For that reason, it is good to
distinguish
matter from soul in the body of nature, and in the soul to distinguish the idea of the species.
Bruno-Cause-Principle-and-Unity
?
?
?
?
?
?
.
Iwouldtellhimthatifhehadeyes,hewouldnotaskforevi- dence of these things, since he could see them for himself, but since he is blind, it is impossible for others to show them to him.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Likewise, you could say to your other people that if they had an intellect, they would not demand evidence of that natural matter, but could see it for themselves.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Some would be humiliated by that answer, and others would see it as too cynical.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then,youcanspeakinlessopenfashion,asfollowing:'Most illustrious sir,' or 'Sacred Majesty, just as some things cannot be evident but for the hands and by the sense of touch, others only through hearing, others by taste, so this matter of natural things cannot be brought to light except through the intellect. '
? ?
13 The pseudo-Timaeus of Locri, in his De anima mundi et natura, ? ? , A.
14 The Franciscans of the school of Duns Scotus.
Third dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . He may perhaps construe the shaft, which after all is neither very obscure nor very veiled, and answer, 'It is you who have no intellect: I have more than all your sort. '
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You will, then, credit him no more than you would a blind man who retorted that it is you who are blind, and that he sees much better than all those who believe they see like you.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You have said enough to demonstrate in more detail than I have ever heard what the word 'matter' means and what must be understood by 'matter' in natural things. In the same way Timaeus the Pythagorean13 teaches us to find, through the metamorphosis of one element into another, the matter that is hidden and that can be known only in analogical terms. 'Where the form of the earth was', he says, 'there afterwards appeared the form of the water', and here we cannot say that one form receives the other, because a contrary thing does not accept or receive another. That is, the dry does not receive the wet, or rather the dryness does not receive the wetness, but there is a third thing from which the dryness is expelled and into which wetness is introduced, and this third thing is the substratum of both con- traries, not being itself contrary to any. It follows that, since we cannot think of the earth as reduced to nothing, we must conjecture that something which was in the earth has subsisted and is found in the water. For the same reason, that same thing will subsist and will be found in the air, when the water is transmuted into air (under the effect of the heat which reduces it to fumes or vapour).
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Fromthiswemayconclude(inspiteofouradversaries)that nothing is ever annihilated and loses its being, except for the external and material accidental form. That is why both the matter and the substantial form of any natural thing whatever (that is, its soul) can be neither destroyed nor annihilated, losing their being completely. Certainly this cannot be true of all the substantial forms of the Peripatetics and others like them, which consist of nothing but a certain complexion and a certain set of accidents; all that they are able to designate outside of their primary matter is nothing but accident, complexion, disposition of qualities, a prin- ciple of definition, quiddity. Hence, some cowled and subtle metaphysi- cians among them14, wishing to excuse rather than accuse their idol Aristotle, have come up with humanity, bovinity, oliveness as specific sub- stantial forms. This humanity - for example, Socratiety - this bovinity, this
? ? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? horseness, are individual substances. They have come up with all that in order to provide a substantial form which merits the name of substance, just as matter has the name of substance, and the being of substance. They have never derived any gain from this, for if you ask them, point by point, 'In what does the the substantial being of Socrates consist? ', they will answer, 'In Socrateity'; if you then ask, 'What do you mean by Socrateity? ', they will answer, 'The substantial form and proper matter of Socrates. ' But let us leave aside this substance which is matter, and ask, 'What is the substance as form? ' Some of them will reply, 'It is its soul'. Ask them, 'What is this soul? ' If they say it is the entelechy and perfection of a body possessing potential life, remark that this is an accident. If they say it is a principle of life, sense, vegetation and intellect, remark that, although that principle is a substance if one considers it fundamentally, as we do, they present it as only an accident. For the fact of being a principle of such and such a thing does not express an absolute and substantial nature, but a nature that is accidental and relative to that which is principled: just as whoever says what I do or can do is not expressing my being and substance; that would be expressed by who says what I am, insofar as I am myself, con- sidered absolutely. You see, then, how they consider this substantial form which is the soul: even if they have chanced to recognize it as substance, they have never, however, designated or considered it as such. You can make this conclusion out more plainly if you ask them in what consists the substantial form of an inanimate thing, for example, that of wood: the most subtle will imagine that it consists in woodness. Now take away that mate- rial common to iron, to wood, to stone, and ask, 'What substantial form of iron remains? ' They will never point out anything but accidents. And these are among the principles of individuation, and provide particularity, because the material cannot be contained within the particular except through some form, and because this form is the constituent principle of some substance, they hold that it is substantial, but then they cannot show it physically except as something accidental. When they have finally done all they can, they are left with a substantial form which exists only logically and not in nature. Thus, a logical construction comes to be posited as the principle of natural things.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Aristotle does not realize this?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I believe he fully realized it but could do nothing about it. This is why he says that the ultimate differences are unknown and cannot be expressed.
