But I perceive
bothofyou
desiretofoundthisMattertothebot tom ;and are apprehensive,likeChildren, that,when
the Soul departs the Body, the Winds run away with it and disperse it, especially when a M a n dies in an open Country in a place expos'd to the Winds.
the Soul departs the Body, the Winds run away with it and disperse it, especially when a M a n dies in an open Country in a place expos'd to the Winds.
Plato - 1701 - Works - a
' ;;
l i k e t h e t h i n g r e m e m b r e d -, a n d s o m e t i m e s b y t h i n g s thatareunlike. Butwhen oneremembersathing by virtue of a likeness, does itnot neceflarily come to pals, that the Mind at first view discovers whe therthe Picture does resemblethe. thing defign'd, lamely or perfectly. . . .
Itmustneedsbe so,repliesSimmias.
? Then pray mind whether your Thoughts ofwhat HtfteJisof
Iamabouttolayagreewithmine. Isnotthereanintdli- something that we call Equality? I do not speakffhlhmt "
oftheequalityobserv'dbetweenoneTreeandano-^;'"
ther, one Stone and another, and several other . ? '? -? '? ' things
? ? |oS
Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
things that are alike. I speak of abstracted equa-~
lityofthings. Shallwecallthatiomethingorno
thing ?
Surely,we shouldcallitsomething? ,butthat
willonlycometopasswhenwe meantospeakPhi losophically and of marvellous things.
ButthendoweknowthisEquality?
Without doubt.
BtmtM! t>> (AE)FromwhencedowederivethatKnowledge?
&Tw- *s**nCft^om the thinSswe mention'dbutnow> *ltdgt? (flhu'Tisupon feeing equalTrees,equalStones, andie-
inteiiigibUveralotherthingsofthatnature,thatwe form the ? Totality IdeaofthatEquality,whichis. noteithertheTrees
f^s,jein or the Stones, but something distracted from all
t^World subjects. Do notyou finditsuch>Pray takeno rthstber*? tice. Th$ Stones and the Trees are always the firemust satne, and yet do not they sometimes appear un- krtfnr'd a[ >
sotiltOtlKT. *r, , Sure enough.
What ! Do equalthingsappearunequal? Or,does equality take up the form of unequality ?
By no means,Socrates,
otherwise Then Equality and the thing which is equal are
Quality twodifferentthings.
<<ndi>>eqna- Mostcertainly.
UtyvoM But after all these equal things, which are dis-
jZZ'shL &rent from Equality, furnish us with the Idea and jett5whichKnowledge of that abstractedEquality.
* a con. tradicihit.
That's true, replies Simmias.
she cafeisthefame,whetherthisEqualitybear
a resemblance to the things that occasion'd its Idea, or not.
(<t)Socratesisoutinthinkingto provethattheknowledge of intelligible Qualities was acquir'd in the other World. That Knowledge isthe effectortheLightwithwhichGod illuminates the Soul, or the Tracks of the Impressions that arenotquitedefac'dby Sin:'TistheremainderoftheKnow ledge w e have lost, and of the Perfection w e have forfeited. So that, if the otbtr Lifebe taken in Socrttes's Sense, the Propo sition is false ; if in ours, for the slate of the Soul before Sin, 'tistrue.
? ? rof the immortality of the Soul.
i d g
Most certainly.
When, upon feeing one thing, you call to mind another. 'tisno matterifitbelikeitornot; stillit isremembrance.
Without doubt.
B u t - w h a t shall w e say'to this, continues Socrates ; *5? J/k/<<*-'
w h e n w e behold trees or other things that ate equal, / Z i f ^ w aretheyequal accordingtotheequalityofwhich/0^r/<<st<<* we havetheIdeajornot? thebad.
Very far from it.
u(R)*<*'
Thenweagreeuponthis. WhenaManfeesa thingbeforehim,andthinksitwouldbeequalto anotherthing,butatthefame timeisfarfrombe ing Ibperfectly equal, astheequalityofwhich he hastheIdea:Then,Ilay,(b)hewhothinksthus,
must necessarily have known beforehand this intel lectualBeing which the thingremsembles, butim perfectly.
There's an absolute Necessity for that.
And isnotthecasethefame,when wecompare things equal with the equality >
Sure enough, Socrates.
Then of necessity we must have known that E- quality before the time, in which we firstsaw the equal things, and thereupon thought, that they all
tended to be equal as equality it self, but could not reach it.
That's certain.
But we likewise agree upon this, That this**>>*>*>>>>"- Thought can be deriv'd from nothing else but one? /e V T '
r C r. c r*? i- ? i>><<. <"**theCon- or our benles, trom seeing, touching, or reelmg one/^we y
way or other : And the fame Conclusion will hold dramsfrom.
of all Beings, whether Intellectual or Sensible. All things will equally conclude for what you
design.
Then, 'tis from the Senses themselves that we
(b)Tho'hemusthaveknownit,itdoesnotfollowthat he knew it in the other Life, unless it be thereby meant the very instantof the Creation of the Soul.
*"f^fi-
derive
? ? rj. lp
Phedon : Oy, A Dialogue
derive this Thought ; that all the Objects of our Senses have a tendency towards this intellectual Equality,but comesshortofit. Isitnot?
Yes,without doubt, Socrates.
In effect, Simmias, (a) before we began to fee, . '. . 'feel,oruseourSenses,wemusthavehadtheknow
ledgeofthisintellectualEquality;elsewe could not be capable to compare it with the sensible things, and perceive that they have all a tendency towards it,but fall short of its Perfection.
That's a necessary Consequence from the Pre- v mises.
But is it not certain, That immediately after our Birth,wesaw,weheard,andmadeuseofourother Senses ?
Very true.
Then it follows, that before that time we had the knowledge of that Equality ?
Without doubt.
rbhConfe- (b)AndbyConsequencewewerepossess'dofit fimceis beforewewereborn.
i^we polsess'd Itbefore we were born, then we
knew things before we were born, and immediately afterour birth knew not only what isequal, what great, what small, but all other things of that na ture. For what we now advance ofEquality, is equally applicable to Goodness,Justice,Sanctityj and, in a word, to all other things that have a real
(a)Onemighthaveanswer'd,ThatwehadnotthatKnow
ledge beforewe were born,but receiv'ditafterwardsby
thegradualCommunicationofLightfromGod intotheSoul.
But, as 'tis certain that the Soul was created full of Light
and Perfection, so this Truth was known to the Pagans, and
upon that account Socrates's Friends were oblig'd to assent to
whathesaid. Andafterall,ifbythefirstLireoftheSoul, vwe . understand the very Instant of Creation, or the State of
the Soul before the Fall, the Proposition istrue.
(l>)We ""knewbeforewesinn'djwelostourKnowledge
-bysinning;andre-callitagainby VirtueoftheLightim partedbyGodtotheSon! . ' ,""
? ? w* SoIthink.
enje.
0E*
? ? ofthe Immortality of the Soul. ii%
(^Existence. So that of necessity we must have known all these thingsbefore we came into this World.
That's certain.
And being possess'dofthatKnowledge,ifwe did
not forget apace every Day, we should not only be
bornwithit,butretainitallourlife-time* Forto
know,isonlytopreservetheKnowledgewe have received,andnottoloseit. Andtoforget,isto
lose the Knowledge we enjoy'd before.
That's certain, Socrates.
Now, if, after having possess'd that Knowledge
beforewewereborn,andhavinglostitsince,we come to retrieve it by the ministry of our Senses, which we callLearning! , shall not we justly entitle it Remembrance ?
With a great deal of reason,Socrates.
