For legislative purposes these
councils
also were
expanded by additional members.
expanded by additional members.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
Boxes would no longer
go round carrying papers which could be disposed of without circu-
lation. “We have”, he wrote, “reformed ourselves a good deal, but
I should like to see the new status of members recognised by Act of
Parliament. ” The dispatch was going by that mail. The proposals
were in “as quiet a form as possible”. The reform of the legislative
council was ‘now far more pressing than that of the Executive
Council”.
Wood had originally contemplated a bill for each of these reforms
but instead on 6 June, 1861, introduced one which dealt with both.
The Mutiny, he said, had aggravated the difficulties of administration.
In fact it would be folly to shut our eyes to the increasing difficulties
of our position in India, and for this reason we should put all our
institutions there on the soundest possible foundation. In the Lords
Earl De Grey and Ripon, under-secretary of state, explained that
the policy was “to limit the changes as much as possible and to make
those only which experience showed to be necessary”.
The Councils Act of 1861 (24 & 25 Vic. c. 74) established a governor-
general's executive council of five ordinary members. In 1853 the
1 See Canning to Frere, 24 October, 1860, Life of Frere, 1, 358.
Afterwards secretary of state for India, 1866; viceroy of India, 1880-4. Hansard,
9 July, 1861, p. 586.
## p. 229 (#265) ############################################
THE COUNCILS ACT OF 1861
229
legal member had been permitted to sit and vote at all council
meetings. He had become a fourth ordinary member. But the dis-
organisation of public finances caused by the Mutiny had led to the
appointment of a trained financier as fourth member. A jurist,
however, was also needed, as the law was in process of codification,
and even the Penal Code, which had originally been drafted by
Macaulay, was still incomplete, so a fifth member was added to the
council. Of the five members three must have served the crown or
the Company in India for not less than ten years. One of these was
a military member, always a distinguished soldier; the other two were
civil servants who up to the year 1859 had always been selected from
the Bengal Presidency. The fourth member was a financial expert,
who might or might not have served the crown or the Company
previously; and the fifth or legal member was a barrister of England
or Ireland, or a member of the Faculty of Advocates in Scotland of at
least five years' standing. The commander-in-chief might be, and in
practice always was, an extraordinary member who divided with the
military member the responsibility for the military administration of
the country. He was the executive head of the army and was charged
with its organisation and preparation for war as well as with questions
of promotion. His office was known as army headquarters and was
distinct from the military department of the government which,
presided over by the military member, concerned itself with the
control of supply and transport, with ordnance, remounts, clothing,
medical stores, military works and military finance, and above all
with the preparation of the military budget. Proposals for military
reform or expenditure went from army headquarters to the military
department of the Government of India where they were noted on,
and, if involving expenditure, further proceeded to the finance depart-
ment. Finally they reached the viceroy through the military member
of council. If the viceroy, the military member and the commander-
in-chief were in general agreement, the proposals were carried out.
But if there were disagreement a proposal was either referred back
for further consideration or was laid before the governor-general in
council, debated on, and accepted or rejected by a majority of votes.
Every ordinary member of ihe governor-general's council, assisted
by a secretary, under-secretaries and a sufficient office establishment,
presided over certain departments of the central government. The
governor-general himself held charge of the foreign department which
conducted the correspondence of India with neighbouring powers;
he kept the London cabinet informed on questions of Asiatic policy
connected with India, and supervised the affairs of the native states.
The British representatives at the courts of ruling princes were the
agents of the governor-general and not the representatives of the
Government of India.
The distribution of departments among ordinary members of
## p. 230 (#266) ############################################
230
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS
council was a matter of custom, not of law. The act of 1861 conferred
on the governor-general the power to make rules and orders for the
more convenient transaction of business in his council other than the
business at legislative meetings, and provided that every order made
and every act done in accordance with such rules and orders must be
treated as being the order or act of the governor-general in council. 1
Canning's reforms in the conduct of business were thus sanctioned by
statute and the portfolio system was firmly established. Councillors
were able to dispose of unimportant cases belonging to their depart-
ments in the name of the Government of India. Cases in which two
departments differed, or a member proposed to overrule a local
government, or important issues were involved, were laid before the
viceroy together with the views of the members in charge and of their
secretaries. Differences of opinion between a member and the viceroy
were referred to a full council, where decision was taken in accordance
with the views of the majority. If opinions were equally divided the
president had a casting vote. But if a measure were proposed which
seemed to the governor-general to affect essentially the safety, tran-
quillity or interests of "the British possessions in India”, he could
overrule the majority of his council. In such cases any two members
of the dissentient majority might require the t. ansmission to the
secretary of state of the decision taken together with their minutes of
dissent. This overruling power of the governor-general's, which came
down from the acts of 1786 and 1793, was reaffirmed and slightly
expanded by an act of 1870. But however widely the views of a
viceroy might originally differ from those of a majority of his coun-
cillors, there was almost invariably a compelling desire for compro-
mise. 2
If the governor-general in council declared it to be expedient that
he should visit any part of India unaccompanied by his council, he
could in council appoint a member to preside at meetings held in his
absence, with all the powers of the governor-general except those
relating to legislation. Should the governor-general be absent from
a council meeting through indisposition, the senior ordinary member
presided.
Thus the Government of India became a cabinet government pre-
sided over by a governor-general, business being carried on depart-
mentally and the governor-general taking a more active and particular
share in it than is taken by a prime minister in a Western country or
than had been taken by any of his predecessors. The system remained
unaltered during our period. But a sixth ordinary member was
provided, by act of parliament, in 1874, to preside over the depart-
1 [lbert, Digest, sec. 42 (2), p. 103.
: See, for instance, Wolf, Life of Lord Ripon, 11, 50. Lord Curzon wrongly adds the aban-
donment of Kandahar to the instances in which a viceroy overruled his council (op. cit.
II, 73).
3 Îlbert, Government of India, pp. 187-8, clauses 45-6.
## p. 231 (#267) ############################################
.
THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL
231
ment of public works. In 1904, on the recommendation of the
secretary of state, the power of appointing a member to this particular
department was converted into a general power, and the public works
member was replaced by a member for commerce and industry.
The next change in the personnel of the council came after warm
discussion and led to the resignation of Lord Curzon in 1905. The
commander-in-chief, Lord Kitchener, had advocated the abolition of
the military member and the replacement of the military department
of the Government of India by an army department presided over by
the commander-in-chief. This proposal was strongly resisted by the
viceroy and the ordinary members of his council on the ground that,
if adopted, it would concentrate military authority in the hands of
the commander-in-chief and would subvert the supremacy of the civil
power by depriving it of independent military advice. Lord Kitchener,
however, maintained his views, urging that proposals from the
commander-in-chief should not reach the Government of India
through any second military adviser, who must necessarily be his
junior in rank and his inferior in experience. Eventually Lord
Kitchener's contention was in substance accepted and was followed
by Lord Curzon's resignation. The commander-in-chief became the
viceroy's sole adviser on all military questions. For a short period
there was a military supply member of inferior status to the former
military member; but this arrangement, as Lord Morley said,
"proved good neither for administration nor economy”. It ceased
in 1909, and the vacancy at the council-board was filled in 1910 by
a newly appointed member in charge of education and sanitation.
For the closing years of our period and throughout the great war the
council consisted of
(a) the commander-in-chief (extraordinary),
(b) the home member,
(c) the financial member,
(d) the legal member,
(e) the commerce and industry member,
(s) the education member,
all holding office for five years.
In the year 1909, on the recommendation of the viceroy and the
secretary of state, a distinguished Hindu barrister, Mr (afterwards
Lord) Sinha, was appointed legal member by the crown. He was
succeeded by a Muhammadan barrister; and when the latter had
completed his term of office, a Hindu high court judge was appointed
education member of the central executive.
The viceroy and governor-general, although invested with para-
mount power in India, was the governor-general in council and,
unlike the secretary of state, possessed a very limited power of separate
action. Rarely, however, did viceroys wish to dispense with the
assistance of their colleagues. John Lawrence was much vexed by
## p. 232 (#268) ############################################
232
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS
opposition from certain councillors; but he came to the viceroyalty
a tired man,' had long been accustomed to govern alone in the
Panjab, and was worried by the atmosphere of rapid evolution and
frequent argument which he found in Calcutta. There is much truth
in a sentence of Frere's on 20 March, 1868:
no Governor-General since the time of Clive has had such power and opportunities;
but he fancies the want of progress is owing to some opposing power which only
exists in his own imagination.
Lord Minto complained on 3 July, 1910, that he had
constantly felt that he must depend upon himself alone with the exception of one
or two advisers he had managed to secure and that the councillors sent him by
Lord Morley were not only useless but mischievous.
But Minto evidently wrote under the influence of intense irritation
with a secretary of state who “arrogated to himself complete in-
dependence” in making appointments to the council and would give
little or no weight to the governor-general's objections. 3 As a general
rule, viceroys and their councillors were drawn together, not only by
identity of aim but by force of circumstances, by the logic of the
palpable facts which encompassed all alike. Unity was generally
achieved, for without it lay no salvation. Thus we see one of the
strongest of viceroys, Lord Northbrook, jealously upholding the
statutory rights of his council and refusing to be led into courses
which might infringe those rights. We find Lord Ripon, even when
fully conscious of serious differences which separated him from the
majority of his councillors, observing “There is a very strong desire
to support the Viceroy, of which I have much proof”. 5 We see Lord
Curzon emphasising the gain to a viceroy of acting with, and not
without, his council, and Lord Minto asserting, in opposition to
Lord Morley, the right of the Government of India, as a body, to be
consulted about the Anglo-Russian agreement. There were ex-
tremely few decisions for which the viceroy's council did not share
responsibility with their president. Notable exceptions were the
abolition of import duties on the coarser kinds of cotton cloths in
Lord Lytton's days and the levy of a countervailing excise duty on
Indian cotton goods in the time of Lord Elgin. In both instances the
viceroy's action was due to pressure from the London cabinet; and
on the second occasion his council protested so strongly against a
measure which they considered unjust to Indian interests that the
secretary of state, Sir Henry Fowler, considered it necessary to convey
a weighty warning.
