No More Learning

"

From the above the reply to the Second Objection is clear. For in the
same moment that this flesh began to be conceived, its conception and
animation were completed.

Reply to Objection 3: The mystery of the Incarnation is not to be
looked upon as an ascent, as it were, of a man already existing and
mounting up to the dignity of the Union: as the heretic Photinus
maintained. Rather is it to be considered as a descent, by reason of
the perfect Word of God taking unto Himself the imperfection of our
nature; according to Jn. 6:38: "I came down from heaven. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether Christ's conception was natural?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ's conception was natural. For
Christ is called the Son of Man by reason of His conception in the
flesh. But He is a true and natural Son of Man: as also is He the true
and natural Son of God. Therefore His conception was natural.

Objection 2: Further, no creature can be the cause of a miraculous
effect. But Christ's conception is attributed to the Blessed Virgin,
who is a mere creature: for we say that the Virgin conceived Christ.
Therefore it seems that His conception was not miraculous, but natural.

Objection 3: Further, for a transformation to be natural, it is enough
that the passive principle be natural, as stated above ([4155]Q[32],
A[4]). But in Christ's conception the passive principle on the part of
His Mother was natural, as we have shown ([4156]Q[32], A[4]). Therefore
Christ's conception was natural.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Ep. ad Caium Monach. ): "Christ does in
a superhuman way those things that pertain to man: this is shown in the
miraculous virginal conception. "

I answer that, As Ambrose says (De Incarn. vi): "In this mystery thou
shalt find many things that are natural, and many that are
supernatural. " For if we consider in this conception anything connected
with the matter thereof, which was supplied by the mother, it was in
all such things natural. But if we consider it on the part of the
active power, thus it was entirely miraculous. And since judgment of a
thing should be pronounced in respect of its form rather than of its
matter: and likewise in respect of its activity rather than of its
passiveness: therefore is it that Christ's conception should be
described simply as miraculous and supernatural, although in a certain
respect it was natural.

Reply to Objection 1: Christ is said to be a natural Son of Man, by
reason of His having a true human nature, through which He is a Son of
Man, although He had it miraculously; thus, too, the blind man to whom
sight has been restored sees naturally by sight miraculously received.

Reply to Objection 2: The conception is attributed to the Blessed
Virgin, not as the active principle thereof, but because she supplied
the matter, and because the conception took place in her womb.

Reply to Objection 3: A natural passive principle suffices for a
transformation to be natural, when it is moved by its proper active
principle in a natural and wonted way. But this is not so in the case
in point. Therefore this conception cannot be called simply natural.
__________________________________________________________________

OF THE PERFECTION OF THE CHILD CONCEIVED (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the perfection of the child conceived: and
concerning this there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether Christ was sanctified by grace in the first instant of His
conception?

(2) Whether in that same instant He had the use of free-will?

(3) Whether in that same instant He could merit?

(4) Whether in that same instant He was a perfect comprehensor?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether Christ was sanctified in the first instant of His conception?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not sanctified in the first
instant of His conception. For it is written (1 Cor. 15:46): "That was
not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural: afterwards
that which is spiritual. " But sanctification by grace is something
spiritual. Therefore Christ received the grace of sanctification, not
at the very beginning of His conception, but after a space of time.

Objection 2: Further, sanctification seems to be a cleansing from sin:
according to 1 Cor. 6:1: "And such some of you were," namely, sinners,
"but you are washed, but you are sanctified. " But sin was never in
Christ. Therefore it was not becoming that He should be sanctified by
grace.

Objection 3: Further, as by the Word of God "all things were made," so
from the Word incarnate all men who are made holy receive holiness,
according to Heb. 2:11: "Both he that sanctifieth and they who are
sanctified are all of one. " But "the Word of God, by whom all things
were made, was not Himself made"; as Augustine says (De Trin. i).
Therefore Christ, by whom all are made holy, was not Himself made holy.

On the contrary, It is written (Lk. 1:35): "The Holy which shall be
born of thee shall be called the Son of God"; and (Jn. 10:36): "Whom
the Father hath sanctified and sent into the world. "

I answer that, As stated above ([4157]Q[7], AA[9],10,12), the abundance
of grace sanctifying Christ's soul flows from the very union of the
Word, according to Jn. 1:14: "We saw His glory . . . as it were of the
Only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth. " For it has been
shown above ([4158]Q[33], AA[2],3) that in the first instant of
conception, Christ's body was both animated and assumed by the Word of
God. Consequently, in the first instant of His conception, Christ had
the fulness of grace sanctifying His body and His soul.