(d) For we have agreed upon this-, That 'tisvery possible,thataMan seeing,hearing,orperceiving one things by any of his Senses, should frame to himself the imagination of another thing that he had forgot j to which the thing perceiv'd by the Senses has some relation, whether it resembles the
other,ornot. Sothatoneoftwothingsmustne cessarily follow. Either we were born with that Knowledge, and preserv'ditallalong;orelsere trievalitafterwardsbyway ofremembrance. Which ofthesetwo,do you pitchupon,Simmias? ,arewe b o r n w i t h t h a t K n o w l e d g e ; o r d o w e c a l l it t o m i n d after having had it and forgot if?
Indeed Socrates, I do not know which to chuse at present.
(c)The GreekExpositionisveryremarkable;itrunsthus; ThingsuponwhichwehaveputthisStamp,That'tisso. Thatis, to distinguish Things that have a true Existence, from sensi ble Things that have no true Existence. ? >
(d) Twas agreed before, Chat upon seeingone thing we c a l l t o m i n d a n o t h e r u n s e e n ;- a s u p o n s e e i n g a L u t e w e t h i n k of a Mistress ; upon seeing equal Trees, we call to mind Equality. -? -<-
* "<< '*
But
? ? I n
Phedon: (C)r, A Dialogue
inPlato?
t
i
Then you thinkallMen havenotthisKnow
ledge?
No sure.
(a) D o they call to mind then, the things they have known ?
That may be.
At what time did our Souls learn that Know ledge ? Itcannot be since we were Men.
No sure. . ,-. ,. ? ,. . . .
Then it must be some time before that i Yes, without doubt. . .
But mind what I'm about to say to you, and then let's fee which you'll chuse. A Man that knows any thing, can he give a reason of his Knowledge ornot?
Doubtlels he can, Socrates.
Itgreat
Tanegyrickfovwnat we havebeenspeakingof?
2TSE" lwislltheycould'rePliesSimmtas>>bu*I'mafraid
Modesiy tomorrowweshallhavenoneherethat'scapable wasthis tOdoit.
And do you think all Men can give a Reason
xhthisis Andbyconsequence,Simmias,? ,ourSoulshada
*/*#"' Beingbeforethat,time;thatistofay,beforethey ? Prmcipe. wgreinvefte(iwjtnahumaneForm,whiletheywere
without the Body, they thought,they knew and un derstood. ,.
Unless you'll allow, Socrates, that we learn'd it intheMinuteofourBirth. There'snoothertime left- . . . . . ;:,
Beitso,my dearSimmias,(b)butatwhatoth^r
timedid we loseit? Forwe did notbringitinto
(a)IftheyarenotthenbornwiththatKnowledgejthen
t h e y m u s t h a v e f o r g o t it, a n d r e c o v e r ' d it a g a i n b y w a y o f remembrance. A falseConsequence. . . ? <
(b)AlltheHeathen Philosophersareataloss,tofindout the time of thus forgetting. They were sensible that God created the Soul fullof Light ana Understanding, but djd notperceivethatthefirstMan lostfhatLightandKnow ledge by his Rebellion ; and . that if he had continued inno cent, he had transmitted to us those valuable Qualities toge ther with his Innocence; as Well as now he is fallen, ne transmitted to us Obscurity and Sin.
she'
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul.
H >
theWorldwith us,aswe concludedbutnow. Did weloseinthelameMinutethatweobtausdit? Or, can you assign any other time ?
No, Socrates* I did not perceive that what Ilaid was to no purpose.
* Then, Simmiat, this must be a standing Truth 5 That if the Objects of our daily Conversation, have arealExistencejImean, ifJustice,Goodness,and allthatEssencewithwhichwe comparetheObjects
of our Senses; [and which having an Existence before us, proves to be of the fame Nature with our own Essence, andistheStandard bywhichwe measure- a l l t h i n g s -, I f a y , i f a l l t h e s e t h i n g s h a v e a r e a l E $ '
istence,our Soul is likewise entitled to Existence, and t h a t b e f o r e w e w e r e b o r n -, a n d i f t h e s e t h i n g s h a v e rioBeing,thenallourDiscoursesareuseless. Isit not a standing Truth, and withal a just and necefla- ry Consequence, that the Existence of our Souls before our birth, stands and falls with that of those
things ?
ThatConsequence, repliesSimmias^seems tomeTheKarai
te be equally just and wonderful : And the result ofle}" not
thewholeDiscourseaffordssomethingveryglorious^ . ^f
and desirableon our behalf, sinceitconcludes,, that'isgliTL-
before we were born our Souls had an Existence, as%/ areno-
well as that intelligible Essence you mention'd butthinSelse
now. Formypart,Ithinkthere'snothingmores*'-fff
evident, and more sensible, than the Existence oiutlht&ul
all these Things, Goodness, Justice, & c and you have u mt God,
sufficientlymade itout. ? 'tUthercork Now forCebes,ftysSocrates*forCebesmustlike-"fGod'
wise be convine'd.
I believe,replies5/<<? >>? ;dy,tho' he is the stiffest M a n
upon Earth, and very much proofagainst Arguments,
* Socrates means to prove, that as Goodness, Justice, and all those intelligible Beings, which are the Patterns ot the sensi ble and real Beings, subsist intelligibly in God from all Eter nity;soourSoul existsbyitfell,andhasan eternalBeing m the Idea of God j and from this Idea it derives all its Knowledge.
Hh yet
? ? 114
Phedon: Or, A Dialogue
yethellownyourProoftobeveryconvincing. In the mean time, tho11am sufficientlyconvincedthat
ourSoulshadaBeingbeforewewereborn:Ihave not yet heard sufficient Proof, for its continuing af terourDeath. ForthatpopularOpinion,which Cebes mention'd but now, remains in all its force, viz. That after the death ofMan, the Soul disperses andceasestobe. AndindeedIcannotfeewhythe Soul should not be horn, or proceed from lome Part or other, and have a Being before it animates theBody in thisLife;andwhen itremoves from theBody,ceasetobe,andmake itsexitaswellas the Body.
You speakwell,Simmias,faysCebes; tomy mind, Socrates has only prov'd the halfof what he pro- pos'd. Tistrue,hehasdemonstratedthattheSoul has a Being before the Body ; but, to compleat his Demonstration, he should have prov'd that our Soul has an Existence after Death, as well as before this Life.
But I have demonstrated it to you both, replies Socrates-, and you'll be sensible of it, if you join thislastProofwith whatyou acknowledg'dbefore, viz. ThattheLivingrifefromtheDead. *Forif 'tistrue,thatourSoulwasinbeingbeforewe were born;then ofnecessitywhen itcomes tolife,it proceeds,sotospeakfromtheBosom ofDeath-, and w h y should not it lie under the lame necessity of be
ing afterDeath, sinceitmust return to. Life? Thus what you speak of is made out.
But I perceive bothofyou desiretofoundthisMattertothebot tom ;and are apprehensive,likeChildren, that,when
the Soul departs the Body, the Winds run away with it and disperse it, especially when a M a n dies in an open Country in a place expos'd to the Winds.
* Tho' our Soul has no being before our coming into the World, yet it continues after Death, since it must return to Life by the Resurrection, and the Living take rise from the Dead. The'defeatofDeathisthetriumphofLife. This Proof of the necessary rile of the Living from the Dead, is an admirable iupport ibr ourChriltian Hope.
Where-
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul.