1 Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, 11, 429-41, 589.
Life of Frere, 11, 40 (Frere to Florence Nightingale).
9 Buchan, Memoir of Lord Minto, p. 311.
4 See Mallet, Life of Lord Northbrook, p. 91.
6 Wolf, op. cit. II, 50.
6 Curzon, op. cit. II, 74, 112-19.
? Morley, Recollections, 11, 178-9.
## p. 233 (#269) ############################################
THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS
233
“A Government”, he wrote, “whether in Downing Street or Calcutta, must act
as a homogeneous body, not as representing certain political opinions, but as
representing an executive authority which cannot act, whether in administration
or legislation, efficiently unless they act unitedly. . . . The existing law subjects the
Government of India to the control of the Imperial Government, and the Secretary
of State, who exercises that control, is responsible to Parliament. He cannot hold
office if the House of Commons disapproves of his official conduct. India is by the Act of
Parliament governed by and in the name of the Queen, and she governs by the
advice of a responsible minister. . . . So long as any matter of administration or
policy is undecided, every member of the Government of India is at liberty to
express an opinion; but when once a certain line of policy has been adopted under
the direction of the Cabinet, it becomes the clear duty of every member of the
Government of India to consider not what that policy ought to be, but how effect
may best be given to the policy that has been decided on; and if any member of
that Government is unable to do this, there is only one alternative open to him. . . .
The Cabinet have decided that the English precedent applies, and therefore that
the members of the (Viceroy's) Executive Council must, just as members of the
Cabinet do here, vote together (at legislative meetings) in support of Government
measures. If they are unable to do this, then the English precedent applies and the
objecting Member resigns before he either abstains from voting or votes against
the measure. ”1
These instructions were followed by the governor-general's coun-
cillors; but time brings its revenges, and in 1916 the reversal of the
policy imposed on the Government of India in 1894 was initiated by
that government and assented to by the secretary of state.
THE New LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS
No government can govern effectively unless it can legislate. The
subject of machinery for legislation was anxiously considered in
Calcutta and in London. In 1853 Wood, as president of the Board of
Control, had proposed and carried through parliament a measure
designed to provide that the governor-generals council, enlarged for
legislative purposes, should be simply a body which would assist the
supreme government in making laws. 2 Put Dalhousie started this
body off with 136 standing orders and a Hansard of its own. Its
debates were public. Of its additional members one was the Chief
Justice of Bengal, another was one of the judges of the Supreme
Court. The remaining additional members were officials from distant
provinces who were not indisposed to import fresh ideas into the close
atmosphere of Calcutta. 3 Somewhat to the consternation of Wood
the council soon showed signs of considering itself “the nucleus of a
constitutional parliament”. * Dalhousie, one of the most arbitrary of
governors-general, had viewed the prospect with no qualms. 5 But,
as time went on, his successor found the debates sometimes embar-
rassing. He thought it “to be regretted that the Council was on its
1 Mrs R. Hamilton, Life of Lord Wolverhampton, pp. 315-17:
: Wood to Dalhousie, 23 December, 1854 (Lee-Warner, Life of Dalhousie, n1, 237).
3 See Life of Frere, p. 309.
See speech by Lord Ripon, under-secretary of state, Lords' Debates, 9 July, 1861.
See Lee-Warner, op. cit. 11, 234-5.
## p. 234 (#270) ############################################
234
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS
first creation invested with forms and modes of procedure so closely
resembling Parliament". 1 Frere, who had to pilot government bills
through the council, agreed and considered that the judges did the
mischief. In writing to the secretary of state he illustrated this view
and found his correspondent entirely sympathetic. The existing
council must go. But what was to take its place? Even as late as
18 February, 1861, Wood was uncertain. No one in 1853, he wrote,
had dreamt of “a debating body with open doors and even quasi-
independence". Lord Dalhousie began wrongly and everything had
gone in the direction of fostering the notion of the council's being “an
independent legislative body”. It was all wrong and very unfortunate
because there was always a sympathy in England for independent
deliberation. Representative bodies, in any real sense, were impossible
in India, and he did not think that “any external element would
really do good”. It might satisfy the English at Calcutta to have an
English merchant or planter in the council, but he was not sure that
it would improve the legislation; and Indians could not be put in who
were “in any sense the exponents of active opinion, or who could take
any part in the deliberations”.
Frere, on 10 April, 1861, drew a vivid picture of racial tension
which had followed on the Mutiny and of European non-official
impatience of official legislation, urging strongly that it was impossible
to recede' and that, in view of the course of events since 1853, Dalhousie
was in the main right. Had he not taken the line which he took,
things would have been worse than they were. The proper course
now was to assist the viceroy with a sort of senate able to advise him
in framing laws which could be of general application to all parts of
India and in confirming or annulling laws shaped by the provincial
legislatures which had been abolished in 1833 but must now be
restored. Whether “any external (legislative) element” on the
governor-general's council would really do any good or not was no
longer a debatable question. Such an external element was essential.
“The days”, he wrote, "are gone when you could govern India without much
caring what the Europeans and Europeanised community say or think of your
measures, and unless you have some barometer and safety-valve in the shape of
a deliberative Council, I believe you will always be liable to very unlooked for and
dangerous explosions. '
He also urged that the new legislative bodies would make fatal
mistakes unless they were assisted by Indian members. 4
Canning agreed with Frere, and Wood largely accepted these views,
but in a pessimistic mood. Writing to Frere on 17 August, 1861, he
ended thus:
1 The governor-general to the secretary of state, 9 December, 1859.
2 Frere to Wood, 21 April, 1861 (Life of Frere, 1, 331. See also pp. 327 and 356).
* Correspondence, Life of Frere, I, 336.
• Idem, pp. 336-41.
## p. 235 (#271) ############################################
THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS
235
The future government of India is a problem of the most serious import, utterly
unexampled in history, and one of which it seems to me very difficult to foresec the
progress.
In addressing the House of Commons on 6 June, 1861," he had pointed
out the impossibility of reverting to a system by which the executive
government alone legislated for India. Nor could the English in India
have a representative body to frame the laws by which they should
be governed. It was equally impossible to assemble in India in one
place persons who would be real representatives of the various classes
of the Indian populations. The residents of the towns no more
represented the general Indian population than a highly educated
native of London represented a highland chieftain or a feudal baron
of six centuries ago. The legislative arrangements which he proposed
were based on Canning's recommendations. They became law and
were these.
For purposes of legislation the council of the governor-general was
reinforced by additional members, not less than six or more than
twelve, nominated by the governor-general and holding office for two
years. Of these additional members not less than one-half were non-
official (in no government service). Should the council meet for
legislative purposes within a lieutenant-governor's province, the
lieutenant-governor became an additional member. The functions of
the council when meeting for legislative purposes were strictly limited
to the consideration and enactment of laws. It could transact no
other business. It could entertain no motion except one for leave to
introduce a bill or having reference to a bill actually introduced.
Measures relating to the public revenue or public debt, religion,
military or naval matters, or foreign relations could be introduced
only with the sanction of the governo:-general. His assent was re-
quired to every act passed by the council; and any such act might be
disallowed by the sovereign, acting through the secretary of state.
While the legislative power of the governor-general in council was
wide, it should not affect certain parliamentary enactments, or the
general authority of parliament, or any part of the unwritten laws or
constitution of the United Kingdom whereon the allegiance of the
subject or the sovereignty of the crown might depend. In order to
remove all doubts respecting the validity of rules or regulations
sanctioned by executive orders of the governor-general in council
for the more lately annexed or non-regulation provinces, a clause was
introduced declaring that no such rules or regulations should be
deemed invalid by reason of not having been made in conformity with
the provisions of the charter renewal acts.
Mr A. H. (afterwards Sir Henry) Layard proposed in the House
of Commons to insert an injunction directing that a certain number
of the additional members of the council, when sitting as a legislative
1 Hansard, CLXIII, 638-9.
## p. 236 (#272) ############################################
236
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS
body, should be natives of India. 1 But the secretary of state con-
sidered it undesirable to make statutory distinction in this connection
between different classes of Her Majesty's subjects. Some of the
additional members appointed would certainly be natives of India.
The act conferred on the governor-general one power of a novel
character. He was enabled to frame and issue on emergency, without
his council, ordinances which would not remain in force for more than
six months. Such a power had been urgently required on certain
occasions in 1857–8. Long afterwards ordinances were resorted to in
the first month of the great war, when the legislative council was
not sitting and immediate action was required in certain directions.
The power of issuing ordinances was vested in the governor-general
alone in order that the responsibility might be solely his. But the
reasons for such exceptional procedure should always be recorded and
should be submitted to Her Majesty's Governınent together with the
ordinance itself. 3
The power of legislation which had been taken from the governors
in council of Madras and Bombay by the Charter Act of 1833 was
restored in 1861.
