No More Learning

Our method of discovering the sciences is such as to leave little to
the acuteness and strength of wit, and indeed rather to level wit and
intellect. For as in the drawing of a straight line, or accurate circle
by the hand, much depends on its steadiness and practice, but if a
ruler or compass be employed there is little occasion for either; so
it is with our method. Although, however, we enter into no individual
confutations, yet a little must be said, first, of the sects and
general divisions of these species of theories; secondly, something
further to show that there are external signs of their weakness; and,
lastly, we must consider the causes of so great a misfortune, and so
long and general a unanimity in error, that we may thus render the
access to truth less difficult, and that the human understanding may
the more readily be purified, and brought to dismiss its idols.

LXII. The idols of the theatre, or of theories, are numerous, and may,
and perhaps will, be still more so. For unless men’s minds had been now
occupied for many ages in religious and theological considerations, and
civil governments (especially monarchies), had been averse to novelties
of that nature even in theory (so that men must apply to them with some
risk and injury to their own fortunes, and not only without reward,
but subject to contumely and envy), there is no doubt that many other
sects of philosophers and theorists would have been introduced, like
those which formerly flourished in such diversified abundance among the
Greeks. For as many imaginary theories of the heavens can be deduced
from the phenomena of the sky, so it is even more easy to found many
dogmas upon the phenomena of philosophy--and the plot of this our
theatre resembles those of the poetical, where the plots which are
invented for the stage are more consistent, elegant, and pleasurable
than those taken from real history.

In general, men take for the groundwork of their philosophy either
too much from a few topics, or too little from many; in either case
their philosophy is founded on too narrow a basis of experiment and
natural history, and decides on too scanty grounds. For the theoretic
philosopher seizes various common circumstances by experiment, without
reducing them to certainty or examining and frequently considering
them, and relies for the rest upon meditation and the activity of his
wit.

There are other philosophers who have diligently and accurately
attended to a few experiments, and have thence presumed to deduce and
invent systems of philosophy, forming everything to conformity with
them.

A third set, from their faith and religious veneration, introduce
theology and traditions; the absurdity of some among them having
proceeded so far as to seek and derive the sciences from spirits and
genii. There are, therefore, three sources of error and three species
of false philosophy; the sophistic, empiric, and superstitious.

LXIII. Aristotle affords the most eminent instance of the first; for
he corrupted natural philosophy by logic--thus he formed the world of
categories, assigned to the human soul, the noblest of substances, a
genus determined by words of secondary operation, treated of density
and rarity (by which bodies occupy a greater or lesser space), by the
frigid distinctions of action and power, asserted that there was a
peculiar and proper motion in all bodies, and that if they shared
in any other motion, it was owing to an external moving cause, and
imposed innumerable arbitrary distinctions upon the nature of things;
being everywhere more anxious as to definitions in teaching and the
accuracy of the wording of his propositions, than the internal truth
of things. And this is best shown by a comparison of his philosophy
with the others of greatest repute among the Greeks. For the similar
parts of Anaxagoras, the atoms of Leucippus and Democritus, the heaven
and earth of Parmenides, the discord and concord of Empedocles,[26]
the resolution of bodies into the common nature of fire, and their
condensation according to Heraclitus, exhibit some sprinkling of
natural philosophy, the nature of things, and experiment; while
Aristotle’s physics are mere logical terms, and he remodelled the
same subject in his metaphysics under a more imposing title, and more
as a realist than a nominalist. Nor is much stress to be laid on his
frequent recourse to experiment in his books on animals, his problems,
and other treatises; for he had already decided, without having
properly consulted experience as the basis of his decisions and axioms,
and after having so decided, he drags experiment along as a captive
constrained to accommodate herself to his decisions: so that he is even
more to be blamed than his modern followers (of the scholastic school)
who have deserted her altogether.

LXIV. The empiric school produces dogmas of a more deformed and
monstrous nature than the sophistic or theoretic school; not being
founded in the light of common notions (which, however poor and
superstitious, is yet in a manner universal, and of a general
tendency), but in the confined obscurity of a few experiments. Hence
this species of philosophy appears probable, and almost certain to
those who are daily practiced in such experiments, and have thus
corrupted their imagination, but incredible and futile to others. We
have a strong instance of this in the alchemists and their dogmas; it
would be difficult to find another in this age, unless perhaps in the
philosophy of Gilbert. [27] We could not, however, neglect to caution
others against this school, because we already foresee and augur, that
if men be hereafter induced by our exhortations to apply seriously
to experiments (bidding farewell to the sophistic doctrines), there
will then be imminent danger from empirics, owing to the premature
and forward haste of the understanding, and its jumping or flying to
generalities and the principles of things. We ought, therefore, already
to meet the evil.

LXV. The corruption of philosophy by the mixing of it up with
superstition and theology, is of a much wider extent, and is
most injurious to it both as a whole and in parts. For the human
understanding is no less exposed to the impressions of fancy, than to
those of vulgar notions. The disputatious and sophistic school entraps
the understanding, while the fanciful, bombastic, and, as it were,
poetical school, rather flatters it.

There is a clear example of this among the Greeks, especially in
Pythagoras, where, however, the superstition is coarse and overcharged,
but it is more dangerous and refined in Plato and his school. This
evil is found also in some branches of other systems of philosophy,
where it introduces abstracted forms, final and first causes, omitting
frequently the intermediate and the like. Against it we must use the
greatest caution; for the apotheosis of error is the greatest evil
of all, and when folly is worshipped, it is, as it were, a plague
spot upon the understanding. Yet some of the moderns have indulged
this folly with such consummate inconsiderateness, that they have
endeavored to build a system of natural philosophy on the first chapter
of Genesis, the book of Job, and other parts of Scripture; seeking
thus the dead among the living. [28] And this folly is the more to be
prevented and restrained, because not only fantastical philosophy, but
heretical religion spring from the absurd mixture of matters divine
and human. It is therefore most wise soberly to render unto faith the
things that are faith’s.

LXVI. Having spoken of the vicious authority of the systems founded
either on vulgar notions, or on a few experiments, or on superstition,
we must now consider the faulty subjects for contemplation, especially
in natural philosophy. The human understanding is perverted by
observing the power of mechanical arts, in which bodies are very
materially changed by composition or separation, and is induced to
suppose that something similar takes place in the universal nature
of things. Hence the fiction of elements, and their co-operation in
forming natural bodies. [29] Again, when man reflects upon the entire
liberty of nature, he meets with particular species of things, as
animals, plants, minerals, and is thence easily led to imagine that
there exist in nature certain primary forms which she strives to
produce, and that all variation from them arises from some impediment
or error which she is exposed to in completing her work, or from the
collision or metamorphosis of different species. The first hypothesis
has produced the doctrine of elementary properties, the second that
of occult properties and specific powers; and both lead to trifling
courses of reflection, in which the mind acquiesces, and is thus
diverted from more important subjects. But physicians exercise a much
more useful labor in the consideration of the secondary qualities of
things, and the operations of attraction, repulsion, attenuation,
inspissation, dilatation, astringency, separation, maturation, and the
like; and would do still more if they would not corrupt these proper
observations by the two systems I have alluded to, of elementary
qualities and specific powers, by which they either reduce the
secondary to first qualities, and their subtile and immeasurable
composition, or at any rate neglect to advance by greater and
more diligent observation to the third and fourth qualities, thus
terminating their contemplation prematurely. Nor are these powers (or
the like) to be investigated only among the medicines for the human
body, but also in all changes of other natural bodies.

A greater evil arises from the contemplation and investigation rather
of the stationary principles of things from which, than of the active
by which things themselves are created. For the former only serve for
discussion, the latter for practice. Nor is any value to be set on
those common differences of motion which are observed in the received
system of natural philosophy, as generation, corruption, augmentation,
diminution, alteration, and translation. For this is their meaning:
if a body, unchanged in other respects, is moved from its place, this
is translation; if the place and species be given, but the quantity
changed, it is alteration; but if, from such a change, the mass and
quantity of the body do not continue the same, this is the motion
of augmentation and diminution; if the change be continued so as to
vary the species and substance, and transfuse them to others, this is
generation and corruption. All this is merely popular, and by no means
penetrates into nature; and these are but the measures and bounds of
motion, and not different species of it; they merely suggest how far,
and not how or whence. For they exhibit neither the affections of
bodies nor the process of their parts, but merely establish a division
of that motion, which coarsely exhibits to the senses matter in its
varied form. Even when they wish to point out something relative to
the causes of motion, and to establish a division of them, they most
absurdly introduce natural and violent motion, which is also a popular
notion, since every violent motion is also in fact natural, that is to
say, the external efficient puts nature in action in a different manner
to that which she had previously employed.

