No More Learning

The excavations have led to the discovery in the fosses of
a multitude of interesting objects, and, among them, more than 600 Roman
and Gaulish coins. (See the list in _Appendix C_. )[537] The extremity of
the upper fosse, represented by dots on _Plates 25_ and _28_, has not
been discovered, because earthfalls have taken place on that part of
Mont Réa, which would have obliged the excavators to dig too deep to
arrive at the bottom of the fosse. The strength of the retrenchments of
the infantry camps was very variable, as may be seen by inspecting the
various profiles of the fosses. (_See Plate 28. _) For each camp, they
have larger dimensions on the side which is not defended by the
escarpments, as may easily be conceived.

There were four cavalry camps, _G H I K_, placed near the different
streams: three in the plain of Laumes, and one in the valley of the
Rabutin. The fosses of these camps took greatly varied shapes. (_See
Plate 28. _) In general, their dimensions were decidedly less than those
of the fosses of the infantry camps. Camp _G_, however, had rather deep
fosses; no doubt because it was farthest from the lines. The fosse which
enclosed camp _I_ towards the side of the Brenne has disappeared by the
inundations of the river.

REDOUBTS, OR CASTELLA. --Of the twenty-three redoubts or blockhouses
(_castella_), five only have been discovered; they were the most
considerable; they are represented on _Plate 25_, by the numbers 10, 11,
15, 18, 22. The others, built of wood, and forming blockhouses, would
not have left any trace; they are marked by circles on the most
convenient places.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARMY. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LINE OF INVESTMENT. --We
know, from the “Commentaries,” that camp _D_, on the slopes of Mont Réa,
contained two legions. By comparing its superficies with that of the
other camps, we may admit that these were occupied in the following
manner: in camp _A_, one legion; in camp _B_, two legions; in camp _C_,
three legions; total, eight legions. The three remaining legions would
have been distributed in the twenty-three redoubts. As we have said, the
number of 11,000 paces can evidently only apply to the line of
investment formed by the eight camps and the twenty-three redoubts
established round Alesia immediately after the arrival of the army, and
not, as has been believed, to the countervallation properly so called,
which was only constructed subsequently (VII. 72). This number is
rigorously exact, for the circuit of ground surrounded by the camps
measures a little more than sixteen kilomètres, which represents 11,000
Roman paces.

THE FOSSE OF TWENTY FEET. --This fosse has been discovered in its whole
extent: it barred the plain of Laumes, following a direction
perpendicular to the course of the Ose and the Oserain, and did not go
round Mont Auxois. _Plate 28_ represents two of its most remarkable
sections. It was not exactly twenty feet in width, as stated in the
“Commentaries;” neither was it everywhere 400 paces distant from the
countervallation. This measurement is only exact towards the extremities
of the fosse, near the two rivers.

COUNTERVALLATION. --Vercingetorix, having retired to the plateau of
Alesia, could only have escaped by the plain of Laumes, and, at the
worst, by the valley of the Rabutin; for the spurs situated to the
south, the east, and the north of Mont Auxois are surmounted by a belt
of perpendicular rocks, which form insurmountable barriers, and the
valleys of the Oserain and the Ose, which divide them, constitute
veritable defiles. It became important, therefore, to bar the plain of
Laumes with impregnable works. Hence Cæsar accumulated there the means
of defence; but he simplified them everywhere else, as the excavations
have shown.

These are the works, peculiar to the plain of Laumes, which Cæsar
describes in chapters 72 and 73. The traces of the two fosses exist
over the whole extent of the plain, from one river to the other. They
had not the same form: the one nearest to Mont Auxois is
square-bottomed; the other is triangular. (_See Plates 27 and 28. _) The
width of the first is fifteen feet, as stated in the text; that of the
triangular fosse is fifteen feet at certain points, but more frequently
a little less. The two fosses have the same depth; but it does not reach
fifteen feet, as the translators have wrongly understood it. To dig a
fosse of fifteen feet deep is so considerable a work, on account of the
two stages of workmen which it requires, that it has, perhaps, never
been executed for a temporary fortification. Moreover, the result of the
excavations leaves no doubt on this subject: the two fosses of the
countervallation have both only a depth of from eight to nine feet.

The fosse which is nearest Mont Auxois was filled with water. The Romans
had naturally introduced the water into that of the two fosses which,
owing to its square bottom, could contain the most considerable volume.
A careful level made in the plain of Laumes has proved that this water
was derived from the Oserain. During the excavations, the gravel has
been found which the water of this river had carried with it, at the
time of the investment of Alesia, almost to the middle of the length of
the fosse.

To the left of the Oserain, the countervallation cut the first slopes of
the hill of Flavigny for a length of 800 mètres; thence it continued,
having but one fosse, the various sections of which are indicated on
_Plate 28_. It ran at first along the left bank of the river, at a mean
distance of fifty mètres, as far as the mill of Chantrier, then cut the
western extremity of Mont Penneville, between the Oserain and the Ose,
followed the right bank of the latter river, along the slopes of the
mountain of Bussy, and, after having crossed the small plain of
Grésigny, joined the camp established at the foot of Mont Réa. Nearly
everywhere the Romans had the advantage of a commanding position to
defend the countervallation. The excavations have proved that in the
plain of Grésigny the fosse of the countervallation had been filled with
water from the Rabutin. They have led to the discovery in the ancient
bed of this stream (_see Plate 25_), at the very point where the fosse
joined it, of a wall of unhewn stones, which barred the waters so as to
conduct them into this fosse. [538]

CIRCUMVALLATION. --Over the extent of the plain of Laumes, and on the
slopes of the mountain of Flavigny, the circumvallation was parallel to
the countervallation, at a mean distance of 200 mètres. It had only one
single fosse, which in the plain was square-bottomed, so as to allow
more soil to be dug out; everywhere else its form was triangular. (_See
Plate_ 28. ) The circumvallation of the mountain of Flavigny ceased
towards the escarpments, where the defences became useless; then, again,
it continued on the plateau, where it formed the connection between the
camps. After this, it descended towards the Oserain, cut the point of
Mont Penneville, re-ascended the slopes of the mountain of Bussy, where
it similarly united the camps, descended into the plain of Grésigny,
which it crossed in a direction parallel to the countervallation, and
ended at camp _D_. On the heights it was made to follow the undulations
of the ground, so that its defenders should occupy as much as possible a
commanding position with respect to that of the assailants. Moreover,
the works of the circumvallation were not everywhere the same. Thus,
near the escarpments and ravines which cut this line, the Romans had
made no fosse with epaulment, but only accessory defences, such as
_abatis_ and wolf-pits, which even alternated on divers points.

