate misunder- standings nearly drove the two states to war in 1916 and continued to afflict U. S. -Mexican relations for many years thereafter. Tensions between the two were due partly to incompatible objectives (Wilson wanted to foster a liberal capitalist order in Mexico that would protect foreign property rights, while Carranza and his followers sought to defend Mexican autonomy and con- solidate their hold on power) and partly to more immediate conflicts of in- terest (such as the safety of U. S. citizens, the security of the border region, and Mexican efforts to tax U. S. properties). These concrete disputes were ex- acerbated by each side's propensity to exaggerate the other's hostility and to ignore how threatening its own conduct might appear. Because U. S. offi- cials disavowed any aggressive aims and genuinely believed that their ac- tions were in Mexico's best interest, they took Carranza's refusals to accept U. S. guidance as a sign of deep-seated hostility. 82 U. S. officials were upset when Carranza rejected an offer of U. S. support in 1913 and condemned the intervention at Vera Cruz in 1914, and his unwillingness to compromise led Wilson to conclude that "nothing can be done with or through the First Chief. "83 By 1917, Wilson was referring to Carranza as a "pedantic ass" and complaining that "all that [he] has said and done shows his intense resent-
? ? 81 This gambit backfired when Carranza declined the offer and British intelligence inter- cepted and released a secret German message describing their efforts. See Katz, Secret War, chaps. 9-10; and Barbara Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram (New York: Macmillan, 1? 6).
82 In 1913, Wilson declared, "We are actuated by no other motives than the betterment of the conditions ofour unfortunate neighbor, and by the sincere desire to advance the cause of human liberty. " Quoted in Link, New Freedom, 394, and see also 386-87. Two years later, Wil- son admitted, "What makes Mexico suspicious of us is that she does not believe as yet th1t we want to serve her. She believes that we want to possess her, and she has justification for the belief in the way in which some of our fellow citizens have tried to exploit her. . . . [But] I will try to serve all America, . . . by trying to serve Mexico herself. " Quoted in Haley, Revolu- tion and Intervention, 224. The U. S. belief that its actions were benevolent is also revealed in House's comment to Wilson: "Heaven knows, you have done all a man could to help the peo- ple there, and the fact that they are not able to follow your kindly lead, is no fault of yours. " Quoted in Lloyd C. Gardner, Safefor Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 66.
83 Quoted in Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 180. The image of Mexican intransigence was reinforced by Carranza's decision to close the port of Progeso (cutting off the U. S. sup- ply of sisal), his opposition to the Punitive Expedition, his refusal to discuss internal matters in the Joint Commission, his occasional attempts to use Germany as a counterweight to U. S. and British pressure, and his stubborn defense of the Constitution of 1917.
? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
ment of this Administration. "84 For their part, the Mexican revolutionaries saw U. S. interference as a direct threat to the goal of establishing Mexican sovereignty and independence, and they failed to appreciate either Wilson's altruistic motives or his reluctance to use force.
These suspicions were compounded by another familiar feature of revo- lutionary situations: namely, the difficulty of obtaining reliable information or forecasting the future course of the revolution itself. Wilson tried to alle- viate this prolblem by dispatching a series of special agents to gather infor- mation, but most of them proved to be woefully unreliable. 85 In 1913, for example, Wilson's hostility to Huerta was reinforced when special agent John Lind reported, erroneously, that British oil interests were controlling British policy and that foreign support was keeping Huerta in power, and the subsequent decision to seize Vera Cruz was based on Lind's similarly misguided assertion that the Mexicans would not oppose a U. S. landing. 86 Other U. S. attempts to predict the course of the revolution were equally un- reliable; Secretary of State Bryan stated in September 1913, "We have nearly reached the end of our trouble," and he offered an equally optimistic (and inaccurate) forecast after Huerta's departure the following year. 87 U. S. lead- ers misread the course of the civil war as well, at first expecting Villa to win quickly and discounting Carranza's chances until the latter's triumph was nearly complete. 88 Once again, this error was partially based on inaccurate
84 Quoted in Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolu tion, 64. Frustration at Mexican unwillingness to accept U. S. help was a recurring theme among U. S. officials. House remarked, "If the Mex- icans understood that our motives were unselfish, she should not object to our helping adjust her unruly household," and the chief U. S. representative on the Joint Commission wrote Wil- son that the Mexicans "certainly are discouraging people to try to help. " Quoted in Knight, Mexican Revolution, 2:153; and Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaignsfor Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 53-54.
85 According to one author, "Wilson's judgment in selecting diplomatic agents was, for the most part, notoriously poor. " Frederick Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1986), 35?
86 Lind predicted that U. S. intervention could "be accomplished without the military loss of an American," but the landing left 19 U. S. soldiers dead and 71 wounded, while the Mexicans suffered 126 killed and 195 wounded. Quoted in Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 130; also see Link, New Freedom, 400. Larry Hill argues that Lind's analysis "had little basis in fact," and Alan Knight describes Lind's reporting as "garbled, ill-informed, and naive, displaying a crude racism and a paranoid suspicion of Britain. " See Larry D. Hill, Emissaries to a Revolution: Woodrow Wilson's Special Agents in Mexico (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), 99-102; Knight, Mexican Revolution, 2:139, 15o-53; and Calvert, Mexican Revolution, 2JJ-34?
87 In December 1914, Bryan wrote Wilson, "The situation seems to be clearing up in Mex- ico. Villa and Zapata are working in harmony and interim president Gutierrez seems to be about to assume authority over most of the country. " Wilson's assessment was more mea- sured, but even he believed "we have certainly cleared the stage and made a beginning. " Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 232, 260, and New Freedom, 363.
88 Villa's efforts to cultivate U. S. support convinced Wilson that he "certainly seems capa- ble of good things. " In August 1914, House described Villas as "the only man of force now in
? [2951
? ? Revolution and War
testimony from U. S. agents in Mexico, who painted a rosy portrait of Villa and an unflattering one of the first chief. 89 U. S. ignorance is also evident in Wilson's repeated attempts to arrange a compromise peace, which rested on the naive hope that Carranza would be willing to share power (or to with- draw entireliy) even though his armies held the upper hand. Uncertainty also exacerbated tensions during the Punitive Expedition, especially after the skirmishes at Parral and Carrizal. In the latter case, however, the rapid acquisition of more accurate information reduced pressure for U. S. retalia- tion and helped both sides back away from the brink. 90
Similar problems contributed to a spiral between Great Britain and Mex- ico in 1917-18. Britain was worried about Carranza's efforts to use Germany as a counterweight to the Allies, especially after intercepting German diplo- matic communications that conveyed an exaggerated impression of Ger- man influence. These reports helped convince Great Britain to attempt to overthrow the Carranza government; by contrast, because the United States had better sources of information by this point (and was not relying on in- tercepted German messages}, it held a far more sanguine view of German influence and merely wanted to keep Mexico calm. 91
Again we arrive at the final issue: Why did the Mexican Revolution not lead to war? There are at least four interrelated reasons.
First, the revolution in Mexico was only modestly threatening, owing to the enormous asymmetry of power between the United States and Mexico. Even if the revolution created greater uncertainty about the precise balance of power, leaders on both sides knew that Mexico was not a major military threat to the United States. Because Mexico was so much weaker, the Mexi-
sight in Mexico," noting further that Carranza was "not equal to the situation. " Quoted in Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 23? 41. According to Edward Haley, "lacking reliable informa- tion about the military capacities of the Constitutionalists, (Wilson] discounted (their) victo- ries (over Villa). Rather than reports of Constitutionalist progress, the President received countless despatches describing widespread starvation and suffering in Mexico. " Revolution and Intervention, 158-00.