But if, neglecting these, any one were, for instance, to observe
that there is in bodies a tendency of adhesion, so as not to suffer
the unity of nature to be completely separated or broken, and a
_vacuum_[30] to be formed, or that they have a tendency to return to
their natural dimensions or tension, so that, if compressed or extended
within or beyond it, they immediately strive to recover themselves, and
resume their former volume and extent; or that they have a tendency to
congregate into masses with similar bodies--the dense, for instance,
toward the circumference of the earth, the thin and rare toward that of
the heavens. These and the like are true physical genera of motions,
but the others are clearly logical and scholastic, as appears plainly
from a comparison of the two.

Another considerable evil is, that men in their systems and
contemplations bestow their labor upon the investigation and discussion
of the principles of things and the extreme limits of nature, although
all utility and means of action consist in the intermediate objects.
Hence men cease not to abstract nature till they arrive at potential
and shapeless matter,[31] and still persist in their dissection, till
they arrive at atoms; and yet were all this true, it would be of little
use to advance man’s estate.

LXVII. The understanding must also be cautioned against the
intemperance of systems, so far as regards its giving or withholding
its assent; for such intemperance appears to fix and perpetuate idols,
so as to leave no means of removing them.

These excesses are of two kinds. The first is seen in those who
decide hastily, and render the sciences positive and dictatorial. The
other in those who have introduced scepticism, and vague unbounded
inquiry. The former subdues, the latter enervates the understanding.
The Aristotelian philosophy, after destroying other systems (as the
Ottomans[32] do their brethren) by its disputatious confutations,
decided upon everything, and Aristotle himself then raises up questions
at will, in order to settle them; so that everything should be certain
and decided, a method now in use among his successors.

The school of Plato introduced scepticism, first, as it were in joke
and irony, from their dislike to Protagoras, Hippias,[33] and others,
who were ashamed of appearing not to doubt upon any subject. But the
new academy dogmatized in their scepticism, and held it as their tenet.
Although this method be more honest than arbitrary decision (for its
followers allege that they by no means confound all inquiry, like
Pyrrho and his disciples, but hold doctrines which they can follow as
probable, though they cannot maintain them to be true), yet when the
human mind has once despaired of discovering truth, everything begins
to languish. Hence men turn aside into pleasant controversies and
discussions, and into a sort of wandering over subjects rather than
sustain any rigorous investigation. But as we observed at first, we
are not to deny the authority of the human senses and understanding,
although weak, but rather to furnish them with assistance.

LXVIII. We have now treated of each kind of idols, and their qualities,
all of which must be abjured and renounced with firm and solemn
resolution, and the understanding must be completely freed and cleared
of them, so that the access to the kingdom of man, which is founded
on the sciences, may resemble that to the kingdom of heaven, where no
admission is conceded except to children.

LXIX. Vicious demonstrations are the muniments and support of idols,
and those which we possess in logic, merely subject and enslave the
world to human thoughts, and thoughts to words. But demonstrations
are in some manner themselves systems of philosophy and science; for
such as they are, and accordingly as they are regularly or improperly
established, such will be the resulting systems of philosophy and
contemplation. But those which we employ in the whole process leading
from the senses and things to axioms and conclusions, are fallacious
and incompetent. This process is fourfold, and the errors are in equal
number. In the first place the impressions of the senses are erroneous,
for they fail and deceive us. We must supply defects by substitutions,
and fallacies by their correction. Secondly, notions are improperly
abstracted from the senses, and indeterminate and confused when they
ought to be the reverse. Thirdly, the induction that is employed is
improper, for it determines the principles of sciences by simple
enumeration,[34] without adopting exclusions and resolutions, or just
separations of nature. Lastly, the usual method of discovery and proof,
by first establishing the most general propositions, then applying and
proving the intermediate axioms according to them, is the parent of
error and the calamity of every science. But we will treat more fully
of that which we now slightly touch upon, when we come to lay down the
true way of interpreting nature, after having gone through the above
expiatory process and purification of the mind.

LXX. But experience is by far the best demonstration, provided it
adhere to the experiment actually made, for if that experiment be
transferred to other subjects apparently similar, unless with proper
and methodical caution it becomes fallacious. The present method of
experiment is blind and stupid; hence men wandering and roaming without
any determined course, and consulting mere chance, are hurried about
to various points, and advance but little--at one time they are happy,
at another their attention is distracted, and they always find that
they want something further. Men generally make their experiments
carelessly, and as it were in sport, making some little variation
in a known experiment, and then if they fail they become disgusted
and give up the attempt; nay, if they set to work more seriously,
steadily, and assiduously, yet they waste all their time on probing
some solitary matter, as Gilbert on the magnet, and the alchemists on
gold. But such conduct shows their method to be no less unskilful than
mean; for nobody can successfully investigate the nature of any object
by considering that object alone; the inquiry must be more generally
extended.

Even when men build any science and theory upon experiment, yet they
almost always turn with premature and hasty zeal to practice, not
merely on account of the advantage and benefit to be derived from
it, but in order to seize upon some security in a new undertaking of
their not employing the remainder of their labor unprofitably, and by
making themselves conspicuous, to acquire a greater name for their
pursuit. Hence, like Atalanta, they leave the course to pick up the
golden apple, interrupting their speed, and giving up the victory. But
in the true course of experiment, and in extending it to new effects,
we should imitate the Divine foresight and order; for God on the first
day only created light, and assigned a whole day to that work without
creating any material substance thereon. In like manner we must first,
by every kind of experiment, elicit the discovery of causes and true
axioms, and seek for experiments which may afford light rather than
profit. Axioms, when rightly investigated and established, prepare
us not for a limited but abundant practice, and bring in their train
whole troops of effects. But we will treat hereafter of the ways of
experience, which are not less beset and interrupted than those of
judgment; having spoken at present of common experience only as a
bad species of demonstration, the order of our subject now requires
some mention of those external signs of the weakness in practice of
the received systems of philosophy and contemplation[35] which we
referred to above, and of the causes of a circumstance at first sight
so wonderful and incredible. For the knowledge of these external
signs prepares the way for assent, and the explanation of the causes
removes the wonder; and these two circumstances are of material use in
extirpating more easily and gently the idols from the understanding.

LXXI. The sciences we possess have been principally derived from
the Greeks; for the addition of the Roman, Arabic, or more modern
writers, are but few and of small importance, and such as they are,
are founded on the basis of Greek invention. But the wisdom of the
Greeks was professional and disputatious, and thus most adverse to
the investigation of truth. The name, therefore, of sophists, which
the contemptuous spirit of those who deemed themselves philosophers,
rejected and transferred to the rhetoricians--Gorgias,[36]
Protagoras, Hippias, Polus--might well suit the whole tribe, such
as Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, Epicurus, Theophrastus, and their
successors--Chrysippus, Carneades, and the rest. There was only
this difference between them--the former were mercenary vagabonds,
travelling about to different states, making a show of their wisdom,
and requiring pay; the latter more dignified and noble, in possession
of fixed habitations, opening schools, and teaching philosophy
gratuitously. Both, however (though differing in other respects), were
professorial, and reduced every subject to controversy, establishing
and defending certain sects and dogmas of philosophy, so that their
doctrines were nearly (what Dionysius not unaptly objected to Plato)
the talk of idle old men to ignorant youths. But the more ancient
Greeks, as Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, Democritus, Parmenides,
Heraclitus, Xenophanes, Philolaus, and the rest[37] (for I omit
Pythagoras as being superstitious), did not (that we are aware) open
schools, but betook themselves to the investigation of truth with
greater silence and with more severity and simplicity, that is, with
less affectation and ostentation. Hence in our opinion they acted
more advisedly, however their works may have been eclipsed in course
of time by those lighter productions which better correspond with
and please the apprehensions and passions of the vulgar; for time,
like a river,[38] bears down to us that which is light and inflated,
and sinks that which is heavy and solid. Nor were even these more
ancient philosophers free from the national defect, but inclined too
much to the ambition and vanity of forming a sect, and captivating
public opinion, and we must despair of any inquiry after truth when it
condescends to such trifles. Nor must we omit the opinion, or rather
prophecy, of an Egyptian priest with regard to the Greeks, that they
would forever remain children, without any antiquity of knowledge or
knowledge of antiquity; for they certainly have this in common with
children, that they are prone to talking, and incapable of generation,
their wisdom being loquacious and unproductive of effects. Hence the
external signs derived from the origin and birthplace of our present
philosophy are not favorable.

