No More Learning

. . when Epictetus spoke these words, his audience could not help elingjust what this man wanted them to feel. "
Epictetus' speech, then, was intended to modi his audience's inner discourse. We are thus in the presence oftwo therapies: one was that of the word, practiced in a variety of rms, by means ofstriking or moving rmulas and with the help oflogical and technical rational processes, but also with the help of seductive and persuasive imagery. Another was the therapy ofwriting r onesel which, r Marcus, consisted in taking up the dogmas and rules of action as they were stated by Epictetus-all the while addressing himself-and assimilating them, so that they might be­ come the principles of his inner discourse. There re, one must con­ stantly rekindle the "representations" hantasiai) within onesel in other words, those discourses which rmulate dogmas (VII, 2).
The Meditations as Spiritual Exercises 5 1
Such writing exercises thus lead necessarily to incessant repetitions, and this is what radically di erentiates the Meditations om every other work. Do as are not mathematical rules, learned once and r all and then mechanically applied. Rather, they must somehow become achievements of awareness, intuitions, emotions, and moral experiences which have the intensity of a mystical experience or a vision. This spiritual and a ective spirituality is, however, quick to dissipate. In order to reawaken it, it is not enough to reread what has already been written. Written pages are already dead, and the Meditations were not made to be reread. What counts is the re rmulation: the act ofwriting or talking to onesel right now, in the very moment when one needs to write. It is also the act of composing with the greatest care possible: to search r that version which, at a given moment, will produce the greatest e ect, in the moment be re it des away, almost instantaneously, almost as soon as it is written. Characters traced onto some medium do not x anything: everything is in the act ofwriting. Thus, we witness a succes­ sion of new attempts at composition, repetitions of the same rmulas, and endless variations on the same themes: the themes ofEpictetus.
The goal is to reactualize, rekindle, and ceaselessly reawaken an inner state which is in constant danger ofbeing numbed or extinguished. The task-ever-renewe is to bring back to order an inner discourse which becomes dispersed and diluted in the tility ofroutine.
As he wrote the Meditations, Marcus was thus practicing Stoic spiritual exercises. He was using writing as a technique or procedure in order to in uence himsel and to trans rm his inner discourse by meditating on the Stoic dogmas and rules ofli . This was an exercise ofwriting day by day, ever-renewed, always taken up again and always needing to be taken up again, since the true philosopher is he who is conscious of not yet having attained wisdom.
"Greek" exercises
It is not su rising to the modern reader that the Meditations were written in Greek. One might, however, wonder why the Emperor, whose mother tongue was Latin, chose to use Greek to write personal notes intended only r himself
First of , we must note that Marcus was completely bilingual, having studied Greek rhetoric with Hera es Atticus and Latin rhetoric with Fronto. More generally, the population of Rome was made up of the most diverse elements, who had converged upon the Empire's metropo-
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lis r a wide variety of reasons, and the two languages were in constant use. In the streets of Rome, the Greek doctor Galen could rub elbows with the Christian apologist Justin, or else with some Gnostic. these gures taught in Rome and had students om the educated classes. 9
Even in Rome, Greek was the language ofphilosophy. The rhetori­ cian Quintillian, writing at the end of the rst century A. D. , notes that few Latin writers had ever dealt with philosophy: he cites only Cicero, Brutus, Seneca, and a few others. He could also have included the name of Lucretius. Be that as it may, in the rst century A. D. Cornutus, Musonius Ru s, and Epictetus all wrote in Greek, which allows us to infer that, om then on, educated Romans accepted that even in Rome, the o cial language ofphilosophy should be Greek.
One might have thought that Marcus would have preferred to talk to himself in Latin. As we have seen, however, the Meditations are not spontaneous e usions, but exercises carried out in accordance with a program which Marcus had received om the Stoic tradition, and in particular om Epictetus. Marcus was working with pre-existing materi­ als, and painting on a canvas given him by someone else. This ct entails several consequences.
In the rst place, this philosophical material was associated with a technical vocabulary, and the Stoics, in particular, were renowned r the technical nature of their terminology. Translators must, by the way, be aware ofthis peculiarity ofMarcus' vocabulary, and pay the closest possi­ ble attention when they encounter such words as hypolepsis ("value-judg­ ment"); kataleptikos ("objective"; "adequate"); phantasia ("repre­ sentation," not "imagination"), hegemonikon ("directing principle"); epakolouthesis ("necessary but nonessential consequence"); and hypexaire­ sis ("reserve clause"), to cite only a few examples. Such technicalities go to show that Marcus was no amateur, and that it was not the case that Stoicism wasjust "a religion" r him. 10
It was di cult to translate these terms into Latin. It could be said that Lucretius, Cicero, and Seneca had done quite well when ced with the same kind of challenge. But the goal of these authors was popularization: they wanted to make Greek philosophy accessible to a Latin audience. Marcus' project was di erent: he was writing r himself To translate or to adapt terminology would distract him om his goal. What is more, if they were translated into Latin, the technical terms of Greek philosophy would lose a part of their meaning. In the same way, when Aulus Gel­ lius, 11 a contemporary of Marcus who had studied philosophy at Athens, translates a passage om the Discourses ofEpictetus as reported by Arrian,
The Meditations as Spiritual Exercises 53
he feels obliged to transcribe technical Greek words, in order to explain his choice of the Latin words which he has chosen to correspond to them. Modern translators ofHeidegger are often rced to do the same. In the nal analysis, philosophy, like poetry, is untranslatable.
In any case, Marcus had no time to indulge in the literary work of translation. In the urgency ofconversion and the imminence ofdeath, he searched r immediate e ects: words and phrases which would dissipate worry or anger immediately (IV, 3 , 3 ) . He lt the need to plunge back into the atmosphere of philosophical instruction, and to remember the exact phraseology of Epictetus, which supplied him with the themes upon which he developed his variations.
4
THE PHILOSOPHER-SLAVE AND THE EMPEROR-PHILOSOPHER
Memories ofphilosophical readings
Some quotations om philosophers appear occasionally in the Medita­ tions. 1 It is possible that Marcus may have read some ofthese authors, but he may also have come across them in the course ofhis Stoic readings.
