The mischiefs attending the prevalence of their system, which would make the success of their ambitious designs
a new and peculiar species of calamity in the world;
6.
a new and peculiar species of calamity in the world;
6.
Edmund Burke
Erskine should have
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 21
deserved such marked applauses for acting merely as
a lawyer for his fee, in the ordinary course of his profession.
15. Indeed, Mr. Fox appeared the general patron
of all such persons and proceedings. When Lord
Edward Fitzgerald, and other persons, for practices
of the most dangerous kind, in Paris and in London,
were removed from the King's Guards, Mr. Fox took
occasion in the House of Commons heavily to censure that act, as unjust and oppressive, and tending to make officers bad citizens. There were few, however,
who did not call for some such measures on the part
of government, as of absolute necessity for the king's
personal safety, as well as that of the public; and
nothing but the mistaken lenity, with which such
practices were rather discountenanced than punished,
could possibly deserve reprehension in what was done
with regard to those gentlemen.
16. Mr. Fox regularly and systematically, and
with a diligence long unusual to him, did everything
he could to countenance the same principle of fraternity and connection with the Jacobins abroad, and the National Convention of France, for which these
officers had been removed from the Guards. For
when a bill (feeble and lax, indeed, and far short of
the vigor required by the conjuncture) was brought
in for removing out of the kingdom the emissaries of
France, Mr. Fox opposed it with all his might. He
pursued a vehement and detailed opposition to it
through all its stages, describing it as a measure contrary to the existing treaties between Great Britain and France, as a violation of the law of nations, and
as an outrage on the Great Charter itself.
17. In the same manner, and with the same heat,
? ? ? ? 22 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
he opposed a bill which (though awkward and inartificial in its construction) was right and wise in its
principle, and was precedented in the best times, and
absolutely necessary at that juncture: I mean the
Traitorous Correspondence Bill. By these means the
enemy, rendered infinitely dangerous by the links of
real faction and pretended commerce, would have
been (had Mr. Fox succeeded) enabled to carry on
the war against us by our own resources. For this
purpose that enemy would have had his agents and
traitors in the midst of us.
18. When at length war was actually declared by
the usurpers in France against this kingdom, and
declared whilst they were pretending a negotiation
through Dumouriez with Lord Auckland, Mr. Fox
still continued, through the whole of the proceedings,
to discredit the national honor and justice, and to
throw the entire blame of the war on Parliament, and
on his own country, as acting with violence, haughtiness, and want of equity. He frequently asserted,
both at the time and ever since, that the war, though
declared by France, was provoked by us, and that it
was wholly unnecessary and fundamentally unjust.
19. He ehas lost no opportunity of railing, in the
most virulent manner and in the most unmeasured
language, at every foreign power with whom we
could now, or at any time, contract any useful or
effectual alliance against France, - declaring that he
hoped no alliance with those powers was made, or
was in a train of being made. *' He always expressed
himself with the utmost horror concerning such alli* It is an exception, that in one of his last speeches'( but not before) Mr. Fox seemed to think an alliance with Spain might be proper.
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 23
ances. So did all his phalanx. Mr. Sheridan in
particular, after one of his invectives against those
powers, sitting by him, said, with manifest marks
of his approbation, that, if we must go to war, he
had rather go to war alone than with such allies.
20. Immediately after the French declaration of
war against us, Parliament addressed the king in
support of the war against them, as just and necessary, and provoked, as well as formally declared against Great Britain. He did not divide the House
upon this measure; yet he immediately followed this
our solemn Parliamentary engagement to the king
with a motion proposing a set of resolutibns, the
effect of which was, that the two Houses were to
load themselves with every kind of reproach for
having made the address which they had just carried to the throne. He commenced this long string of criminatory resolutions against his country (if
King, Lords, and Commons of Great Britain, and
a decided majority without doors are his country)
with a declaration against intermeddling in the interior
concerns of -France. The purport of this resolution
of non-interference is a thing unexampled in the
history of the world, when one nation has been
actually at war with another. The best writers
on the law of nations give no sort of countenance
to his doctrine of non-iinterference, in the extent
and manner in which he used it, even when there
is no war. When the war exists, not one authority is against it in all its latitude. His doctrine is equally contrary to the enemy's uniform practice,
who, whether in peace or in war, makes it his great
aim not only to change the government, but to make
an entire revolution in the whole of the social order
in every country.
? ? ? ? 24 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
The object of the last of this extraordinary string
of resolutions moved by Mr. Fox was to advise the
crown not to enter into such an engagement with
any foreign power so as to hinder us from making
a separate peace with France, or which might tend
to enable any of those powers to introduce a government in that country other than such as those persons whom he calls the people of France shall choose to establish. In short, the whole of these resolutions
appeared to have but one drift, namely, the sacrifice'of Our own domestic dignity and safety, and
the independency of Europe, to the support of this
strange mixture of anarchy and tyranny which prevails in France, and which Mr. Fox and his party
were pleased to call a government. The immediate
consequence of these measures was (by an example
the ill effects of which on the whole world are not
to be calculated) to secure the robbers of the innocent nobility, gentry, and ecclesiastics of France in'
the enjoyment of the spoil they have made of the
estates, houses, and goods of their fellow-citizens.
21. Not satisfied with moving these resolutions,
tending to confirm this horrible tyranny and robbery, and with actually dividing the House on the
first of the long string which they composed, in a
few days afterwards he encouraged and supported
Mr. Grey in producing the very same string in a
new form, and in moving, under the shape of an address of Parliament to the crown, another virulent
libel on all its own proceedings in this session, in
which not only all the ground of the resolutions
was again travelled over, but much new inflammatorv matter was introduced. In particular, a
charge was made, that Great Britain had not in
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 25
terposed to prevent the last partition of Poland.
On this head the party dwelt very largely and very
vehemently. Mr. Fox's intention, in the choice of
this extraordinary topic, was evident enough. He
well knows two things: first, that no wise or honest
man can approve of that partition, or can contemplate it without prognosticating great mischief from it to all countries at some future time; secondly, he
knows quite as well, that, let our opinions on that
partition be what they will, England, by itself, is not
in a situation to afford to Poland any assistance whatsoever. The purpose of the introduction of Polish politics into this discussion was not for the sake of
Poland; it was to throw an odium upon those who
are obliged to decline the cause of justice from their
impossibility of supporting a cause which they approve: as if we, who think more strongly on this subject than he does, were of a party against Poland,
because we are obliged to act with some of the authors of that injustice against our common enemy, France. But the great and leading purpose of this
introduction of Poland into the debates on the French
war was to divert the public attention from what was
in our power. that is, from a steady cooperation
against France, to a quarrel with the allies for the
sake of a Polish war, which, for any useful purpose
to Poland, he knew it was out of our power to make.
If England can touch Poland ever so remotely, it
mlust be through the medium of alliances. But by
attacking all the combined powers together for their
supposed unjust aggression upon France, he bound
theim by a new common interest not separately to
join England for the rescue of Poland. The proposition could only mean to do what all the writers
? ? ? ? 26 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
of his party in the Morning Chronicle have aimed
at persuading the public to, through the whole of the
last autumn and winter, and to this hour: that is, to
an alliance with the Jacobins of France, for the pretended purpose of succoring Poland. This curious
project would leave to Great Britain no other ally
in all Europe except its old enemy, France.
22. Mr. Fox, after the first day's discussion on the
question for the address, was at length driven to admit (to admit rather than to urge, and that very
faintly) that France had discovered ambitious views,
which none of his partisans, that I recollect, (Mr.
Sheridan excepted,) did, however, either urge or
admit. What is remarkable enough, all the points
admitted against the Jacobins were brought to bear
in their favor as much as those in which they were
defended. For when Mr. Fox admitted that the conduct of the Jacobins did discover ambition, he always
ended his admission of their ambitious views by an
apology for them, insisting that the universally hostile disposition shown to them rendered their ambition a sort of defensive policy. Thus, on whatever roads he travelled, they all terminated in reconmmending a recognition of their pretended republic,
and in the plan of sending an ambassador to it.