? ?
Third dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then, he seems to me to have openly confessed his igno- rance; therefore, I would be of the opinion that it is better to embrace those philosophical principles which, in this important question, do not plead ignorance, such as those of Pythagoras, Empedocles and your Nolan, whose opinions we touched on yesterday.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . This is what the Nolan holds: there is an intellect that gives being to everything, which the Pythagoreans and the Timaeus call the 'giver of forms'; a soul and a formal principle which becomes and informs everything, that they call 'fountain of forms'; there is matter, out of which everything is produced and formed, and which is called by everyone the 'receptacle of forms'.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . This doctrine, from which it seems nothing is lacking, pleases me much. And, indeed, it is necessary that, just as we can posit a constant and eternal material principle, we similarly posit a formal princi- ple. We see that all natural forms cease in matter, then appear again in mat- ter; therefore, nothing, if not matter, seems in reality to be constant, firm, eternal and worthy to be considered as principle. Besides, forms do not exist without matter, in which they are generated and corrupted, and out of whose bosom they spring and into which they are taken back. Hence, matter, which always remains fecund and the same, must have the funda- mental prerogative of being recognized as the only substantial principle; as that which is, and forever remains, and all the forms together are to be taken merely as varied dispositions of matter, which come and go, cease and renew themselves, so that none have value as principle. This is why we find philosophers who, having pondered thoroughly the essence of natural forms, such as one may see in Aristotle and his kind, have finally concluded that they are only accidents and particularities of matter, so that, accord- ing to them, it is to matter that we must accord the privilege of being act and perfection, and not to the things of which we can truly say that they are neither substance nor nature, but relative to the substance and nature - that is to say, in their opinion, matter, which for them is a necessary, eter- nal and divine principle, as it is to Avicebron, the Moor, who calls it 'God who is in everything'.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Those who have not recognized any other form outside of accidental form have been led to this error, and this Moor, although he had accepted the substantial form from the Peripatetic doctrine in which he was nurtured, judged it corruptible and not merely susceptible to material mutations. Since he despised that which is produced and does not produce,
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? is constituted and does not constitute, is remade but does not remake, he held it worthless compared to matter, which is stable, eternal, progenitor and mother. And this happens, inevitably, to those who do not know what wedo.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thepointhasbeenverywellexamined. Butitistimetoturn from this digression back to our problem. We now know how to distinguish matter from form, as much from the accidental form (whatever it may be) as from the substantial form. We must still look into its nature and its real- ity. But first, I would like to know whether, in view of the great union that this world soul and universal form has with matter, one could not admit that other mode of philosophizing, belonging to those who do not separate the act from the essence of matter, and who understand matter as a divine thing, and not as something so pure and formless that it cannot form and clothe itself.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . It is not easy, because absolutely nothing operates on itself alone, and there is always some distinction between an agent and what is produced or that on which the action and operation work.
For that reason, it is good to distinguish matter from soul in the body of nature, and in the soul to distinguish the idea of the species. 15 Hence we affirm that in this body there are three things: first, the universal intellect inherent in things; second, the soul that vivifies all; and third, the substratum. But we shall not refuse the name of philosopher to someone who follows his own bent and takes this formed body, or (as we prefer to call it) this rational animal, and then begins to take as first principle, in some sense, the constituents of this body, such as air, earth, fire, or even the ethereal region and the astral region, or spirit and body, or the void and the plenum (though not the void in Aristotle's sense), or yet another convenient way. Such a philosophy, it seems to me, does not deserve to be repudiated, especially when, no mat- ter what basis is presupposed or what form of construction is contem- plated, it helps to improve speculative science and knowledge of natural things, as was, indeed, done by many ancient philosophers. For it is a sign of an ambitious, presumptuous, envious and vain mind to wish to persuade others that there is only one way to investigate and to attain knowledge of nature, and it is the sign of a madman or man without reason to believe that this way lies within himself alone. So that, although we should always rather prefer, honour and practise the most resolute and constant, the most contemplative and dignified way, and the most lofty method of inquiry, we 15 The universal intellect, mentioned in the following sentence.