H J
Whereupon Cebes smiling,replied, Pray then So* crates, try to discuss our Fears, or rather convince us, as if we fear'd nothing : Tho indeed there be someamong uswholieunderthosechildishAppre hensions. PersuadeusthennottofearDeath,asa vain Phantome.
f ' Asforthat,faysSocrates,youmustemploySpellsTMfS? J and Exorcisms every day, till you be cur'd. afms m? Hst
But pray, Socrates, where shall we meet with belook'dfor that excellent Conjurer * since you are going toinJhe,w'("^ leave us > ? sGo<l>
Greeceislargeenough,repliesSocrates,and well'Two*from stor'dwithlearnedMen. Besides,thereareagreat'V**{<*>>-
many barbarous Nations, which you must fcour inTMlalhbar-
order to find out the Conjurer, without sparing either baroat, that Labour or Charges: For you cannot imploy yomhe<i'ri'v'<1
Money inabetter Cause. You mustlikewiselook^J^'jl foroneamongyourselves;for'tispossibletheret? at? * may be none found more capable to perform thoses0>>lUtn.
Enchantments, than your selves.
W e shall obey your Oidexs,Socrates, in looking out
for one : But in the mean while, if you please, let's resume our former Discourse.
With allmy Heart,Cebes.
Well said,Socrates.
*The firstQuestion,we oughttoaskofourselves^
fays Socrates, is, what forts of Things they are that are apt to be dissipated ; j#hat Things are liable to that accident, and what^art ofthose Things? Then we must enquireintothenatureofoutSoul,and form our Fears or Hopes accordingly.
That's very true.
mortal;
Is'it not certain, that only compounded Things,Onlynm- or such as are of a compoundible nature, admit ofp>>>>nded
i ? -l Things can * Hitherto Socrates endeavour'd to make good the Existence naturallj
of Souls before their Bodies, as being a point of the receiv'd ie ^ippa- Theology. AndforasmuchasthePrincipleisseise,'twasu^ impoflible for him to give better proof, since a Lye does not admitofdemonstration. Butnowhe'sabouttomakegcod
the future Existence and Immortality of the Soul, by solid unshaken Arguments*
H h i being
? ? n 6 Phedon: Or, A Dialogue
Headdsm-beingdissipatedatthesame ratethattheywere turally compounded? IfthereareanyuncompoundedBe-
wTiiofGod m&-> t^eJr a^one are free ftom this Accident, and nar maycon- turallyuncapableofdissipation.
troul Wo- That I think is very clear, replies Cebes.
tme. , js jt not very likely, that Things which are al-
Mange,a wavstnefame,andintheiamecondition,arenot
signofcom-atallcompounded ;andthatthosewhichareliable positions. t0perpetualchanges,andareneverthefame,are
certainly compounded >
Iam ofyourmind,Socrates,
intellectual LetusbetakeourselvestotheThingswewere B"nP>&c- speaking of but now, the Existence whereof is ne
ver contested either in Question or Answer \ are these always the same,or do they sometimes change?
Equality, Beauty , (aoodnefs , and every singular T h i n g ? , /'. e . t h e E s s e n c e i t s e l f ; d o t h e s e r e c e i v e t h e
least alteration, or are they so pure and simple that they continue always the fame, without under going the least change ?
O f necessity, replies Cebes, they must cotinue still the fame without alteration.
And all these fine things, fays Socrates, such as Men, Horses, Habits, Movables, and a great many other things of the fame nature, are they entirely opposite to the former, that they never continue in the fame condition, either with reference to them-- selves, or to others-, but are subject: to perpetual alterations. ^
They never continue in the fame condition, re plies Cebes.
N o w these are the things that are visible, touch- . able, or perceptible by some other Sense ; whereas the former, which continue still the fame, can only be reach'd by Thought , as being immaterial and
invisible.
That's true, Socrates.
It' you please, continues Socrates, I'll instance in ? two things, one visible, the other invisible ; one still
the iame, and the other betraying continual altera tions. *' With
? ? ofthe ImmortalityoftheSoul.
117
With all,my Heart,saysCebes. Let'sfeethen;arenotwe compoundedofaBo
dy and a Soul^ or is there any other Ingredient in our Composition ?
No, sure.
Which of the two kinds of things does our Body most resemble ?
AllMenownthatitismostconformabletothe visible fort. . ; c.
Andpray, mydealCebes,isourSoulvisibleor invisible ?
At least, 'tis invisible to Men.
Butwhen wespeakofvisibleorinvisiblethings,Men,'f-
wemeanwithreferencetoMen,withoutmindingv^/a/e any otherNature. Once morethenjis. theSoul*,God. visible,or not i
Tis not visible.
Then 'tisimmaterialand invisible?
Yes. AndbyConsequencetheSoulismoreconforma
ble than the Body to the invisible kind of things$ and the Body suits better with the visible ?
There's an absolute necessity for that.
WhentheSoulmakesuseoftheBodyinconsi
dering any thing, by seeing,hearing, or any otherThecondi- Sense, (that being the sole function of the Body to J'"*. ? /**?
consider things by the Senses) should not w e then e? *rf'? . 'J*f
fay that the Body draws the Soul upon mutable nutur.
things. Inthisconditionitstrays,frets,staggers,
andisgiddy likeaMan indrink,byreasonofits^Zilsl*
beingengag'dinmatter. Whereas whenitpursuesengagd.
things by it self, without calling in the Body, it betakesitselftowhat isPure, Immortal, Immuta-^Tt'esof
hiejand,as beingofthefameNature,dwellscon-tTMe$? */'? *
stantly uponitwhile itisMasterofitself Then>>*? >><><< itsErrorsareatanend,and itisalwaysthefame,diyon'd
asbeing united to>>what never changes:And this-? "V^of- Passion of the JSquI is what we call Wisdom oxtheB? dy% Prudence. unitedcon
stantly to Hh 3 That'sGod-
He addsto
? ? *11
Phedon : Or, J Dialogue
ruSoul
That's admirably well spoke, Socrates, and a very great Truth.
After all,then, which sort of things does the Soul seem to resemble most ?
To my mind, Socrates,there's no Man so stupid and stiff, as not to be oblig'd by your Method of Arguing, to acknowledge that the Soul bears a grea ter resemblance and conformity to the immuta ble Being, than to that which is always upon the change. ^ :
AndasfortheBody?
Itbearsagreater resemblancetotheother. Let'stryyetanotherway. During theconjuncti-
beingthe on of Body and Soul,Nature orders the one to imageof 0^eyancjfeaSlave,andtheothertocommandand
ToclmmZiholdtheEmpire. WhichofthesetwoCharaaers andthebo- ismost suitable to theDivine Being-, and which to dytoobey, that that is Mortal ? Are not you sensible,that the
Divine is only capable of commanding and ruling ; and'whatisMortal isonlyworthyofobedienceand slavery ? . : .
Sure enough.
Which of these two then agrees best with the Soul ?
'Tis evident, Socrates, that our Soul resembles what is Divine, and our Body what is Mortal.
You see then, my dear Cebes,the necessary result of all,is, that our Soul bears a strict:resemblance to what is ]3ivjne5 Immortal, Intellectual, Simple, In-
dissolvable ; and is always the fame and always like
it:And thatourBodydoesperfectlyresemblewhat
1S human' mortal>> sensible, compounded, dissolva- ? jt J-t^alwayschanging,andneverlikeitself. Can
any thing be alkdg'd, to destroy that Consequence, or to make out the contrary ?
No, sure,Socrates.
