No More Learning

Therefore the human body was produced by some created power, and not
immediately by God.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:1): "God created man out of
the earth. "

I answer that, The first formation of the human body could not be by
the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from God.
Some, indeed, supposed that the forms which are in corporeal matter are
derived from some immaterial forms; but the Philosopher refutes this
opinion (Metaph. vii), for the reason that forms cannot be made in
themselves, but only in the composite, as we have explained
([764]Q[65], A[4]); and because the agent must be like its effect, it
is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter, should produce
a form which is in matter, and which form is only made by the fact that
the composite is made. So a form which is in matter can only be the
cause of another form that is in matter, according as composite is made
by composite. Now God, though He is absolutely immaterial, can alone by
His own power produce matter by creation: wherefore He alone can
produce a form in matter, without the aid of any preceding material
form. For this reason the angels cannot transform a body except by
making use of something in the nature of a seed, as Augustine says (De
Trin. iii, 19). Therefore as no pre-existing body has been formed
whereby another body of the same species could be generated, the first
human body was of necessity made immediately by God.

Reply to Objection 1: Although the angels are the ministers of God, as
regards what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies beyond
the angels' power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or giving sight
to the blind: and by this power He formed the body of the first man
from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels could act as
ministers in the formation of the body of the first man, in the same
way as they will do at the last resurrection by collecting the dust.

Reply to Objection 2: Perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be
made by the sole power of a heavenly body, as Avicenna imagined;
although the power of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the
work of natural generation, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 26),
"man and the sun beget man from matter. " For this reason, a place of
moderate temperature is required for the production of man and other
animals. But the power of heavenly bodies suffices for the production
of some imperfect animals from properly disposed matter: for it is
clear that more conditions are required to produce a perfect than an
imperfect thing.

Reply to Objection 3: The movement of the heavens causes natural
changes; but not changes that surpass the order of nature, and are
caused by the Divine Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life,
or the blind to see: like to which also is the making of man from the
slime of the earth.

Reply to Objection 4: An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal
virtues of creatures, in two ways. First, both in active and in passive
potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of pre-existing
matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can produce it.
Secondly, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out of
pre-existing matter it can be produced by God. In this sense, according
to Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous work in their
causal virtues.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the body of man was given an apt disposition?

Objection 1: It would seem that the body of man was not given an apt
disposition. For since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought to
be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in sense
and movement. But some animals have sharper senses and quicker movement
than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a swifter flight.
Therefore man's body was not aptly disposed.

Objection 2: Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. But the human body
lacks more than the body of other animals, for these are provided with
covering and natural arms of defense, in which man is lacking.
Therefore the human body is very imperfectly disposed.

Objection 3: Further, man is more distant from plants than he is from
the brutes. But plants are erect in stature, while brutes are prone in
stature. Therefore man should not be of erect stature.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 7:30): "God made man right. "

I answer that, All natural things were produced by the Divine art, and
so may be called God's works of art. Now every artist intends to give
to his work the best disposition; not absolutely the best, but the best
as regards the proposed end; and even if this entails some defect, the
artist cares not: thus, for instance, when man makes himself a saw for
the purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron, which is suitable for the
object in view; and he does not prefer to make it of glass, though this
be a more beautiful material, because this very beauty would be an
obstacle to the end he has in view. Therefore God gave to each natural
being the best disposition; not absolutely so, but in the view of its
proper end. This is what the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 7): "And
because it is better so, not absolutely, but for each one's substance. "

Now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its
operations; since matter is for the sake of the form, and instruments
are for the action of the agent. I say, therefore, that God fashioned
the human body in that disposition which was best, as most suited to
such a form and to such operations. If defect exists in the disposition
of the human body, it is well to observe that such defect arises as a
necessary result of the matter, from the conditions required in the
body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to the soul and its
operations.