? ? ?
Third dialogue
? should not fault that other method, which is not without fruit, though it does not belong to the same tree.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You approve, then, of the study of different philosophies?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . For those who possess an abundance of time and wit, I recommend it. For others, I approve the study of the best way, provided the gods allow them to guess which it is.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I am sure, however, that you do not approve of all philoso- phies, but only of the good or best.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thatistrue. Likewise,amongthedifferentmedicalmethods, I do not condemn the one that proceeds magically, applying roots, wearing stones or murmuring incantations, if the severity of the theologians will permit me to speak purely as a natural philosopher. I approve of what is done physically, carried out by means of apothecaries' prescriptions to flux or cause to run bile, blood, phlegm and melancholia. I accept that other method which proceeds alchemically, extracting the quintessences, and using fire to volatilize mercury, deposit salt, make sulphur grow luminous or extract oil from composites. But I do not wish to determine what method is the best among so many medical procedures. If the epileptic, to whom the physician and the alchemist have dedicated so much time in vain, chances to be cured by the magician, he will rightly endorse that medicine over the two other types. Keep to the same reasoning for other methods: none serves less well than another, if it attains the end it has set itself. In my case, I consider the doctor who cures me to be worth more than the others who hurt me or murder me.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . What is the reason for the great enmity between these schools of medicine?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Greed, envy, ambition and ignorance. In the main, they hardly understand their own method of treatment, much less those of the other schools. Most of them try to get ahead by casting the others down and showing contempt for whatever they cannot acquire, being unable to ele- vate themselves to honour and profit thanks to their own merits. The best and truest among them is he who is not only physician, but also alchemist and astrologer. But, to return to our point, the best philosophy is that which brings about the perfection of the human intellect most easily and eminently, and most closely corresponds to the truth of nature. The best one renders us, as far as possible, co-operators with nature, whether by div- ination (I mean according to the natural order and the principles of change, not by animal instinct in the manner of beasts and those who resemble
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? them, nor by the inspiration of good or bad demons, like the prophets, nor, finally, under the effect of melancholic enthusiasm, like poets or other contemplatives), or by instituting laws and reforming customs, by practis- ing medicine, or even by becoming acquainted with and leading a blessed and more divine life. That is why no well-organized philosophy exists that does not contain some special quality not found in the others. I understand the same of medicine, which derives from principles that presuppose a fairly good philosophical outlook, as the function of the hand or foot pre- supposes that of the eye. Thus, it is said that there cannot be good medical principles where there is not a good point of departure in philosophy.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Youpleasemegreatly,andIpraiseyouinequalmeasure,for just as you are not as vulgar as Aristotle, you are neither as pretentious nor offensive as he, devoting himself to belittling the opinions of all other philosophers as well as their manner of philosophizing.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Ofallthephilosophers,Iknownonemorereliantuponfan- cies and more remote from nature than he. Even if he says excellent things at times, it is recognized that they are not derived from his own principles, but are always propositions borrowed from other philosophers, such as those divine things we see in the books On Generation, Meteors and On Animals and Plants.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Comingbacktothematterathand,doyouholdthatonecan give different definitions of matter, without error or contradiction?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes, just as different senses may judge the same object and the same thing may reveal itself in diverse ways. In addition (as we have already mentioned), the same thing may be understood from different points of view. The Epicureans have said some good things, although they have not risen beyond the material quality. Heraclitus has shown us some excellent things, even though he has not gone beyond the soul. Anaxagoras manages to make progress in the study of nature, claiming to recognize, not only within nature but also outside and perhaps above it, an intellect which is the same as what Socrates, Plato, Trismegistus and our theolo- gians call God. Thus, those who begin from an experimental analysis of simple elements (as they call them)16 make as much progress in discover- ing the secrets of nature as those who start from a rational theory. And, among them, those who start from the study of physiological structure progress no less than those who begin from humours, and they, in turn, do
? 16 I. e. the materialists: on one hand, Anaxagoras (who speaks of 'parts'), and on the other, the followers of Democritus and Epicurus (who speak of 'atoms').