Does not it then suit with the Body to be quickly dissolv'd, and with the Soul to be always indissolva-' ble, or something very near it?
n,enature oftheSoul.
s? tod
That's a standing Truth,
Ac-
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul. 119
(a)Ac&rdinglyyouseeeveryday,when aMan dies, his visible Body, that continues expos'd to our view, and which we call the Corps ; that alone admits of dissolution, alteration and dissipation; this, I fay, does not immediately undergo any of these Accidents, but continues a pretty while in its entire form, or in its flower, if I may so speak, .
(b)especiallyinthisSeason. Bodiesimbalm'dafter
the manner of thole in Egypt, remain entire for an 7'l'atu t0 infinityofYears:And even inthosethatcorrupt,^^'*^t
there are always some Parts, such as the Bones,? wl^s. Nerves, or the like,that continue, in a manner im
mortal. Isnotthistrue?
Very true.
N o w as for the Soul, which is an invisible Being, that goes to a Place like it self, marvellous, pure, and invisible, in the infernal World ; and returns to aGodfullofGoodnessandWisdom;whichIhope will be the fate of m y Soul in a minute, if it please God ; Shall a Soul of this nature, and created with
_(a) Socratesisabouttoshew theridiculousnessof theOpi nionoftheSouls dissipationafter death. What ! shallthe Body, a compounded Being, subsist a pretty while after death ; and the Soul, a simple Being, be immediately dissi-, pated ? Aster what has been said, the ridiculousness is very plain.
(4) This Passage is enough, to stun the Criticks,w h o make agreatbustletofind outtheprecise timeofSucre'sdeathj andasterstraininghardindemonstrating theAttickCalender, and computing its Months, assure us he died in the Month offaly. Here,totheirgreatmisfortune,Socrateshimselffays
he died in the Season in which Corps keep best. The Month of July is not entitled to that Character, especially in Greece. SothattheymustmakeanewComputation. Buthowcame thisPassagetoescapetheirview ? The reasonisplain. Most of'emdonotreadtheOriginals. Whentheylookforany thing, they content themselves with running over a Transla tion. Now thetranslationofthisPassageisveryfaulty. Nei therMarstliutFicinus,nordeSerresunderstoodit. Theytook s>W for the good Condition and entireness of the Parts ; whereasitsignifiestheSeason. Uponwhichmistaketheone renders \v tqiauth <>>&. , cum quadam mederatione j and the other corfore perbelie affetto. I?
Hh4 all
? ? i2. o
Phedon: Or, A Dialogue
all these Advantages, be dissipated and " nihilated, assoonasitpartsfrom theBody,asmostMen be lieve>Nosuchthing,my dearSimmiasandmy dearCebes. I'lltellyouwhatwillrathercometo pals, and what we ought to believe steddily. If the Soul retain its Purity without any mixture of filth from the Body, as having entertain'd no volun tary Correspondence with it; but on the contrary, having always avoided it, and recollected it self within it self in continual Meditations ; that is, in studying the true Philosophy, and effectually learn ing to die -, for Philosophy is a preparation to
death : I fay, if the Soul depart in this Tinstateoftheit- Condition,itrepairstoaBeinglikeit tfrtejsouh ofthose who self a Being that>s Divine, Immortal,
fervd(jodinsincerityall ,' c 11 Fm-n ? i? i ? >> theirlifetime. ancl soil of Wisdom -,inwhich Itesl-
joys an inexpressible Felicity, as being theinitiationintoMy freedfromitsErrors,itsIgnorance,its
sieriej,wasonlyasha- Fears,it'sAmoursthattyrannisedover dow of what was to be jf afidajj the other g ^ j-g^ing to compleatedintheother ,' xi i s? r-T ? ?
World.
human Nature;and,as tis? laidor
those who have been initiated in holy Mysteries, it truly passes a whole course of Eternity with the Gods. Ought not this to be the Matter of our Belief?
Sure enough, Socrates.
n,efuture ButiftheSouldepartfullofLlncleannessand
#*"9f'p-Impurity,as having been allalong mingledwith sureous. ^ gocjy^aiwaySemploy'dinitsService,always
possess'd by the love of it, wheedled and charm'd
by itsPleasures and Lusts-, insomuch that it believ'd '{here was nothing real or true beyond what is Cor
poreal,what maybeseen,touch'd,drankoreaten, or what is' the Object of Carnal Plea- bnfure Souh belieye sore;thatithated,dreadedandavoided
SK'fa*"f? /*Tr Wh3ttheEyeS0itheB? dyC0UWn0t I'onai"*Wat" W~ descry,and allthatisintelligibleand
-*//intelligiblethings CaslTMl7,beTOTJ* ^ ^ W ? - 'Dp arccnhobscuritytothe y? uthink,1lay,thataSoulinthiscorj- Evs ofthejody. dition can depart pure and simple from
theBody? ' ? No
? ? 'osthe Immortality of the Soul. I$j
No sure,Socrates,that'simpossible.
On thecontrary,itdepartsstain'dwithCorporeal-^Smifd- Pollution, which was rendred natural to itby itsl"tedan*
continual Commerce and toointimateUnionwith^uTfilth theBody,atatimewhenitwasitsconstantCom- * panion, and was still employ'd in serving and gra
tifying it
Most certainly.
This Pollution, m y dear Cebes, is a gross, heavy,
earthy and visible Mass, and the Soul loaded with
fiich a weight, is dragg'd into that visible Place, not
only by the Weight, but by its own dreading the
Light and the invisible Place; and, as we commonly impureSfi.
fay, it wanders in the (a) Church-yards rourid the "tsfre.
Tombs, wheredark Phantomsand Apparitionsaref**f! & often seen * such as these Souls that did not depart sTulnres-
the Body in purity ofSimplicity, but polluted with that earthy and visible Matter that makes them degenerate into a visible Form.
? That's very likely, Socrates.
Yes,, without doubt, Cebes; and 'tis also likely
that 'tis'not the good but the bad Souls that are
forc'd to wander in those Places of Impurity $ where theysuffer fortheir former illLife,and continue^? ? rrB, to wander, till, through the love they have to this^>>/ran corporeal Mass which always follows 'em, they en- Pythago- gage again in a new Body, and in all probabilityras'*/,Tr
plunge themselves into the fame Manners and Pas ^kminl fions,asweretheOccupationoftheirfirstLife, graftSense.
How doyoufay,Socrates?
I fay, Cebes, that, for Instance, those w h o m a d e their Belly their God, and lov'd nothing but Inso lence' and Impurity^ without any Shame, and with
v. (a) Socrates speaks here of the impure Spirits that dwelt among Tombs in Church-yards, such as are mention'd in the the Gospel, Matth. 8. 28. 'Mark J. 2. luhe 8. z6. which wan- der'dNightandDayroundtheTembsandupontheMoun
tains. ,. He alledges they were corrupt and polluted Souls, which bore the Pollution they had contracted by Sin, in plun gingthemselvestoodeepinMatter. -'- , '
;. i \
out
? ? 12*
Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
out any Reserve ; those (b) enter into the Bodies of AflesorsuchlikeCreatures. Do notyouthinkthis very probable >
Yes, sure, Socrates. ,
And those Souls which lov'd only Injustice, Ty ranny and Rapine, are employ'd to animate the Bodies of Wolves, Hawks and Faulcons. Where else should Souls of that stamp go ?
No where else,Socrates.
Thecaseofalltherestismuchthefame. They go to animate the Bodies of Beasts of different Spe cies, according as they resemble their first courses.