Reply to Objection 1: The order set down by the Apostle in this passage
refers to those who by advancing attain to the spiritual state. But the
mystery of the Incarnation is considered as a condescension of the
fulness of the Godhead into human nature rather than as the promotion
of human nature, already existing, as it were, to the Godhead.
Therefore in the man Christ there was perfection of spiritual life from
the very beginning.

Reply to Objection 2: To be sanctified is to be made holy. Now
something is made not only from its contrary, but also from that which
is opposite to it, either by negation or by privation: thus white is
made either from black or from not-white. We indeed from being sinners
are made holy: so that our sanctification is a cleansing from sin.
Whereas Christ, as man, was made holy, because He was not always thus
sanctified by grace: yet He was not made holy from being a sinner,
because He never sinned; but He was made holy from not-holy as man, not
indeed by privation, as though He were at some time a man and not holy;
but by negation---that is, when He was not man He had not human
sanctity. Therefore at the same time He was made man and a holy man.
For this reason the angel said (Lk. 1:35): "The Holy which shall be
born of thee. " Which words Gregory expounds as follows (Moral. xviii):
"In order to show the distinction between His holiness and ours, it is
declared that He shall be born holy. For we, though we are made holy,
yet are not born holy, because by the mere condition of a corruptible
nature we are tied . . . But He alone is truly born holy who . . . was
not conceived by the combining of carnal union. "

Reply to Objection 3: The Father creates things through the Son, and
the whole Trinity sanctifies men through the Man Christ, but not in the
same way. For the Word of God has the same power and operation as God
the Father: hence the Father does not work through the Son as an
instrument, which is both mover and moved. Whereas the humanity of
Christ is as the instrument of the Godhead, as stated above
([4159]Q[7], A[1], ad 3;[4160] Q[8], A[1], ad 1). Therefore Christ's
humanity is both sanctified and sanctifier.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether Christ as man had the use of free-will in the first instant of His
conception?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ as man had not the use of
free-will in the first instant of His conception. For a thing is,
before it acts or operates. Now the use of free-will is an operation.
Since, therefore, Christ's soul began to exist in the first instant of
His conception, as was made clear above ([4161]Q[33], A[2]), it seems
impossible that He should have the use of free-will in the first
instant of His conception.

Objection 2: Further, the use of free-will consists in choice. But
choice presupposes the deliberation of counsel: for the Philosopher
says (Ethic. iii) that choice is "the desire of what has been
previously the object of deliberation. " Therefore it seems impossible
that Christ should have had the use of free-will in the first instant
of His conception.

Objection 3: Further, the free-will is "a faculty of the will and
reason," as stated in the [4162]FP, Q[83], A[2], OBJ[2]: consequently
the use of free-will is an act of the will and the reason or intellect.
But the act of the intellect presupposes an act of the senses; and this
cannot exist without proper disposition of the organs---a condition
which would seem impossible in the first instant of Christ's
conception. Therefore it seems that Christ could not have the use of
free-will at the first instant of His conception.

On the contrary, Augustine says in his book on the Trinity (Gregory:
Regist. ix, Ep. 61): "As soon as the Word entered the womb, while
retaining the reality of His Nature, He was made flesh, and a perfect
man. " But a perfect man has the use of free-will. Therefore Christ had
the use of free-will in the first instant of His conception.

I answer that, As stated above [4163](A[1]), spiritual perfection was
becoming to the human nature which Christ took, which perfection He
attained not by making progress, but by receiving it from the very
first. Now ultimate perfection does not consist in power or habit, but
in operation; wherefore it is said (De Anima ii, text. 5) that
operation is a "second act. " We must, therefore, say that in the first
instant of His conception Christ had that operation of the soul which
can be had in an instant. And such is the operation of the will and
intellect, in which the use of free-will consists. For the operation of
the intellect and will is sudden and instantaneous, much more, indeed,
than corporeal vision; inasmuch as to understand, to will, and to feel,
are not movements that may be described as "acts of an imperfect
being," which attains perfection successively, but are "the acts of an
already perfect being," as is said, De Anima iii, text. 28. We must
therefore say that Christ had the use of free-will in the first instant
of His conception.

