I am far from
flattering
myself that I have reached
the truth in every case, and shall be very grateful for corrections, in
whatever spirit they may be offered; but I trust that I have been able
to present in their essential features, the "ancient ideals of
education.
the truth in every case, and shall be very grateful for corrections, in
whatever spirit they may be offered; but I trust that I have been able
to present in their essential features, the "ancient ideals of
education.
Aristotle and Ancient Educational Ideals by Thomas Davidson
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The Great Educators
Edited by NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER
ARISTOTLE
AND
ANCIENT EDUCATIONAL IDEALS
BY
THOMAS DAVIDSON
NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1892
COPYRIGHT, 1892, BY
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS.
PREFACE
In undertaking to treat of Aristotle as the expounder of ancient
educational ideas, I might, with Kapp's _Aristoteles' Staatspaedagogik_
before me, have made my task an easy one. I might simply have presented
in an orderly way and with a little commentary, what is to be found on
the subject of education in his various works--Politics, Ethics,
Rhetoric, Poetics, etc. I had two reasons, however, for not adopting
this course: (1) that this work had been done, better than I could do
it, in the treatise referred to, and (2) that a mere restatement of what
Aristotle says on education would hardly have shown his relation to
ancient pedagogy as a whole. I therefore judged it better, by tracing
briefly the whole history of Greek education up to Aristotle and down
from Aristotle, to show the past which conditioned his theories and the
future which was conditioned by them. Only thus, it seemed to me, could
his teachings be seen in their proper light. And I have found that this
method has many advantages, of which I may mention one. It has enabled
me to show the close connection that existed at all times between Greek
education and Greek social and political life, and to present the one
as the reflection of the other. And this is no small advantage, since it
is just from its relation to the whole of life that Greek education
derives its chief interest for us. We can never, indeed, return to the
purely political education of the Greeks; they themselves had to abandon
that, and, since then,
A boundless hope has passed across the earth--
a hope which gives our education a meaning and a scope far wider than
any that the State aims at; but in these days, when the State and the
institution which embodies that hope are contending for the right to
educate, it cannot but aid us in settling their respective claims, to
follow the process by which they came to have distinct claims at all,
and to see just what these mean. This process, the method which I have
followed has, I hope, enabled me, in some degree, to bring into
clearness. This, at all events, has been one of my chief aims.
In treating of the details of Greek educational practice, I have been
guided by a desire to present only, or mainly, those which contribute to
make up the complete picture. For this reason I have omitted all
reference to the training for the Olympic and other games, this (so it
seems to me) being no essential part of the system.
It would have been easy for me to give my book a learned appearance, by
checkering its pages with references to ancient authors, or quotations,
in the original, from them; but this has seemed to me both unnecessary
and unprofitable in a work intended for the general public. I have,
therefore, preferred to place at the heads of the different chapters,
in English mostly, such quotations as seemed to express, in the most
striking way, the spirit of the different periods and theories of Greek
education. Taken together, I believe these quotations will be found to
present a fairly definite outline of the whole subject.
In conclusion, I would say that, though I have used a few modern works,
such as those of Kapp and Grasberger, I have done so almost solely for
the sake of finding references. In regard to every point I believe I
have turned to the original sources. If, therefore, my conclusions on
certain points differ from those of writers of note who have preceded
me, I can only say that I have tried to do my best with the original
materials before me. I am far from flattering myself that I have reached
the truth in every case, and shall be very grateful for corrections, in
whatever spirit they may be offered; but I trust that I have been able
to present in their essential features, the "ancient ideals of
education. "
THOMAS DAVIDSON.
"Glenmore,"
Keene, Essex Co. , N. Y.
October, 1891.
CONTENTS
BOOK I.
INTRODUCTORY.
PAGE
CHAPTER I.
Character and Ideal of Greek Education 3
CHAPTER II.
Branches of Greek Education 6
CHAPTER III.
Conditions of Education 9
CHAPTER IV.
Subjects of Education 12
CHAPTER V.
Education as Influenced by Time, Place,
and Circumstances 15
CHAPTER VI.
Epochs in Greek Education 26
BOOK II.
THE HELLENIC PERIOD (B. C. 776-338).
PART I.
_THE "OLD EDUCATION"_ (B. C. 776-480).
CHAPTER I.
Education for Work and Leisure 33
CHAPTER II.
AEolian or Theban Education 38
CHAPTER III.
Dorian or Spartan Education 41
CHAPTER IV.
Pythagoras 52
CHAPTER V.
Ionian or Athenian Education 60
(1) Family Education 64
(2) School Education 67
(? ) Musical (and Literary) Education 72
(? ) Gymnastics, or Bodily Training 77
(? ) Dancing 82
(3) College Education 85
(4) University Education 90
PART II.
_THE "NEW EDUCATION"_ (B. C. 480-338).
CHAPTER I.
Individualism and Philosophy 93
CHAPTER II.
Xenophon 114
CHAPTER III.
Plato 133
BOOK III.
ARISTOTLE (B. C. 384-322).
CHAPTER I.
His Life and Works 153
CHAPTER II.
His Philosophy 161
CHAPTER III.
His Theory of the State 166
CHAPTER IV.
His Pedagogical State 172
CHAPTER V.
Education during the first Seven Years 184
CHAPTER VI.
Education from Seven To Twenty-one 188
CHAPTER VII.
Education after Twenty-one 200
BOOK IV.
THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD (B. C. 338-A. D. 313).
CHAPTER I.
From Ethnic to Cosmopolitan Life 205
CHAPTER II.
Quintilian and Rhetorical Education 214
CHAPTER III.
Plotinus and Philosophic Education 225
CHAPTER IV.
Conclusion 231
APPENDIX.
The Seven Liberal Arts 239
BIBLIOGRAPHY 249
INDEX 253
BOOK I
INTRODUCTORY
ERRATA.
Page 19, line 5 from below, insert 102.
53, " 6 " " " 133.
181, " 14 " " for "and" read "or. "
250, " 11 " " " "Watsno" read "Watson. "
ARISTOTLE
CHAPTER I
CHARACTER AND IDEAL OF GREEK EDUCATION
Nothing in excess! --Solon.
No citizen has a right to consider himself as belonging to himself;
but all ought to regard themselves as belonging to the State,
inasmuch as each is a part of the State; and care for the part
naturally looks to care for the whole. --Aristotle.
