No More Learning

But, except for Godfrey of Bouillon, who had been unable to make his
ducal authority effective in Lower Lorraine, no important German noble
actually went on crusade at this time. Indeed, it does not seem that the
position of Henry was to any material extent affected by the Crusade.
But, if the immediate effect was negligible, it was otherwise with the
ultimate effect. Important results were to arise from the circumstances in
which the crusading movement was launched—the Pope, the spiritual
head of Christendom, preaching the Crusade against the infidel, while
the Emperor, the temporal head, remained helpless in Italy, cut off from
communion with the faithful. Gregory VII in 1074 had planned to lead
a crusade himself, and wrote to Henry IV that he would leave the Roman
Church during his absence under Henry's care and protection. This plan
was typical of its author, though it was a curious reversal of the natural
functions of the two heads of Christendom. Had Pope and Emperor been
working together in the ideal harmony that Gregory VII conceived, it
would certainly have been the Emperor that would have led the crusaders
to Palestine in 1095, and under his suzerainty that the kingdom of
Jerusalem would have been formed. As it was, the Papacy took the
lead; its suzerainty was acknowledged; in the war against the infidel it
arrogated to itself the temporal as well as the spiritual sword. And not
only was the Emperor affected by the advantages that accrued to his
CH. III.
10-2


## p. 148 (#194) ############################################

148
Peace in Germany
great rival. His semi-divine character was impaired; when he failed to
take his natural place as the champion of the Cross, he prejudiced his
claim to be the representative of God upon earth.
At any rate, on his return to Germany Henry found but slight
opposition to his authority. The reconciliation with Welf was confirmed
in a diet at Worms in 1098, and was extended to Berthold as well. Welf
was formally restored to his duchy, and the succession was promised to
his son. The rival claims to Swabia were settled: Frederick was confirmed
in the duchy, Berthold was compensated with the title of Duke (of
Zähringen) and the grant of Zurich, to be held as a fief directly from the
Emperor. At the price of concessions, which implied that he had re-
nounced the royal ambitions of his earlier years, Henry had made peace
with his old enemies, and all lay opposition to him in Germany ceased.
At a diet at Mayence the princes elected his second son Henry as king,
and promised to acknowledge him as his father's successor; the young
Henry took an oath of allegiance to his father, promising not to act with
independent authority during his father's lifetime. For the Emperor,
though anxious to secure the succession, was careful not to allow his son
the position Conrad had abused. The young Henry was anointed king
at Aix-la-Chapelle the following year; on the sacred relics he repeated
the oath he had taken at Mayence, and the princes took an oath of fealty
to him.
Ecclesiastical opposition remained, but was seriously weakened by the
defection of Berthold and Welf. It gained one notable, if not very
creditable, adherent in the person of Ruthard, who had succeeded Werner
as Archbishop of Mayence in 1089. The crusading fervour had manifested
itself, especially in the Rhine district, in outbreaks against the Jews, who,
when they were not murdered, were maltreated, forcibly baptised, and
despoiled of their property. Henry on more than one occasion had shewn
special favour to the Jews, who played no small part in the prosperity of
the towns. Immediately on his return from Italy, he had given permission
to the victims to return to their faith, and he was active in recovering for
them the property they had lost. Mayence had been the scene of one of
these anti-Jewish outbreaks, and the archbishop was suspected of com-
plicity and of having received his share of the plunder. Henry opened an
enquiry into this on the occasion of his son's election, to which the
archbishop refused to submit and fled to his Thuringian estates. Apart
from this, there is, until 1104, a period of unwonted calm in Germany,
and in consequence little to record. During these years the chief interest
lies in Lorraine, owing to the ambition of Count Robert II of Flanders
and the recrudescence of a communal movement at Cambrai. Defence
against the count was its object, and so the commune received recognition
from the Emperor and Bishop Walcher; but it found itself compelled
to come to terms with the count, who made peace with Henry in 1103.
Having enjoyed independence, the commune continued to exist, and