Reply to Objection 1: The sense of touch, which is the foundation of
the other senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal; and
for this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all
animals. Moreover man excels all other animals in the interior
sensitive powers, as is clear from what we have said above ([765]Q[78],
A[4]). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals
in some of the exterior senses; thus of all animals he has the least
sense of smell. For man needs the largest brain as compared to the
body; both for his greater freedom of action in the interior powers
required for the intellectual operations, as we have seen above
([766]Q[84], A[7]); and in order that the low temperature of the brain
may modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable in man
for him to be able to stand erect. So that size of the brain, by reason
of its humidity, is an impediment to the smell, which requires dryness.
In the same way, we may suggest a reason why some animals have a keener
sight, and a more acute hearing than man; namely, on account of a
hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the perfect equability
of his temperament. The same reason suffices to explain why some
animals are more rapid in movement than man, since this excellence of
speed is inconsistent with the equability of the human temperament.

Reply to Objection 2: Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some
animals, and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which
are the clothing of animals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly
element; which does not agree with the equability and softness of the
human temperament. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of man.
Instead of these, he has reason and hands whereby he can make himself
arms and clothes, and other necessaries of life, of infinite variety.
Wherefore the hand is called by Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), "the organ
of organs. " Moreover this was more becoming to the rational nature,
which is capable of conceiving an infinite number of things, so as to
make for itself an infinite number of instruments.

Reply to Objection 3: An upright stature was becoming to man for four
reasons. First, because the senses are given to man, not only for the
purpose of procuring the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed
on other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence, whereas
the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as
ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the beauty of
sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as the senses are
situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned to the
ground, as it were for the purpose of seeking food and procuring a
livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that by the
senses, and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and penetrates
further into the differences of things, he may freely survey the
sensible objects around him, both heavenly and earthly, so as to gather
intelligible truth from all things. Secondly, for the greater freedom
of the acts of the interior powers; the brain, wherein these actions
are, in a way, performed, not being low down, but lifted up above other
parts of the body. Thirdly, because if man's stature were prone to the
ground he would need to use his hands as fore-feet; and thus their
utility for other purposes would cease. Fourthly, because if man's
stature were prone to the ground, and he used his hands as fore-feet,
he would be obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth. Thus he
would have a protruding mouth, with thick and hard lips, and also a
hard tongue, so as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things; as we
see in other animals. Moreover, such an attitude would quite hinder
speech, which is reason's proper operation.

Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For
man's superior part, his head, is turned towards the superior part of
the world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior world;
and therefore he is perfectly disposed as to the general situation of
his body. Plants have the superior part turned towards the lower world,
since their roots correspond to the mouth; and their inferior part
towards the upper world. But brute animals have a middle disposition,
for the superior part of the animal is that by which it takes food, and
the inferior part that by which it rids itself of the surplus.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the production of the human body is fittingly described in
Scripture?

Objection 1: It would seem that the production of the human body is not
fittingly described in Scripture. For, as the human body was made by
God, so also were the other works of the six days. But in the other
works it is written, "God said; Let it be made, and it was made. "
Therefore the same should have been said of man.

Objection 2: Further, the human body was made by God immediately, as
explained above [767](A[2]). Therefore it was not fittingly said, "Let
us make man. "

Objection 3: Further, the form of the human body is the soul itself
which is the breath of life. Therefore, having said, "God made man of
the slime of the earth," he should not have added: "And He breathed
into him the breath of life. "

Objection 4: Further, the soul, which is the breath of life, is in the
whole body, and chiefly in the heart. Therefore it was not fittingly
said: "He breathed into his face the breath of life. "

Objection 5: Further, the male and female sex belong to the body, while
the image of God belongs to the soul. But the soul, according to
Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), was made before the body. Therefore
having said: "To His image He made them," he should not have added,
"male and female He created them. "

On the contrary, Is the authority of Scripture.

Reply to Objection 1: As Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12), man
surpasses other things, not in the fact that God Himself made man, as
though He did not make other things; since it is written (Ps. 101:26),
"The work of Thy hands is the heaven," and elsewhere (Ps. 94:5), "His
hands laid down the dry land"; but in this, that man is made to God's
image. Yet in describing man's production, Scripture uses a special way
of speaking, to show that other things were made for man's sake. For we
are accustomed to do with more deliberation and care what we have
chiefly in mind.

Reply to Objection 2: We must not imagine that when God said "Let us
make man," He spoke to the angels, as some were perverse enough to
think. But by these words is signified the plurality of the Divine
Person, Whose image is more clearly expressed in man.