For legislative purposes these councils also were
expanded by additional members. No line of demarcation was drawn
between subjects reserved for the central and those allotted to the
local legislatures; but while local legislation in certain cases could not
be undertaken without sanction from the governor-general, all acts of
local legislatures required his subsequent assent as well as that of the
local governor and were subject to disallowance by the crown. The
governor-general was directed to establish a legislative council in
Bengal and empowered to set up similar councils in the North-
Western Provinces and the Panjab when the time was ripe. Councils
were established in Bengal in 1862, in the North-Western Provinces
in 1886, and in the Panjab and Burma in 1898.
The legislative councils established by the act of 1861 were com-
mittees by means of which the executive government obtained advice
and help in legislation. While the government enacted the laws
through its council, the public had a right to make itself heard, and
the executive was able to defend its legislation. When the laws were
once made they were binding on the government as well as on the
public. They had been made in a manner which ensured publicity
and discussion and could only be changed by the deliberate and
public process by which they had been made. The councils could only
deliberate on the legislation immediately at issue. They could not call
for information on other subjects or impugn acts of the administra-
tion. 4
In the year 1870 there was a discussion 5 between Lord Mayo's
1 Hansard, CLXIII, 1016, 18 June, 1861.
2 Idem, p. 1027.
3 Ilbert, Digest, pp. 215-16, 566, para. 26, Wood's dispatch of 9 August, 1861.
4 See Report on Constitutional Reforms, 1918, p. 54.
5 See Accounts and Papers, 15, East India, 1876, LVI, 6-10.
5
## p. 237 (#273) ############################################
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL FROM LONDON
237
government and the Duke of Argyll, then secretary of state, the former
claiming that they had been endowed by section 22 of the 1861
Councils Act with legislative discretion which they should exercise to
the best of their judgment. The secretary of state could, of course,
disallow any law which they passed. They could not, however, be expected
to introduce any measure of which they disapproved.
Any other view would invest the Secretary of State with the character of the
legislator for British India and would convert the Legislative Council into a mere
instrument to be used by him for that purpose.
On 24 November, 1870, the duke replied that theoretical incon-
veniences were inseparably connected with the working of such a
machinery of government as t'iat through which the empire of India
was ruled from England, but these could in practice be reduced to
a minimum by mutual respect on the part of those concerned. One
great principle underlay the whole system. The final control and direction of
affairs in India rested with the Home Government. It made no real difference
if its directions related to legislative affairs. If the crown's interposition
were limited to a veto on acts passed in India, the queen's government
would be helpless to secure legislative sanction for any measures
however essential it might deem them to be, for the welfare or safety
of the Indian Empire. It followed, then, that this government must
hold in its hands the ultimate power of requiring the governor-
general to introduce a measure and requiring the members of the
Indian government to vote for it. This was the practice in all parts
of the queen's dominions where the authority of the legislative body
was not derived from the principle of popular representation. It
was a question of abstract right, not of ordinary procedure. It was
only necessary to bear in mind where the seat of ultimate authority
was placed in order to secure on both sides that fairness and modera-
tion without which no political constituțion could work with smooth-
ness and success. Lord Mayo's government on 1 February, 1871,
accepted this doctrine, as it defined a principle which they had never
intended to question; they were glad, however, to hear that the
ruling would not be applied to ordinary procedure but only “with
great deliberation and on the rarest occasions”.
The enlargements of the legislative councils in 1892, 1909 and 1919
are described in later chapters. Those of 1892 were made in response
to the demands of“ a limited but important section of Indian opinion
and established the fact of election to the councils by certain public
bodies; but the government nominated a majority of the members of
each council and maintained cfficial majorities on the ground that no
administration which did not possess sufficient power to carry out
whatever measures it considered to be for the public interest could
remain at the head of affairs among the different İndian nationalities. 1
* See Lord Dufferin's picture of the India of his day, Report on Constitutional Reforms,
1918, p. 117.
## p. 238 (#274) ############################################
238
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS
The Morley-Minto reforms were the first real breach in the system
of 1861. The king's proclamation of 2 November, 1908, had an-
nounced that “the principle of representative institutions which had
from the first been gradually introduced” would now be "prudently
extended”. The reforms conceded non-official majorities on the
provincial legislative councils composed mainly of elected members,
but also of persons nominated by the governments concerned. They
allowed any member to divide his council on financial questions and
all councils to discuss matters of public importance and to make re-
commendations to the executive governments. But on the imperial
legislative council the official majority was retained. This reservation
was justified by Morley on the ground that the new councils were not
designed to pave the way to the establishment of a parliamentary
system, a goal to which he would not "for one moment aspire”. But
by establishing non-official majorities on provincial legislative councils
and by admitting an Indian gentleman to a seat on the governor-
general's executive council, the core of authority in India, a step
which was taken, with some searchings of heart, on the viceroy's
recommendation, the way was prepared for further developments
which were to follow with unexpected rapidity under the pressure of
movements which are described in later chapters.
. . .
. . .
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS
The following are now the major provinces of British India:
Province
Population (1921)
Madras . . .
42,300,000
Bengal . . .
46,700,000
United Provinces of Agra and Oudh 45,600,000
Bihar and Orissa
34,000,000
Bombay
19,300,000
Assam
7,600,000
Panjab . . .
20,700,000
Central Provinces and Berar
13,900,000
Burma . . .
13,200,000
The minor provinces are:
The North-West Frontier Province
2,250,000
British Baluchistan
422,000
Ajmer-Merwara
496,000
Coorg . . .
164,000
Andaman and Nicobar Islands
27,000
Delhi
486,000
Thus the total population of British territory in India is 247 millions.
I
Between the years 1858 and 1918 changes were made in the titles,
boundaries and governments of certain provinces originally without
any friction or difficulty, but on one occasion resented by a local
1 Morley, Indian Speeches, p. 92.
2 See Morley, Recollections, 11, 301-3.
## p. 239 (#275) ############################################
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS
239
government and on another raising an unexpected but violent storm
of local fury.
Madras and Bombay remained under a governor in council
throughout. Distinguished by the traditions of their old independence
and by the presence of great seaports, they still retained some relics of
their original privileges. Each government could correspond directly
with the secretary of state if no financial considerations were involved.
Each could appeal to him against orders of the Government of India
and possessed full discretion in selecting men for important provincial
offices. Both were less liable to supervision than other provinces in
the administration of forests and land-revenue. In 1909, under the
Morley-Minto reforms, the executive council of the governor in each
was increased by the addition of an Indian member. In emergencies
the governor could overrule his colleagues, but ordinarily questions
were decided by majority votes.
Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Assam remained under one lieutenant-
governor until 1874, when Assam was constituted a separate province
and placed under a chief commissioner.
In the year 1905 Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Assam were converted
by the ill-fated “Partition” into two provinces under lieutenant-
governors, one composed of Western Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, the
other of Eastern Bengal and Assam. In 1910 the lieutenant-governor
of Western Bengal was given an executive council of two British civil
servants and one Indian non-official.
In 1911 Lord Curzon's partition was set aside. The two new pro-
vinces became three. Bengal became the charge of a governor in
council; Bihar and Orissa were placed under a lieutenant-governor
in council; Assam was entrusted to a chief commissioner.
At the commencement of our period the present United
Provinces of Agra and Oudh were two provinces under separate
administrations. The Agra Province was known as the North-
Western Provinces and was under a lieutenant-governor. Oudh was
the charge of a chief commissioner. In 1877 the offices of lieutenant-
governor of the North-Western Provinces and chief commissioner of
Oudh were united in the same person. In 1902 the provinces were
named the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh in order to avoid all
confusion between their title and that of the then newly-created
North-West Frontier Province.
The chief commissioner of the Panjab became a lieutenant-
governor in 1859. In 1901 the frontier districts of the Panjab beyond
the Indus were formed into a separate charge under a chief com-
missioner and called the North-West Frontier Province.
The Central Provinces were formed in 1861 by combining the
Sagor and Narbada territories with the Nagpur territories in one
charge under a chief commissioner. Berar was placed under the same
· See Ronaldshay, Life of Lord Curzon, vol. 11, chap. viii. 2 Idem, chap. xxiv.
## p. 240 (#276) ############################################
240
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS
administration when, in 1902, it was leased in perpetuity to the
British by the Nizam of Hyderabad.
Lower Burma became the charge of a chief commissioner in
1860. In 1886 the kingdom of Upper Burma was added to it after
the third Burmese War, and the whole was called the province of
Burma. In 1897 the chief commissioner became a lieutenant-
governor.
The six minor provinces are under chief commissioners. The North-
West Frontier Province was carved out of the Panjab in 1901. British
Baluchistan was incorporated in British India in 1887. The Andaman
and the Nicobar Islands were united under a chief commissioner in
1872. The city of Delhi with a small area surrounding it was con-
stituted an "administrative enclave" under a chief commissioner in
1912 when the imperial capital was transferred there from Calcutta.
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL AND THE
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS
The central government necessarily kept in its own hands functions
which concerned the whole empire. It also exercised financial,
legislative and administrative control over the provincial govern-
ments.
The Charter Act of 1833 had centralised the administration of the
country's finances in the hands of the Government o: India. The act
of 1858 vested the superintendence of the revenues and expenditure
of the country in the secretary of state in council. More than
£42,000,000 were added to the public debt by the troubles of 1857–8;
all branches of the administration needed reorganisation, and im-
provements of every kind were called for. An efficient system of
public accounts and strict financial control was absolutely necessary;
and James Wilson, financial secretary to the treasury, was dispatched
to India as member of the governor-general's council and lived just
long enough to lay the foundations of a system under which the
central government was to retain in its own hands an extensive
measure of financial control. Rules of great stringency were imposed.