LXXII. Nor are those much better which can be deduced from the
character of the time and age, than the former from that of the country
and nation; for in that age the knowledge both of time and of the world
was confined and meagre, which is one of the worst evils for those who
rely entirely on experience--they had not a thousand years of history
worthy of that name, but mere fables and ancient traditions; they were
acquainted with but a small portion of the regions and countries of the
world, for they indiscriminately called all nations situated far toward
the north Scythians, all those to the west Celts; they knew nothing of
Africa but the nearest part of Ethiopia, or of Asia beyond the Ganges,
and had not even heard any sure and clear tradition of the regions of
the New World. Besides, a vast number of climates and zones, in which
innumerable nations live and breathe, were pronounced by them to be
uninhabitable; nay, the travels of Democritus, Plato, and Pythagoras,
which were not extensive, but rather mere excursions from home, were
considered as something vast. But in our times many parts of the New
World, and every extremity of the Old, are well known, and the mass of
experiments has been infinitely increased; wherefore, if external signs
were to be taken from the time of the nativity or procreation (as in
astrology), nothing extraordinary could be predicted of these early
systems of philosophy.

LXXIII. Of all signs there is none more certain or worthy than that
of the fruits produced, for the fruits and effects are the sureties
and vouchers, as it were, for the truth of philosophy. Now, from the
systems of the Greeks, and their subordinate divisions in particular
branches of the sciences during so long a period, scarcely one single
experiment can be culled that has a tendency to elevate or assist
mankind, and can be fairly set down to the speculations and doctrines
of their philosophy. Celsus candidly and wisely confesses as much,
when he observes that experiments were first discovered in medicine,
and that men afterward built their philosophical systems upon them,
and searched for and assigned causes, instead of the inverse method of
discovering and deriving experiments from philosophy and the knowledge
of causes; it is not, therefore, wonderful that the Egyptians (who
bestowed divinity and sacred honors on the authors of new inventions)
should have consecrated more images of brutes than of men, for the
brutes by their natural instinct made many discoveries, while men
derived but few from discussion and the conclusions of reason.

The industry of the alchemists has produced some effect, by chance,
however, and casualty, or from varying their experiments (as mechanics
also do), and not from any regular art or theory, the theory they have
imagined rather tending to disturb than to assist experiment. Those,
too, who have occupied themselves with natural magic (as they term it)
have made but few discoveries, and those of small import, and bordering
on imposture; for which reason, in the same manner as we are cautioned
by religion to show our faith by our works, we may very properly apply
the principle to philosophy, and judge of it by its works, accounting
that to be futile which is unproductive, and still more so if, instead
of grapes and olives, it yield but the thistle and thorns of dispute
and contention.

LXXIV. Other signs may be selected from the increase and progress of
particular systems of philosophy and the sciences; for those which are
founded on nature grow and increase, while those which are founded
on opinion change and increase not. If, therefore, the theories we
have mentioned were not like plants, torn up by the roots, but grew
in the womb of nature, and were nourished by her, that which for the
last two thousand years has taken place would never have happened,
namely, that the sciences still continue in their beaten track, and
nearly stationary, without having received any important increase,
nay, having, on the contrary, rather bloomed under the hands of their
first author, and then faded away. But we see that the case is reversed
in the mechanical arts, which are founded on nature and the light
of experience, for they (as long as they are popular) seem full of
life, and uninterruptedly thrive and grow, being at first rude, then
convenient, lastly polished, and perpetually improved.

LXXV. There is yet another sign (if such it may be termed, being
rather an evidence, and one of the strongest nature), namely, the
actual confession of those very authorities whom men now follow; for
even they who decide on things so daringly, yet at times, when they
reflect, betake themselves to complaints about the subtilty of nature,
the obscurity of things, and the weakness of man’s wit. If they would
merely do this, they might perhaps deter those who are of a timid
disposition from further inquiry, but would excite and stimulate those
of a more active and confident turn to further advances. They are
not, however, satisfied with confessing so much of themselves, but
consider everything which has been either unknown or unattempted by
themselves or their teachers, as beyond the limits of possibility,
and thus, with most consummate pride and envy, convert the defects of
their own discoveries into a calumny on nature and a source of despair
to every one else. Hence arose the New Academy, which openly professed
scepticism,[39] and consigned mankind to eternal darkness; hence the
notion that forms, or the true differences of things (which are in
fact the laws of simple action), are beyond man’s reach, and cannot
possibly be discovered; hence those notions in the active and operative
branches, that the heat of the sun and of fire are totally different,
so as to prevent men from supposing that they can elicit or form, by
means of fire, anything similar to the operations of nature; and again,
that composition only is the work of man and mixture of nature, so
as to prevent men from expecting the generation or transformation of
natural bodies by art. Men will, therefore, easily allow themselves to
be persuaded by this sign not to engage their fortunes and labor in
speculations, which are not only desperate, but actually devoted to
desperation.

LXXVI. Nor should we omit the sign afforded by the great dissension
formerly prevalent among philosophers, and the variety of schools,
which sufficiently show that the way was not well prepared that leads
from the senses to the understanding, since the same groundwork of
philosophy (namely, the nature of things), was torn and divided into
such widely differing and multifarious errors. And although in these
days the dissensions and differences of opinions with regard to first
principles and entire systems are nearly extinct,[40] yet there remain
innumerable questions and controversies with regard to particular
branches of philosophy. So that it is manifest that there is nothing
sure or sound either in the systems themselves or in the methods of
demonstration. [41]

LXXVII. With regard to the supposition that there is a general
unanimity as to the philosophy of Aristotle, because the other systems
of the ancients ceased and became obsolete on its promulgation, and
nothing better has been since discovered; whence it appears that it is
so well determined and founded, as to have united the suffrages of both
ages; we will observe--1st. That the notion of other ancient systems
having ceased after the publication of the works of Aristotle is false,
for the works of the ancient philosophers subsisted long after that
event, even to the time of Cicero, and the subsequent ages. But at a
later period, when human learning had, as it were, been wrecked in the
inundation of barbarians into the Roman empire, then the systems of
Aristotle and Plato were preserved in the waves of ages, like planks
of a lighter and less solid nature. 2d. The notion of unanimity, on
a clear inspection, is found to be fallacious. For true unanimity
is that which proceeds from a free judgment, arriving at the same
conclusion, after an investigation of the fact. Now, by far the greater
number of those who have assented to the philosophy of Aristotle,
have bound themselves down to it from prejudice and the authority
of others, so that it is rather obsequiousness and concurrence than
unanimity. But even if it were real and extensive unanimity, so far
from being esteemed a true and solid confirmation, it should even
lead to a violent presumption to the contrary. For there is no worse
augury in intellectual matters than that derived from unanimity, with
the exception of divinity and politics, where suffrages are allowed
to decide. For nothing pleases the multitude, unless it strike the
imagination or bind down the understanding, as we have observed above,
with the shackles of vulgar notions. Hence we may well transfer
Phocion’s remark from morals to the intellect: “That men should
immediately examine what error or fault they have committed, when the
multitude concurs with, and applauds them. ”[42] This then is one of
the most unfavorable signs. All the signs, therefore, of the truth and
soundness of the received systems of philosophy and the sciences are
unpropitious, whether taken from their origin, their fruits, their
progress, the confessions of their authors, or from unanimity.

LXXVIII. We now come to the causes of errors,[43] and of such
perseverance in them for ages. These are sufficiently numerous and
powerful to remove all wonder, that what we now offer should have so
long been concealed from, and have escaped the notice of mankind, and
to render it more worthy of astonishment, that it should even now have
entered any one’s mind, or become the subject of his thoughts; and
that it should have done so, we consider rather the gift of fortune
than of any extraordinary talent, and as the offspring of time rather
than wit. But, in the first place, the number of ages is reduced to
very narrow limits, on a proper consideration of the matter. For out
of twenty-five[44] centuries, with which the memory and learning of
man are conversant, scarcely six can be set apart and selected as
fertile in science and favorable to its progress. For there are deserts
and wastes in times as in countries, and we can only reckon up three
revolutions and epochs of philosophy. 1. The Greek. 2. The Roman.
3. Our own, that is the philosophy of the western nations of Europe:
and scarcely two centuries can with justice be assigned to each. The
intermediate ages of the world were unfortunate both in the quantity
and richness of the sciences produced. Nor need we mention the Arabs,
or the scholastic philosophy, which, in those ages, ground down the
sciences by their numerous treatises, more than they increased their
weight. The first cause, then, of such insignificant progress in the
sciences, is rightly referred to the small proportion of time which has
been favorable thereto.