89 In November 1914, a State Department official reported, "General Villa is the only indi- vidual who can put the country on a peaceful footing," and predicted that "one good fight will settle the question and Carranza will find himself with scant forces and will have to flee the country. " Another special agent, Duval West, confirmed this assessment after visiting Villa, Zapata, andl Carranza in the spring of 1915, and his negative report on Carranza con- vinced Wilson that the first chief was not the man to bring order to Mexico. See Link, Strug- glefor Neutrality, 25B-59, 459"-61, 46? 71; and Haley, Revolution and Interoention, 15? 1.
90 When news of the clash at Carrizal reached Washington, Wilson's first belief was that "thebreaksemestohavecomeinMexico;andallmypatienceseemstohavegonefornoth- ing. " He prepared a message to Congress requesting authorization to occupy northern Mex- ico, but public opinion was strongly opposed to war, and a report that U. S. troops had started the fighting convinced Wilson to make another attempt to avoid escalation. See Haley, Revo- lution and Interoention, 21o-23; Katz, Secret War, 31o-11.
? ? 91 See Katz, Secret War, 485--95.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
cans knew all-out war would be foolhardy and U. S. leaders knew they could afford to act with forebearance. Thus, Wilson justified his policy of "watchful waiting" in 1913 by saying, "We can afford to exercise the self-re- straint of a really great nation, which realizes its own strength and scorns to misuse it," and. he offered a similar appraisal the following year. 92
Second, the "ideology" of the Mexican revolutionary movements did not menace other states in the same way as French republicanism, Soviet Marx- ism, or Khomeini's version of Islamic fundamentalism. Instead, U. S. leaders were sympathetic to the basic ideals of the revolution (despite their reserva- tions about specific issues), and Wilson's various interventions were in- tended to guide the revolution but not to reverse it. 93 And in contrast to the other revolutions we have examined, in Mexico the revolutionaries did not develop a universalist ideology and did not see themselves as a model for other societies. 94 The danger of contagion was further reduced because the central goals of the revolution-the establishment of a liberal constitutional order and far-reaching agrarian reform-were simply not relevant north of the border. Apart from the minor threat posed by banditry and border raid- ing, therefore, there was no danger that the revolution would spread and thus little incentive for preventive war.
Apartial exception to this argument was the U. S. concern that Mexican ef- forts to assert control over foreign investments might establish a dangerous precedent for other developing countries. Especially after World War I, some U. S. officials seem to have believed that the Mexican government was fomenting unrest in the United States and was in cahoots with the Bolshe- viks and the International Workers of the World movement. Yet this danger was never great enough to justify intervention, because Carranza's revolu- tionary nationalism was not directed against private property per se and did not pose a serious threat to U. S. business interests. Indeed, some U. S. businessmen recognized that intervention might harm rather than protect U. S. assets in Mexico. 95
Third, U. S.
leaders were aware that an invasion would not be easy or cheap; indeed, Wilson's diplomatic efforts were clearly inspired by his de-
92 InMarch1914,Wilsontoldareporterthat"acountryofthesizeandpoweroftheUnited States can afford to wait just as long as it pleases. Nobody doubts its power, and nobody doubts that Mr. Huerta is eventually to retire. " Quoted in Haley, Revolu tion and Intervention, 100, 130.
93 On the broad ndeological compatibility of the United States and Mexico, see Alan Knight, U. S. -Mexican Relations, 1910-1940 (San Diego: Center for U. S. -Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1987), 5-10.
94 On this point see Knight, Mexican Revolution, 2:297; and also Eric Woif, Peasant Wars ofthe Twentieth Century {New York: Harper, 1969), 25-26. The ideological background to the revo- lution is summarized in James D. Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1913 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968).
95 See Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, 158-59, 174-75. [2971
? ? Revolution and War
sire to avoid having to do more. Wilson had agreed to occupy Vera Cruz in 1914 because he believed (incorrectly) that the Mexicans would not resist, but the experience had been chastening. U. S. military leaders estimated tha? an all-out intervention in Mexico would require roughly five hundred thou- sand men, and given the deep divisions that persisted throughout the coun- try, merely sending an expedition to Mexico City would not have restored! order. Instead, a prolonged and costly occupation would have been neces- sary, on a much larger scale than the earlier U. S. occupations of Cuba or Nicaragua. Thus, the awareness that there was no offensive advantage vis-
a-vis Mexnco reinforced Wilson's already strong desire to avoid war.
The most important barrier to a North American war, however, was the outbreak of World War I. Wilson and his advisors recognized that large- scale involvement in Mexico would limit their ability to influence events in Europe, which they regarded as far more important. As Wilson told his pri- vate secretary in 1916: "It begins to look as if war with Germany is in- evitable. If it should come . . . I do not wish America's energies and forces divided for we will need every ounce of reserve we have to lick Germany. "96 This consideration also explains why Germany was eager to promote a U. S. - Mexican conflict; as Lansing put it in 1915, "Germany desires to keep up the turmoil in Mexico until the United States is forced to intervene; therefore, we must not intervene. "97 This concern increased as the U. S. entry into the world! war approached and helped persuade Wilson to withdraw the Punitive Ex-
pedition. House told the new U. S. ambassador, Henry Fletcher, "to do everything possible to avoid a break with Carranza," and Fletcher later re- called that "during the war my job was to keep Mexico quiet, and it was done. "98
Thus, the absence of war was due to the relatively low level of threat cre- ated by the revolution, as well as to the fact that events elsewhere posed an even greater danger. 99 Like the United States during the wars of the French Revolutio! l,l the Mexican revolutionaries were fortunate that a war in Eu- rope encouraged its potential opponents to act with restraint. U. S. -Mexican
% See Joseph Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him (Garden Gty, N. Y. : Garden City Pub- lishing, 1927), 159?
97 Quoted in Link, Wilson and the Progressive Era, 134 n. 59? Lansing later told a friend that concern for Germany "was a decided factor in our Mexican policy, I might say, a controlling factor. " According to Boaz Long, "but for the European war, the Mexican situation would have been one of the foremost foreign issues of our time. " Quoted in Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, 68-69.
98 Quoted in Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, 93; and see Katz, Secret War, 313.
99 Similar conditions facilitated Cardenas's consolidation of the revolution in the 1930s, es- pecially his nationalization of the Mexican oil industry in 1938. The United States would have opposed this step more strongly had the rise of Nazi Germany and the growing tensions in Europe not encouraged efforts to solidify ties with anti-Fascist leaders such as Cardenas.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
relations deteriorated again after the armistice (and unlike in 1916, the United States now possessed a sizeable army), but Wilson's attention was still focused primarily on European affairs and he remained firmly set against intervention for the remainder of his term.
Overall, this case is best seen as a near miss. Although war did not occur, the risk of war was very high on more than one occasion, and for many of the reasons identified by the theory. The Mexican instance also confirms that intervening nn a revolution is a difficult and unpredictable business; despite its more or less benevolent intentions and the absence of intense ideological conflict, U. S. efforts to guide the course of events in Mexico were unsuc- cessful at best and counterproductive at worst.