The Stoics considered Heraclitus, r instance, as their great ancestor. 2 Several passages om the Ephesian philosopher appear in the Meditations, but it is di cult to distinguish the authentic passages om the paraphrases which the Emperor gives of them, perhaps because he is quoting them om memory. It is possible that Marcus' allusion to "people who speak and act while asleep," and thus live in a state ofunconsciousness (IV, 46, 4) , is only a development of the rst agment of Heraclitus, which also alluded to the unconsciousness ofthe majority ofmankind, analogous to sleep. 3
At any rate, the theme of the sleep of unconsciousness made a deep impression on Marcus. He makes a possible allusion to the Heraclitean agment4 which speaks ofa person so drunk he no longer knows where he is going: "he who rgets where the road leads," as Marcus puts it (IV, 46, 2). More signi cantly, Marcus a rms-still under the inspiration of Heraclitus5-that those who are asleep and unconscious also contribute, in their own way, to the brication ofthe world, and he draws om this the llowing conclusion (VI, 42, 1):
We are all working together in order to complete one work; some ofus knowingly and consciously, and the others unconsciously.
Thus, even when we oppose ourselves to the will of universal Reason, each of us collaborates with it, r the course of Nature also has need of those who re se to llow it. A er all, Nature has integrated eedom
The Philosopher-Slave and the Emperor-Philosopher 5 5
into her plan, as well as all that it implies: including unconsciousness or resistance. In the drama which Nature makes us play, sleepers and oppo­ nents are precisely what she has to resee.
For these people, asleep or unconscious, who are "in discord with the logos"6 (IV, 46, 3), "what they encounter every day seems reign to them"7 (IV, 46, 3). It could be that this Heraclitean theme was all the more dear to Marcus because ofthe great importance he attached to the notion of" miliarity" with Nature, and there re with the logos. It is this miliarity which allows us to recognize as miliar or natural, and not reign, those events which occur by the will ofNature (III, 2, 6).
The death of the elements into one another-an eminently Her­ aclitean theme-could not il to attract the Emperor's attention (IV, 46, 1); a er all, Stoicism had accustomed him to meditate upon universal metamorphosis. 9
Together with Heraclitus we nd Empedocles, one of whose verses Marcus cites (XII, 3). The "pure-orbed" Sphairos which this poet­ philosopher had ima ned was the traditional model r the Sage. 10
Without naming its author, Marcus quotes and criticizes (IV, 24) a agment ofDemocritus which advises people not to get involved in too many things, if they want to keep their peace of mind. In ct, among those authors-especially Stoics-who dealt with this virtue, it was a tradition to re se the Democritean invitation to inaction. 11
In the collection entitled "The Sentences ofDemocratus," sometimes attributed to Democritus,12 Marcus und an aphorism which, one could say, sums up his own thought (IV, 3, r I):
The world is nothing but metamorphosis (alloiosis), and life is noth­ ing but an opinion (or a judgment: hypolepsis) .
In this rmulation, Marcus no doubt recognized Epictetus' idea accord­
ing to which it is not things that trouble us, but the representations and judgments which we make about them (Manual, §5).
Elsewhere (VII, 3 r , 4), Marcus criticizes another Democritean text, which a rmed that true reality consists of atoms and the void, and that everything else was only "by convention" (nomisti). As Galen explains,13 this meant that "in itsel " there is nothing but atoms; but that "with regard to us," there is a whole world ofcolors, odors, and tastes, which we assume is real, but which in ct is only subjective. Marcus corrects the Democritean rmula, but inte rets it in a Stoic sense. He denies the in nite number of atoms which, on this theory, are the only real princi-
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ples, but h e admits the word nomisti, on the condition that it b e under­ stood not in the sense of "by convention, " but as ifit meant "by a law. " For Marcus, then, only halfofDemocritus' rmula is true: "Everything is nomisti. " Its meaning, however, is that "everything happens by the law," that is, the law ofuniversal Nature. The other part ofDemocritus' rmula, which asserted that the true reality is the multiplicity of atoms which constitute the principles, is lse; r if everything comes about by the laws of Nature, then the number of principles is quite restricted. In ct, it is reduced to one: the logos; or to two: the logos and matter. Such, at least, is one inte retation ofthis di cult and probably corrupt text. 14 One might also consider that Marcus understands "Everything is nomisti" in the same sense as the sentence ofDemocritus cited above: "Everything is subjective; that is, everything is judgment. " In other words, Marcus may have understood it in the light ofEpictetus' idea that everything is in our representations. 15 This does not mean that we do not know reality, but that we attribute to it values ofgood or ofevil which have no basis in reality.
Marcus also thinks he recognizes this doctrine in the rmula of a Cynic (II, 15):
"Everything is matter ofjudgment. " No doubt what people used to say in opposition to Monimus the Cynic is obvious; but the use l­ ness of what he said is obvious too, as long as we receive what is pro table in what he said, while remaining within the limits ofwhat is true.
According to the comic playwright Menander,16 Monimus the Cynic used to declare that all human opinion (to hypolephthen) is only vanity (tuphos). Marcus believed he was penetrating to the deepest truth ofthe rmula cited by Menander: in the nal analysis, everything is a matter of opinion; what troubles us are our value-judgments, and they are only vanity (tuphos).
As Monimus said, it is usually precisely our vanity- tuphos in the sense of "emptiness," "smoke," but also "pride"-which perverts our value­
judgments (VI, lJ):
Pride is a dreadful sophist, and it is just at the moment when you think you are devoting yourself to serious matters that it enchants you the most. Look, r instance, at what Crates says about a man like Xenocrates.
The Philosopher-Slave and the Emperor-Philosopher 57
In antiquity, Platonists like Xenocrates had the reputation of being vain, proud, and haughty, so it is not su rising that Crates-who, like Monimus, was a Cynic-should have reproached him r his tuphos, or pu ed-up vanity. 17
There is no doubt that, either directly or indirectly, Marcus was mil­ iar with other Cynic texts. There is nothing su rising about this: on the one hand, Cynicism and Stoicism were very close to each other with regard to their conceptions oflife; and on the other, as we have seen in the case ofDemocritus and Monimus, our philosopher-emperor had the gi of recognizing Stoic doctrines in the texts which retained his atten­ tion.