LXXIX. A second cause offers itself, which is certainly of the greatest
importance; namely, that in those very ages in which men’s wit and
literature flourished considerably, or even moderately, but a small
part of their industry was bestowed on natural philosophy, the great
mother of the sciences. For every art and science torn from this root
may, perhaps, be polished, and put into a serviceable shape, but can
admit of little growth. It is well known, that after the Christian
religion had been acknowledged, and arrived at maturity, by far the
best wits were busied upon theology, where the highest rewards offered
themselves, and every species of assistance was abundantly supplied,
and the study of which was the principal occupation of the western
European nations during the third epoch; the rather because literature
flourished about the very time when controversies concerning religion
first began to bud forth. 2. In the preceding ages, during the second
epoch (that of the Romans), philosophical meditation and labor was
chiefly occupied and wasted in moral philosophy (the theology of
the heathens): besides, the greatest minds in these times applied
themselves to civil affairs, on account of the magnitude of the Roman
empire, which required the labor of many. 3. The age during which
natural philosophy appeared principally to flourish among the Greeks,
was but a short period, since in the more ancient times the seven sages
(with the exception of Thales), applied themselves to moral philosophy
and politics, and at a later period, after Socrates had brought
down philosophy from heaven to earth, moral philosophy became more
prevalent, and diverted men’s attention from natural. Nay, the very
period during which physical inquiries flourished, was corrupted and
rendered useless by contradictions, and the ambition of new opinions.
Since, therefore, during these three epochs, natural philosophy has
been materially neglected or impeded, it is not at all surprising
that men should have made but little progress in it, seeing they were
attending to an entirely different matter.

LXXX. Add to this that natural philosophy, especially of late, has
seldom gained exclusive possession of an individual free from all other
pursuits, even among those who have applied themselves to it, unless
there may be an example or two of some monk studying in his cell, or
some nobleman in his villa. [45] She has rather been made a passage and
bridge to other pursuits.

Thus has this great mother of the sciences been degraded most
unworthily to the situation of a handmaid, and made to wait upon
medicine or mathematical operations, and to wash the immature minds
of youth, and imbue them with a first dye, that they may afterward be
more ready to receive and retain another. In the meantime, let no one
expect any great progress in the sciences (especially their operative
part), unless natural philosophy be applied to particular sciences,
and particular sciences again referred back to natural philosophy. For
want of this, astronomy, optics, music, many mechanical arts, medicine
itself, and (what perhaps is more wonderful), moral and political
philosophy, and the logical sciences have no depth, but only glide over
the surface and variety of things; because these sciences, when they
have been once partitioned out and established, are no longer nourished
by natural philosophy, which would have imparted fresh vigor and
growth to them from the sources and genuine contemplation of motion,
rays, sounds, texture, and conformation of bodies, and the affections
and capacity of the understanding. But we can little wonder that the
sciences grow not when separated from their roots.

LXXXI. There is another powerful and great cause of the little
advancement of the sciences, which is this; it is impossible to advance
properly in the course when the goal is not properly fixed. But the
real and legitimate goal of the sciences is the endowment of human
life with new inventions and riches. The great crowd of teachers know
nothing of this, but consist of dictatorial hirelings; unless it so
happen that some artisan of an acute genius, and ambitious of fame,
gives up his time to a new discovery, which is generally attended with
a loss of property. The majority, so far from proposing to themselves
the augmentation of the mass of arts and sciences, make no other use
of an inquiry into the mass already before them, than is afforded by
the conversion of it to some use in their lectures, or to gain, or
to the acquirement of a name, and the like. But if one out of the
multitude be found, who courts science from real zeal, and on his own
account, even he will be seen rather to follow contemplation, and the
variety of theories, than a severe and strict investigation of truth.
Again, if there even be an unusually strict investigator of truth, yet
will he propose to himself, as the test of truth, the satisfaction
of his mind and understanding, as to the causes of things long since
known, and not such a test as to lead to some new earnest of effects,
and a new light in axioms. If, therefore, no one have laid down the
real end of science, we cannot wonder that there should be error in
points subordinate to that end.

LXXXII. But, in like manner, as the end and goal of science is
ill defined, so, even were the case otherwise, men have chosen an
erroneous and impassable direction. For it is sufficient to astonish
any reflecting mind, that nobody should have cared or wished to open
and complete a way for the understanding, setting off from the senses,
and regular, well-conducted experiment; but that everything has been
abandoned either to the mists of tradition, the whirl and confusion of
argument, or the waves and mazes of chance, and desultory, ill-combined
experiment. Now, let any one but consider soberly and diligently
the nature of the path men have been accustomed to pursue in the
investigation and discovery of any matter, and he will doubtless first
observe the rude and inartificial manner of discovery most familiar to
mankind: which is no other than this. When any one prepares himself for
discovery, he first inquires and obtains a full account of all that
has been said on the subject by others, then adds his own reflections,
and stirs up and, as it were, invokes his own spirit, after much
mental labor, to disclose its oracles. All which is a method without
foundation, and merely turns on opinion.

Another, perhaps, calls in logic to assist him in discovery, which
bears only a nominal relation to his purpose. For the discoveries of
logic are not discoveries of principles and leading axioms, but only
of what appears to accord with them. [46] And when men become curious
and importunate, and give trouble, interrupting her about her proofs,
and the discovery of principles or first axioms, she puts them off with
her usual answer, referring them to faith, and ordering them to swear
allegiance to each art in its own department.

There remains but mere experience, which, when it offers itself, is
called chance; when it is sought after, experiment. [47] But this kind
of experience is nothing but a loose fagot; and mere groping in the
dark, as men at night try all means of discovering the right road,
while it would be better and more prudent either to wait for day, or
procure a light, and then proceed. On the contrary, the real order of
experience begins by setting up a light, and then shows the road by it,
commencing with a regulated and digested, not a misplaced and vague
course of experiment, and thence deducing axioms, and from those axioms
new experiments: for not even the Divine Word proceeded to operate on
the general mass of things without due order.

Let men, therefore, cease to wonder if the whole course of science be
not run, when all have wandered from the path; quitting it entirely,
and deserting experience, or involving themselves in its mazes, and
wandering about, while a regularly combined system would lead them in
a sure track through its wilds to the open day of axioms.

LXXXIII. The evil, however, has been wonderfully increased by an
opinion, or inveterate conceit, which is both vainglorious and
prejudicial, namely, that the dignity of the human mind is lowered by
long and frequent intercourse with experiments and particulars, which
are the objects of sense, and confined to matter; especially since such
matters generally require labor in investigation, are mean subjects
for meditation, harsh in discourse, unproductive in practice, infinite
in number, and delicate in their subtilty. Hence we have seen the true
path not only deserted, but intercepted and blocked up, experience
being rejected with disgust, and not merely neglected or improperly
applied.

LXXXIV. Again, the reverence for antiquity,[48] and the authority of
men who have been esteemed great in philosophy, and general unanimity,
have retarded men from advancing in science, and almost enchanted them.
As to unanimity, we have spoken of it above.

The opinion which men cherish of antiquity is altogether idle, and
scarcely accords with the term. For the old age and increasing years
of the world should in reality be considered as antiquity, and this is
rather the character of our own times than of the less advanced age of
the world in those of the ancients; for the latter, with respect to
ourselves, are ancient and elder, with respect to the world modern
and younger. And as we expect a greater knowledge of human affairs,
and more mature judgment from an old man than from a youth, on account
of his experience, and the variety and number of things he has seen,
heard, and meditated upon, so we have reason to expect much greater
things of our own age (if it knew but its strength and would essay and
exert it) than from antiquity, since the world has grown older, and its
stock has been increased and accumulated with an infinite number of
experiments and observations.
We must also take into our consideration that many objects in nature
fit to throw light upon philosophy have been exposed to our view, and
discovered by means of long voyages and travels, in which our times
have abounded. It would, indeed, be dishonorable to mankind, if the
regions of the material globe, the earth, the sea, and stars, should
be so prodigiously developed and illustrated in our age, and yet the
boundaries of the intellectual globe should be confined to the narrow
discoveries of the ancients.

With regard to authority, it is the greatest weakness to attribute
infinite credit to particular authors, and to refuse his own
prerogative to time, the author of all authors, and, therefore, of all
authority. For truth is rightly named the daughter of time, not of
authority. It is not wonderful, therefore, if the bonds of antiquity,
authority, and unanimity, have so enchained the power of man, that he
is unable (as if bewitched) to become familiar with things themselves.