THE TURKISH REVOLUTION
Beginning in 1919, the Nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal transformed the core of the former Ottoman Empire from the center of multinational. Muslim dynasty into a secular Turkish state. Bernard Lewis describes this development as "one of the major revolutions of modern times," and it eventually enabled the Turks to escape the punitive condi- tions imposed at the end of World War I and to reemerge as an accepted member of the European system. 100
Like the American and Mexican cases, the revolution in Turkey did not re- sult in significant interstate violence. Although some familiar sources of conflict were present, their effects were relatively weak and short-lived. The revolution was accompanied by a major war with Greece, but this conflict was a cause of the revolution rather than an effect. The revolution also led to a protracted confrontation with Great Britain, and nearly to open warfare at one point, but a direct clash was avoided and Turkey soon established itself as a status quo power within the European order.
The comparatively mild repercussions of the Turkish Revolution were due in part to the origins and character of the revolutionary movement and its limited international objectives. This was not a mass revolution-from-below, guided or exploited by a revolutionary vanguard party; rather, it was an elite revolution-from-above conducted by dissident members of the old regime. 101 In constructing their new state, the leaders of the revolution explicitly re- jected a pan-Turanian or pan-Islamic agenda in favor of a program based on modernization and the promotion of Turkish nationalism within Anatolia proper. Thus, unlike most revolutionary states, Turkey did not pose a signif-
100 See his EmergenceofModern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 1.
101 See Ellen Kay Trimberger, Revolutionfrom Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, N. J. : Transaction Books, 1978).
[2991
? ? ? Revolution and War
icant threat to its immediate neighbors once its borders were reestablished after World War I. The Turks also benefited from favorable international con- ditions, which gave the new regime ample room for maneuver and aided its efforts to secure foreign recognition and diplomatic support.
The Revolutionary Process
The Ottoman Empire had been in decline since the seventeenth century, steadily losing territory and influence to its European neighbors. 102 In 19QS, the so-called Young Turk movement forced the sultan to recall Parliament and invited Western advisors to conduct military and economic reforms, but its initiatives failed to halt the empire's decline. Austria-Hungary an- nexed Bosma-Herzegovina in 1908, the Albanians revolted the following year, and the empire lost 83 percent of its European territory and 69 percent of its European population in the Balkan wars of 1912-1913. 103
The decislion to join the Central Powers in November 1914 was the Ot- toman Empire's final, fatal mistake. 104 By 1915, the Entente had agreed to partition the empire in the event of victory, with Russia receiving control of the Turkish Straits and Britain and France dividing the Arab portions of the empire into separate spheres of influence. Italy was promised the Dode- canese Islands, Libya, and portions of Anatolia, and Greece was eventually brought into the war with similar promises. 105
Although the Ottoman forces fought well on some fronts and obtained a large portion of Russian territory at Brest-Litovsk, the German collapse ended any chance of victory and the sultanate negotiated an armistice with the Entente on October 30, 1918. Based on the stated war aims of the Entente and Woodrow Wilson's pledge to preserve Turkish sovereignty, the Turks expected fairly lenient treatment at the hands of the Allies. To their surprise,
102 A map delllneating the Ottoman Empire's territorial losses is in Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History ofthe Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 2:xxiv.
103 The Young Turk movement was accompanied by a protracted debate of the Ottoman ideal of a decentralized, multinational empire, the concept of a new state based on Turkish nationalism, and proposals to reconstitute the empire along pan-Islamic lines. See Roderic Davison, Turkey (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall, 1968), uo-12; Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, 351-52; Shaw and Shaw, Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2:301-305. On the B a l k a n w a r s , se e E . C . H e l m r e i c h , T h e D i p l o m a cy of t h e B a l k a n Wa r s ( C a m b r i d g e : H a rv a r d U n i - versity Press, 1938).
104 The decision to enter the war reflected both the pan-Turkic ambitions of some Turkish leaders (most notably Enver Pasha) and the belief that the war was an ideal opportunity to attack Russia. Shaw and Shaw, Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2:31o-11.
105 For the texts of the various agreements, see J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (1956; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1972), 2:7-25. On the Greek decision to enter the war, see A. A. Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Adventure-and After (London: Methuen, 1937), esp. 18.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
however, the end of the war unleashed the victors' acquisitive ambitions, accompanied by intense disputes over the size and distribution of the spoils. Istanbul was occupied and placed under military administration. French troops moved into Cilicia and eastern Thrace, Greece seized western Thrace, and British forces occupied Mosul, the Dardanelles, Samsun, and several other strategic points. 106 The newly independent Armenian state expanded into eastern Anatolia, and its claims for portions of former Ottoman terri- tory received a favorable hearing at the Paris Peace Conference. Greece and Italy also presented extensive claims for Turkish territory at the conference and began to back up their demands with military force. Italy landed troops on the southern coast of Anatolia in April 1919, and Britain, France, and the
United States helped Greek forces occupy Smyrna (Izmir) in May. 107
The Greek decision to occupy Smyrna was a manifestation of its long- standing desire to reunify the Greek peoples of the former Byzantine Em- pire. The Entente supported this step in order to forestall an Italian occupation of the same area, partly because British prime minister David Lloyd George was sympathetic to the Greeks and saw this move as a way of enhancing British influence in an important strategic area. As the Greek forces moved into the surrounding countryside, however, armed resistance groups began to form among the local population. 108 The sultanate was in- capable or unwilling to resist the Greek assault on Turkish sovereignty, and
the stage was set for a challenge to the sultan's authority.
Allied ocrupation and pressure from the emerging Armenian state had al- ready sparked resistance movements in eastern Anatolia, but it was the Greek occupation of Smyrna that was most responsible for inspiring the Na- tionalist movement in Turkey. 109 As the resistance grew, a group of national- ist officers led by Mustafa Kemal, inspector-general of the Ninth Army in Samsun, began to unite the resistance into a coherent movement. Kemal re- signed his commission and formed a Representative Committee to guide the new organization, and this group issued a proclamation in June declaring
106 See Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2:36-37; Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 1918-1923: Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement (Beverly Hills, Calif: SagePublishing, 1975), 2-3; and M. Phillips Price, AHistoryofTurkeyfrom Empire to Re- public (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956), 96.
107 Greece asked for all of Thrace, the Aegean islands, and a substantial portion of western Asia Minor, while Italy wanted the Dodacanese Islands and similar portions of Anatolia in accordance with the Tripartite Agreement of 1917. See Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1931), 222-2J.
1 08 The population of Smyrna was predominantly Greek, but the surrounding territory was mainly Turkish.
109 See Howard, Partition of Turkey, 257? Harry J. Psomiades argues that although many Turks accepted the Allied occupation as a necessary evil, "it was the Greek occupation which was an affront which no patriotic Turk could endure. " The Eastern Question: The Last Phase: A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy (Thessalonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1968), esp. 31.
[301]
? Revolution and War
that "national independence [was] in danger" because the sultanate was "unable to carry out its responsibilities. "11? Kemal consolidated additional support at a congress of the so-called Society for the Defense of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia in July, and a new National Congress consisting of three delegates from each province then confirmed these resolutions in September.
The Nationalists dominated elections for the Chamber of Deputies in No- vember, and Kemal informed the Entente that the sultan's emissaries at the Paris Peace Conference no longer represented the will of the nation. The new parliament met in Istanbul in January 1920 and proclaimed a new Na- tional Pact that reaffirmed the resolutions of the earlier congresses and de- manded "complete independence and liberty. "111
International Consequences
These developments threatened the Entente's plans for extensive spheres of influence in Anatolia and jeopardized British hopes of controlling the Turkish Straits. In response, British troops occupied the Turkish areas of Is- tanbul in March 1920 in order to arrest and deport the Nationalist deputies. Most of the Nationalists managed to escape, however, and Kemal organized a Grand National Assembly in Ankara outside the reach of the Allied forces. Declaring that the sultan was a prisoner who was unable to exercise his au- thority, the Assembly and Representative Committee proclaimed them- selves the true government of a new Turkish state.