We also nd several Platonic texts in the Meditations, taken om the Apology (28b; 28d), the Gorgias (512d-e), the Republic (486a), and the Theaetetus (174d-e). Once again, this is not surprising, because the Plato whom Marcus quotes is, so to speak, a "pre-Stoic" Plato-that is, one who has Socrates speak in terms the Stoics would not have denied. For this Plato/Socrates, the important questions are not those dealing with life and death, but those that deal withjustice and injustice, or good and evil (VII, 44); we must remain at the post which has been assigned to us
(VII, 45); what matters is not to save one's life, but to spend it in the worthiest way possible (VII, 46); he who embraces in one ance the totality oftime and ofsubstance is not a aid ofdeath (VII, 35). Finally, Marcus nds in the Theaetetus ( 1 74d-e) a description of the di cult situation ofa king, bereft ofthe leisure he needs to think and to philoso­ phize, like a shepherd shut up with his ock "in a pasture in the midst of the mountains" (X, 23). What Marcus recognized in all these quotations was Stoicism, not Platonism. 18
Marcus also read a text by Theophrastus, the student of Aristotle, which he alone mentions of all the authors of antiquity. The passage probably interested the judge in Marcus, responsible r assessing guilt, since it raises the question of degrees of responsibility. According to Theophrastus, crimes committed with pleasure, and resulting om the attraction ofpleasure, are more serious than those one is rced to com­ mit because of the su ering caused by an injustice we have borne, which pushes us on to anger. Marcus approves ofthis theory (II, rn), and it has been maintained that he was thereby un ith l to Stoicism, since the Stoa held that ults are equal. 19 Now, it is true that the Stoics consid­ ered wisdom to be an absolute perfection. The slightest ult, there re, estranged a person om this perfection just as much as the most serious one did. One was either a sage or not, and there was no intermediate
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status. In theory, there re, there was no such thing as a more or less serious ult. Yet, r all that, the Stoics did allow r the possibility of moral progress in the case of the non-sage, and consequently they also admitted degrees of moral progress. Di erent degrees of the gravity of ults could there re also be allowed in the case of the non-sage. 20 Epictetus himsel r that matter, also appears to consider that certain ults are more easy to pardon than others (IV, l, 147): the passion of love, r example, is easier to pardon than that ofambition.
Marcus also mentions the "Pythagoreans," who ordained that we should raise our eyes toward the heavens at dawn, in order to remind ourselves of that model of order and purity represented by the stars (XI, 27). 21
Epicurean maxims and passages om Epicurus are also to be und in the Meditations. Marcus rewrites them into a Stoic vocabulary when he quotes them, and he retains om them advice which a Stoic could legitimately practice: be happy with the present, without regretting that which we do not possess and could not possess (VII, 27); pain cannot be simultaneously both unbearable and eternal (VII, 33; VII, 64); we should always keep the virtues ofthe ancients in mind (XI, 26); and nally, in every circumstance, we must remain on the level ofphilosophy, and not let ourselves be dragged down into sharing the anthropomorphic view­ points ofthose who do not practice philosophy (IX, 41). 22 The commen­ tary Marcus gives on this last-mentioned passage-a letter written by Epicurus while he was ill or on his deathbed-allows us to understand how Stoics such as Seneca and Epictetus could nd, even in Epicurean­ ism, maxims capable of nourishing their own meditation. We must not assume that they were eclectics, rather than dyed-in-the-wool Stoics: they knew perfectly well that there was a radical opposition between Stoic and Epicurean doctrines, as well as between the practical attitude of the Stoics and the Epicureans. They were also aware, however, that Epicureanism, Stoicism, Platonism, and Aristotelianism were merely the di erent and opposing rms of a single phenomenon: the philosophical style oflife. Within the latter, there could be points held in common by several-or even all-of the schools, as Marcus states expressly with regard to the letter ofEpicurus (IX, 41):
I t i s common t o all the schools not t o depart om philosophy under any circumstances, and not to let oneselfbe dragged into the chatter of the vulgar, that is, of those who do not practice the science of Nature .
The Philosopher-Slave and the Emperor-Philosopher 59
In particular, the Stoics and the Epicureans shared a speci c attitude with regard to time. They insisted on concentration on the present moment,23 which allows us both to grasp the incomparable value of the present instant, and to diminish the intensity of pain, as we become conscious ofthe ct that we onlyfeel and live this pain within the present moment.
When all is said and done, it was as a Stoic, and as a disciple of Epictetus, that Marcus read the texts of the philosophers whom he quotes. For it is above all the reading ofEpictetus, and the knowledge of his teachings, which explain the Meditations.
The teachings ofEpictetus
In the course of the preceding pages, we have encountered the name of Epictetus more than once. Nor is this surprising, given that he is men­ tioned many times in the Meditations. For instance, Marcus expresses his gratitude to his Stoic teacher Rusticus r having passed along to him notes taken at Epictetus' classes. Marcus o en quotes texts explicitly om Epictetus, and places him on the same level as those whom the Stoics considered the greatest ofmasters II, 19, 2):
How many men-like Chrysippus, like Socrates, like Epictetus­ has Eternity swallowed up!
Epictetus was, at the time, considered to be the great philosopher. His image and teachings were mentioned throughout the literature of the second century A. D. , and he was to remain a model r philosophers down to the end ofantiquity. The Latin author Aulus Gellius, who had studied at Athens, mentions a conversation he had witnessed there in which the rhetorician Herodes Atticus quoted a passage om the Dis­ courses of Epictetus, as collected by Arrian. He also in rms us that, in another conversation, the philosopher Favorinus had reported several of the Master's sayings. In the course ofa sea voyage, Aulus Gellius himself had met another philosopher, who pulled the Discourses out ofhis travel­ bag and read him a passage om them. Elsewhere in Gellius' Attic Nights, we nd allusions to details about Epictetus' life: his initial condition as a slave; his expulsion om Rome by the emperor Domitian; and his even­ tual settling down in Nicopolis. 24 The satirist Lucian, who also lived under the reign ofMarcus, tells how an admirer once bought "the clay lamp ofthe Stoic Epictetus" r 3,000 drachmas. "No doubt he hoped,"
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remarks Lucian,25 " that if he read at night by the light of this lamp, the wisdom of Epictetus would come upon him all of a sudden during his sleep, and he would bejust like that admirable old man. " Marcus' doctor, Galen, alludes to a dialogue which Favorinus of Ades had directed against Epictetus, and which Galen himself re ted. 26 Even Christians such as Origen, who wrote in the third century, speak of Epictetus in terms ofrespect. 27
Epictetus was born in the rst century A. D. , in Phrygian Hierapolis (Pammukale in modern Turkey) . Sometime during the second half of the century, he was brought to Rome as the slave ofEpaphroditus, one of Nero's eedmen. Epictetus mentions his master Epaphroditus several times in the Discourses; he allowed his slave to attend the classes of the Stoic philosopher Musonius Ru s. Musonius had a tremendous in uence on Epictetus; the latter equently reproduces his teacher's sayings in the Discourses, and describes his teaching as llows (III, 23, 29): "When we sat be re him, each of us felt as though someone had de­ nounced our ults to him. Such was the exactitude with which he hit upon our current state, and placed everyone's ults be re his eyes. "
After having been set ee by Epaphroditus, Epictetus opened his own philosophy school in Rome, but was expelled om the city, together with all other philosophers, by the emperor Domitian in 93-94· He then set himselfup at Nicopolis, in Epirus on the Greek coast, a town which served as a jumping-o point r the sea voyage across the Adriatic to Italy. There he opened a new philosophy school. The Neoplatonist Simplicius relates that Epictetus was so poor that the house he lived in at Rome had no need r a lock, since it contained nothing other than the mattress and the mat on which he used to sleep. The same author reports that Epictetus had adopted an o han, and had taken in a woman in order to bring him up,28 but he never married. 29 The precise date of his death is not known.
