After a few preliminary observa-
tions, it states: "The view given of our situation by con-
gress, is just, full, and explicit.
tions, it states: "The view given of our situation by con-
gress, is just, full, and explicit.
Hamilton - 1834 - Life on Hamilton - v1
248 THE LIFE OF
tions made beyond its strength, and not the cause, though,
at that time, it partook of the nature of both; -- that as
prices rose, the value of money fell; and that as the public
expenditures became immense, no taxes which the people
could bear on that quantity of money which is deemed a pro-
per medium, would have been sufficient for the current de-
mands of the nation, had it been gold instead of paper; that
the idea was chimerical, that without resorting to foreign
loans, we could do otherwise than augment the quantity
of our artificial wealth beyond those bounds which were pro-
per to preserve its credit.
That the quantity of money in circulation, previous to the
revolution, was about thirty millions of dollars, which was
barely sufficient for our interior commerce, the foreign trade
being carried on by barter; and as the balance of our prin-
cipal trade was against us, and the specie was transferred
to meet that balance, no part of it entered into the home
circulation; and that it would have been impossible, by
loans and taxes, to bring such part of it into the public cof-
fers as would have served the purposes of the war, without
obstructing commercial operations.
He next shows, that the product of the taxes, both from
the peculiar situation of the country, and by reference to
the condition of other countries, would necessarily be ina-
dequate to our wants.
Hence he infers, that congress, when their emissions rose
to thirty millions, were obliged, in order to keep up the sup-
plies, to go on creating artificial revenues by new emissions;
and that the only remedy then was a foreign loan, which
judiciously applied, and assisted by a vigorous taxation,
would have created a credit that might have prevented the
excess of emissions. He contends, on the same principles,
that in proportion to the extent of the depreciation at that
time, was the impossibility of raising the money value by
any other means, and that in the existing situation of the
country, a foreign loan was the only expedient.
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? HAMILTON. 249
He adds, "these reasonings may prove useless, as the ne-
cessity of a loan is admitted, but that his object is to establish
good principles, the want of which has brought us to the
desperate crisis we have arrived at, and may betray us into
fatal mistakes. "
The next inquiry raised is, -- How is the loan to be em-
ployed ? -- Two plans were stated to have been in contem-
plation :--one, that of buying up the paper, which he shows
would have been impracticable, from the rapid artificial
appreciation of it, which would require means far beyond
the compass of the national resources, while this apprecia-
tion would be more relative to the purchasing medium, than
to the prices of commodities, as the value of the paper might
be raised by the combination of individuals, while the re-
duction of prices must necessarily be slow, depending, as it
would, on the sentiments of the great body of the people.
The result of this plan, he states, would be "that the
money would return into circulation almost as fast as it was
drawn out, and at the end of the year the treasury would be
completely empty; -- the foreign loan dissipated, and the
state of the finances as deplorable as ever. It would be
much better, instead of purchasing up the paper currency,
to purchase the supplies-with. the specje^? _biIia^3r. '. 'A--
great source of error," he observes,"u in disquisitions of this
nature, is the judging of events by abstract calculations,
which, though geometrically true, are^alse as they relate
to the concerns of beings governed more by passion and
prejudice, than by an enlightened sense of their interests.
A degree of illusion mixes itself in all the affairs of society.
The opinion of objects . has more influence than their real
nature. The quantity of money in circulation, is certainly
a chief cause of its declining; but we find it is depreciated
more than five times as mu:h as it ought to be: -- the ex-
cess is derived from opinion, -- a want of confidence. In
like manner, we deceive ourselves, when we suppose the
vol. i. 32
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? 250 THI LIFE OF
value will increase in proportion as the quantity is lessened;
opinion will operate here also, and a thousand circumstan-
ces may promote or counteract the principle. "
I The other plan proposed, was to convert the loan into
(merchandise, and import it on public account. This plan,
'though better than the former, he deems also liable to great
objections, but not wholly to be rejected; and after suggest-
ing a tax in kind, he contends, that "the only plan which
can preserve the currency, is one that will make it the im-
mediate interest of the moneyed men to co-operate with go-
vernment in its support. This country is in the same pre-
dicament in which France was previous to the famous Mis-
sissippi scheme, projected by Mr. Law. Its paper money,
like ours, had dwindled to nothing, and no efforts of the
government could revive it, because the people had lost all
confidence in its ability. Mr. Law, who had muchmore pene-
tration than integrity, readily perceived that no plan could
succeed, which did not unite the interest and credit of rich in-
dividuals with those of the state; and upon this he framed
the idea of his project, which so far agreed in principle with
the Bank of England, -- the foundation was good, but the
superstructure too vast. The projectors aimed at unlimit-
ed wealth, and the government itself expected too much,
which was the cause of the ultimate miscarriage of the
scheme, and of all the mischiefs that befel the kingdom in
consequence. It will be our wisdom to select what is good
in this plan, and in any others that have gone before us,
avoiding their defects and excesses. Something on a simi-
lar principle in America, will alone accomplish the resto-
ration of paper credit, and establish a permanent fund for
the future exigencies of government. "
He then states his plan to be an American bank, to be
instituted by congress for ten years, under the denomination
of " The Bank of the United States. "
The basis of this bank was to be a foreign loan of two
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? HAMILTON. 251
millions sterling, to be thrown into the bank as a part of its
stock; a subscription to be opened in the currency of two
hundred millions of dollars, and the subscribers to be incor-
porated; the payment of which to be guarantied by the
government on the dissolution of the bank, by ten millions
of specie, being at the rate of one for twenty, or by a cur-
rency bona fide equivalent, and the annual money taxes to
become part of the stock.
All the remaining paper to be called in, (at the option of
the possessor,) and bank notes to be issued in lieu of it for so
much sterling, payable to the bearer in three months from
the date, at two per cent, per annum interest; a pound
sterling to be estimated at two hundred and sixty-six and
two-thirds of the existing dollars ;* the interest payab'e
punctually in specie at the end of the three months, when
the possessor might have the bank notes renewed, or receive
the sum deposited in the old paper; all the money issued
from the bank to be of the same denomination, and on the
same terms.
An annual loan of two millions sterling to be furnished
to congress by the bank, at four per cent. , and the whole,
or part of the stock, by arrangement between the bank and
a Board of Trade, which he contemplated, to be employed
in commerce. If only a part, the residue to be loaned oc-
casionally, by permission of congress, in such sums as may
be thought expedient, at an interest of six per cent. , on
private securities; the government to hold one half of the
stock, and the bank to be managed by trustees of the stock-
holders, under the inspection of the Board of Trade.
The part of the manuscript which details the effect of the
commercial operations, is mutilated; but the result is sta-
ted to be, that the war might be carried on three years, and
the government incur a debt of only four hundred and
* Sixty dollars for one dollar of four shillings and sixpence sterling.
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? 252 THE LIFE OF
twenty thousand pounds sterling, above the guaranty of
the subscription, which it is probable would not be requi-
red, as the corporation would find it their interest to obtain
a renewal of their charter.
( Having presented his plan, he observes, "that he does
not believe that its advantages will be as great as they ap-
pear in speculation, from a less profitable commerce than
is supposed, and from other causes. I am aware how apt
the imagination is to be heated in projects of this nature,
and to oycffook the fallacies which often lurk in first prin-
ciple^; But when I consider, on the other hand, that this
scheme slands on the firm footing of public and private faith,
that it links the interest of the state in an intimate connex-
ion with those of the rich individuals belonging to it; that
it turns the wealth and influence of both into a commercial
channel for mutual benefit^rhich must afford advantages
not to be estimated; that there is a defect of a circula-
ting medium, which this plan supplies by a sort of creative
power, converting what is so produced, into a real and effi-
cacious instrument of trade; I say, when I consider these
things, and many more that might be added, I cannot for-
bear feeling a degree of confidence in the plan, and at least
hoping that it is capable of being improved into something
that will give relief to our finances. "
To enlarge its advantages, he suggests that a variety of
secondary expedients may be invented, and the whole scheme
of annuities engrafted upon it.
That the European loan might be converted into a Euro-
pean bank, to aid the American bank, by engaging the inte-
rests of the wealthy, and that the bank might also make con-
tracts with the government for the supplies of the army, on
terms mutually beneficial. He then expatiates on the rea-
sons for giving one half of the stock to the government, and
answers the objection that the plan might be prejudicial to
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? HAMILTON. 253
trade, by proposing a guaranty from the government not
to grant any monopolies.
