No More Learning

Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God is not opposed to
the virtue of religion. The temptation of God is sinful, because a man
doubts God, as stated above [3125](A[2]). Now doubt about God comes
under the head of unbelief, which is opposed to faith. Therefore
temptation of God is opposed to faith rather than to religion.

Objection 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 18:23): "Before prayer
prepare thy soul, and be not as a man that tempteth God. Such a man,"
that is, who tempts God, says the interlinear gloss, "prays for what
God taught him to pray for, yet does not what God has commanded him to
do. " Now this pertains to imprudence which is opposed to hope.
Therefore it seems that temptation of God is a sin opposed to hope.

Objection 3: Further, a gloss on Ps. 77:18, "And they tempted God in
their hearts," says that "to tempt God is to pray to Him deceitfully,
with simplicity in our words and wickedness in our hearts. " Now deceit
is opposed to the virtue of truth. Therefore temptation of God is
opposed, not to religion, but to truth.

On the contrary, According to the gloss quoted above "to tempt God is
to pray to Him inordinately. " Now to pray to God becomingly is an act
of religion as stated above ([3126]Q[83], A[15]). Therefore to tempt
God is a sin opposed to religion.

I answer that, As clearly shown above ([3127]Q[81], A[5]), the end of
religion is to pay reverence to God. Wherefore whatever pertains
directly to irreverence for God is opposed to religion. Now it is
evident that to tempt a person pertains to irreverence for him: since
no one presumes to tempt one of whose excellence he is sure. Hence it
is manifest that to tempt God is a sin opposed to religion.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3128]Q[81], A[7]), it belongs
to religion to declare one's faith by certain signs indicative of
reverence towards God. Consequently it belongs to irreligion that,
through doubtful faith, a man does things indicative of irreverence
towards God. To tempt God is one of these; wherefore it is a species of
irreligion.

Reply to Objection 2: He that prepares not his soul before prayer by
forgiving those against whom he has anything, or in some other way
disposing himself to devotion, does not do what he can to be heard by
God, wherefore he tempts God implicitly as it were. And though this
implicit temptation would seem to arise from presumption or
indiscretion, yet the very fact that a man behaves presumptuously and
without due care in matters relating to God implies irreverence towards
Him. For it is written (1 Pet. 5:6): "Be you humbled . . . under the
mighty hand of God," and (2 Tim. 2:15): "Carefully study to present
thyself approved unto God. " Therefore also this kind of temptation is a
species of irreligion.

Reply to Objection 3: A man is said to pray deceitfully, not in
relation to God, Who knows the secrets of the heart, but in relation to
man. Wherefore deceit is accidental to the temptation of God, and
consequently it does not follow that to tempt God is directly opposed
to the truth.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the temptation of God is a graver sin than superstition?

Objection 1: It would seem that the temptation of God is a graver sin
than superstition. The greater sin receives the greater punishment. Now
the sin of tempting God was more severely punished in the Jews than was
the sin of idolatry; and yet the latter is the chief form of
superstition: since for the sin of idolatry three thousand men of their
number were slain, as related in Ex. 32:28 [*Septuagint version. The
Vulgate has "twenty-three thousand. "], whereas for the sin of
temptation they all without exception perished in the desert, and
entered not into the land of promise, according to Ps. 94:9, "Your
fathers tempted Me," and further on, "so I swore in My wrath that they
should not enter into My rest. " Therefore to tempt God is a graver sin
than superstition.

Objection 2: Further, the more a sin is opposed to virtue the graver it
would seem to be. Now irreligion, of which the temptation of God is a
species, is more opposed to the virtue of religion, than superstition
which bears some likeness to religion. Therefore to tempt God is a
graver sin than superstition.

Objection 3: Further, it seems to be a greater sin to behave
disrespectfully to one's parents, than to pay others the respect we owe
to our parents. Now God should be honored by us as the Father of all
(Malach. 1:6). Therefore. temptation of God whereby we behave
irreverently to God, seems to be a greater sin than idolatry, whereby
we give to a creature the honor we owe to God.