Reply to Objection 1: Existence precedes action by nature, but not in
time; but at the same time the agent has perfect existence, and begins
to act unless it is hindered. Thus fire, as soon as it is generated,
begins to give heat and light. The action of heating, however, is not
terminated in an instant, but continues for a time; whereas the action
of giving light is perfected in an instant. And such an operation is
the use of free-will, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2: As soon as counsel or deliberation is ended,
there may be choice. But those who need the deliberation of counsel, as
soon as this comes to an end are certain of what ought to be chosen:
and consequently they choose at once. From this it is clear that the
deliberation of counsel does not of necessity precede choice save for
the purpose of inquiring into what is uncertain. But Christ, in the
first instant of His conception, had the fulness of sanctifying grace,
and in like manner the fulness of known truth; according to Jn. 1:14:
"Full of grace and truth. " Wherefore, as being possessed of certainty
about all things, He could choose at once in an instant.

Reply to Objection 3: Christ's intellect, in regard to His infused
knowledge, could understand without turning to phantasms, as stated
above ([4164]Q[11], A[2]). Consequently His intellect and will could
act without any action of the senses.

Nevertheless it was possible for Him, in the first instant of His
conception, to have an operation of the senses: especially as to the
sense of touch, which the infant can exercise in the womb even before
it has received the rational soul, as is said, De Gener. Animal. ii,
3,4. Wherefore, since Christ had the rational soul in the first instant
of His conception, through His body being already fashioned and endowed
with sensible organs, much more was it possible for Him to exercise the
sense of touch in that same instant.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether Christ could merit in the first instant of His conception?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ could not merit in the first
instant of His conception. For the free-will bears the same relation to
merit as to demerit. But the devil could not sin in the first instant
of his creation, as was shown in the [4165]FP, Q[63], A[5]. Therefore
neither could Christ's soul merit in the first instant of its
creation---that is, in the first instant of Christ's conception.

Objection 2: Further, that which man has in the first instant of his
conception seems to be natural to him: for it is in this that his
natural generation is terminated. But we do not merit by what is
natural to us, as is clear from what has been said in the [4166]FS,
Q[109], A[5]; [4167]FS, Q[114], A[2]. Therefore it seems that the use
of free-will, which Christ as man had in the first instant of His
conception, was not meritorious.

Objection 3: Further, that which a man has once merited he makes, in a
way, his own: consequently it seems that he cannot merit the same thing
again: for no one merits what is already his. If, therefore, Christ
merited in the first instant of His conception, it follows that
afterwards He merited nothing. But this is evidently untrue. Therefore
Christ did not merit in the first instant of His conception.

On the contrary, Augustine [*Paterius, Expos. Vet. et Nov. Test. super
Ex. 40] says: "Increase of merit was absolutely impossible to the soul
of Christ. " But increase of merit would have been possible had He not
merited in the first instant of His conception. Therefore Christ
merited in the first instant of His conception.

I answer that, As stated above [4168](A[1]), Christ was sanctified by
grace in the first instant of His conception. Now, sanctification is
twofold: that of adults who are sanctified in consideration of their
own act; and that of infants who are sanctified in consideration of,
not their own act of faith, but that of their parents or of the Church.
The former sanctification is more perfect than the latter: just as act
is more perfect than habit; and "that which is by itself, than that
which is by another" [*Aristotle, Phys. viii]. Since, therefore, the
sanctification of Christ was most perfect, because He was so sanctified
that He might sanctify others; consequently He was sanctified by reason
of His own movement of the free-will towards God. Which movement,
indeed, of the free-will is meritorious. Consequently, Christ did merit
in the first instant of His conception.

Reply to Objection 1: Free-will does not bear the same relation to good
as to evil: for to good it is related of itself, and naturally; whereas
to evil it is related as to a defect, and beside nature. Now, as the
Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, text. 18): "That which is beside nature
is subsequent to that which is according to nature; because that which
is beside nature is an exception to nature. " Therefore the free-will of
a creature can be moved to good meritoriously in the first instant of
its creation, but not to evil sinfully; provided, however, its nature
be unimpaired.

Reply to Objection 2: That which man has at the first moment of his
creation, in the ordinary course of nature, is natural to him. but
nothing hinders a creature from receiving from God a gift of grace at
the very beginning of its creation. In this way did Christ's soul in
the first instant of its creation receive grace by which it could
merit. And for this reason is that grace, by way of a certain likeness,
said to be natural to this Man, as explained by Augustine (Enchiridion
xl).

Reply to Objection 3: Nothing prevents the same thing belonging to
someone from several causes. And thus it is that Christ was able by
subsequent actions and sufferings to merit the glory of immortality,
which He also merited in the first instant of His conception: not,
indeed, so that it became thereby more due to Him than before, but so
that it was due to Him from more causes than before.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether Christ was a perfect comprehensor in the first instant of His
conception?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not a perfect comprehensor
in the first instant of His conception. For merit precedes reward, as
fault precedes punishment. But Christ merited in the first instant of
His conception, as stated above [4169](A[3]). Since, therefore, the
state of comprehension is the principal reward, it seems that Christ
was not a comprehensor in the first instant of His conception.