? ?
Third dialogue
? no better than those who begin from the perceptible elements, or, more profoundly, from absolute elements, or from the one matter, which of all principles is the highest and most eminent. Sometimes, he who takes the longest way round does not make the best journey, especially if his purpose is not so much contemplation but action. As for the manner of doing phi- losophy, it will be no less advantageous to explicate forms as proceeding from something implicated than to distinguish them as from a chaos, or to distribute them, as from an ideal source, or have them pass into act as from some state of possibility, or draw them out as from a womb, or bring them out into the light as from a blind and gloomy abyss. For every foundation is good, if it is strong enough to support the edifice, and every seed is suitable, if the trees and the fruit are desirable.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . To come now to our objective, please present us with your own detailed theory of this principle.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Certainly, this principle, called matter, can be considered in two ways: first, as potency; second, as substratum. Regarded as potency, there is nothing in which it cannot be found in a certain way and in the appropriate sense; the Pythagoreans, the Platonists, the Stoics and others have placed it in the intelligible as well as in the sensible world. But we, who do not understand it exactly as they did, but in a more elevated and broader sense, speak of potency or possibility in the following way. Potency is com- monly divided into active potency, through which its substratum can oper- ate, and passive potency, through which it can exist, or receive, or have, or be the substratum of the efficient in some manner. Without taking active potency into consideration for the moment, I say that potency, in its pas- sive sense (although it is not always passive), may be considered either rel- atively or absolutely. Thus, there is nothing to which we can attribute being without also attributing to it the possibility of being. And this passive potency corresponds so perfectly to active potency that one cannot exist in any way without the other, so that, if the power to make, produce and create has always existed, so, likewise, has the power to be made, produced and created, for one potency implies the other. I mean that in positing one we necessarily posit the other. Since this passive potency does not indicate any weakness in that to which it is attributed, but confirms, rather, its virtue and efficacy, and since the active potency and the passive potency are, in the end, one and the same thing, there is no philosopher or theologian who hes- itates to attribute it to the first, supernatural principle. For the absolute possibility, through which the things that are in act can exist, does not come
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? before the actuality, nor even after it. Furthermore, the power to be accom- panies the being in act and does not come before it, for if what can exist made itself, it would exist before being made. Consider at present the prime and optimal principle, which is all it can be: if it could not be all, it would not be all; therefore, in it, act and potency are the same thing. This is not the case with other things, which, however much they are what they can be, could possibly not exist at all, or certainly could be something else, or be different from what they are, for nothing outside of the first principle is all that it can be. Man is what he can be, but not all that he can be. A stone is not all it can be, because it is not lime, nor dust, nor vase, nor grass. That which is all that it can be is a unity, which in its being comprises every being. Every other thing is not like that. That is why potency is not the same as act, since act is not absolute but limited. Moreover, the potency is always limited to a single act, because it never has more than one, specific and particular being. And even if it aspires to every form and every act, this is by means of certain dispositions, and following a certain succession of beings, one after another. Hence, every potency, every act which, in the principle, is (so to speak) enfolded, united and unique, is unfolded, dis- persed and multiplied in other things. The universe, which is the great simulacrum, the great image and sole-begotten nature, is also all that it can be, through the very species and principal members, and by containing the totality of matter, to which nothing is added, nothing taken away, of com- plete and unified form. But it is also not all that it can be, because of its very differences, its particulars, its modes and its individuals. It is only a shadow of the first act and the first potency, and, in consequence, potency and act are not absolutely one and the same thing in it, since none of its parts is all that it can be. Furthermore, in the specific way that we have mentioned, the universe is all that it can be, in an unfolded, dispersed and distinct man- ner, while its first principle is all it can be in a unified and undifferentiated way, since all is there as a whole, an absolutely one and the same thing without difference or distinction.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . What do you say of death, corruption, vices, defects, mon- sters? Do you think they also have a place in that which is all it can be and which is in act all it is in potency?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? .