On the contrary, A gloss on Dt. 17:2, "When there shall be found among
you," etc. says: "The Law detests error and idolatry above all: for it
is a very great sin to give to a creature the honor that belongs to the
Creator. "

I answer that, Among sins opposed to religion, the more grievous is
that which is the more opposed to the reverence due to God. Now it is
less opposed to this reverence that one should doubt the divine
excellence than that one should hold the contrary for certain. For just
as a man is more of an unbeliever if he be confirmed in his error, than
if he doubt the truth of faith, so, too, a man acts more against the
reverence due to God, if by his deeds he professes an error contrary to
the divine excellence, than if he expresses a doubt. Now the
superstitious man professes an error, as shown above (Q[94], A[1], ad
1), whereas he who tempts God by words or deeds expresses a doubt of
the divine excellence, as stated above [3129](A[2]). Therefore the sin
of superstition is graver than the sin of tempting God.

Reply to Objection 1: The sin of idolatry was not punished in the above
manner, as though it were a sufficient punishment; because a more
severe punishment was reserved in the future for that sin, for it is
written (Ex. 32:34): "And I, in the day of revenge, will visit this sin
also of theirs. "

Reply to Objection 2: Superstition bears a likeness to religion, as
regards the material act which it pays just as religion does. But, as
regards the end, it is more contrary to religion than the temptation of
God, since it implies greater irreverence for God, as stated.

Reply to Objection 3: It belongs essentially to the divine excellence
that it is singular and incommunicable. Consequently to give divine
reverence to another is the same as to do a thing opposed to the divine
excellence. There is no comparison with the honor due to our parents,
which can without sin be given to others.
__________________________________________________________________

OF PERJURY (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider perjury: under which head there are four points of
inquiry:

(1) Whether falsehood is necessary for perjury?

(2) Whether perjury is always a sin?

(3) Whether it is always a mortal sin?

(4) Whether it is a sin to enjoin an oath on a perjurer?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether it is necessary for perjury that the statement confirmed on oath be
false?

Objection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary for perjury that
the statement confirmed on oath be false. As stated above ([3130]Q[89],
A[3]), an oath should be accompanied by judgment and justice no less
than by truth. Since therefore perjury is incurred through lack of
truth, it is incurred likewise through lack of judgment, as when one
swears indiscreetly, and through lack of justice, as when one swears to
something unjust.

Objection 2: Further, that which confirms is more weighty than the
thing confirmed thereby: thus in a syllogism the premises are more
weighty than the conclusion. Now in an oath a man's statement is
confirmed by calling on the name of God. Therefore perjury seems to
consist in swearing by false gods rather than in a lack of truth in the
human statement which is confirmed on oath.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm.
clxxx): "Men swear falsely both in deceiving others and when they are
deceived themselves"; and he gives three examples. The first is:
"Supposing a man to swear, thinking that what he swears to is true,
whereas it is false"; the second is: "Take the instance of another who
knows the statement to be false, and swears to it as though it were
true"; and the third is: "Take another, who thinks his statement false,
and swears to its being true, while perhaps it is true," of whom he
says afterwards that he is a perjurer. Therefore one may be a perjurer
while swearing to the truth. Therefore falsehood is not necessary for
perjury.

On the contrary, Perjury is defined "a falsehood confirmed by oath"
[*Hugh of St. Victor, Sum. Sent. iv, 5].

I answer that, As stated above ([3131]Q[92], A[2]), moral acts take
their species from their end. Now the end of an oath is the
confirmation of a human assertion. To this confirmation falsehood is
opposed: since an assertion is confirmed by being firmly shown to be
true; and this cannot happen to that which is false. Hence falsehood
directly annuls the end of an oath: and for this reason, that
perversity in swearing, which is called perjury, takes its species
chiefly from falsehood. Consequently falsehood is essential to perjury.

Reply to Objection 1: As Jerome says on Jer. 4:2, "whichever of these
three be lacking, there is perjury," but in different order. For first
and chiefly perjury consists in a lack of truth, for the reason stated
in the Article. Secondly, there is perjury when justice is lacking, for
in whatever way a man swears to that which is unlawful, for this very
reason he is guilty of falsehood, since he is under an obligation to do
the contrary. Thirdly, there is perjury when judgment is lacking, since
by the very fact that a man swears indiscreetly, he incurs the danger
of lapsing into falsehood.

Reply to Objection 2: In syllogisms the premises are of greater weight,
since they are in the position of active principle, as stated in Phys.
ii, 3: whereas in moral matters the end is of greater importance than
the active principle. Hence though it is a perverse oath when a man
swears to the truth by false gods, yet perjury takes its name from that
kind of perversity in an oath, that deprives the oath of its end, by
swearing what is false.