Meanwhile, the Entente had completed its negotiations for the distribu- tion of Ottoman territories and submitted the Treaty of 5evres to the sultan in May. To forestall a Nationalist attack on Istanbul, the Supreme Allied Council approved a Greek proposal for an offensive against the Nationalist forces. The attack was successful and the Greek forces had occupied sub- stantial portions of Anatolia and Thrace by midsummer. When the sultan accepted the peace treaty in August, the triumph of Allied ambitions over Turkish weakness seemed complete. 112 Yet a combination of astute diplo-
110 Quoted in Elaine Diana Smith, Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Govern- mentoftheGrarodNationalAssembly,1919-1923 (Washington,D. C. :JuddandDetweiler,1959), 12-13. Mustafa Kemal was one of the Ottoman Empire's most accomplished commanders. He was connected with the Young Turk movement but had fallen out with its leaders before World War I and did not play a political role during the war.
111 See Roderic Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne," in The Diplomats, 1919-1939, ed. Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 17S--79; and Hlllrewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2:74-'75?
112 The Treaty of 5evres opened the Dardanelles to international shipping, established Kur- dish autonomy, gave Grece e de facto control over Smyrna and the surrounding region, forced Turkey to recognize Armenian independence and made the rest of the former empire either independent or placed under British, French, or Italian control. See Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2:81--89; and Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 242-49.
? ? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
macy and the Nationalists' growing military power gradually restored the Turkish position, overthrew the sultanate, and turned the Treaty of sevres into an irrelevant anachronism. 113
The Nationalists began by seeking an alliance with Soviet Russia. Soviet Russia had extended diplomatic feelers to Kemal in 1919, and though progress was delayed by their competition in Transcaucasia, the two gov- ernments signed a formal friendship treaty in March 1921 and Moscow began providing arms and financial assistance. n4
The Nationalists were equally successful in their efforts to divide the En- tente and isolate the Greeks. Relations among the Allies were already. strained by conflicting imperial interests, contentious discussions at the peace conference, and growing public opposition to costly military commit- ments, and the Nationalists exploited these tensions with considerable skill. The Turks also benefited when a Greek plebiscite removed Prime Minister Elftherios Venizelos and restored the deposed King Constantine, undermin- ing French and Italian support for the Greek cause and forcing the Greeks to rely solely on Great Britain. Allied fears of the growing Soviet-Turkish rap- prochement led them to propose a formal revision of the Sevres agreement. The resulting London conference in February 1921 enhanced the status and prestige of the Nationalists. Kemal refused to send a delegation until the Nationalists received a direct invitation, and the decision to let the Nation- alist representative, Bekir Sami, speak on behalf of the Istanbul and Ankara governments underscored the Nationalists' dominant position still further. Britain still refused to end its support for the Greeks, but France and Italy now broke ranks and agreed to withdraw from Anatolia in exchange for economic concessions. Although Kemal later declared that Sami had ex- ceeded his authority and repudiated the agreements, the London conference had exposed the rifts within the Entente and revealed that the Treaty of Sevres was not cast in stone. 115
Turkey's improved military position aided its attempts at fostering divi- sions within the Entente. The Greek advance had been halted in January 1921, and the Nationalists defeated a second Greek offensive in ApriL When a third offensive was thwarted in July, British support began to waver, and
the Supreme Allied Council now declared that it would remain neutral in the Greco-Turkish conflict. The breakthrough came with an agreement with
113 For an account of Kemal's diplomatic and military strategy, see George W. Gawryeh, "Kemal Atatiirk's Politico-Military Strategy in the Turkish War of Independence, 1918-1922: From Guerrilla Warfare to the Decisive Battle," Journal of Strategic Studies 11, no. 3 (1988).
114 See Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 186-91; and Jane Degras, ed. , Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1951-52), 1:237-42.
115 The background and results of the London conference of 1921 are discussed in Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 188""9o; Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 95-105; Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 26o-61.
? ? Revolution and War
France. The French government regarded the Treaty of 5evres as excessively favorable to Britain, and its forces in Cilicia were facing increasingly effec- tive resistance from the Nationalist forces. Negotiations began in earnest in June 1921, and the final treaty was completed in October, whereby France agreed to withdraw from Cilicia in exchange for temporary control over the disputed district of Alexandretta. The French also agreed to recognize the Turkish National Pact, in effect abandoning the Treaty of 5evres. 116 Italy was next. The Italian government, which viewed the Treaty of Sevres with even less enthusiasm than France, had begun withdrawing its troops from Adalia in June 1921. Aformal rapprochement with the Nationalists was delayed by political shifts in Italy, and subsequent negotiations in the fall of 1921 foundered on Turkey's refusal to grant economic concessions, but it was clear that Italy had given up any hope of making territorial gains at Turkey's expense. 117
These improvements in Turkey's relations with the West threatened its ties with the Soviet Union and forced Kemal to walk a fine line. The Na- tionalists assured Soviet foreign minister Chicherin that the detente with France would not undermine the Soviet-Turkish friendship treaty, and they signed a formal treaty guaranteeing their eastern frontier with Russia, Geor- gia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in October 1921. A visit by a Soviet military mission to Ankara in December arranged for additional military aid and wasfollowed! by afriendshiptreatybetweenTurkeyandtheUkrainianSo- viet Socialist Republic in January 1922. A Soviet ambassador took up resi- dence in Ankara, and the Soviet mission soon became the largest foreign delegation there. 118
The cessation of hostilities with France and Italy and the guarantee of Turkey's eastern border allowed Kemal to tum his attention back to the Greeks.
tober 1915 was largely a response to the fear of German influence? 9 The pos- sibility of a German-Mexican rapprochement also influenced the decision to intervene in 1916, and Carranza's occasional efforts to use Germany as a counterweight to the United States remained a major concern for U. S. pol- icy makers until the end of World War I.
These fears were not entirely misplaced, as Germany also tried to exploit the turmoil in Mexico to further its own interests. The Germans' policy in Mexico initiallly aimed at protecting their investments and preserving good relations with the United States; to this end, they tried unsuccessfully to me- diate between Huerta and the United States and proposed joint intervention to restore order in 1913. After Huerta's ouster and the outbreak of World War I, however, Germany began to see the revolution primarily as a means of hindering U. S. support for Britain and France. 80 Germany deflected Car- ranza's initial inquiries about an alliance (to avoid provoking the United States), but when the onset of unrestricted submarine warfare made conflict with the United States virtually inevitable, Germany tried to entice Car-
76 "In the years 1917-18 the British were attempting to fight a three-front war in Mexico against Germany, the United States, and the Mexican nationalists. " Katz, Secret War, 464.
n See Katz, Secret War, 191-93, 222-23, 493-96.
78 The U. S. ambassador in London also warned a group of British businessmen that the United States "will warmly welcome your investments in all parts of ? he Americas on the condition that these investments do not give you control of the country in question. " Quoted in Katz, Secret War, 180; and see also Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution, B-;-9 Haley, Revolu- tion and Intervention, 108-no; and Link, New Freedom, 320.