LXXXV. Nor is it only the admiration of antiquity, authority, and
unanimity, that has forced man’s industry to rest satisfied with
present discoveries, but, also, the admiration of the effects already
placed within his power. For whoever passes in review the variety
of subjects, and the beautiful apparatus collected and introduced by
the mechanical arts for the service of mankind, will certainly be
rather inclined to admire our wealth than to perceive our poverty:
not considering that the observations of man and operations of nature
(which are the souls and first movers of that variety) are few, and
not of deep research; the rest must be attributed merely to man’s
patience, and the delicate and well-regulated motion of the hand or of
instruments. To take an instance, the manufacture of clocks is delicate
and accurate, and appears to imitate the heavenly bodies in its wheels,
and the pulse of animals in its regular oscillation, yet it only
depends upon one or two axioms of nature.

Again, if one consider the refinement of the liberal arts, or even that
exhibited in the preparation of natural bodies in mechanical arts and
the like, as the discovery of the heavenly motions in astronomy, of
harmony in music, of the letters of the alphabet[49] (still unadopted
by the Chinese) in grammar; or, again, in mechanical operations, the
productions of Bacchus and Ceres, that is, the preparation of wine
and beer, the making of bread, or even the luxuries of the table,
distillation, and the like; if one reflect also, and consider for how
long a period of ages (for all the above, except distillation, are
ancient) these things have been brought to their present state of
perfection, and (as we instanced in clocks) to how few observations and
axioms of nature they may be referred, and how easily, and as it were,
by obvious chance or contemplation, they might be discovered, one
would soon cease to admire and rather pity the human lot on account of
its vast want and dearth of things and discoveries for so many ages.
Yet even the discoveries we have mentioned were more ancient than
philosophy and the intellectual arts; so that (to say the truth) when
contemplation and doctrinal science began, the discovery of useful
works ceased.

But if any one turn from the manufactories to libraries, and be
inclined to admire the immense variety of books offered to our view,
let him but examine and diligently inspect the matter and contents of
these books, and his astonishment will certainly change its object: for
when he finds no end of repetitions, and how much men do and speak the
same thing over again, he will pass from admiration of this variety to
astonishment at the poverty and scarcity of matter, which has hitherto
possessed and filled men’s minds.

But if any one should condescend to consider such sciences as are
deemed rather curious than sound, and take a full view of the
operations of the alchemists or magii, he will perhaps hesitate whether
he ought rather to laugh or to weep. For the alchemist cherishes
eternal hope, and when his labors succeed not, accuses his own
mistakes, deeming, in his self-accusation, that he has not properly
understood the words of art or of his authors; upon which he listens
to tradition and vague whispers, or imagines there is some slight
unsteadiness in the minute details of his practice, and then has
recourse to an endless repetition of experiments: and in the meantime,
when, in his casual experiments, he falls upon something in appearance
new, or of some degree of utility, he consoles himself with such an
earnest, and ostentatiously publishes them, keeping up his hope of
the final result. Nor can it be denied that the alchemists have made
several discoveries, and presented mankind with useful inventions. But
we may well apply to them the fable of the old man, who bequeathed to
his sons some gold buried in his garden, pretending not to know the
exact spot, whereupon they worked diligently in digging the vineyard,
and though they found no gold, the vintage was rendered more abundant
by their labor.

The followers of natural magic, who explain everything by sympathy
and antipathy, have assigned false powers and marvellous operations
to things by gratuitous and idle conjectures: and if they have ever
produced any effects, they are rather wonderful and novel than of any
real benefit or utility.

In superstitious magic (if we say anything at all about it) we must
chiefly observe, that there are only some peculiar and definite objects
with which the curious and superstitious arts have, in every nation and
age, and even under every religion, been able to exercise and amuse
themselves. Let us, therefore, pass them over. In the meantime we
cannot wonder that the false notion of plenty should have occasioned
want.

LXXXVI. The admiration of mankind with regard to the arts and sciences,
which is of itself sufficiently simple and almost puerile, has been
increased by the craft and artifices of those who have treated the
sciences, and delivered them down to posterity. For they propose and
produce them to our view so fashioned, and as it were masked, as to
make them pass for perfect and complete. For if you consider their
method and divisions, they appear to embrace and comprise everything
which can relate to the subject. And although this frame be badly
filled up and resemble an empty bladder, yet it presents to the vulgar
understanding the form and appearance of a perfect science.

The first and most ancient investigators of truth were wont, on the
contrary, with more honesty and success, to throw all the knowledge
they wished to gather from contemplation, and to lay up for use, into
aphorisms, or short scattered sentences unconnected by any method, and
without pretending or professing to comprehend any entire art. But
according to the present system, we cannot wonder that men seek nothing
beyond that which is handed down to them as perfect, and already
extended to its full complement.

LXXXVII. The ancient theories have received additional support and
credit from the absurdity and levity of those who have promoted the
new, especially in the active and practical part of natural philosophy.
For there have been many silly and fantastical fellows who, from
credulity or imposture, have loaded mankind with promises, announcing
and boasting of the prolongation of life, the retarding of old age,
the alleviation of pains, the remedying of natural defects, the
deception of the senses, the restraint and excitement of the passions,
the illumination and exaltation of the intellectual faculties, the
transmutation of substances, the unlimited intensity and multiplication
of motion, the impressions and changes of the air, the bringing into
our power the management of celestial influences, the divination of
future events, the representation of distant objects, the revelation of
hidden objects, and the like. One would not be very wrong in observing
with regard to such pretenders, that there is as much difference in
philosophy, between their absurdity and real science, as there is in
history between the exploits of Cæsar or Alexander, and those of
Amadis de Gaul and Arthur of Britain. For those illustrious generals
are found to have actually performed greater exploits than such
fictitious heroes are even pretended to have accomplished, by the
means, however, of real action, and not by any fabulous and portentous
power. Yet it is not right to suffer our belief in true history to be
diminished, because it is sometimes injured and violated by fables. In
the meantime we cannot wonder that great prejudice has been excited
against any new propositions (especially when coupled with any mention
of effects to be produced), by the conduct of impostors who have
made a similar attempt; for their extreme absurdity, and the disgust
occasioned by it, has even to this day overpowered every spirited
attempt of the kind.

LXXXVIII. Want of energy, and the littleness and futility of the tasks
that human industry has undertaken, have produced much greater injury
to the sciences: and yet (to make it still worse) that very want of
energy manifests itself in conjunction with arrogance and disdain.

For, in the first place, one excuse, now from its repetition become
familiar, is to be observed in every art, namely, that its promoters
convert the weakness of the art itself into a calumny upon nature:
and whatever it in their hands fails to effect, they pronounce to be
physically impossible. But how can the art ever be condemned while it
acts as judge in its own cause? Even the present system of philosophy
cherishes in its bosom certain positions or dogmas, which (it will be
found on diligent inquiry) are calculated to produce a full conviction
that no difficult, commanding, and powerful operation upon nature ought
to be anticipated through the means of art; we instanced[50] above the
alleged different quality of heat in the sun and fire, and composition
and mixture. Upon an accurate observation the whole tendency of such
positions is wilfully to circumscribe man’s power, and to produce a
despair of the means of invention and contrivance, which would not only
confound the promises of hope, but cut the very springs and sinews of
industry, and throw aside even the chances of experience. The only
object of such philosophers is to acquire the reputation of perfection
for their own art, and they are anxious to obtain the most silly and
abandoned renown, by causing a belief that whatever has not yet been
invented and understood can never be so hereafter. But if any one
attempt to give himself up to things, and to discover something new;
yet he will only propose and destine for his object the investigation
and discovery of some one invention, and nothing more; as the nature
of the magnet, the tides, the heavenly system, and the like, which
appear enveloped in some degree of mystery, and have hitherto been
treated with but little success. Now it is the greatest proof of want
of skill, to investigate the nature of any object in itself alone; for
that same nature, which seems concealed and hidden in some instances,
is manifest and almost palpable in others, and excites wonder in the
former, while it hardly attracts attention in the latter. [51] Thus the
nature of consistency is scarcely observed in wood or stone, but passed
over by the term solid without any further inquiry about the repulsion
of separation or the solution of continuity. But in water-bubbles the
same circumstance appears matter of delicate and ingenious research,
for they form themselves into thin pellicles, curiously shaped into
hemispheres, so as for an instant to avoid the solution of continuity.