Greek life, in all its manifestations, was dominated by a single idea,
and that an aesthetic one. This idea, which worked sometimes consciously,
sometimes unconsciously, was PROPORTION. The Greek term for this
(_Logos_) not only came to designate the incarnate Word of Religion, but
has also supplied many modern languages with a name for the Science of
Manifested Reason--Logic. To the Greek, indeed, Reason always meant
ratio, proportion; and a rational life meant to him a life of which all
the parts, internal and external, stood to each other in just
proportion. Such proportion was threefold; _first_, between the
different parts of the individual human being; _second_, between the
individual and his fellows in a social whole; _third_, between the
human, as such, and the overruling divine. The realization of this
threefold harmony in the individual was called by the Greeks WORTH
(? ? ? ? ? , usually, but incorrectly, rendered Virtue). There has come down
to us, from the pen of Aristotle, in whom all that was implicit in
Hellenism became explicit, a portion of a paean addressed to this ideal.
It may be fitly inserted here, in a literal translation.
TO WORTH.
O Worth! stern taskmistress of human kind,
Life's noblest prize:
O Virgin! for thy beauty's sake
It is an envied lot in Hellas even to die,
And suffer toils devouring, unassuaged--
So well dost thou direct the spirit
To fruit immortal, better than gold
And parents and soft-eyed sleep.
For thy cause Jove-born Hercules and Leda's sons
Much underwent, by deeds
Thy power proclaiming.
For love of thee Achilles and Ajax to Hades' halls went down.
For thy dear beauty's sake Atarneus' nursling too widowed the glances
of the sun.
Therefore, as one renowned for deeds and deathless, him the Muses
shall exalt,
The daughters of Memory, exalting so the glory of Stranger-guarding
Jove, and the honor of friendship firm.
With regard to this ideal, four things are especially noteworthy;
_first_, that it took an exhaustive survey of man's nature and
relations; _second_, that it called for strong, persistent, heroic
effort; _third_, that it tended to sink the individual in the social
whole and the universal order; _fourth_, that its aim was, on the whole,
a static perfection. The first two were merits; the second two,
demerits. The first merit prevented the Greeks from pursuing one-sided
systems of education; the second, from trying to turn education into a
means of amusement. Aristotle says distinctly, "Education ought
certainly not to be turned into a means of amusement; for young people
are not playing when they are learning, since all learning is
accompanied with pain. " The first demerit was prejudicial to individual
liberty, and therefore obstructive of the highest human development; the
second encouraged Utopian dreams, which, being always of static
conditions, undisturbed by the toils and throes essential to progress,
tend to produce impatience of that slow advance whereby alone man
arrives at enduring results. To this tendency we owe such works as
Plato's _Republic_ and Xenophon's _Education of Cyrus_.
CHAPTER II
BRANCHES OF GREEK EDUCATION
With thee the aged car-borne Peleus sent me on the day whereon from
Phthia to Agamemnon he sent thee, a mere boy, not yet acquainted
with mutual war or councils, in which men rise to distinction--for
this end he sent me forth to teach thee all these things, to be a
speaker of words and a doer of deeds. --(_Phoenix in_) Homer.
Above all and by every means we provide that our citizens shall have
good souls and strong bodies. --Lucian.
Life is the original school--life, domestic and social. All other
schools merely exercise functions delegated by the family and by
society, and it is not until the latter has reached such a state of
complication as to necessitate a division of labor that special schools
exist. Among the Homeric Greeks we find no mention of schools, and the
only person recorded as having had a tutor is Achilles, who was sent
away from home so early in life as to be deprived of that education
which he would naturally have received from his father. In what that
education consisted, we learn from the first quotation at the head of
this chapter. It consisted in such training as would make the pupil "a
speaker of words and a doer of deeds"--a man eloquent and persuasive in
council, and brave and resolute on the field of battle. For these ends
he required, as Lucian says, a good soul and a strong body.
These expressions mark the two great divisions into which Greek
education at all periods fell--MENTAL EDUCATION and PHYSICAL
EDUCATION--as well as their original aims, viz. goodness (that is,
bravery) of soul and strength of body. As time went on, these aims
underwent considerable changes, and consequently the means for attaining
them considerable modifications and extensions. Physical education aimed
more and more at beauty and grace, instead of strength, while mental
education, in its effort to extend itself to all the powers of the mind,
divided itself into literary and musical education.
As we have seen, the Greeks aimed at developing all the powers of the
human being in due proportion and harmony. But, in course of time, they
discovered that the human creature comes into the world with his powers,
not only undeveloped, but already disordered and inharmonious; that not
only do the germs of manhood require to be carefully watched and tended,
but also that the ground in which they are to grow must be cleared from
an overgrowth of choking weeds, before education can be undertaken with
any hope of success. This clearing process was called by the later
Greeks _Katharsis_, or Purgation, and played an ever-increasing part in
their pedagogical systems. It was supposed to do for man's emotional
nature what Medicine undertook to do for his body. The means employed
were mainly music and the kindred arts, which the ancients believed to
exert what we should now call a daemonic effect upon the soul, drawing
off the exciting causes of disturbing passion, and leaving it in
complete possession of itself. It would hardly be too much to say that
the power to exert this purgative influence on the soul was regarded by
the ancients as the chief function and end of the Fine Arts. Such was
certainly Aristotle's opinion.
When purgation and the twofold education of body and mind had produced
their perfect work, the result was what the Greeks called _Kalokagathia_
(? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) that is, Fair-and-Goodness. Either half of this ideal was
named ? ? ? ? ? (_arete_), Worth or Excellence. We are expressly told by
Aristotle (_Categories_, chap. viii. ) that the adjective to ? ? ? ? ? is
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? (_spoudaios_), a word which we usually render into English by
"earnest. " And we do so with reason; for to the Greek, Excellence or
Worth meant, above all, earnestness, genuineness, truthfulness,
thoroughness, absence of frivolity.
CHAPTER III
CONDITIONS OF EDUCATION
Some hold that men become good by nature, others by training, others
by instruction. The part that is due to nature obviously does not
depend upon us, but is imparted through certain divine causes to the
truly fortunate. --Aristotle.
It is not merely begetting that makes the father, but also the
imparting of a noble education. --John Chrysostom.
There are two sorts of education, the one divine, the other human.
The divine is great and strong and easy; the human small and weak
and beset with many dangers and delusions. Nevertheless, the latter
must be added to the former, if a right result is to be
reached. --Dion Chrysostom.
The same thing that we are wont to assert regarding the arts and
sciences, may be asserted regarding moral worth, viz. that the
production of a completely just character demands three
conditions--nature, reason, and habit. By "reason" I mean
instruction, by "habit," training. . . . Nature without instruction is
blind; instruction without nature, helpless; exercise (training)
without both, aimless. --Plutarch.
To the realization of their ideal in any individual the Greeks conceived
three conditions to be necessary, (1) a noble nature, (2) persistent
exercise or training in right action, (3) careful instruction. If any
one of these was lacking, the highest result could not be attained.