Tills was the burden of all his song:-" Everything
which we could reasonably hope from war would be
obtained from treaty. " It is to be observed, however, that, in all these debates, Mr. Fox never once
stated to the House upon what ground it was he conceived that all the objects of the French system of
united fanaticism and ambition would instantly be
given up, whenever England should think fit to propose a treaty. On proposing so strange a recogni
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 27
tion and so humiliating an embassy as he moved,
he was bound to produce his authority, if any authority he had. He ought to have done this the
rather, because Le Brun, in his first propositions,
and in his answers to Lord Grenville, defended, on
principle, not on temporary convenience,' everything
which was objected to France, and showed not the
smallest disposition to give up any one of the points
in discussion. Mr. Fox must also have known that
the Convention had passed to the order of the day,
on a proposition to give some sort of explanation or
modification to the hostile decree of the 19th of November for exciting insurrections in all countries, --
a decree known to be peculiarly pointed at Great
Britain. The whole proceeding of the French administration was the most remote that could be
imagined from furnishing any indication of a pacific disposition: for at the very time in which it
was pretended that the Jacobins entertained those
boasted pacific intentions, at the very time in which
Mr. Fox was urging a treaty with them, not content
with refusing a modification of the decree for insurrections, they published their ever-memorable decree of the 15th of December, 1792, for disorganizing every country in Europe into which they should on any occasion set their foot; and on the 25th and the 30th
of the same month, they solemnly, and, on the last of
these days, practically, confirmed that decree.
23. But Mr. Fox had himself taken good care, in
the negotiation he proposed, that France should not
be obliged to make any very great concessions to
hel presumed moderation: for he had laid down
one general, comprehensive rule, with him (as he
said) constant and inviolable. This rule, in fact,
? ? ? ? 28 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
would not only have left to the faction in France
all the property and power they had usurped at
home, but most, if not all, of the conquests which
by their atrocious perfidy and violence they had
made abroad. The principle laid down by Mr. Fox
is this, -- "' That every state, in the conclusion of a war,
has a right to avail itself of its conquests towards an
indemnification. " This principle (true or false) is
totally contrary to the policy which this country
has pursued with France at various periods, particularly at the Treaty of Ryswick, in the last century,
and at the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in this. ' Whatever the merits of his rule may be in the eyes of
neutral judges, it is a rule which no statesman before
him ever laid down in favor of the adverse power with
whom he was to negotiate. The adverse party himself may safely be trusted to take care of his own aggrandizement. But (as if the black boxes of the several parties had been exchanged) Mr. Fox's English ambassador, by some odd mistake, would find himself charged with the concerns of France. If we
were to leave France as she stood at the time when
Mr. Fox proposed to treat with her, that formidable
power must have been infinitely strengthened, and
almost every other power in Europe as much weakened, by the extraordinary basis which he laid for
a treaty. For Avignon must go from the Pope;
Savoy (at least) from the King of Sardinia, if not
Nice. Liege, Mentz, Salm, Deux-Ponts, and Basle
mullst be separated friom Germany. On this side of
the Rhilne, Liege (at least) must be lost to the Empire, and added to France. Mr. Fox's general principle fillly covered all this. How much of these
territories came within his rule lie never attempted
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 29
to define. He kept a profound silence as to Germany. As to the Netherlands he was something
more explicit. He said (if I recollect right) that
France on that side might expect something towards strengthening her frontier. As to the remaining parts of the Netherlands, which he supposed France might consent to surrender, he went so far
as to declare that England ought not to permit the
Emperor to be repossessed of the remainder of the
ten Provinces, but that the people should choose such
a form of independent government as they liked.
This proposition of Mr. Fox was just the arrangement which the usurpation in France had all along
proposed to make. As the circumstances were at
that time, and have been ever since, his proposition
fully indicated what government the Flemings must
have in the stated extent of what was left to them.
A government so set up in the Netherlands, whether
compulsory, or by the choice of the sans-culottes, (who
he well knew were to be the real electors, and the
sole electors,) in whatever name it was to exist, must
evidently depend for its existence, as it had done for
its original formation, on France. In reality, it must
have ended in that point to which, piece by piece,
the French were then actually bringing all the Netherlands,- that is, an incorporation with France as a
body of new Departments, just as Savoy and Liege
and the rest of their pretended independent popular sovereignties have been united to their republic.
Such an arrangement must have destroyed Austria;
it must have left Holland always at the mercy of
France; it must totally and forever cut off all political communication between England and the Continent. Such must have been the situation of Europe,
? ? ? ? 30 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
according to Mr. Fox's system of politics, however
laudable his personal motives may have been in proposing so complete a change in the whole system of
Great Britain with regard to all the Continental
powers.
24. After it had been generally supposed that all
public business was over for the session, and that
Mr. Fox had exhausted all the modes of pressing
this French scheme, he thought proper to take a step
beyond every expectation, and which demonstrated
his wonderful eagerness and perseverance in his
cause, as well as the nature and true character of
the cause itself. This step was taken by Mr. Fox
immediately after his giving his assent to the grant
of supply voted to him by Mr. Serjeant Adair and a
committee of gentlemen who assumed to themselves
to act in the name of the public. In the instrument
of his acceptance of this grant, Mr. Fox took occasion
to assure them that he would always persevere in the
same conduct which had procured to him so honorable
a mark of the public approbation. He was as good
as his word.
25. It was not long before an opportunity was
found, or made, for proving the sincerity of his professions, and demonstrating his gratitude to those
who had given public and unequivocal marks of
their. approbation of his late conduct. One of the
most virulent of the Jacobin faction, Mr. Gurney,
a banker at Norwich, had all along distinguished
himself by his French politics. By the means of this
gentleman, and of his associates of the same description, one of the most insidious and dangerous handbills that ever was seen had been circulated at Norwich against the war, drawn up in an hypocritical tone
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 31
of compassion for the poor. This address to the populace of Norwich was to play in concert with an address to Mr. Fox; it was signed by Mr. Gurney and the higher part of the French fraternity in that town.
In this paper Mr. Fox is applauded for his conduct
throughout the session, and requested, before the
prorogation, to make a motion for an immediate
peace with France.
26. Mr. Fox did not revoke to this suit: he readily and thankfully undertook the task assigned to
him. Not content, however, with merely falling in
with their wishes, he proposed a task on his part to
the gentlemen of Norwich, which was, that they should
move the people without doors to petition against the
war. He said, that, without such assistance, little
good could be expected from anything he might attempt within the walls of the House of Commons.
In the mean time, to animate his Norwich friends in
their endeavors to besiege Parliament, he snatched
the first opportunity to give notice of a motion
which he very soon after made, namely, to address
the crown to make peace with France. The address
was so worded as to coiperate with the handbill in
bringing forward matter calculated to inflame the
manufacturers throughout the kingdom.
27. In support of his motion, he declaimed in the
most virulent strain, even beyond any of his former
invectives, against every power with whom we were
then, and are now, acting against France. In the
moral forum some of these powers certainly deserve
all the ill he said of them; but the political effect
aimed at, evidently, was to turn our indignation from
France, with whom we were at war, upon Russia, or
Priussia, or Austria, or Sardinia, or all of them to
? ? ? ? 32 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
gether. In consequence of his knowledge that we
could not effectually do without them, and his resolution that we should not act with them, he proposed, that, having, as he asserted, "obtained the only
avowed object of the war (the evacuation of Holland) we ought to conclude an instant peace. "
28. Mr. Fox could not be ignorant of the mistaken basis upon which his motion was grounded.
He was not ignorant, that, though the attempt of
Dumouriez on Holland, (so very near succeeding,)
and the navigation of the Scheldt, (a part of the same
piece,) were among the immediate causes, they were
by no means the only causes, alleged for Parliament's
taking that offence at the proceedings of France,
for which the Jacobins were so prompt in declaring war upon this kingdom. Other full as weighty
causes had been alleged: they were,- 1. The general
overbearing and desperate ambition of that faction;
2. Their actual attacks on every nation in Europe;
3. Their usurpation of territories in the Empire with
the governments of which they had no pretence of
quarrel; 4. Their perpetual and irrevocable consolidation with their own dominions of every territory
of the Netherlands, of Germany, and of Italy, of
which they got a temporary possession; 5.