According to these Principles, it cannot be other
wise.
n,ePateof ThehappiestofalltheseMen, whose Soulsare thosewho ? nt t0 tjje moft agreeable Place, are those who
raVaJl' nave always made a profession of Popular and Civil jn. fibyHa- Vertues, which are call'dTemperance and Justice ^ tit,withoutto which they have brought themselves only by Ha-
If'Zfffi'bitandExercise,without any assistancefromPhilo- fbp " sophy and the Mind.
Howcantheybesohappythen?
l i k e t h e t h i n g r e m e m b r e d -, a n d s o m e t i m e s b y t h i n g s thatareunlike. Butwhen oneremembersathing by virtue of a likeness, does itnot neceflarily come to pals, that the Mind at first view discovers whe therthe Picture does resemblethe. thing defign'd, lamely or perfectly. . . .
Itmustneedsbe so,repliesSimmias.
? Then pray mind whether your Thoughts ofwhat HtfteJisof
Iamabouttolayagreewithmine. Isnotthereanintdli- something that we call Equality? I do not speakffhlhmt "
oftheequalityobserv'dbetweenoneTreeandano-^;'"
ther, one Stone and another, and several other . ? '? -? '? ' things
? ? |oS
Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
things that are alike. I speak of abstracted equa-~
lityofthings. Shallwecallthatiomethingorno
thing ?
Surely,we shouldcallitsomething? ,butthat
willonlycometopasswhenwe meantospeakPhi losophically and of marvellous things.
ButthendoweknowthisEquality?
Without doubt.
BtmtM! t>> (AE)FromwhencedowederivethatKnowledge?
&Tw- *s**nCft^om the thinSswe mention'dbutnow> *ltdgt? (flhu'Tisupon feeing equalTrees,equalStones, andie-
inteiiigibUveralotherthingsofthatnature,thatwe form the ? Totality IdeaofthatEquality,whichis. noteithertheTrees
f^s,jein or the Stones, but something distracted from all
t^World subjects. Do notyou finditsuch>Pray takeno rthstber*? tice. Th$ Stones and the Trees are always the firemust satne, and yet do not they sometimes appear un- krtfnr'd a[ >
sotiltOtlKT. *r, , Sure enough.
What ! Do equalthingsappearunequal? Or,does equality take up the form of unequality ?
By no means,Socrates,
otherwise Then Equality and the thing which is equal are
Quality twodifferentthings.
<<ndi>>eqna- Mostcertainly.
UtyvoM But after all these equal things, which are dis-
jZZ'shL &rent from Equality, furnish us with the Idea and jett5whichKnowledge of that abstractedEquality.
* a con. tradicihit.
That's true, replies Simmias.
she cafeisthefame,whetherthisEqualitybear
a resemblance to the things that occasion'd its Idea, or not.
(<t)Socratesisoutinthinkingto provethattheknowledge of intelligible Qualities was acquir'd in the other World. That Knowledge isthe effectortheLightwithwhichGod illuminates the Soul, or the Tracks of the Impressions that arenotquitedefac'dby Sin:'TistheremainderoftheKnow ledge w e have lost, and of the Perfection w e have forfeited. So that, if the otbtr Lifebe taken in Socrttes's Sense, the Propo sition is false ; if in ours, for the slate of the Soul before Sin, 'tistrue.
? ? rof the immortality of the Soul.
i d g
Most certainly.
When, upon feeing one thing, you call to mind another. 'tisno matterifitbelikeitornot; stillit isremembrance.
Without doubt.
B u t - w h a t shall w e say'to this, continues Socrates ; *5? J/k/<<*-'
w h e n w e behold trees or other things that ate equal, / Z i f ^ w aretheyequal accordingtotheequalityofwhich/0^r/<<st<<* we havetheIdeajornot? thebad.
Very far from it.
u(R)*<*'
Thenweagreeuponthis. WhenaManfeesa thingbeforehim,andthinksitwouldbeequalto anotherthing,butatthefame timeisfarfrombe ing Ibperfectly equal, astheequalityofwhich he hastheIdea:Then,Ilay,(b)hewhothinksthus,
must necessarily have known beforehand this intel lectualBeing which the thingremsembles, butim perfectly.
There's an absolute Necessity for that.
And isnotthecasethefame,when wecompare things equal with the equality >
Sure enough, Socrates.
Then of necessity we must have known that E- quality before the time, in which we firstsaw the equal things, and thereupon thought, that they all
tended to be equal as equality it self, but could not reach it.
That's certain.
But we likewise agree upon this, That this**>>*>*>>>>"- Thought can be deriv'd from nothing else but one? /e V T '
r C r. c r*? i- ? i>><<. <"**theCon- or our benles, trom seeing, touching, or reelmg one/^we y
way or other : And the fame Conclusion will hold dramsfrom.
of all Beings, whether Intellectual or Sensible. All things will equally conclude for what you
design.
Then, 'tis from the Senses themselves that we
(b)Tho'hemusthaveknownit,itdoesnotfollowthat he knew it in the other Life, unless it be thereby meant the very instantof the Creation of the Soul.
*"f^fi-
derive
? ? rj. lp
Phedon : Oy, A Dialogue
derive this Thought ; that all the Objects of our Senses have a tendency towards this intellectual Equality,but comesshortofit. Isitnot?
Yes,without doubt, Socrates.
In effect, Simmias, (a) before we began to fee, . '. . 'feel,oruseourSenses,wemusthavehadtheknow
ledgeofthisintellectualEquality;elsewe could not be capable to compare it with the sensible things, and perceive that they have all a tendency towards it,but fall short of its Perfection.
That's a necessary Consequence from the Pre- v mises.
But is it not certain, That immediately after our Birth,wesaw,weheard,andmadeuseofourother Senses ?
Very true.
Then it follows, that before that time we had the knowledge of that Equality ?
Without doubt.
rbhConfe- (b)AndbyConsequencewewerepossess'dofit fimceis beforewewereborn.
i^we polsess'd Itbefore we were born, then we
knew things before we were born, and immediately afterour birth knew not only what isequal, what great, what small, but all other things of that na ture. For what we now advance ofEquality, is equally applicable to Goodness,Justice,Sanctityj and, in a word, to all other things that have a real
(a)Onemighthaveanswer'd,ThatwehadnotthatKnow
ledge beforewe were born,but receiv'ditafterwardsby
thegradualCommunicationofLightfromGod intotheSoul.
But, as 'tis certain that the Soul was created full of Light
and Perfection, so this Truth was known to the Pagans, and
upon that account Socrates's Friends were oblig'd to assent to
whathesaid. Andafterall,ifbythefirstLireoftheSoul, vwe . understand the very Instant of Creation, or the State of
the Soul before the Fall, the Proposition istrue.
(l>)We ""knewbeforewesinn'djwelostourKnowledge
-bysinning;andre-callitagainby VirtueoftheLightim partedbyGodtotheSon! . ' ,""
? ? w* SoIthink.
enje.
0E*
? ? ofthe Immortality of the Soul. ii%
(^Existence. So that of necessity we must have known all these thingsbefore we came into this World.
That's certain.
And being possess'dofthatKnowledge,ifwe did
not forget apace every Day, we should not only be
bornwithit,butretainitallourlife-time* Forto
know,isonlytopreservetheKnowledgewe have received,andnottoloseit. Andtoforget,isto
lose the Knowledge we enjoy'd before.
That's certain, Socrates.
Now, if, after having possess'd that Knowledge
beforewewereborn,andhavinglostitsince,we come to retrieve it by the ministry of our Senses, which we callLearning! , shall not we justly entitle it Remembrance ?
With a great deal of reason,Socrates.