(1) To be well or nobly born was regarded by the Greeks as one of the
best gifts of the gods. Aristotle defines noble birth as "ancient wealth
and worth," and this fairly enough expresses the Greek view generally.
I am far from flattering myself that I have reached
the truth in every case, and shall be very grateful for corrections, in
whatever spirit they may be offered; but I trust that I have been able
to present in their essential features, the "ancient ideals of
education. "
THOMAS DAVIDSON.
"Glenmore,"
Keene, Essex Co. , N. Y.
October, 1891.
CONTENTS
BOOK I.
INTRODUCTORY.
PAGE
CHAPTER I.
Character and Ideal of Greek Education 3
CHAPTER II.
Branches of Greek Education 6
CHAPTER III.
Conditions of Education 9
CHAPTER IV.
Subjects of Education 12
CHAPTER V.
Education as Influenced by Time, Place,
and Circumstances 15
CHAPTER VI.
Epochs in Greek Education 26
BOOK II.
THE HELLENIC PERIOD (B. C. 776-338).
PART I.
_THE "OLD EDUCATION"_ (B. C. 776-480).
CHAPTER I.
Education for Work and Leisure 33
CHAPTER II.
AEolian or Theban Education 38
CHAPTER III.
Dorian or Spartan Education 41
CHAPTER IV.
Pythagoras 52
CHAPTER V.
Ionian or Athenian Education 60
(1) Family Education 64
(2) School Education 67
(? ) Musical (and Literary) Education 72
(? ) Gymnastics, or Bodily Training 77
(? ) Dancing 82
(3) College Education 85
(4) University Education 90
PART II.
_THE "NEW EDUCATION"_ (B. C. 480-338).
CHAPTER I.
Individualism and Philosophy 93
CHAPTER II.
Xenophon 114
CHAPTER III.
Plato 133
BOOK III.
ARISTOTLE (B. C. 384-322).
CHAPTER I.
His Life and Works 153
CHAPTER II.
His Philosophy 161
CHAPTER III.
His Theory of the State 166
CHAPTER IV.
His Pedagogical State 172
CHAPTER V.
Education during the first Seven Years 184
CHAPTER VI.
Education from Seven To Twenty-one 188
CHAPTER VII.
Education after Twenty-one 200
BOOK IV.
THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD (B. C. 338-A. D. 313).
CHAPTER I.
From Ethnic to Cosmopolitan Life 205
CHAPTER II.
Quintilian and Rhetorical Education 214
CHAPTER III.
Plotinus and Philosophic Education 225
CHAPTER IV.
Conclusion 231
APPENDIX.
The Seven Liberal Arts 239
BIBLIOGRAPHY 249
INDEX 253
BOOK I
INTRODUCTORY
ERRATA.
Page 19, line 5 from below, insert 102.
53, " 6 " " " 133.
181, " 14 " " for "and" read "or. "
250, " 11 " " " "Watsno" read "Watson. "
ARISTOTLE
CHAPTER I
CHARACTER AND IDEAL OF GREEK EDUCATION
Nothing in excess! --Solon.
No citizen has a right to consider himself as belonging to himself;
but all ought to regard themselves as belonging to the State,
inasmuch as each is a part of the State; and care for the part
naturally looks to care for the whole. --Aristotle.
Greek life, in all its manifestations, was dominated by a single idea,
and that an aesthetic one. This idea, which worked sometimes consciously,
sometimes unconsciously, was PROPORTION. The Greek term for this
(_Logos_) not only came to designate the incarnate Word of Religion, but
has also supplied many modern languages with a name for the Science of
Manifested Reason--Logic. To the Greek, indeed, Reason always meant
ratio, proportion; and a rational life meant to him a life of which all
the parts, internal and external, stood to each other in just
proportion. Such proportion was threefold; _first_, between the
different parts of the individual human being; _second_, between the
individual and his fellows in a social whole; _third_, between the
human, as such, and the overruling divine. The realization of this
threefold harmony in the individual was called by the Greeks WORTH
(? ? ? ? ? , usually, but incorrectly, rendered Virtue). There has come down
to us, from the pen of Aristotle, in whom all that was implicit in
Hellenism became explicit, a portion of a paean addressed to this ideal.
It may be fitly inserted here, in a literal translation.
TO WORTH.
O Worth! stern taskmistress of human kind,
Life's noblest prize:
O Virgin! for thy beauty's sake
It is an envied lot in Hellas even to die,
And suffer toils devouring, unassuaged--
So well dost thou direct the spirit
To fruit immortal, better than gold
And parents and soft-eyed sleep.
For thy cause Jove-born Hercules and Leda's sons
Much underwent, by deeds
Thy power proclaiming.
For love of thee Achilles and Ajax to Hades' halls went down.
For thy dear beauty's sake Atarneus' nursling too widowed the glances
of the sun.
Therefore, as one renowned for deeds and deathless, him the Muses
shall exalt,
The daughters of Memory, exalting so the glory of Stranger-guarding
Jove, and the honor of friendship firm.
With regard to this ideal, four things are especially noteworthy;
_first_, that it took an exhaustive survey of man's nature and
relations; _second_, that it called for strong, persistent, heroic
effort; _third_, that it tended to sink the individual in the social
whole and the universal order; _fourth_, that its aim was, on the whole,
a static perfection. The first two were merits; the second two,
demerits. The first merit prevented the Greeks from pursuing one-sided
systems of education; the second, from trying to turn education into a
means of amusement. Aristotle says distinctly, "Education ought
certainly not to be turned into a means of amusement; for young people
are not playing when they are learning, since all learning is
accompanied with pain. " The first demerit was prejudicial to individual
liberty, and therefore obstructive of the highest human development; the
second encouraged Utopian dreams, which, being always of static
conditions, undisturbed by the toils and throes essential to progress,
tend to produce impatience of that slow advance whereby alone man
arrives at enduring results. To this tendency we owe such works as
Plato's _Republic_ and Xenophon's _Education of Cyrus_.
CHAPTER II
BRANCHES OF GREEK EDUCATION
With thee the aged car-borne Peleus sent me on the day whereon from
Phthia to Agamemnon he sent thee, a mere boy, not yet acquainted
with mutual war or councils, in which men rise to distinction--for
this end he sent me forth to teach thee all these things, to be a
speaker of words and a doer of deeds. --(_Phoenix in_) Homer.
Above all and by every means we provide that our citizens shall have
good souls and strong bodies. --Lucian.