To the scheme, notes are appended, explanatory of the
operation of the project; in one of which he states, "a Board
of Trade ought immediately to be established. The royal
council of France, and the subordinate chambers in each
province, form an excellent institution, and may, in many
respects, prove a model. Congress have too long neglect-
ed to institute a good scheme of administration, and throw
public business into proper executive departments. For
commerce, I prefer a board; but for most other things, sin-
gle men. We want a Minister of War, a Minister of Fo-
reign Affairs, a Minister of Finance, and a Minister of Ma-
rine. There is always more decision, more despatch, more
secrecy, and more responsibility where single men, than
where bodies are concerned. By a plan of this. kind, we
should blend the advantages of a monarchy and of a repub-
lic, in a happy and beneficial union. Men will only devote
their lives and attention to a profession on which they can
build reputation and consequence, which they do not share
with others. If this plan should be approved, congress
ought immediately to appoint a Minister of Finance. He
ought to be a man of ability, to comprehend it in all its con-
sequences, and of eloquence to make others comprehend
and relish it. He ought, besides, to have some general
knowledge of the science, and to address himself to some
of the most suitable moneyed men, to convince them of the
utility of the project. The congress must establish the
bank, and set it agoing. I know of no man that has better
pretensions than yourself, and shall be very happy to hear
that_congress have said,' Thou art the man. '"
(The first essay of an individual, who has been designated
as "the Founder of the public credit of the United States,"
will have interest, (although his project was not adopted in\
all its parts,) as evincing the progressive growth of his mind. y
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? 254 THE LIFE OF
At a time when the intricate science of finance was little
understood in the United States, the statesman will per-
ceive the clear and sound views which are taken of the
condition of the currency; and will remark, with admira-
tion, how far the author of this plan rose above all the crude
opinions of that day; rejecting the whole scheme of legis-
lative expedients, and pointing out, as the only basis of a
permanent system, the combination of public with private
capital. It has been observed, that this project was not
embraced in all its parts; but it had, nevertheless, its influ-
ence on the mind of the eminent financier of the revolution;
for within a short time after, a plan of a bank in Pennsyl-
vania was introduced by him, founded on private contribu-
tions, to the amount of ? 300,000 sterling, by patriotic indi-
viduals, to furnish the army with a temporary supply of pro-
visions, which, though limited in its views, led on to farther
results of moment. The idea of executive departments,
also, from this time, became a topic of discussion in con-
gress; which, as will be seen hereafter, was more earnest-
ly pressed upon the consideration of that body by him, and
was ultimately adopted, almost in the terms proposed by
Hamilton.
A question has been recently raised, as to the merit of
having first suggested an American bank. It would be idle
to allege, that with similar institutions existing in Europe,
it was not a topic frequently adverted to by thinking men
in America; and there is found, within a short time after
the date of Hamilton's communication, a suggestion, in a
gazette of Massachusetts, of the Bank of Amsterdam as a
model for such an institution; but the most careful research-
es show, that Hamilton's first revolutionary plan had more
than a twelvemonth's priority* over that of the Superin-
* This remark refers to the Bank of North America. Hamilton's first plan
was addressed to Robert Morris, in 1779. The Bank of Pennsylvania was
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? HAMILTON. 255
tendent of finance, of which the merit is claimed by his as-
sistant. *
Although the idea of a bank, with powers to carry on
commercial operations, may be regarded with some dis-
trust, and the extent of the plan may be supposed to dero-
gate from its merit, yet a careful examination of this scheme
will show, that it was the only one, proposed at that time,
which could have absorbed the depreciated paper, and have
restored a sound currency; which the other projects could
not have effected. The idea of using the credit of govern-
ment in mercantile adventures, which is the only objectional
part of the scheme, as a general one, was peculiarly felici-
tous at the time it was suggested, and might have been in-
strumental in producing a uniform sytem of commercial re-
gulations. As a mere temporary expedient, it did not es-
cape the vigilant observation of Robert Morris, who enter-
ed into several commercial adventures, on account of the
United States, to pay the interest on the foreign debt, which
proved a great convenience to the treasury, and resulted in
a small profit to the government.
During the series of military disasters at the south, the
sufferings of the army at Morristown, in a winter of memo-
rable severity, baffle description; -- a post from which, in
the reduced numbers of his men, Washington could not
move with safety, and which possessed advantages that
more than counterbalanced the inconvenience of its rugged
and snow-clad hills. These sufferings were much increased
by the introduction of a new system of requisitions, and by
a most unwise interference with the civil staff of the army,
reported to congress June 22d, 1780. The Bank of North America, it will be
subsequently seen, was proposed by Robert Morris, in May, 1781.
* Mr. G. Morris was appointed assistant to R. Morris, July 6th, 1781. It
is stated, in a letter of Mr. G. Morris to a friend--" The first bank in this coun-
try was planned by your humble servant. " -- Life of G. Morris, voL i, p. 235.
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? 256 THE LIFE OF
which led to the resignation of General Greene, as quarter-
master-general.
To meet this emergency, a committee was appointed by
congress, to confer with the commander-in-chief, of which
General Schuyler was the leading member. This gentle-
man, disgusted with the injuries he had received, after the
sentence of a court martial, (which was long cruelly with-
held from his most urgent solicitations,) acquitting him of all
misconduct, and declaring that he was entitled to the high-
est honours,* had been recently returned to congress; hav-
ing determined never more to fill any other stations than
such as were derived directly from the people, to whom he
chose only to be responsible. His arrival in camp was wel-
comed by Washington, with all the ardour of devoted friend-
ship; and the result of their conferences, aided by General
Greene, was a plan investing the commander-in-chief with
powers adequate to the exigency. But an over-cautious
congress withheld from him a trust, which had been before
exercised with unexampled moderation, and with infinite
public advantage. f
The golden opportunity of regaining New-York was thus
lost; and Washington, with victory in his grasp, was com-
pelled to submit to the insulting inroads of the enemy, from
a want of means to put his little army in motion. But even
thus situated, he was unwilling to be inactive; and learning
that a body of the enemy was stationed at Staten Island,
he despatched Lord Stirling to attack them, accompanied
* Mr. Jay, in a letter of February 12th, 1778, says: "Congress has refused
to accept your resignation. Twelve states are represented; New-England
and Pennsylvania against you. The delegates of the latter are new men,
and not free from the influence of the former. From New-York, south, you
have fast friends. I have the best authority to assure you, the commander-
in-chief wishes you to retain your commission. "
t And yet, soon after, martial law was proclaimed in Pennsylvania, (June
9th, 1780,) in order to enable the state officers to procure supplies, and to
drive strangers from Philadelphia.
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? HAMILTON. 257
V.
by Colonel Hamilton to aid in the execution of the project.
But it appears, from a letter of the latter, written on the
night selected for the attack, that the ice at Bergen Point
was impassable; and the expedition returned, without hav-
ing effected any thing of moment.
The situation of the prisoners being still a source of great
disquietude, Hamilton was sent on a commission, with Gene-
ral St. Clair and Colonel Carrington, (with the latter of
whom he maintained an intimacy through life, founded on
the highest respect for his character and abilities,) to meet
certain British commissioners at Amboy.
He writes thence, on the seventeenth of March, "that the
enemy, as was supposed, had no idea of treating on mutual
ground; that the commission was broken up; and that they
were in private conversation, entertaining hopes that the
liberation of our prisoners would be effected on admissible
terms. " This desirable result was not attained.
The sufferings of the army now produced an effect which
had long been apprehended. "Two regiments of Connec-
ticut paraded under arms, with a declared resolution to re-
turn home, or obtain subsistence at the point of the bayo-
net. The interference of the officers, and decisive mea-
sures, soon suppressed the mutiny; a discovery was made,
that they had been tampered with by the enemy, who, ho-
ping to take advantage of their supposed disaffection, moved
a force suddenly to Springfield. "* To counteract this move-
ment, General Greene was sent forward by General Wash-
ington, and Hamilton was directed to reconnoitre. The
battle of Springfield ensued, "in which the veteran Knyp-
hausen was baffled and almost beaten, by the gallantry of
Greene, at the head of a force of continentals and militia,
amounting to little more than a third of the enemy," f-- the
last of his distinguished achievements at the north.