Above the _castellum_ 21, between Grésigny and Mont Réa, the excavations
have brought to light a fosse of great dimensions, the bottom of which
was full of bones of animals of divers kinds. Its position, near a small
ravine in which runs a brook, may lead us to suppose that here was the
_abattoir_ of the Roman army. In considering this fosse, and those which
have been discovered on the top and on the slopes of Mont Réa, as
forming part of the circumvallation, there will be found for the
development of this line about twenty kilomètres, which represents with
sufficient accuracy the fourteen miles of the text of the
“Commentaries. ”[539]

WOLF-PITS. --In the plain of Laumes, at the top of the circumvallation,
and close to the exterior bank of the fosse, there have been counted
more than fifty wolf-pits, in five rows. Others have been cleared out on
the heights--nine between the camp _A_ and the escarpments, twenty-seven
on the mountain of Bussy, near the _castellum_ 15; they are dug in the
rock, and in such a perfect state of preservation that they appear as
though they had been made but yesterday. At the bottom of some of these
last, fifteen arrow-heads were picked up. All these wolf-pits are three
feet deep, two feet in diameter at the top, and a little less than one
foot at the bottom.

GAULISH CAMP. --During the first days of the investment, the besieged
encamped on the slopes of Mont Auxois, towards the eastern part of the
hill. They were protected by a fosse and a wall of unhewn stones six
feet high. We have traced the site of this camp at _P Q R S_ on _Plate
25_. The excavations have brought to light, in the direction of _Q R_ on
the slopes which shelve towards the Oserain, traces of fosses and
remains of walls. On the plateau of Mont Auxois it might be interesting
to attempt to discover the ancient Gaulish wall. It has been uncovered
in pieces here and there over the whole space of the declivities; hence
it may be concluded that the town occupied the whole of the plateau.

A remarkable specimen of this wall is visible at a point of Mont Auxois,
near the spot where recently the statue of Vercingetorix has been
erected.

As to the camps of the army of succour, it is probable that the Gauls
did not form any retrenchments on the hills where they established
themselves.




CHAPTER XI.

(Year of Rome 703. )

(BOOK VIII. [540] OF THE “COMMENTARIES. ”)


[Sidenote: Expedition against the Bituriges and Carnutes. ]

I. The capture of Alesia and that of Vercingetorix, in spite of the
united efforts of all Gaul, naturally gave Cæsar hopes of a general
submission; and he therefore believed that he could leave his army,
during the winter, to rest quietly in its quarters from the hard labours
which had lasted, without interruption, during the whole of the past
summer. But the spirit of insurrection was not extinct among the Gauls;
and convinced by experience that, whatever might be their number, they
could not, in a body, cope with troops inured to war, they resolved, by
partial insurrections, raised on all points at once, to divide the
attention and the forces of the Romans, as their only chance of
resisting them with advantage.

Cæsar was unwilling to leave them time to realise this new plan, but
gave the command of his winter quarters to his quæstor Mark Antony,
quitted Bibracte on the day before the Calends of January (the 25th of
December), with an escort of cavalry, joined the 13th legion, which was
in winter quarters among the Bituriges, not far from the frontier of the
Ædui, and called to him the 11th legion, which was the nearest at hand.
Having left two cohorts of each legion to guard the baggage, he
proceeded towards the fertile country of the Bituriges, a vast
territory, where the presence of a single legion was insufficient to put
a stop to the preparations for insurrection.

His sudden arrival in the midst of men without distrust, who were spread
over the open country, produced the result which he expected. They were
surprised before they could enter into their _oppida_, for Cæsar had
strictly forbidden everything which might have raised their suspicion,
especially the application of fire, which usually betrays the sudden
presence of an enemy. Several thousands of captives were made; those who
succeeded in escaping sought in vain a refuge among the neighbouring
nations. Cæsar, by forced marches, came up with them everywhere, and
obliged each tribe to think of its own safety before that of others.
This activity held the populations in their fidelity, and, through fear,
engaged the wavering to submit to the conditions of peace. Thus the
Bituriges, seeing that Cæsar offered them an easy way to recover his
protection, and that the neighbouring states had suffered no other
chastisement than that of having to deliver hostages, did not hesitate
in submitting.

The soldiers of the 11th and 13th legions had, during the winter,
supported with rare constancy the fatigues of very difficult marches, in
intolerable cold. To reward them, he promised to give, by way of
prize-money, 200 sestertii to each soldier, and 2,000 to each centurion.
He then sent them into their winter quarters, and returned to Bibracte,
after an absence of forty days. Whilst he was there dispensing justice,
the Bituriges came to implore his support against the attacks of the
Carnutes. Although it was only eighteen days since he returned, he
marched again, at the head of two legions, the 6th and the 14th, which
had been placed on the Saône to ensure the supply of provisions.

On his approach, the Carnutes, taught by the fate of others, abandoned
their miserable huts, which they had erected on the site of their burgs
and _oppida_ destroyed in the last campaign, and fled in every
direction. Cæsar, unwilling to expose his soldiers to the rigour of the
season, established his camp at Genabum (_Gien_), and lodged his
soldiers partly in the huts which had remained undestroyed, partly in
tents, under penthouses covered with straw. The cavalry and auxiliary
infantry were sent in pursuit of the Carnutes, who, hunted down
everywhere, and without shelter, took refuge in the neighbouring
countries. [541]


[Sidenote: Campaign against the Bellovaci. ]

II. After having dispersed some rebellious meetings and stifled the
germs of an insurrection, Cæsar believed that the summer would pass
without any serious war. He left, therefore, at Genabum, the two legions
he had with him, and gave the command of them to C. Trebonius.
Nevertheless, he learnt, by several intimations from the Remi, that the
Bellovaci and neighbouring peoples, with Correus and Commius at their
head, were collecting troops to make an inroad on the territory of the
Suessiones, who had been placed, since the campaign of 697, under the
dependence of the Remi.

He then considered that it regarded his interest, as well as his
dignity, to protect allies who had deserved so well of the Republic. He
again drew the 11th legion from its winter quarters, sent written orders
to C. Fabius, who was encamped in the country of the Remi, to bring into
that of the Suessiones the two legions under his command, and demanded
one of his legions from Labienus, who was at Besançon. Thus, without
taking any rest himself, he shared the fatigues among the legions by
turns, as far as the position of the winter quarters and the necessities
of the war permitted.