Life is the original school--life, domestic and social. All other
schools merely exercise functions delegated by the family and by
society, and it is not until the latter has reached such a state of
complication as to necessitate a division of labor that special schools
exist. Among the Homeric Greeks we find no mention of schools, and the
only person recorded as having had a tutor is Achilles, who was sent
away from home so early in life as to be deprived of that education
which he would naturally have received from his father. In what that
education consisted, we learn from the first quotation at the head of
this chapter. It consisted in such training as would make the pupil "a
speaker of words and a doer of deeds"--a man eloquent and persuasive in
council, and brave and resolute on the field of battle. For these ends
he required, as Lucian says, a good soul and a strong body.
These expressions mark the two great divisions into which Greek
education at all periods fell--MENTAL EDUCATION and PHYSICAL
EDUCATION--as well as their original aims, viz. goodness (that is,
bravery) of soul and strength of body. As time went on, these aims
underwent considerable changes, and consequently the means for attaining
them considerable modifications and extensions. Physical education aimed
more and more at beauty and grace, instead of strength, while mental
education, in its effort to extend itself to all the powers of the mind,
divided itself into literary and musical education.
As we have seen, the Greeks aimed at developing all the powers of the
human being in due proportion and harmony. But, in course of time, they
discovered that the human creature comes into the world with his powers,
not only undeveloped, but already disordered and inharmonious; that not
only do the germs of manhood require to be carefully watched and tended,
but also that the ground in which they are to grow must be cleared from
an overgrowth of choking weeds, before education can be undertaken with
any hope of success. This clearing process was called by the later
Greeks _Katharsis_, or Purgation, and played an ever-increasing part in
their pedagogical systems. It was supposed to do for man's emotional
nature what Medicine undertook to do for his body. The means employed
were mainly music and the kindred arts, which the ancients believed to
exert what we should now call a daemonic effect upon the soul, drawing
off the exciting causes of disturbing passion, and leaving it in
complete possession of itself. It would hardly be too much to say that
the power to exert this purgative influence on the soul was regarded by
the ancients as the chief function and end of the Fine Arts. Such was
certainly Aristotle's opinion.
When purgation and the twofold education of body and mind had produced
their perfect work, the result was what the Greeks called _Kalokagathia_
(? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) that is, Fair-and-Goodness. Either half of this ideal was
named ? ? ? ? ? (_arete_), Worth or Excellence. We are expressly told by
Aristotle (_Categories_, chap. viii. ) that the adjective to ? ? ? ? ? is
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? (_spoudaios_), a word which we usually render into English by
"earnest. " And we do so with reason; for to the Greek, Excellence or
Worth meant, above all, earnestness, genuineness, truthfulness,
thoroughness, absence of frivolity.
CHAPTER III
CONDITIONS OF EDUCATION
Some hold that men become good by nature, others by training, others
by instruction. The part that is due to nature obviously does not
depend upon us, but is imparted through certain divine causes to the
truly fortunate. --Aristotle.
It is not merely begetting that makes the father, but also the
imparting of a noble education. --John Chrysostom.
There are two sorts of education, the one divine, the other human.
The divine is great and strong and easy; the human small and weak
and beset with many dangers and delusions. Nevertheless, the latter
must be added to the former, if a right result is to be
reached. --Dion Chrysostom.
The same thing that we are wont to assert regarding the arts and
sciences, may be asserted regarding moral worth, viz. that the
production of a completely just character demands three
conditions--nature, reason, and habit. By "reason" I mean
instruction, by "habit," training. . . . Nature without instruction is
blind; instruction without nature, helpless; exercise (training)
without both, aimless. --Plutarch.
To the realization of their ideal in any individual the Greeks conceived
three conditions to be necessary, (1) a noble nature, (2) persistent
exercise or training in right action, (3) careful instruction. If any
one of these was lacking, the highest result could not be attained.
(1) To be well or nobly born was regarded by the Greeks as one of the
best gifts of the gods. Aristotle defines noble birth as "ancient wealth
and worth," and this fairly enough expresses the Greek view generally.
Naturally enough, therefore, the Greek in marrying looked above all
things to the chances of a worthy offspring. Indeed, it may be fairly
said that the purpose of the Greek in marriage was, not so much to
secure a helpmeet for himself as to find a worthy mother for his
children. In Greece, as everywhere else in the ancient world, marriage
was looked upon solely as an arrangement for the procreation and rearing
of offspring. The romantic, pathological love-element, which plays so
important a part in modern match-making, was almost entirely absent
among the Greeks. What love there was, assumed either the noble form of
enthusiastic friendship or the base one of free lust. In spite of this,
and of the fact that woman was regarded as a means and not as an end,
the relations between Greek husbands and wives were very often such as
to render the family a school of virtue for the children. They were
noble, sweet, and strong,--all the more so, it should seem, that they
were based, not upon a delusive sentimentality, but upon reason and a
sense of reciprocal duty.
(2) The value of exercise, practice, habituation, seems to have been far
better understood by the ancients than by the moderns. Whatever a man
has to do, be it speaking, swimming, playing, or fighting, he can learn
only by doing it; this was a universally accepted maxim. The modern
habit of trying to teach languages and virtues by rules, not preceded by
extensive practice, would have seemed to the ancients as absurd as the
notion that a man could learn to swim before going into the water.
Practice first; theory afterwards: do the deed, and ye shall know of
the doctrine--so said ancient Wisdom, to which the notion that children
should not be called upon to perform any act, or submit to any
restriction, without having the grounds thereof explained to them, would
have seemed the complete inversion of all scientific method. It was by
insisting upon a certain practice in children, on the ground of simple
authority, that the ancients sought to inculcate the virtues of
reverence for experience and worth, and respect for law.
(3) The work begun by nature, and continued by habit or exercise, was
completed and crowned by instruction. This had, according to the Greek,
two functions, (_a_) to make action free, by making it rational, (_b_)
to make possible an advance to original action. Nature and habit left
men thralls, governed by instincts and prescriptions; instruction,
revelation of the grounds of action, set them free. Such freedom, based
on insight, was to the thinkers of Greece the realization of manhood, or
rather, of the divine in man. "The truth shall make you free"--no one
understood this better than they. Hence, with all their steady
insistence upon practice in education, they never regarded it as the
ultimate end, or as any end at all, except when guided by insight, the
fruit of instruction. A practicality leading to no widening of the
spiritual horizon, to no freeing insight, was to them illiberal,
slavish, paltry--"banausic," they said,--degrading both to body and
soul.
CHAPTER IV
SUBJECTS FOR EDUCATION
It is right that Greeks should rule over barbarians, but not
barbarians over Greeks; for those are slaves, but these are free
men. --Euripides.
Barbarian and slave are by nature the same. --Aristotle.