79 As Lansing put it, "Germany does not wish to have one faction dominant in Mexico, therefore, we must recognize one. . . . Our possible relations with Germany must be our first con- sideration, and all our intercourse with Mexico must be regulated accordingly. " See Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 134 n. 59; and Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution, 3o-31?
80 German state secretary Gottlieb von Jagow remarked i n May, "It would be very desirable that America be drawn into a war and be distracted from Europe, where it tends to be pro- English. " Quoted in Katz, "Pancho Villa and the Attack on Columbus," 126.
? ? Revolution and War
ranza into attacking the United States by offering to help Mexico regain Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. 81 Like Britain and the United States, in short, German policy illustrates how intervention in a revolution can be mo- tivated by the desire to improve a state's position vis-a-vis other powers.
The Mexican case also illustrates revolutionary states' tendency to spiral with foreign powers, as was most apparent in Mexico's relations with the United States. Although leaders in both countries sought to avoid a serious conflict, a combination of legitimate differences and unfortunate misunder- standings nearly drove the two states to war in 1916 and continued to afflict U. S. -Mexican relations for many years thereafter. Tensions between the two were due partly to incompatible objectives (Wilson wanted to foster a liberal capitalist order in Mexico that would protect foreign property rights, while Carranza and his followers sought to defend Mexican autonomy and con- solidate their hold on power) and partly to more immediate conflicts of in- terest (such as the safety of U. S. citizens, the security of the border region, and Mexican efforts to tax U. S. properties). These concrete disputes were ex- acerbated by each side's propensity to exaggerate the other's hostility and to ignore how threatening its own conduct might appear. Because U. S. offi- cials disavowed any aggressive aims and genuinely believed that their ac- tions were in Mexico's best interest, they took Carranza's refusals to accept U. S. guidance as a sign of deep-seated hostility. 82 U. S. officials were upset when Carranza rejected an offer of U. S. support in 1913 and condemned the intervention at Vera Cruz in 1914, and his unwillingness to compromise led Wilson to conclude that "nothing can be done with or through the First Chief. "83 By 1917, Wilson was referring to Carranza as a "pedantic ass" and complaining that "all that [he] has said and done shows his intense resent-
? ? 81 This gambit backfired when Carranza declined the offer and British intelligence inter- cepted and released a secret German message describing their efforts. See Katz, Secret War, chaps. 9-10; and Barbara Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram (New York: Macmillan, 1? 6).
82 In 1913, Wilson declared, "We are actuated by no other motives than the betterment of the conditions ofour unfortunate neighbor, and by the sincere desire to advance the cause of human liberty. " Quoted in Link, New Freedom, 394, and see also 386-87. Two years later, Wil- son admitted, "What makes Mexico suspicious of us is that she does not believe as yet th1t we want to serve her. She believes that we want to possess her, and she has justification for the belief in the way in which some of our fellow citizens have tried to exploit her. . . . [But] I will try to serve all America, . . . by trying to serve Mexico herself. " Quoted in Haley, Revolu- tion and Intervention, 224. The U. S. belief that its actions were benevolent is also revealed in House's comment to Wilson: "Heaven knows, you have done all a man could to help the peo- ple there, and the fact that they are not able to follow your kindly lead, is no fault of yours. " Quoted in Lloyd C. Gardner, Safefor Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 66.
83 Quoted in Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 180. The image of Mexican intransigence was reinforced by Carranza's decision to close the port of Progeso (cutting off the U. S. sup- ply of sisal), his opposition to the Punitive Expedition, his refusal to discuss internal matters in the Joint Commission, his occasional attempts to use Germany as a counterweight to U. S. and British pressure, and his stubborn defense of the Constitution of 1917.
? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
ment of this Administration. "84 For their part, the Mexican revolutionaries saw U. S. interference as a direct threat to the goal of establishing Mexican sovereignty and independence, and they failed to appreciate either Wilson's altruistic motives or his reluctance to use force.
These suspicions were compounded by another familiar feature of revo- lutionary situations: namely, the difficulty of obtaining reliable information or forecasting the future course of the revolution itself. Wilson tried to alle- viate this prolblem by dispatching a series of special agents to gather infor- mation, but most of them proved to be woefully unreliable. 85 In 1913, for example, Wilson's hostility to Huerta was reinforced when special agent John Lind reported, erroneously, that British oil interests were controlling British policy and that foreign support was keeping Huerta in power, and the subsequent decision to seize Vera Cruz was based on Lind's similarly misguided assertion that the Mexicans would not oppose a U. S. landing. 86 Other U. S. attempts to predict the course of the revolution were equally un- reliable; Secretary of State Bryan stated in September 1913, "We have nearly reached the end of our trouble," and he offered an equally optimistic (and inaccurate) forecast after Huerta's departure the following year. 87 U. S. lead- ers misread the course of the civil war as well, at first expecting Villa to win quickly and discounting Carranza's chances until the latter's triumph was nearly complete. 88 Once again, this error was partially based on inaccurate
84 Quoted in Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolu tion, 64. Frustration at Mexican unwillingness to accept U. S. help was a recurring theme among U. S. officials. House remarked, "If the Mex- icans understood that our motives were unselfish, she should not object to our helping adjust her unruly household," and the chief U. S. representative on the Joint Commission wrote Wil- son that the Mexicans "certainly are discouraging people to try to help. " Quoted in Knight, Mexican Revolution, 2:153; and Arthur S. Link, Wilson: Campaignsfor Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 53-54.
85 According to one author, "Wilson's judgment in selecting diplomatic agents was, for the most part, notoriously poor. " Frederick Calhoun, Power and Principle: Armed Intervention in Wilsonian Foreign Policy (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1986), 35?
86 Lind predicted that U. S. intervention could "be accomplished without the military loss of an American," but the landing left 19 U. S. soldiers dead and 71 wounded, while the Mexicans suffered 126 killed and 195 wounded. Quoted in Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 130; also see Link, New Freedom, 400. Larry Hill argues that Lind's analysis "had little basis in fact," and Alan Knight describes Lind's reporting as "garbled, ill-informed, and naive, displaying a crude racism and a paranoid suspicion of Britain. " See Larry D. Hill, Emissaries to a Revolution: Woodrow Wilson's Special Agents in Mexico (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), 99-102; Knight, Mexican Revolution, 2:139, 15o-53; and Calvert, Mexican Revolution, 2JJ-34?
87 In December 1914, Bryan wrote Wilson, "The situation seems to be clearing up in Mex- ico. Villa and Zapata are working in harmony and interim president Gutierrez seems to be about to assume authority over most of the country. " Wilson's assessment was more mea- sured, but even he believed "we have certainly cleared the stage and made a beginning. " Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 232, 260, and New Freedom, 363.
88 Villa's efforts to cultivate U. S. support convinced Wilson that he "certainly seems capa- ble of good things. " In August 1914, House described Villas as "the only man of force now in
? [2951
? ? Revolution and War
testimony from U. S. agents in Mexico, who painted a rosy portrait of Villa and an unflattering one of the first chief. 89 U. S. ignorance is also evident in Wilson's repeated attempts to arrange a compromise peace, which rested on the naive hope that Carranza would be willing to share power (or to with- draw entireliy) even though his armies held the upper hand. Uncertainty also exacerbated tensions during the Punitive Expedition, especially after the skirmishes at Parral and Carrizal. In the latter case, however, the rapid acquisition of more accurate information reduced pressure for U. S. retalia- tion and helped both sides back away from the brink. 90
Similar problems contributed to a spiral between Great Britain and Mex- ico in 1917-18. Britain was worried about Carranza's efforts to use Germany as a counterweight to the Allies, especially after intercepting German diplo- matic communications that conveyed an exaggerated impression of Ger- man influence. These reports helped convince Great Britain to attempt to overthrow the Carranza government; by contrast, because the United States had better sources of information by this point (and was not relying on in- tercepted German messages}, it held a far more sanguine view of German influence and merely wanted to keep Mexico calm. 91
Again we arrive at the final issue: Why did the Mexican Revolution not lead to war? There are at least four interrelated reasons.