(d) For we have agreed upon this-, That 'tisvery possible,thataMan seeing,hearing,orperceiving one things by any of his Senses, should frame to himself the imagination of another thing that he had forgot j to which the thing perceiv'd by the Senses has some relation, whether it resembles the
other,ornot. Sothatoneoftwothingsmustne cessarily follow. Either we were born with that Knowledge, and preserv'ditallalong;orelsere trievalitafterwardsbyway ofremembrance. Which ofthesetwo,do you pitchupon,Simmias? ,arewe b o r n w i t h t h a t K n o w l e d g e ; o r d o w e c a l l it t o m i n d after having had it and forgot if?
Indeed Socrates, I do not know which to chuse at present.
(c)The GreekExpositionisveryremarkable;itrunsthus; ThingsuponwhichwehaveputthisStamp,That'tisso. Thatis, to distinguish Things that have a true Existence, from sensi ble Things that have no true Existence. ? >
(d) Twas agreed before, Chat upon seeingone thing we c a l l t o m i n d a n o t h e r u n s e e n ;- a s u p o n s e e i n g a L u t e w e t h i n k of a Mistress ; upon seeing equal Trees, we call to mind Equality. -? -<-
* "<< '*
But
? ? I n
Phedon: (C)r, A Dialogue
inPlato?
t
i
Then you thinkallMen havenotthisKnow
ledge?
No sure.
(a) D o they call to mind then, the things they have known ?
That may be.
At what time did our Souls learn that Know ledge ? Itcannot be since we were Men.
No sure. . ,-. ,. ? ,. . . .
Then it must be some time before that i Yes, without doubt. . .
But mind what I'm about to say to you, and then let's fee which you'll chuse. A Man that knows any thing, can he give a reason of his Knowledge ornot?
Doubtlels he can, Socrates.
Itgreat
Tanegyrickfovwnat we havebeenspeakingof?
2TSE" lwislltheycould'rePliesSimmtas>>bu*I'mafraid
Modesiy tomorrowweshallhavenoneherethat'scapable wasthis tOdoit.
And do you think all Men can give a Reason
xhthisis Andbyconsequence,Simmias,? ,ourSoulshada
*/*#"' Beingbeforethat,time;thatistofay,beforethey ? Prmcipe. wgreinvefte(iwjtnahumaneForm,whiletheywere
without the Body, they thought,they knew and un derstood. ,.
Unless you'll allow, Socrates, that we learn'd it intheMinuteofourBirth. There'snoothertime left- . . . . . ;:,
Beitso,my dearSimmias,(b)butatwhatoth^r
timedid we loseit? Forwe did notbringitinto
(a)IftheyarenotthenbornwiththatKnowledgejthen
t h e y m u s t h a v e f o r g o t it, a n d r e c o v e r ' d it a g a i n b y w a y o f remembrance. A falseConsequence. . . ? <
(b)AlltheHeathen Philosophersareataloss,tofindout the time of thus forgetting. They were sensible that God created the Soul fullof Light ana Understanding, but djd notperceivethatthefirstMan lostfhatLightandKnow ledge by his Rebellion ; and . that if he had continued inno cent, he had transmitted to us those valuable Qualities toge ther with his Innocence; as Well as now he is fallen, ne transmitted to us Obscurity and Sin.
she'
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul.
H >
theWorldwith us,aswe concludedbutnow. Did weloseinthelameMinutethatweobtausdit? Or, can you assign any other time ?
No, Socrates* I did not perceive that what Ilaid was to no purpose.
* Then, Simmiat, this must be a standing Truth 5 That if the Objects of our daily Conversation, have arealExistencejImean, ifJustice,Goodness,and allthatEssencewithwhichwe comparetheObjects
of our Senses; [and which having an Existence before us, proves to be of the fame Nature with our own Essence, andistheStandard bywhichwe measure- a l l t h i n g s -, I f a y , i f a l l t h e s e t h i n g s h a v e a r e a l E $ '
istence,our Soul is likewise entitled to Existence, and t h a t b e f o r e w e w e r e b o r n -, a n d i f t h e s e t h i n g s h a v e rioBeing,thenallourDiscoursesareuseless. Isit not a standing Truth, and withal a just and necefla- ry Consequence, that the Existence of our Souls before our birth, stands and falls with that of those
things ?
ThatConsequence, repliesSimmias^seems tomeTheKarai
te be equally just and wonderful : And the result ofle}" not
thewholeDiscourseaffordssomethingveryglorious^ . ^f
and desirableon our behalf, sinceitconcludes,, that'isgliTL-
before we were born our Souls had an Existence, as%/ areno-
well as that intelligible Essence you mention'd butthinSelse
now. Formypart,Ithinkthere'snothingmores*'-fff
evident, and more sensible, than the Existence oiutlht&ul
all these Things, Goodness, Justice, & c and you have u mt God,
sufficientlymade itout. ? 'tUthercork Now forCebes,ftysSocrates*forCebesmustlike-"fGod'
wise be convine'd.
I believe,replies5/<<? >>? ;dy,tho' he is the stiffest M a n
upon Earth, and very much proofagainst Arguments,
* Socrates means to prove, that as Goodness, Justice, and all those intelligible Beings, which are the Patterns ot the sensi ble and real Beings, subsist intelligibly in God from all Eter nity;soourSoul existsbyitfell,andhasan eternalBeing m the Idea of God j and from this Idea it derives all its Knowledge.
Hh yet
? ? 114
Phedon: Or, A Dialogue
yethellownyourProoftobeveryconvincing. In the mean time, tho11am sufficientlyconvincedthat
ourSoulshadaBeingbeforewewereborn:Ihave not yet heard sufficient Proof, for its continuing af terourDeath. ForthatpopularOpinion,which Cebes mention'd but now, remains in all its force, viz. That after the death ofMan, the Soul disperses andceasestobe. AndindeedIcannotfeewhythe Soul should not be horn, or proceed from lome Part or other, and have a Being before it animates theBody in thisLife;andwhen itremoves from theBody,ceasetobe,andmake itsexitaswellas the Body.
You speakwell,Simmias,faysCebes; tomy mind, Socrates has only prov'd the halfof what he pro- pos'd. Tistrue,hehasdemonstratedthattheSoul has a Being before the Body ; but, to compleat his Demonstration, he should have prov'd that our Soul has an Existence after Death, as well as before this Life.
But I have demonstrated it to you both, replies Socrates-, and you'll be sensible of it, if you join thislastProofwith whatyou acknowledg'dbefore, viz. ThattheLivingrifefromtheDead. *Forif 'tistrue,thatourSoulwasinbeingbeforewe were born;then ofnecessitywhen itcomes tolife,it proceeds,sotospeakfromtheBosom ofDeath-, and w h y should not it lie under the lame necessity of be
ing afterDeath, sinceitmust return to. Life? Thus what you speak of is made out.
But I perceive bothofyou desiretofoundthisMattertothebot tom ;and are apprehensive,likeChildren, that,when
the Soul departs the Body, the Winds run away with it and disperse it, especially when a M a n dies in an open Country in a place expos'd to the Winds.
* Tho' our Soul has no being before our coming into the World, yet it continues after Death, since it must return to Life by the Resurrection, and the Living take rise from the Dead. The'defeatofDeathisthetriumphofLife. This Proof of the necessary rile of the Living from the Dead, is an admirable iupport ibr ourChriltian Hope.
Where-
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul.