Objection 2: Further, our Lord said (Lk. 24:26): "Ought not Christ to
have suffered these things, and so to enter into His glory? " But glory
belongs to the state of comprehension. Therefore Christ was not in the
state of comprehension in the first instant of His conception, when as
yet He had not suffered.

Objection 3: Further, what befits neither man nor angel seems proper to
God; and therefore is not becoming to Christ as man. But to be always
in the state of beatitude befits neither man nor angel: for if they had
been created in beatitude, they would not have sinned afterwards.
Therefore Christ, as man, was not in the state of beatitude in the
first instant of His conception.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 64:5): "Blessed is he whom Thou
hast chosen, end taken to Thee"; which words, according to the gloss,
refer to Christ's human nature, which "was taken by the Word of God
unto the unity of Person. " But human nature was taken by the Word of
God in the first instant of His conception. Therefore, in the first
instant of His conception, Christ, as man, was in the state of
beatitude; which is to be a comprehensor.

I answer that, As appears from what was said above [4170](A[3]), it was
unbecoming that in His conception Christ should receive merely habitual
grace without the act. Now, He received grace "not by measure" (Jn.
3:34), as stated above (Q[7], A[11]). But the grace of the "wayfarer,"
being short of that of the "comprehensor," is in less measure than that
of the comprehensor. Wherefore it is manifest that in the first instant
of His conception Christ received not only as much grace as
comprehensors have, but also greater than that which they all have. And
because that grace was not without its act, it follows that He was a
comprehensor in act, seeing God in His Essence more clearly than other
creatures.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([4171]Q[19], A[3]), Christ did
not merit the glory of the soul, in respect of which He is said to have
been a comprehensor, but the glory of the body, to which He came
through His Passion.

Wherefore the reply to the Second Objection is clear.

Reply to Objection 3: Since Christ was both God and man, He had, even
in His humanity, something more than other creatures---namely, that He
was in the state of beatitude from the very beginning.
__________________________________________________________________

OF CHRIST'S NATIVITY (EIGHT ARTICLES)

After considering Christ's conception, we must treat of His nativity.
First, as to the nativity itself; secondly, as to His manifestation
after birth.

Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:

(1) Whether nativity regards the nature or the person?

(2) Whether another, besides His eternal, birth should be attributed to
Christ?

(3) Whether the Blessed Virgin is His Mother in respect of His temporal
birth?

(4) Whether she ought to be called the Mother of God?

(5) Whether Christ is the Son of God the Father and of the Virgin
Mother in respect of two filiations?

(6) Of the mode of the Nativity;

(7) Of its place;

(8) Of the time of the Nativity.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether nativity regards the nature rather than the person?

Objection 1: It would seem that nativity regards the nature rather than
the person. For Augustine [*Fulgentius] says (De Fide ad Petrum): "The
eternal Divine Nature could not be conceived and born of human nature,
except in a true human nature. " Consequently it becomes the Divine
Nature to be conceived and born by reason of the human nature. Much
more, therefore, does it regard human nature itself.

Objection 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v),
"nature" is so denominated from "nativity. " But things are denominated
from one another by reason of some likeness.
Therefore it seems that
nativity regards the nature rather than the person.

Objection 3: Further, properly speaking, that is born which begins to
exist by nativity. But Christ's Person did not begin to exist by His
nativity, whereas His human nature did. Therefore it seems that the
nativity properly regards the nature, and not the person.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "Nativity regards
the hypostasis, not the nature. "

I answer that, Nativity can be attributed to someone in two ways:
first, as to its subject; secondly, as to its terminus. To him that is
born it is attributed as to its subject: and this, properly speaking,
is the hypostasis, not the nature. For since to be born is to be
generated; as a thing is generated in order for it to be, so is a thing
born in order for it to be. Now, to be, properly speaking, belongs to
that which subsists; since a form that does not subsist is said to be
only inasmuch as by it something is: and whereas person or hypostasis
designates something as subsisting, nature designates form, whereby
something subsists. Consequently, nativity is attributed to the person
or hypostasis as to the proper subject of being born, but not to the
nature.

But to the nature nativity is attributed as to its terminus. For the
terminus of generation and of every nativity is the form. Now, nature
designates something as a form: wherefore nativity is said to be "the
road to nature," as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii): for the purpose
of nature is terminated in the form or nature of the species.