The mischiefs attending the prevalence of their system, which would make the success of their ambitious designs
a new and peculiar species of calamity in the world;
6. Their formal, public decrees, particularly those of
the 19th of November and 15th and 25th of December; 7. Their notorious attempts to undermine the Constitution of this country; 8. Their public reception of deputations of traitors for that direct purpose;
9. Their murder of their sovereign, declared by most
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 33
of the members of the Convention, who spoke with
their vote, (without a disavowal from any,) to be perpetrated as an example to all kings and a precedent
for all subjects to follow. All these, and not the
Scheldt alone, or the invasion of Holland, were urged
by the minister, and by Mr. Windham, by myself, and
by others who spoke in those debates, as causes for
bringing France to a sense of her wrong in the war
which she declared against us. Mr. Fox well knew
that not one man argued for the necessity of a vigor-'ous resistance to France, who did not state the war
as being for the very existence of the social order
here, and in every part of Europe, - who did not
state his opinion that this war was not at all a foreign war of empire, but as much for our liberties,
properties, laws, and religion, and even more so,
than any we had ever been engaged in. This was
the war which, according to Mr. Fox and Mr. Gurney, we were to abandon before the enemy had felt
in the slightest degree the impression of our arms.
29. Had Mr. Fox's disgraceful proposal been complied with, this kingdom would have been stained with
a blot of perfidy hitherto without an example in our
history, and with far less excuse than any act of perfidy which we find in the history of any other nation.
The moment when, by the incredible exertions of Austria, (very little through ours,) the temporary deliverance of Holland (in effect our own deliverance) had been achieved, he advised the House instantly to abandon her to that very enemy from whose arms she had
freed ourselves and the closest of our allies.
30. But we are not to be imposed on by forms of
language. We must act on the substance of things.
To abandon Austria in this manner was to abandon
VOL. V. 3
? ? ? ? 84 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
Holland itself. For suppose France, encouraged and
strengthened as she must have been by our treacherous desertion, -suppose France, I say. to succeed'
against Austria, (as she had succeeded the very year
before,) England would, after its disarmament, have
nothing in the world but the inviolable faith of Jacobinism and the steady politics of anarchy to depend
upon, against France's renewing the very same at
tempts upon Holland, and renewing them (considering what Holland was and is) with much better prospects of success. Mr. Fox must have been well aware, that, if we were to break with the greater
Continental powers, and particularly to come to a
rupture with them, in the violent and intemperate
mode in which he would have made the breach, the
defence of Holland against a foreign enemy and a
strong domestic faction must hereafter rest solely
upon England, without the chance of a single ally,
either on that or on any other occasion. So far as
to the pretended sole object of the war, which Mr.
Fox supposed to be so completely obtained (but
which then was not at all, and at this day is not
completely obtained) as to leave us nothing else to
do than to cultivate a peaceful, quiet correspondence
with those quiet, peaceable, and moderate people, the
Jacobins of France.
31. To induce us to this, Mr. Fox labored hard to
make it appear that the powers with whom we acted
were full as ambitious and as perfidious as the French.
This might be true as to other nations. They had not,
however, been so to us or to Holland. He produced
no proof of active ambition and ill faith against Austria. But supposing the combined powers had been
all thus faitlless, and been all alike so, there was one
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 35
circumstance which made an essential difference between them and France. I need not, therefore, be at
the trouble of contesting this point, -which, however,
in this latitude, and as at all affecting Great Britain
and Holland, I deny utterly. Be it so. But the great
monarchies have it in their power to keep their faith,
if they please, because they are governments of established and recognized authority at home and abroad.
France had, in reality, no government. The very
factions who exercised power had no stability. The
French Convention had no powers of peace or war.
Supposing the Convention to be free, (most assuredly
it was not,) they had shown no disposition to abandon
their projects. Though long driven out of Liege, it
was not many days before Mr. Fox's motion that
they still continued to claim it as a country which
their principles of fraternity bound them to protect, -
that is, to subdue and to regulate at their pleasure.
That party which Mr. Fox inclined most to favor and
trust, and from which he must have received his assurances, (if any he did receive,) that is, the Brissotins, were then either prisoners or fugitives. The party which prevailed over them (that of Danton and
Marat) was itself in a tottering condition, and was disowned by a very great part of France. To say nothing
of the royal party, who were powerful and growing,
and who had full as good a right to claim to be the
legitimate government as any of the Parisian factions
with whom he proposed to treat, - or rather, (as it
seemed to me,) to surrender at discretion.
32. But when Mr. Fox began to come from his
general hopes of the moderation of the Jacobins to
particulars, he put Lile case that they might not perhaps be willing to surrender Savoy. He certainly
? ? ? ? 36 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
was not willing to contest that point with them, but
plainly and explicitly (as I understood him) proposed to let them keep it, -- though he knew (or he was much worse informed than he would be thought)
that England had at the very time agreed on the
terms of a treaty with the King of Sardinia, of which
the recovery of Savoy was the casus foederis. In the
teeth of this treaty, Mr. Fox proposed a direct and
most scandalous breach of our faith, formally and
recently given. But to surrender Savoy was to surrender a great deal more than so many square acres of land or so much revenue. In its consequences,
the surrender of Savoy was to make a surrender to
France of Switzerland and Italy, of both which countries Savoy is the key, --as it is known to ordinary speculators in politics, though it may not be known
to the weavers in Norwich, who, it seems, are by Mr.
Fox called to be the judges in this matter.
A sure way, indeed, to encourage France not to
make a surrender of this key of Italy and Switzerland; or of Mentz, the key of Germany, or of any other object whatsoever which she holds, is to let
her see that the people of -England raise a clamor
against the war before terms are so much as proposed
on any side. From that moment the Jacobins would
be masters of the terms. They would know that
Parliament, at all hazards, would force the king
to a separate peace. The crown could not, in that
case, have any use of its judgment. Parliament
could not possess more judgment than the crown,
when besieged (as Mr. Fox proposed to Mr. Gurney)
by the cries of the manufacturers. This description
of men Mr. Fox endeavored in his speech by every
method to irritate and inflame. In effect, his twe
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 37
speeches were, through the whole, nothing more than
(a. amplification of the Norwich handbill. He rested the greatest part of his argument on the distress of trade, which he attributed to the war; though it
was obvious to any tolerably good observation, and,
much more, must have been clear to such an observation as his, that the then difficulties of the trade and manufacture could have no sort of connection
with our share in it. The war had hardly begun.
We had suffered neither by spoil, nor by defeat, nor
by disgrace of any kind. Public credit was so little
impaired, that, instead of being supported by any
extraordinary aids from individuals, it advanced a
credit to individuals to the amount of five millions
for the support of trade and manufactures under
their temporary difficulties, a thing before never
heard of, -a thing of which I do not commend the
policy, but only state it, to show that Mr. Fox's
ideas of the effects of war were without any trace
of foundation.
33. It is impossible not to connect the arguments
and proceedings of a party with that of its leader,
especially when not disavowed or controlled by him.
Mr. Fox's partisans declaim against all the powers
of Europe, except the Jacobins, just as he does; but
not having the same reasons for management and
caution which he has, they speak out. He satisfies
himself merely with making his invectives, and leaves
others to draw the conclusion. But they produce
their Polish interposition for the express purpose
of leading to a French alliance. They urge their
French peace in order to make a junction with the
Jacobins to oppose the powers, whom, in their lantguage, they call despots, and their leagues, a comn
? ? ? ? 38 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
bination of despots. Indeed, no man can look on
the present posture of Europe with the least degree
of discernment, who will not be thoroughly convinced that England must be the fast friend or the determined enemy of France. There is no medium;
and I do not think Mr. Fox to be so dull as not to
observe this. His peace would have involved us instantly in the most extensive and most ruinous wars, at the same time that it would have made a broad
highway (across which no human wisdom could put
an effectual barrier) for a mutual intercourse with
the fraternizing Jacobins on both sides, the consequences of which those will certainly not provide against who do not dread or dislike them.
34. It is not amiss in this place to enter a little
more fully into the spirit of the principal arguments
on which Mr. Fox thought proper to rest this his
grand and concluding motion, particularly such as
were drawn from the internal state of our affairs.
Under a specious appearance, (not uncommonly put
on by men of unscrupulous ambition,) that of tenderness and compassion to the poor, he did his best to appeal to the judgments of the meanest and most
ignorant of the people on the merits of the war. He
had before done something of the same dangerous
kind in his printed letter. The ground of a political
war is of all things that which the poor laborer and
manufacturer are the least capable of conceiving.