When this army was assembled, he marched against the Bellovaci,
established his camp on their territory, and sent cavalry in every
direction, in order to make some prisoners, and learn from them the
designs of the enemy. The cavalry reported that the emigration was
general, and that the few inhabitants who were to be seen were not
remaining behind in order to apply themselves to agriculture, but to act
as spies upon the Romans. Cæsar, by interrogating the prisoners, learnt
that all the Bellovaci able to fight had assembled on one spot, and that
they had been joined by the Ambiani, the Aulerci,[542] the Caletes, the
Veliocasses, and the Atrebates. Their camp was in a forest, on a height
surrounded by marshes (Mont Saint-Marc, in the forest of Compiègne)
(_see Plate 29_); their baggage had been transported to more distant
woods. The command was divided among several chiefs, but the greater
part obeyed Correus, on account of his well-known hatred to the Romans.
Commius had, a few days before, gone to seek succour from the numerous
Germans who lived in great numbers in the neighbouring countries
(probably those on the banks of the Meuse). The Bellovaci resolved with
one accord to give Cæsar battle, if, as report said, he was advancing
with only three legions, for they would not run the risk of having
afterwards to encounter his entire army. If, on the contrary, the Romans
were advancing with more considerable forces, they proposed to keep
their positions, and confine themselves to intercepting, by means of
ambuscades, the provisions and forage, which were very scarce at that
season.

This plan, confirmed by many reports, seemed to Cæsar full of prudence,
and altogether contrary to the usual rashness of the barbarians. He
took, therefore, every possible care to dissimulate the number of his
troops; he had with him the 7th, 8th, and 9th legions, composed of old
soldiers of tried valour, and the 11th, which, formed of picked young
men who had gone through eight campaigns, deserved his confidence,
although it could not be compared with the others with regard to bravery
and experience in war. In order to deceive the enemies by showing them
only three legions, the only number they were willing to fight, he
placed the 7th, 8th, and 9th in one line; whilst the baggage, which was
not very considerable, was placed behind, under the protection of the
11th legion, which closed the march. In this order, which formed almost
a square, he came unawares in sight of the Bellovaci. At the unexpected
view of the legions, which advanced in order of battle and with a firm
step, they lost their courage; and instead of attacking, as they had
engaged to do, they confined themselves to drawing themselves up before
their camp, without leaving the height. A valley, deeper than it was
wide (_magis in altitudinem depressa quam late patente_), separated the
two armies. On account of this obstacle and the numerical superiority of
the barbarians, Cæsar, though he had wished for battle, abandoned the
idea of attacking them, and placed his camp opposite that of the Gauls,
in a strong position (the camp of Saint Pierre-en-Chatre [_in Castris_],
in the forest of Compiègne). [543] (_See Plates 29 and 30. _) He caused it
to be surrounded with a parapet twelve feet high, surmounted with
accessory works, proportioned to the importance of the retrenchment
(_loriculamque pro ratione ejus altitudinis_),[544] and preceded by a
double fosse, fifteen feet wide, with a square bottom;[545] towers of
three stories were constructed from distance to distance, and united
together by covered bridges, the exterior part of which was protected by
hurdle-work. In this manner, the camp was protected not only by a double
fosse, but also by a double row of defenders, some of whom, placed on
the bridges, could, from this elevated and sheltered position, throw
their missiles farther and with a better aim; while the others, placed
on the _vallum_, nearer to the enemy, were protected by the bridges from
the missiles which showered down upon them. The entrances were defended
by means of higher towers, and were closed with gates.

These formidable retrenchments had a double aim: to increase the
confidence of the barbarians, by making them believe that they were
feared; and, next, to allow the number of the garrison to be reduced
with safety, when they had to go far for provisions. For some days there
were no serious engagements, but slight skirmishes in the marshy plain
which extended between the two camps. The capture, however, of a few
foragers did not fail to swell the presumption of the barbarians, which
was still more increased by the arrival of Commius, although he had
brought only 500 German cavalry.

The enemies remained for several days shut up in their impregnable
position. Cæsar judged that an assault would cost too many lives; an
investment alone seemed to him opportune, but it would require a greater
number of troops. He wrote thereupon to Trebonius to send him as soon as
possible the 13th legion, which, under the command of T. Sextius, was in
winter quarters among the Bituriges; to join it with the 6th and the
14th, which the first of these lieutenants commanded at Genabum, and to
come himself with these three legions by forced marches. During this
time he employed the numerous cavalry of the Remi, the Lingones, and the
other allies, to protect the foragers and to prevent surprises. But this
daily service, as is often the case, ended by being negligently
performed; and one day the Remi, pursuing the Bellovaci with too much
ardour, fell into an ambuscade. In withdrawing, they were surrounded by
foot-soldiers, in the midst of whom Vertiscus, their chief, met with his
death. True to his Gaulish manner, he would not allow his age to
dispense him from commanding and mounting on horseback, although he was
hardly able to keep his seat. His death and this feeble advantage raised
the self-confidence of the barbarians still more, but it rendered the
Romans more circumspect. Nevertheless, in one of the skirmishes which
were continually taking place within sight of the two camps, about the
fordable places of the marsh, the German infantry, which Cæsar had sent
for from beyond the Rhine, in order to mix them with the cavalry, joined
in a body, boldly crossed the marsh, and, meeting with little
resistance, continued the pursuit with such impetuosity that fear seized
not only the enemies who fought, but even those who were in reserve.
Instead of availing themselves of the advantages of the ground, all fled
cowardly; they did not stop till they were within their camp, and some
even were not ashamed to fly beyond it. This defeat caused a general
discouragement, for the Gauls were as easily damped by the least reverse
as they became arrogant on the smallest success.

Day after day was passing in this manner, when Cæsar was informed of the
arrival of C. Trebonius and his troops, which raised the number of his
legions to seven. The chiefs of the Bellovaci then feared an investment
like that of Alesia, and resolved to quit their position. They sent away
by night the old men, the infirm, the unarmed men, and the part of the
baggage which they had kept with them. Scarcely was this confused
multitude in motion, embarrassed with its own mass and its numerous
chariots, when daylight surprised it, and the troops had to be drawn up
in line before the camp, to give the column time to move away. Cæsar saw
no advantage either in giving battle to those who were in position, or,
on account of the steepness of the hill, in pursuing those who were
making their retreat; he resolved, nevertheless, to make two legions
advance in order to disturb the enemy in his retreat. Having observed
that the mountain on which the Gauls were established was connected with
another height (Mont Collet), from which it was only separated by a
narrow valley, he ordered bridges to be thrown on the marsh; the legions
crossed over them, and soon attained the summit of the height, which was
defended on both sides by abrupt declivities. There he collected his
troops, and advanced in order of battle up to the extremity of the
plateau, whence the engines, placed in battery, could reach the masses
of the enemy with their missiles.