Reply to Objection 1: On account of the identity of nature and
hypostasis in God, nature fs sometimes put instead of person or
hypostasis. And in this sense Augustine says that the Divine Nature was
conceived and born, inasmuch as the Person of the Son was conceived and
born in the human nature.

Reply to Objection 2: No movement or change is denominated from the
subject moved, but from the terminus of the movement, whence the
subject has its species. For this reason nativity is not denominated
from the person born, but from nature, which is the terminus of
nativity.

Reply to Objection 3: Nature, properly speaking, does not begin to
exist: rather is it the person that begins to exist in some nature.
Because, as stated above, nature designates that by which something is;
whereas person designates something as having subsistent being.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether a temporal nativity should be attributed to Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that temporal nativity is not to be
attributed to Christ. For "to be born is a certain movement of a thing
that did not exist before it was born, which movement procures for it
the benefit of existence" [*Cf. Augustine, De Unit. Trin. xii]. But
Christ was from all eternity. Therefore He could not be born in time.

Objection 2: Further, what is perfect in itself needs not to be born.
But the Person of the Son of God was perfect from eternity. Therefore
He needs not to be born in time. Therefore it seems that He had no
temporal birth.

Objection 3: Further, properly speaking, nativity regards the person.
But in Christ there is only one person. Therefore in Christ there is
but one nativity.

Objection 4: Further, what is born by two nativities is born twice. But
this proposition is false; "Christ was born twice": because the
nativity whereby He was born of the Father suffers no interruption;
since it is eternal. Whereas interruption is required to warrant the
use of the adverb "twice": for a man is said to run twice whose running
is interrupted. Therefore it seems that we should not admit a double
nativity in Christ.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "We confess two
nativities in Christ: one of the Father---eternal; and one which
occurred in these latter times for our sake. "

I answer that, As stated above [4172](A[1]), nature is compared to
nativity, as the terminus to movement or change. Now, movement is
diversified according to the diversity of its termini, as the
Philosopher shows (Phys. v). But, in Christ there is a twofold nature:
one which He received of the Father from eternity, the other which He
received from His Mother in time. Therefore we must needs attribute to
Christ a twofold nativity: one by which He was born of the Father from
all eternity; one by which He was born of His Mother in time.

Reply to Objection 1: This was the argument of a certain heretic,
Felician, and is solved thus by Augustine (Contra Felic. xii). "Let us
suppose," says he, "as many maintain, that in the world there is a
universal soul, which, by its ineffable movement, so gives life to all
seed, that it is not compounded with things begotten, but bestows life
that they may be begotten. Without doubt, when this soul reaches the
womb, being intent on fashioning the passible matter to its own
purpose, it unites itself to the personality thereof, though manifestly
it is not of the same substance; and thus of the active soul and
passive matter, one man is made out of two substances. And so we
confess that the soul is born from out the womb; but not as though,
before birth, it was nothing at all in itself. Thus, then, but in a way
much more sublime, the Son of God was born as man, just as the soul is
held to be born together with the body: not as though they both made
one substance, but that from both, one person results. Yet we do not
say that the Son of God began thus to exist: lest it be thought that
His Divinity is temporal. Nor do we acknowledge the flesh of the Son of
God to have been from eternity: lest it be thought that He took, not a
true human body, but some resemblance thereof. "

Reply to Objection 2: This was an argument of Nestorius, and it is thus
solved by Cyril in an epistle [*Cf. Acta Concil. Ephes. , p. 1, cap.
viii]: "We do not say that the Son of God had need, for His own sake,
of a second nativity, after that which is from the Father: for it is
foolish and a mark of ignorance to say that He who is from all
eternity, and co-eternal with the Father, needs to begin again to
exist. But because for us and for our salvation, uniting the human
nature to His Person, He became the child of a woman, for this reason
do we say that He was born in the flesh. "

Reply to Objection 3: Nativity regards the person as its subject, the
nature as its terminus. Now, it is possible for several transformations
to be in the same subject: yet must they be diversified in respect of
their termini. But we do not say this as though the eternal nativity
were a transformation or a movement, but because it is designated by
way of a transformation or movement.