In general those very things which are considered as secret are
manifest and common in other objects, but will never be clearly seen
if the experiments and contemplation of man be directed to themselves
only. Yet it commonly happens, that if, in the mechanical arts, any
one bring old discoveries to a finer polish, or more elegant height of
ornament, or unite and compound them, or apply them more readily to
practice, or exhibit them on a less heavy and voluminous scale, and the
like, they will pass off as new.

We cannot, therefore, wonder that no magnificent discoveries, worthy
of mankind, have been brought to light, while men are satisfied and
delighted with such scanty and puerile tasks, nay, even think that they
have pursued or attained some great object in their accomplishment.

LXXXIX. Nor should we neglect to observe that natural philosophy has,
in every age, met with a troublesome and difficult opponent: I mean
superstition, and a blind and immoderate zeal for religion. For we see
that, among the Greeks, those who first disclosed the natural causes of
thunder and storms to the yet untrained ears of man were condemned as
guilty of impiety toward the gods. [52] Nor did some of the old fathers
of Christianity treat those much better who showed by the most positive
proofs (such as no one now disputes) that the earth is spherical, and
thence asserted that there were antipodes. [53]

Even in the present state of things the condition of discussions on
natural philosophy is rendered more difficult and dangerous by the
summaries and methods of divines, who, after reducing divinity into
such order as they could, and brought it into a scientific form, have
proceeded to mingle an undue proportion of the contentious and thorny
philosophy of Aristotle with the substance of religion. [54]

The fictions of those who have not feared to deduce and confirm the
truth of the Christian religion by the principles and authority of
philosophers, tend to the same end, though in a different manner. [55]
They celebrate the union of faith and the senses as though it were
legitimate, with great pomp and solemnity, and gratify men’s pleasing
minds with a variety, but in the meantime confound most improperly
things divine and human. Moreover, in these mixtures of divinity and
philosophy the received doctrines of the latter are alone included,
and any novelty, even though it be an improvement, scarcely escapes
banishment and extermination.

In short, you may find all access to any species of philosophy, however
pure, intercepted by the ignorance of divines. Some in their simplicity
are apprehensive that a too deep inquiry into nature may penetrate
beyond the proper bounds of decorum, transferring and absurdly applying
what is said of sacred mysteries in Holy Writ against those who
pry into divine secrets, to the mysteries of nature, which are not
forbidden by any prohibition. Others with more cunning imagine and
consider, that if secondary causes be unknown, everything may more
easily be referred to the Divine hand and wand, a matter, as they
think, of the greatest consequence to religion, but which can only
really mean that God wishes to be gratified by means of falsehood.
Others fear, from past example, lest motion and change in philosophy
should terminate in an attack upon religion. Lastly, there are others
who appear anxious lest there should be something discovered in the
investigation of nature to overthrow, or at least shake, religion,
particularly among the unlearned. The last two apprehensions appear
to resemble animal instinct, as if men were diffident, in the bottom
of their minds and secret meditations, of the strength of religion
and the empire of faith over the senses, and therefore feared that
some danger awaited them from an inquiry into nature. But any one who
properly considers the subject will find natural philosophy to be,
after the Word of God, the surest remedy against superstition, and the
most approved support of faith. She is, therefore, rightly bestowed
upon religion as a most faithful attendant, for the one exhibits the
will and the other the power of God. Nor was he wrong who observed,
“Ye err, not knowing the Scriptures and the power of God,” thus uniting
in one bond the revelation of his will and the contemplation of his
power. In the meanwhile, it is not wonderful that the progress of
natural philosophy has been restrained, since religion, which has so
much influence on men’s minds, has been led and hurried to oppose her
through the ignorance of some and the imprudent zeal of others.

XC. Again, in the habits and regulations of schools, universities,
and the like assemblies, destined for the abode of learned men and
the improvement of learning, everything is found to be opposed to
the progress of the sciences; for the lectures and exercises are so
ordered, that anything out of the common track can scarcely enter the
thoughts and contemplations of the mind. If, however, one or two have
perhaps dared to use their liberty, they can only impose the labor on
themselves, without deriving any advantage from the association of
others; and if they put up with this, they will find their industry and
spirit of no slight disadvantage to them in making their fortune; for
the pursuits of men in such situations are, as it were, chained down
to the writings of particular authors, and if any one dare to dissent
from them he is immediately attacked as a turbulent and revolutionary
spirit. Yet how great is the difference between civil matters and
the arts, for there is not the same danger from new activity and new
light. In civil matters even a change for the better is suspected
on account of the commotion it occasions, for civil government is
supported by authority, unanimity, fame, and public opinion, and not
by demonstration. In the arts and sciences, on the contrary, every
department should resound, as in mines, with new works and advances.
And this is the rational, though not the actual view of the case, for
that administration and government of science we have spoken of is
wont too rigorously to repress its growth.

XCI. And even should the odium I have alluded to be avoided, yet it is
sufficient to repress the increase of science that such attempts and
industry pass unrewarded; for the cultivation of science and its reward
belong not to the same individual. The advancement of science is the
work of a powerful genius, the prize and reward belong to the vulgar or
to princes, who (with a few exceptions) are scarcely moderately well
informed. Nay, such progress is not only deprived of the rewards and
beneficence of individuals, but even of popular praise; for it is above
the reach of the generality, and easily overwhelmed and extinguished
by the winds of common opinions. It is not wonderful, therefore, that
little success has attended that which has been little honored.

XCII. But by far the greatest obstacle to the advancement of the
sciences, and the undertaking of any new attempt or department, is to
be found in men’s despair and the idea of impossibility; for men of a
prudent and exact turn of thought are altogether diffident in matters
of this nature, considering the obscurity of nature, the shortness of
life, the deception of the senses, and weakness of the judgment. They
think, therefore, that in the revolutions of ages and of the world
there are certain floods and ebbs of the sciences, and that they grow
and flourish at one time, and wither and fall off at another, that when
they have attained a certain degree and condition they can proceed no
further.

If, therefore, any one believe or promise greater things, they impute
it to an uncurbed and immature mind, and imagine that such efforts
begin pleasantly, then become laborious, and end in confusion.
And since such thoughts easily enter the minds of men of dignity
and excellent judgment, we must really take heed lest we should be
captivated by our affection for an excellent and most beautiful
object, and relax or diminish the severity of our judgment; and we
must diligently examine what gleam of hope shines upon us, and in what
direction it manifests itself, so that, banishing her lighter dreams,
we may discuss and weigh whatever appears of more sound importance. We
must consult the prudence of ordinary life, too, which is diffident
upon principle, and in all human matters augurs the worst. Let us,
then, speak of hope, especially as we are not vain promisers, nor
are willing to enforce or insnare men’s judgment, but would rather
lead them willingly forward. And although we shall employ the most
cogent means of enforcing hope when we bring them to particulars,
and especially those which are digested and arranged in our Tables
of Invention (the subject partly of the second, but principally of
the fourth part of the Instauration), which are, indeed, rather
the very object of our hopes than hope itself; yet to proceed more
leniently we must treat of the preparation of men’s minds, of which
the manifestation of hope forms no slight part; for without it all
that we have said tends rather to produce a gloom than to encourage
activity or quicken the industry of experiment, by causing them to
have a worse and more contemptuous opinion of things as they are than
they now entertain, and to perceive and feel more thoroughly their
unfortunate condition. We must, therefore, disclose and prefix our
reasons for not thinking the hope of success improbable, as Columbus,
before his wonderful voyage over the Atlantic, gave the reasons of his
conviction that new lands and continents might be discovered besides
those already known; and these reasons, though at first rejected, were
yet proved by subsequent experience, and were the causes and beginnings
of the greatest events.

XCIII. Let us begin from God, and show that our pursuit from its
exceeding goodness clearly proceeds from him, the author of good and
father of light. Now, in all divine works the smallest beginnings lead
assuredly to some result, and the remark in spiritual matters that
“the kingdom of God cometh without observation,” is also found to be
true in every great work of Divine Providence, so that everything
glides quietly on without confusion or noise, and the matter is
achieved before men either think or perceive that it is commenced.
Nor should we neglect to mention the prophecy of Daniel, of the last
days of the world, “Many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be
increased,”[56] thus plainly hinting and suggesting that fate (which
is Providence) would cause the complete circuit of the globe (now
accomplished, or at least going forward by means of so many distant
voyages), and the increase of learning to happen at the same epoch.