The barbarians, rendered confident by the advantage of their position,
were ready to accept battle, if the Romans dared to attack the mountain;
besides, they were afraid to withdraw their troops successively, as, if
divided, they might have been thrown into disorder. This attitude led
Cæsar to resolve on leaving twenty cohorts under arms, and on tracing a
camp on this spot, and retrenching it. When the works were completed,
the legions were placed before the retrenchments, and the cavalry
distributed with their horses bridled at the outposts. The Bellovaci had
recourse to a stratagem in order to effect their retreat. They passed
from hand to hand the fascines and the straw on which, according to the
Gaulish custom, they were in the habit of sitting, preserving at the
same time their order of battle, placed them in front of the camp, and,
towards the close of the day, on a preconcerted signal, set fire to
them. Immediately a vast flame concealed from the Romans the Gaulish
troops, who fled in haste.

Although the fire prevented Cæsar from seeing the retreat of the enemy,
he suspected it. He ordered his legions to advance, and sent the cavalry
in pursuit; but he marched only slowly, for fear of some stratagem, as
the barbarians might have formed the design of drawing the Romans to a
disadvantageous ground. Besides, the cavalry did not dare to ride
through the smoke and flames; and thus the Bellovaci were able to pass
over a distance of ten miles, and halt in a place strongly fortified by
nature, Mont Ganelon, where they pitched their camp. In this position,
they confined themselves to placing cavalry and infantry in frequent
ambuscades, thus inflicting great damage on the Romans when they went to
forage. [546]


[Sidenote: Battle on the Aisne. ]

III. After several encounters of this kind, Cæsar learnt by a prisoner
that Correus, chief of the Bellovaci, with 6,000 picked infantry and
1,000 horsemen, were preparing an ambuscade in the places where the
abundance of corn and forage was likely to attract the Romans. In
consequence of this information, he sent forward the cavalry, which was
always employed to protect the foragers, and joined with them some
light-armed auxiliaries; and he himself, with a greater number of
legions, followed them as near as possible.

The enemy had posted themselves in a plain (that of Choisy-au-Bac) of
about 1,000 paces wide in every direction, and surrounded on one side by
forests, on the other by a river which was difficult to pass (the
Aisne). The cavalry were acquainted with the designs of the Gauls;
feeling themselves supported, they advanced resolutely, in squadrons,
towards this plain, which was surrounded with ambushes on all sides.
Correus, seeing them arrive in this manner, believed the opportunity
favourable for the execution of his plan, and began by attacking the
first squadrons with a few men. The Romans sustained the shock, without
concentrating themselves in a mass on the same point, “which,” says
Hirtius, “happens usually in cavalry engagements, and leads always to a
dangerous confusion. ” There, on the contrary, the squadrons remained
separated, fought in detached bodies, and, when one of them advanced,
its flanks were protected by the others. Correus then ordered the rest
of his cavalry to issue from the woods. An obstinate combat began on all
sides, without any decisive result, until the enemy’s infantry,
debouching from the forest in close ranks, forced the Roman cavalry to
fall back. The lightly-armed soldiers, who preceded the legions, placed
themselves between the squadrons, and restored the fortune of the
combat. After a certain time, the troops, animated by the approach of
the legions and the arrival of Cæsar, and ambitious of obtaining alone
the honour of the victory, redoubled their efforts, and gained the
advantage. The enemies, on the other hand, were discouraged and took to
flight; but they were stopped by the very obstacles which they intended
to throw in the way of the Romans. A small number, nevertheless, escaped
through the forest and crossed the river. Correus, who remained unshaken
under this catastrophe, obstinately refused to surrender, and fell
pierced with wounds.

After this success, Cæsar hoped that, if he continued his march, the
enemy, in dismay, would abandon his camp, which was only eight miles
from the field of battle. He therefore crossed the Aisne, though not
without great difficulties.

The Bellovaci and their allies, informed by the fugitives of the death
of Correus, of the loss of their cavalry and the flower of their
infantry, fearing every moment to see the Romans appear, convoked, by
sound of trumpets, a general assembly, and decided by acclamation to
send deputies and hostages to the proconsul. The barbarians implored
forgiveness, alleging that this last defeat had ruined their power, and
that the death of Correus, the instigator of the war, delivered them
from oppression, for during his life it was not the Senate who
governed, but an ignorant multitude. To their prayers, Cæsar replied,
“that last year the Bellovaci had revolted in concert with the other
Gaulish peoples, but that they alone had persisted in the revolt. It was
very convenient to throw their faults upon those who were dead; but how
could it be believed that, with nothing but the help of a weak populace,
a man should have had sufficient influence to raise and sustain a war,
contrary to the will of the chiefs, the decision of the Senate, and the
desire of honest people? However, the evil which they had drawn upon
themselves was for him a sufficient reparation. ”

The following night the Bellovaci and their allies submitted, with the
exception of Commius, who fled to the country whence he had recently
drawn succours. He had not dared to trust the Romans for the following
reason: the year before, in the absence of Cæsar, T. Labienus, informed
that Commius was conspiring and preparing an insurrection, thought that,
without accusing him of bad faith, says Hirtius, he could repress his
treason. Under pretext of an interview, he sent C. Volusenus Quadratus
with some centurions to kill him; but, when they were in the presence of
the Gaulish chief, the centurion who was to strike him missed his blow,
and only wounded him; swords were drawn on both sides, and Commius had
time to escape. [547]


[Sidenote: Devastation of the Country of the Eburones. ]

IV. The most warlike tribes had been vanquished, and none of them dreamt
of further revolt. Nevertheless, many inhabitants of the
newly-conquered countries abandoned the towns and the fields in order to
withdraw themselves from the Roman dominion. Cæsar, in order to put a
stop to this emigration, distributed his army into different countries.
He ordered the quæstor Mark Antony to come to him, with the 12th legion,
and sent the lieutenant Fabius with twenty-five cohorts into an opposite
part of Gaul (to the country situated between the Creuse and the
Vienne), where it was said that several peoples were in arms, and where
the lieutenant Caninius Rebilus, who commanded with two legions,
appeared not to be sufficiently strong;[548] lastly, he ordered T.
Labienus to join him in person, and to send the 15th legion,[549] which
he had under his command, into Cisalpine Gaul, to protect the colonies
of Roman citizens there against the sudden inroads of the barbarians,
who, the summer before, had attacked the Tergestini (the inhabitants of
Trieste).