* Chief Justice Marshall. t Colonel Hamilton's Eulogium.
vol. i. 33
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? 253 THE LIFE OF
The anxiety produced by the discontents of the army, and
the views entertained at head quarters of the national pros-
pects, are strongly depicted in a letter transmitted by the
commander-in-chief to Messrs. Schuyler and Peabody, a
committee of congress.
After a few preliminary observa-
tions, it states: "The view given of our situation by con-
gress, is just, full, and explicit. The measures they have re-
commended are well adapted to the emergency, and of in-
dispensable necessity. I very freely give it as my opinion,
that unless they are carried into execution, in the fullest ex-
tent, and with the greatest decision and rapidity, it will be
impossible for us to undertake the intended co-operation
with any reasonable prospect of success.
'' The consequences you have well delineated. The suc-
cour designed for our benefit will prove a serious misfor-
une; and instead of rescuing us from the embarrassments
we experience, and from the danger with which we are
threatened, will, in all probability, precipitate our ruin.
Drained and weakened as we already are, the exertions we
shall make, though they may be too imperfect to secure
success, will at any rate be such as to leave us in a state of
relaxation and debility, from which it will be difficult, if
not impracticable, to recover. The country exhausted, the
people disheartened, the consequence and reputation of
these states in Europe sunk, -- our friends chagrined and
discouraged, our enemies deriving new credit, new confi-
dence, and new resources, -- we have not, nor ought we to
wish, an alternative. The court of France has done so
much that we must make a decisive effort on our part.
Our situation demands it, --- 'tis expected. We have the
means to success, without some unforeseen accident; and
it only remains to employ them. But the conjuncture re-
quires all our wisdom, and all our energy. Such is the
present state of this country, that the utmost exertion of
its resources, though equal, is not more than equal, to the
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? HAMILTON. 259
object, and our measures must be so taken as to call them
into immediate and full effect. " After some observations,
indicating the necessity of obtaining a larger supply of men,
it is stated: ". Unless the principal part of the force be com-
posed of men regularly organized, and on the continuance
of whose services we can rely, nothing decisive can be at-
tempted. The militia are too precarious a dependence to
justify such an attempt, where they form a particular part
of the plan. Militia cannot have the necessary habits, nor
the consistency, either for an assault or a siege. In em-
ploying them essentially, we should run the risk of being
abandoned in the most critical moments.
"The mode by draft is, I am persuaded, the only effica-
cious one to obtain men. It appears to me certain, that it
is the only one to obtain them in time; nor can the period
you have appointed for bringing them into the field be de-
layed, without defeating the object. I have little doubt,
that at any time, and much less at the present juncture, the
power of government, exerted with confidence, will be equal
to the purpose of drafting. The hopes of the people, ele-
vated by the prospect before them, will induce a cheerful
compliance with this and all the other measures of vigour
which have been recommended, and which the exigency
requires. "
Similar views were, with the greatest solemnity, and most
eloquently, presented to congress throughout the year.
The anticipated reinforcements from France, to which
this extract refers, and which excited the expectations of
the country to so great a degree, arrived off the coast early
in July.
Soon after the intelligence was received at head quarters,
a letter was addressed to the committee of co-operation,
stating, "that the Guadaloupe had arrived in New-York,
and brought an account that she had fallen in with a large
French fleet, consisting of several sail of the line, and a num-
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? 260 THE LIFE OF
ber of transports, between the Capes of Virginia and Dela-
ware. This intelligence has every appearance of authen-
ticity; and, if true, the arrival of the fleet on the coast may
instantly be looked for. This, indeed, must be the case at
any rate from the time they are said to have sailed. It
cannot be too much lamented, that our preparations are
still so greatly behind hand; not a thousand men, that I have
heard of, have yet joined the army, and in all probability
the period for commencing our operations is at hand. I am
happy to learn, that a spirit of animation has diffused itself
throughout the states, from which we may expect the hap-
piest consequences. But the exigency is so pressing, that
we ought to multiply our efforts, to give new activity and
despatch to our measures; levying and forwarding the men,
providing the supplies of every sort required; forage and
transportation, demand particular attention. After what
had been preconcerted with the honourable the congress,
after two month's previous notice of the intended succour,
if our allies find us unprepared, and are obliged to wait se-
veral weeks in a state of inaction, it is easy to conceive how
unfavourable will be the impressions, which if improved with
all the vigour in our power, is less than were to be wished for
an undertaking of so arduous and important a nature. So
much is at stake, -- so much to be hoped, -- so much to be
lost, that we shall be inexcusable if we do not employ all
our zeal and all our exertion. "
The arrival of these reinforcements awakened a new in-
terest to effect a descent on New-York.
A plan of operations was immediately forwarded to Cape
Henry, with a communication, apprizing the French com-
manders, Rochambeau and De Ternay, of the naval force
and position of the enemy; indicating a station off Sandy
Hook for the purpose of intercepting the troops which had
embarked at Charleston on their return to New-York, and
proposing a combined attack on that place.
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? HAMILTON. 261
Intelligence being received of the arrival of Admiral
Greaves, a letter was prepared by Colonel Hamilton, urging
the French commanders, in case of the superiority of their
force, still to proceed to Sandy Hook; in which he states,
that later information had led them to believe that the har-
bour of New-York was more practicable than had been sup-
posed, and strongly inciting them by "the greater glory
which would be derived from overcoming increased diffi-
culties," to adhere to the original plan. The French were,
however, unwilling to encounter the enemy, and made sail
for Newport; whither Sir Henry Clinton, apprehensive of
losing it, made a rapid movement. Washington, on his de-
parture, instantly pushed for New-York, when Clinton sud-
denly returning, the Americans recrossed the Hudson. From
this period, the respective armies retired to their former
quarters, the Americans waiting farther reinforcements from
France.
The uncertain counsels which seemed to have governed
the French commanders, and the course of the correspond-
ence with them from head quarters, notwithstanding ths
mission of La Fayette to Newport, rendered a personal in-
terview between them and Washington desirable, in order
to efface an impression entertained by Rochambeau, that his
communications had received less attention than he ima-
gined them entitled lo; -- a measure which Hamilton ad-
vised, influenced by letters from Colonel Fleury.
With this view, General Washington having ordered Ge-
neral Greene to move to Tappan, in order to protect West
Point, proceeded with La Fayette, Hamilton, and McHen-
ry, to meet the Count and Admiral at Hartford, on the
twentieth of September.
The arrival of Rodney, rendering the projected attack on
New-York impracticable, it was reluctantly abandoned;
and after some general conversation as to the probable
strength of the reinforcements, and the policy of their future
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? 262 THE LIFE OP
operations, the commanders returned to their respective
quarters.
During this journey, an event occurred which threatened
the most alarming consequences to the country, and was
attended with circumstances of the deepest interest.
As Washington and La Fayette were returning from
Hartford, the former proposed to visit some works which
had been recently erected, and as General Arnold, who had
command at West Point, was waiting breakfast for them,
Hamilton and McHenry proceeded to his quarters, at the
house of Mr. Beverley Robinson, to announce the approach
of the General.
While they were sitting at table, Arnold received a note,
stating the arrest of Major Andre. He immediately left
the table, ran up stairs, mentioned the event to his wife, and
left her, though fainting, under the pretence of preparing
for the reception of the commander-in-chief at West Point.
The General and a part of his suite learning Mrs. Ar-
nold's indisposition before they entered the house, embark-
ed for the Point, and were astonished to find that Arnold
was not there. During their absence, Colonel Hamilton
received the papers which had been despatched from the
lines in quest of the commander-in-chief, and sent him the
alarming tidings. Hamilton and McHenry rode instantly
to the water's edge in pursuit of the traitor, who had, by
this time, proceeded some distance in a barge, which con-
veyed him on board the Vulture, whence he addressed an
audacious letter to Washington.
Irritated and appalled as Washington was, his first thought
was to send a message to Mrs. Arnold, stating that although
his duty had rendered it necessary to endeavour to capture
her husband, he found pleasure in soothing her sorrows, by
the assurance that he was safe; while Hamilton wrote to
General Greene, who was uninformed of the extent of the
treason, to put his army under marching orders.
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? HAMILTON. 263
"The feelings of the whole army," says La Fayette, from
whom these incidents are derived, "were most liberal in
behalf of Andre; but none was more impressed with those
sentiments of generosity and sympathy than Colonel Ha-
milton. He was daily searching some way to save him.