Reply to Objection 3: Moral acts proceed from the will, whose object is
the apprehended good. Wherefore if the false be apprehended as true, it
will be materially false, but formally true, as related to the will. If
something false be apprehended as false, it will be false both
materially and formally. If that which is true be apprehended as false,
it will be materially true, and formally false. Hence in each of these
cases the conditions required for perjury are to be found in some way,
on account of some measure of falsehood. Since, however, that which is
formal in anything is of greater importance than that which is
material, he that swears to a falsehood thinking it true is not so much
of a perjurer as he that swears to the truth thinking it false. For
Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. clxxx): "It depends how
the assertion proceeds from the mind, for the tongue is not guilty
except the mind be guilty. "
__________________________________________________________________

Whether all perjury is sinful?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all perjury is sinful. Whoever does
not fulfil what he has confirmed on oath is seemingly a perjurer. Yet
sometimes a man swears he will do something unlawful (adultery, for
instance, or murder): and if he does it, he commits a sin. If therefore
he would commit a sin even if he did it not, it would follow that he is
perplexed.

Objection 2: Further, no man sins by doing what is best. Yet sometimes
by committing a perjury one does what is best: as when a man swears not
to enter religion, or not to do some kind of virtuous deed. Therefore
not all perjury is sinful.

Objection 3: Further, he that swears to do another's will would seem to
be guilty of perjury unless he do it. Yet it may happen sometimes that
he sins not, if he do not the man's will: for instance, if the latter
order him to do something too hard and unbearable. Therefore seemingly
not all perjury is sinful.

Objection 4: Further, a promissory oath extends to future, just as a
declaratory oath extends to past and present things. Now the obligation
of an oath may be removed by some future occurrence: thus a state may
swear to fulfil some obligation, and afterwards other citizens come on
the scene who did not take the oath; or a canon may swear to keep the
statutes of a certain church, and afterwards new statutes are made.
Therefore seemingly he that breaks an oath does not sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Verb. Apost. Jacobi; Serm. cxxx),
in speaking of perjury: "See how you should detest this horrible beast
and exterminate it from all human business. "

I answer that, As stated above ([3132]Q[89], A[1]), to swear is to call
God as witness. Now it is an irreverence to God to call Him to witness
to a falsehood, because by so doing one implies either that God ignores
the truth or that He is willing to bear witness to a falsehood.
Therefore perjury is manifestly a sin opposed to religion, to which it
belongs to show reverence to God.

Reply to Objection 1: He that swears to do what is unlawful is thereby
guilty of perjury through lack of justice: though, if he fails to keep
his oath, he is not guilty of perjury in this respect, since that which
he swore to do was not a fit matter of an oath.

Reply to Objection 2: A person who swears not to enter religion, or not
to give an alms, or the like, is guilty of perjury through lack of
judgment. Hence when he does that which is best it is not an act of
perjury, but contrary thereto: for the contrary of that which he is
doing could not be a matter of an oath.

Reply to Objection 3: When one man swears or promises to do another's
will, there is to be understood this requisite condition---that the
thing commanded be lawful and virtuous, and not unbearable or
immoderate.

Reply to Objection 4: An oath is a personal act, and so when a man
becomes a citizen of a state, he is not bound, as by oath, to fulfil
whatever the state has sworn to do. Yet he is bound by a kind of
fidelity, the nature of which obligation is that he should take his
share of the state's burdens if he takes a share of its goods.

The canon who swears to keep the statutes that have force in some
particular "college" is not bound by his oath to keep any that may be
made in the future, unless he intends to bind himself to keep all, past
and future. Nevertheless he is bound to keep them by virtue of the
statutes themselves, since they are possessed of coercive force, as
stated above ([3133]FS, Q[96], A[4]).
__________________________________________________________________

Whether all perjury is a mortal sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all perjury is a mortal sin. It is
laid down (Extra, De Jurejur, cap. Verum): "Referring to the question
whether an oath is binding on those who have taken one in order to
safeguard their life and possessions, we have no other mind than that
which our predecessors the Roman Pontiffs are known to have had, and
who absolved such persons from the obligations of their oath.
Henceforth, that discretion may be observed, and in order to avoid
occasions of perjury, let them not be told expressly not to keep their
oath: but if they should not keep it, they are not for this reason to
be punished as for a mortal sin. " Therefore not all perjury is a mortal
sin.

OBJ 2. Further, as Chrysostom [*Hom. xliv in the Opus Imperfectum on
St. Matthew, falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom] says, "it is a
greater thing to swear by God than by the Gospels. " Now it is not
always a mortal sin to swear by God to something false; for instance,
if we were to employ such an oath in fun or by a slip of the tongue in
the course of an ordinary conversation. Therefore neither is it always
a mortal sin to break an oath that has been taken solemnly on the
Gospels.