First, the revolution in Mexico was only modestly threatening, owing to the enormous asymmetry of power between the United States and Mexico. Even if the revolution created greater uncertainty about the precise balance of power, leaders on both sides knew that Mexico was not a major military threat to the United States. Because Mexico was so much weaker, the Mexi-
sight in Mexico," noting further that Carranza was "not equal to the situation. " Quoted in Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 23? 41. According to Edward Haley, "lacking reliable informa- tion about the military capacities of the Constitutionalists, (Wilson] discounted (their) victo- ries (over Villa). Rather than reports of Constitutionalist progress, the President received countless despatches describing widespread starvation and suffering in Mexico. " Revolution and Intervention, 158-00.
89 In November 1914, a State Department official reported, "General Villa is the only indi- vidual who can put the country on a peaceful footing," and predicted that "one good fight will settle the question and Carranza will find himself with scant forces and will have to flee the country. " Another special agent, Duval West, confirmed this assessment after visiting Villa, Zapata, andl Carranza in the spring of 1915, and his negative report on Carranza con- vinced Wilson that the first chief was not the man to bring order to Mexico. See Link, Strug- glefor Neutrality, 25B-59, 459"-61, 46? 71; and Haley, Revolution and Interoention, 15? 1.
90 When news of the clash at Carrizal reached Washington, Wilson's first belief was that "thebreaksemestohavecomeinMexico;andallmypatienceseemstohavegonefornoth- ing. " He prepared a message to Congress requesting authorization to occupy northern Mex- ico, but public opinion was strongly opposed to war, and a report that U. S. troops had started the fighting convinced Wilson to make another attempt to avoid escalation. See Haley, Revo- lution and Interoention, 21o-23; Katz, Secret War, 31o-11.
? ? 91 See Katz, Secret War, 485--95.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
cans knew all-out war would be foolhardy and U. S. leaders knew they could afford to act with forebearance. Thus, Wilson justified his policy of "watchful waiting" in 1913 by saying, "We can afford to exercise the self-re- straint of a really great nation, which realizes its own strength and scorns to misuse it," and. he offered a similar appraisal the following year. 92
Second, the "ideology" of the Mexican revolutionary movements did not menace other states in the same way as French republicanism, Soviet Marx- ism, or Khomeini's version of Islamic fundamentalism. Instead, U. S. leaders were sympathetic to the basic ideals of the revolution (despite their reserva- tions about specific issues), and Wilson's various interventions were in- tended to guide the revolution but not to reverse it. 93 And in contrast to the other revolutions we have examined, in Mexico the revolutionaries did not develop a universalist ideology and did not see themselves as a model for other societies. 94 The danger of contagion was further reduced because the central goals of the revolution-the establishment of a liberal constitutional order and far-reaching agrarian reform-were simply not relevant north of the border. Apart from the minor threat posed by banditry and border raid- ing, therefore, there was no danger that the revolution would spread and thus little incentive for preventive war.
Apartial exception to this argument was the U. S. concern that Mexican ef- forts to assert control over foreign investments might establish a dangerous precedent for other developing countries. Especially after World War I, some U. S. officials seem to have believed that the Mexican government was fomenting unrest in the United States and was in cahoots with the Bolshe- viks and the International Workers of the World movement. Yet this danger was never great enough to justify intervention, because Carranza's revolu- tionary nationalism was not directed against private property per se and did not pose a serious threat to U. S. business interests. Indeed, some U. S. businessmen recognized that intervention might harm rather than protect U. S. assets in Mexico. 95
Third, U. S.
leaders were aware that an invasion would not be easy or cheap; indeed, Wilson's diplomatic efforts were clearly inspired by his de-
92 InMarch1914,Wilsontoldareporterthat"acountryofthesizeandpoweroftheUnited States can afford to wait just as long as it pleases. Nobody doubts its power, and nobody doubts that Mr. Huerta is eventually to retire. " Quoted in Haley, Revolu tion and Intervention, 100, 130.
93 On the broad ndeological compatibility of the United States and Mexico, see Alan Knight, U. S. -Mexican Relations, 1910-1940 (San Diego: Center for U. S. -Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1987), 5-10.
94 On this point see Knight, Mexican Revolution, 2:297; and also Eric Woif, Peasant Wars ofthe Twentieth Century {New York: Harper, 1969), 25-26. The ideological background to the revo- lution is summarized in James D. Cockcroft, Intellectual Precursors of the Mexican Revolution, 1900-1913 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1968).
95 See Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, 158-59, 174-75. [2971
? ? Revolution and War
sire to avoid having to do more. Wilson had agreed to occupy Vera Cruz in 1914 because he believed (incorrectly) that the Mexicans would not resist, but the experience had been chastening. U. S. military leaders estimated tha? an all-out intervention in Mexico would require roughly five hundred thou- sand men, and given the deep divisions that persisted throughout the coun- try, merely sending an expedition to Mexico City would not have restored! order. Instead, a prolonged and costly occupation would have been neces- sary, on a much larger scale than the earlier U. S. occupations of Cuba or Nicaragua. Thus, the awareness that there was no offensive advantage vis-
a-vis Mexnco reinforced Wilson's already strong desire to avoid war.
The most important barrier to a North American war, however, was the outbreak of World War I. Wilson and his advisors recognized that large- scale involvement in Mexico would limit their ability to influence events in Europe, which they regarded as far more important. As Wilson told his pri- vate secretary in 1916: "It begins to look as if war with Germany is in- evitable. If it should come . . . I do not wish America's energies and forces divided for we will need every ounce of reserve we have to lick Germany. "96 This consideration also explains why Germany was eager to promote a U. S. - Mexican conflict; as Lansing put it in 1915, "Germany desires to keep up the turmoil in Mexico until the United States is forced to intervene; therefore, we must not intervene. "97 This concern increased as the U. S. entry into the world! war approached and helped persuade Wilson to withdraw the Punitive Ex-
pedition. House told the new U. S. ambassador, Henry Fletcher, "to do everything possible to avoid a break with Carranza," and Fletcher later re- called that "during the war my job was to keep Mexico quiet, and it was done. "98
Thus, the absence of war was due to the relatively low level of threat cre- ated by the revolution, as well as to the fact that events elsewhere posed an even greater danger. 99 Like the United States during the wars of the French Revolutio! l,l the Mexican revolutionaries were fortunate that a war in Eu- rope encouraged its potential opponents to act with restraint. U. S. -Mexican
% See Joseph Tumulty, Woodrow Wilson As I Know Him (Garden Gty, N. Y. : Garden City Pub- lishing, 1927), 159?
97 Quoted in Link, Wilson and the Progressive Era, 134 n. 59? Lansing later told a friend that concern for Germany "was a decided factor in our Mexican policy, I might say, a controlling factor. " According to Boaz Long, "but for the European war, the Mexican situation would have been one of the foremost foreign issues of our time. " Quoted in Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, 68-69.