But the central government possessed neither time nor knowledge
sufficient to exercise such far-reaching responsibility in many details
which should have been left to the discretion of local governments;
and much wrangling and waste of time resulted from these rigid
arrangements. For some years the central government, which was
itself subject to the secretary of state in all such matters as related
to borrowing, changes of taxation and general fiscal policy, main-
tained this meticulous control. But friction increased; and after
.
careful deliberation, a system of financial decentralisation was in-
augurated by Lord Mayo which was afterwards developed with
beneficial effect. Even at the end of our period, however, special
## p. 241 (#277) ############################################
METHODS OF CONTROL
241
revenues were assigned to each province by the central government,
and were shown with corresponding expenditure in the imperial
budget while each provincial budget required the approval of the
central government, whose sanction was requisite for proposals in-
volving large expenditure and the creation of posts. The responsi-
bility of that government to the secretary of state was firmly insisted
on. In 1907 Lord Morley appointed a Decentralisation Commission
to simplify relations between the central government and its sub-
ordinate and co-ordinate parts; but this body proposed no material
change in financial relations between the central and provincial
governments. The secretary of state himself continued to hold the
central government in strict financial subordination. He watched
the expenditure of Indian revenues “as the ferocious dragon of the
old legend watched the golden apples”. 1 Held in such rigid sub-
ordination, expected to keep down provincial charges, sharing in
provincial proceeds, controlling provincial taxation, the central
government could not effectively decentralise finance.
While legislating for British India, that government also controlled
provincial legislation. Local legislatures, however, made laws “for
the peace and good government” of their provinces on condition that
no such laws affected any act of parliament, or, without previous
sanction, any act of the governor-general's legislative council. They
could not, without the previous permission of the governor-general
in council, consider any law affecting the religion or religious rites
and usages of any class of British subjects in India, or regulating
patents or copyright, or affecting the relations of the government with
foreign princes or states. Their discretion was further curtailed by the
fact that the field open to them was largely covered by acts of the
imperial legislative council. That body still exercised its powers in
matters which were handled for all provinces on uniform lines such
as Penal and Procedure Codes, laws for prisons and police, for forests,
mines, factories and the preservation of the public health. Every
local act required the subsequent assent of the governor-general; and
local governments submitted all projects for legislation to the central
government and secretary of state for approval. Provincial legisla-
tures were still in theory expansions of the executive government for
the purpose of law-making. 2
Every provincial government was required to obey the orders of
the governor-general in council, and to keep him constantly and
diligently informed of its administrative proceedings and of all
matters which ought to be reported to him. He was required by
statute to control all its proceedings. The reasons for so much cen-
tralisation of authority are thus explained in the Montagu-Chelmsford
Report:
1 Morley, Indian Speeches, p. 46. • Report on Constitutional Reforms, 1918, p. 98.
• See section 45, Government of India Act, 1915 (which consolidated all previousstatutes).
CHIVI
16
## p. 242 (#278) ############################################
242
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS
It is easy to see that in many respects India is one single and undivided country,
in which much work must be done on uniform lines. The main Services which
execute the orders of provincial governments have been recruited from England
on terms guaranteed by the Secretary of State, with the result that many questions
affecting them cannot be determined by any provincial government. Again the
development of trade and industry and science throughout India has favoured the
tendency at headquarters to formulate and pursue a uniform policy. Business and
industry might be seriously hampered if (even with one law for India) the provinces
were left to administer such matters as statistics, patents, copyright, insurance,
income-tax, explosives or mining on different lines. Particularly in the more
scientific spheres—such as bacteriology, or agricultural and veterinary science-
advance has tended to concentration, because the expert services were much too
small to be organised on a provincial basis, and also because the experience and
resources of any one institution would not be fully used unless they were placed at
the disposal of the whole country. Moreover in the past the Government of India
have regarded themselves as distinctly charged with the duty of framing policy
and inspiring reforms for the whole of India. i
The central government, with the sanction of the secretary of state,
frequently appointed commissions of enquiry to report on such
questions of grave concern as famine, irrigation, police or education.
After consultation with provincial governments regarding recom-
mendations contained in the reports of such commissions the Govern-
ment of India formulated decisions which were often accompanied
by grants earmarked for the purpose of carrying out reforms. Such
reforms sometimes included the appointment of new advising or
inspecting officers at headquarters and then tended to encourage
interference with local discretion. In any case the report of a com-
mission enabled the central government to take careful stock of a
critical situation, and tr shape new policy.
The whole position was aptly summed up by Lord Morley's
Decentralisation Commission:
Among the important matters which the Central Government retain in their
own hands are those relating to foreign affairs, the defences of the country, general
taxation, currency, debt, tariffs, posts and telegraphs, railways and accounts and
auditing. Ordinary internal administration, police, civil and criminal justice,
prisons, the assessment and collection of the revenues, education, medical and
sanitary arrangements, irrigation, buildings and roads, forests and the control over
municipal and rural boards fall to the share of provincial governments. But even
in these matters the Government of India exercise a general and constant control.
They lay down lines of policy and test their application from the administration
reports and returns relating to the main departments under the Local Governments.
They also employ expert officers to inspect and advise upon a number of depart-
ments which are primarily administered by the Local Governments, including
Agriculture, Irrigation, Forests, Medical, Sanitation, Education, Excise and Salt,
Printing and Stationery, and Archaeology.
The control of the Government of India is, moreover, not confined to prescription
of policy and to action taken upon reports and inspections. It assumes more specific
forms. They scrutinise, and when necessary, modify the annual budgets of the
Local Governments. Every newly created appointment of importance, every
material alteration in service grades, has to receive their specific approval, and in
many cases reference to the Secretary of State is likewise necessary. . . . Moreover
1 Report on Constitutionel Reforms, 1918, p. 99.
## p. 243 (#279) ############################################
CENTRALISATION
243
1
the general conditions of Government Service, such as leave, pension and travelling
allowance rules, and the Public Works and Forest Codes are all strictly prescribed
by the Central Government, either suo motu or on instruction from the Secretary
of State. Lastly there is a wide field of appeal to the Government of India, as also
the Secretary of State, from persons who may deem themselves aggrieved by the
action of a Local Government.
The essential point to be borne in mind is that at present, even in matters pri-
marily assigned to the Provincial Governments, these act as agents of the Govern-
ment of India who exercise a very full and constant check over their proceedings.
Public policy and legislation were everywhere controlled by the
central government which was, in its turn, dominated by its re-
sponsibility to parliament through the secretary of state. Both policy
and laws were latterly much influenced by Indian councillors; but
the last word and the whole responsibility lay with the British govern-
ment. The basic principle was defined by Lord Dufferin:
It is absolutely necessary, not merely for the maintenance of our own power, but
for the good government of the country and for the general content of all classes,
and especially of the people at large, that England should never abdicate the supreme
control of public affairs, or delegate to a minority or a class, the duty of providing
for the diversified communities over which she rules. 1
Tradition and practice operated to demarcate "spheres of in-
fluence” for the central and the provincial governments, but the
demarcation was neither clear-cut nor legally recognised. As the
major provinces were really different countries, their governments
necessarily exercised considerable liberty in the management of
domestic affairs. Differences of opinion periodically arose as to the
lengths to which this libertyshould go. Provincial governors sometimes
complained of vexatious interference. 2 Lord Curzon, on the other
hand, complained in 1901 that in respect of educational policy the
local governments had become a “sort of heptarchy", and at another
time proposed to reduce Madras and Bombay to the status of pro-
vinces in the charge of lieutenant-governors. Yet no constitution can
work successfully in a sub-continent so vast and various as India which
does not concede a large degree of discretion to provincial rulers. The
best of these were willing to trust their executive officers; and they
were certainly justified in expecting a generous measure of confidence
from their own superiors. This, as a rule, they received; but we find
Lord Morley writing to Lord Minto on 15 July, 1909:
All that you say about lieutenant-governors fills me with sympathy, compre-
hension and holy rage. You have now three capable men below you, each of them
bent in a more or less quiet way on having his head, and each entitled to have his
views respectfully considered, and nine times out of ten probably right, but the
tenth time capable of bringing things into a dangerous mess. And then there is
the weak man, who is a greater nuisance than the strong uppish man. "
Lord Sydenham illustrates Morley's reluctance to rely on the con-
Lyall, Life of Dufferin, IT, 203:
? Life of Frete, 1, 441-2; Lord Sydenham, My Working Life, pp. 229-31, also 247,
· Ronaldshay, op. cit. 11, 57-60, 416.
* Morley, Recollections, 1, 263.
1
16-2
## p. 244 (#280) ############################################
244
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS
victions of responsible rulers in personal and daily touch with facts1
and realities. Morley certainly carried this feeling to excessive
lengths. A uniform policy which sets the time for all subordinates is
obviously necessary. But India is still the country of which Wood
said in 1853, "On nearly all sides I find that there is the greatest
difference between its various parts". Diversity of circumstances
renders general. conditions difficult to arrive at; and provincial rulers
who are not backward in pressing their convictions, even at the cost
of jarring on doctrines and theories conceived in a very different
atmosphere, are entitled to a full and unbiassed hearing. It is still
true that
there can be no successful government in India unless the fundamental fact of the
immense diversities of Indian countries and peoples be recognised, and each great
province be administered by its own separate government with a minimum of
interference from outside. ?
THE LAST WORD
We have seen the secretary of state growing in stature as years went
by, anxious at times to play an energetic part in the actual governing
of India, and reluctant to think that after all this must be the task of
the men on the spot. Throughout our period it was the central and
provincial governments who, working through the officers of the public
services among vast Asiatic communities split into thousands of
sections and possessed of traditions and usages of immemorial an-
tiquity, gave shape and living form to the policies of distant parlia-
ments and cabinets. It was they who brought India through the
supreme trial of more than four years of a world-wide war.
go round carrying papers which could be disposed of without circu-
lation. “We have”, he wrote, “reformed ourselves a good deal, but
I should like to see the new status of members recognised by Act of
Parliament. ” The dispatch was going by that mail. The proposals
were in “as quiet a form as possible”. The reform of the legislative
council was ‘now far more pressing than that of the Executive
Council”.