Reply to Objection 3: Some have thought that man's body was formed
first in priority of time, and that afterwards the soul was infused
into the formed body. But it is inconsistent with the perfection of the
production of things, that God should have made either the body without
the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is a part of human
nature. This is especially unfitting as regards the body, for the body
depends on the soul, and not the soul on the body.

To remove the difficulty some have said that the words, "God made man,"
must be understood of the production of the body with the soul; and
that the subsequent words, "and He breathed into his face the breath of
life," should be understood of the Holy Ghost; as the Lord breathed on
His Apostles, saying, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost" (Jn. 20:22). But this
explanation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 24), is excluded by
the very words of Scripture. For we read farther on, "And man was made
a living soul"; which words the Apostle (1 Cor. 15:45) refers not to
spiritual life, but to animal life. Therefore, by breath of life we
must understand the soul, so that the words, "He breathed into his face
the breath of life," are a sort of exposition of what goes before; for
the soul is the form of the body.

Reply to Objection 4: Since vital operations are more clearly seen in
man's face, on account of the senses which are there expressed;
therefore Scripture says that the breath of life was breathed into
man's face.

Reply to Objection 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34), the
works of the six days were done all at one time; wherefore according to
him man's soul, which he holds to have been made with the angels, was
not made before the sixth day; but on the sixth day both the soul of
the first man was made actually, and his body in its causal elements.
But other doctors hold that on the sixth day both body and soul of man
were actually made.
__________________________________________________________________

THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must next consider the production of the woman. Under this head
there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the woman should have been made in that first production of
things?

(2) Whether the woman should have been made from man?

(3) Whether of man's rib?

(4) Whether the woman was made immediately by God?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the woman should have been made in the first production of things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been made in
the first production of things. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii,
3), that "the female is a misbegotten male. " But nothing misbegotten or
defective should have been in the first production of things. Therefore
woman should not have been made at that first production.

Objection 2: Further, subjection and limitation were a result of sin,
for to the woman was it said after sin (Gn. 3:16): "Thou shalt be under
the man's power"; and Gregory says that, "Where there is no sin, there
is no inequality. " But woman is naturally of less strength and dignity
than man; "for the agent is always more honorable than the patient," as
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore woman should not have
been made in the first production of things before sin.

Objection 3: Further, occasions of sin should be cut off. But God
foresaw that the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. Therefore He
should not have made woman.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:18): "It is not good for man to
be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself. "

I answer that, It was necessary for woman to be made, as the Scripture
says, as a "helper" to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works,
as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in
other works; but as a helper in the work of generation. This can be
made clear if we observe the mode of generation carried out in various
living things. Some living things do not possess in themselves the
power of generation, but are generated by some other specific agent,
such as some plants and animals by the influence of the heavenly
bodies, from some fitting matter and not from seed: others possess the
active and passive generative power together; as we see in plants which
are generated from seed; for the noblest vital function in plants is
generation. Wherefore we observe that in these the active power of
generation invariably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect
animals the active power of generation belongs to the male sex, and the
passive power to the female. And as among animals there is a vital
operation nobler than generation, to which their life is principally
directed; therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with
the female in perfect animals, but only at the time of coition; so that
we may consider that by this means the male and female are one, as in
plants they are always united; although in some cases one of them
preponderates, and in some the other. But man is yet further ordered to
a still nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation.
Therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two
forces in man; so that the female should be produced separately from
the male; although they are carnally united for generation. Therefore
directly after the formation of woman, it was said: "And they shall be
two in one flesh" (Gn. 2:24).

Reply to Objection 1: As regards the individual nature, woman is
defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends
to the production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the
production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from some
material indisposition, or even from some external influence; such as
that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher observes (De
Gener. Animal. iv, 2). On the other hand, as regards human nature in
general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature's
intention as directed to the work of generation. Now the general
intention of nature depends on God, Who is the universal Author of
nature. Therefore, in producing nature, God formed not only the male
but also the female.