Nature endeavors to make the bodies of freemen and slaves different;
the latter strong for necessary use, the former erect and useless
for such operations, but useful for political life. . . . It is
evident, then, that by nature some men are free, others slaves, and
that, in the case of the latter, slavery is both beneficial and
just.
Thomas Davidson
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Title: Aristotle and Ancient Educational Ideals
Author: Thomas Davidson
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Language: English
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The Great Educators
Edited by NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER
ARISTOTLE
AND
ANCIENT EDUCATIONAL IDEALS
BY
THOMAS DAVIDSON
NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
1892
COPYRIGHT, 1892, BY
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS.
PREFACE
In undertaking to treat of Aristotle as the expounder of ancient
educational ideas, I might, with Kapp's _Aristoteles' Staatspaedagogik_
before me, have made my task an easy one. I might simply have presented
in an orderly way and with a little commentary, what is to be found on
the subject of education in his various works--Politics, Ethics,
Rhetoric, Poetics, etc. I had two reasons, however, for not adopting
this course: (1) that this work had been done, better than I could do
it, in the treatise referred to, and (2) that a mere restatement of what
Aristotle says on education would hardly have shown his relation to
ancient pedagogy as a whole. I therefore judged it better, by tracing
briefly the whole history of Greek education up to Aristotle and down
from Aristotle, to show the past which conditioned his theories and the
future which was conditioned by them. Only thus, it seemed to me, could
his teachings be seen in their proper light. And I have found that this
method has many advantages, of which I may mention one. It has enabled
me to show the close connection that existed at all times between Greek
education and Greek social and political life, and to present the one
as the reflection of the other. And this is no small advantage, since it
is just from its relation to the whole of life that Greek education
derives its chief interest for us. We can never, indeed, return to the
purely political education of the Greeks; they themselves had to abandon
that, and, since then,
A boundless hope has passed across the earth--
a hope which gives our education a meaning and a scope far wider than
any that the State aims at; but in these days, when the State and the
institution which embodies that hope are contending for the right to
educate, it cannot but aid us in settling their respective claims, to
follow the process by which they came to have distinct claims at all,
and to see just what these mean. This process, the method which I have
followed has, I hope, enabled me, in some degree, to bring into
clearness. This, at all events, has been one of my chief aims.
In treating of the details of Greek educational practice, I have been
guided by a desire to present only, or mainly, those which contribute to
make up the complete picture. For this reason I have omitted all
reference to the training for the Olympic and other games, this (so it
seems to me) being no essential part of the system.
It would have been easy for me to give my book a learned appearance, by
checkering its pages with references to ancient authors, or quotations,
in the original, from them; but this has seemed to me both unnecessary
and unprofitable in a work intended for the general public. I have,
therefore, preferred to place at the heads of the different chapters,
in English mostly, such quotations as seemed to express, in the most
striking way, the spirit of the different periods and theories of Greek
education. Taken together, I believe these quotations will be found to
present a fairly definite outline of the whole subject.
In conclusion, I would say that, though I have used a few modern works,
such as those of Kapp and Grasberger, I have done so almost solely for
the sake of finding references. In regard to every point I believe I
have turned to the original sources. If, therefore, my conclusions on
certain points differ from those of writers of note who have preceded
me, I can only say that I have tried to do my best with the original
materials before me. I am far from flattering myself that I have reached
the truth in every case, and shall be very grateful for corrections, in
whatever spirit they may be offered; but I trust that I have been able
to present in their essential features, the "ancient ideals of
education. "
THOMAS DAVIDSON.
"Glenmore,"
Keene, Essex Co. , N. Y.
October, 1891.
CONTENTS
BOOK I.
INTRODUCTORY.
PAGE
CHAPTER I.
Character and Ideal of Greek Education 3
CHAPTER II.
Branches of Greek Education 6
CHAPTER III.
Conditions of Education 9
CHAPTER IV.
Subjects of Education 12
CHAPTER V.
Education as Influenced by Time, Place,
and Circumstances 15
CHAPTER VI.
Epochs in Greek Education 26
BOOK II.
THE HELLENIC PERIOD (B. C. 776-338).
PART I.
_THE "OLD EDUCATION"_ (B. C. 776-480).
CHAPTER I.
Education for Work and Leisure 33
CHAPTER II.
AEolian or Theban Education 38
CHAPTER III.
Dorian or Spartan Education 41
CHAPTER IV.
Pythagoras 52
CHAPTER V.
Ionian or Athenian Education 60
(1) Family Education 64
(2) School Education 67
(? ) Musical (and Literary) Education 72
(? ) Gymnastics, or Bodily Training 77
(? ) Dancing 82
(3) College Education 85
(4) University Education 90
PART II.
_THE "NEW EDUCATION"_ (B. C. 480-338).
CHAPTER I.
Individualism and Philosophy 93
CHAPTER II.
Xenophon 114
CHAPTER III.
Plato 133
BOOK III.
ARISTOTLE (B. C. 384-322).
CHAPTER I.
His Life and Works 153
CHAPTER II.
His Philosophy 161
CHAPTER III.
His Theory of the State 166
CHAPTER IV.
His Pedagogical State 172
CHAPTER V.
Education during the first Seven Years 184
CHAPTER VI.
Education from Seven To Twenty-one 188
CHAPTER VII.
Education after Twenty-one 200
BOOK IV.
THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD (B. C. 338-A. D. 313).
CHAPTER I.
From Ethnic to Cosmopolitan Life 205
CHAPTER II.
Quintilian and Rhetorical Education 214
CHAPTER III.
Plotinus and Philosophic Education 225
CHAPTER IV.
Conclusion 231
APPENDIX.
The Seven Liberal Arts 239
BIBLIOGRAPHY 249
INDEX 253
BOOK I
INTRODUCTORY
ERRATA.
Page 19, line 5 from below, insert 102.
53, " 6 " " " 133.
181, " 14 " " for "and" read "or. "
250, " 11 " " " "Watsno" read "Watson. "
ARISTOTLE
CHAPTER I
CHARACTER AND IDEAL OF GREEK EDUCATION
Nothing in excess! --Solon.
No citizen has a right to consider himself as belonging to himself;
but all ought to regard themselves as belonging to the State,
inasmuch as each is a part of the State; and care for the part
naturally looks to care for the whole. --Aristotle.
Greek life, in all its manifestations, was dominated by a single idea,
and that an aesthetic one. This idea, which worked sometimes consciously,
sometimes unconsciously, was PROPORTION. The Greek term for this
(_Logos_) not only came to designate the incarnate Word of Religion, but
has also supplied many modern languages with a name for the Science of
Manifested Reason--Logic. To the Greek, indeed, Reason always meant
ratio, proportion; and a rational life meant to him a life of which all
the parts, internal and external, stood to each other in just
proportion. Such proportion was threefold; _first_, between the
different parts of the individual human being; _second_, between the
individual and his fellows in a social whole; _third_, between the
human, as such, and the overruling divine. The realization of this
threefold harmony in the individual was called by the Greeks WORTH
(? ? ? ? ? , usually, but incorrectly, rendered Virtue). There has come down
to us, from the pen of Aristotle, in whom all that was implicit in
Hellenism became explicit, a portion of a paean addressed to this ideal.