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Likewise, you could say to your other people that if they had an intellect, they would not demand evidence of that natural matter, but could see it for themselves.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Some would be humiliated by that answer, and others would see it as too cynical.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then,youcanspeakinlessopenfashion,asfollowing:'Most illustrious sir,' or 'Sacred Majesty, just as some things cannot be evident but for the hands and by the sense of touch, others only through hearing, others by taste, so this matter of natural things cannot be brought to light except through the intellect. '
? ?
13 The pseudo-Timaeus of Locri, in his De anima mundi et natura, ? ? , A.
14 The Franciscans of the school of Duns Scotus.
Third dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . He may perhaps construe the shaft, which after all is neither very obscure nor very veiled, and answer, 'It is you who have no intellect: I have more than all your sort. '
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You will, then, credit him no more than you would a blind man who retorted that it is you who are blind, and that he sees much better than all those who believe they see like you.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You have said enough to demonstrate in more detail than I have ever heard what the word 'matter' means and what must be understood by 'matter' in natural things. In the same way Timaeus the Pythagorean13 teaches us to find, through the metamorphosis of one element into another, the matter that is hidden and that can be known only in analogical terms. 'Where the form of the earth was', he says, 'there afterwards appeared the form of the water', and here we cannot say that one form receives the other, because a contrary thing does not accept or receive another. That is, the dry does not receive the wet, or rather the dryness does not receive the wetness, but there is a third thing from which the dryness is expelled and into which wetness is introduced, and this third thing is the substratum of both con- traries, not being itself contrary to any. It follows that, since we cannot think of the earth as reduced to nothing, we must conjecture that something which was in the earth has subsisted and is found in the water. For the same reason, that same thing will subsist and will be found in the air, when the water is transmuted into air (under the effect of the heat which reduces it to fumes or vapour).
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Fromthiswemayconclude(inspiteofouradversaries)that nothing is ever annihilated and loses its being, except for the external and material accidental form. That is why both the matter and the substantial form of any natural thing whatever (that is, its soul) can be neither destroyed nor annihilated, losing their being completely. Certainly this cannot be true of all the substantial forms of the Peripatetics and others like them, which consist of nothing but a certain complexion and a certain set of accidents; all that they are able to designate outside of their primary matter is nothing but accident, complexion, disposition of qualities, a prin- ciple of definition, quiddity. Hence, some cowled and subtle metaphysi- cians among them14, wishing to excuse rather than accuse their idol Aristotle, have come up with humanity, bovinity, oliveness as specific sub- stantial forms. This humanity - for example, Socratiety - this bovinity, this
? ? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? horseness, are individual substances. They have come up with all that in order to provide a substantial form which merits the name of substance, just as matter has the name of substance, and the being of substance. They have never derived any gain from this, for if you ask them, point by point, 'In what does the the substantial being of Socrates consist? ', they will answer, 'In Socrateity'; if you then ask, 'What do you mean by Socrateity? ', they will answer, 'The substantial form and proper matter of Socrates. ' But let us leave aside this substance which is matter, and ask, 'What is the substance as form? ' Some of them will reply, 'It is its soul'. Ask them, 'What is this soul? ' If they say it is the entelechy and perfection of a body possessing potential life, remark that this is an accident. If they say it is a principle of life, sense, vegetation and intellect, remark that, although that principle is a substance if one considers it fundamentally, as we do, they present it as only an accident. For the fact of being a principle of such and such a thing does not express an absolute and substantial nature, but a nature that is accidental and relative to that which is principled: just as whoever says what I do or can do is not expressing my being and substance; that would be expressed by who says what I am, insofar as I am myself, con- sidered absolutely. You see, then, how they consider this substantial form which is the soul: even if they have chanced to recognize it as substance, they have never, however, designated or considered it as such. You can make this conclusion out more plainly if you ask them in what consists the substantial form of an inanimate thing, for example, that of wood: the most subtle will imagine that it consists in woodness. Now take away that mate- rial common to iron, to wood, to stone, and ask, 'What substantial form of iron remains? ' They will never point out anything but accidents. And these are among the principles of individuation, and provide particularity, because the material cannot be contained within the particular except through some form, and because this form is the constituent principle of some substance, they hold that it is substantial, but then they cannot show it physically except as something accidental. When they have finally done all they can, they are left with a substantial form which exists only logically and not in nature. Thus, a logical construction comes to be posited as the principle of natural things.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Aristotle does not realize this?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I believe he fully realized it but could do nothing about it. This is why he says that the ultimate differences are unknown and cannot be expressed.