This sort of people know in general that they must
suffer by war. It is a matter to which they are sufficiently competent, because it is a matter of feeling. The causes of a war are not matters of feeling, but of
reason and foresight, and often of remote considerations, and of a very great combination of circumstan
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 39
ces which they are utterly incapable of comprehending: and, indeed, it is not every man in the highest classes who is altogether equal to it. Nothing, in a
general sense, appears to me less fair and justifiable
(even if no attempt were made to inflame the passions)
than to submit a matter on discussion to a tribunal
incapable of judging of more than one side of the
question. It is at least as unjustifiable to inflame
the passions of such judges against that side in favor of which they cannot so much as comprehend the arguments. Before the prevalence of the French
system, (which, as far as it has gone, has extinguished
the salutary prejudice called our country,) nobody
was more sensible of this important truth than Mr.
Fox; and nothing was more proper and pertinent,
or was more felt at the time, than his reprimand
to Mr. Wilberforce for an inconsiderate expression
which tended to call in the judgment of the poor to
estimate the policy of war upon the standard of the
taxes they may be obliged to pay towards its support.
35. It is fatally known that the great object of
the Jacobin system is, to excite the lowest description
of the people to range themselves under ambitious
men for the pillage and destruction of the more
eminent orders and classes of the community. The
thing, therefore, that a man not fanatically attached
to that dreadful project would most studiously avoid
is, to act a part with the French Propagandists, in
attributing (as they constantly do) all wars, and all
the consequences of wars, to the pride of those orders,
and to their contempt of the weak and indigent part
of the society. The ruling Jacobins insist upon it,
that even the wars which they carry on with so much
obstinacy against all nations are made to prevent the
? ? ? ? 40 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
poor from any longer being the instruments and victims of kings, nobles, and the aristocracy of burghers
and rich men. They pretend that the destruction of
kings, nobles, and the aristocracy of burghers and
rich men is the only means of establishing an universal and perpetual peace. This is the great drift
of all their writings, from the time of the meeting of
the states of France, in 1789, to the publication of
the last Morning Chronicle. They insist that even
the war which with so much boldness they have
declared against all nations is to prevent the poor
from becoming the instruments and victims of these
persons and descriptions. It is but too easy, if
you once teach poor laborers and mechanics to defy
their prejudices, and, as this has been done with an
industry scarcely credible, to substitute the principles of fraternity in the room of that salutary prejudice called our country, -it is, I say, but too easy to persuade them, agreeably to what Mr. Fox hints
in his public letter, that this war is, and that the
other wars have been, the wars of kings; it is easy
to persuade them that the terrors even of a foreign
conquest are not terrors for them; it is easy to persuade them, that, for their part, they have nothing
to lose, -- and that their condition is not likely to be
altered for the worse, whatever party may happen
to prevail in the war. Under any circumstances
this doctrine is highly dangerous, as it tends to
make separate parties of the higher and lower orders, and to put their interests on a different bottom. But if the enemy you have to deal with should appear, as France now appears, under the
very name and title of the deliverer of the poor
and the chastiser of the rich, the former class would
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 41
readily become not an indifferent spectator of the
war, but would be ready to enlist in the faction of
the enemy, - which they would consider, though under a foreign name, to be more connected with them
than an adverse description in the same land. All
the props of society would be drawn from us by these
doctrines, and the very foundations of the public defence would give way in an instant.
36. There is no point which the faction of fraternity in England have labored more than to excite in
the poor the horror of any war with France upon any
occasion. When they found that their open attacks
upon our Constitution in favor of a French republic
were for the present repelled, they put that matter
out of sight, and have taken up the more plausible
and popular ground of general peace, upon merely
general principles; although these very men, in the
correspondence of their clubs with those of France,
had reprobated the neutrality which now they so earnestly press. But, in reality, their maxim was, and
is, "Peace and alliance with France, and war with
the rest of the world. "
37. This last motion of Mr. Fox bound up the
whole of his politics during the session. This motion had many circumstances, particularly in the
Norwich correspondence, by which the mischief of
all the others was aggravated beyond measure. Yet
this last motion, far the worst of Mr. Fox's proceedinlgs, was the best supported of any of them, except
his amendment to the address. The Duke of Portland had directly engaged to support the war;here was a motion as directly made to force the crown to put an end to it before a blow had been
struck. The efforts of the faction have so prevailed
? ? ? ? 42 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
that some of his Grace's nearest friends have actually voted for that motion; some, after showing themselves, went away; others did not appear at all. So it must be, where a man is for any time supported from personal considerations, without reference to his public conduct. Through the whole of
this business, the spirit of fraternity appears to me
to have been the governing principle. It might be
shameful for any man, above the vulgar, to show so
blind a partiality even to his own country as Mr.
Fox appears, on all occasions, this session, to have
shown to France. Had Mr. Fox been a minister,
and proceeded on the principles laid down by him,
I believe there is little doubt he would have been
considered as the most criminal statesman that ever
lived in this country. I do not know why a statesman out of place is not to be judged in the same
manner, unless we can excuse him by pleading in
his favor a total indifference to principle, and that
he would act and think in quite a different way, if
he were in office. This I will not suppose. One
may think better of him, and that, in case of his
power, he might change his mind. But supposing,
that, from better or from worse motives, he might
change his mind on his acquisition of the favor of
the crown, I seriously fear, that, if the king should
to-morrow put power into his hands, and that his
good genius would inspire him with maxims very
different from those he has promulgated, he would
not be able to get the better of the ill temper and
the ill doctrines lie has been the means of exciting
and propagating throughout the kingdom. From the
very beginning of their inhuman and unprovoked
rebellion and tyrannic usurpation, he has covered
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 43
the predominant faction in France, and their adherents here, with the most exaggerated panegyrics;
neither has he missed a single opportunity of abusing and vilifying those who, in uniform concurrence
with the Duke of Portland's and Lord Fitzwilliam's
opinion, have maintained the true grounds of the
Revolution Settlement in 1688. He lamented all
the defeats of the French; he rejoiced in all their
victories, - even when these victories threatened to
overwhelm the continent of Europe, and, by facilitating their means of penetrating into Holland, to
bring this most dreadful of all evils with irresistible
force to the very doors, if not into the very heart,
of our country. To this hour he always speaks of
every thought of overturning the French Jacobinism
by force, on the part of any power whatsoever, as an
attempt unjust and cruel, and which he reprobates
with horror. If any of the French Jacobin leaders
are spoken of with hatred or scorn, he falls upon
those who take that liberty with all the zeal and
warmth with which men of honor defend their particular and bosom friends, when attacked. He always represents their cause as a cause of liberty, and all who oppose it as partisans of despotism. He
obstinately continues to consider the great and growing vices, crimes, and disorders of that country as
only evils of passage, which are to produce a permanently happy state of order and freedom. He
represents these disorders exactly in the same way
and with the same limitations which are used by one
of the two great Jacobin factions: I mean that of P6tion and Brissot. Like them, he studiously confines
his horror and reprobation only to the massacres
of the 2d of September, and passes by those of the
? ? ? ? 44 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
10th of August, as well as the imprisonment and
deposition of the king, which were the consequences
of that day, as indeed were the massacres themselves
to which he confines his censure, though they were
not actually perpetrated till early in September.
Like that faction, he condemns, not the deposition,
or the proposed exile or perpetual imprisonment,
but only the murder of the king. Mr. Sheridan,
on every occasion, palliates all their massacres committed in every part of France, as the effects of a natural indignation at the exorbitances of despotism,
and of the dread of the people of returning under
that yoke. He has thus taken occasion to load, not
the actors in this wickedness, but the government of
a mild, merciful, beneficent, and patriotic prince, and
his suffering, faithful subjects, with all the crimes
of the new anarchical tyranny under which the one
has been murdered and the others are oppressed.
Those continual either praises or palliating apologies
of everything done in France, and those invectives
as uniformly vomited out upon all those who venture
to express their disapprobation of such proceedings,
coming from a man of Mr. Fox's fame and authority, and one who is considered as the person to whom a great party of the wealthiest men of the kingdom
look up, have been the cause why the principle of
French fraternity formerly gained the ground which
at one time it had obltained in this country. It will
infallibly recover itself again, and in ten times a
greater degree, if the kind of peace, in the manner
which he preaches, ever shall be established with the
reigning faction in France.