Reply to Objection 2: Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by virtue
of which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and
this kind of subjection began after sin. There is another kind of
subjection which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior
makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this kind
of subjection existed even before sin. For good order would have been
wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others wiser
than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally
subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason predominates.
Nor is inequality among men excluded by the state of innocence, as we
shall prove ([768]Q[96], A[3]).

Reply to Objection 3: If God had deprived the world of all those things
which proved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been
imperfect. Nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in
order that individual evil might be avoided; especially as God is so
powerful that He can direct any evil to a good end.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether woman should have been made from man?

Objection 1: It would seem that woman should not have been made from
man. For sex belongs both to man and animals. But in the other animals
the female was not made from the male. Therefore neither should it have
been so with man.

Objection 2: Further, things of the same species are of the same
matter. But male and female are of the same species. Therefore, as man
was made of the slime of the earth, so woman should have been made of
the same, and not from man.

Objection 3: Further, woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the
work of generation. But close relationship makes a person unfit for
that office; hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage, as
is written (Lev. 18:6). Therefore woman should not have been made from
man.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. 17:5): "He created of him,"
that is, out of man, "a helpmate like to himself," that is, woman.

I answer that, When all things were first formed, it was more suitable
for the woman to be made from man that (for the female to be from the
male) in other animals. First, in order thus to give the first man a
certain dignity consisting in this, that as God is the principle of the
whole universe, so the first man, in likeness to God, was the principle
of the whole human race. Wherefore Paul says that "God made the whole
human race from one" (Acts 17:26). Secondly, that man might love woman
all the more, and cleave to her more closely, knowing her to be
fashioned from himself. Hence it is written (Gn. 2:23,24): "She was
taken out of man, wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and
shall cleave to his wife. " This was most necessary as regards the human
race, in which the male and female live together for life; which is not
the case with other animals. Thirdly, because, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. viii, 12), the human male and female are united, not only for
generation, as with other animals, but also for the purpose of domestic
life, in which each has his or her particular duty, and in which the
man is the head of the woman. Wherefore it was suitable for the woman
to be made out of man, as out of her principle. Fourthly, there is a
sacramental reason for this. For by this is signified that the Church
takes her origin from Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 5:32):
"This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church. "

Reply OBJ 1 is clear from the foregoing.

Reply to Objection 2: Matter is that from which something is made. Now
created nature has a determinate principle; and since it is determined
to one thing, it has also a determinate mode of proceeding. Wherefore
from determinate matter it produces something in a determinate species.
On the other hand, the Divine Power, being infinite, can produce things
of the same species out of any matter, such as a man from the slime of
the earth, and a woman from out of man.

Reply to Objection 3: A certain affinity arises from natural
generation, and this is an impediment to matrimony. Woman, however, was
not produced from man by natural generation, but by the Divine Power
alone. Wherefore Eve is not called the daughter of Adam; and so this
argument does not prove.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the woman was fittingly made from the rib of man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been formed
from the rib of man. For the rib was much smaller than the woman's
body. Now from a smaller thing a larger thing can be made only---either
by addition (and then the woman ought to have been described as made
out of that which was added, rather than out of the rib itself)---or by
rarefaction, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x): "A body
cannot increase in bulk except by rarefaction. " But the woman's body is
not more rarefied than man's---at least, not in the proportion of a rib
to Eve's body. Therefore Eve was not formed from a rib of Adam.

Objection 2: Further, in those things which were first created there
was nothing superfluous.
Therefore a rib of Adam belonged to the
integrity of his body. So, if a rib was removed, his body remained
imperfect; which is unreasonable to suppose.

Objection 3: Further, a rib cannot be removed from man without pain.
But there was no pain before sin. Therefore it was not right for a rib
to be taken from the man, that Eve might be made from it.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 2:22): "God built the rib, which He
took from Adam, into a woman. "

I answer that, It was right for the woman to be made from a rib of man.
First, to signify the social union of man and woman, for the woman
should neither "use authority over man," and so she was not made from
his head; nor was it right for her to be subject to man's contempt as
his slave, and so she was not made from his feet. Secondly, for the
sacramental signification; for from the side of Christ sleeping on the
Cross the Sacraments flowed---namely, blood and water---on which the
Church was established.