? ?
Third dialogue
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Then, he seems to me to have openly confessed his igno- rance; therefore, I would be of the opinion that it is better to embrace those philosophical principles which, in this important question, do not plead ignorance, such as those of Pythagoras, Empedocles and your Nolan, whose opinions we touched on yesterday.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . This is what the Nolan holds: there is an intellect that gives being to everything, which the Pythagoreans and the Timaeus call the 'giver of forms'; a soul and a formal principle which becomes and informs everything, that they call 'fountain of forms'; there is matter, out of which everything is produced and formed, and which is called by everyone the 'receptacle of forms'.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . This doctrine, from which it seems nothing is lacking, pleases me much. And, indeed, it is necessary that, just as we can posit a constant and eternal material principle, we similarly posit a formal princi- ple. We see that all natural forms cease in matter, then appear again in mat- ter; therefore, nothing, if not matter, seems in reality to be constant, firm, eternal and worthy to be considered as principle. Besides, forms do not exist without matter, in which they are generated and corrupted, and out of whose bosom they spring and into which they are taken back. Hence, matter, which always remains fecund and the same, must have the funda- mental prerogative of being recognized as the only substantial principle; as that which is, and forever remains, and all the forms together are to be taken merely as varied dispositions of matter, which come and go, cease and renew themselves, so that none have value as principle. This is why we find philosophers who, having pondered thoroughly the essence of natural forms, such as one may see in Aristotle and his kind, have finally concluded that they are only accidents and particularities of matter, so that, accord- ing to them, it is to matter that we must accord the privilege of being act and perfection, and not to the things of which we can truly say that they are neither substance nor nature, but relative to the substance and nature - that is to say, in their opinion, matter, which for them is a necessary, eter- nal and divine principle, as it is to Avicebron, the Moor, who calls it 'God who is in everything'.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Those who have not recognized any other form outside of accidental form have been led to this error, and this Moor, although he had accepted the substantial form from the Peripatetic doctrine in which he was nurtured, judged it corruptible and not merely susceptible to material mutations. Since he despised that which is produced and does not produce,
? ?
Cause, principle and unity
? is constituted and does not constitute, is remade but does not remake, he held it worthless compared to matter, which is stable, eternal, progenitor and mother. And this happens, inevitably, to those who do not know what wedo.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thepointhasbeenverywellexamined. Butitistimetoturn from this digression back to our problem. We now know how to distinguish matter from form, as much from the accidental form (whatever it may be) as from the substantial form. We must still look into its nature and its real- ity. But first, I would like to know whether, in view of the great union that this world soul and universal form has with matter, one could not admit that other mode of philosophizing, belonging to those who do not separate the act from the essence of matter, and who understand matter as a divine thing, and not as something so pure and formless that it cannot form and clothe itself.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . It is not easy, because absolutely nothing operates on itself alone, and there is always some distinction between an agent and what is produced or that on which the action and operation work.
For that reason, it is good to distinguish matter from soul in the body of nature, and in the soul to distinguish the idea of the species. 15 Hence we affirm that in this body there are three things: first, the universal intellect inherent in things; second, the soul that vivifies all; and third, the substratum. But we shall not refuse the name of philosopher to someone who follows his own bent and takes this formed body, or (as we prefer to call it) this rational animal, and then begins to take as first principle, in some sense, the constituents of this body, such as air, earth, fire, or even the ethereal region and the astral region, or spirit and body, or the void and the plenum (though not the void in Aristotle's sense), or yet another convenient way. Such a philosophy, it seems to me, does not deserve to be repudiated, especially when, no mat- ter what basis is presupposed or what form of construction is contem- plated, it helps to improve speculative science and knowledge of natural things, as was, indeed, done by many ancient philosophers. For it is a sign of an ambitious, presumptuous, envious and vain mind to wish to persuade others that there is only one way to investigate and to attain knowledge of nature, and it is the sign of a madman or man without reason to believe that this way lies within himself alone. So that, although we should always rather prefer, honour and practise the most resolute and constant, the most contemplative and dignified way, and the most lofty method of inquiry, we 15 The universal intellect, mentioned in the following sentence.