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 21
deserved such marked applauses for acting merely as
a lawyer for his fee, in the ordinary course of his profession.
15. Indeed, Mr. Fox appeared the general patron
of all such persons and proceedings. When Lord
Edward Fitzgerald, and other persons, for practices
of the most dangerous kind, in Paris and in London,
were removed from the King's Guards, Mr. Fox took
occasion in the House of Commons heavily to censure that act, as unjust and oppressive, and tending to make officers bad citizens. There were few, however,
who did not call for some such measures on the part
of government, as of absolute necessity for the king's
personal safety, as well as that of the public; and
nothing but the mistaken lenity, with which such
practices were rather discountenanced than punished,
could possibly deserve reprehension in what was done
with regard to those gentlemen.
16. Mr. Fox regularly and systematically, and
with a diligence long unusual to him, did everything
he could to countenance the same principle of fraternity and connection with the Jacobins abroad, and the National Convention of France, for which these
officers had been removed from the Guards. For
when a bill (feeble and lax, indeed, and far short of
the vigor required by the conjuncture) was brought
in for removing out of the kingdom the emissaries of
France, Mr. Fox opposed it with all his might. He
pursued a vehement and detailed opposition to it
through all its stages, describing it as a measure contrary to the existing treaties between Great Britain and France, as a violation of the law of nations, and
as an outrage on the Great Charter itself.
17. In the same manner, and with the same heat,
? ? ? ? 22 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
he opposed a bill which (though awkward and inartificial in its construction) was right and wise in its
principle, and was precedented in the best times, and
absolutely necessary at that juncture: I mean the
Traitorous Correspondence Bill. By these means the
enemy, rendered infinitely dangerous by the links of
real faction and pretended commerce, would have
been (had Mr. Fox succeeded) enabled to carry on
the war against us by our own resources. For this
purpose that enemy would have had his agents and
traitors in the midst of us.
18. When at length war was actually declared by
the usurpers in France against this kingdom, and
declared whilst they were pretending a negotiation
through Dumouriez with Lord Auckland, Mr. Fox
still continued, through the whole of the proceedings,
to discredit the national honor and justice, and to
throw the entire blame of the war on Parliament, and
on his own country, as acting with violence, haughtiness, and want of equity. He frequently asserted,
both at the time and ever since, that the war, though
declared by France, was provoked by us, and that it
was wholly unnecessary and fundamentally unjust.
19. He ehas lost no opportunity of railing, in the
most virulent manner and in the most unmeasured
language, at every foreign power with whom we
could now, or at any time, contract any useful or
effectual alliance against France, - declaring that he
hoped no alliance with those powers was made, or
was in a train of being made. *' He always expressed
himself with the utmost horror concerning such alli* It is an exception, that in one of his last speeches'( but not before) Mr. Fox seemed to think an alliance with Spain might be proper.
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 23
ances. So did all his phalanx. Mr. Sheridan in
particular, after one of his invectives against those
powers, sitting by him, said, with manifest marks
of his approbation, that, if we must go to war, he
had rather go to war alone than with such allies.
20. Immediately after the French declaration of
war against us, Parliament addressed the king in
support of the war against them, as just and necessary, and provoked, as well as formally declared against Great Britain. He did not divide the House
upon this measure; yet he immediately followed this
our solemn Parliamentary engagement to the king
with a motion proposing a set of resolutibns, the
effect of which was, that the two Houses were to
load themselves with every kind of reproach for
having made the address which they had just carried to the throne. He commenced this long string of criminatory resolutions against his country (if
King, Lords, and Commons of Great Britain, and
a decided majority without doors are his country)
with a declaration against intermeddling in the interior
concerns of -France. The purport of this resolution
of non-interference is a thing unexampled in the
history of the world, when one nation has been
actually at war with another. The best writers
on the law of nations give no sort of countenance
to his doctrine of non-iinterference, in the extent
and manner in which he used it, even when there
is no war. When the war exists, not one authority is against it in all its latitude. His doctrine is equally contrary to the enemy's uniform practice,
who, whether in peace or in war, makes it his great
aim not only to change the government, but to make
an entire revolution in the whole of the social order
in every country.
? ? ? ? 24 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
The object of the last of this extraordinary string
of resolutions moved by Mr. Fox was to advise the
crown not to enter into such an engagement with
any foreign power so as to hinder us from making
a separate peace with France, or which might tend
to enable any of those powers to introduce a government in that country other than such as those persons whom he calls the people of France shall choose to establish. In short, the whole of these resolutions
appeared to have but one drift, namely, the sacrifice'of Our own domestic dignity and safety, and
the independency of Europe, to the support of this
strange mixture of anarchy and tyranny which prevails in France, and which Mr. Fox and his party
were pleased to call a government. The immediate
consequence of these measures was (by an example
the ill effects of which on the whole world are not
to be calculated) to secure the robbers of the innocent nobility, gentry, and ecclesiastics of France in'
the enjoyment of the spoil they have made of the
estates, houses, and goods of their fellow-citizens.
21. Not satisfied with moving these resolutions,
tending to confirm this horrible tyranny and robbery, and with actually dividing the House on the
first of the long string which they composed, in a
few days afterwards he encouraged and supported
Mr. Grey in producing the very same string in a
new form, and in moving, under the shape of an address of Parliament to the crown, another virulent
libel on all its own proceedings in this session, in
which not only all the ground of the resolutions
was again travelled over, but much new inflammatorv matter was introduced. In particular, a
charge was made, that Great Britain had not in
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 25
terposed to prevent the last partition of Poland.
On this head the party dwelt very largely and very
vehemently. Mr. Fox's intention, in the choice of
this extraordinary topic, was evident enough. He
well knows two things: first, that no wise or honest
man can approve of that partition, or can contemplate it without prognosticating great mischief from it to all countries at some future time; secondly, he
knows quite as well, that, let our opinions on that
partition be what they will, England, by itself, is not
in a situation to afford to Poland any assistance whatsoever. The purpose of the introduction of Polish politics into this discussion was not for the sake of
Poland; it was to throw an odium upon those who
are obliged to decline the cause of justice from their
impossibility of supporting a cause which they approve: as if we, who think more strongly on this subject than he does, were of a party against Poland,
because we are obliged to act with some of the authors of that injustice against our common enemy, France. But the great and leading purpose of this
introduction of Poland into the debates on the French
war was to divert the public attention from what was
in our power. that is, from a steady cooperation
against France, to a quarrel with the allies for the
sake of a Polish war, which, for any useful purpose
to Poland, he knew it was out of our power to make.
If England can touch Poland ever so remotely, it
mlust be through the medium of alliances. But by
attacking all the combined powers together for their
supposed unjust aggression upon France, he bound
theim by a new common interest not separately to
join England for the rescue of Poland. The proposition could only mean to do what all the writers
? ? ? ? 26 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
of his party in the Morning Chronicle have aimed
at persuading the public to, through the whole of the
last autumn and winter, and to this hour: that is, to
an alliance with the Jacobins of France, for the pretended purpose of succoring Poland. This curious
project would leave to Great Britain no other ally
in all Europe except its old enemy, France.
22. Mr. Fox, after the first day's discussion on the
question for the address, was at length driven to admit (to admit rather than to urge, and that very
faintly) that France had discovered ambitious views,
which none of his partisans, that I recollect, (Mr.
Sheridan excepted,) did, however, either urge or
admit. What is remarkable enough, all the points
admitted against the Jacobins were brought to bear
in their favor as much as those in which they were
defended. For when Mr. Fox admitted that the conduct of the Jacobins did discover ambition, he always
ended his admission of their ambitious views by an
apology for them, insisting that the universally hostile disposition shown to them rendered their ambition a sort of defensive policy. Thus, on whatever roads he travelled, they all terminated in reconmmending a recognition of their pretended republic,
and in the plan of sending an ambassador to it.