Wood had originally contemplated a bill for each of these reforms
but instead on 6 June, 1861, introduced one which dealt with both.
The Mutiny, he said, had aggravated the difficulties of administration.
In fact it would be folly to shut our eyes to the increasing difficulties
of our position in India, and for this reason we should put all our
institutions there on the soundest possible foundation. In the Lords
Earl De Grey and Ripon, under-secretary of state, explained that
the policy was “to limit the changes as much as possible and to make
those only which experience showed to be necessary”.
The Councils Act of 1861 (24 & 25 Vic. c. 74) established a governor-
general's executive council of five ordinary members. In 1853 the
1 See Canning to Frere, 24 October, 1860, Life of Frere, 1, 358.
Afterwards secretary of state for India, 1866; viceroy of India, 1880-4. Hansard,
9 July, 1861, p. 586.
## p. 229 (#265) ############################################
THE COUNCILS ACT OF 1861
229
legal member had been permitted to sit and vote at all council
meetings. He had become a fourth ordinary member. But the dis-
organisation of public finances caused by the Mutiny had led to the
appointment of a trained financier as fourth member. A jurist,
however, was also needed, as the law was in process of codification,
and even the Penal Code, which had originally been drafted by
Macaulay, was still incomplete, so a fifth member was added to the
council. Of the five members three must have served the crown or
the Company in India for not less than ten years. One of these was
a military member, always a distinguished soldier; the other two were
civil servants who up to the year 1859 had always been selected from
the Bengal Presidency. The fourth member was a financial expert,
who might or might not have served the crown or the Company
previously; and the fifth or legal member was a barrister of England
or Ireland, or a member of the Faculty of Advocates in Scotland of at
least five years' standing. The commander-in-chief might be, and in
practice always was, an extraordinary member who divided with the
military member the responsibility for the military administration of
the country. He was the executive head of the army and was charged
with its organisation and preparation for war as well as with questions
of promotion. His office was known as army headquarters and was
distinct from the military department of the government which,
presided over by the military member, concerned itself with the
control of supply and transport, with ordnance, remounts, clothing,
medical stores, military works and military finance, and above all
with the preparation of the military budget. Proposals for military
reform or expenditure went from army headquarters to the military
department of the Government of India where they were noted on,
and, if involving expenditure, further proceeded to the finance depart-
ment. Finally they reached the viceroy through the military member
of council. If the viceroy, the military member and the commander-
in-chief were in general agreement, the proposals were carried out.
But if there were disagreement a proposal was either referred back
for further consideration or was laid before the governor-general in
council, debated on, and accepted or rejected by a majority of votes.
Every ordinary member of ihe governor-general's council, assisted
by a secretary, under-secretaries and a sufficient office establishment,
presided over certain departments of the central government. The
governor-general himself held charge of the foreign department which
conducted the correspondence of India with neighbouring powers;
he kept the London cabinet informed on questions of Asiatic policy
connected with India, and supervised the affairs of the native states.
The British representatives at the courts of ruling princes were the
agents of the governor-general and not the representatives of the
Government of India.
The distribution of departments among ordinary members of
## p. 230 (#266) ############################################
230
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS
council was a matter of custom, not of law. The act of 1861 conferred
on the governor-general the power to make rules and orders for the
more convenient transaction of business in his council other than the
business at legislative meetings, and provided that every order made
and every act done in accordance with such rules and orders must be
treated as being the order or act of the governor-general in council. 1
Canning's reforms in the conduct of business were thus sanctioned by
statute and the portfolio system was firmly established. Councillors
were able to dispose of unimportant cases belonging to their depart-
ments in the name of the Government of India. Cases in which two
departments differed, or a member proposed to overrule a local
government, or important issues were involved, were laid before the
viceroy together with the views of the members in charge and of their
secretaries. Differences of opinion between a member and the viceroy
were referred to a full council, where decision was taken in accordance
with the views of the majority. If opinions were equally divided the
president had a casting vote. But if a measure were proposed which
seemed to the governor-general to affect essentially the safety, tran-
quillity or interests of "the British possessions in India”, he could
overrule the majority of his council. In such cases any two members
of the dissentient majority might require the t. ansmission to the
secretary of state of the decision taken together with their minutes of
dissent. This overruling power of the governor-general's, which came
down from the acts of 1786 and 1793, was reaffirmed and slightly
expanded by an act of 1870. But however widely the views of a
viceroy might originally differ from those of a majority of his coun-
cillors, there was almost invariably a compelling desire for compro-
mise. 2
If the governor-general in council declared it to be expedient that
he should visit any part of India unaccompanied by his council, he
could in council appoint a member to preside at meetings held in his
absence, with all the powers of the governor-general except those
relating to legislation. Should the governor-general be absent from
a council meeting through indisposition, the senior ordinary member
presided.
Thus the Government of India became a cabinet government pre-
sided over by a governor-general, business being carried on depart-
mentally and the governor-general taking a more active and particular
share in it than is taken by a prime minister in a Western country or
than had been taken by any of his predecessors. The system remained
unaltered during our period. But a sixth ordinary member was
provided, by act of parliament, in 1874, to preside over the depart-
1 [lbert, Digest, sec. 42 (2), p. 103.
: See, for instance, Wolf, Life of Lord Ripon, 11, 50. Lord Curzon wrongly adds the aban-
donment of Kandahar to the instances in which a viceroy overruled his council (op. cit.
II, 73).
3 Îlbert, Government of India, pp. 187-8, clauses 45-6.
## p. 231 (#267) ############################################
.
THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL
231
ment of public works. In 1904, on the recommendation of the
secretary of state, the power of appointing a member to this particular
department was converted into a general power, and the public works
member was replaced by a member for commerce and industry.
The next change in the personnel of the council came after warm
discussion and led to the resignation of Lord Curzon in 1905. The
commander-in-chief, Lord Kitchener, had advocated the abolition of
the military member and the replacement of the military department
of the Government of India by an army department presided over by
the commander-in-chief. This proposal was strongly resisted by the
viceroy and the ordinary members of his council on the ground that,
if adopted, it would concentrate military authority in the hands of
the commander-in-chief and would subvert the supremacy of the civil
power by depriving it of independent military advice. Lord Kitchener,
however, maintained his views, urging that proposals from the
commander-in-chief should not reach the Government of India
through any second military adviser, who must necessarily be his
junior in rank and his inferior in experience. Eventually Lord
Kitchener's contention was in substance accepted and was followed
by Lord Curzon's resignation. The commander-in-chief became the
viceroy's sole adviser on all military questions. For a short period
there was a military supply member of inferior status to the former
military member; but this arrangement, as Lord Morley said,
"proved good neither for administration nor economy”. It ceased
in 1909, and the vacancy at the council-board was filled in 1910 by
a newly appointed member in charge of education and sanitation.
For the closing years of our period and throughout the great war the
council consisted of
(a) the commander-in-chief (extraordinary),
(b) the home member,
(c) the financial member,
(d) the legal member,
(e) the commerce and industry member,
(s) the education member,
all holding office for five years.
In the year 1909, on the recommendation of the viceroy and the
secretary of state, a distinguished Hindu barrister, Mr (afterwards
Lord) Sinha, was appointed legal member by the crown. He was
succeeded by a Muhammadan barrister; and when the latter had
completed his term of office, a Hindu high court judge was appointed
education member of the central executive.
The viceroy and governor-general, although invested with para-
mount power in India, was the governor-general in council and,
unlike the secretary of state, possessed a very limited power of separate
action. Rarely, however, did viceroys wish to dispense with the
assistance of their colleagues. John Lawrence was much vexed by
## p. 232 (#268) ############################################
232
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS
opposition from certain councillors; but he came to the viceroyalty
a tired man,' had long been accustomed to govern alone in the
Panjab, and was worried by the atmosphere of rapid evolution and
frequent argument which he found in Calcutta. There is much truth
in a sentence of Frere's on 20 March, 1868:
no Governor-General since the time of Clive has had such power and opportunities;
but he fancies the want of progress is owing to some opposing power which only
exists in his own imagination.
Lord Minto complained on 3 July, 1910, that he had
constantly felt that he must depend upon himself alone with the exception of one
or two advisers he had managed to secure and that the councillors sent him by
Lord Morley were not only useless but mischievous.
But Minto evidently wrote under the influence of intense irritation
with a secretary of state who “arrogated to himself complete in-
dependence” in making appointments to the council and would give
little or no weight to the governor-general's objections. 3 As a general
rule, viceroys and their councillors were drawn together, not only by
identity of aim but by force of circumstances, by the logic of the
palpable facts which encompassed all alike. Unity was generally
achieved, for without it lay no salvation. Thus we see one of the
strongest of viceroys, Lord Northbrook, jealously upholding the
statutory rights of his council and refusing to be led into courses
which might infringe those rights. We find Lord Ripon, even when
fully conscious of serious differences which separated him from the
majority of his councillors, observing “There is a very strong desire
to support the Viceroy, of which I have much proof”. 5 We see Lord
Curzon emphasising the gain to a viceroy of acting with, and not
without, his council, and Lord Minto asserting, in opposition to
Lord Morley, the right of the Government of India, as a body, to be
consulted about the Anglo-Russian agreement. There were ex-
tremely few decisions for which the viceroy's council did not share
responsibility with their president. Notable exceptions were the
abolition of import duties on the coarser kinds of cotton cloths in
Lord Lytton's days and the levy of a countervailing excise duty on
Indian cotton goods in the time of Lord Elgin. In both instances the
viceroy's action was due to pressure from the London cabinet; and
on the second occasion his council protested so strongly against a
measure which they considered unjust to Indian interests that the
secretary of state, Sir Henry Fowler, considered it necessary to convey
a weighty warning.