? ? ?
Third dialogue
? should not fault that other method, which is not without fruit, though it does not belong to the same tree.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . You approve, then, of the study of different philosophies?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . For those who possess an abundance of time and wit, I recommend it. For others, I approve the study of the best way, provided the gods allow them to guess which it is.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . I am sure, however, that you do not approve of all philoso- phies, but only of the good or best.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Thatistrue. Likewise,amongthedifferentmedicalmethods, I do not condemn the one that proceeds magically, applying roots, wearing stones or murmuring incantations, if the severity of the theologians will permit me to speak purely as a natural philosopher. I approve of what is done physically, carried out by means of apothecaries' prescriptions to flux or cause to run bile, blood, phlegm and melancholia. I accept that other method which proceeds alchemically, extracting the quintessences, and using fire to volatilize mercury, deposit salt, make sulphur grow luminous or extract oil from composites. But I do not wish to determine what method is the best among so many medical procedures. If the epileptic, to whom the physician and the alchemist have dedicated so much time in vain, chances to be cured by the magician, he will rightly endorse that medicine over the two other types. Keep to the same reasoning for other methods: none serves less well than another, if it attains the end it has set itself. In my case, I consider the doctor who cures me to be worth more than the others who hurt me or murder me.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? . What is the reason for the great enmity between these schools of medicine?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Greed, envy, ambition and ignorance. In the main, they hardly understand their own method of treatment, much less those of the other schools. Most of them try to get ahead by casting the others down and showing contempt for whatever they cannot acquire, being unable to ele- vate themselves to honour and profit thanks to their own merits. The best and truest among them is he who is not only physician, but also alchemist and astrologer. But, to return to our point, the best philosophy is that which brings about the perfection of the human intellect most easily and eminently, and most closely corresponds to the truth of nature. The best one renders us, as far as possible, co-operators with nature, whether by div- ination (I mean according to the natural order and the principles of change, not by animal instinct in the manner of beasts and those who resemble
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Cause, principle and unity
? them, nor by the inspiration of good or bad demons, like the prophets, nor, finally, under the effect of melancholic enthusiasm, like poets or other contemplatives), or by instituting laws and reforming customs, by practis- ing medicine, or even by becoming acquainted with and leading a blessed and more divine life. That is why no well-organized philosophy exists that does not contain some special quality not found in the others. I understand the same of medicine, which derives from principles that presuppose a fairly good philosophical outlook, as the function of the hand or foot pre- supposes that of the eye. Thus, it is said that there cannot be good medical principles where there is not a good point of departure in philosophy.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Youpleasemegreatly,andIpraiseyouinequalmeasure,for just as you are not as vulgar as Aristotle, you are neither as pretentious nor offensive as he, devoting himself to belittling the opinions of all other philosophers as well as their manner of philosophizing.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Ofallthephilosophers,Iknownonemorereliantuponfan- cies and more remote from nature than he. Even if he says excellent things at times, it is recognized that they are not derived from his own principles, but are always propositions borrowed from other philosophers, such as those divine things we see in the books On Generation, Meteors and On Animals and Plants.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Comingbacktothematterathand,doyouholdthatonecan give different definitions of matter, without error or contradiction?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Yes, just as different senses may judge the same object and the same thing may reveal itself in diverse ways. In addition (as we have already mentioned), the same thing may be understood from different points of view. The Epicureans have said some good things, although they have not risen beyond the material quality. Heraclitus has shown us some excellent things, even though he has not gone beyond the soul. Anaxagoras manages to make progress in the study of nature, claiming to recognize, not only within nature but also outside and perhaps above it, an intellect which is the same as what Socrates, Plato, Trismegistus and our theolo- gians call God. Thus, those who begin from an experimental analysis of simple elements (as they call them)16 make as much progress in discover- ing the secrets of nature as those who start from a rational theory. And, among them, those who start from the study of physiological structure progress no less than those who begin from humours, and they, in turn, do
? 16 I. e. the materialists: on one hand, Anaxagoras (who speaks of 'parts'), and on the other, the followers of Democritus and Epicurus (who speak of 'atoms').