Epictetus wrote nothing. If we can still get some idea of his teachings, it is thanks to Arrian of Nicomedia, a politician who, as a young man about rn8 A. D. , had attended Epictetus' classes in Nicopolis, and later published the " notes " he had taken at these classes. Arrian of Nicomedia is an attractive character. 30 It should be pointed out right away that his contemporaries considered him a philosopher: inscriptions dedicated to him during his lifetime at Athens and Corinth designate him by this title. 31 The historian Cassius Dio had apparently written a "Life ofArrian the Philosopher. "32 Arrian did, indeed, leave philosophical works behind him. In addition to his notes which report the Sayings or Discourses of Epictetus, one must add a little work which was ofmuch greater impor-
The Philosopher-Slave and the Emperor-Philosopher 6 1
tance in the history ofwestern thought: the so-called Manual ofEpictetus (in Greek, Encheiridion). The word Encheiridion ("that which one has at hand") alludes to a requirement of the Stoic philosophical life-a re­ quirement to which Marcus, too, had tried to respond by composing his Meditations. In every one oflife's circumstances, it was necessary to have "at hand" the principles, "dogmas," rules of life, or rmulas which would allow a person to place himself in that inner disposition most conducive to correct action, or to accept his te. The Manual is a selection ofpassages taken om the Sayings ofEpictetus. 33 It is a kind of anthology of striking maxims aimed at illuminating the philosopher in the course of his actions. Arrian also seems to have written a book on celestial phenomena, or what was called meteorology in antiquity. 34 As we have seen, however, a philosopher in antiquity was not someone who wrote philosophical books, but someone who led a philosophical life, and we have every reason to believe that Arrian, although he remained a
politician like Marcus' teacher Rusticus, tried to live like a philosopher. We can surmise this om the end ofhis pre ce to Epictetus' Discourses; by publishing them, Arrian wanted to produce in his readers the same e ect that Epictetus had on his auditors: to raise them up toward the Good. His model, moreover, was Socrates' mous disciple Xenophon, who had also had a military and political career at the same time as a literary one. Arrian wanted to be known as the "new Xenophon"; he imitates the latter both in style and in the subject matter ofhis works, and, like Xenophon, he too wrote a treatise on hunting. Above all, however, Arrian wrote the Discourses, which are as it were the Memora­ bilia ofEpictetus, the new Socrates. 35 He certainly did not have in mind a mere literary model, but a model r li : that of the philosopher in action. Two centuries later, the philosopher Themistius36 would praise Junius Rusticus and Arrian r having abandoned their books and placed themselves at the service ofthe common good, not only like Cato and other Romans, but especially like Xenophon and Socrates himsel For Rusticus and Arrian, Themistius goes on, philosophy did not stop with pen and ink: they were not content merely to write about courage, and they did not shrink om their duty ofserving the interests ofthe State.
Arrian did, indeed, enjoy a brilliant career as a statesman: he was proconsul of the province ofBeltica around 123 A. D. , consul su ectus37 in l29 or l3o, and governor of Cappadocia om l3o (or l3 l) to l37 (or l 3 8) . In this last capacity, he repulsed an invasion of the Alani in l 3 5 , made an inspection ofthe coasts ofthe Black Sea, and presented a report
on his trip to the emperor Hadrian.
In the pre ce he addressed to his friend Lucius Gellius, Arrian explains
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the way h e had gathered together his notes taken at the classes ven by Epictetus: "I did not compose them in a literary style, as could have been done in the case of sayings of this kind, and I did not publish them mysel precisely because I did not compose them. " In antiquity, it was in principle only works care lly composed according to the rules of style and composition that were made public, either by means of a public reading, or by giving the text over to booksellers.
Yet I tried to write down everything I heard while he was speaking, in the same words that he used, in order to preserve r myself, in the ture, "notes to help me remember" ypomnemata) his thought and his eedom of speech. It is there re natural that these notes should have the appearance of a spontaneous, man-to-man conver­ sation, and not at all that ofa composition intended to be read later.
What Arrian means is that he has reproduced, inso r as was possible, the spontaneity of an exhortation or a dialogue, and this is how he explains his use of popular language (koine) throughout the work, instead of the literary style he had used in his other books. He continues: "I do not know how notes which were in such a state have managed to nd their way into the public domain, unbeknownst to me and against my wishes. " The same thing probably happened to Arrian as had happened to Galen: class notes, initially con ded to iends, were gradually copied in a wide variety of circumstances and were thus, r all intents and purposes, "published. " "I don't particularly care ifpeople think me inca­ pable of properly composing a work. " Here, by despising literary glory, Arrian shows himselfto be a good student ofEpictetus.
As r Epictetus: it is not important in his case either, ifit is true that he held discourses in contempt. When he spoke, the only thing he wanted was to set the thoughts of his listeners in motion toward better things. If that is indeed the result of these discourses, then they will certainly not il to produce the e ect that the discourse of philosophers should produce. Ifthe contrary should occur, then at least may those who read them know that when they were spoken by Epictetus himsel the person listening to them necessarily felt what that man wanted him to feel. If these discourses il to produce this e ect, perhaps I am to blame; perhaps, however, thingsjust had to be that way.