XCIV. We will next give a most potent reason for hope deduced from
the errors of the past, and the ways still unattempted; for well
was an ill-governed state thus reproved, “That which is worst with
regard to the past should appear most consolatory for the future;
for if you had done all that your duty commanded, and your affairs
proceeded no better, you could not even hope for their improvement;
but since their present unhappy situation is not owing to the force of
circumstances, but to your own errors, you have reason to hope that by
banishing or correcting the latter you can produce a great change for
the better in the former. ” So if men had, during the many years that
have elapsed, adhered to the right way of discovering and cultivating
the sciences without being able to advance, it would be assuredly bold
and presumptuous to imagine it possible to improve; but if they have
mistaken the way and wasted their labor on improper objects, it follows
that the difficulty does not arise from things themselves, which are
not in our power, but from the human understanding, its practice and
application, which is susceptible of remedy and correction. Our best
plan, therefore, is to expose these errors; for in proportion as they
impeded the past, so do they afford reason to hope for the future. And
although we have touched upon them above, yet we think it right to give
a brief, bare, and simple enumeration of them in this place.

XCV. Those who have treated of the sciences have been either empirics
or dogmatical. [57] The former like ants only heap up and use their
store, the latter like spiders spin out their own webs. The bee, a
mean between both, extracts matter from the flowers of the garden and
the field, but works and fashions it by its own efforts. The true
labor of philosophy resembles hers, for it neither relies entirely or
principally on the powers of the mind, nor yet lays up in the memory
the matter afforded by the experiments of natural history and mechanics
in its raw state, but changes and works it in the understanding. We
have good reason, therefore, to derive hope from a closer and purer
alliance of these faculties (the experimental and rational) than has
yet been attempted.

XCVI. Natural philosophy is not yet to be found unadulterated, but is
impure and corrupted--by logic in the school of Aristotle, by natural
theology in that of Plato,[58] by mathematics in the second school of
Plato (that of Proclus and others)[59] which ought rather to terminate
natural philosophy than to generate or create it. We may, therefore,
hope for better results from pure and unmixed natural philosophy.

XCVII. No one has yet been found possessed of sufficient firmness
and severity to resolve upon and undertake the task of entirely
abolishing common theories and notions, and applying the mind afresh,
when thus cleared and levelled, to particular researches; hence our
human reasoning is a mere farrago and crude mass made up of a great
deal of credulity and accident, and the puerile notions it originally
contracted.

But if a man of mature age, unprejudiced senses, and clear mind, would
betake himself anew to experience and particulars, we might hope much
more from such a one; in which respect we promise ourselves the fortune
of Alexander the Great, and let none accuse us of vanity till they have
heard the tale, which is intended to check vanity.

For Æschines spoke thus of Alexander and his exploits: “We live not
the life of mortals, but are born at such a period that posterity will
relate and declare our prodigies”; as if he considered the exploits of
Alexander to be miraculous.

But in succeeding ages[60] Livy took a better view of the fact, and
has made some such observation as this upon Alexander: “That he did no
more than dare to despise insignificance. ” So in our opinion posterity
will judge of us, that we have achieved no great matters, but only set
less account upon what is considered important; for the meantime (as
we have before observed) our only hope is in the regeneration of the
sciences, by regularly raising them on the foundation of experience and
building them anew, which I think none can venture to affirm to have
been already done or even thought of.

XCVIII. The foundations of experience (our sole resource) have
hitherto failed completely or have been very weak; nor has a store
and collection of particular facts, capable of informing the mind or
in any way satisfactory, been either sought after or amassed. On the
contrary, learned, but idle and indolent, men have received some mere
reports of experience, traditions as it were of dreams, as establishing
or confirming their philosophy, and have not hesitated to allow them
the weight of legitimate evidence. So that a system has been pursued
in philosophy with regard to experience resembling that of a kingdom
or state which would direct its councils and affairs according to the
gossip of city and street politicians, instead of the letters and
reports of ambassadors and messengers worthy of credit. Nothing is
rightly inquired into, or verified, noted, weighed, or measured, in
natural history; indefinite and vague observation produces fallacious
and uncertain information. If this appear strange, or our complaint
somewhat too unjust (because Aristotle himself, so distinguished a
man and supported by the wealth of so great a king, has completed an
accurate history of animals, to which others with greater diligence
but less noise have made considerable additions, and others again
have composed copious histories and notices of plants, metals, and
fossils), it will arise from a want of sufficiently attending to and
comprehending our present observations; for a natural history compiled
on its own account, and one collected for the mind’s information as a
foundation for philosophy, are two different things. They differ in
several respects, but principally in this--the former contains only
the varieties of natural species without the experiments of mechanical
arts; for as in ordinary life every person’s disposition, and the
concealed feelings of the mind and passions are most drawn out when
they are disturbed--so the secrets of nature betray themselves more
readily when tormented by art than when left to their own course. We
must begin, therefore, to entertain hopes of natural philosophy then
only, when we have a better compilation of natural history, its real
basis and support.

XCIX. Again, even in the abundance of mechanical experiments, there
is a very great scarcity of those which best inform and assist
the understanding. For the mechanic, little solicitous about the
investigation of truth, neither directs his attention, nor applies his
hand to anything that is not of service to his business. But our hope
of further progress in the sciences will then only be well founded,
when numerous experiments shall be received and collected into natural
history, which, though of no use in themselves, assist materially in
the discovery of causes and axioms; which experiments we have termed
enlightening, to distinguish them from those which are profitable. They
possess this wonderful property and nature, that they never deceive
or fail you; for being used only to discover the natural cause of
some object, whatever be the result, they equally satisfy your aim by
deciding the question.

C. We must not only search for, and procure a greater number of
experiments, but also introduce a completely different method, order,
and progress of continuing and promoting experience. For vague and
arbitrary experience is (as we have observed), mere groping in the
dark, and rather astonishes than instructs. But when experience shall
proceed regularly and uninterruptedly by a determined rule, we may
entertain better hopes of the sciences.

CI. But after having collected and prepared an abundance and store of
natural history, and of the experience required for the operations
of the understanding or philosophy, still the understanding is as
incapable of acting on such materials of itself, with the aid of memory
alone, as any person would be of retaining and achieving, by memory,
the computation of an almanac. Yet meditation has hitherto done more
for discovery than writing, and no experiments have been committed to
paper. We cannot, however, approve of any mode of discovery without
writing, and when that comes into more general use, we may have further
hopes.

CII. Besides this, there is such a multitude and host, as it were, of
particular objects, and lying so widely dispersed, as to distract and
confuse the understanding; and we can, therefore, hope for no advantage
from its skirmishing, and quick movements and incursions, unless we
put its forces in due order and array, by means of proper and well
arranged, and, as it were, living tables of discovery of these matters,
which are the subject of investigation, and the mind then apply itself
to the ready prepared and digested aid which such tables afford.

CIII. When we have thus properly and regularly placed before the eyes
a collection of particulars, we must not immediately proceed to the
investigation and discovery of new particulars or effects, or, at
least, if we do so, must not rest satisfied therewith. For, though
we do not deny that by transferring the experiments from one art to
another (when all the experiments of each have been collected and
arranged, and have been acquired by the knowledge, and subjected to
the judgment of a single individual), many new experiments may be
discovered tending to benefit society and mankind, by what we term
literate experience; yet comparatively insignificant results are to be
expected thence, while the more important are to be derived from the
new light of axioms, deduced by certain method and rule from the above
particulars, and pointing out and defining new particulars in their
turn. Our road is not a long plain, but rises and falls, ascending to
axioms, and descending to effects.

CIV. Nor can we suffer the understanding to jump and fly from
particulars to remote and most general axioms (such as are termed the
principles of arts and things), and thus prove and make out their
intermediate axioms according to the supposed unshaken truth of the
former. This, however, has always been done to the present time from
the natural bent of the understanding, educated too, and accustomed to
this very method, by the syllogistic mode of demonstration. But we can
then only augur well for the sciences, when the assent shall proceed by
a true scale and successive steps, without interruption or breach, from
particulars to the lesser axioms, thence to the intermediate (rising
one above the other), and lastly, to the most general. For the lowest
axioms differ but little from bare experiment;[61] the highest and most
general (as they are esteemed at present), are notional, abstract, and
of no real weight. The intermediate are true, solid, full of life, and
upon them depend the business and fortune of mankind; beyond these are
the really general, but not abstract, axioms, which are truly limited
by the intermediate.

We must not then add wings, but rather lead and ballast to the
understanding, to prevent its jumping or flying, which has not yet been
done; but whenever this takes place, we may entertain greater hopes of
the sciences.