As for Cæsar, he proceeded with four legions to the territory of the
Eburones, to lay it waste; as he could not secure Ambiorix, who was
still wandering at large, he thought it advisable to destroy everything
by fire and sword, persuaded that this chief would never dare to return
to a country on which he had brought such a terrible calamity: the
legions and the auxiliaries were charged with this execution. Then, he
sent Labienus with two legions to the country of the Treviri, who,
always at war with the Germans, were only kept in obedience by the
presence of a Roman army. [550]


[Sidenote: Expedition against Dumnacus. ]

V.
During this time, Caninius Rebilus, who had first been appointed to
go into the country of the Ruteni, but who had been detained by partial
insurrections in the region situated between the Creuse and the Vienne,
learnt that numerous hostile bands were assembling in the country of the
Pictones; he was informed of this by letters from Duratius, their king,
who, amid the defection of a part of his people, had remained invariably
faithful to the Romans. He started immediately for Lemonum (_Poitiers_).
On the road, he learnt from prisoners that Duratius was shut up there,
and besieged by several thousand men under the orders of Dumnacus, chief
of the Andes. Rebilus, at the head of two weak legions, did not dare to
measure his strength with the enemy; he contented himself with
establishing his camp in a strong position. At the news of his approach,
Dumnacus raised the siege, and marched to meet the legions. But, after
several days’ fruitless attempts to force their camp, he returned to
attack Lemonum.

Meanwhile, the lieutenant Caius Fabius, occupied in pacifying several
peoples, learnt from Caninius Rebilus what was going on in the country
of the Pictones; he marched without delay to the assistance of
Duratius. The news of the march of Fabius deprived Dumnacus of all hope
of opposing at the same time the troops shut up in Lemonum and the army
of succour. He abandoned the siege again in great haste, not thinking
himself safe until he had placed the Loire between him and the Romans;
but he could only pass that river where there was a bridge (at Saumur).
Before he had joined Rebilus, before he had even obtained a sight of the
enemy, Fabius, who came from the north, and had lost no time, doubted
not, from what he heard from the people of the country, that Dumnacus,
in his fear, had taken the road which led to that bridge. He therefore
marched thither with his legions, preceded, at a short distance, by his
cavalry. The latter surprised the column of Dumnacus on its march,
dispersed it, and returned to the camp laden with booty.

During the night of the following day, Fabius again sends his cavalry
forward, with orders to delay the march of the enemy, so as to give time
for the arrival of the infantry. The two cavalries are soon engaged; but
the enemy, thinking that he had to contend only with the same troops as
the day before, draws up his infantry in line, so as to support the
squadrons, when, suddenly, the legions appear in order of battle. At
this sight, the barbarians are struck with terror, the long train of
baggage is thrown into confusion, and they disperse. More than 12,000
men were killed, and all the baggage fell into the hands of the Romans.

Only 5,000 fugitives escaped from this rout; they were received by the
Senonan Drappes, the same who, in the first revolt of the Gauls, had
collected a crowd of vagabonds, slaves, exiles, and robbers, to
intercept the convoys of the Romans. They took the direction of the
Narbonnese with the Cadurcan Lucterius, who, as has been seen in the
preceding chapter (p. 275), had before attempted a similar invasion.
Rebilus pursued them with two legions, in order to avoid the shame of
seeing the province suffering any injury from such a contemptible
rabble.

As for Fabius, he led the twenty-five cohorts against the Carnutes and
the other peoples, whose forces had already been reduced by the defeat
they had just experienced with Dumnacus. The Carnutes, though often
beaten, had never been completely subdued; they gave hostages; the
Armorican peoples followed their example. Dumnacus, driven out of his
own territory, went to seek a refuge in the remotest part of Gaul. [551]


[Sidenote: Capture of Uxellodunum. ]

VI. Drappes and Lucterius, when they learnt that they were pursued by
Rebilus and his two legions, gave up the design of penetrating into the
province; they halted in the country of the Cadurci, and threw
themselves into the _oppidum_ of Uxellodunum (_Puy-d’Issolu_, near
Vayrac), an exceedingly strong place, formerly under the dependence of
Lucterius, who soon excited the inhabitants into revolt.

Rebilus appeared immediately before the town, which, surrounded on all
sides by steep rocks, was, even without being defended, difficult of
access to armed men. Knowing that there was in the _oppidum_ so great a
quantity of baggage that the besieged could not send them secretly away
without being overtaken by the cavalry, and even by the infantry, he
divided his cohorts into three bodies, and established three camps on
the highest points. (_See Plate 31. _) Next, he ordered a
countervallation to be made. On seeing these preparations, the besieged
remembered the ill fortune of Alesia, and feared a similar fate.
Lucterius, who had witnessed the horrors of famine during the investment
of that town, took especial care for the provisions, and, with the
consent of all, having 2,000 men in Uxellodunum, he left by night, with
Drappes and the rest of the troops, to procure them.

After a few days they collected, by good-will or by force, a great
quantity of provisions. During this time the garrison of the _oppidum_
attacked the redoubts of Rebilus several times, which obliged him to
interrupt the work of the countervallation, which, indeed, he would not
have had sufficient forces to defend.

Drappes and Lucterius established themselves at a distance of ten miles
from the _oppidum_, with the intention of introducing the provisions
gradually. They shared the duties between them. Drappes remained with
part of the troops to protect the camp. Lucterius, during the
night-time, endeavoured to introduce beasts of burden into the town, by
a narrow and woody path. The noise of their march gave warning to the
sentries. Rebilus, informed of what was going on, ordered the cohorts to
sally from the neighbouring redoubts, and at daybreak fell upon the
convoy, the escort of which was slaughtered. Lucterius, having escaped
with a small number of his followers, was unable to rejoin Drappes.

Rebilus soon learnt from prisoners that the rest of the troops which had
left the _oppidum_ were with Drappes at a distance of twelve miles, and
that, by a fortunate chance, not one fugitive had taken that direction
to carry him news of the last combat. The Roman general sent in advance
all the cavalry and the light German infantry; he followed them with one
legion without baggage, leaving the other as a guard to the three camps.
When he came near the enemy, he learnt by his scouts that the
barbarians, according to their custom, neglecting the heights, had
placed their camp on the banks of a river (probably the Dordogne); that
the Germans and the cavalry had surprised them, and that they were
already fighting. Rebilus then advanced rapidly at the head of the
legion, drawn up in order of battle, and took possession of the heights.
As soon as the ensigns appeared, the cavalry redoubled their ardour, the
cohorts rush forward from all sides, the Gauls were taken or killed, the
booty was immense, and Drappes fell into the hands of the Romans.

Rebilus, after this successful exploit, which cost him but a few
wounded, returned under the walls of Uxellodunum. Fearing no longer any
attack from without, he set resolutely to work to continue his
circumvallation. The day after, C. Fabius arrived, followed by his
troops, and shared with him the labours of the siege.