H J
Whereupon Cebes smiling,replied, Pray then So* crates, try to discuss our Fears, or rather convince us, as if we fear'd nothing : Tho indeed there be someamong uswholieunderthosechildishAppre hensions. PersuadeusthennottofearDeath,asa vain Phantome.
f ' Asforthat,faysSocrates,youmustemploySpellsTMfS? J and Exorcisms every day, till you be cur'd. afms m? Hst
But pray, Socrates, where shall we meet with belook'dfor that excellent Conjurer * since you are going toinJhe,w'("^ leave us > ? sGo<l>
Greeceislargeenough,repliesSocrates,and well'Two*from stor'dwithlearnedMen. Besides,thereareagreat'V**{<*>>-
many barbarous Nations, which you must fcour inTMlalhbar-
order to find out the Conjurer, without sparing either baroat, that Labour or Charges: For you cannot imploy yomhe<i'ri'v'<1
Money inabetter Cause. You mustlikewiselook^J^'jl foroneamongyourselves;for'tispossibletheret? at? * may be none found more capable to perform thoses0>>lUtn.
Enchantments, than your selves.
W e shall obey your Oidexs,Socrates, in looking out
for one : But in the mean while, if you please, let's resume our former Discourse.
With allmy Heart,Cebes.
Well said,Socrates.
*The firstQuestion,we oughttoaskofourselves^
fays Socrates, is, what forts of Things they are that are apt to be dissipated ; j#hat Things are liable to that accident, and what^art ofthose Things? Then we must enquireintothenatureofoutSoul,and form our Fears or Hopes accordingly.
That's very true.
mortal;
Is'it not certain, that only compounded Things,Onlynm- or such as are of a compoundible nature, admit ofp>>>>nded
i ? -l Things can * Hitherto Socrates endeavour'd to make good the Existence naturallj
of Souls before their Bodies, as being a point of the receiv'd ie ^ippa- Theology. AndforasmuchasthePrincipleisseise,'twasu^ impoflible for him to give better proof, since a Lye does not admitofdemonstration. Butnowhe'sabouttomakegcod
the future Existence and Immortality of the Soul, by solid unshaken Arguments*
H h i being
? ? n 6 Phedon: Or, A Dialogue
Headdsm-beingdissipatedatthesame ratethattheywere turally compounded? IfthereareanyuncompoundedBe-
wTiiofGod m&-> t^eJr a^one are free ftom this Accident, and nar maycon- turallyuncapableofdissipation.
troul Wo- That I think is very clear, replies Cebes.
tme. , js jt not very likely, that Things which are al-
Mange,a wavstnefame,andintheiamecondition,arenot
signofcom-atallcompounded ;andthatthosewhichareliable positions. t0perpetualchanges,andareneverthefame,are
certainly compounded >
Iam ofyourmind,Socrates,
intellectual LetusbetakeourselvestotheThingswewere B"nP>&c- speaking of but now, the Existence whereof is ne
ver contested either in Question or Answer \ are these always the same,or do they sometimes change?
Equality, Beauty , (aoodnefs , and every singular T h i n g ? , /'. e . t h e E s s e n c e i t s e l f ; d o t h e s e r e c e i v e t h e
least alteration, or are they so pure and simple that they continue always the fame, without under going the least change ?
O f necessity, replies Cebes, they must cotinue still the fame without alteration.
And all these fine things, fays Socrates, such as Men, Horses, Habits, Movables, and a great many other things of the fame nature, are they entirely opposite to the former, that they never continue in the fame condition, either with reference to them-- selves, or to others-, but are subject: to perpetual alterations. ^
They never continue in the fame condition, re plies Cebes.
N o w these are the things that are visible, touch- . able, or perceptible by some other Sense ; whereas the former, which continue still the fame, can only be reach'd by Thought , as being immaterial and
invisible.
That's true, Socrates.
It' you please, continues Socrates, I'll instance in ? two things, one visible, the other invisible ; one still
the iame, and the other betraying continual altera tions. *' With
? ? ofthe ImmortalityoftheSoul.
117
With all,my Heart,saysCebes. Let'sfeethen;arenotwe compoundedofaBo
dy and a Soul^ or is there any other Ingredient in our Composition ?
No, sure.
Which of the two kinds of things does our Body most resemble ?
AllMenownthatitismostconformabletothe visible fort. . ; c.
Andpray, mydealCebes,isourSoulvisibleor invisible ?
At least, 'tis invisible to Men.
Butwhen wespeakofvisibleorinvisiblethings,Men,'f-
wemeanwithreferencetoMen,withoutmindingv^/a/e any otherNature. Once morethenjis. theSoul*,God. visible,or not i
Tis not visible.
Then 'tisimmaterialand invisible?
Yes. AndbyConsequencetheSoulismoreconforma
ble than the Body to the invisible kind of things$ and the Body suits better with the visible ?
There's an absolute necessity for that.
WhentheSoulmakesuseoftheBodyinconsi
dering any thing, by seeing,hearing, or any otherThecondi- Sense, (that being the sole function of the Body to J'"*. ? /**?
consider things by the Senses) should not w e then e? *rf'? . 'J*f
fay that the Body draws the Soul upon mutable nutur.
things. Inthisconditionitstrays,frets,staggers,
andisgiddy likeaMan indrink,byreasonofits^Zilsl*
beingengag'dinmatter. Whereas whenitpursuesengagd.
things by it self, without calling in the Body, it betakesitselftowhat isPure, Immortal, Immuta-^Tt'esof
hiejand,as beingofthefameNature,dwellscon-tTMe$? */'? *
stantly uponitwhile itisMasterofitself Then>>*? >><><< itsErrorsareatanend,and itisalwaysthefame,diyon'd
asbeing united to>>what never changes:And this-? "V^of- Passion of the JSquI is what we call Wisdom oxtheB? dy% Prudence. unitedcon
stantly to Hh 3 That'sGod-
He addsto
? ? *11
Phedon : Or, J Dialogue
ruSoul
That's admirably well spoke, Socrates, and a very great Truth.
After all,then, which sort of things does the Soul seem to resemble most ?
To my mind, Socrates,there's no Man so stupid and stiff, as not to be oblig'd by your Method of Arguing, to acknowledge that the Soul bears a grea ter resemblance and conformity to the immuta ble Being, than to that which is always upon the change. ^ :
AndasfortheBody?
Itbearsagreater resemblancetotheother. Let'stryyetanotherway. During theconjuncti-
beingthe on of Body and Soul,Nature orders the one to imageof 0^eyancjfeaSlave,andtheothertocommandand
ToclmmZiholdtheEmpire. WhichofthesetwoCharaaers andthebo- ismost suitable to theDivine Being-, and which to dytoobey, that that is Mortal ? Are not you sensible,that the
Divine is only capable of commanding and ruling ; and'whatisMortal isonlyworthyofobedienceand slavery ? . : .
Sure enough.
Which of these two then agrees best with the Soul ?
'Tis evident, Socrates, that our Soul resembles what is Divine, and our Body what is Mortal.
You see then, my dear Cebes,the necessary result of all,is, that our Soul bears a strict:resemblance to what is ]3ivjne5 Immortal, Intellectual, Simple, In-
dissolvable ; and is always the fame and always like
it:And thatourBodydoesperfectlyresemblewhat
1S human' mortal>> sensible, compounded, dissolva- ? jt J-t^alwayschanging,andneverlikeitself. Can
any thing be alkdg'd, to destroy that Consequence, or to make out the contrary ?
No, sure,Socrates.
Does not it then suit with the Body to be quickly dissolv'd, and with the Soul to be always indissolva-' ble, or something very near it?
n,enature oftheSoul.
s? tod
That's a standing Truth,
Ac-
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul. 119
(a)Ac&rdinglyyouseeeveryday,when aMan dies, his visible Body, that continues expos'd to our view, and which we call the Corps ; that alone admits of dissolution, alteration and dissipation; this, I fay, does not immediately undergo any of these Accidents, but continues a pretty while in its entire form, or in its flower, if I may so speak, .