Tills was the burden of all his song:-" Everything
which we could reasonably hope from war would be
obtained from treaty. " It is to be observed, however, that, in all these debates, Mr. Fox never once
stated to the House upon what ground it was he conceived that all the objects of the French system of
united fanaticism and ambition would instantly be
given up, whenever England should think fit to propose a treaty. On proposing so strange a recogni
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 27
tion and so humiliating an embassy as he moved,
he was bound to produce his authority, if any authority he had. He ought to have done this the
rather, because Le Brun, in his first propositions,
and in his answers to Lord Grenville, defended, on
principle, not on temporary convenience,' everything
which was objected to France, and showed not the
smallest disposition to give up any one of the points
in discussion. Mr. Fox must also have known that
the Convention had passed to the order of the day,
on a proposition to give some sort of explanation or
modification to the hostile decree of the 19th of November for exciting insurrections in all countries, --
a decree known to be peculiarly pointed at Great
Britain. The whole proceeding of the French administration was the most remote that could be
imagined from furnishing any indication of a pacific disposition: for at the very time in which it
was pretended that the Jacobins entertained those
boasted pacific intentions, at the very time in which
Mr. Fox was urging a treaty with them, not content
with refusing a modification of the decree for insurrections, they published their ever-memorable decree of the 15th of December, 1792, for disorganizing every country in Europe into which they should on any occasion set their foot; and on the 25th and the 30th
of the same month, they solemnly, and, on the last of
these days, practically, confirmed that decree.
23. But Mr. Fox had himself taken good care, in
the negotiation he proposed, that France should not
be obliged to make any very great concessions to
hel presumed moderation: for he had laid down
one general, comprehensive rule, with him (as he
said) constant and inviolable. This rule, in fact,
? ? ? ? 28 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
would not only have left to the faction in France
all the property and power they had usurped at
home, but most, if not all, of the conquests which
by their atrocious perfidy and violence they had
made abroad. The principle laid down by Mr. Fox
is this, -- "' That every state, in the conclusion of a war,
has a right to avail itself of its conquests towards an
indemnification. " This principle (true or false) is
totally contrary to the policy which this country
has pursued with France at various periods, particularly at the Treaty of Ryswick, in the last century,
and at the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, in this. ' Whatever the merits of his rule may be in the eyes of
neutral judges, it is a rule which no statesman before
him ever laid down in favor of the adverse power with
whom he was to negotiate. The adverse party himself may safely be trusted to take care of his own aggrandizement. But (as if the black boxes of the several parties had been exchanged) Mr. Fox's English ambassador, by some odd mistake, would find himself charged with the concerns of France. If we
were to leave France as she stood at the time when
Mr. Fox proposed to treat with her, that formidable
power must have been infinitely strengthened, and
almost every other power in Europe as much weakened, by the extraordinary basis which he laid for
a treaty. For Avignon must go from the Pope;
Savoy (at least) from the King of Sardinia, if not
Nice. Liege, Mentz, Salm, Deux-Ponts, and Basle
mullst be separated friom Germany. On this side of
the Rhilne, Liege (at least) must be lost to the Empire, and added to France. Mr. Fox's general principle fillly covered all this. How much of these
territories came within his rule lie never attempted
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 29
to define. He kept a profound silence as to Germany. As to the Netherlands he was something
more explicit. He said (if I recollect right) that
France on that side might expect something towards strengthening her frontier. As to the remaining parts of the Netherlands, which he supposed France might consent to surrender, he went so far
as to declare that England ought not to permit the
Emperor to be repossessed of the remainder of the
ten Provinces, but that the people should choose such
a form of independent government as they liked.
This proposition of Mr. Fox was just the arrangement which the usurpation in France had all along
proposed to make. As the circumstances were at
that time, and have been ever since, his proposition
fully indicated what government the Flemings must
have in the stated extent of what was left to them.
A government so set up in the Netherlands, whether
compulsory, or by the choice of the sans-culottes, (who
he well knew were to be the real electors, and the
sole electors,) in whatever name it was to exist, must
evidently depend for its existence, as it had done for
its original formation, on France. In reality, it must
have ended in that point to which, piece by piece,
the French were then actually bringing all the Netherlands,- that is, an incorporation with France as a
body of new Departments, just as Savoy and Liege
and the rest of their pretended independent popular sovereignties have been united to their republic.
Such an arrangement must have destroyed Austria;
it must have left Holland always at the mercy of
France; it must totally and forever cut off all political communication between England and the Continent. Such must have been the situation of Europe,
? ? ? ? 30 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
according to Mr. Fox's system of politics, however
laudable his personal motives may have been in proposing so complete a change in the whole system of
Great Britain with regard to all the Continental
powers.
24. After it had been generally supposed that all
public business was over for the session, and that
Mr. Fox had exhausted all the modes of pressing
this French scheme, he thought proper to take a step
beyond every expectation, and which demonstrated
his wonderful eagerness and perseverance in his
cause, as well as the nature and true character of
the cause itself. This step was taken by Mr. Fox
immediately after his giving his assent to the grant
of supply voted to him by Mr. Serjeant Adair and a
committee of gentlemen who assumed to themselves
to act in the name of the public. In the instrument
of his acceptance of this grant, Mr. Fox took occasion
to assure them that he would always persevere in the
same conduct which had procured to him so honorable
a mark of the public approbation. He was as good
as his word.
25. It was not long before an opportunity was
found, or made, for proving the sincerity of his professions, and demonstrating his gratitude to those
who had given public and unequivocal marks of
their. approbation of his late conduct. One of the
most virulent of the Jacobin faction, Mr. Gurney,
a banker at Norwich, had all along distinguished
himself by his French politics. By the means of this
gentleman, and of his associates of the same description, one of the most insidious and dangerous handbills that ever was seen had been circulated at Norwich against the war, drawn up in an hypocritical tone
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 31
of compassion for the poor. This address to the populace of Norwich was to play in concert with an address to Mr. Fox; it was signed by Mr. Gurney and the higher part of the French fraternity in that town.
In this paper Mr. Fox is applauded for his conduct
throughout the session, and requested, before the
prorogation, to make a motion for an immediate
peace with France.
26. Mr. Fox did not revoke to this suit: he readily and thankfully undertook the task assigned to
him. Not content, however, with merely falling in
with their wishes, he proposed a task on his part to
the gentlemen of Norwich, which was, that they should
move the people without doors to petition against the
war. He said, that, without such assistance, little
good could be expected from anything he might attempt within the walls of the House of Commons.
In the mean time, to animate his Norwich friends in
their endeavors to besiege Parliament, he snatched
the first opportunity to give notice of a motion
which he very soon after made, namely, to address
the crown to make peace with France. The address
was so worded as to coiperate with the handbill in
bringing forward matter calculated to inflame the
manufacturers throughout the kingdom.
27. In support of his motion, he declaimed in the
most virulent strain, even beyond any of his former
invectives, against every power with whom we were
then, and are now, acting against France. In the
moral forum some of these powers certainly deserve
all the ill he said of them; but the political effect
aimed at, evidently, was to turn our indignation from
France, with whom we were at war, upon Russia, or
Priussia, or Austria, or Sardinia, or all of them to
? ? ? ? 32 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
gether. In consequence of his knowledge that we
could not effectually do without them, and his resolution that we should not act with them, he proposed, that, having, as he asserted, "obtained the only
avowed object of the war (the evacuation of Holland) we ought to conclude an instant peace. "
28. Mr. Fox could not be ignorant of the mistaken basis upon which his motion was grounded.
He was not ignorant, that, though the attempt of
Dumouriez on Holland, (so very near succeeding,)
and the navigation of the Scheldt, (a part of the same
piece,) were among the immediate causes, they were
by no means the only causes, alleged for Parliament's
taking that offence at the proceedings of France,
for which the Jacobins were so prompt in declaring war upon this kingdom. Other full as weighty
causes had been alleged: they were,- 1. The general
overbearing and desperate ambition of that faction;
2. Their actual attacks on every nation in Europe;
3. Their usurpation of territories in the Empire with
the governments of which they had no pretence of
quarrel; 4. Their perpetual and irrevocable consolidation with their own dominions of every territory
of the Netherlands, of Germany, and of Italy, of
which they got a temporary possession; 5.