Objection 3: Further, according to the Law a man incurs infamy through
committing perjury (VI, qu. i, cap. Infames). Now it would seem that
infamy is not incurred through any kind of perjury, as it is prescribed
in the case of a declaratory oath violated by perjury [*Cap. Cum
dilectus, de Ord. Cognit. ]. Therefore, seemingly, not all perjury is a
mortal sin.

On the contrary, Every sin that is contrary to a divine precept is a
mortal sin. Now perjury is contrary to a divine precept, for it is
written (Lev. 19:12): "Thou shalt not swear falsely by My name. "
Therefore it is a mortal sin.

I answer that, According to the teaching of the Philosopher (Poster. i,
2), "that which causes a thing to be such is yet more so. " Now we know
that an action which is, by reason of its very nature, a venial sin, or
even a good action, is a mortal sin if it be done out of contempt of
God. Wherefore any action that of its nature, implies contempt of God
is a mortal sin. Now perjury, of its very nature implies contempt of
God, since, as stated above [3134](A[2]), the reason why it is sinful
is because it is an act of irreverence towards God. Therefore it is
manifest that perjury, of its very nature, is a mortal sin.

Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3135]Q[89], A[7], ad 3),
coercion does not deprive a promissory oath of its binding force, as
regards that which can be done lawfully. Wherefore he who fails to
fulfil an oath which he took under coercion is guilty of perjury and
sins mortally. Nevertheless the Sovereign Pontiff can, by his
authority, absolve a man from an obligation even of an oath, especially
if the latter should have been coerced into taking the oath through
such fear as may overcome a high-principled man.

When, however, it is said that these persons are not to be punished as
for a mortal sin, this does not mean that they are not guilty of mortal
sin, but that a lesser punishment is to be inflicted on them.

Reply to Objection 2: He that swears falsely in fun is nonetheless
irreverent to God, indeed, in a way, he is more so, and consequently is
not excused from mortal sin. He that swears falsely by a slip of
tongue, if he adverts to the fact that he is swearing, and that he is
swearing to something false, is not excused from mortal sin, as neither
is he excused from contempt of God. If, however, he does not advert to
this, he would seem to have no intention of swearing, and consequently
is excused from the sin of perjury.

It is, however, a more grievous sin to swear solemnly by the Gospels,
than to swear by God in ordinary conversation, both on account of
scandal and on account of the greater deliberation. But if we consider
them equally in comparison with one another, it is more grievous to
commit perjury in swearing by God than in swearing by the Gospels.

Reply to Objection 3: Not every sin makes a man infamous in the eye of
the law. Wherefore, if a man who has sworn falsely in a declaratory
oath be not infamous in the eye of the law, but only when he has been
so declared by sentence in a court of law, it does not follow that he
has not sinned mortally. The reason why the law attaches infamy rather
to one who breaks a promissory oath taken solemnly is that he still has
it in his power after he has sworn to substantiate his oath, which is
not the case in a declaratory oath.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether he sins who demands an oath of a perjurer?

Objection 1: It would seem that he who demands an oath of a perjurer
commits a sin. Either he knows that he swears truly, or he knows that
he swears falsely. If he knows him to swear truly, it is useless for
him to demand an oath: and if he believes him to swear falsely, for his
own part he leads him into sin. Therefore nowise seemingly should one
enjoin an oath on another person.

Objection 2: Further, to receive an oath from a person is less than to
impose an oath on him. Now it would seem unlawful to receive an oath
from a person, especially if he swear falsely, because he would then
seem to consent in his sin. Much less therefore would it seem lawful to
impose an oath on one who swears falsely.

Objection 3: Further, it is written (Lev. 5:1): "If anyone sin, and
hear the voice of one swearing falsely [*'Falsely' is not in the
Vulgate'], and is a witness either because he himself hath seen, or is
privy to it: if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity. " Hence
it would seem that when a man knows another to be swearing falsely, he
is bound to denounce him. Therefore it is not lawful to demand an oath
of such a man.