## p. 149 (#195) ############################################

The revolt of Henry V
149
entered into a struggle with the bishop, who was handicapped by a rival
and pro-papal bishop. For a time it maintained its independence, unti)
in 1107 it was overthrown by Henry V and episcopal authority restored.
Henry, then, might seem to have at last accomplished his object in
Germany, and by the universal recognition of his authority to have
achieved the mastery. But in reality he had failed, and the peace was
his recognition of failure. For it was a peace of acquiescence, acquiescence
on both sides, due to weariness. The nobles recognised him as king, and he
recognised the rights they claimed. Not as subjects, but almost as equals,
the Saxons, Welf, Berthold, had all made terms with him. No concessions,
however, could reconcile the Papacy. The death of Urban II in 1099
made no difference; his successor, Paschal II, was even more inflexible.
There seemed a prospect of peace when the anti-Pope Guibert died in
1100, and a diet at Mayence proposed an embassy to Rome. The follow-
ing year Henry proposed to go to Rome himself. In January 1103, at
another diet at Mayence, besides promulgating a land-peace for the
Empire for four years, Henry announced his intention, provided he could
be reconciled with the Pope, of going on pilgrimage to the Holy Land.
But to all these proposals the Pope turned a deaf ear. Henry had been
excommunicated and deposed, and the sentence was repeated by Paschal in
1102. There was no hope of ending the schism during Henry IV's lifetime.
This state of affairs led to the final catastrophe. To no one did the
situation give so much cause for dissatisfaction as to the heir to the
throne—the young Henry V. The longer his father lived the weaker he
felt would be the authority to which he would succeed. Self-interest de-
termined him, in defiance of his oath, to seize power before matters
became worse. He knew that he might expect the reconciliation with the
Pope that was denied to his father, and that the Germans would willingly
accept the leadership of one who was at the same time lawful king and
in communion with the Pope. Probably the disturbances that broke out
Ratisbon while the court was staying there at the beginning of 1104
decided him in his purpose. Many nobles had disliked the promulgation
of a land-peace, which interfered with their customary violence; then the
murder of a Bavarian count by one of his own ministeriales, and the
Emperor's neglect to punish the offender, provoked such discontent that
Henry IV found it wiser to leave Bavaria and go to Lorraine. Henry V
went with him, but he had already the nucleus of a party and began to
mature his plans. In Lorraine his father was among friends, but when at
the end of the year he marched north to punish a breach of the peace
by a Saxon count, the young Henry decided that the moment was ripe
for his venture. At Fritzlar on 12 December he escaped by night and
went rapidly south to Ratisbon, where he placed himself at the head of
the discontented nobles. His father, abandoning his expedition, returned
to the Rhine; he was broken-hearted at his son's treachery and made
frantic appeals to him to return. Henry V sanctimoniously refused to
CH. III.


## p. 150 (#196) ############################################

150
Treachery of Henry V
listen to an excommunicated man, and made overtures to the Pope which
were immediately successful.
The revolt was well-timed, and events turned out as Henry V had
planned. The papal legate, Bishop Gebhard of Constance, met him in
Bavaria and gave him the papal absolution. The Saxon and Thuringian
princes, with whom was the exiled Archbishop Ruthard of Mayence, sent
him an invitation which he eagerly accepted, and with the papal legate
at his side he arrived at Quedlinburg for Easter 1105. A synod was
held at Nordhausen on 21 May, at which he adopted an attitude of
humility that was immediately successful. The Church party was won
over by his action against imperialist bishops, and by his placing in the
forefront the excommunication of his father as the cause of his revolt;
the lay princes were equally attracted by his promise to act always in
accordance with their direction. He could now count on Saxony wholly,
and largely on Bavaria; Duke Welf seems on the whole to have remained
neutral. He was fortunate, too, in the death this year of his brother-in-
law, Duke Frederick of Swabia, whose sons were too young to intervene.
He now took the field against his father, and marched on Mayence
with the intention of restoring the archbishop. But the Rhine towns
stood firm in their loyalty, and, after taking Würzburg, he was forced to
retire to Ratisbon. His father followed hard on his tracks, retook
Würzburg, and nearly surprised the son at Ratisbon. Here the Emperor
was reinforced by Margrave Liutpold of Austria and Duke Bořivoi of
Bohemia. Henry V marched against him, and managed to entice from his
father his two chief supporters. The Emperor found himself abandoned on
all sides, and had to make a hurried escape to avoid capture. After an ad-
venturous and perilous flight through Bohemia and Saxony, he arrived
safely at Mayence at the end of October. Driven from there by his son's
approach, he took refuge at Cologne,and then followed the second and most
shameful treachery of the young Henry'. Promising to assist his reconcilia-
tion with the Pope, he persuaded his father to meet him and accompany
him to Mayence. Nothing was wanting that hypocrisy could suggest--
tears, prostration at his father's feet, solemn and repeated pledges of safe-
conduct. By these means he induced him to dismiss his retinue, and, on
arriving at Bingen, represented the danger of going to Mayence and enticed
him into the castle of Böckelheim, where he kept him a close prisoner. At
Christmas a diet was held at Mayence in the presence of papal legates, who
dominated the proceedings. The Emperor was brought before the diet, not
at Mayence where the townspeople might have rescued him, but at Ingel-
heim; crushed in spirit by his sufferings in prison and in fear for his life, he
surrendered the royal insignia, promising a humble confession of his mis-
deeds and even resignation of his throne. It was a scene that moved the
lay nobles to compassion, but the legates, having gained their ends,
1 K. Hampe, Deutsche Kaisergeschichte im Zeitalter der Salier und Staufen, p. 70,
calls it “the most devilish deed in all German history. ”