98 Quoted in Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, 93; and see Katz, Secret War, 313.
99 Similar conditions facilitated Cardenas's consolidation of the revolution in the 1930s, es- pecially his nationalization of the Mexican oil industry in 1938. The United States would have opposed this step more strongly had the rise of Nazi Germany and the growing tensions in Europe not encouraged efforts to solidify ties with anti-Fascist leaders such as Cardenas.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
relations deteriorated again after the armistice (and unlike in 1916, the United States now possessed a sizeable army), but Wilson's attention was still focused primarily on European affairs and he remained firmly set against intervention for the remainder of his term.
Overall, this case is best seen as a near miss. Although war did not occur, the risk of war was very high on more than one occasion, and for many of the reasons identified by the theory. The Mexican instance also confirms that intervening nn a revolution is a difficult and unpredictable business; despite its more or less benevolent intentions and the absence of intense ideological conflict, U. S. efforts to guide the course of events in Mexico were unsuc- cessful at best and counterproductive at worst.
THE TURKISH REVOLUTION
Beginning in 1919, the Nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal transformed the core of the former Ottoman Empire from the center of multinational. Muslim dynasty into a secular Turkish state. Bernard Lewis describes this development as "one of the major revolutions of modern times," and it eventually enabled the Turks to escape the punitive condi- tions imposed at the end of World War I and to reemerge as an accepted member of the European system. 100
Like the American and Mexican cases, the revolution in Turkey did not re- sult in significant interstate violence. Although some familiar sources of conflict were present, their effects were relatively weak and short-lived. The revolution was accompanied by a major war with Greece, but this conflict was a cause of the revolution rather than an effect. The revolution also led to a protracted confrontation with Great Britain, and nearly to open warfare at one point, but a direct clash was avoided and Turkey soon established itself as a status quo power within the European order.
The comparatively mild repercussions of the Turkish Revolution were due in part to the origins and character of the revolutionary movement and its limited international objectives. This was not a mass revolution-from-below, guided or exploited by a revolutionary vanguard party; rather, it was an elite revolution-from-above conducted by dissident members of the old regime. 101 In constructing their new state, the leaders of the revolution explicitly re- jected a pan-Turanian or pan-Islamic agenda in favor of a program based on modernization and the promotion of Turkish nationalism within Anatolia proper. Thus, unlike most revolutionary states, Turkey did not pose a signif-
100 See his EmergenceofModern Turkey (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 1.
101 See Ellen Kay Trimberger, Revolutionfrom Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru (New Brunswick, N. J. : Transaction Books, 1978).
[2991
? ? ? Revolution and War
icant threat to its immediate neighbors once its borders were reestablished after World War I. The Turks also benefited from favorable international con- ditions, which gave the new regime ample room for maneuver and aided its efforts to secure foreign recognition and diplomatic support.
The Revolutionary Process
The Ottoman Empire had been in decline since the seventeenth century, steadily losing territory and influence to its European neighbors. 102 In 19QS, the so-called Young Turk movement forced the sultan to recall Parliament and invited Western advisors to conduct military and economic reforms, but its initiatives failed to halt the empire's decline. Austria-Hungary an- nexed Bosma-Herzegovina in 1908, the Albanians revolted the following year, and the empire lost 83 percent of its European territory and 69 percent of its European population in the Balkan wars of 1912-1913. 103
The decislion to join the Central Powers in November 1914 was the Ot- toman Empire's final, fatal mistake. 104 By 1915, the Entente had agreed to partition the empire in the event of victory, with Russia receiving control of the Turkish Straits and Britain and France dividing the Arab portions of the empire into separate spheres of influence. Italy was promised the Dode- canese Islands, Libya, and portions of Anatolia, and Greece was eventually brought into the war with similar promises. 105
Although the Ottoman forces fought well on some fronts and obtained a large portion of Russian territory at Brest-Litovsk, the German collapse ended any chance of victory and the sultanate negotiated an armistice with the Entente on October 30, 1918. Based on the stated war aims of the Entente and Woodrow Wilson's pledge to preserve Turkish sovereignty, the Turks expected fairly lenient treatment at the hands of the Allies. To their surprise,
102 A map delllneating the Ottoman Empire's territorial losses is in Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History ofthe Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 2:xxiv.
103 The Young Turk movement was accompanied by a protracted debate of the Ottoman ideal of a decentralized, multinational empire, the concept of a new state based on Turkish nationalism, and proposals to reconstitute the empire along pan-Islamic lines. See Roderic Davison, Turkey (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall, 1968), uo-12; Lewis, Emergence of Modern Turkey, 351-52; Shaw and Shaw, Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2:301-305. On the B a l k a n w a r s , se e E . C . H e l m r e i c h , T h e D i p l o m a cy of t h e B a l k a n Wa r s ( C a m b r i d g e : H a rv a r d U n i - versity Press, 1938).
104 The decision to enter the war reflected both the pan-Turkic ambitions of some Turkish leaders (most notably Enver Pasha) and the belief that the war was an ideal opportunity to attack Russia. Shaw and Shaw, Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, 2:31o-11.
105 For the texts of the various agreements, see J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (1956; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1972), 2:7-25. On the Greek decision to enter the war, see A. A. Pallis, Greece's Anatolian Adventure-and After (London: Methuen, 1937), esp. 18.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
however, the end of the war unleashed the victors' acquisitive ambitions, accompanied by intense disputes over the size and distribution of the spoils. Istanbul was occupied and placed under military administration. French troops moved into Cilicia and eastern Thrace, Greece seized western Thrace, and British forces occupied Mosul, the Dardanelles, Samsun, and several other strategic points. 106 The newly independent Armenian state expanded into eastern Anatolia, and its claims for portions of former Ottoman terri- tory received a favorable hearing at the Paris Peace Conference. Greece and Italy also presented extensive claims for Turkish territory at the conference and began to back up their demands with military force. Italy landed troops on the southern coast of Anatolia in April 1919, and Britain, France, and the
United States helped Greek forces occupy Smyrna (Izmir) in May. 107
The Greek decision to occupy Smyrna was a manifestation of its long- standing desire to reunify the Greek peoples of the former Byzantine Em- pire. The Entente supported this step in order to forestall an Italian occupation of the same area, partly because British prime minister David Lloyd George was sympathetic to the Greeks and saw this move as a way of enhancing British influence in an important strategic area. As the Greek forces moved into the surrounding countryside, however, armed resistance groups began to form among the local population. 108 The sultanate was in- capable or unwilling to resist the Greek assault on Turkish sovereignty, and
the stage was set for a challenge to the sultan's authority.
Allied ocrupation and pressure from the emerging Armenian state had al- ready sparked resistance movements in eastern Anatolia, but it was the Greek occupation of Smyrna that was most responsible for inspiring the Na- tionalist movement in Turkey. 109 As the resistance grew, a group of national- ist officers led by Mustafa Kemal, inspector-general of the Ninth Army in Samsun, began to unite the resistance into a coherent movement. Kemal re- signed his commission and formed a Representative Committee to guide the new organization, and this group issued a proclamation in June declaring
106 See Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2:36-37; Salahi Ramsdan Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 1918-1923: Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish National Movement (Beverly Hills, Calif: SagePublishing, 1975), 2-3; and M. Phillips Price, AHistoryofTurkeyfrom Empire to Re- public (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956), 96.