Objection 4: On the other hand, Just as it is a sin to swear falsely so
is it to swear by false gods. Yet it is lawful to take advantage of an
oath of one who has sworn by false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public.
Ep. xlvii). Therefore it is lawful to demand an oath from one who
swears falsely.
I answer that, As regards a person who demands an oath from another, a
distinction would seem to be necessary. For either he demands the oath
on his own account and of his own accord, or he demands it on account
of the exigencies of a duty imposed on him. If a man demands an oath on
his own account as a private individual, we must make a distinction, as
does Augustine (de Perjuriis. serm. clxxx): "For if he knows not that
the man will swear falsely, and says to him accordingly: 'Swear to me'
in order that he may be credited, there is no sin: yet it is a human
temptation" (because, to wit, it proceeds from his weakness in doubting
whether the man will speak the truth). "This is the evil whereof Our
Lord says (Mat. 5:37): That which is over and above these, is of evil.
But if he knows the man to have done so," i. e. the contrary of what he
swears to, "and yet forces him to swear, he is a murderer: for the
other destroys himself by his perjury, but it is he who urged the hand
of the slayer. "

If, on the other hand, a man demands an oath as a public person, in
accordance with the requirements of the law, on the requisition of a
third person: he does not seem to be at fault, if he demands an oath of
a person, whether he knows that he will swear falsely or truly, because
seemingly it is not he that exacts the oath but the person at whose
instance he demands it.

Reply to Objection 1: This argument avails in the case of one who
demands an oath on his own account. Yet he does not always know that
the other will swear truly or falsely, for at times he has doubts about
the fact, and believes he will swear truly. In such a case he exacts an
oath in order that he may be more certain.

Reply to Objection 2: As Augustine says (ad Public. serm. xlvii),
"though we are forbidden to swear, I do not remember ever to have read
in the Holy Scriptures that we must not accept oaths from others. "
Hence he that accepts an oath does not sin, except perchance when of
his own accord he forces another to swear, knowing that he will swear
falsely.

Reply to Objection 3: As Augustine says (QQ. Super Lev, qu. i), Moses
in the passage quoted did not state to whom one man had to denounce
another's perjury: wherefore it must be understood that the matter had
to be denounced "to those who would do the perjurer good rather than
harm. " Again, neither did he state in what order the denunciation was
to be made: wherefore seemingly the Gospel order should be followed, if
the sin of perjury should be hidden, especially when it does not tend
to another person's injury: because if it did, the Gospel order would
not apply to the case, as stated above ([3136]Q[33], A[7];[3137] Q[68],
A[1]).

Reply to Objection 4: It is lawful to make use of an evil for the sake
of good, as God does, but it is not lawful to lead anyone to do evil.
Consequently it is lawful to accept the oath of one who is ready to
swear by false gods, but it is not lawful to induce him to swear by
false gods. Yet it seems to be different in the case of one who swears
falsely by the true God, because an oath of this kind lacks the good of
faith, which a man makes use of in the oath of one who swears truly by
false gods, as Augustine says (ad Public. Ep. xlvii). Hence when a man
swears falsely by the true God his oath seems to lack any good that one
may use lawfully.
__________________________________________________________________

OF SACRILEGE (FOUR ARTICLES)

We must now consider the vices which pertain to irreligion, whereby
sacred things are treated with irreverence. We shall consider (1)
Sacrilege; (2) Simony.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) What is sacrilege?

(2) Whether it is a special sin?

(3) Of the species of sacrilege;

(4) Of the punishment of sacrilege.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether sacrilege is the violation of a sacred thing?

Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege is not the violation of a
sacred thing. It is stated (XVII, qu. iv [*Append. Gratian, on can. Si
quis suadente]): "They are guilty of sacrilege who disagree about the
sovereign's decision, and doubt whether the person chosen by the
sovereign be worthy of honor. " Now this seems to have no connection
with anything sacred. Therefore sacrilege does not denote the violation
of something sacred.

Objection 2: Further, it is stated further on [*Append. Gratian, on
can. Constituit. ] that if any man shall allow the Jews to hold public
offices, "he must be excommunicated as being guilty of sacrilege. " Yet
public offices have nothing to do with anything sacred. Therefore it
seems that sacrilege does not denote the violation of a sacred thing.

Objection 3: Further, God's power is greater than man's. Now sacred
things receive their sacred character from God. Therefore they cannot
be violated by man: and so a sacrilege would not seem to be the
violation of a sacred thing.