Reply to Objection 1: Some say that the woman's body was formed by a
material increase, without anything being added; in the same way as our
Lord multiplied the five loaves. But this is quite impossible. For such
an increase of matter would either be by a change of the very substance
of the matter itself, or by a change of its dimensions. Not by change
of the substance of the matter, both because matter, considered in
itself, is quite unchangeable, since it has a potential existence, and
has nothing but the nature of a subject, and because quantity and size
are extraneous to the essence of matter itself. Wherefore
multiplication of matter is quite unintelligible, as long as the matter
itself remains the same without anything added to it; unless it
receives greater dimensions. This implies rarefaction, which is for the
same matter to receive greater dimensions, as the Philosopher says
(Phys. iv). To say, therefore, that the same matter is enlarged,
without being rarefied, is to combine contradictories ---viz. the
definition with the absence of the thing defined.

Wherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such multiplication of
matter, we must admit an addition of matter: either by creation, or
which is more probable, by conversion. Hence Augustine says (Tract.
xxiv in Joan. ) that "Christ filled five thousand men with five loaves,
in the same way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest of
corn"---that is, by transformation of the nourishment. Nevertheless, we
say that the crowds were fed with five loaves, or that woman was made
from the rib, because an addition was made to the already existing
matter of the loaves and of the rib.

Reply to Objection 2: The rib belonged to the integral perfection of
Adam, not as an individual, but as the principle of the human race;
just as the semen belongs to the perfection of the begetter, and is
released by a natural and pleasurable operation. Much more, therefore,
was it possible that by the Divine power the body of the woman should
be produced from the man's rib.

From this it is clear how to answer the third objection.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the woman was formed immediately by God?

Objection 1: It would seem that the woman was not formed immediately by
God. For no individual is produced immediately by God from another
individual alike in species. But the woman was made from a man who is
of the same species. Therefore she was not made immediately by God.

Objection 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) says that corporeal
things are governed by God through the angels. But the woman's body was
formed from corporeal matter. Therefore it was made through the
ministry of the angels, and not immediately by God.

Objection 3: Further, those things which pre-exist in creatures as to
their causal virtues are produced by the power of some creature, and
not immediately by God. But the woman's body was produced in its causal
virtues among the first created works, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
ix, 15). Therefore it was not produced immediately by God.

On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same work: "God alone, to Whom
all nature owes its existence, could form or build up the woman from
the man's rib. "

I answer that, As was said above (A[2], ad 2), the natural generation
of every species is from some determinate matter. Now the matter whence
man is naturally begotten is the human semen of man or woman. Wherefore
from any other matter an individual of the human species cannot
naturally be generated. Now God alone, the Author of nature, can
produce an effect into existence outside the ordinary course of nature.
Therefore God alone could produce either a man from the slime of the
earth, or a woman from the rib of man.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument is verified when an individual is
begotten, by natural generation, from that which is like it in the same
species.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15), we do
not know whether the angels were employed by God in the formation of
the woman; but it is certain that, as the body of man was not formed by
the angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body of the
woman formed by them from the man's rib.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 18): "The
first creation of things did not demand that woman should be made thus;
it made it possible for her to be thus made. " Therefore the body of the
woman did indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues, in the things first
created; not as regards active potentiality, but as regards a
potentiality passive in relation to the active potentiality of the
Creator.
__________________________________________________________________

THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN (NINE ARTICLES)

We now treat of the end or term of man's production, inasmuch as he is
said to be made "to the image and likeness of God. " There are under
this head nine points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the image of God is in man?

(2) Whether the image of God is in irrational creatures?

(3) Whether the image of God is in the angels more than in man?

(4) Whether the image of God is in every man?

(5) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with the Essence,
or with all the Divine Persons, or with one of them?

(6) Whether the image of God is in man, as to his mind only?

(7) Whether the image of God is in man's power or in his habits and
acts?

(8) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with every object?

(9) Of the difference between "image" and "likeness. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the image of God is in man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not in man. For it
is written (Is. 40:18): "To whom have you likened God? or what image
will you make for Him? "

Objection 2: Further, to be the image of God is the property of the
First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says (Col. 1:15): "Who is the image
of the invisible God, the First-Born of every creature. " Therefore the
image of God is not to be found in man.