107 Greece asked for all of Thrace, the Aegean islands, and a substantial portion of western Asia Minor, while Italy wanted the Dodacanese Islands and similar portions of Anatolia in accordance with the Tripartite Agreement of 1917. See Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History, 1913-1923 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1931), 222-2J.
1 08 The population of Smyrna was predominantly Greek, but the surrounding territory was mainly Turkish.
109 See Howard, Partition of Turkey, 257? Harry J. Psomiades argues that although many Turks accepted the Allied occupation as a necessary evil, "it was the Greek occupation which was an affront which no patriotic Turk could endure. " The Eastern Question: The Last Phase: A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy (Thessalonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1968), esp. 31.
[301]
? Revolution and War
that "national independence [was] in danger" because the sultanate was "unable to carry out its responsibilities. "11? Kemal consolidated additional support at a congress of the so-called Society for the Defense of the Rights of Eastern Anatolia in July, and a new National Congress consisting of three delegates from each province then confirmed these resolutions in September.
The Nationalists dominated elections for the Chamber of Deputies in No- vember, and Kemal informed the Entente that the sultan's emissaries at the Paris Peace Conference no longer represented the will of the nation. The new parliament met in Istanbul in January 1920 and proclaimed a new Na- tional Pact that reaffirmed the resolutions of the earlier congresses and de- manded "complete independence and liberty. "111
International Consequences
These developments threatened the Entente's plans for extensive spheres of influence in Anatolia and jeopardized British hopes of controlling the Turkish Straits. In response, British troops occupied the Turkish areas of Is- tanbul in March 1920 in order to arrest and deport the Nationalist deputies. Most of the Nationalists managed to escape, however, and Kemal organized a Grand National Assembly in Ankara outside the reach of the Allied forces. Declaring that the sultan was a prisoner who was unable to exercise his au- thority, the Assembly and Representative Committee proclaimed them- selves the true government of a new Turkish state.
Meanwhile, the Entente had completed its negotiations for the distribu- tion of Ottoman territories and submitted the Treaty of 5evres to the sultan in May. To forestall a Nationalist attack on Istanbul, the Supreme Allied Council approved a Greek proposal for an offensive against the Nationalist forces. The attack was successful and the Greek forces had occupied sub- stantial portions of Anatolia and Thrace by midsummer. When the sultan accepted the peace treaty in August, the triumph of Allied ambitions over Turkish weakness seemed complete. 112 Yet a combination of astute diplo-
110 Quoted in Elaine Diana Smith, Turkey: Origins of the Kemalist Movement and the Govern- mentoftheGrarodNationalAssembly,1919-1923 (Washington,D. C. :JuddandDetweiler,1959), 12-13. Mustafa Kemal was one of the Ottoman Empire's most accomplished commanders. He was connected with the Young Turk movement but had fallen out with its leaders before World War I and did not play a political role during the war.
111 See Roderic Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy from Mudros to Lausanne," in The Diplomats, 1919-1939, ed. Gordon Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 17S--79; and Hlllrewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2:74-'75?
112 The Treaty of 5evres opened the Dardanelles to international shipping, established Kur- dish autonomy, gave Grece e de facto control over Smyrna and the surrounding region, forced Turkey to recognize Armenian independence and made the rest of the former empire either independent or placed under British, French, or Italian control. See Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2:81--89; and Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 242-49.
? ? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
macy and the Nationalists' growing military power gradually restored the Turkish position, overthrew the sultanate, and turned the Treaty of sevres into an irrelevant anachronism. 113
The Nationalists began by seeking an alliance with Soviet Russia. Soviet Russia had extended diplomatic feelers to Kemal in 1919, and though progress was delayed by their competition in Transcaucasia, the two gov- ernments signed a formal friendship treaty in March 1921 and Moscow began providing arms and financial assistance. n4
The Nationalists were equally successful in their efforts to divide the En- tente and isolate the Greeks. Relations among the Allies were already. strained by conflicting imperial interests, contentious discussions at the peace conference, and growing public opposition to costly military commit- ments, and the Nationalists exploited these tensions with considerable skill. The Turks also benefited when a Greek plebiscite removed Prime Minister Elftherios Venizelos and restored the deposed King Constantine, undermin- ing French and Italian support for the Greek cause and forcing the Greeks to rely solely on Great Britain. Allied fears of the growing Soviet-Turkish rap- prochement led them to propose a formal revision of the Sevres agreement. The resulting London conference in February 1921 enhanced the status and prestige of the Nationalists. Kemal refused to send a delegation until the Nationalists received a direct invitation, and the decision to let the Nation- alist representative, Bekir Sami, speak on behalf of the Istanbul and Ankara governments underscored the Nationalists' dominant position still further. Britain still refused to end its support for the Greeks, but France and Italy now broke ranks and agreed to withdraw from Anatolia in exchange for economic concessions. Although Kemal later declared that Sami had ex- ceeded his authority and repudiated the agreements, the London conference had exposed the rifts within the Entente and revealed that the Treaty of Sevres was not cast in stone. 115
Turkey's improved military position aided its attempts at fostering divi- sions within the Entente. The Greek advance had been halted in January 1921, and the Nationalists defeated a second Greek offensive in ApriL When a third offensive was thwarted in July, British support began to waver, and
the Supreme Allied Council now declared that it would remain neutral in the Greco-Turkish conflict. The breakthrough came with an agreement with
113 For an account of Kemal's diplomatic and military strategy, see George W. Gawryeh, "Kemal Atatiirk's Politico-Military Strategy in the Turkish War of Independence, 1918-1922: From Guerrilla Warfare to the Decisive Battle," Journal of Strategic Studies 11, no. 3 (1988).
114 See Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 186-91; and Jane Degras, ed. , Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1951-52), 1:237-42.
115 The background and results of the London conference of 1921 are discussed in Davison, "Turkish Diplomacy," 188""9o; Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy, 95-105; Howard, Partition ofTurkey, 26o-61.
? ? Revolution and War
France. The French government regarded the Treaty of 5evres as excessively favorable to Britain, and its forces in Cilicia were facing increasingly effec- tive resistance from the Nationalist forces. Negotiations began in earnest in June 1921, and the final treaty was completed in October, whereby France agreed to withdraw from Cilicia in exchange for temporary control over the disputed district of Alexandretta. The French also agreed to recognize the Turkish National Pact, in effect abandoning the Treaty of 5evres. 116 Italy was next. The Italian government, which viewed the Treaty of Sevres with even less enthusiasm than France, had begun withdrawing its troops from Adalia in June 1921. Aformal rapprochement with the Nationalists was delayed by political shifts in Italy, and subsequent negotiations in the fall of 1921 foundered on Turkey's refusal to grant economic concessions, but it was clear that Italy had given up any hope of making territorial gains at Turkey's expense. 117
These improvements in Turkey's relations with the West threatened its ties with the Soviet Union and forced Kemal to walk a fine line. The Na- tionalists assured Soviet foreign minister Chicherin that the detente with France would not undermine the Soviet-Turkish friendship treaty, and they signed a formal treaty guaranteeing their eastern frontier with Russia, Geor- gia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in October 1921. A visit by a Soviet military mission to Ankara in December arranged for additional military aid and wasfollowed! by afriendshiptreatybetweenTurkeyandtheUkrainianSo- viet Socialist Republic in January 1922. A Soviet ambassador took up resi- dence in Ankara, and the Soviet mission soon became the largest foreign delegation there. 118
The cessation of hostilities with France and Italy and the guarantee of Turkey's eastern border allowed Kemal to tum his attention back to the Greeks.