The mischiefs attending the prevalence of their system, which would make the success of their ambitious designs
a new and peculiar species of calamity in the world;
6. Their formal, public decrees, particularly those of
the 19th of November and 15th and 25th of December; 7. Their notorious attempts to undermine the Constitution of this country; 8. Their public reception of deputations of traitors for that direct purpose;
9. Their murder of their sovereign, declared by most
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 33
of the members of the Convention, who spoke with
their vote, (without a disavowal from any,) to be perpetrated as an example to all kings and a precedent
for all subjects to follow. All these, and not the
Scheldt alone, or the invasion of Holland, were urged
by the minister, and by Mr. Windham, by myself, and
by others who spoke in those debates, as causes for
bringing France to a sense of her wrong in the war
which she declared against us. Mr. Fox well knew
that not one man argued for the necessity of a vigor-'ous resistance to France, who did not state the war
as being for the very existence of the social order
here, and in every part of Europe, - who did not
state his opinion that this war was not at all a foreign war of empire, but as much for our liberties,
properties, laws, and religion, and even more so,
than any we had ever been engaged in. This was
the war which, according to Mr. Fox and Mr. Gurney, we were to abandon before the enemy had felt
in the slightest degree the impression of our arms.
29. Had Mr. Fox's disgraceful proposal been complied with, this kingdom would have been stained with
a blot of perfidy hitherto without an example in our
history, and with far less excuse than any act of perfidy which we find in the history of any other nation.
The moment when, by the incredible exertions of Austria, (very little through ours,) the temporary deliverance of Holland (in effect our own deliverance) had been achieved, he advised the House instantly to abandon her to that very enemy from whose arms she had
freed ourselves and the closest of our allies.
30. But we are not to be imposed on by forms of
language. We must act on the substance of things.
To abandon Austria in this manner was to abandon
VOL. V. 3
? ? ? ? 84 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
Holland itself. For suppose France, encouraged and
strengthened as she must have been by our treacherous desertion, -suppose France, I say. to succeed'
against Austria, (as she had succeeded the very year
before,) England would, after its disarmament, have
nothing in the world but the inviolable faith of Jacobinism and the steady politics of anarchy to depend
upon, against France's renewing the very same at
tempts upon Holland, and renewing them (considering what Holland was and is) with much better prospects of success. Mr. Fox must have been well aware, that, if we were to break with the greater
Continental powers, and particularly to come to a
rupture with them, in the violent and intemperate
mode in which he would have made the breach, the
defence of Holland against a foreign enemy and a
strong domestic faction must hereafter rest solely
upon England, without the chance of a single ally,
either on that or on any other occasion. So far as
to the pretended sole object of the war, which Mr.
Fox supposed to be so completely obtained (but
which then was not at all, and at this day is not
completely obtained) as to leave us nothing else to
do than to cultivate a peaceful, quiet correspondence
with those quiet, peaceable, and moderate people, the
Jacobins of France.
31. To induce us to this, Mr. Fox labored hard to
make it appear that the powers with whom we acted
were full as ambitious and as perfidious as the French.
This might be true as to other nations. They had not,
however, been so to us or to Holland. He produced
no proof of active ambition and ill faith against Austria. But supposing the combined powers had been
all thus faitlless, and been all alike so, there was one
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 35
circumstance which made an essential difference between them and France. I need not, therefore, be at
the trouble of contesting this point, -which, however,
in this latitude, and as at all affecting Great Britain
and Holland, I deny utterly. Be it so. But the great
monarchies have it in their power to keep their faith,
if they please, because they are governments of established and recognized authority at home and abroad.
France had, in reality, no government. The very
factions who exercised power had no stability. The
French Convention had no powers of peace or war.
Supposing the Convention to be free, (most assuredly
it was not,) they had shown no disposition to abandon
their projects. Though long driven out of Liege, it
was not many days before Mr. Fox's motion that
they still continued to claim it as a country which
their principles of fraternity bound them to protect, -
that is, to subdue and to regulate at their pleasure.
That party which Mr. Fox inclined most to favor and
trust, and from which he must have received his assurances, (if any he did receive,) that is, the Brissotins, were then either prisoners or fugitives. The party which prevailed over them (that of Danton and
Marat) was itself in a tottering condition, and was disowned by a very great part of France. To say nothing
of the royal party, who were powerful and growing,
and who had full as good a right to claim to be the
legitimate government as any of the Parisian factions
with whom he proposed to treat, - or rather, (as it
seemed to me,) to surrender at discretion.
32. But when Mr. Fox began to come from his
general hopes of the moderation of the Jacobins to
particulars, he put Lile case that they might not perhaps be willing to surrender Savoy. He certainly
? ? ? ? 36 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
was not willing to contest that point with them, but
plainly and explicitly (as I understood him) proposed to let them keep it, -- though he knew (or he was much worse informed than he would be thought)
that England had at the very time agreed on the
terms of a treaty with the King of Sardinia, of which
the recovery of Savoy was the casus foederis. In the
teeth of this treaty, Mr. Fox proposed a direct and
most scandalous breach of our faith, formally and
recently given. But to surrender Savoy was to surrender a great deal more than so many square acres of land or so much revenue. In its consequences,
the surrender of Savoy was to make a surrender to
France of Switzerland and Italy, of both which countries Savoy is the key, --as it is known to ordinary speculators in politics, though it may not be known
to the weavers in Norwich, who, it seems, are by Mr.
Fox called to be the judges in this matter.
A sure way, indeed, to encourage France not to
make a surrender of this key of Italy and Switzerland; or of Mentz, the key of Germany, or of any other object whatsoever which she holds, is to let
her see that the people of -England raise a clamor
against the war before terms are so much as proposed
on any side. From that moment the Jacobins would
be masters of the terms. They would know that
Parliament, at all hazards, would force the king
to a separate peace. The crown could not, in that
case, have any use of its judgment. Parliament
could not possess more judgment than the crown,
when besieged (as Mr. Fox proposed to Mr. Gurney)
by the cries of the manufacturers. This description
of men Mr. Fox endeavored in his speech by every
method to irritate and inflame. In effect, his twe
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 37
speeches were, through the whole, nothing more than
(a. amplification of the Norwich handbill. He rested the greatest part of his argument on the distress of trade, which he attributed to the war; though it
was obvious to any tolerably good observation, and,
much more, must have been clear to such an observation as his, that the then difficulties of the trade and manufacture could have no sort of connection
with our share in it. The war had hardly begun.
We had suffered neither by spoil, nor by defeat, nor
by disgrace of any kind. Public credit was so little
impaired, that, instead of being supported by any
extraordinary aids from individuals, it advanced a
credit to individuals to the amount of five millions
for the support of trade and manufactures under
their temporary difficulties, a thing before never
heard of, -a thing of which I do not commend the
policy, but only state it, to show that Mr. Fox's
ideas of the effects of war were without any trace
of foundation.
33. It is impossible not to connect the arguments
and proceedings of a party with that of its leader,
especially when not disavowed or controlled by him.
Mr. Fox's partisans declaim against all the powers
of Europe, except the Jacobins, just as he does; but
not having the same reasons for management and
caution which he has, they speak out. He satisfies
himself merely with making his invectives, and leaves
others to draw the conclusion. But they produce
their Polish interposition for the express purpose
of leading to a French alliance. They urge their
French peace in order to make a junction with the
Jacobins to oppose the powers, whom, in their lantguage, they call despots, and their leagues, a comn
? ? ? ? 38 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
bination of despots. Indeed, no man can look on
the present posture of Europe with the least degree
of discernment, who will not be thoroughly convinced that England must be the fast friend or the determined enemy of France. There is no medium;
and I do not think Mr. Fox to be so dull as not to
observe this. His peace would have involved us instantly in the most extensive and most ruinous wars, at the same time that it would have made a broad
highway (across which no human wisdom could put
an effectual barrier) for a mutual intercourse with
the fraternizing Jacobins on both sides, the consequences of which those will certainly not provide against who do not dread or dislike them.
34. It is not amiss in this place to enter a little
more fully into the spirit of the principal arguments
on which Mr. Fox thought proper to rest this his
grand and concluding motion, particularly such as
were drawn from the internal state of our affairs.
Under a specious appearance, (not uncommonly put
on by men of unscrupulous ambition,) that of tenderness and compassion to the poor, he did his best to appeal to the judgments of the meanest and most
ignorant of the people on the merits of the war. He
had before done something of the same dangerous
kind in his printed letter. The ground of a political
war is of all things that which the poor laborer and
manufacturer are the least capable of conceiving.