It may be fitly inserted here, in a literal translation.
TO WORTH.
O Worth! stern taskmistress of human kind,
Life's noblest prize:
O Virgin! for thy beauty's sake
It is an envied lot in Hellas even to die,
And suffer toils devouring, unassuaged--
So well dost thou direct the spirit
To fruit immortal, better than gold
And parents and soft-eyed sleep.
For thy cause Jove-born Hercules and Leda's sons
Much underwent, by deeds
Thy power proclaiming.
For love of thee Achilles and Ajax to Hades' halls went down.
For thy dear beauty's sake Atarneus' nursling too widowed the glances
of the sun.
Therefore, as one renowned for deeds and deathless, him the Muses
shall exalt,
The daughters of Memory, exalting so the glory of Stranger-guarding
Jove, and the honor of friendship firm.
With regard to this ideal, four things are especially noteworthy;
_first_, that it took an exhaustive survey of man's nature and
relations; _second_, that it called for strong, persistent, heroic
effort; _third_, that it tended to sink the individual in the social
whole and the universal order; _fourth_, that its aim was, on the whole,
a static perfection. The first two were merits; the second two,
demerits. The first merit prevented the Greeks from pursuing one-sided
systems of education; the second, from trying to turn education into a
means of amusement. Aristotle says distinctly, "Education ought
certainly not to be turned into a means of amusement; for young people
are not playing when they are learning, since all learning is
accompanied with pain. " The first demerit was prejudicial to individual
liberty, and therefore obstructive of the highest human development; the
second encouraged Utopian dreams, which, being always of static
conditions, undisturbed by the toils and throes essential to progress,
tend to produce impatience of that slow advance whereby alone man
arrives at enduring results. To this tendency we owe such works as
Plato's _Republic_ and Xenophon's _Education of Cyrus_.
CHAPTER II
BRANCHES OF GREEK EDUCATION
With thee the aged car-borne Peleus sent me on the day whereon from
Phthia to Agamemnon he sent thee, a mere boy, not yet acquainted
with mutual war or councils, in which men rise to distinction--for
this end he sent me forth to teach thee all these things, to be a
speaker of words and a doer of deeds. --(_Phoenix in_) Homer.
Above all and by every means we provide that our citizens shall have
good souls and strong bodies. --Lucian.
Life is the original school--life, domestic and social. All other
schools merely exercise functions delegated by the family and by
society, and it is not until the latter has reached such a state of
complication as to necessitate a division of labor that special schools
exist. Among the Homeric Greeks we find no mention of schools, and the
only person recorded as having had a tutor is Achilles, who was sent
away from home so early in life as to be deprived of that education
which he would naturally have received from his father. In what that
education consisted, we learn from the first quotation at the head of
this chapter. It consisted in such training as would make the pupil "a
speaker of words and a doer of deeds"--a man eloquent and persuasive in
council, and brave and resolute on the field of battle. For these ends
he required, as Lucian says, a good soul and a strong body.
These expressions mark the two great divisions into which Greek
education at all periods fell--MENTAL EDUCATION and PHYSICAL
EDUCATION--as well as their original aims, viz. goodness (that is,
bravery) of soul and strength of body. As time went on, these aims
underwent considerable changes, and consequently the means for attaining
them considerable modifications and extensions. Physical education aimed
more and more at beauty and grace, instead of strength, while mental
education, in its effort to extend itself to all the powers of the mind,
divided itself into literary and musical education.
As we have seen, the Greeks aimed at developing all the powers of the
human being in due proportion and harmony. But, in course of time, they
discovered that the human creature comes into the world with his powers,
not only undeveloped, but already disordered and inharmonious; that not
only do the germs of manhood require to be carefully watched and tended,
but also that the ground in which they are to grow must be cleared from
an overgrowth of choking weeds, before education can be undertaken with
any hope of success. This clearing process was called by the later
Greeks _Katharsis_, or Purgation, and played an ever-increasing part in
their pedagogical systems. It was supposed to do for man's emotional
nature what Medicine undertook to do for his body. The means employed
were mainly music and the kindred arts, which the ancients believed to
exert what we should now call a daemonic effect upon the soul, drawing
off the exciting causes of disturbing passion, and leaving it in
complete possession of itself. It would hardly be too much to say that
the power to exert this purgative influence on the soul was regarded by
the ancients as the chief function and end of the Fine Arts. Such was
certainly Aristotle's opinion.
When purgation and the twofold education of body and mind had produced
their perfect work, the result was what the Greeks called _Kalokagathia_
(? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) that is, Fair-and-Goodness. Either half of this ideal was
named ? ? ? ? ? (_arete_), Worth or Excellence. We are expressly told by
Aristotle (_Categories_, chap. viii. ) that the adjective to ? ? ? ? ? is
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? (_spoudaios_), a word which we usually render into English by
"earnest. " And we do so with reason; for to the Greek, Excellence or
Worth meant, above all, earnestness, genuineness, truthfulness,
thoroughness, absence of frivolity.
CHAPTER III
CONDITIONS OF EDUCATION
Some hold that men become good by nature, others by training, others
by instruction. The part that is due to nature obviously does not
depend upon us, but is imparted through certain divine causes to the
truly fortunate. --Aristotle.
It is not merely begetting that makes the father, but also the
imparting of a noble education. --John Chrysostom.
There are two sorts of education, the one divine, the other human.
The divine is great and strong and easy; the human small and weak
and beset with many dangers and delusions. Nevertheless, the latter
must be added to the former, if a right result is to be
reached. --Dion Chrysostom.
The same thing that we are wont to assert regarding the arts and
sciences, may be asserted regarding moral worth, viz. that the
production of a completely just character demands three
conditions--nature, reason, and habit. By "reason" I mean
instruction, by "habit," training. . . . Nature without instruction is
blind; instruction without nature, helpless; exercise (training)
without both, aimless. --Plutarch.
To the realization of their ideal in any individual the Greeks conceived
three conditions to be necessary, (1) a noble nature, (2) persistent
exercise or training in right action, (3) careful instruction. If any
one of these was lacking, the highest result could not be attained.
(1) To be well or nobly born was regarded by the Greeks as one of the
best gifts of the gods. Aristotle defines noble birth as "ancient wealth
and worth," and this fairly enough expresses the Greek view generally.