The Philosopher-Slave and the Emperor-Philosopher
I shall not go into detail about the discussions to which this passage has given rise among historians. Some are of the opinion that Arrian has preserved r us in his work the very words ofEpictetus, taken down by stenography. For others, on the contrary, Arrian, in his desire to imitate Xenophon's Memorabilia, carried out a much more extensive editorial activity than he gives us to understand in his letter to Gellius: he often reconstituted Epictetus' sayings, since their literary rm is much more re ned than Arrian was willing to admit. In any case, unless we suppose that Arrian was capable ofdeveloping an original philosophical discourse himself and attributing it to Epictetus, we have no alternative but to concede that, as r as the main points are concerned, Arrian's work is closely connected with the living teaching ofEpictetus. 38
We must not conclude om this, however-as has been done by the majority ofhistorians and commentators-that all ofEpictetus' teachings are contained in the Discourses as reported by Arrian. As we read them, we nd allusions to parts of the course which were not included by Arrian. In ct, as has been shown by Souilhe,39 the greatest part of Epictetus' course, as was the case r all philosophy courses om at least the rst century A. D. on, was devoted to the explanation oftexts by the unders of the school-that is, in the case of the Stoics, Zeno and Chrysippus. The master would explain these texts, but this was also sometimes the task ofthe auditors. Now, although Arrian did not repro­ duce one single bit of this technical aspect of Epictetus' pedagogical activity, he does sometimes allude to it.
For instance, he relates a scene in which one of Epictetus' students is explaining, under the guidance of a more advanced student, a Stoic text concerning the logical problem of syllogisms (I, 26, 13); similarly, he speaks ofEpictetus getting up in the morning and thinking about how he will direct the exercise of textual explanation in his class later that day (I, IO, 8).
This part of the class, then, which consisted of "reading"40 would become the lectio ofthe Middle Ages, and nally our "lesson. " It made up the most essential part of Epictetus' teachings, but is completely absent om the Discourses of Epictetus. What they do preserve r us, however, is what could be termed the nontechnical part of the course. philosophy courses-at least since the beginning of the rst century A. D. -contained as an essential element the explanation oftexts; yet they could also end in a moment of ee discussion between the philosopher and his auditors. Aulus Gellius, writing a few decades after Arrian, tells how his Platonic teacher had the habit, a er the lectio or textual explana­ tion, of suggesting that his auditors question him on a topic of their
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choice. The Discourses narrated by Arrian thus correspond to those more relaxed moments in which the Master entered into a dialogue with his students, or developed remarks which he considered use l r the prac­ tice of the philosophical li . 41
It is most important to emphasize this point, r it means that we cannot expect to nd technical and systematic expositions of the whole of Stoic doctrine in Epictetus' Discourses as reported by Arrian. This does not mean, however, that Epictetus did not, in that part of course devoted to theoretical instruction, tackle the Stoic system as a whole by means of the explanation of texts. In other words, we should not say that, of the three parts of Stoic philosophy-physics, ethics, and logic-Epictetus ignores physics, or that part of this discipline which described physical phenomena; r we have no idea which Stoic texts Epictetus read during his classes, nor of the explanation he gave of them. we can say is that he does not mention physical problems in those discourses with his disciples which have come down to us. It does appear that Arrian himself wrote a book on comets, which is un rtunately now lost to us. Ifthis is true, we can presume that Arrian had been initiated by Epictetus into the philosophical treatment of this kind of question. The way Photius de­ scribes the contents of the work even allows us to see what Arrian had retained om the lessons ofEpictetus-that is, the moral signi cance that was to be attributed to physical investigations:42 "Arrian, who wrote a little work on the nature, rmation, and apparitions of comets, tries to show in a number of discussions that appearances such as this do not retell anything, either good or evil. "
We shall have occasion to return to Epictetus' conception of the tripartite division of philosophy. For the moment, it is su cient to say that it would be utte y false to conclude, on the basis of the content of the Discourses as they have come down to us, that Late Stoicism under­ went an impoverishment in its theoretical teaching. 43 In the rst place, as we have seen, the Discourses only reproduce-certainly in a highly ag­ mentary way-that part of the course which was, by de nition, neither theoretical nor technical. Second, they are only the echo ofthe remarks that Arrian heard over a period of one or two years, during the time of his stay at Nicopolis. Epictetus, by contrast, taught r twenty- ve or thirty years. Finally, we must not rget that only the rst ur books of the Discourses have been preserved. This means that one or more books have been lost: Aulus Gellius quotes a long passage om book V. 44 Thanks to Marcus Aurelius, we can also get a glimpse ofthe existence of Epictetan texts otherwise unknown to us. Thus we can see that the
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Discourses, at least in the condition in which they have come down to us, do not by any means give us an idea of everything that Epictetus said, much less ofwhat he did not say.
We know om Book I ofthe Meditations (chapter 7) that Marcus came to know Epictetus thanks to Junius Rusticus, who had instructed Marcus in Stoic doctrine be re going on to become one of his counselors. Marcus tells us that Rusticus lent him his personal copy ofthe hypomne­ mata ofEpictetus, that is, ofnotes taken at his classes. This assertion can be interpreted in two ways: in the rst place, we might think that the writings in question were a copy of the work by Arrian. Arrian himself, in his letter to Lucius Gellius mentioned above, represented his work as hypomnemata, or notes designed to serve as an aide-memoire. The letter to Gellius was probably written after the death of Epictetus, which took place sometime between 125 and 130 A. D. The book was probably in circulation by 130. Aulus Gellius tells us that during the year he spent studying at Athens around 140, he was present at a discussion in the course of which the mous millionaire Herodes Atticus had brought om the library a copy ofwhat Gellius calls the dissertationes ofEpictetus, put into order (digestae) by Arrian. 45 He also tells how, on a sea voyage om Cassiopoiea to Brindisium, he had encountered a philosopher who was carrying this work in his traveler's sack; what is more, the philoso­ pher had read him a passage om the now-lost book V. Thus, thanks to Rusticus, Marcus was able to read a copy of the Discourses as composed by Arrian, and this copy was more complete than the ones known by our modern editions.
Another hypothesis, proposed by Farquharson,46 could also be envis­ aged. The notes passed on by Rusticus to Marcus might have been Rusticus' own, which he himself had taken at the classes of Epictetus. From the point of view of chronology, if we assume that Epictetus died between 125 and 130 A. D. , and that Rusticus was born at the beginning of the second century (as can be surmised om his o cial cursus), it is entirely possible that he may have been Epictetus' student around 120 A. D. Moreover, since the Discourses ofEpictetus as reported by Arrian were widely known in Greece around 140, it is di cult to imagine that in the Rome of about 145-146 A. D. -at the time when Marcus had become converted to philosophy-no copy of the work was to be und. Marcus represents Rusticus' gift as something exceptional, so we are entitled to wonder ifthe gift was indeed Rusticus' own notes. Ifthis were the case, then these notes may have revealed to Marcus an Epictetus quite di erent om the one we know thanks to Arrian. A er ,
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Epictetus certainly did not say the same things, every year, to all of his students.