Reply to Objection 4: Christ can be said to have been born twice in
respect of His two nativities. For just as he is said to run twice who
runs at two different times, so can He be said to be born twice who is
born once from eternity and once in time: because eternity and time
differ much more than two different times, although each signifies a
measure of duration.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the Blessed Virgin can be called Christ's Mother in respect of His
temporal nativity?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin cannot be called
Christ's Mother in respect of His temporal nativity. For, as stated
above ([4173]Q[32], A[4]), the Blessed Virgin Mary did not cooperate
actively in begetting Christ, but merely supplied the matter. But this
does not seem sufficient to make her His Mother: otherwise wood might
be called the mother of the bed or bench. Therefore it seems that the
Blessed Virgin cannot be called the Mother of Christ.

Objection 2: Further, Christ was born miraculously of the Blessed
Virgin. But a miraculous begetting does not suffice for motherhood or
sonship: for we do not speak of Eve as being the daughter of Adam.
Therefore neither should Christ be called the Son of the Blessed
Virgin.

Objection 3: Further, motherhood seems to imply partial separation of
the semen. But, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii), "Christ's body
was formed, not by a seminal process, but by the operation of the Holy
Ghost. " Therefore it seems that the Blessed Virgin should not be called
the Mother of Christ.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 1:18): "The generation of Christ
was in this wise. When His Mother Mary was espoused to Joseph," etc.

I answer that, The Blessed Virgin Mary is in truth and by nature the
Mother of Christ. For, as we have said above ([4174]Q[5], A[2];[4175]
Q[31], A[5]), Christ's body was not brought down from heaven, as the
heretic Valentine maintained, but was taken from the Virgin Mother, and
formed from her purest blood. And this is all that is required for
motherhood, as has been made clear above ([4176]Q[31], A[5];[4177]
Q[32], A[4]). Therefore the Blessed Virgin is truly Christ's Mother.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([4178]Q[32], A[3]), not every
generation implies fatherhood or motherhood and sonship, but only the
generation of living things. Consequently when inanimate things are
made from some matter, the relationship of motherhood and sonship does
not follow from this, but only in the generation of living things,
which is properly called nativity.

Reply to Objection 2: As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii): "The
temporal nativity by which Christ was born for our salvation is, in a
way, natural, since a Man was born of a woman, and after the due lapse
of time from His conception: but it is also supernatural, because He
was begotten, not of seed, but of the Holy Ghost and the Blessed
Virgin, above the law of conception. " Thus, then, on the part of the
mother, this nativity was natural, but on the part of the operation of
the Holy Ghost it was supernatural. Therefore the Blessed Virgin is the
true and natural Mother of Christ.

Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([4179]Q[31], A[5], ad 3;[4180]
Q[32], A[4]), the resolution of the woman's semen is not necessary for
conception; neither, therefore, is it required for motherhood.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the Blessed Virgin should be called the Mother of God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the Blessed Virgin should not be called
the Mother of God. For in the Divine mysteries we should not make any
assertion that is not taken from Holy Scripture. But we read nowhere in
Holy Scripture that she is the mother or parent of God, but that she is
the "mother of Christ" or of "the Child," as may be seen from Mat.
1:18. Therefore we should not say that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother
of God.

Objection 2: Further, Christ is called God in respect of His Divine
Nature. But the Divine Nature did not first originate from the Virgin.
Therefore the Blessed Virgin should not be called the Mother of God.

Objection 3: Further, the word "God" is predicated in common of Father,
Son, and Holy Ghost. If, therefore, the Blessed Virgin is Mother of God
it seems to follow that she was the Mother of Father, Son, and Holy
Ghost, which cannot be allowed. Therefore the Blessed Virgin should not
be called Mother of God.

On the contrary, In the chapters of Cyril, approved in the Council of
Ephesus (P. 1, Cap. xxvi), we read: "If anyone confess not that the
Emmanuel is truly God, and that for this reason the Holy Virgin is the
Mother of God, since she begot of her flesh the Word of God made flesh,
let him be anathema. "

I answer that, As stated above ([4181]Q[16], A[1]), every word that
signifies a nature in the concrete can stand for any hypostasis of that
nature. Now, since the union of the Incarnation took place in the
hypostasis, as above stated ([4182]Q[2], A[3]), it is manifest that
this word "God" can stand for the hypostasis, having a human and a
Divine nature. Therefore whatever belongs to the Divine and to the
human nature can be attributed to that Person: both when a word is
employed to stand for it, signifying the Divine Nature, and when a word
is used signifying the human nature. Now, conception and birth are
attributed to the person and hypostasis in respect of that nature in
which it is conceived and born. Since, therefore, the human nature was
taken by the Divine Person in the very beginning of the conception, as
stated above ([4183]Q[33], A[3]), it follows that it can be truly said
that God was conceived and born of the Virgin. Now from this is a woman
called a man's mother, that she conceived him and gave birth to him.
Therefore the Blessed Virgin is truly called the Mother of God. For the
only way in which it could be denied that the Blessed Virgin is the
Mother of God would be either if the humanity were first subject to
conception and birth, before this man were the Son of God, as Photinus
said; or if the humanity were not assumed unto unity of the Person or
hypostasis of the Word of God, as Nestorius maintained. But both of
these are erroneous. Therefore it is heretical to deny that the Blessed
Virgin is the Mother of God.