I am far from flattering myself that I have reached
the truth in every case, and shall be very grateful for corrections, in
whatever spirit they may be offered; but I trust that I have been able
to present in their essential features, the "ancient ideals of
education. "
THOMAS DAVIDSON.
"Glenmore,"
Keene, Essex Co. , N. Y.
October, 1891.
CONTENTS
BOOK I.
INTRODUCTORY.
PAGE
CHAPTER I.
Character and Ideal of Greek Education 3
CHAPTER II.
Branches of Greek Education 6
CHAPTER III.
Conditions of Education 9
CHAPTER IV.
Subjects of Education 12
CHAPTER V.
Education as Influenced by Time, Place,
and Circumstances 15
CHAPTER VI.
Epochs in Greek Education 26
BOOK II.
THE HELLENIC PERIOD (B. C. 776-338).
PART I.
_THE "OLD EDUCATION"_ (B. C. 776-480).
CHAPTER I.
Education for Work and Leisure 33
CHAPTER II.
AEolian or Theban Education 38
CHAPTER III.
Dorian or Spartan Education 41
CHAPTER IV.
Pythagoras 52
CHAPTER V.
Ionian or Athenian Education 60
(1) Family Education 64
(2) School Education 67
(? ) Musical (and Literary) Education 72
(? ) Gymnastics, or Bodily Training 77
(? ) Dancing 82
(3) College Education 85
(4) University Education 90
PART II.
_THE "NEW EDUCATION"_ (B. C. 480-338).
CHAPTER I.
Individualism and Philosophy 93
CHAPTER II.
Xenophon 114
CHAPTER III.
Plato 133
BOOK III.
ARISTOTLE (B. C. 384-322).
CHAPTER I.
His Life and Works 153
CHAPTER II.
His Philosophy 161
CHAPTER III.
His Theory of the State 166
CHAPTER IV.
His Pedagogical State 172
CHAPTER V.
Education during the first Seven Years 184
CHAPTER VI.
Education from Seven To Twenty-one 188
CHAPTER VII.
Education after Twenty-one 200
BOOK IV.
THE HELLENISTIC PERIOD (B. C. 338-A. D. 313).
CHAPTER I.
From Ethnic to Cosmopolitan Life 205
CHAPTER II.
Quintilian and Rhetorical Education 214
CHAPTER III.
Plotinus and Philosophic Education 225
CHAPTER IV.
Conclusion 231
APPENDIX.
The Seven Liberal Arts 239
BIBLIOGRAPHY 249
INDEX 253
BOOK I
INTRODUCTORY
ERRATA.
Page 19, line 5 from below, insert 102.
53, " 6 " " " 133.
181, " 14 " " for "and" read "or. "
250, " 11 " " " "Watsno" read "Watson. "
ARISTOTLE
CHAPTER I
CHARACTER AND IDEAL OF GREEK EDUCATION
Nothing in excess! --Solon.
No citizen has a right to consider himself as belonging to himself;
but all ought to regard themselves as belonging to the State,
inasmuch as each is a part of the State; and care for the part
naturally looks to care for the whole. --Aristotle.
Greek life, in all its manifestations, was dominated by a single idea,
and that an aesthetic one. This idea, which worked sometimes consciously,
sometimes unconsciously, was PROPORTION. The Greek term for this
(_Logos_) not only came to designate the incarnate Word of Religion, but
has also supplied many modern languages with a name for the Science of
Manifested Reason--Logic. To the Greek, indeed, Reason always meant
ratio, proportion; and a rational life meant to him a life of which all
the parts, internal and external, stood to each other in just
proportion. Such proportion was threefold; _first_, between the
different parts of the individual human being; _second_, between the
individual and his fellows in a social whole; _third_, between the
human, as such, and the overruling divine. The realization of this
threefold harmony in the individual was called by the Greeks WORTH
(? ? ? ? ? , usually, but incorrectly, rendered Virtue). There has come down
to us, from the pen of Aristotle, in whom all that was implicit in
Hellenism became explicit, a portion of a paean addressed to this ideal.
It may be fitly inserted here, in a literal translation.
TO WORTH.
O Worth! stern taskmistress of human kind,
Life's noblest prize:
O Virgin! for thy beauty's sake
It is an envied lot in Hellas even to die,
And suffer toils devouring, unassuaged--
So well dost thou direct the spirit
To fruit immortal, better than gold
And parents and soft-eyed sleep.
For thy cause Jove-born Hercules and Leda's sons
Much underwent, by deeds
Thy power proclaiming.
For love of thee Achilles and Ajax to Hades' halls went down.
For thy dear beauty's sake Atarneus' nursling too widowed the glances
of the sun.
Therefore, as one renowned for deeds and deathless, him the Muses
shall exalt,
The daughters of Memory, exalting so the glory of Stranger-guarding
Jove, and the honor of friendship firm.
With regard to this ideal, four things are especially noteworthy;
_first_, that it took an exhaustive survey of man's nature and
relations; _second_, that it called for strong, persistent, heroic
effort; _third_, that it tended to sink the individual in the social
whole and the universal order; _fourth_, that its aim was, on the whole,
a static perfection. The first two were merits; the second two,
demerits. The first merit prevented the Greeks from pursuing one-sided
systems of education; the second, from trying to turn education into a
means of amusement. Aristotle says distinctly, "Education ought
certainly not to be turned into a means of amusement; for young people
are not playing when they are learning, since all learning is
accompanied with pain. " The first demerit was prejudicial to individual
liberty, and therefore obstructive of the highest human development; the
second encouraged Utopian dreams, which, being always of static
conditions, undisturbed by the toils and throes essential to progress,
tend to produce impatience of that slow advance whereby alone man
arrives at enduring results. To this tendency we owe such works as
Plato's _Republic_ and Xenophon's _Education of Cyrus_.
CHAPTER II
BRANCHES OF GREEK EDUCATION
With thee the aged car-borne Peleus sent me on the day whereon from
Phthia to Agamemnon he sent thee, a mere boy, not yet acquainted
with mutual war or councils, in which men rise to distinction--for
this end he sent me forth to teach thee all these things, to be a
speaker of words and a doer of deeds. --(_Phoenix in_) Homer.
Above all and by every means we provide that our citizens shall have
good souls and strong bodies. --Lucian.
Life is the original school--life, domestic and social. All other
schools merely exercise functions delegated by the family and by
society, and it is not until the latter has reached such a state of
complication as to necessitate a division of labor that special schools
exist. Among the Homeric Greeks we find no mention of schools, and the
only person recorded as having had a tutor is Achilles, who was sent
away from home so early in life as to be deprived of that education
which he would naturally have received from his father. In what that
education consisted, we learn from the first quotation at the head of
this chapter. It consisted in such training as would make the pupil "a
speaker of words and a doer of deeds"--a man eloquent and persuasive in
council, and brave and resolute on the field of battle. For these ends
he required, as Lucian says, a good soul and a strong body.