It is, in any case, virtually certain that Marcus did read Arrian's work, since the Meditations contain several literal quotations taken om it. Whether Marcus read only the Discourses as composed by Arrian, or whether he also had access to the notes ofRusticus, one thing is certain: Marcus was miliar with more texts pertaining to the teachings of Epictetus than we are today. We now possess only a part of Arrian's work; and the notes of Rusticus-if indeed they did exist-might well have revealed to Marcus teachings ofEpictetus other than those reported by Arrian. As we shall see, it is thanks to Marcus that we have access to several agments ofEpictetus which are otherwise unknown.
Quotations ofEpictetus in the Meditations
You are a little soul carrying around a co se, as Epictetus has said
(IV, 41).
When you kiss your child, says Epictetus, you must say to yoursel "perhaps you will be dead tomorrow . . . " (XI, 34).
These are the two explicit quotations of Epictetus which are to be und in the Meditations. 47 The rst text is not to be und in the ur books ofEpictetus' Discourses reported by Arrian which we possess today, and came to Marcus, as I have said, by some other channel. The "soul carrying around a corpse" also reappears in IX, 24, in one ofa series of descriptions of the miserable condition into which human life is plunged when it is not in con rmity with Nature and with Reason:
In ntile rages, in ntile games! Souls carrying corpses around! In order that the scene of the Evocation of the dead be be re your eyes in a yet more striking way.
In the other quotation om Epictetus (XI, 34), we can recognize a text om book III ofthe Discourses (III, 24, 88).
Yet it o en happens that Marcus repeats whole passages om Epictetus, without quoting him. When Marcus (VII, 63) quotes a passage om Plato (Republic, 4r2e-4rJa), r example, he gives the text in the rm which had been given it by Epictetus (I, 28, 4):
The Philosopher-Slave and the Emperor-Philosopher
Each soul is deprived ofthe truth against its will.
We encounter this quote again, moreover, in the long series ofkephalaia against anger (XI, 18, 5).
Epictetus alluded to the Stoic theory ofsuicide as llows (I, 25, I 8):
So there's some smoke in the house? If there's not too much, I' stay; ifthere's too much, I'll leave. For what you must never rget, and keep rmly in mind, is that the door is wide open.
Marcus echoes Epictetus as llows 0f, 29, 2): Smoke? Then I'm leaving!
Epictetus gave the llowing recommendation to his disciple (III, 3, 14):
As soon as you go out in the morning, and whatever it is you see or hear, carry out this test. You respond, as if we were having an argument by questions and answers:
-What did you see?
-A handsome man, or a good-looking woman.
Then apply the rule (epage ton kanona), [and ask yourself] : -Does their beauty depend upon their will, or not?
-It does not depend upon their will.
-Then reject it.
Once more, Marcus picks up the tune (V, 22) :
That which does not harm the State does not harm its citizen either. Each time you imagine you have been injured, apply this rule (epage touton ton kanona).
In both cases, we see a theoretical position or dogma (the distinction between what does and does not depend on us, or the identity ofinterest between the State and the citizen) represented as a rule (kanon) which must be applied to each particular case.
The whole nal part ofBook XI (chapters 33-39) appears to be a series ofpassages om Epictetus. First, as we have seen, Epictetus is cited explicitly in chapter 3 4 . Chapter 3 3 also gives an anonymous summary of a passage om book III of the Discourses (III, 24, 86), while chapters
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35-36 cite still more texts om book III (III, 24, 92-93; III, 22, 105). In ct, it is as though we had be re us a collection ofnotes that Marcus had taken while reading book III ofthe Discourses.
The llowing chapter (XI, 37) is introduced by the phrase "he says," which gives us every right to suppose that Marcus is continuing to quote the same author as in the preceding chapters-that is, Epictetus. This text has no parallel in the Discourses, but it comes without any doubt om the lost portion ofEpictetus. In it, we can recognize Epictetus' usual vocabu­ lary (topos peri tas hormas, hypexairesis, kat'axian, orexis, ekklisis), and above all one ofhis ndamental teachings: that ofthe three rules ofli , or the disciplines of judgment, of desire, and of action, of which I shall be speaking throughout the present work.
Chapter 38 is also introduced by "he says," which can only designate Epictetus. It is perhaps a rather ee paraphrase of a text (III, 25, 3) in which Epictetus a rms that the ght r virtue is no small matter, since what is at stake is nothing less than happiness. Marcus remarks (XI, 38):
The struggle, then, is not about winning just any old prize, but about deciding whether one will be sane or insane.
The last chapter (XI, 39) is supposed to transmit various sayings of Socrates, but since chapters 3 3 to 3 8 are taken om Epictetus, it is quite likely that this passage should also be attributed to Epictetus.
There may be still other anonymous quotations om Epictetus in the Meditations. H. Frankel48 thought, with good reason, that IV, 49, 2-5 was one such quotation:
-I'm so unlucky that such-and-such a thing has happened to me! -Not at all! On the contrary, you should say: "How lucky I am, since now that such-and-such a thing has happened to me, I remain ee om grief I neither let myselfbe broken by the present, nor do I fear what is going to happen! For this event could have happened
to anyone, but not everyone would have remained ee om grief -Why, moreover, should we say that this particular event is a mis rtune, while that one is a piece ofgood rtune? In general, do you call anything a "mis rtune" r man which does not cause the nature of man to deviate om its goal? And do you think that that which is not contrary to the will ofNature causes the nature ofman
to deviate om its goal?
-What, then, is the will of Nature?
The Philosopher-Slave and the Emperor-Philosopher
-You've lea ed it. Does the event which has happened to you prevent you om beingjust, om possessing greatness ofsoul, om being temperant and prudent, without haste in your judgments, without lsity in your speech, reserved, and ee, and everything else such that, when they are present together, the nature of man possesses that which is proper to it?
Frankel bases his contention on lexical and grammatical particularities which are quite convincing. 49 It could perhaps be objected-quite rightly-that this passage basically does nothing but express in dialogue rm the ndamental dogma of Stoicism: that the only evil is moral evil, in other words, that which prevents us om practicing the virtues. This is true, but it does not alter the ct that the tone and rm ofthis passage are in stark contrast with the rest of the Meditations. Normally, when Marcus uses the word " I , " he is speaking either about himsel or about the good man, speaking to himself Here, by contrast, the "I" represents the interlocutor of a dialogue which Marcus is reporting. It is highly probable that this is a dialogue which Epictetus has imagined be re his auditors, as he often does in the Discourses, and that Marcus has copied it down. It should be noted that, elsewhere in his Discourses (I, 4, 23), Epictetus tells his auditors that what is truly worthwhile is to work at eliminating all "Alas! " and "How unhappy I am! " om one's life.