Every wish to that effect having proved impossible, Hamil-
ton, who was as sensible as any other of that impossibility,
and one of those who lamented it the most, published a nar-
rative of the events, and a portraiture of the unfortunate
Andre, which is a masterpiece of literary talents and amia-
ble sensibility. " As it embraces all the essential circum-
stances of this interesting scene, and has been erroneously
published, it may not improperly be introduced into the
biography of its author.
HAMILTON TO LAURENS.
Since my return from Hartford, my dear Laurens, my
mind has been too little at ease to permit me to write to
you sooner. It has been wholly occupied by the affecting
and tragic consequences of Arnold's treason. My feelings
were never put to so severe a trial. You will no doubt
have heard the principal facts before this reaches you; but
there are particulars to which my situation gave me access,
that cannot have come to your knowledge from public re-
port, which I am persuaded you will find interesting.
From several circumstances, the project seems to have
originated with Arnold himself, and to have been long
premeditated. The first overture is traced back to some
time in June last. It was conveyed in a letter to Colonel
Robinson, the substance of which was, that the ingratitude
he had experienced from his country, concurring with other
causes, had entirely changed his principles; that he now
only sought to restore himself to the favour of his king, by
some signal proof of his repentance, and would be happy
to open a correspondence with Sir Henry Clinton for that
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? 264 THE LIFE OF
purpose. About this period he made a journey to Connecti-
cut; on his return from which to Philadelphia, he solicited
the command of West Point, alleging that the effects of
his wound had disqualified him for the active duties of the
field. The sacrifice of this important post was the atone-
ment he intended to make. General Washington hesitated
the less to gratify an officer who had rendered such eminent
services, as he was convinced the post might be safely
entrusted to one who had given so many distinguished
proofs of his bravery. In the beginning of August he
joined the army, and renewed his application. The ene-
my at this juncture had embarked the greatest part of their
force on an expedition to Rhode-Island, and our army was
in motion to compel them to relinquish the enterprise or to
attack New-York in its weakened state. The General of-
fered Arnold the left wing of the army, which he declined,
on the pretext already mentioned, but not without visible
embarrassment. He certainly might have executed the
duties of such a temporary command, and it was expected
from his enterprising temper, that he would gladly have
embraced so splendid an opportunity. But he did not
choose to be diverted a moment from his favourite object;
probably from an apprehension, that some different dispo-
sition might have taken place which would have excluded
him. The extreme solicitude he discovered to get posses-
sion of the post, would have led to a suspicion of the trea-
chery, had it been possible, from his past conduct, to have
supposed him capable of it.
The correspondence thus began, was carried on between
Arnold and Major Andre, Adjutant General to the British ar-
my, in behalf of Sir Henry Clinton, under feigned signatures,
and in a mercantile disguise. In an intercepted letter of Ar-
nold. which lately fell into our hands, he proposes an inter-
view " to settle the risks and profits of the copartnership,"
and in the same style of metaphor intimates an expected aug-
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? HAMILTON. 265
mentation of the garrison, and speaks of it as the means of
extending their traffic. It appears by another letter, that
Andre was to have met him on the lines, under the sanc-
tion of a flag, in the character of Mr. John Anderson. But
some cause or other, not known, prevented this interview.
The twentieth of last month, Robinson and Andre went
up the river in the Vulture sloop of war. Robinson sent a
flag to Arnold with two letters, one to General Putnam,
enclosed in another to himself, proposing an interview with
Putnam, or in his absence with Arnold, to adjust some pri-
vate concerns. The one to General Putnam was evidently
meant as a cover to the other, in case, by accident, the let-
ters should have fallen under the inspection of a third per-
son.
General Washington crossed the river on his way to
Hartford, the day these despatches arrived. Arnold, con-
ceiving he must have heard of the flag, thought it necessa-
ry, for the sake of appearances, to submit the letters to
him, and ask his opinion of the propriety of complying
with the request, The General, with his usual caution,
though without the least surmise of the design, dissuaded
him from it, and advised him to reply to Robinson, that
whatever related to his private affairs must be of a civil
nature, and could only properly be addressed to the civil
authority. This reference fortunately deranged the plan,
and was the first link in the chain of events that led to the
detection. The interview could no longer take place in
the form of a flag, but was obliged to be managed in a se-
cret manner.
Arnold employed one Smith to go on board the Vulture
the night of the twenty-second, to bring Andre on shore
with a pass for Mr. John Anderson. Andre came ashore
accordingly, and was conducted within a picket of ours to
the house of Smith, where Arnold and he remained together
in close conference all that night and the day following.
vol. i. 34
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? 2G6 THE LIFE OF
At day light in the morning, the commanding officer at
King's Ferry, without the privity of Arnold, moved a couple
of pieces of cannon to a point opposite to where the Vul-
ture lay, and obliged her to take a more remote station.
This event, or some lurking distrust, made the boatmen re-
fuse to convey the two passengers back, and disconcerted
Arnold so much, that by one of those strokes of infatuation
which often confound the schemes of men conscious of
guilt, he insisted on Andre's exchanging his uniform for a
disguise, and returning in a mode different from that in
which he came. Andre, who had been undesignedly
brought within our posts, in the first instance, remonstrated
warmly against this new and dangerous expedient. But
Arnold, persisting in declaring it impossible for him to
return as he came, he at length reluctantly yielded to his
direction, and consented to change his dress, and take the
route he recommended. Smith furnished the disguise, and
in the evening passed King's Ferry with him, and proceeded
to Crompond, where they stopped the remainder of the
night, (at the instance of a militia officer,) to avoid being sus-
pected by him. The next morning they resumed their journey,
Smith accompanying Andre a little beyond Pine's Bridge,
where he left him. He had reached Tarrytown, when he
was taken up by three militia men, who rushed out of the
woods, and seized his horse. At this critical moment, his
presence of mind forsook him. Instead of producing his
pass, which would have extricated him from our parties,
and could have done him no harm with his own, he asked the
militia men if they were of the upper or lower party, dis-
tinctive appellations known among the refugee corps. The
militia men replied, they were of the lower party; upon
which he told them he was a British officer, and pressed
them not to detain him as he was upon urgent business.
This confession removed all doubt; and it was in vain he
afterwards produced his pass. He was instantly forced off
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? HAMILTON. 267
to a place of greater security ; where, after a careful search,
there were found concealed in the feet of his stockings, se-
veral papers of importance delivered to him by Arnold.
Among these there were a plan of the fortifications of West
Point, a memorial from the engineer on the attack and de-
fence of the place, returns of the garrison, cannon, and
stores, copy of the minutes of a council of war held by Ge-
neral Washington a few weeks before. The prisoner at
first was inadvertently ordered to Arnold; but on recollec-
tion, while still on the way, he was countermanded and
sent to Old Salem.
The papers were enclosed in a letter to General Wash-
ington, which having taken a route different from that by
which he returned, made a circuit, that afforded leisure for
another letter, through an ill-judged delicacy, written to
Arnold, with information of Anderson's capture, to get to
him an hour before General Washington arrived at his
quarters, time enough to elude the fate that awaited him.
He went down the river in his barge to the Vulture, with
such precipitate confusion, that he did not take with him
a single paper useful to the enemy. On the first notice of
the affair he was pursued, but much too late to be over-
taken.
There was some colour for imagining it was a part of
the plan to betray the General into the hands of the ene-
my: Arnold was very anxious to ascertain from him the
precise day of his return, and the enemy's movement seem
to have corresponded to this point. But if it was really
the case, it was very injudicious. The success must have
depended on surprise, and as the officers at the advanced
posts were not in the secret, their measures might have
given the alarm, and General Washington, taking the com-
mand of the post, might have rendered the whole scheme
abortive. Arnold, it is true, had so dispersed the garrison
as to have made a defence difficult, but not impracticable;
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? 268 THE LIFE OF
and the acquisition of West Point was of such magnitude
to the enemy, that it would have been unwise to connect
it with any other object, however great, which might make
the obtaining of it precarious.
Arnold, a moment before his setting out, went into Mrs.