(b)especiallyinthisSeason. Bodiesimbalm'dafter
the manner of thole in Egypt, remain entire for an 7'l'atu t0 infinityofYears:And even inthosethatcorrupt,^^'*^t
there are always some Parts, such as the Bones,? wl^s. Nerves, or the like,that continue, in a manner im
mortal. Isnotthistrue?
Very true.
N o w as for the Soul, which is an invisible Being, that goes to a Place like it self, marvellous, pure, and invisible, in the infernal World ; and returns to aGodfullofGoodnessandWisdom;whichIhope will be the fate of m y Soul in a minute, if it please God ; Shall a Soul of this nature, and created with
_(a) Socratesisabouttoshew theridiculousnessof theOpi nionoftheSouls dissipationafter death. What ! shallthe Body, a compounded Being, subsist a pretty while after death ; and the Soul, a simple Being, be immediately dissi-, pated ? Aster what has been said, the ridiculousness is very plain.
(4) This Passage is enough, to stun the Criticks,w h o make agreatbustletofind outtheprecise timeofSucre'sdeathj andasterstraininghardindemonstrating theAttickCalender, and computing its Months, assure us he died in the Month offaly. Here,totheirgreatmisfortune,Socrateshimselffays
he died in the Season in which Corps keep best. The Month of July is not entitled to that Character, especially in Greece. SothattheymustmakeanewComputation. Buthowcame thisPassagetoescapetheirview ? The reasonisplain. Most of'emdonotreadtheOriginals. Whentheylookforany thing, they content themselves with running over a Transla tion. Now thetranslationofthisPassageisveryfaulty. Nei therMarstliutFicinus,nordeSerresunderstoodit. Theytook s>W for the good Condition and entireness of the Parts ; whereasitsignifiestheSeason. Uponwhichmistaketheone renders \v tqiauth <>>&. , cum quadam mederatione j and the other corfore perbelie affetto. I?
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all these Advantages, be dissipated and " nihilated, assoonasitpartsfrom theBody,asmostMen be lieve>Nosuchthing,my dearSimmiasandmy dearCebes. I'lltellyouwhatwillrathercometo pals, and what we ought to believe steddily. If the Soul retain its Purity without any mixture of filth from the Body, as having entertain'd no volun tary Correspondence with it; but on the contrary, having always avoided it, and recollected it self within it self in continual Meditations ; that is, in studying the true Philosophy, and effectually learn ing to die -, for Philosophy is a preparation to
death : I fay, if the Soul depart in this Tinstateoftheit- Condition,itrepairstoaBeinglikeit tfrtejsouh ofthose who self a Being that>s Divine, Immortal,
fervd(jodinsincerityall ,' c 11 Fm-n ? i? i ? >> theirlifetime. ancl soil of Wisdom -,inwhich Itesl-
joys an inexpressible Felicity, as being theinitiationintoMy freedfromitsErrors,itsIgnorance,its
sieriej,wasonlyasha- Fears,it'sAmoursthattyrannisedover dow of what was to be jf afidajj the other g ^ j-g^ing to compleatedintheother ,' xi i s? r-T ? ?
World.
human Nature;and,as tis? laidor
those who have been initiated in holy Mysteries, it truly passes a whole course of Eternity with the Gods. Ought not this to be the Matter of our Belief?
Sure enough, Socrates.
n,efuture ButiftheSouldepartfullofLlncleannessand
#*"9f'p-Impurity,as having been allalong mingledwith sureous. ^ gocjy^aiwaySemploy'dinitsService,always
possess'd by the love of it, wheedled and charm'd
by itsPleasures and Lusts-, insomuch that it believ'd '{here was nothing real or true beyond what is Cor
poreal,what maybeseen,touch'd,drankoreaten, or what is' the Object of Carnal Plea- bnfure Souh belieye sore;thatithated,dreadedandavoided
SK'fa*"f? /*Tr Wh3ttheEyeS0itheB? dyC0UWn0t I'onai"*Wat" W~ descry,and allthatisintelligibleand
-*//intelligiblethings CaslTMl7,beTOTJ* ^ ^ W ? - 'Dp arccnhobscuritytothe y? uthink,1lay,thataSoulinthiscorj- Evs ofthejody. dition can depart pure and simple from
theBody? ' ? No
? ? 'osthe Immortality of the Soul. I$j
No sure,Socrates,that'simpossible.
On thecontrary,itdepartsstain'dwithCorporeal-^Smifd- Pollution, which was rendred natural to itby itsl"tedan*
continual Commerce and toointimateUnionwith^uTfilth theBody,atatimewhenitwasitsconstantCom- * panion, and was still employ'd in serving and gra
tifying it
Most certainly.
This Pollution, m y dear Cebes, is a gross, heavy,
earthy and visible Mass, and the Soul loaded with
fiich a weight, is dragg'd into that visible Place, not
only by the Weight, but by its own dreading the
Light and the invisible Place; and, as we commonly impureSfi.
fay, it wanders in the (a) Church-yards rourid the "tsfre.
Tombs, wheredark Phantomsand Apparitionsaref**f! & often seen * such as these Souls that did not depart sTulnres-
the Body in purity ofSimplicity, but polluted with that earthy and visible Matter that makes them degenerate into a visible Form.
? That's very likely, Socrates.
Yes,, without doubt, Cebes; and 'tis also likely
that 'tis'not the good but the bad Souls that are
forc'd to wander in those Places of Impurity $ where theysuffer fortheir former illLife,and continue^? ? rrB, to wander, till, through the love they have to this^>>/ran corporeal Mass which always follows 'em, they en- Pythago- gage again in a new Body, and in all probabilityras'*/,Tr
plunge themselves into the fame Manners and Pas ^kminl fions,asweretheOccupationoftheirfirstLife, graftSense.
How doyoufay,Socrates?
I fay, Cebes, that, for Instance, those w h o m a d e their Belly their God, and lov'd nothing but Inso lence' and Impurity^ without any Shame, and with
v. (a) Socrates speaks here of the impure Spirits that dwelt among Tombs in Church-yards, such as are mention'd in the the Gospel, Matth. 8. 28. 'Mark J. 2. luhe 8. z6. which wan- der'dNightandDayroundtheTembsandupontheMoun
tains. ,. He alledges they were corrupt and polluted Souls, which bore the Pollution they had contracted by Sin, in plun gingthemselvestoodeepinMatter. -'- , '
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out any Reserve ; those (b) enter into the Bodies of AflesorsuchlikeCreatures. Do notyouthinkthis very probable >
Yes, sure, Socrates. ,
And those Souls which lov'd only Injustice, Ty ranny and Rapine, are employ'd to animate the Bodies of Wolves, Hawks and Faulcons. Where else should Souls of that stamp go ?
No where else,Socrates.
Thecaseofalltherestismuchthefame. They go to animate the Bodies of Beasts of different Spe cies, according as they resemble their first courses.
According to these Principles, it cannot be other
wise.
n,ePateof ThehappiestofalltheseMen, whose Soulsare thosewho ? nt t0 tjje moft agreeable Place, are those who
raVaJl' nave always made a profession of Popular and Civil jn. fibyHa- Vertues, which are call'dTemperance and Justice ^ tit,withoutto which they have brought themselves only by Ha-
If'Zfffi'bitandExercise,without any assistancefromPhilo- fbp " sophy and the Mind.
Howcantheybesohappythen?