CV. In forming axioms, we must invent a different form of induction
from that hitherto in use; not only for the proof and discovery of
principles (as they are called), but also of minor, intermediate, and,
in short, every kind of axioms. The induction which proceeds by simple
enumeration is puerile, leads to uncertain conclusions, and is exposed
to danger from one contradictory instance, deciding generally from too
small a number of facts, and those only the most obvious. But a really
useful induction for the discovery and demonstration of the arts and
sciences, should separate nature by proper rejections and exclusions,
and then conclude for the affirmative, after collecting a sufficient
number of negatives. Now this has not been done, nor even attempted,
except perhaps by Plato, who certainly uses this form of induction in
some measure, to sift definitions and ideas. But much of what has never
yet entered the thoughts of man must necessarily be employed, in order
to exhibit a good and legitimate mode of induction or demonstration,
so as even to render it essential for us to bestow more pains upon
it than have hitherto been bestowed on syllogisms. The assistance of
induction is to serve us not only in the discovery of axioms, but
also in defining our notions. Much indeed is to be hoped from such an
induction as has been described.

CVI. In forming our axioms from induction, we must examine and try
whether the axiom we derive be only fitted and calculated for the
particular instances from which it is deduced, or whether it be more
extensive and general. If it be the latter, we must observe, whether
it confirm its own extent and generality by giving surety, as it were,
in pointing out new particulars, so that we may neither stop at actual
discoveries, nor with a careless grasp catch at shadows and abstract
forms, instead of substances of a determinate nature: and as soon as we
act thus, well authorized hope may with reason be said to beam upon us.

CVII. Here, too, we may again repeat what we have said above,
concerning the extending of natural philosophy and reducing particular
sciences to that one, so as to prevent any schism or dismembering of
the sciences; without which we cannot hope to advance.

CVIII. Such are the observations we would make in order to remove
despair and excite hope, by bidding farewell to the errors of past
ages, or by their correction. Let us examine whether there be other
grounds for hope. And, first, if many useful discoveries have occurred
to mankind by chance or opportunity, without investigation or attention
on their part, it must necessarily be acknowledged that much more may
be brought to light by investigation and attention, if it be regular
and orderly, not hasty and interrupted. For although it may now and
then happen that one falls by chance upon something that had before
escaped considerable efforts and laborious inquiries, yet undoubtedly
the reverse is generally the case. We may, therefore, hope for further,
better, and more frequent results from man’s reason, industry, method,
and application, than from chance and mere animal instinct, and the
like, which have hitherto been the sources of invention.

CIX. We may also derive some reason for hope from the circumstance
of several actual inventions being of such a nature, that scarcely
any one could have formed a conjecture about them previously to their
discovery, but would rather have ridiculed them as impossible. For
men are wont to guess about new subjects from those they are already
acquainted with, and the hasty and vitiated fancies they have thence
formed: than which there cannot be a more fallacious mode of reasoning,
because much of that which is derived from the sources of things does
not flow in their usual channel.

If, for instance, before the discovery of cannon, one had described
its effects in the following manner: There is a new invention by which
walls and the greatest bulwarks can be shaken and overthrown from a
considerable distance; men would have begun to contrive various means
of multiplying the force of projectiles and machines by means of
weights and wheels, and other modes of battering and projecting. But
it is improbable that any imagination or fancy would have hit upon a
fiery blast, expanding and developing itself so suddenly and violently,
because none would have seen an instance at all resembling it, except
perhaps in earthquakes or thunder, which they would have immediately
rejected as the great operations of nature, not to be imitated by man.

So, if before the discovery of silk thread, any one had observed, that
a species of thread had been discovered, fit for dresses and furniture,
far surpassing the thread of worsted or flax in fineness, and at the
same time in tenacity, beauty, and softness; men would have begun
to imagine something about Chinese plants, or the fine hair of some
animals, or the feathers or down of birds, but certainly would never
have had an idea of its being spun by a small worm, in so copious a
manner, and renewed annually. But if any one had ventured to suggest
the silkworm, he would have been laughed at as if dreaming of some new
manufacture from spiders.

So again, if before the discovery of the compass, any one had said,
that an instrument had been invented, by which the quarters and points
of the heavens could be exactly taken and distinguished, men would
have entered into disquisitions on the refinement of astronomical
instruments, and the like, from the excitement of their imaginations;
but the thought of anything being discovered, which, not being a
celestial body, but a mere mineral or metallic substance, should yet
in its motion agree with that of such bodies, would have appeared
absolutely incredible. Yet were these facts, and the like (unknown for
so many ages) not discovered at last either by philosophy or reasoning,
but by chance and opportunity; and (as we have observed), they are of a
nature most heterogeneous, and remote from what was hitherto known, so
that no previous knowledge could lead to them.

We may, therefore, well hope[62] that many excellent and useful matters
are yet treasured up in the bosom of nature, bearing no relation or
analogy to our actual discoveries, but out of the common track of
our imagination, and still undiscovered, and which will doubtless be
brought to light in the course and lapse of years, as the others have
been before them; but in the way we now point out, they may rapidly and
at once be both represented and anticipated.

CX. There are, moreover, some inventions which render it probable
that men may pass and hurry over the most noble discoveries which
lie immediately before them. For however the discovery of gunpowder,
silk, the compass, sugar, paper, or the like, may appear to depend on
peculiar properties of things and nature, printing at least involves
no contrivance which is not clear and almost obvious. But from want
of observing that although the arrangement of the types of letters
required more trouble than writing with the hand, yet these types once
arranged serve for innumerable impressions, while manuscript only
affords one copy; and again, from want of observing that ink might be
thickened so as to stain without running (which was necessary, seeing
the letters face upward, and the impression is made from above), this
most beautiful invention (which assists so materially the propagation
of learning) remained unknown for so many ages.

The human mind is often so awkward and ill-regulated in the career of
invention that it is at first diffident, and then despises itself. For
it appears at first incredible that any such discovery should be made,
and when it has been made, it appears incredible that it should so long
have escaped men’s research. All which affords good reason for the
hope that a vast mass of inventions yet remains, which may be deduced
not only from the investigation of new modes of operation, but also
from transferring, comparing, and applying these already known, by the
method of what we have termed literate experience.

CXI. Nor should we omit another ground of hope. Let men only consider
(if they will) their infinite expenditure of talent, time, and
fortune, in matters and studies of far inferior importance and value;
a small portion of which applied to sound and solid learning would be
sufficient to overcome every difficulty. And we have thought right to
add this observation, because we candidly own that such a collection of
natural and experimental history as we have traced in our own mind, and
as is really necessary, is a great and as it were royal work, requiring
much labor and expense.

CXII. In the meantime let no one be alarmed at the multitude of
particulars, but rather inclined to hope on that very account. For the
particular phenomena of the arts and nature are in reality but as a
handful, when compared with the fictions of the imagination removed and
separated from the evidence of facts. The termination of our method
is clear, and I had almost said near at hand; the other admits of no
termination, but only of infinite confusion. For men have hitherto
dwelt but little, or rather only slightly touched upon experience,
while they have wasted much time on theories and the fictions of the
imagination. If we had but any one who could actually answer our
interrogations of nature, the invention of all causes and sciences
would be the labor of but a few years.

CXIII. We think some ground of hope is afforded by our own example,
which is not mentioned for the sake of boasting, but as a useful
remark. Let those who distrust their own powers observe myself, one who
have among my contemporaries been the most engaged in public business,
who am not very strong in health (which causes a great loss of time),
and am the first explorer of this course, following the guidance of
none, nor even communicating my thoughts to a single individual; yet
having once firmly entered in the right way, and submitting the powers
of my mind to things, I have somewhat advanced (as I make bold to
think) the matter I now treat of. Then let others consider what may
be hoped from men who enjoy abundant leisure, from united labors, and
the succession of ages, after these suggestions on our part, especially
in a course which is not confined, like theories, to individuals,
but admits of the best distribution and union of labor and effect,
particularly in collecting experiments. For men will then only begin to
know their own power, when each performs a separate part, instead of
undertaking in crowds the same work.

CXIV. Lastly, though a much more faint and uncertain breeze of hope
were to spring up from our new continent, yet we consider it necessary
to make the experiment, if we would not show a dastard spirit. For
the risk attending want of success is not to be compared with that
of neglecting the attempt; the former is attended with the loss of
a little human labor, the latter with that of an immense benefit.
For these and other reasons it appears to us that there is abundant
ground to hope, and to induce not only those who are sanguine to make
experiment, but even those who are cautious and sober to give their
assent.

CXV.