Arnold's apartment, and informed her that some transac-
tions had just come to light, which must forever banish
him from his country. She fell into a swoon at this decla-
ration, and he left her in it to consult his own safety, till
the servants, alarmed by her cries, came to her relief. She
remained frantic all day, accusing every one who ap-
proached her with an intention to murder her child, (an
infant in her arms,) and exhibiting every other mark of the
most genuine and agonizing distress. Exhausted by the
fatigue and tumult of her spirits, her phrenzy subsided to-
wards evening, and she sunk into all the sadness of afflic-
tion.
tions made beyond its strength, and not the cause, though,
at that time, it partook of the nature of both; -- that as
prices rose, the value of money fell; and that as the public
expenditures became immense, no taxes which the people
could bear on that quantity of money which is deemed a pro-
per medium, would have been sufficient for the current de-
mands of the nation, had it been gold instead of paper; that
the idea was chimerical, that without resorting to foreign
loans, we could do otherwise than augment the quantity
of our artificial wealth beyond those bounds which were pro-
per to preserve its credit.
That the quantity of money in circulation, previous to the
revolution, was about thirty millions of dollars, which was
barely sufficient for our interior commerce, the foreign trade
being carried on by barter; and as the balance of our prin-
cipal trade was against us, and the specie was transferred
to meet that balance, no part of it entered into the home
circulation; and that it would have been impossible, by
loans and taxes, to bring such part of it into the public cof-
fers as would have served the purposes of the war, without
obstructing commercial operations.
He next shows, that the product of the taxes, both from
the peculiar situation of the country, and by reference to
the condition of other countries, would necessarily be ina-
dequate to our wants.
Hence he infers, that congress, when their emissions rose
to thirty millions, were obliged, in order to keep up the sup-
plies, to go on creating artificial revenues by new emissions;
and that the only remedy then was a foreign loan, which
judiciously applied, and assisted by a vigorous taxation,
would have created a credit that might have prevented the
excess of emissions. He contends, on the same principles,
that in proportion to the extent of the depreciation at that
time, was the impossibility of raising the money value by
any other means, and that in the existing situation of the
country, a foreign loan was the only expedient.
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? HAMILTON. 249
He adds, "these reasonings may prove useless, as the ne-
cessity of a loan is admitted, but that his object is to establish
good principles, the want of which has brought us to the
desperate crisis we have arrived at, and may betray us into
fatal mistakes. "
The next inquiry raised is, -- How is the loan to be em-
ployed ? -- Two plans were stated to have been in contem-
plation :--one, that of buying up the paper, which he shows
would have been impracticable, from the rapid artificial
appreciation of it, which would require means far beyond
the compass of the national resources, while this apprecia-
tion would be more relative to the purchasing medium, than
to the prices of commodities, as the value of the paper might
be raised by the combination of individuals, while the re-
duction of prices must necessarily be slow, depending, as it
would, on the sentiments of the great body of the people.
The result of this plan, he states, would be "that the
money would return into circulation almost as fast as it was
drawn out, and at the end of the year the treasury would be
completely empty; -- the foreign loan dissipated, and the
state of the finances as deplorable as ever. It would be
much better, instead of purchasing up the paper currency,
to purchase the supplies-with. the specje^? _biIia^3r. '. 'A--
great source of error," he observes,"u in disquisitions of this
nature, is the judging of events by abstract calculations,
which, though geometrically true, are^alse as they relate
to the concerns of beings governed more by passion and
prejudice, than by an enlightened sense of their interests.
A degree of illusion mixes itself in all the affairs of society.
The opinion of objects . has more influence than their real
nature. The quantity of money in circulation, is certainly
a chief cause of its declining; but we find it is depreciated
more than five times as mu:h as it ought to be: -- the ex-
cess is derived from opinion, -- a want of confidence. In
like manner, we deceive ourselves, when we suppose the
vol. i. 32
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? 250 THI LIFE OF
value will increase in proportion as the quantity is lessened;
opinion will operate here also, and a thousand circumstan-
ces may promote or counteract the principle. "
I The other plan proposed, was to convert the loan into
(merchandise, and import it on public account. This plan,
'though better than the former, he deems also liable to great
objections, but not wholly to be rejected; and after suggest-
ing a tax in kind, he contends, that "the only plan which
can preserve the currency, is one that will make it the im-
mediate interest of the moneyed men to co-operate with go-
vernment in its support. This country is in the same pre-
dicament in which France was previous to the famous Mis-
sissippi scheme, projected by Mr. Law. Its paper money,
like ours, had dwindled to nothing, and no efforts of the
government could revive it, because the people had lost all
confidence in its ability. Mr. Law, who had muchmore pene-
tration than integrity, readily perceived that no plan could
succeed, which did not unite the interest and credit of rich in-
dividuals with those of the state; and upon this he framed
the idea of his project, which so far agreed in principle with
the Bank of England, -- the foundation was good, but the
superstructure too vast. The projectors aimed at unlimit-
ed wealth, and the government itself expected too much,
which was the cause of the ultimate miscarriage of the
scheme, and of all the mischiefs that befel the kingdom in
consequence. It will be our wisdom to select what is good
in this plan, and in any others that have gone before us,
avoiding their defects and excesses. Something on a simi-
lar principle in America, will alone accomplish the resto-
ration of paper credit, and establish a permanent fund for
the future exigencies of government. "
He then states his plan to be an American bank, to be
instituted by congress for ten years, under the denomination
of " The Bank of the United States. "
The basis of this bank was to be a foreign loan of two
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? HAMILTON. 251
millions sterling, to be thrown into the bank as a part of its
stock; a subscription to be opened in the currency of two
hundred millions of dollars, and the subscribers to be incor-
porated; the payment of which to be guarantied by the
government on the dissolution of the bank, by ten millions
of specie, being at the rate of one for twenty, or by a cur-
rency bona fide equivalent, and the annual money taxes to
become part of the stock.
All the remaining paper to be called in, (at the option of
the possessor,) and bank notes to be issued in lieu of it for so
much sterling, payable to the bearer in three months from
the date, at two per cent, per annum interest; a pound
sterling to be estimated at two hundred and sixty-six and
two-thirds of the existing dollars ;* the interest payab'e
punctually in specie at the end of the three months, when
the possessor might have the bank notes renewed, or receive
the sum deposited in the old paper; all the money issued
from the bank to be of the same denomination, and on the
same terms.
An annual loan of two millions sterling to be furnished
to congress by the bank, at four per cent. , and the whole,
or part of the stock, by arrangement between the bank and
a Board of Trade, which he contemplated, to be employed
in commerce. If only a part, the residue to be loaned oc-
casionally, by permission of congress, in such sums as may
be thought expedient, at an interest of six per cent. , on
private securities; the government to hold one half of the
stock, and the bank to be managed by trustees of the stock-
holders, under the inspection of the Board of Trade.
The part of the manuscript which details the effect of the
commercial operations, is mutilated; but the result is sta-
ted to be, that the war might be carried on three years, and
the government incur a debt of only four hundred and
* Sixty dollars for one dollar of four shillings and sixpence sterling.
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? 252 THE LIFE OF
twenty thousand pounds sterling, above the guaranty of
the subscription, which it is probable would not be requi-
red, as the corporation would find it their interest to obtain
a renewal of their charter.
( Having presented his plan, he observes, "that he does
not believe that its advantages will be as great as they ap-
pear in speculation, from a less profitable commerce than
is supposed, and from other causes. I am aware how apt
the imagination is to be heated in projects of this nature,
and to oycffook the fallacies which often lurk in first prin-
ciple^; But when I consider, on the other hand, that this
scheme slands on the firm footing of public and private faith,
that it links the interest of the state in an intimate connex-
ion with those of the rich individuals belonging to it; that
it turns the wealth and influence of both into a commercial
channel for mutual benefit^rhich must afford advantages
not to be estimated; that there is a defect of a circula-
ting medium, which this plan supplies by a sort of creative
power, converting what is so produced, into a real and effi-
cacious instrument of trade; I say, when I consider these
things, and many more that might be added, I cannot for-
bear feeling a degree of confidence in the plan, and at least
hoping that it is capable of being improved into something
that will give relief to our finances. "
To enlarge its advantages, he suggests that a variety of
secondary expedients may be invented, and the whole scheme
of annuities engrafted upon it.
That the European loan might be converted into a Euro-
pean bank, to aid the American bank, by engaging the inte-
rests of the wealthy, and that the bank might also make con-
tracts with the government for the supplies of the army, on
terms mutually beneficial. He then expatiates on the rea-
sons for giving one half of the stock to the government, and
answers the objection that the plan might be prejudicial to
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? HAMILTON. 253
trade, by proposing a guaranty from the government not
to grant any monopolies.