While the south of Gaul was the scene of serious troubles, Cæsar left
the quæstor Mark Antony, with fifteen cohorts, in the country of the
Bellovaci. To deprive the Belgæ of all idea of revolt, he had proceeded
to the neighbouring countries with two legions, had exacted hostages,
and restored confidence by his conciliating speeches. When he arrived
among the Carnutes, who, the year before, had been the first to revolt,
he saw that the remembrance of their conduct kept them in great alarm,
and he resolved to put an end to it by causing his vengeance to fall
only upon Gutruatus, the instigator of the war. This man was brought and
delivered up; and although Cæsar was naturally inclined to indulgence,
he could not resist the tumultuous entreaties of his soldiers, who made
that chief responsible for all the dangers they had run, and for all the
misery they had suffered. Gutruatus died under the stripes, and was
afterwards beheaded.

It was in the land of the Carnutes that Cæsar received news, by the
letters of Rebilus, of the events which had taken place at Uxellodunum,
and of the resistance of the besieged. Although a handful of men shut up
in a fortress was not very formidable, he judged it necessary to punish
their obstinacy, for fear that the Gauls should acquire the conviction
that it was not strength, but constancy, which had failed them in
resisting the Romans; and lest this example might encourage the other
states, which possessed fortresses advantageously situated, to recover
their independence.

Moreover, it was known everywhere amongst the Gauls that Cæsar had only
one summer more to hold his command, and that after that they would
have nothing more to fear. He left, therefore, the lieutenant Quintus
Calenus[552] at the head of his two legions, with orders to follow him
by ordinary marches, and with his cavalry he hastened by long marches
towards Uxellodunum.

Cæsar, arriving unexpectedly before that town, found it completely
invested on all accessible points. He judged that it could not be taken
by assault (_neque ab oppugnatione recedi videret ulla conditione
posse_), and, as it was abundantly provided with provisions, he
conceived the project of depriving the inhabitants of water. The
mountain was surrounded nearly on every side by very low ground; but on
one side there existed a valley through which a river (the Tourmente)
ran. As it flowed at the foot of two precipitous mountains, the
disposition of the localities did not admit of turning it aside and
conducting it into lower channels. It was difficult for the besieged to
come down to it, and the Romans rendered the approaches to it still more
dangerous. They placed posts of archers and slingers, and brought
engines which commanded all the slopes which gave access to the river.
The besieged had thenceforth no other means of procuring water but by
fetching it from an abundant spring which arose at the foot of the wall,
300 feet from the channel of the Tourmente. (_See Plate 31. _) Cæsar
resolved to drain this spring, and for this purpose he did not hesitate
to attempt a laborious undertaking: opposite the point where it rose, he
ordered covered galleries to be pushed forwards against the mountain,
and, under protection of these, a terrace to be raised, labours which
were carried on in the middle of continual fights and incessant
fatigues. Although the besieged, from their elevated position, fought
without danger, and wounded many Romans, yet the latter did not yield to
discouragement, but continued their task. At the same time they made a
subterranean gallery, which, running from the covered galleries, was
intended to lead up to the spring. This work, carried on free from all
danger, was executed without being perceived by the enemy; the terrace
attained a height of sixty feet, and was surmounted by a tower of ten
stories, which, without equalling the elevation of the wall, a result it
was impossible to obtain, still commanded the fountain. (_See Plate
32. _) Its approaches, battered by engines from the top of this tower,
became inaccessible; in consequence of this, many men and animals in the
place died of thirst. The besieged, terrified at this mortality, filled
barrels with pitch, grease, and shavings, and rolled them in flames upon
the Roman works, making at the same time a sally, so as to prevent them
from extinguishing the fire; soon it spread to the covered galleries and
the terrace, which stopped the progress of the inflammable materials.
Notwithstanding the difficulty of the ground and the increasing danger,
the Romans still persevered in their struggle. The battle took place on
a height, within sight of the army; loud cries were raised on both
sides; each individual sought to rival his fellows in zeal, and the more
he was exposed to view, the more courageously he faced the missiles and
the fire.

Cæsar, as he was sustaining great loss, determined to feign an assault,
in order to create a diversion: he ordered some cohorts to climb the
hill on all sides, uttering loud cries. This movement terrified the
besieged, who, fearing to be attacked on other points, called back to
the defence of the wall those who were setting fire to the works. Then
the Romans were able to extinguish the fire. Nevertheless, the siege
span out in length; the Gauls, although exhausted by thirst and reduced
to a small number, did not cease to defend themselves vigorously. At
length, the subterranean gallery having reached the veins of the spring,
they were taken and turned aside. The besieged, seeing the fountain all
at once dried up, believed, in their despair, that it was an
intervention of the gods, submitted to necessity, and surrendered.

Cæsar considered that the pacification of Gaul would never be completed
if the same resistance was encountered in many other towns. He thought
it indispensable to spread terror by a severe example, so much the more
as “the well-known mildness of his temper,” says Hirtius, “would not
allow this necessary rigour to be ascribed to cruelty. ” He ordered all
those who had carried arms to have their hands cut off, and sent them
away, as living witnesses of the chastisement reserved for rebels.
Drappes, who had been taken prisoner, starved himself to death;
Lucterius, who had been arrested by the Arvernan Epasnactus, a friend of
the Romans, was delivered up to Cæsar. [553]


[Sidenote: Excavations made at Puy-d’Issolu. ]

VII. The excavations made at Puy-d’Issolu in 1865 leave no further doubt
as to the site of Uxellodunum. (_See Plates 31 and 32. _)

The Puy d’Issolu is a lofty mountain, situated not far from the right
bank of the Dordogne, between Vayrac and Martel; it is isolated on all
sides except towards the north, where it is joined by a defile of 400
mètres wide (the Col de Roujon) to heights named the Pech-Demont. Its
plateau, crowned by a circle of perpendicular rocks, commands, almost in
every direction, the low ground which surrounds it. This is what the
author of the VIIIth book _De Bello Gallico_ expresses by these words:
_Infima vallis totum pæne montem cingebat in quo positum erat præruptum
undique oppidum Uxellodunum_. This plateau, with a surface of eighty
hectares in extent, presents strongly-marked undulations: its general
incline lies from the north to the south, in the direction of the length
of the mountain mass; its highest point is 317 mètres above the level of
the sea, and it rises 200 mètres above the valleys which surround it.