Objection 3: Further, Hilary says (De Synod [*Super i can. Synod.
Ancyr. ]) that "an image is of the same species as that which it
represents"; and he also says that "an image is the undivided and
united likeness of one thing adequately representing another. " But
there is no species common to both God and man; nor can there be a
comparison of equality between God and man. Therefore there can be no
image of God in man.

On the contrary, It is written (Gn. 1:26): "Let Us make man to Our own
image and likeness. "

I answer that, As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where an image
exists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness, there
is not necessarily an image. " Hence it is clear that likeness is
essential to an image; and that an image adds something to
likeness---namely, that it is copied from something else. For an
"image" is so called because it is produced as an imitation of
something else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like and
equal to another egg, is not called an image of the other egg, because
it is not copied from it.

But equality does not belong to the essence of an image; for as
Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where there is an image there is not
necessarily equality," as we see in a person's image reflected in a
glass. Yet this is of the essence of a perfect image; for in a perfect
image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a
copy. Now it is manifest that in man there is some likeness to God,
copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of
equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy. Therefore
there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect likeness, but
imperfect. And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was
made "to" God's likeness; for the preposition "to" signifies a certain
approach, as of something at a distance.

Reply to Objection 1: The Prophet speaks of bodily images made by man.
Therefore he says pointedly: "What image will you make for Him? " But
God made a spiritual image to Himself in man.

Reply to Objection 2: The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image
of God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so He
is said to be the "Image," and never "to the image. " But man is said to
be both "image" by reason of the likeness; and "to the image" by reason
of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect likeness to God cannot
be except in an identical nature, the Image of God exists in His
first-born Son; as the image of the king is in his son, who is of the
same nature as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature,
as the image of the king is in a silver coin, as Augustine says
explains in De decem Chordis (Serm. ix, al, xcvi, De Tempore).

Reply to Objection 3: As unity means absence of division, a species is
said to be the same as far as it is one. Now a thing is said to be one
not only numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according
to a certain analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature is one
with God, or like to Him; but when Hilary says "of a thing which
adequately represents another," this is to be understood of a perfect
image.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is to be found in
irrational creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Effects are
contingent images of their causes. " But God is the cause not only of
rational, but also of irrational creatures. Therefore the image of God
is to be found in irrational creatures.

Objection 2: Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it
approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
that "the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine
goodness. " Therefore it is made to the image of God.

Objection 3: Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the
more it is like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness
than man; for though each individual thing is good, all things together
are called "very good" (Gn. 1:31). Therefore the whole universe is to
the image of God, and not only man.

Objection 4: Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says of God: "Holding
the world in His mind, and forming it into His image. " Therefore the
whole world is to the image of God, and not only the rational creature.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12): "Man's
excellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by
giving him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of
the field. " Therefore things without intellect are not made to God's
image.

I answer that, Not every likeness, not even what is copied from
something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be
only generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does
not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a
worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man's image,
merely because of the generic likeness. Nor, if anything is made white
like something else, can we say that it is the image of that thing; for
whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature of
an image requires likeness in species; thus the image of the king
exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and chiefly
in the shape; thus, we speak of a man's image in copper. Whence Hilary
says pointedly that "an image is of the same species. "

Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate
difference. But some things are like to God first and most commonly
because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because
they know or understand; and these last, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu.
51) "approach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures
nothing comes nearer to Him. " It is clear, therefore, that intellectual
creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's image.

Reply to Objection 1: Everything imperfect is a participation of what
is perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image,
so far as it possesses any sort of likeness to God, participates in
some degree the nature of an image. So Dionysius says that effects are
"contingent images of their causes"; that is, as much as they happen
[contingit] to be so, but not absolutely.

Reply to Objection 2: Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine
goodness, as regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity
which is involved in the idea of an image.

Reply to Objection 3: The universe is more perfect in goodness than the
intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but
intensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is
found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the
highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided
against the whole, but only against another part. Wherefore, when we
say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of God, we do
not mean that the universe in any part is not to God's image, but that
the other parts are excluded.