These expressions mark the two great divisions into which Greek
education at all periods fell--MENTAL EDUCATION and PHYSICAL
EDUCATION--as well as their original aims, viz. goodness (that is,
bravery) of soul and strength of body. As time went on, these aims
underwent considerable changes, and consequently the means for attaining
them considerable modifications and extensions. Physical education aimed
more and more at beauty and grace, instead of strength, while mental
education, in its effort to extend itself to all the powers of the mind,
divided itself into literary and musical education.
As we have seen, the Greeks aimed at developing all the powers of the
human being in due proportion and harmony. But, in course of time, they
discovered that the human creature comes into the world with his powers,
not only undeveloped, but already disordered and inharmonious; that not
only do the germs of manhood require to be carefully watched and tended,
but also that the ground in which they are to grow must be cleared from
an overgrowth of choking weeds, before education can be undertaken with
any hope of success. This clearing process was called by the later
Greeks _Katharsis_, or Purgation, and played an ever-increasing part in
their pedagogical systems. It was supposed to do for man's emotional
nature what Medicine undertook to do for his body. The means employed
were mainly music and the kindred arts, which the ancients believed to
exert what we should now call a daemonic effect upon the soul, drawing
off the exciting causes of disturbing passion, and leaving it in
complete possession of itself. It would hardly be too much to say that
the power to exert this purgative influence on the soul was regarded by
the ancients as the chief function and end of the Fine Arts. Such was
certainly Aristotle's opinion.
When purgation and the twofold education of body and mind had produced
their perfect work, the result was what the Greeks called _Kalokagathia_
(? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) that is, Fair-and-Goodness. Either half of this ideal was
named ? ? ? ? ? (_arete_), Worth or Excellence. We are expressly told by
Aristotle (_Categories_, chap. viii. ) that the adjective to ? ? ? ? ? is
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? (_spoudaios_), a word which we usually render into English by
"earnest. " And we do so with reason; for to the Greek, Excellence or
Worth meant, above all, earnestness, genuineness, truthfulness,
thoroughness, absence of frivolity.
CHAPTER III
CONDITIONS OF EDUCATION
Some hold that men become good by nature, others by training, others
by instruction. The part that is due to nature obviously does not
depend upon us, but is imparted through certain divine causes to the
truly fortunate. --Aristotle.
It is not merely begetting that makes the father, but also the
imparting of a noble education. --John Chrysostom.
There are two sorts of education, the one divine, the other human.
The divine is great and strong and easy; the human small and weak
and beset with many dangers and delusions. Nevertheless, the latter
must be added to the former, if a right result is to be
reached. --Dion Chrysostom.
The same thing that we are wont to assert regarding the arts and
sciences, may be asserted regarding moral worth, viz. that the
production of a completely just character demands three
conditions--nature, reason, and habit. By "reason" I mean
instruction, by "habit," training. . . . Nature without instruction is
blind; instruction without nature, helpless; exercise (training)
without both, aimless. --Plutarch.
To the realization of their ideal in any individual the Greeks conceived
three conditions to be necessary, (1) a noble nature, (2) persistent
exercise or training in right action, (3) careful instruction. If any
one of these was lacking, the highest result could not be attained.
(1) To be well or nobly born was regarded by the Greeks as one of the
best gifts of the gods. Aristotle defines noble birth as "ancient wealth
and worth," and this fairly enough expresses the Greek view generally.
Naturally enough, therefore, the Greek in marrying looked above all
things to the chances of a worthy offspring. Indeed, it may be fairly
said that the purpose of the Greek in marriage was, not so much to
secure a helpmeet for himself as to find a worthy mother for his
children. In Greece, as everywhere else in the ancient world, marriage
was looked upon solely as an arrangement for the procreation and rearing
of offspring. The romantic, pathological love-element, which plays so
important a part in modern match-making, was almost entirely absent
among the Greeks. What love there was, assumed either the noble form of
enthusiastic friendship or the base one of free lust. In spite of this,
and of the fact that woman was regarded as a means and not as an end,
the relations between Greek husbands and wives were very often such as
to render the family a school of virtue for the children. They were
noble, sweet, and strong,--all the more so, it should seem, that they
were based, not upon a delusive sentimentality, but upon reason and a
sense of reciprocal duty.
(2) The value of exercise, practice, habituation, seems to have been far
better understood by the ancients than by the moderns. Whatever a man
has to do, be it speaking, swimming, playing, or fighting, he can learn
only by doing it; this was a universally accepted maxim. The modern
habit of trying to teach languages and virtues by rules, not preceded by
extensive practice, would have seemed to the ancients as absurd as the
notion that a man could learn to swim before going into the water.
Practice first; theory afterwards: do the deed, and ye shall know of
the doctrine--so said ancient Wisdom, to which the notion that children
should not be called upon to perform any act, or submit to any
restriction, without having the grounds thereof explained to them, would
have seemed the complete inversion of all scientific method. It was by
insisting upon a certain practice in children, on the ground of simple
authority, that the ancients sought to inculcate the virtues of
reverence for experience and worth, and respect for law.
(3) The work begun by nature, and continued by habit or exercise, was
completed and crowned by instruction. This had, according to the Greek,
two functions, (_a_) to make action free, by making it rational, (_b_)
to make possible an advance to original action. Nature and habit left
men thralls, governed by instincts and prescriptions; instruction,
revelation of the grounds of action, set them free. Such freedom, based
on insight, was to the thinkers of Greece the realization of manhood, or
rather, of the divine in man. "The truth shall make you free"--no one
understood this better than they. Hence, with all their steady
insistence upon practice in education, they never regarded it as the
ultimate end, or as any end at all, except when guided by insight, the
fruit of instruction. A practicality leading to no widening of the
spiritual horizon, to no freeing insight, was to them illiberal,
slavish, paltry--"banausic," they said,--degrading both to body and
soul.
CHAPTER IV
SUBJECTS FOR EDUCATION
It is right that Greeks should rule over barbarians, but not
barbarians over Greeks; for those are slaves, but these are free
men. --Euripides.
Barbarian and slave are by nature the same. --Aristotle.
Nature endeavors to make the bodies of freemen and slaves different;
the latter strong for necessary use, the former erect and useless
for such operations, but useful for political life. . . . It is
evident, then, that by nature some men are free, others slaves, and
that, in the case of the latter, slavery is both beneficial and
just.