The whole eastern slope of the mountain, that which looks towards Vayrac
and the Dordogne, is surmounted with rocks, which have a height of as
much as forty mètres; consequently, no operation took place on this side
during the time of the siege. The western slope alone was the theatre of
the different combats. Its declivities are not inaccessible, especially
between the village of Loulié and the hamlet of Leguillat, but they are
sufficiently abrupt to make the Latin author say: _Quo, defendente
nullo, tamen armatis ascendere esset difficile_. At the very foot of
this declivity, and at 200 mètres beneath the culminating point of the
plateau, the Tourmente flows, a little river ten mètres broad, embanked
between this declivity and that of the opposite heights: _Flumen infimam
vallem dividebat_, &c. Such a disposition of the localities, as well as
the slight descent of the Tourmente (one mètre in 1,000), rendered it
impossible to turn off that river. (_Hoc flumem averti loci natura
prohibebat_, &c. )

There is no spring on the plateau of Puy-d’Issolu; but several issue
from the sides of the mountain, one of which, that of Loulié, is
sufficiently abundant to provide for the necessities of a numerous
population. This was the spring which the Romans succeeded in turning
off. At the time of the siege, it issued from the side of the mountain
at _S_ (_see Plate 31_), at twenty-five mètres from the wall of the
_oppidum_, and at a distance of about 300 mètres from the Tourmente.
These 300 mètres make about 200 Roman paces. We see, therefore, that in
the Latin text the word _pedum_ must be replaced by _passuum_. We also
see that the word _circuitus_ (VIII. 4) must be taken in the sense of
the _course_ of the river.

The “Commentaries” say (VIII. 33) that Rebilus established three camps
in very elevated positions. Their sites are indicated by the nature of
the localities: the first, _A_, was on the heights of Montbuisson; the
second, _B_, on those of the Château de Termes; the third, _C_, opposite
the defile of Roujon, on the Pech-Demont. It appears from the
excavations that the Romans had not retrenched the two first, which is
easily explained, for the heights to the west of the Puy-d’Issolu are
impregnable. Moreover, the Romans at Uxellodunum were not in the same
situation as at Alesia. There they had before them 80,000 men, and in
their rear a very numerous army of succour; here, on the contrary, it
was only a question of reducing a few thousand men. The camp _C_
required to be protected, because it was possible for troops to descend
from the tableau of the Puy-d’Issolu towards the defile of Roujon,
which, being situated fifty mètres lower down, gives an easy access to
the heights of Pech-Demont. The excavations have, in fact, brought to
light a double line of parallel fosses, which barred the defile behind,
and formed at the same time a countervallation.

The Gauls could only quit the town by this defile, and by the western
slope of the mountain. It became, consequently, interesting to ascertain
if the Romans made a countervallation along the Tourmente, on the slopes
of the heights of the castle of Termes and of Montbuisson.
Unfortunately, the railway from Perigueux to Capdenac, which passes over
the very site where the countervallation might have been made, has
destroyed all traces of the Roman works: the excavations made above this
line have produced no result.

The most interesting discovery was that of the subterranean
gallery. [554] Until the moment when the excavations were commenced, a
part of the rain-water absorbed by the plateau of the Puy-d’Issolu
issued near the village of Loulié by two springs, _A_ and _A’_. (_See
Plate 32. _) The spring _A’_ flows from a ravine, and corresponds to the
_thalweg_ of the slope; as to the source _A_, it is easily seen by the
appearance of the ground that it has been turned from its natural
course. The excavations, in fact, have proved that it is produced by the
waters which run in the Roman gallery. This gallery has been opened over
an extent of forty mètres. It was dug in a solid mass of tufa nearly ten
mètres thick, which had been formed in the centuries anterior to Cæsar.
Its form is that of a semicircular vault, supported by two perpendicular
sides; its average dimensions are 1·80m. in height, by a width of 1·50
mètres. The mud carried along by the waters, and accumulated since the
time of the siege of Uxellodunum, had almost filled the gallery, leaving
only at the top of the _intrados_ an empty space in the form of a
segment of a circle, with 0·50m. chord by 0·15m. for the absciss of its
curve. Through this empty space the water ran at the time of the
excavations.

Before reaching the tufa, the first subterranean works of the Romans had
been made in the pure soil, which had to be propped: fragments of
blindage have been found, some of them fixed in silicious mud, corroded
or reduced to the state of ligneous paste, others petrified by their
long contact with the waters charged with calcareous sediments. A
considerable number of these petrified blocks, and remains of wood,
collected in the interior of the gallery, are deposited in the museum of
Saint-Germain.

The gallery does not lead directly to the spring which existed in the
time of the Gauls. The Roman miners, after having made their way
straightforward for a length of six mètres, came upon a thick bed of
blue marl of the lias: they turned to their left to avoid digging
through it, and advanced four mètres farther, following the marl, which
they left to the right. When they reached the end of the marls, a
horizontal layer of hard rock, one mètre thick, obliged them to bring
the gallery back to its former direction, and to raise it, in order to
avoid this new obstacle without going out of the tufas, which, formed by
the waters, would necessarily lead towards the spring. (_See Plate 32. _)
From this second turning, the gallery continued close to the line of
separation of the marls and the tufas. It rose rapidly, until it reached
the limit of the deposits of tufa. At this point blindage had again been
necessary. It was there chiefly that the blocks of petrification
presented a peculiar character: some lay thrown down in the gallery,
pierced by sockets with a rectangular section, which show the dimensions
and the way in which it had been worked; others, with a rounded base,
are veritable uprights, still standing on the rock.

Independently of the excavations made to find the Roman fosses and the
subterranean gallery, others have been made on the slope of Loulié, in
the soil which is near the spring. They have brought to light numerous
fragments of Gaulish pottery and of amphoræ, and, which is a further
confirmation of the identity of the Puy d’Issolu with Uxellodunum,
remains of arms similar in all respects to those found in the fosses of
Alesia. [555] Under the earthfalls which during nineteen centuries have
taken place on the slope of Loulié, all the traces of the fire described
in the “Commentaries” have been also found. The site of the terrace and
the covered galleries which were fired were also traced on the ground.
_Plate 32_ represents the slope which was the scene of the struggle: the
terrace, the tower, and the covered galleries are represented on it, as
well as the subterranean gallery, according to a very exact survey made
on the spot.


[Sidenote: Complete Submission of Gaul. ]

VIII. Whilst these events were taking place on the banks of the
Dordogne, Labienus, in a cavalry engagement, had gained a decisive
advantage over a part of the Treviri and Germans, had taken prisoner
their chief, and thus subjected that people, who were always ready to
support any insurrection against the Romans. The Æduan Surus fell also
into his hands: he was a chief distinguished for his courage and his
birth, and the only one of that nation who had not yet laid down his
arms.