It is thus probable that we have here an unrecognized a ent of Epictetus. Are there others? I think it likely that there are some. In general, moreover, we should not exclude the hypothesis that a given passage of the Meditations may be utilizing a text om an unknown author, or at any rate may be a paraphrase thereof As r as Epictetus is concerned, however, we must bear in mind the ct that Marcus had read so much of him as to become impregnated with his vocabulary, his stylistic habits, and especially his ideas. This situation was recognized perfectly by the unknown urteenth-century humanist who copied ex­ tracts om Books I to IX in a manuscript now kept at Darmstadt. At the beginning of Book II, he wrote: antikrus epiktetizei ("He is openly Epictetizing"; that is, he is llowing and imitating Epictetus).
The three rules oflife or disciplines according to Epictetus
We have already seen the important role played in the Meditations by what I have called the triple rule of li , which proposes a discipline of representations or judgments, of desire, and of action. This very triparti-
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tion of the acts and nctions of the soul, and the entire distinction betweenjudgment, desire, and impulse, is a doctrine which is peculiar to Epictetus, and which is not und in Stoicism prior to him. Its presence in Marcus Aurelius is, nevertheless, unmistakable. In VIII, 7, r exam­ ple, Marcus clearly draws an opposition between representations hanta­ siai), desires (orexeis), and impulses toward action (hormai), and he does so again in VIII, 28:
Everyjudgment, every impulse to action, and every desire or aver­ sion are within the soul, and nothing else can enter therein.
We have already encountered a briefmaxim which also makes use ofthe same schema:
Erase your representation hantasia), check your impulse to action (horme), extinguish your desire (orexis). Keep your directing princi­ ple (hegemonikon) within your power (IX, 7) .
The three rules oflife propose an askesis, or discipline, r these three acts of the soul. In the context of the cento of passages om Epictetus (XI , 3 3 -3 9) which we have already seen, Marcus himself cites an Epictetan passage which we know only through his intermediary (XI, 37):
We must discover the rule to b e applied in the case of the assent [to be given to representations and judgments] ,
-while in the matter of exercises relating to impulses to action, we must never relax our attention, in order that these impulses to action may be accompanied by a reserve clause, that their goal be to serve the community, and that they be proportionate to value,
-and, nally, we must abstain completely om desire, and pay no attention to things that do not depend on us.
Discipline of representations and judgment, discipline of impulsive action, discipline of desire: Epictetus rmulates these three rules of life not only in this text, but in several chapters ofhis Discourses. Moreover, they correspond precisely to the three rules oflife rmulated by Marcus, which are in a sense the key to his Meditations.
The Philosopher-Slave and the Emperor-Philosopher 71 The in uence ofAristo
In the context of Marcus' conversion to philosophy, I alluded to the in uence that the reading of the works of the third century B. C. Stoic Aristo of Chios may have exerted on the Emperor. I had once thought I could recognize an echo of Aristo's teachings in some of the Emperor's sayings. Aristo had de ned the supreme goal of life in the llowing terms: "To live in a disposition ofindi erence with regard to indi erent things. " Marcus, r his part, writes (XI, 16):
To spend one's life in the best way: the power to do this resides within the soul, ifone is indi erent to indi erent things.
I was once struck by the similarity of these rmulas. 50 In ct, how­ ever, Aristo was not the only Stoic to speak ofindi erence to indi erent things; moreover, Marcus, as a ith l adherent to the Stoicism of Epictetus and of Chrysippus, did not understand this principle in the same sense as Aristo, and interpreted it in a wholly di erent way.
The principle of all Stoicism is, moreover, precisely indi erence to indi erent things. This means, in the rst place, that the only value is moral good, which depends on our eedom, and that everything that does not depend on our eedom-poverty, wealth, sickness, and health-is neither good nor bad, and is there re indi erent. Second, it means that we must not make any distinction between indi erent things; in other words, we must love them equally, since they have been willed by universal Nature. This indi erence to indi erent things can be und, r example, in a passage om Philo ofAlexandria,51 which describes the exercise of wisdom-that is to say, philosophy-without there having been any particular in uence by Aristo on Philo: "Accustomed no longer to pay attention to bodily and external evils, exercising ourselves to be indi erent to indi erent things, armed against pleasures and desires . . . r such people, all oflife is a festival. "
As a matter of ct, the di erence between Aristo and the other Stoics b o r e p r e c i s e l y o n t h e v e r y n o t i o n o f " i n d i e r e n t . " F o r A r i s t o , t h a t w h i c h was indi erent was completely "undi erentiated,"52 and no element of daily life had any importance in and ofitself Such a view ran the risk of leading to a skeptical attitude such as that of Pyrrho, who was also indi erent to everything. Orthodox Stoics, while they recognized that the things which do not depend on us are indi erent, nevertheless ad­ mitted that we could attribute to them a moral value, by conceding the
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existence ofpolitical, social, and mily obligations, linked to the needs of human nature in accordance with reasonable probability. This was the realm ofthe kathekonta, or duties, ofwhich I shall have more to say later. Marcus Aurelius, like Epictetus, allowed r the existence of this entire order ofobligations and duties, which Arista had denied. In ct, Marcus uses the technical term kathekon in the Stoic sense a total of ve times. 53 There can thus be no question of any in uence by Arista on Marcus as r as the doctrine ofindi erence is concerned.
Moreover, Arista rejected the physical and logical parts ofphilosophy as useless. 54 At rst glance, Marcus appears to incline toward a similar attitude; r example, he thanks the gods r not having allowed him to be carried away with resolving syllogisms or studying celestial phenom­ ena (I, 17, 22). Elsewhere, he admits that he no longer hopes to excel in dialectics or in the philosophy ofnature (VII, 67). Here again, however, the underlying sense is wholly di erent. For Arista, logic and physics are strictly useless. For Marcus, by contrast, it is the theoretical discourse oflogic and physics which is no longer a matter of concern. He did, however, intend to practice a lived logic (the discipline ofjudgment) and a lived physics (the discipline ofdesire). As he says explicitly (VIII, lJ):
Continuously, and, if possible, on the occasion of every repre­ sentation which presents itself to you, practice physics, pathology, and dialectics.