On the contrary, Isidore says (Etym. x) that "a man is said to be
sacrilegious because he selects," i. e. steals, "sacred things. "

I answer that, As stated above (Q[81], A[5]; [3138]FS, Q[101], A[4]), a
thing is called "sacred" through being deputed to the divine worship.
Now just as a thing acquires an aspect of good through being deputed to
a good end, so does a thing assume a divine character through being
deputed to the divine worship, and thus a certain reverence is due to
it, which reverence is referred to God. Therefore whatever pertains to
irreverence for sacred things is an injury to God, and comes under the
head of sacrilege.

Reply to Objection 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 2) the
common good of the nation is a divine thing, wherefore in olden times
the rulers of a commonwealth were called divines, as being the
ministers of divine providence, according to Wis. 6:5, "Being ministers
of His kingdom, you have not judged rightly. " Hence by an extension of
the term, whatever savors of irreverence for the sovereign, such as
disputing his judgment, and questioning whether one ought to follow it,
is called sacrilege by a kind of likeness.

Reply to Objection 2: Christians are sanctified by faith and the
sacraments of Christ, according to 1 Cor. 6:11, "But you are washed,
but you are sanctified. " Wherefore it is written (1 Pet. 2:9): "You are
a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, a holy nation, a purchased
people. " Therefore any injury inflicted on the Christian people, for
instance that unbelievers should be put in authority over it, is an
irreverence for a sacred thing, and is reasonably called a sacrilege.

Reply to Objection 3: Violation here means any kind of irreverence or
dishonor. Now as "honor is in the person who honors and not in the one
who is honored" (Ethic. i, 5), so again irreverence is in the person
who behaves irreverently even though he do no harm to the object of his
irreverence. Hence, so far he is concerned, he violates the sacred
thing, though the latter be not violated in itself.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether sacrilege is a special sin?

Objection 1: It would seem that sacrilege not a special sin. It is
stated (XVII, qu. iv) "They are guilty of sacrilege who through
ignorance sin against the sanctity of the law, violate and defile it by
their negligence. " But this is done in every sin, because sin is "a
word, deed or desire contrary to the law of God," according to
Augustine (Contra Faust. xxi, 27). Therefore sacrilege is a general
sin.

Objection 2: Further, no special sin is comprised under different kinds
of sin. Now sacrilege comprised under different kinds of sin, for
instance under murder, if one kill a priest under lust, as the
violation of a consecrate virgin, or of any woman in a sacred place
under theft, if one steal a sacred thing. Therefore sacrilege is not a
special sin.

Objection 3: Further, every special sin is to found apart from other
sins as the Philosopher states, in speaking of special justice (Ethic.
v, 11). But, seemingly, sacrilege is not to be found apart from other
sins; for it is sometimes united to theft, sometimes to murder, as
stated in the preceding objection. Therefore it is not a special sin.

On the contrary, That which is opposed to a special virtue is a special
sin. But sacrilege is opposed to a special virtue, namely religion, to
which it belongs to reverence God and divine things. Therefore
sacrilege is a special sin.

I answer that, Wherever we find a special aspect of deformity, there
must needs be a special sin; because the species of a thing is derived
chiefly from its formal aspect, and not from its matter or subject. Now
in sacrilege we find a special aspect of deformity, namely, the
violation of a sacred thing by treating it irreverently. Hence it is a
special sin.

Moreover, it is opposed to religion. For according to Damascene (De
Fide Orth. iv, 3), "When the purple has been made into a royal robe, we
pay it honor and homage, and if anyone dishonor it he is condemned to
death," as acting against the king: and in the same way if a man
violate a sacred thing, by so doing his behavior is contrary to the
reverence due to God and consequently he is guilty of irreligion.

Reply to Objection 1: Those are said to sin against the sanctity of the
divine law who assail God's law, as heretics and blasphemers do. These
are guilty of unbelief, through not believing in God; and of sacrilege,
through perverting the words of the divine law.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing prevents one specific kind of sin being
found in various generic kinds of sin, inasmuch as various sins are
directed to the end of one sin, just as happens in the case of virtues
commanded by one virtue. In this way, by whatever kind of sin a man
acts counter to reverence due to sacred things, he commits a sacrilege
formally; although his act contains various kinds of sin materially.

Reply to Objection 3: Sacrilege is sometimes found apart from other
sins, through its act having no other deformity than the violation of a
sacred thing: for instance, if a judge were to take a person from a
sacred place for he might lawfully have taken him from elsewhere.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the species of sacrilege are distinguished according to the sacred
things?

Objection 1: It would seem that the species of sacrilege are not
distinguished according to the sacred things. Material diversity does
not differentiate species, if the formal aspect remains the same. Now
there would seem to be the same formal aspect of sin in all violations
of sacred things, and that the only difference is one of matter.
Therefore the species of sacrilege are not distinguished thereby.