This sort of people know in general that they must
suffer by war. It is a matter to which they are sufficiently competent, because it is a matter of feeling. The causes of a war are not matters of feeling, but of
reason and foresight, and often of remote considerations, and of a very great combination of circumstan
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 39
ces which they are utterly incapable of comprehending: and, indeed, it is not every man in the highest classes who is altogether equal to it. Nothing, in a
general sense, appears to me less fair and justifiable
(even if no attempt were made to inflame the passions)
than to submit a matter on discussion to a tribunal
incapable of judging of more than one side of the
question. It is at least as unjustifiable to inflame
the passions of such judges against that side in favor of which they cannot so much as comprehend the arguments. Before the prevalence of the French
system, (which, as far as it has gone, has extinguished
the salutary prejudice called our country,) nobody
was more sensible of this important truth than Mr.
Fox; and nothing was more proper and pertinent,
or was more felt at the time, than his reprimand
to Mr. Wilberforce for an inconsiderate expression
which tended to call in the judgment of the poor to
estimate the policy of war upon the standard of the
taxes they may be obliged to pay towards its support.
35. It is fatally known that the great object of
the Jacobin system is, to excite the lowest description
of the people to range themselves under ambitious
men for the pillage and destruction of the more
eminent orders and classes of the community. The
thing, therefore, that a man not fanatically attached
to that dreadful project would most studiously avoid
is, to act a part with the French Propagandists, in
attributing (as they constantly do) all wars, and all
the consequences of wars, to the pride of those orders,
and to their contempt of the weak and indigent part
of the society. The ruling Jacobins insist upon it,
that even the wars which they carry on with so much
obstinacy against all nations are made to prevent the
? ? ? ? 40 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
poor from any longer being the instruments and victims of kings, nobles, and the aristocracy of burghers
and rich men. They pretend that the destruction of
kings, nobles, and the aristocracy of burghers and
rich men is the only means of establishing an universal and perpetual peace. This is the great drift
of all their writings, from the time of the meeting of
the states of France, in 1789, to the publication of
the last Morning Chronicle. They insist that even
the war which with so much boldness they have
declared against all nations is to prevent the poor
from becoming the instruments and victims of these
persons and descriptions. It is but too easy, if
you once teach poor laborers and mechanics to defy
their prejudices, and, as this has been done with an
industry scarcely credible, to substitute the principles of fraternity in the room of that salutary prejudice called our country, -it is, I say, but too easy to persuade them, agreeably to what Mr. Fox hints
in his public letter, that this war is, and that the
other wars have been, the wars of kings; it is easy
to persuade them that the terrors even of a foreign
conquest are not terrors for them; it is easy to persuade them, that, for their part, they have nothing
to lose, -- and that their condition is not likely to be
altered for the worse, whatever party may happen
to prevail in the war. Under any circumstances
this doctrine is highly dangerous, as it tends to
make separate parties of the higher and lower orders, and to put their interests on a different bottom. But if the enemy you have to deal with should appear, as France now appears, under the
very name and title of the deliverer of the poor
and the chastiser of the rich, the former class would
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 41
readily become not an indifferent spectator of the
war, but would be ready to enlist in the faction of
the enemy, - which they would consider, though under a foreign name, to be more connected with them
than an adverse description in the same land. All
the props of society would be drawn from us by these
doctrines, and the very foundations of the public defence would give way in an instant.
36. There is no point which the faction of fraternity in England have labored more than to excite in
the poor the horror of any war with France upon any
occasion. When they found that their open attacks
upon our Constitution in favor of a French republic
were for the present repelled, they put that matter
out of sight, and have taken up the more plausible
and popular ground of general peace, upon merely
general principles; although these very men, in the
correspondence of their clubs with those of France,
had reprobated the neutrality which now they so earnestly press. But, in reality, their maxim was, and
is, "Peace and alliance with France, and war with
the rest of the world. "
37. This last motion of Mr. Fox bound up the
whole of his politics during the session. This motion had many circumstances, particularly in the
Norwich correspondence, by which the mischief of
all the others was aggravated beyond measure. Yet
this last motion, far the worst of Mr. Fox's proceedinlgs, was the best supported of any of them, except
his amendment to the address. The Duke of Portland had directly engaged to support the war;here was a motion as directly made to force the crown to put an end to it before a blow had been
struck. The efforts of the faction have so prevailed
? ? ? ? 42 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
that some of his Grace's nearest friends have actually voted for that motion; some, after showing themselves, went away; others did not appear at all. So it must be, where a man is for any time supported from personal considerations, without reference to his public conduct. Through the whole of
this business, the spirit of fraternity appears to me
to have been the governing principle. It might be
shameful for any man, above the vulgar, to show so
blind a partiality even to his own country as Mr.
Fox appears, on all occasions, this session, to have
shown to France. Had Mr. Fox been a minister,
and proceeded on the principles laid down by him,
I believe there is little doubt he would have been
considered as the most criminal statesman that ever
lived in this country. I do not know why a statesman out of place is not to be judged in the same
manner, unless we can excuse him by pleading in
his favor a total indifference to principle, and that
he would act and think in quite a different way, if
he were in office. This I will not suppose. One
may think better of him, and that, in case of his
power, he might change his mind. But supposing,
that, from better or from worse motives, he might
change his mind on his acquisition of the favor of
the crown, I seriously fear, that, if the king should
to-morrow put power into his hands, and that his
good genius would inspire him with maxims very
different from those he has promulgated, he would
not be able to get the better of the ill temper and
the ill doctrines lie has been the means of exciting
and propagating throughout the kingdom. From the
very beginning of their inhuman and unprovoked
rebellion and tyrannic usurpation, he has covered
? ? ? ? CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY. 43
the predominant faction in France, and their adherents here, with the most exaggerated panegyrics;
neither has he missed a single opportunity of abusing and vilifying those who, in uniform concurrence
with the Duke of Portland's and Lord Fitzwilliam's
opinion, have maintained the true grounds of the
Revolution Settlement in 1688. He lamented all
the defeats of the French; he rejoiced in all their
victories, - even when these victories threatened to
overwhelm the continent of Europe, and, by facilitating their means of penetrating into Holland, to
bring this most dreadful of all evils with irresistible
force to the very doors, if not into the very heart,
of our country. To this hour he always speaks of
every thought of overturning the French Jacobinism
by force, on the part of any power whatsoever, as an
attempt unjust and cruel, and which he reprobates
with horror. If any of the French Jacobin leaders
are spoken of with hatred or scorn, he falls upon
those who take that liberty with all the zeal and
warmth with which men of honor defend their particular and bosom friends, when attacked. He always represents their cause as a cause of liberty, and all who oppose it as partisans of despotism. He
obstinately continues to consider the great and growing vices, crimes, and disorders of that country as
only evils of passage, which are to produce a permanently happy state of order and freedom. He
represents these disorders exactly in the same way
and with the same limitations which are used by one
of the two great Jacobin factions: I mean that of P6tion and Brissot. Like them, he studiously confines
his horror and reprobation only to the massacres
of the 2d of September, and passes by those of the
? ? ? ? 44 OBSERVATIONS ON THE
10th of August, as well as the imprisonment and
deposition of the king, which were the consequences
of that day, as indeed were the massacres themselves
to which he confines his censure, though they were
not actually perpetrated till early in September.
Like that faction, he condemns, not the deposition,
or the proposed exile or perpetual imprisonment,
but only the murder of the king. Mr. Sheridan,
on every occasion, palliates all their massacres committed in every part of France, as the effects of a natural indignation at the exorbitances of despotism,
and of the dread of the people of returning under
that yoke. He has thus taken occasion to load, not
the actors in this wickedness, but the government of
a mild, merciful, beneficent, and patriotic prince, and
his suffering, faithful subjects, with all the crimes
of the new anarchical tyranny under which the one
has been murdered and the others are oppressed.
Those continual either praises or palliating apologies
of everything done in France, and those invectives
as uniformly vomited out upon all those who venture
to express their disapprobation of such proceedings,
coming from a man of Mr. Fox's fame and authority, and one who is considered as the person to whom a great party of the wealthiest men of the kingdom
look up, have been the cause why the principle of
French fraternity formerly gained the ground which
at one time it had obltained in this country. It will
infallibly recover itself again, and in ten times a
greater degree, if the kind of peace, in the manner
which he preaches, ever shall be established with the
reigning faction in France.