1 Bosworth Smith, Life of Lord Lawrence, 11, 429-41, 589.
Life of Frere, 11, 40 (Frere to Florence Nightingale).
9 Buchan, Memoir of Lord Minto, p. 311.
4 See Mallet, Life of Lord Northbrook, p. 91.
6 Wolf, op. cit. II, 50.
6 Curzon, op. cit. II, 74, 112-19.
? Morley, Recollections, 11, 178-9.
## p. 233 (#269) ############################################
THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS
233
“A Government”, he wrote, “whether in Downing Street or Calcutta, must act
as a homogeneous body, not as representing certain political opinions, but as
representing an executive authority which cannot act, whether in administration
or legislation, efficiently unless they act unitedly. . . . The existing law subjects the
Government of India to the control of the Imperial Government, and the Secretary
of State, who exercises that control, is responsible to Parliament. He cannot hold
office if the House of Commons disapproves of his official conduct. India is by the Act of
Parliament governed by and in the name of the Queen, and she governs by the
advice of a responsible minister. . . . So long as any matter of administration or
policy is undecided, every member of the Government of India is at liberty to
express an opinion; but when once a certain line of policy has been adopted under
the direction of the Cabinet, it becomes the clear duty of every member of the
Government of India to consider not what that policy ought to be, but how effect
may best be given to the policy that has been decided on; and if any member of
that Government is unable to do this, there is only one alternative open to him. . . .
The Cabinet have decided that the English precedent applies, and therefore that
the members of the (Viceroy's) Executive Council must, just as members of the
Cabinet do here, vote together (at legislative meetings) in support of Government
measures. If they are unable to do this, then the English precedent applies and the
objecting Member resigns before he either abstains from voting or votes against
the measure. ”1
These instructions were followed by the governor-general's coun-
cillors; but time brings its revenges, and in 1916 the reversal of the
policy imposed on the Government of India in 1894 was initiated by
that government and assented to by the secretary of state.
THE New LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS
No government can govern effectively unless it can legislate. The
subject of machinery for legislation was anxiously considered in
Calcutta and in London. In 1853 Wood, as president of the Board of
Control, had proposed and carried through parliament a measure
designed to provide that the governor-generals council, enlarged for
legislative purposes, should be simply a body which would assist the
supreme government in making laws. 2 Put Dalhousie started this
body off with 136 standing orders and a Hansard of its own. Its
debates were public. Of its additional members one was the Chief
Justice of Bengal, another was one of the judges of the Supreme
Court. The remaining additional members were officials from distant
provinces who were not indisposed to import fresh ideas into the close
atmosphere of Calcutta. 3 Somewhat to the consternation of Wood
the council soon showed signs of considering itself “the nucleus of a
constitutional parliament”. * Dalhousie, one of the most arbitrary of
governors-general, had viewed the prospect with no qualms. 5 But,
as time went on, his successor found the debates sometimes embar-
rassing. He thought it “to be regretted that the Council was on its
1 Mrs R. Hamilton, Life of Lord Wolverhampton, pp. 315-17:
: Wood to Dalhousie, 23 December, 1854 (Lee-Warner, Life of Dalhousie, n1, 237).
3 See Life of Frere, p. 309.
See speech by Lord Ripon, under-secretary of state, Lords' Debates, 9 July, 1861.
See Lee-Warner, op. cit. 11, 234-5.
## p. 234 (#270) ############################################
234
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS
first creation invested with forms and modes of procedure so closely
resembling Parliament". 1 Frere, who had to pilot government bills
through the council, agreed and considered that the judges did the
mischief. In writing to the secretary of state he illustrated this view
and found his correspondent entirely sympathetic. The existing
council must go. But what was to take its place? Even as late as
18 February, 1861, Wood was uncertain. No one in 1853, he wrote,
had dreamt of “a debating body with open doors and even quasi-
independence". Lord Dalhousie began wrongly and everything had
gone in the direction of fostering the notion of the council's being “an
independent legislative body”. It was all wrong and very unfortunate
because there was always a sympathy in England for independent
deliberation. Representative bodies, in any real sense, were impossible
in India, and he did not think that “any external element would
really do good”. It might satisfy the English at Calcutta to have an
English merchant or planter in the council, but he was not sure that
it would improve the legislation; and Indians could not be put in who
were “in any sense the exponents of active opinion, or who could take
any part in the deliberations”.
Frere, on 10 April, 1861, drew a vivid picture of racial tension
which had followed on the Mutiny and of European non-official
impatience of official legislation, urging strongly that it was impossible
to recede' and that, in view of the course of events since 1853, Dalhousie
was in the main right. Had he not taken the line which he took,
things would have been worse than they were. The proper course
now was to assist the viceroy with a sort of senate able to advise him
in framing laws which could be of general application to all parts of
India and in confirming or annulling laws shaped by the provincial
legislatures which had been abolished in 1833 but must now be
restored. Whether “any external (legislative) element” on the
governor-general's council would really do any good or not was no
longer a debatable question. Such an external element was essential.
“The days”, he wrote, "are gone when you could govern India without much
caring what the Europeans and Europeanised community say or think of your
measures, and unless you have some barometer and safety-valve in the shape of
a deliberative Council, I believe you will always be liable to very unlooked for and
dangerous explosions. '
He also urged that the new legislative bodies would make fatal
mistakes unless they were assisted by Indian members. 4
Canning agreed with Frere, and Wood largely accepted these views,
but in a pessimistic mood. Writing to Frere on 17 August, 1861, he
ended thus:
1 The governor-general to the secretary of state, 9 December, 1859.
2 Frere to Wood, 21 April, 1861 (Life of Frere, 1, 331. See also pp. 327 and 356).
* Correspondence, Life of Frere, I, 336.
• Idem, pp. 336-41.
## p. 235 (#271) ############################################
THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS
235
The future government of India is a problem of the most serious import, utterly
unexampled in history, and one of which it seems to me very difficult to foresec the
progress.
In addressing the House of Commons on 6 June, 1861," he had pointed
out the impossibility of reverting to a system by which the executive
government alone legislated for India. Nor could the English in India
have a representative body to frame the laws by which they should
be governed. It was equally impossible to assemble in India in one
place persons who would be real representatives of the various classes
of the Indian populations. The residents of the towns no more
represented the general Indian population than a highly educated
native of London represented a highland chieftain or a feudal baron
of six centuries ago. The legislative arrangements which he proposed
were based on Canning's recommendations. They became law and
were these.
For purposes of legislation the council of the governor-general was
reinforced by additional members, not less than six or more than
twelve, nominated by the governor-general and holding office for two
years. Of these additional members not less than one-half were non-
official (in no government service). Should the council meet for
legislative purposes within a lieutenant-governor's province, the
lieutenant-governor became an additional member. The functions of
the council when meeting for legislative purposes were strictly limited
to the consideration and enactment of laws. It could transact no
other business. It could entertain no motion except one for leave to
introduce a bill or having reference to a bill actually introduced.
Measures relating to the public revenue or public debt, religion,
military or naval matters, or foreign relations could be introduced
only with the sanction of the governo:-general. His assent was re-
quired to every act passed by the council; and any such act might be
disallowed by the sovereign, acting through the secretary of state.
While the legislative power of the governor-general in council was
wide, it should not affect certain parliamentary enactments, or the
general authority of parliament, or any part of the unwritten laws or
constitution of the United Kingdom whereon the allegiance of the
subject or the sovereignty of the crown might depend. In order to
remove all doubts respecting the validity of rules or regulations
sanctioned by executive orders of the governor-general in council
for the more lately annexed or non-regulation provinces, a clause was
introduced declaring that no such rules or regulations should be
deemed invalid by reason of not having been made in conformity with
the provisions of the charter renewal acts.
Mr A. H. (afterwards Sir Henry) Layard proposed in the House
of Commons to insert an injunction directing that a certain number
of the additional members of the council, when sitting as a legislative
1 Hansard, CLXIII, 638-9.
## p. 236 (#272) ############################################
236
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS
body, should be natives of India. 1 But the secretary of state con-
sidered it undesirable to make statutory distinction in this connection
between different classes of Her Majesty's subjects. Some of the
additional members appointed would certainly be natives of India.
The act conferred on the governor-general one power of a novel
character. He was enabled to frame and issue on emergency, without
his council, ordinances which would not remain in force for more than
six months. Such a power had been urgently required on certain
occasions in 1857–8. Long afterwards ordinances were resorted to in
the first month of the great war, when the legislative council was
not sitting and immediate action was required in certain directions.
The power of issuing ordinances was vested in the governor-general
alone in order that the responsibility might be solely his. But the
reasons for such exceptional procedure should always be recorded and
should be submitted to Her Majesty's Governınent together with the
ordinance itself. 3
The power of legislation which had been taken from the governors
in council of Madras and Bombay by the Charter Act of 1833 was
restored in 1861.
For legislative purposes these councils also were
expanded by additional members. No line of demarcation was drawn
between subjects reserved for the central and those allotted to the
local legislatures; but while local legislation in certain cases could not
be undertaken without sanction from the governor-general, all acts of
local legislatures required his subsequent assent as well as that of the
local governor and were subject to disallowance by the crown. The
governor-general was directed to establish a legislative council in
Bengal and empowered to set up similar councils in the North-
Western Provinces and the Panjab when the time was ripe. Councils
were established in Bengal in 1862, in the North-Western Provinces
in 1886, and in the Panjab and Burma in 1898.