## p. 151 (#197) ############################################

Last days and death of Henry IV
151
declared themselves not competent to grant absolution. Henry V was
equally obdurate, and his father was kept in confinement at Ingelheim.
An invitation was sent to the Pope inviting his presence at a synod in
Germany. Henry V for his own purposes was willing to allow the papal
decision so much desired by Gregory VII.
But the year 1106 saw a change of fortune. The Emperor escaped
from captivity and was strongly supported in Lorraine and the Rhine
towns. In the spring Henry V was severely defeated outside Liège by a
coalition of Duke Henry of Lower Lorraine, Count Godfrey of Namur,
and the people of Liège; in the summer he signally failed before Cologne.
In face of this devoted loyalty to his father he was powerless; then sud-
denly death came to his aid, and the opposition collapsed. The Emperor,
worn out by sorrow and suffering, fell ill at Liège and died on 7 August.
On his death-bed he sent his last message to his son, requesting pardon
for his followers and that he might be buried beside his father at Spires.
His dying appeal was disregarded. Henry V deposed the Duke of Lower
Lorraine, and appointed Godfrey of Brabant in his place; the town of
Cologne was fined 5000 marks. The Pope refused absolution and Chris-
tian burial to the excommunicated Emperor. The people of Liège, in
defiance of king and Pope, had given his body a royal funeral in their
cathedral amid universal lamentation; the papal legates ordered its
removal. It was taken to the cathedral at Spires, where again the people
displayed their grief and affection. The bishop ordered it to be removed
once more to an unconsecrated chapel. Five years later, when Henry V
wrung from the Pope the cession of investiture, he also obtained absolu-
tion for his father, and on 7 August 1111 the body of Henry IV was at
last solemnly interred beside those of his father and grandfather in the
cathedral he had so richly endowed at Spires.
The story of this long reign of fifty years reads like a tragedy on
the Greek model. Mainly owing to conditions for which he was not
responsible, Henry was forced to struggle, in defence of his rights, against
odds that were too great for him, and finally to fall a victim to the
treachery of his son. The mismanagement of the imperial government
during his minority had given the opportunity for particularism in
Germany and for the Papacy in Italy to obtain a position from which
he could not dislodge them. As far as Germany was concerned, he might
have been successful, and he did at any rate acquire an important ally
for the monarchy in the towns, especially in the Rhine district. How
important it was is seen in 1073-4, when the example set by Worms
turned the tide that was flowing so strongly against him; and, more
notably still, in the resistance he was able to make to his son in the last
year of his life. But the reason that prevented his making full use of this
alliance prevented also his success in Germany. The fatal policy of Otto I
had placed the monarchy in a position from which it could not extricate
itself. Essentially it had to lean on ecclesiastical support, and from this
CH. III.


## p. 152 (#198) ############################################

152
Causes of his failure
two results followed. In the first place, as the important towns were
under episcopal authority, a direct alliance with them took place only
when the bishop was hostile to the king. Secondly, the success of Otto I's
policy, in Germany as in Italy, depended now on the Papacy being sub-
servient, or at least obedient, to imperial authority. The Papacy re-
generated by Henry III, especially with the opportunities it had had
during Henry IV's minority, could not acquiesce in its own dependence
or in the subordination of ecclesiastical appointments to lay control. A
contest between sacerdotium and imperium was inevitable, and, as we can
see, it could only have one end. Certainly it was the Papacy that caused
the failure of Henry IV. He was unfortunate in being faced at the
beginning by one of the greatest of all the Popes, and yet he was able
to defeat him; but he could not defeat the Papacy. It was the long
schism that partly prompted the revolt of Henry V, and it was the desire
to end it that won him the support of most of Germany. Papal excom-
munication was the weapon that brought Henry IV to his tragic end,
and avenged the death in exile of Gregory VII. And, apart from this,
it was owing to the Papacy that his reign in Germany had been unsuc-
cessful. He made peace with his enemies, but on their conditions; and
the task that he had set out so energetically to achieve-the vindication
of imperial authority-he had definitely failed to accomplish.
With the passing of the old king, many others of the leading actor
disappear from the scene. Especially in Saxony, old houses were becoming
extinct, and new families were rising to take their place in German
history. The Billungs, the Counts of Nordheim, the Ekberts of Brunswick,
had each in turn played the leading part against the king; and now the
male line had failed in all these families, and the inheritance had fallen
to women. In 1090 by the death of Ekbert II the male line of the
Brunswick house became extinct; his sister Gertrude was left as heiress,
and she married (as her second husband) Henry the Fat, the elder son of
Otto of Nordheim. He was murdered in 1101, his brother Conrad suffered
the same fate in 1103, and the elder daughter of Henry and Gertrude,
Richenza, became eventually heiress to both these houses'. Lothar, Count
of Supplinburg, by his marriage with Richenza in 1100, rose from an
insignificant position to become the most powerful noble in Saxony. In
1106 died Duke Magnus, the last of the Billungs. His duchy was given
by Henry V to Lothar, his family possessions were divided between his
two daughters: the eastern portion went to the younger, Eilica, who
married Count Otto of Ballenstädt and became the mother of Albert the
Bear, the Saxon rival of the Welfs; the western portion to the elder,
Wulfhild, who married Henry the Black, son of Duke Welf of Bavaria.
1 Gertrude had been married first to Count Dietrich of Katlenburg; on the death
of Henry the Fat she married Henry of Eilenburg, Margrave of Meissen •and the
East Mark. He died in 1103, and his posthumous son Henry died childless in 1123.
Gertrude herself died in 1117.