Objection 2: Further, it does not seem possible that things belonging
to the same species should at the same time differ specifically. Now
murder, theft, and unlawful intercourse, are different species of sin.
Therefore they cannot belong to the one same species of sacrilege: and
consequently it seems that the species of sacrilege are distinguished
in accordance with the species of other sins, and not according to the
various sacred things.

Objection 3: Further, among sacred things sacred persons are reckoned.
If, therefore, one species of sacrilege arises from the violation of a
sacred person, it would follow that every sin committed by a sacred
person is a sacrilege, since every sin violates the person of the
sinner. Therefore the species of sacrilege are not reckoned according
to the sacred things.

On the contrary, Acts and habits are distinguished by their objects.
Now the sacred thing is the object of sacrilege, as stated above
[3139](A[1]). Therefore the species of sacrilege are distinguished
according to the sacred things.

I answer that, As stated above [3140](A[1]), the sin of sacrilege
consists in the irreverent treatment of a sacred thing. Now reverence
is due to a sacred thing by reason of its holiness: and consequently
the species of sacrilege must needs be distinguished according to the
different aspects of sanctity in the sacred things which are treated
irreverently: for the greater the holiness ascribed to the sacred thing
that is sinned against, the more grievous the sacrilege.

Now holiness is ascribed, not only to sacred persons, namely, those who
are consecrated to the divine worship, but also to sacred places and to
certain other sacred things. And the holiness of a place is directed to
the holiness of man, who worships God in a holy place. For it is
written (2 Macc. 5:19): "God did not choose the people for the place's
sake, but the place for the people's sake. " Hence sacrilege committed
against a sacred person is a graver sin than that which is committed
against a sacred place. Yet in either species there are various degrees
of sacrilege, according to differences of sacred persons and places.

In like manner the third species of sacrilege, which is committed
against other sacred things, has various degrees, according to the
differences of sacred things. Among these the highest place belongs to
the sacraments whereby man is sanctified: chief of which is the
sacrament of the Eucharist, for it contains Christ Himself. Wherefore
the sacrilege that is committed against this sacrament is the gravest
of all. The second place, after the sacraments, belongs to the vessels
consecrated for the administration of the sacraments; also sacred
images, and the relics of the saints, wherein the very persons of the
saints, so to speak, are reverenced and honored. After these come
things connected with the apparel of the Church and its ministers; and
those things, whether movable or immovable, that are deputed to the
upkeep of the ministers. And whoever sins against any one of the
aforesaid incurs the crime of sacrilege.

Reply to Objection 1: There is not the same aspect of holiness in all
the aforesaid: wherefore the diversity of sacred things is not only a
material, but also a formal difference.

Reply to Objection 2: Nothing hinders two things from belonging to one
species in one respect, and to different species in another respect.
Thus Socrates and Plato belong to the one species, "animal," but differ
in the species "colored thing," if one be white and the other black. In
like manner it is possible for two sins to differ specifically as to
their material acts, and to belong to the same species as regards the
one formal aspect of sacrilege: for instance, the violation of a nun by
blows or by copulation.

Reply to Objection 3: Every sin committed by a sacred person is a
sacrilege materially and accidentally as it were. Hence Jerome [*The
quotation is from St. Bernard, De Consideration, ii, 13] says that "a
trifle on a priest's lips is a sacrilege or a blasphemy. " But formally
and properly speaking a sin committed by a sacred person is a sacrilege
only when it is committed against his holiness, for instance if a
virgin consecrated to God be guilty of fornication: and the same is to
be said of other instances.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether the punishment of sacrilege should be pecuniary?

Objection 1: It would seem that the punishment of sacrilege should not
be pecuniary. A pecuniary punishment is not wont to be inflicted for a
criminal fault. But sacrilege is a criminal fault, wherefore it is
punished by capital sentence according to civil law [*Dig. xlviii, 13;
Cod. i, 3, de Episc. et Cleric. ]. Therefore sacrilege should not be
awarded a pecuniary punishment.

Objection 2: Further, the same sin should not receive a double
punishment, according to Nahum 1:9, "There shall not rise a double
affliction. " But sacrilege is punished with excommunication; major
excommunication, for violating a sacred person, and for burning or
destroying a church, and minor excommunication for other sacrileges.
Therefore sacrilege should not be awarded a pecuniary punishment.