To the scheme, notes are appended, explanatory of the
operation of the project; in one of which he states, "a Board
of Trade ought immediately to be established. The royal
council of France, and the subordinate chambers in each
province, form an excellent institution, and may, in many
respects, prove a model. Congress have too long neglect-
ed to institute a good scheme of administration, and throw
public business into proper executive departments. For
commerce, I prefer a board; but for most other things, sin-
gle men. We want a Minister of War, a Minister of Fo-
reign Affairs, a Minister of Finance, and a Minister of Ma-
rine. There is always more decision, more despatch, more
secrecy, and more responsibility where single men, than
where bodies are concerned. By a plan of this. kind, we
should blend the advantages of a monarchy and of a repub-
lic, in a happy and beneficial union. Men will only devote
their lives and attention to a profession on which they can
build reputation and consequence, which they do not share
with others. If this plan should be approved, congress
ought immediately to appoint a Minister of Finance. He
ought to be a man of ability, to comprehend it in all its con-
sequences, and of eloquence to make others comprehend
and relish it. He ought, besides, to have some general
knowledge of the science, and to address himself to some
of the most suitable moneyed men, to convince them of the
utility of the project. The congress must establish the
bank, and set it agoing. I know of no man that has better
pretensions than yourself, and shall be very happy to hear
that_congress have said,' Thou art the man. '"
(The first essay of an individual, who has been designated
as "the Founder of the public credit of the United States,"
will have interest, (although his project was not adopted in\
all its parts,) as evincing the progressive growth of his mind. y
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? 254 THE LIFE OF
At a time when the intricate science of finance was little
understood in the United States, the statesman will per-
ceive the clear and sound views which are taken of the
condition of the currency; and will remark, with admira-
tion, how far the author of this plan rose above all the crude
opinions of that day; rejecting the whole scheme of legis-
lative expedients, and pointing out, as the only basis of a
permanent system, the combination of public with private
capital. It has been observed, that this project was not
embraced in all its parts; but it had, nevertheless, its influ-
ence on the mind of the eminent financier of the revolution;
for within a short time after, a plan of a bank in Pennsyl-
vania was introduced by him, founded on private contribu-
tions, to the amount of ? 300,000 sterling, by patriotic indi-
viduals, to furnish the army with a temporary supply of pro-
visions, which, though limited in its views, led on to farther
results of moment. The idea of executive departments,
also, from this time, became a topic of discussion in con-
gress; which, as will be seen hereafter, was more earnest-
ly pressed upon the consideration of that body by him, and
was ultimately adopted, almost in the terms proposed by
Hamilton.
A question has been recently raised, as to the merit of
having first suggested an American bank. It would be idle
to allege, that with similar institutions existing in Europe,
it was not a topic frequently adverted to by thinking men
in America; and there is found, within a short time after
the date of Hamilton's communication, a suggestion, in a
gazette of Massachusetts, of the Bank of Amsterdam as a
model for such an institution; but the most careful research-
es show, that Hamilton's first revolutionary plan had more
than a twelvemonth's priority* over that of the Superin-
* This remark refers to the Bank of North America. Hamilton's first plan
was addressed to Robert Morris, in 1779. The Bank of Pennsylvania was
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? HAMILTON. 255
tendent of finance, of which the merit is claimed by his as-
sistant. *
Although the idea of a bank, with powers to carry on
commercial operations, may be regarded with some dis-
trust, and the extent of the plan may be supposed to dero-
gate from its merit, yet a careful examination of this scheme
will show, that it was the only one, proposed at that time,
which could have absorbed the depreciated paper, and have
restored a sound currency; which the other projects could
not have effected. The idea of using the credit of govern-
ment in mercantile adventures, which is the only objectional
part of the scheme, as a general one, was peculiarly felici-
tous at the time it was suggested, and might have been in-
strumental in producing a uniform sytem of commercial re-
gulations. As a mere temporary expedient, it did not es-
cape the vigilant observation of Robert Morris, who enter-
ed into several commercial adventures, on account of the
United States, to pay the interest on the foreign debt, which
proved a great convenience to the treasury, and resulted in
a small profit to the government.
During the series of military disasters at the south, the
sufferings of the army at Morristown, in a winter of memo-
rable severity, baffle description; -- a post from which, in
the reduced numbers of his men, Washington could not
move with safety, and which possessed advantages that
more than counterbalanced the inconvenience of its rugged
and snow-clad hills. These sufferings were much increased
by the introduction of a new system of requisitions, and by
a most unwise interference with the civil staff of the army,
reported to congress June 22d, 1780. The Bank of North America, it will be
subsequently seen, was proposed by Robert Morris, in May, 1781.
* Mr. G. Morris was appointed assistant to R. Morris, July 6th, 1781. It
is stated, in a letter of Mr. G. Morris to a friend--" The first bank in this coun-
try was planned by your humble servant. " -- Life of G. Morris, voL i, p. 235.
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? 256 THE LIFE OF
which led to the resignation of General Greene, as quarter-
master-general.
To meet this emergency, a committee was appointed by
congress, to confer with the commander-in-chief, of which
General Schuyler was the leading member. This gentle-
man, disgusted with the injuries he had received, after the
sentence of a court martial, (which was long cruelly with-
held from his most urgent solicitations,) acquitting him of all
misconduct, and declaring that he was entitled to the high-
est honours,* had been recently returned to congress; hav-
ing determined never more to fill any other stations than
such as were derived directly from the people, to whom he
chose only to be responsible. His arrival in camp was wel-
comed by Washington, with all the ardour of devoted friend-
ship; and the result of their conferences, aided by General
Greene, was a plan investing the commander-in-chief with
powers adequate to the exigency. But an over-cautious
congress withheld from him a trust, which had been before
exercised with unexampled moderation, and with infinite
public advantage. f
The golden opportunity of regaining New-York was thus
lost; and Washington, with victory in his grasp, was com-
pelled to submit to the insulting inroads of the enemy, from
a want of means to put his little army in motion. But even
thus situated, he was unwilling to be inactive; and learning
that a body of the enemy was stationed at Staten Island,
he despatched Lord Stirling to attack them, accompanied
* Mr. Jay, in a letter of February 12th, 1778, says: "Congress has refused
to accept your resignation. Twelve states are represented; New-England
and Pennsylvania against you. The delegates of the latter are new men,
and not free from the influence of the former. From New-York, south, you
have fast friends. I have the best authority to assure you, the commander-
in-chief wishes you to retain your commission. "
t And yet, soon after, martial law was proclaimed in Pennsylvania, (June
9th, 1780,) in order to enable the state officers to procure supplies, and to
drive strangers from Philadelphia.
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? HAMILTON. 257
V.
by Colonel Hamilton to aid in the execution of the project.
But it appears, from a letter of the latter, written on the
night selected for the attack, that the ice at Bergen Point
was impassable; and the expedition returned, without hav-
ing effected any thing of moment.
The situation of the prisoners being still a source of great
disquietude, Hamilton was sent on a commission, with Gene-
ral St. Clair and Colonel Carrington, (with the latter of
whom he maintained an intimacy through life, founded on
the highest respect for his character and abilities,) to meet
certain British commissioners at Amboy.
He writes thence, on the seventeenth of March, "that the
enemy, as was supposed, had no idea of treating on mutual
ground; that the commission was broken up; and that they
were in private conversation, entertaining hopes that the
liberation of our prisoners would be effected on admissible
terms. " This desirable result was not attained.
The sufferings of the army now produced an effect which
had long been apprehended. "Two regiments of Connec-
ticut paraded under arms, with a declared resolution to re-
turn home, or obtain subsistence at the point of the bayo-
net. The interference of the officers, and decisive mea-
sures, soon suppressed the mutiny; a discovery was made,
that they had been tampered with by the enemy, who, ho-
ping to take advantage of their supposed disaffection, moved
a force suddenly to Springfield. "* To counteract this move-
ment, General Greene was sent forward by General Wash-
ington, and Hamilton was directed to reconnoitre. The
battle of Springfield ensued, "in which the veteran Knyp-
hausen was baffled and almost beaten, by the gallantry of
Greene, at the head of a force of continentals and militia,
amounting to little more than a third of the enemy," f-- the
last of his distinguished achievements at the north.
* Chief Justice Marshall. t Colonel Hamilton's Eulogium.
vol. i. 33
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? 253 THE LIFE OF
The anxiety produced by the discontents of the army, and
the views entertained at head quarters of the national pros-
pects, are strongly depicted in a letter transmitted by the
commander-in-chief to Messrs. Schuyler and Peabody, a
committee of congress.