Reply to Objection 4: Boethius here uses the word "image" to express
the likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species
in the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the
exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using
the word "image" in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in nature,
that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to the First Being;
as living, like to the First Life; and as intelligent, like to the
Supreme Wisdom.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the angels are more to the image of God than man is?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not more to the image of
God than man is. For Augustine says in a sermon de Imagine xliii (de
verbis Apost. xxvii) that God granted to no other creature besides man
to be to His image. Therefore it is not true to say that the angels are
more than man to the image of God.

Objection 2: Further, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 51), "man is
so much to God's image that God did not make any creature to be between
Him and man: and therefore nothing is more akin to Him. " But a creature
is called God's image so far as it is akin to God. Therefore the angels
are not more to the image of God than man.

Objection 3: Further, a creature is said to be to God's image so far as
it is of an intellectual nature. But the intellectual nature does not
admit of intensity or remissness; for it is not an accidental thing,
since it is a substance. Therefore the angels are not more to the image
of God than man.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv): "The angel is
called a "seal of resemblance" [Ezech. 28:12] because in him the
resemblance of the Divine image is wrought with greater expression. "

I answer that, We may speak of God's image in two ways. First, we may
consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is, the
intellectual nature. Thus the image of God is more perfect in the
angels than in man, because their intellectual nature is more perfect,
as is clear from what has been said ([769]Q[58], A[3]; [770]Q[79],
A[8]). Secondly, we may consider the image of God in man as regards its
accidental qualities, so far as to observe in man a certain imitation
of God, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as God from
God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole
body, as God from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul
is in the whole body, and again, in every part, as God is in regard to
the whole world. In these and the like things the image of God is more
perfect in man than it is in the angels. But these do not of themselves
belong to the nature of the Divine image in man, unless we presuppose
the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature; otherwise even
brute animals would be to God's image. Therefore, as in their
intellectual nature, the angels are more to the image of God than man
is, we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the angels are more to the
image of God than man is, but that in some respects man is more like to
God.

Reply to Objection 1: Augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft
of reason from the image of God; but not the angels.

Reply to Objection 2: As fire is said to be specifically the most
subtle of bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is more subtle
than another; so we say that nothing is more like to God than the human
soul in its generic and intellectual nature, because as Augustine had
said previously, "things which have knowledge, are so near to Him in
likeness that of all creatures none are nearer. " Wherefore this does
not mean that the angels are not more to God's image.

Reply to Objection 3: When we say that substance does not admit of more
or less, we do not mean that one species of substance is not more
perfect than another; but that one and the same individual does not
participate in its specific nature at one time more than at another;
nor do we mean that a species of substance is shared among different
individuals in a greater or lesser degree.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the image of God is found in every man?

Objection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not found in every
man. For the Apostle says that "man is the image of God, but woman is
the image [Vulg. glory] of man" (1 Cor. 11:7). Therefore, as woman is
an individual of the human species, it is clear that every individual
is not an image of God.

Objection 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:29): "Whom God foreknew,
He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son. "
But all men are not predestined. Therefore all men have not the
conformity of image.

Objection 3: Further, likeness belongs to the nature of the image, as
above explained [771](A[1]). But by sin man becomes unlike God.
Therefore he loses the image of God.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. 38:7): "Surely man passeth as an
image. "

I answer that, Since man is said to be the image of God by reason of
his intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God according to
that in which he can best imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now
the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God
understands and loves Himself. Wherefore we see that the image of God
is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man possesses a natural
aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists
in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. Secondly,
inasmuch as man actually and habitually knows and loves God, though
imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace.
Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and loves God perfectly; and this image
consists in the likeness of glory. Wherefore on the words, "The light
of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us" (Ps. 4:7), the gloss
distinguishes a threefold image of "creation," of "re-creation," and of
"likeness. " The first is found in all men, the second only in the just,
the third only in the blessed.

Reply to Objection 1: The image of God, in its principal signification,
namely the intellectual nature, is found both in man and in woman.
Hence after the words, "To the image of God He created him," it is
added, "Male and female He created them" (Gn. 1:27).