We are thus rced to conclude that there is no trace of Aristo's doctrines to be und in the Meditations ofMarcus Aurelius. 55
5
THE STOICISM OF EPICTETUS
The general characteristics of Stoicism
It is probably scarcely necessary to remind the reader that when we speak of the doctrines of a philosopher om the period we are studying, we must not imagine that we have to do with a system invented lock, stock, and barrel by the philosopher in question. Ancient philosophy had noth­ ing in common with our contemporary philosophers, who imagine that philosophy consists, r each philosopher, in inventing a "new discourse" or new language, all the more original the more it is incomprehensible and arti cial. In general, ancient philosophy was situated within a tradi­ tion, and attached to a school. Now, Epictetus was a Stoic; this means that r him philosophy consisted in explicating the texts of Zeno and Chrysippus, the unders of the school, and above all in practicing him­ self, and having his disciples practice, the way oflife peculiar to the Stoic school. This does not mean that Epictetus' teaching was devoid of its own characteristic features. These features, however, did not modi the ndamental dogmas ofStoicism, or the essential choice ofa way ofli . On the contrary, they are to be und within his rm ofteaching, in his way of presenting the doctrine, and in the de nition of certain speci c points ( r instance, the distinction between desire and impulse), or else within the particular color and tonality which permeate the Stoic way of life proposed by the philosopher.
By the time Epictetus taught, it had been some ur centuries since Zeno of Citium had unded the Stoic school at Athens. One can say that Stoicism was born of the sion of three traditions: the Socratic ethical tradition, the Heraclitean physical and "materialistic" tradition, and the dialectical tradition ofthe Megareans and ofAristotle. The Stoic choice of li was analogous to the Socratic choice of life, according to which moral good or virtue is the only value, to which everything else
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must be subordinated. As Socrates says in Plato's Apology (41d): "For a good man, no evil is possible, whether he be dead or alive. " "No evil is possible, " precisely because such a man, since he is good, is a stranger to moral evil. Since r him there is no other evil than moral evil, he believes that those things which appear to be evil in the eyes of men-death, illness, the loss of wealth, insults-are not evils r him. This transmutation ofvalues, however, can on be carried out by means ofan operation which is, at the same time, both intellectual and ethical: it consists in examining oneselfin a dialogue, a logos, or a process ofreason­ ing which one develops either with someone else or with onesel The spirit of Socratism is thus the a rmation of the absolute value of moral good, as discovered by reason; it is also the idea according to which the moral li is a matter ofjudgment and ofknowledge.
Prima cie, it does not appear that the physical tradition of Her­ aclitean "materialism" has anything to do with the Socratic ethical tradi­ tion. We shall soon see, however, that the originality ofStoicism consists precisely in the intimate and indissoluble sion of these two traditions. For the moment, it is su cient to emphasize the in uence of Heraclitus upon the Stoic vision of a universe in perpetual trans rmation, of which the original element is re, and which is set in order by a logos or Reason, in accordance with which events are linked by mutual necessity.
Finally, it is not surprising that Stoicism is situated as well within the dialectical tradition ofthe Megarians, but also within that ofthe Platonic Academy and ofAristotle. In this period, instruction in philosophy con­ sisted above in training r discussion and argumentation, and conse­ quently in dialectical exercises. Here again, we encounter a logos: this time it is human discourse, but one which is rational andjust, inso r as it imitates that logos which maintains the universe in order.
We can thus glimpse the extraordinary unity which held the parts of the Stoic system together. It is the unity of one single logos, or Reason, which permeates all things. In the words ofEmile Brehier:
It is one single, unique reason which, in dialectics, links consequent propositions to their antecedents; which, in nature, links together all causes; and which, in human conduct, establishes perfect con­ cord between acts. It is impossible that a good man should not be a physicist and a dialectician; it is impossible r rationality to be realized separately in these three areas; it is impossible completely to grasp the reason within the course of events in the universe with­ out, at the same time, realizing reason within one's own behavior. 1
The Stoicism ofEpictetus 75
Stoicism is a philosophy of self-coherence, based upon a remarkable intuition of the essence of li . From the very rst moment of its exist­ ence, every living being is instinctively attuned to itsel that is, it tends to preserve itsel to love its own existence, and to love all that can preserve this existence. This instinctive accord becomes a moral accord with onesel as soon as man discovers by means ofhis reason that the supreme value is not those things which are the objects ofthis instinct r self­ preservation, but the re ective choice of accord with onesel and the activity ofchoice itse This is because voluntary accord with oneself coin­ cides with the tendencies of universal Reason, which not only makes each living being into a being in accord with itsel but makes the entire world as well a being in accord with itself In the words of Marcus Aurelius (IV, 23):
that is in accord with you is in accord with me, 0 World.
Human society, which is the society of those who participate in one single logos or Reason, also rms-at least in principle-an ideal City, whose Reason, which is the Law, ensures its accord with itself Finally, it is obvious that the Reason ofeach individual, in the mutual linkage ofits thoughts or speech, demands logical and dialectical coherence with itself
This coherence with oneself is thus the ndamental principle of Stoi­ cism. For Seneca,2 all wisdom may be summed up in the rmula: "Al­ ways want the same thing, and always re se the same thing. " There is no need, Seneca continues, to add the tiny restriction "as long as what one wants is morally good. " Why? Because, he says, "One and the same thing can be universally and constantly pleasing only if it is morally right. " This is nothing but the distant echo of the rmulas by which Zeno, the under ofStoicism, used to de ne the sovereign Good: "Live in a coherent way omologoumenos);3 that is to say, live in accordance with a rule oflife which is one and harmonious, because those who live in incoherence are unhappy. "
This coherence with oneself is, as we have seen, based on the self­ coherence ofuniversal Reason or Nature. The well-known Stoic theme of the Eternal Return is only one other aspect of this theme. Universal Reason wishes this world to be as it is: that is to say, arising om the original re, and returning to this original re, and there re having a beginning and an end. Nature's will, however, is always the same; and the only thing its continuous action can accomplish is the repetition of this world, with precisely this beginning, precisely this end, and the
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entire course of events situated between these two moments. Thus, this world returns eternally: "There will be another Socrates, a Plato, and every man with the same iends and the same fellow-citizens . . . and this renewal will not happen once, but several times; rather, all things will be repeated eternally. "4 This is why the sage, like universal Reason, must intensely wish r each instant: he must wish intensely r things to happen eternally exactly as they do happen.
I have just mentioned the gure of the sage. It was characteristic of Stoic philosophy to make of this gure a transcendent norm, which can only be realized in rare and exceptional cases. Here we encounter an echo ofPlato's Symposium (204d), where Socrates appears as the gure who knows that he is not a sage.