Reply to Objection 1: This was an argument of Nestorius, and it is
solved by saying that, although we do not find it said expressly in
Scripture that the Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God, yet we do find
it expressly said in Scripture that "Jesus Christ is true God," as may
be seen 1 Jn. 5:20, and that the Blessed Virgin is the "Mother of Jesus
Christ," which is clearly expressed Mat. 1:18. Therefore, from the
words of Scripture it follows of necessity that she is the Mother of
God.

Again, it is written (Rom. 9:5) that Christ is of the Jews "according
to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed for ever. " But He is
not of the Jews except through the Blessed Virgin. Therefore He who is
"above all things, God blessed for ever," is truly born of the Blessed
Virgin as of His Mother.

Reply to Objection 2: This was an argument of Nestorius. But Cyril, in
a letter against Nestorius [*Cf. Acta Conc. Ephes. , p. 1, cap. ii],
answers it thus: "Just as when a man's soul is born with its body, they
are considered as one being: and if anyone wish to say that the mother
of the flesh is not the mother of the soul, he says too much. Something
like this may be perceived in the generation of Christ. For the Word of
God was born of the substance of God the Father: but because He took
flesh, we must of necessity confess that in the flesh He was born of a
woman. " Consequently we must say that the Blessed Virgin is called the
Mother of God, not as though she were the Mother of the Godhead, but
because she is the mother, according to His human nature, of the Person
who has both the divine and the human nature.

Reply to Objection 3: Although the name "God" is common to the three
Persons, yet sometimes it stands for the Person of the Father alone,
sometimes only for the Person of the Son or of the Holy Ghost, as
stated above (Q[16], A[1]; [4184]FP, Q[39], A[4]). So that when we say,
"The Blessed Virgin is the Mother of God," this word "God" stands only
for the incarnate Person of the Son.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there are two filiations in Christ?

Objection 1: It would seem that there are two filiations in Christ. For
nativity is the cause of filiation. But in Christ there are two
nativities. Therefore in Christ there are also two filiations.

Objection 2: Further, filiation, which is said of a man as being the
son of someone, his father or his mother, depends, in a way, on him:
because the very being of a relation consists "in being referred to
another"; wherefore if one of two relatives be destroyed, the other is
destroyed also. But the eternal filiation by which Christ is the Son of
God the Father depends not on His Mother, because nothing eternal
depends on what is temporal. Therefore Christ is not His Mother's Son
by temporal filiation. Either, therefore, He is not her Son at all,
which is in contradiction to what has been said above ([4185]AA[3],4),
or He must needs be her Son by some other temporal filiation. Therefore
in Christ there are two filiations.

Objection 3: Further, one of two relatives enters the definition of the
other; hence it is clear that of two relatives, one is specified from
the other. But one and the same cannot be in diverse species. Therefore
it seems impossible that one and the same relation be referred to
extremes which are altogether diverse. But Christ is said to be the Son
of the Eternal Father and a temporal mother, who are terms altogether
diverse. Therefore it seems that Christ cannot, by the same relation,
be called the Son of the Father and of His Mother Therefore in Christ
there are two filiations.

On the contrary, As Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii), things
pertaining to the nature are multiple in Christ; but not those things
that pertain to the Person. But filiation belongs especially to the
Person, since it is a personal property, as appears from what was said
in the [4186]FP, Q[32], A[3]; [4187]FP, Q[40], A[2]. Therefore there is
but one filiation in Christ.