The legislative councils established by the act of 1861 were com-
mittees by means of which the executive government obtained advice
and help in legislation. While the government enacted the laws
through its council, the public had a right to make itself heard, and
the executive was able to defend its legislation. When the laws were
once made they were binding on the government as well as on the
public. They had been made in a manner which ensured publicity
and discussion and could only be changed by the deliberate and
public process by which they had been made. The councils could only
deliberate on the legislation immediately at issue. They could not call
for information on other subjects or impugn acts of the administra-
tion. 4
In the year 1870 there was a discussion 5 between Lord Mayo's
1 Hansard, CLXIII, 1016, 18 June, 1861.
2 Idem, p. 1027.
3 Ilbert, Digest, pp. 215-16, 566, para. 26, Wood's dispatch of 9 August, 1861.
4 See Report on Constitutional Reforms, 1918, p. 54.
5 See Accounts and Papers, 15, East India, 1876, LVI, 6-10.
5
## p. 237 (#273) ############################################
LEGISLATIVE CONTROL FROM LONDON
237
government and the Duke of Argyll, then secretary of state, the former
claiming that they had been endowed by section 22 of the 1861
Councils Act with legislative discretion which they should exercise to
the best of their judgment. The secretary of state could, of course,
disallow any law which they passed. They could not, however, be expected
to introduce any measure of which they disapproved.
Any other view would invest the Secretary of State with the character of the
legislator for British India and would convert the Legislative Council into a mere
instrument to be used by him for that purpose.
On 24 November, 1870, the duke replied that theoretical incon-
veniences were inseparably connected with the working of such a
machinery of government as t'iat through which the empire of India
was ruled from England, but these could in practice be reduced to
a minimum by mutual respect on the part of those concerned. One
great principle underlay the whole system. The final control and direction of
affairs in India rested with the Home Government. It made no real difference
if its directions related to legislative affairs. If the crown's interposition
were limited to a veto on acts passed in India, the queen's government
would be helpless to secure legislative sanction for any measures
however essential it might deem them to be, for the welfare or safety
of the Indian Empire. It followed, then, that this government must
hold in its hands the ultimate power of requiring the governor-
general to introduce a measure and requiring the members of the
Indian government to vote for it. This was the practice in all parts
of the queen's dominions where the authority of the legislative body
was not derived from the principle of popular representation. It
was a question of abstract right, not of ordinary procedure. It was
only necessary to bear in mind where the seat of ultimate authority
was placed in order to secure on both sides that fairness and modera-
tion without which no political constituțion could work with smooth-
ness and success. Lord Mayo's government on 1 February, 1871,
accepted this doctrine, as it defined a principle which they had never
intended to question; they were glad, however, to hear that the
ruling would not be applied to ordinary procedure but only “with
great deliberation and on the rarest occasions”.
The enlargements of the legislative councils in 1892, 1909 and 1919
are described in later chapters. Those of 1892 were made in response
to the demands of“ a limited but important section of Indian opinion
and established the fact of election to the councils by certain public
bodies; but the government nominated a majority of the members of
each council and maintained cfficial majorities on the ground that no
administration which did not possess sufficient power to carry out
whatever measures it considered to be for the public interest could
remain at the head of affairs among the different İndian nationalities. 1
* See Lord Dufferin's picture of the India of his day, Report on Constitutional Reforms,
1918, p. 117.
## p. 238 (#274) ############################################
238
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS
The Morley-Minto reforms were the first real breach in the system
of 1861. The king's proclamation of 2 November, 1908, had an-
nounced that “the principle of representative institutions which had
from the first been gradually introduced” would now be "prudently
extended”. The reforms conceded non-official majorities on the
provincial legislative councils composed mainly of elected members,
but also of persons nominated by the governments concerned. They
allowed any member to divide his council on financial questions and
all councils to discuss matters of public importance and to make re-
commendations to the executive governments. But on the imperial
legislative council the official majority was retained. This reservation
was justified by Morley on the ground that the new councils were not
designed to pave the way to the establishment of a parliamentary
system, a goal to which he would not "for one moment aspire”. But
by establishing non-official majorities on provincial legislative councils
and by admitting an Indian gentleman to a seat on the governor-
general's executive council, the core of authority in India, a step
which was taken, with some searchings of heart, on the viceroy's
recommendation, the way was prepared for further developments
which were to follow with unexpected rapidity under the pressure of
movements which are described in later chapters.
. . .
. . .
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS
The following are now the major provinces of British India:
Province
Population (1921)
Madras . . .
42,300,000
Bengal . . .
46,700,000
United Provinces of Agra and Oudh 45,600,000
Bihar and Orissa
34,000,000
Bombay
19,300,000
Assam
7,600,000
Panjab . . .
20,700,000
Central Provinces and Berar
13,900,000
Burma . . .
13,200,000
The minor provinces are:
The North-West Frontier Province
2,250,000
British Baluchistan
422,000
Ajmer-Merwara
496,000
Coorg . . .
164,000
Andaman and Nicobar Islands
27,000
Delhi
486,000
Thus the total population of British territory in India is 247 millions.
I
Between the years 1858 and 1918 changes were made in the titles,
boundaries and governments of certain provinces originally without
any friction or difficulty, but on one occasion resented by a local
1 Morley, Indian Speeches, p. 92.
2 See Morley, Recollections, 11, 301-3.
## p. 239 (#275) ############################################
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS
239
government and on another raising an unexpected but violent storm
of local fury.
Madras and Bombay remained under a governor in council
throughout. Distinguished by the traditions of their old independence
and by the presence of great seaports, they still retained some relics of
their original privileges. Each government could correspond directly
with the secretary of state if no financial considerations were involved.
Each could appeal to him against orders of the Government of India
and possessed full discretion in selecting men for important provincial
offices. Both were less liable to supervision than other provinces in
the administration of forests and land-revenue. In 1909, under the
Morley-Minto reforms, the executive council of the governor in each
was increased by the addition of an Indian member. In emergencies
the governor could overrule his colleagues, but ordinarily questions
were decided by majority votes.
Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Assam remained under one lieutenant-
governor until 1874, when Assam was constituted a separate province
and placed under a chief commissioner.
In the year 1905 Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Assam were converted
by the ill-fated “Partition” into two provinces under lieutenant-
governors, one composed of Western Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, the
other of Eastern Bengal and Assam. In 1910 the lieutenant-governor
of Western Bengal was given an executive council of two British civil
servants and one Indian non-official.
In 1911 Lord Curzon's partition was set aside. The two new pro-
vinces became three. Bengal became the charge of a governor in
council; Bihar and Orissa were placed under a lieutenant-governor
in council; Assam was entrusted to a chief commissioner.
At the commencement of our period the present United
Provinces of Agra and Oudh were two provinces under separate
administrations. The Agra Province was known as the North-
Western Provinces and was under a lieutenant-governor. Oudh was
the charge of a chief commissioner. In 1877 the offices of lieutenant-
governor of the North-Western Provinces and chief commissioner of
Oudh were united in the same person. In 1902 the provinces were
named the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh in order to avoid all
confusion between their title and that of the then newly-created
North-West Frontier Province.
The chief commissioner of the Panjab became a lieutenant-
governor in 1859. In 1901 the frontier districts of the Panjab beyond
the Indus were formed into a separate charge under a chief com-
missioner and called the North-West Frontier Province.
The Central Provinces were formed in 1861 by combining the
Sagor and Narbada territories with the Nagpur territories in one
charge under a chief commissioner. Berar was placed under the same
· See Ronaldshay, Life of Lord Curzon, vol. 11, chap. viii. 2 Idem, chap. xxiv.
## p. 240 (#276) ############################################
240
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS
administration when, in 1902, it was leased in perpetuity to the
British by the Nizam of Hyderabad.
Lower Burma became the charge of a chief commissioner in
1860. In 1886 the kingdom of Upper Burma was added to it after
the third Burmese War, and the whole was called the province of
Burma. In 1897 the chief commissioner became a lieutenant-
governor.
The six minor provinces are under chief commissioners. The North-
West Frontier Province was carved out of the Panjab in 1901. British
Baluchistan was incorporated in British India in 1887. The Andaman
and the Nicobar Islands were united under a chief commissioner in
1872. The city of Delhi with a small area surrounding it was con-
stituted an "administrative enclave" under a chief commissioner in
1912 when the imperial capital was transferred there from Calcutta.
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL AND THE
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS
The central government necessarily kept in its own hands functions
which concerned the whole empire. It also exercised financial,
legislative and administrative control over the provincial govern-
ments.
The Charter Act of 1833 had centralised the administration of the
country's finances in the hands of the Government o: India. The act
of 1858 vested the superintendence of the revenues and expenditure
of the country in the secretary of state in council. More than
£42,000,000 were added to the public debt by the troubles of 1857–8;
all branches of the administration needed reorganisation, and im-
provements of every kind were called for. An efficient system of
public accounts and strict financial control was absolutely necessary;
and James Wilson, financial secretary to the treasury, was dispatched
to India as member of the governor-general's council and lived just
long enough to lay the foundations of a system under which the
central government was to retain in its own hands an extensive
measure of financial control. Rules of great stringency were imposed.