After a few preliminary observa-
tions, it states: "The view given of our situation by con-
gress, is just, full, and explicit. The measures they have re-
commended are well adapted to the emergency, and of in-
dispensable necessity. I very freely give it as my opinion,
that unless they are carried into execution, in the fullest ex-
tent, and with the greatest decision and rapidity, it will be
impossible for us to undertake the intended co-operation
with any reasonable prospect of success.
'' The consequences you have well delineated. The suc-
cour designed for our benefit will prove a serious misfor-
une; and instead of rescuing us from the embarrassments
we experience, and from the danger with which we are
threatened, will, in all probability, precipitate our ruin.
Drained and weakened as we already are, the exertions we
shall make, though they may be too imperfect to secure
success, will at any rate be such as to leave us in a state of
relaxation and debility, from which it will be difficult, if
not impracticable, to recover. The country exhausted, the
people disheartened, the consequence and reputation of
these states in Europe sunk, -- our friends chagrined and
discouraged, our enemies deriving new credit, new confi-
dence, and new resources, -- we have not, nor ought we to
wish, an alternative. The court of France has done so
much that we must make a decisive effort on our part.
Our situation demands it, --- 'tis expected. We have the
means to success, without some unforeseen accident; and
it only remains to employ them. But the conjuncture re-
quires all our wisdom, and all our energy. Such is the
present state of this country, that the utmost exertion of
its resources, though equal, is not more than equal, to the
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? HAMILTON. 259
object, and our measures must be so taken as to call them
into immediate and full effect. " After some observations,
indicating the necessity of obtaining a larger supply of men,
it is stated: ". Unless the principal part of the force be com-
posed of men regularly organized, and on the continuance
of whose services we can rely, nothing decisive can be at-
tempted. The militia are too precarious a dependence to
justify such an attempt, where they form a particular part
of the plan. Militia cannot have the necessary habits, nor
the consistency, either for an assault or a siege. In em-
ploying them essentially, we should run the risk of being
abandoned in the most critical moments.
"The mode by draft is, I am persuaded, the only effica-
cious one to obtain men. It appears to me certain, that it
is the only one to obtain them in time; nor can the period
you have appointed for bringing them into the field be de-
layed, without defeating the object. I have little doubt,
that at any time, and much less at the present juncture, the
power of government, exerted with confidence, will be equal
to the purpose of drafting. The hopes of the people, ele-
vated by the prospect before them, will induce a cheerful
compliance with this and all the other measures of vigour
which have been recommended, and which the exigency
requires. "
Similar views were, with the greatest solemnity, and most
eloquently, presented to congress throughout the year.
The anticipated reinforcements from France, to which
this extract refers, and which excited the expectations of
the country to so great a degree, arrived off the coast early
in July.
Soon after the intelligence was received at head quarters,
a letter was addressed to the committee of co-operation,
stating, "that the Guadaloupe had arrived in New-York,
and brought an account that she had fallen in with a large
French fleet, consisting of several sail of the line, and a num-
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? 260 THE LIFE OF
ber of transports, between the Capes of Virginia and Dela-
ware. This intelligence has every appearance of authen-
ticity; and, if true, the arrival of the fleet on the coast may
instantly be looked for. This, indeed, must be the case at
any rate from the time they are said to have sailed. It
cannot be too much lamented, that our preparations are
still so greatly behind hand; not a thousand men, that I have
heard of, have yet joined the army, and in all probability
the period for commencing our operations is at hand. I am
happy to learn, that a spirit of animation has diffused itself
throughout the states, from which we may expect the hap-
piest consequences. But the exigency is so pressing, that
we ought to multiply our efforts, to give new activity and
despatch to our measures; levying and forwarding the men,
providing the supplies of every sort required; forage and
transportation, demand particular attention. After what
had been preconcerted with the honourable the congress,
after two month's previous notice of the intended succour,
if our allies find us unprepared, and are obliged to wait se-
veral weeks in a state of inaction, it is easy to conceive how
unfavourable will be the impressions, which if improved with
all the vigour in our power, is less than were to be wished for
an undertaking of so arduous and important a nature. So
much is at stake, -- so much to be hoped, -- so much to be
lost, that we shall be inexcusable if we do not employ all
our zeal and all our exertion. "
The arrival of these reinforcements awakened a new in-
terest to effect a descent on New-York.
A plan of operations was immediately forwarded to Cape
Henry, with a communication, apprizing the French com-
manders, Rochambeau and De Ternay, of the naval force
and position of the enemy; indicating a station off Sandy
Hook for the purpose of intercepting the troops which had
embarked at Charleston on their return to New-York, and
proposing a combined attack on that place.
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? HAMILTON. 261
Intelligence being received of the arrival of Admiral
Greaves, a letter was prepared by Colonel Hamilton, urging
the French commanders, in case of the superiority of their
force, still to proceed to Sandy Hook; in which he states,
that later information had led them to believe that the har-
bour of New-York was more practicable than had been sup-
posed, and strongly inciting them by "the greater glory
which would be derived from overcoming increased diffi-
culties," to adhere to the original plan. The French were,
however, unwilling to encounter the enemy, and made sail
for Newport; whither Sir Henry Clinton, apprehensive of
losing it, made a rapid movement. Washington, on his de-
parture, instantly pushed for New-York, when Clinton sud-
denly returning, the Americans recrossed the Hudson. From
this period, the respective armies retired to their former
quarters, the Americans waiting farther reinforcements from
France.
The uncertain counsels which seemed to have governed
the French commanders, and the course of the correspond-
ence with them from head quarters, notwithstanding ths
mission of La Fayette to Newport, rendered a personal in-
terview between them and Washington desirable, in order
to efface an impression entertained by Rochambeau, that his
communications had received less attention than he ima-
gined them entitled lo; -- a measure which Hamilton ad-
vised, influenced by letters from Colonel Fleury.
With this view, General Washington having ordered Ge-
neral Greene to move to Tappan, in order to protect West
Point, proceeded with La Fayette, Hamilton, and McHen-
ry, to meet the Count and Admiral at Hartford, on the
twentieth of September.
The arrival of Rodney, rendering the projected attack on
New-York impracticable, it was reluctantly abandoned;
and after some general conversation as to the probable
strength of the reinforcements, and the policy of their future
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? 262 THE LIFE OP
operations, the commanders returned to their respective
quarters.
During this journey, an event occurred which threatened
the most alarming consequences to the country, and was
attended with circumstances of the deepest interest.
As Washington and La Fayette were returning from
Hartford, the former proposed to visit some works which
had been recently erected, and as General Arnold, who had
command at West Point, was waiting breakfast for them,
Hamilton and McHenry proceeded to his quarters, at the
house of Mr. Beverley Robinson, to announce the approach
of the General.
While they were sitting at table, Arnold received a note,
stating the arrest of Major Andre. He immediately left
the table, ran up stairs, mentioned the event to his wife, and
left her, though fainting, under the pretence of preparing
for the reception of the commander-in-chief at West Point.
The General and a part of his suite learning Mrs. Ar-
nold's indisposition before they entered the house, embark-
ed for the Point, and were astonished to find that Arnold
was not there. During their absence, Colonel Hamilton
received the papers which had been despatched from the
lines in quest of the commander-in-chief, and sent him the
alarming tidings. Hamilton and McHenry rode instantly
to the water's edge in pursuit of the traitor, who had, by
this time, proceeded some distance in a barge, which con-
veyed him on board the Vulture, whence he addressed an
audacious letter to Washington.
Irritated and appalled as Washington was, his first thought
was to send a message to Mrs. Arnold, stating that although
his duty had rendered it necessary to endeavour to capture
her husband, he found pleasure in soothing her sorrows, by
the assurance that he was safe; while Hamilton wrote to
General Greene, who was uninformed of the extent of the
treason, to put his army under marching orders.
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? HAMILTON. 263
"The feelings of the whole army," says La Fayette, from
whom these incidents are derived, "were most liberal in
behalf of Andre; but none was more impressed with those
sentiments of generosity and sympathy than Colonel Ha-
milton. He was daily searching some way to save him.