I answer that, opinions differ on this question. For some, considering
only the cause of filiation, which is nativity, put two filiations in
Christ, just as there are two nativities. On the contrary, others,
considering only the subject of filiation, which is the person or
hypostasis, put only one filiation in Christ, just as there is but one
hypostasis or person. Because the unity or plurality of a relation is
considered in respect, not of its terms, but of its cause or of its
subject. For if it were considered in respect of its terms, every man
would of necessity have in himself two filiations---one in reference to
his father, and another in reference to his mother. But if we consider
the question aright, we shall see that every man bears but one relation
to both his father and his mother, on account of the unity of the cause
thereof. For man is born by one birth of both father and mother: whence
he bears but one relation to both. The same is said of one master who
teaches many disciples the same doctrine, and of one lord who governs
many subjects by the same power. But if there be various causes
specifically diverse, it seems that in consequence the relations differ
in species: wherefore nothing hinders several such relations being in
the same subject. Thus if a man teach grammar to some and logic to
others, his teaching is of a different kind in one case and in the
other; and therefore one and the same man may have different relations
as the master of different disciples, or of the same disciples in
regard to diverse doctrines. Sometimes, however, it happens that a man
bears a relation to several in respect of various causes, but of the
same species: thus a father may have several sons by several acts of
generation. Wherefore the

paternity cannot differ specifically, since the acts of generation are
specifically the same. And because several forms of the same species
cannot at the same time be in the same subject, it is impossible for
several paternities to be in a man who is the father of several sons by
natural generation. But it would not be so were he the father of one
son by natural generation and of another by adoption.

Now, it is manifest that Christ was not born by one and the same
nativity, of the Father from eternity, and of His Mother in time:
indeed, these two nativities differ specifically. Wherefore, as to
this, we must say that there are various filiations, one temporal and
the other eternal. Since, however, the subject of filiation is neither
the nature nor part of the nature, but the person or hypostasis alone;
and since in Christ there is no other hypostasis or person than the
eternal, there can be no other filiation in Christ but that which is in
the eternal hypostasis. Now, every relation which is predicated of God
from time does not put something real in the eternal God, but only
something according to our way of thinking, as we have said in the
[4188]FP, Q[13], A[7]. Therefore the filiation by which Christ is
referred to His Mother cannot be a real relation, but only a relation
of reason.

Consequently each opinion is true to a certain extent. For if we
consider the adequate causes of filiation, we must needs say that there
are two filiations in respect of the twofold nativity. But if we
consider the subject of filiation, which can only be the eternal
suppositum, then no other than the eternal filiation in Christ is a
real relation. Nevertheless, He has the relation of Son in regard to
His Mother, because it is implied in the relation of motherhood to
Christ. Thus God is called Lord by a relation which is implied in the
real relation by which the creature is subject to God. And although
lordship is not a real relation in God, yet is He really Lord through
the real subjection of the creature to Him. In the same way Christ is
really the Son of the Virgin Mother through the real relation of her
motherhood to Christ.

Reply to Objection 1: Temporal nativity would cause a real temporal
filiation in Christ if there were in Him a subject capable of such
filiation. But this cannot be; since the eternal suppositum cannot be
receptive of a temporal relation, as stated above. Nor can it be said
that it is receptive of temporal filiation by reason of the human
nature, just as it is receptive of the temporal nativity; because human
nature would need in some way to be the subject of filiation, just as
in a way it is the subject of nativity; for since an Ethiopian is said
to be white by reason of his teeth, it must be that his teeth are the
subject of whiteness. But human nature can nowise be the subject of
filiation, because this relation regards directly the person.

Reply to Objection 2: Eternal filiation does not depend on a temporal
mother, but together with this eternal filiation we understand a
certain temporal relation dependent on the mother, in respect of which
relation Christ is called the Son of His Mother.

Reply to Objection 3: One and being are mutually consequent, as is said
Metaph. iv. Therefore, just as it happens that in one of the extremes
of a relation there is something real, whereas in the other there is
not something real, but merely a certain aspect, as the Philosopher
observes of knowledge and the thing known; so also it happens that on
the part of one extreme there is one relation, whereas on the part of
the other there are many. Thus in man on the part of his parents there
is a twofold relation, the one of paternity, the other of motherhood,
which are specifically diverse, inasmuch as the father is the principle
of generation in one way, and the mother in another (whereas if many be
the principle of one action and in the same way---for instance, if
many. together draw a ship along---there would be one and the same
relation in all of them); but on the part of the child there is but one
filiation in reality, though there be two in aspect, corresponding to
the two relations in the parents, as considered by the intellect. And
thus in one way there is only one real filiation in Christ, which is in
respect of the Eternal Father: yet there is another temporal relation
in regard to His temporal mother.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether Christ was born without His Mother suffering?

Objection 1: It would seem that Christ was not born without His Mother
suffering. For just as man's death was a result of the sin of our first
parents, according to Gn. 2:17: "In what day soever ye shall eat, ye
shall [Vulg. : 'thou shalt eat of it, thou shalt] die"; so were the
pains of childbirth, according to Gn. 3:16: "In sorrow shalt thou bring
forth children. " But Christ was willing to undergo death.