But the central government possessed neither time nor knowledge
sufficient to exercise such far-reaching responsibility in many details
which should have been left to the discretion of local governments;
and much wrangling and waste of time resulted from these rigid
arrangements. For some years the central government, which was
itself subject to the secretary of state in all such matters as related
to borrowing, changes of taxation and general fiscal policy, main-
tained this meticulous control. But friction increased; and after
.
careful deliberation, a system of financial decentralisation was in-
augurated by Lord Mayo which was afterwards developed with
beneficial effect. Even at the end of our period, however, special
## p. 241 (#277) ############################################
METHODS OF CONTROL
241
revenues were assigned to each province by the central government,
and were shown with corresponding expenditure in the imperial
budget while each provincial budget required the approval of the
central government, whose sanction was requisite for proposals in-
volving large expenditure and the creation of posts. The responsi-
bility of that government to the secretary of state was firmly insisted
on. In 1907 Lord Morley appointed a Decentralisation Commission
to simplify relations between the central government and its sub-
ordinate and co-ordinate parts; but this body proposed no material
change in financial relations between the central and provincial
governments. The secretary of state himself continued to hold the
central government in strict financial subordination. He watched
the expenditure of Indian revenues “as the ferocious dragon of the
old legend watched the golden apples”. 1 Held in such rigid sub-
ordination, expected to keep down provincial charges, sharing in
provincial proceeds, controlling provincial taxation, the central
government could not effectively decentralise finance.
While legislating for British India, that government also controlled
provincial legislation. Local legislatures, however, made laws “for
the peace and good government” of their provinces on condition that
no such laws affected any act of parliament, or, without previous
sanction, any act of the governor-general's legislative council. They
could not, without the previous permission of the governor-general
in council, consider any law affecting the religion or religious rites
and usages of any class of British subjects in India, or regulating
patents or copyright, or affecting the relations of the government with
foreign princes or states. Their discretion was further curtailed by the
fact that the field open to them was largely covered by acts of the
imperial legislative council. That body still exercised its powers in
matters which were handled for all provinces on uniform lines such
as Penal and Procedure Codes, laws for prisons and police, for forests,
mines, factories and the preservation of the public health. Every
local act required the subsequent assent of the governor-general; and
local governments submitted all projects for legislation to the central
government and secretary of state for approval. Provincial legisla-
tures were still in theory expansions of the executive government for
the purpose of law-making. 2
Every provincial government was required to obey the orders of
the governor-general in council, and to keep him constantly and
diligently informed of its administrative proceedings and of all
matters which ought to be reported to him. He was required by
statute to control all its proceedings. The reasons for so much cen-
tralisation of authority are thus explained in the Montagu-Chelmsford
Report:
1 Morley, Indian Speeches, p. 46. • Report on Constitutional Reforms, 1918, p. 98.
• See section 45, Government of India Act, 1915 (which consolidated all previousstatutes).
CHIVI
16
## p. 242 (#278) ############################################
242
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS
It is easy to see that in many respects India is one single and undivided country,
in which much work must be done on uniform lines. The main Services which
execute the orders of provincial governments have been recruited from England
on terms guaranteed by the Secretary of State, with the result that many questions
affecting them cannot be determined by any provincial government. Again the
development of trade and industry and science throughout India has favoured the
tendency at headquarters to formulate and pursue a uniform policy. Business and
industry might be seriously hampered if (even with one law for India) the provinces
were left to administer such matters as statistics, patents, copyright, insurance,
income-tax, explosives or mining on different lines. Particularly in the more
scientific spheres—such as bacteriology, or agricultural and veterinary science-
advance has tended to concentration, because the expert services were much too
small to be organised on a provincial basis, and also because the experience and
resources of any one institution would not be fully used unless they were placed at
the disposal of the whole country. Moreover in the past the Government of India
have regarded themselves as distinctly charged with the duty of framing policy
and inspiring reforms for the whole of India. i
The central government, with the sanction of the secretary of state,
frequently appointed commissions of enquiry to report on such
questions of grave concern as famine, irrigation, police or education.
After consultation with provincial governments regarding recom-
mendations contained in the reports of such commissions the Govern-
ment of India formulated decisions which were often accompanied
by grants earmarked for the purpose of carrying out reforms. Such
reforms sometimes included the appointment of new advising or
inspecting officers at headquarters and then tended to encourage
interference with local discretion. In any case the report of a com-
mission enabled the central government to take careful stock of a
critical situation, and tr shape new policy.
The whole position was aptly summed up by Lord Morley's
Decentralisation Commission:
Among the important matters which the Central Government retain in their
own hands are those relating to foreign affairs, the defences of the country, general
taxation, currency, debt, tariffs, posts and telegraphs, railways and accounts and
auditing. Ordinary internal administration, police, civil and criminal justice,
prisons, the assessment and collection of the revenues, education, medical and
sanitary arrangements, irrigation, buildings and roads, forests and the control over
municipal and rural boards fall to the share of provincial governments. But even
in these matters the Government of India exercise a general and constant control.
They lay down lines of policy and test their application from the administration
reports and returns relating to the main departments under the Local Governments.
They also employ expert officers to inspect and advise upon a number of depart-
ments which are primarily administered by the Local Governments, including
Agriculture, Irrigation, Forests, Medical, Sanitation, Education, Excise and Salt,
Printing and Stationery, and Archaeology.
The control of the Government of India is, moreover, not confined to prescription
of policy and to action taken upon reports and inspections. It assumes more specific
forms. They scrutinise, and when necessary, modify the annual budgets of the
Local Governments. Every newly created appointment of importance, every
material alteration in service grades, has to receive their specific approval, and in
many cases reference to the Secretary of State is likewise necessary. . . . Moreover
1 Report on Constitutionel Reforms, 1918, p. 99.
## p. 243 (#279) ############################################
CENTRALISATION
243
1
the general conditions of Government Service, such as leave, pension and travelling
allowance rules, and the Public Works and Forest Codes are all strictly prescribed
by the Central Government, either suo motu or on instruction from the Secretary
of State. Lastly there is a wide field of appeal to the Government of India, as also
the Secretary of State, from persons who may deem themselves aggrieved by the
action of a Local Government.
The essential point to be borne in mind is that at present, even in matters pri-
marily assigned to the Provincial Governments, these act as agents of the Govern-
ment of India who exercise a very full and constant check over their proceedings.
Public policy and legislation were everywhere controlled by the
central government which was, in its turn, dominated by its re-
sponsibility to parliament through the secretary of state. Both policy
and laws were latterly much influenced by Indian councillors; but
the last word and the whole responsibility lay with the British govern-
ment. The basic principle was defined by Lord Dufferin:
It is absolutely necessary, not merely for the maintenance of our own power, but
for the good government of the country and for the general content of all classes,
and especially of the people at large, that England should never abdicate the supreme
control of public affairs, or delegate to a minority or a class, the duty of providing
for the diversified communities over which she rules. 1
Tradition and practice operated to demarcate "spheres of in-
fluence” for the central and the provincial governments, but the
demarcation was neither clear-cut nor legally recognised. As the
major provinces were really different countries, their governments
necessarily exercised considerable liberty in the management of
domestic affairs. Differences of opinion periodically arose as to the
lengths to which this libertyshould go. Provincial governors sometimes
complained of vexatious interference. 2 Lord Curzon, on the other
hand, complained in 1901 that in respect of educational policy the
local governments had become a “sort of heptarchy", and at another
time proposed to reduce Madras and Bombay to the status of pro-
vinces in the charge of lieutenant-governors. Yet no constitution can
work successfully in a sub-continent so vast and various as India which
does not concede a large degree of discretion to provincial rulers. The
best of these were willing to trust their executive officers; and they
were certainly justified in expecting a generous measure of confidence
from their own superiors. This, as a rule, they received; but we find
Lord Morley writing to Lord Minto on 15 July, 1909:
All that you say about lieutenant-governors fills me with sympathy, compre-
hension and holy rage. You have now three capable men below you, each of them
bent in a more or less quiet way on having his head, and each entitled to have his
views respectfully considered, and nine times out of ten probably right, but the
tenth time capable of bringing things into a dangerous mess. And then there is
the weak man, who is a greater nuisance than the strong uppish man. "
Lord Sydenham illustrates Morley's reluctance to rely on the con-
Lyall, Life of Dufferin, IT, 203:
? Life of Frete, 1, 441-2; Lord Sydenham, My Working Life, pp. 229-31, also 247,
· Ronaldshay, op. cit. 11, 57-60, 416.
* Morley, Recollections, 1, 263.
1
16-2
## p. 244 (#280) ############################################
244
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENTS
victions of responsible rulers in personal and daily touch with facts1
and realities. Morley certainly carried this feeling to excessive
lengths. A uniform policy which sets the time for all subordinates is
obviously necessary. But India is still the country of which Wood
said in 1853, "On nearly all sides I find that there is the greatest
difference between its various parts". Diversity of circumstances
renders general. conditions difficult to arrive at; and provincial rulers
who are not backward in pressing their convictions, even at the cost
of jarring on doctrines and theories conceived in a very different
atmosphere, are entitled to a full and unbiassed hearing. It is still
true that
there can be no successful government in India unless the fundamental fact of the
immense diversities of Indian countries and peoples be recognised, and each great
province be administered by its own separate government with a minimum of
interference from outside. ?
THE LAST WORD
We have seen the secretary of state growing in stature as years went
by, anxious at times to play an energetic part in the actual governing
of India, and reluctant to think that after all this must be the task of
the men on the spot. Throughout our period it was the central and
provincial governments who, working through the officers of the public
services among vast Asiatic communities split into thousands of
sections and possessed of traditions and usages of immemorial an-
tiquity, gave shape and living form to the policies of distant parlia-
ments and cabinets. It was they who brought India through the
supreme trial of more than four years of a world-wide war.