Objection 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Thess. 2:5): "Neither have we
taken an occasion of covetousness. " But it seems to involve an occasion
of covetousness that a pecuniary punishment should be exacted for the
violation of a sacred thing. Therefore this does not seem to be a
fitting punishment of sacrilege.

On the contrary, It is written [*XVII, qu. iv, can. Si quis contumax]:
"If anyone contumaciously or arrogantly take away by force an escaped
slave from the confines of a church he shall pay nine hundred soldi":
and again further on (XVII, qu. iv, can. Quisquis inventus, can. 21):
"Whoever is found guilty of sacrilege shall pay thirty pounds of tried
purest silver. "

I answer that, In the award of punishments two points must be
considered. First equality, in order that the punishment may be just,
and that "by what things a man sinneth by the same . . . he may be
tormented" (Wis. 11:17). In this respect the fitting punishment of one
guilty of sacrilege, since he has done an injury to a sacred thing, is
excommunication [*Append. Gratian. on can. Si quis contumax, quoted
above] whereby sacred things are withheld from him. The second point to
be considered is utility. For punishments are inflicted as medicines,
that men being deterred thereby may desist from sin. Now it would seem
that the sacrilegious man, who reverences not sacred things, is not
sufficiently deterred from sinning by sacred things being withheld from
him, since he has no care for them. Wherefore according to human laws
he is sentenced to capital punishment, and according to the statutes of
the Church, which does not inflict the death of the body, a pecuniary
punishment is inflicted, in order that men may be deterred from
sacrilege, at least by temporal punishments.

Reply to Objection 1: The Church inflicts not the death of the body,
but excommunication in its stead.

Reply to Objection 2: When one punishment is not sufficient to deter a
man from sin, a double punishment must be inflicted. Wherefore it was
necessary to inflict some kind of temporal punishment in addition to
the punishment of excommunication, in order to coerce those who despise
spiritual things.

Reply to Objection 3: If money were exacted without a reasonable cause,
this would seem to involve an occasion of covetousness. But when it is
exacted for the purpose of man's correction, it has a manifest utility,
and consequently involves no occasion of avarice.
__________________________________________________________________

ON SIMONY (SIX ARTICLES)

We must now consider simony, under which head there are six points of
inquiry:

(1) What is simony?

(2) Whether it is lawful to accept money for the sacraments?

(3) Whether it is lawful to accept money for spiritual actions?

(4) Whether it is lawful to sell things connected with spirituals?

(5) Whether real remuneration alone makes a man guilty of simony, or
also oral remuneration or remuneration by service?

(6) Of the punishment of simony.
__________________________________________________________________

Whether simony is an intentional will to buy or sell something spiritual or
connected with a spiritual thing?

Objection 1: It would seem that simony is not "an express will to buy
or sell something spiritual or connected with a spiritual thing. "
Simony is heresy, since it is written (I, qu. i [*Can. Eos qui per
pecunias. ]): "The impious heresy of Macedonius and of those who with
him impugned the Holy Ghost, is more endurable than that of those who
are guilty of simony: since the former in their ravings maintained that
the Holy Spirit of Father and Son is a creature and the slave of God,
whereas the latter make the same Holy Spirit to be their own slave. For
every master sells what he has just as he wills, whether it be his
slave or any other of his possessions. " But unbelief, like faith, is an
act not of the will but of the intellect, as shown above ([3141]Q[10],
A[2]). Therefore simony should not be defined as an act of the will.

Objection 2: Further, to sin intentionally is to sin through malice,
and this is to sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore, if simony is an
intentional will to sin, it would seem that it is always a sin against
the Holy Ghost.

Objection 3: Further, nothing is more spiritual than the kingdom of
heaven. But it is lawful to buy the kingdom of heaven: for Gregory says
in a homily (v, in Ev. ): "The kingdom of heaven is worth as much as you
possess. " Therefore simony does not consist in a will to buy something
spiritual.

Objection 4: Further, simony takes its name from Simon the magician, of
whom we read (Acts 8:18,19) that "he offered the apostles money" that
he might buy a spiritual power, in order, to wit, "that on whomsoever
he imposed his hand they might receive the Holy Ghost. " But we do not
read that he wished to sell anything. Therefore simony is not the will
to sell a spiritual thing.

Objection 5: Further, there are many other voluntary commutations
besides buying and selling, such as exchange and transaction [*A kind
of legal compromise---Oxford Dictionary]. Therefore it would seem that
simony is defined insufficiently.