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Third dialogue
? no better than those who begin from the perceptible elements, or, more profoundly, from absolute elements, or from the one matter, which of all principles is the highest and most eminent. Sometimes, he who takes the longest way round does not make the best journey, especially if his purpose is not so much contemplation but action. As for the manner of doing phi- losophy, it will be no less advantageous to explicate forms as proceeding from something implicated than to distinguish them as from a chaos, or to distribute them, as from an ideal source, or have them pass into act as from some state of possibility, or draw them out as from a womb, or bring them out into the light as from a blind and gloomy abyss. For every foundation is good, if it is strong enough to support the edifice, and every seed is suitable, if the trees and the fruit are desirable.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . To come now to our objective, please present us with your own detailed theory of this principle.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . Certainly, this principle, called matter, can be considered in two ways: first, as potency; second, as substratum. Regarded as potency, there is nothing in which it cannot be found in a certain way and in the appropriate sense; the Pythagoreans, the Platonists, the Stoics and others have placed it in the intelligible as well as in the sensible world. But we, who do not understand it exactly as they did, but in a more elevated and broader sense, speak of potency or possibility in the following way. Potency is com- monly divided into active potency, through which its substratum can oper- ate, and passive potency, through which it can exist, or receive, or have, or be the substratum of the efficient in some manner. Without taking active potency into consideration for the moment, I say that potency, in its pas- sive sense (although it is not always passive), may be considered either rel- atively or absolutely. Thus, there is nothing to which we can attribute being without also attributing to it the possibility of being. And this passive potency corresponds so perfectly to active potency that one cannot exist in any way without the other, so that, if the power to make, produce and create has always existed, so, likewise, has the power to be made, produced and created, for one potency implies the other. I mean that in positing one we necessarily posit the other. Since this passive potency does not indicate any weakness in that to which it is attributed, but confirms, rather, its virtue and efficacy, and since the active potency and the passive potency are, in the end, one and the same thing, there is no philosopher or theologian who hes- itates to attribute it to the first, supernatural principle. For the absolute possibility, through which the things that are in act can exist, does not come
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Cause, principle and unity
? before the actuality, nor even after it. Furthermore, the power to be accom- panies the being in act and does not come before it, for if what can exist made itself, it would exist before being made. Consider at present the prime and optimal principle, which is all it can be: if it could not be all, it would not be all; therefore, in it, act and potency are the same thing. This is not the case with other things, which, however much they are what they can be, could possibly not exist at all, or certainly could be something else, or be different from what they are, for nothing outside of the first principle is all that it can be. Man is what he can be, but not all that he can be. A stone is not all it can be, because it is not lime, nor dust, nor vase, nor grass. That which is all that it can be is a unity, which in its being comprises every being. Every other thing is not like that. That is why potency is not the same as act, since act is not absolute but limited. Moreover, the potency is always limited to a single act, because it never has more than one, specific and particular being. And even if it aspires to every form and every act, this is by means of certain dispositions, and following a certain succession of beings, one after another. Hence, every potency, every act which, in the principle, is (so to speak) enfolded, united and unique, is unfolded, dis- persed and multiplied in other things. The universe, which is the great simulacrum, the great image and sole-begotten nature, is also all that it can be, through the very species and principal members, and by containing the totality of matter, to which nothing is added, nothing taken away, of com- plete and unified form. But it is also not all that it can be, because of its very differences, its particulars, its modes and its individuals. It is only a shadow of the first act and the first potency, and, in consequence, potency and act are not absolutely one and the same thing in it, since none of its parts is all that it can be. Furthermore, in the specific way that we have mentioned, the universe is all that it can be, in an unfolded, dispersed and distinct man- ner, while its first principle is all it can be in a unified and undifferentiated way, since all is there as a whole, an absolutely one and the same thing without difference or distinction.
? ? ? ? ? ? ? . What do you say of death, corruption, vices, defects, mon- sters? Do you think they also have a place in that which is all it can be and which is in act all it is in potency?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? .