Every wish to that effect having proved impossible, Hamil-
ton, who was as sensible as any other of that impossibility,
and one of those who lamented it the most, published a nar-
rative of the events, and a portraiture of the unfortunate
Andre, which is a masterpiece of literary talents and amia-
ble sensibility. " As it embraces all the essential circum-
stances of this interesting scene, and has been erroneously
published, it may not improperly be introduced into the
biography of its author.
HAMILTON TO LAURENS.
Since my return from Hartford, my dear Laurens, my
mind has been too little at ease to permit me to write to
you sooner. It has been wholly occupied by the affecting
and tragic consequences of Arnold's treason. My feelings
were never put to so severe a trial. You will no doubt
have heard the principal facts before this reaches you; but
there are particulars to which my situation gave me access,
that cannot have come to your knowledge from public re-
port, which I am persuaded you will find interesting.
From several circumstances, the project seems to have
originated with Arnold himself, and to have been long
premeditated. The first overture is traced back to some
time in June last. It was conveyed in a letter to Colonel
Robinson, the substance of which was, that the ingratitude
he had experienced from his country, concurring with other
causes, had entirely changed his principles; that he now
only sought to restore himself to the favour of his king, by
some signal proof of his repentance, and would be happy
to open a correspondence with Sir Henry Clinton for that
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? 264 THE LIFE OF
purpose. About this period he made a journey to Connecti-
cut; on his return from which to Philadelphia, he solicited
the command of West Point, alleging that the effects of
his wound had disqualified him for the active duties of the
field. The sacrifice of this important post was the atone-
ment he intended to make. General Washington hesitated
the less to gratify an officer who had rendered such eminent
services, as he was convinced the post might be safely
entrusted to one who had given so many distinguished
proofs of his bravery. In the beginning of August he
joined the army, and renewed his application. The ene-
my at this juncture had embarked the greatest part of their
force on an expedition to Rhode-Island, and our army was
in motion to compel them to relinquish the enterprise or to
attack New-York in its weakened state. The General of-
fered Arnold the left wing of the army, which he declined,
on the pretext already mentioned, but not without visible
embarrassment. He certainly might have executed the
duties of such a temporary command, and it was expected
from his enterprising temper, that he would gladly have
embraced so splendid an opportunity. But he did not
choose to be diverted a moment from his favourite object;
probably from an apprehension, that some different dispo-
sition might have taken place which would have excluded
him. The extreme solicitude he discovered to get posses-
sion of the post, would have led to a suspicion of the trea-
chery, had it been possible, from his past conduct, to have
supposed him capable of it.
The correspondence thus began, was carried on between
Arnold and Major Andre, Adjutant General to the British ar-
my, in behalf of Sir Henry Clinton, under feigned signatures,
and in a mercantile disguise. In an intercepted letter of Ar-
nold. which lately fell into our hands, he proposes an inter-
view " to settle the risks and profits of the copartnership,"
and in the same style of metaphor intimates an expected aug-
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? HAMILTON. 265
mentation of the garrison, and speaks of it as the means of
extending their traffic. It appears by another letter, that
Andre was to have met him on the lines, under the sanc-
tion of a flag, in the character of Mr. John Anderson. But
some cause or other, not known, prevented this interview.
The twentieth of last month, Robinson and Andre went
up the river in the Vulture sloop of war. Robinson sent a
flag to Arnold with two letters, one to General Putnam,
enclosed in another to himself, proposing an interview with
Putnam, or in his absence with Arnold, to adjust some pri-
vate concerns. The one to General Putnam was evidently
meant as a cover to the other, in case, by accident, the let-
ters should have fallen under the inspection of a third per-
son.
General Washington crossed the river on his way to
Hartford, the day these despatches arrived. Arnold, con-
ceiving he must have heard of the flag, thought it necessa-
ry, for the sake of appearances, to submit the letters to
him, and ask his opinion of the propriety of complying
with the request, The General, with his usual caution,
though without the least surmise of the design, dissuaded
him from it, and advised him to reply to Robinson, that
whatever related to his private affairs must be of a civil
nature, and could only properly be addressed to the civil
authority. This reference fortunately deranged the plan,
and was the first link in the chain of events that led to the
detection. The interview could no longer take place in
the form of a flag, but was obliged to be managed in a se-
cret manner.
Arnold employed one Smith to go on board the Vulture
the night of the twenty-second, to bring Andre on shore
with a pass for Mr. John Anderson. Andre came ashore
accordingly, and was conducted within a picket of ours to
the house of Smith, where Arnold and he remained together
in close conference all that night and the day following.
vol. i. 34
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? 2G6 THE LIFE OF
At day light in the morning, the commanding officer at
King's Ferry, without the privity of Arnold, moved a couple
of pieces of cannon to a point opposite to where the Vul-
ture lay, and obliged her to take a more remote station.
This event, or some lurking distrust, made the boatmen re-
fuse to convey the two passengers back, and disconcerted
Arnold so much, that by one of those strokes of infatuation
which often confound the schemes of men conscious of
guilt, he insisted on Andre's exchanging his uniform for a
disguise, and returning in a mode different from that in
which he came. Andre, who had been undesignedly
brought within our posts, in the first instance, remonstrated
warmly against this new and dangerous expedient. But
Arnold, persisting in declaring it impossible for him to
return as he came, he at length reluctantly yielded to his
direction, and consented to change his dress, and take the
route he recommended. Smith furnished the disguise, and
in the evening passed King's Ferry with him, and proceeded
to Crompond, where they stopped the remainder of the
night, (at the instance of a militia officer,) to avoid being sus-
pected by him. The next morning they resumed their journey,
Smith accompanying Andre a little beyond Pine's Bridge,
where he left him. He had reached Tarrytown, when he
was taken up by three militia men, who rushed out of the
woods, and seized his horse. At this critical moment, his
presence of mind forsook him. Instead of producing his
pass, which would have extricated him from our parties,
and could have done him no harm with his own, he asked the
militia men if they were of the upper or lower party, dis-
tinctive appellations known among the refugee corps. The
militia men replied, they were of the lower party; upon
which he told them he was a British officer, and pressed
them not to detain him as he was upon urgent business.
This confession removed all doubt; and it was in vain he
afterwards produced his pass. He was instantly forced off
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? HAMILTON. 267
to a place of greater security ; where, after a careful search,
there were found concealed in the feet of his stockings, se-
veral papers of importance delivered to him by Arnold.
Among these there were a plan of the fortifications of West
Point, a memorial from the engineer on the attack and de-
fence of the place, returns of the garrison, cannon, and
stores, copy of the minutes of a council of war held by Ge-
neral Washington a few weeks before. The prisoner at
first was inadvertently ordered to Arnold; but on recollec-
tion, while still on the way, he was countermanded and
sent to Old Salem.
The papers were enclosed in a letter to General Wash-
ington, which having taken a route different from that by
which he returned, made a circuit, that afforded leisure for
another letter, through an ill-judged delicacy, written to
Arnold, with information of Anderson's capture, to get to
him an hour before General Washington arrived at his
quarters, time enough to elude the fate that awaited him.
He went down the river in his barge to the Vulture, with
such precipitate confusion, that he did not take with him
a single paper useful to the enemy. On the first notice of
the affair he was pursued, but much too late to be over-
taken.
There was some colour for imagining it was a part of
the plan to betray the General into the hands of the ene-
my: Arnold was very anxious to ascertain from him the
precise day of his return, and the enemy's movement seem
to have corresponded to this point. But if it was really
the case, it was very injudicious. The success must have
depended on surprise, and as the officers at the advanced
posts were not in the secret, their measures might have
given the alarm, and General Washington, taking the com-
mand of the post, might have rendered the whole scheme
abortive. Arnold, it is true, had so dispersed the garrison
as to have made a defence difficult, but not impracticable;
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? 268 THE LIFE OF
and the acquisition of West Point was of such magnitude
to the enemy, that it would have been unwise to connect
it with any other object, however great, which might make
the obtaining of it precarious.
Arnold, a moment before his setting out, went into Mrs.
Arnold's apartment, and informed her that some transac-
tions had just come to light, which must forever banish
him from his country. She fell into a swoon at this decla-
ration, and he left her in it to consult his own safety, till
the servants, alarmed by her cries, came to her relief. She
remained frantic all day, accusing every one who ap-
proached her with an intention to murder her child, (an
infant in her arms,) and exhibiting every other mark of the
most genuine and agonizing distress. Exhausted by the
fatigue and tumult of her spirits, her phrenzy subsided to-
wards evening, and she sunk into all the sadness of afflic-
tion.