From that moment Cæsar considered Gaul to be completely pacified; he
resolved, however, to go himself to Aquitaine, which he had not yet
visited, and which Publius Crassus had partly conquered. Arriving there
at the head of two legions, he obtained the complete submission of that
country without difficulty: all the tribes sent him hostages. He
proceeded next to Narbonne with a detachment of cavalry, and charged
his lieutenants to put the army into winter quarters. Four legions,
under the orders of Mark Antony, Caius Trebonius, Publius Vatinius, and
Q. Tullius, were quartered in Belgium; two among the Ædui, and two among
the Turones, on the frontier of the Carnutes, to hold in check all the
countries bordering on the ocean. These two last legions took up their
winter quarters on the territory of the Lemovices, not far from the
Arverni, so that no part of Gaul should be without troops. Cæsar
remained but a short time in the province, presiding hastily over the
assemblies, determining cases of public contestation, and rewarding
those who had served him well. He had had occasion, more than any one,
to know their sentiments individually, because, during the general
revolt of Gaul, the fidelity and succour of the province had aided him
in triumphing over it. When these affairs were settled, he returned to
his legions in Belgium, and took up his winter quarters at Nemetocenna
(_Arras_).

There he was informed of the last attempts of Commius, who, continuing a
partisan war at the head of a small number of cavalry, intercepted the
Roman convoys. Mark Antony had charged C. Volusenus Quadratus, prefect
of the cavalry, to pursue him; he had accepted the task eagerly, in the
hope of succeeding this time better than the first; but Commius, taking
advantage of the rash ardour with which his enemy had rushed upon him,
had wounded him seriously, and escaped; he was discouraged, however, and
had promised Mark Antony to retire to any spot which should be
appointed him, on condition that he should never be compelled to appear
before a Roman. [556] This condition having been accepted, he had given
hostages. [557]

Gaul was henceforth subjugated; death or slavery had carried off its
principal citizens. Of all the chiefs who had fought for its
independence, only two survived, Commius and Ambiorix. Banished far from
their country, they died unknown.




BOOK IV.

RECAPITULATION OF THE WAR IN GAUL, AND RELATION OF EVENTS AT ROME FROM
696 TO 705.




CHAPTER I.

EVENTS OF THE YEAR 696.


[Sidenote: Difficulties of Cæsar’s Task. ]

I. In the preceding book we have given, from the “Commentaries,” the
relation of the war in Gaul, and endeavoured to elucidate doubtful
questions, and to discover the localities which were the scenes of so
many combats. It will now be not uninteresting to recapitulate the
principal events of the eight campaigns of the Roman proconsul,
separated from all their technical details. We will at the same time
examine what was passing, during this period, on the banks of the Tiber,
and the events which led to the Civil War.

Writers who dislike glory take pleasure in undervaluing it. They seem to
wish thus to invalidate the judgment of past ages: we seek in preference
to confirm it, by explaining why the renown of certain men has filled
the world. To bring to light the heroic examples of the past, to show
that glory is the legitimate reward of great actions, is to pay homage
to the public opinion of all times. Man struggling with difficulties
which seem insurmountable, and conquering them by his genius, offers a
spectacle always worthy of our admiration; and this admiration will be
the more justified, according to the greater disproportion between the
end and the means.

Cæsar is going to quit Rome, to go far from the debates of the Forum,
the agitation of the comitia, and the intrigues of a corrupt town, in
order to take the command of his troops. Let us, then, for a moment lay
aside the statesman, and consider only the warrior, the great captain.
The Roman proconsul is not one of those barbarian chieftains who, at the
head of innumerable hordes, throw themselves upon a foreign country to
ravage it with fire and sword. His mission is not to destroy, but to
extend to a distance the influence of the Republic, by protecting the
peoples of Gaul, either against their own dissensions, or against the
encroachments of their dangerous neighbours. The dangers from which
Italy had been saved by the victories of Marius are not forgotten. Men’s
memory still recalls the savage bravery, and, still more, the multitude
of those barbarians who, before the battle of Aix, had employed six
entire days in defiling in front of the camp of Marius;[558] they still
fear a renewal of these inundations of peoples, and Cæsar’s first duty
is to avert similar perils. Already the Helvetii and their allies, to
the number of 368,000, are on the road towards the Rhine; 120,000
Germans have established themselves in Gaul; 24,000 Harudes, their
countrymen, have just followed the same example; others are marching
after them, and more than 100,000 Suevi are preparing to cross the
Rhine.

The Narbonnese forms the proconsul’s basis of operation, but it is
partly composed of populations recently subjugated, whose fidelity is as
yet doubtful. Rome has in Gaul allied peoples, but they have lost their
preponderance. The different states, divided among themselves by
intestine rivalries, offer an easy prey to the enemy; but let the Roman
army come to occupy their territory in a permanent manner, and thus
wound their feelings of independence, and all the warlike youth will
unite, eager to begin a struggle full of perils for the invaders. Cæsar
is obliged, therefore, to act with extreme prudence, to favour the
ambition of some, repress the encroachments of others, and spare the
susceptibility of all, taking care not to wound their religion, their
laws, or their manners; he is obliged at the same time to draw a part of
his forces from the country he occupies, and obtain thence men,
subsidies, and provisions. The greatest difficulty experienced by the
commander of an army operating in a country the good-will of which he
seeks to conciliate, is to enable his troops to live without exhausting
it, and to assure the welfare of his soldiers without exciting the
discontent of the inhabitants. “To seek to call,” says the Emperor
Napoleon I. in his _Mémoires_, “a nation to liberty and independence; to
desire that a public spirit should form in the midst of it, and that it
should furnish troops; and at the same time to take from it its
principal resources, are two contradictory ideas, and to conciliate them
is the province of talent. ”[559]

Thus, to fight between two and three hundred thousand Helvetii and
Germans, to hold in dominion eight millions of Gauls, and to maintain
the Roman province--such is the task which Cæsar has undertaken, and, to
carry it out, he has as yet only at hand a single legion. What means
will he have to overcome all these obstacles? His genius and the
ascendency of civilisation over barbarism.


[Sidenote: Campaign against the Helvetii. ]

II. Cæsar starts from Rome towards the middle of March, 696, and arrives
in eight days at Geneva. Immediately the Helvetii, who had appointed
their rendezvous on the banks of the Rhine towards the 24th of March,
the day of the equinox, ask his permission to cross Savoy, with the
intention of going to establish themselves in Saintonge. He adjourns his
answer to the 8th of April, and employs the fifteen days thus gained in
fortifying the left bank of the Rhone, from Geneva to the
Pas-de-l’Ecluse, in raising troops in the Roman province, and in
renewing the old bonds of friendship with the Burgundians,[560] who will
soon furnish him with men, horses, and provisions.