## p. 153 (#199) ############################################

Supplinburg
Ascanians
Brunonings
Nordheim
Otto,
Ekbert I
C. of Brunswick,
M. of Meissen,
ob. 1068
C. of Nordheim
(D. of Bavaria, 1061-70),
ob. 1083
Eilica m. Otto of Ballenstedt
Ekbert II
ob. 1090
Gertrude m. Henry the Fat
ob. 1117 ob. 1101
Conrad
ob, 1103
Gertrude
Lothar, C. of Supplinburg, m. Richenza
later Emperor
Sophia m. Dietrich of
Holland
Gertrude
Albert the Bear
D. of Bavaria and Saxony
1
Bernard of Anhalt,
Otto of Brunswick M. of Brandenburg
D. of Saxony
The rise of new noble families in Germany
Babenbergers
KING HENRY IV
1
(1) Agnes (2)
m.
Liutpold,
M. of Austria
King Conrad III
Liutpold,
M. of Austria
Henry Jasomirgott,
first D. of Austria
Otto,
Bishop of Freising
Welfs
Billungs
Welf IV,
D. of Bavaria, ob. 1101
Magnus,
D. of Saxony, ob. 1106
Welf V,
ob. 1120
Henry the Black m. Wulfhild
Henry the Proud m.
Henry the Lion,
Otto,
Welfs
Hohenstaufen
Henry the Black
Frederick,
C. of Staufen,
D. of Swabia
Judith
m. Frederick,
D. of Swabia
| D.
Frederick I Barbarossa
153
CH. 11.


## p. 154 (#200) ############################################

154
The character of Henry V
Thus were laid the foundations of the Welf power in Saxony; the struc-
ture was to be completed when the son of Henry and Wulfhild, Henry
the Proud, married Gertrude, daughter and heiress of Lothar and
Richenza; for the house of Supplinburg also failed in the male line.
Duke Welf of Bavaria himself died on crusade in 1101, and his duchy,
now hereditary, passed to Welf V, Countess Matilda's husband, and on
his death in 1120 to his brother Henry the Black. Finally, in 1105, Duke
Frederick of Swabia died and was succeeded by his son Frederick II; while
his widow Agnes, daughter of Henry IV, married in 1106 Liutpold III,
Margrave of Austria, and so became the ancestress of Babenbergers as
well as Hohenstaufen? .
Henry V, born in 1081, had been elected king in 1098; so that, young
as he still was, he had already been associated in the government for
eight years. He will always, apart from the Concordat of Worms, be
remembered primarily for his treatment of his father and, five years later,
of the Pope; in both these episodes he shewed himself brutal and un-
scrupulous. Perhaps to modern minds the studied treachery and hypocrisy
of 1105–6 will appear more repulsive than the direct and unconcealed
violence of 1111; his contemporaries, however, viewed the two incidents
quite differently, regarding rather the nature of the victim than the
quality of the crime. His action in deposing his excommunicated father
met with fairly general approval; while the horror inspired by his treat-
ment of the Pope did considerable damage to his prestige. He was not
capable, like his father, of inspiring devotion, but he could inspire respect.
For he was forceful, energetic, resourceful, and he did for some time
manage to dominate the German nobles. With more prudence too than
his father he conserved imperial resources, and, except in Italy in 1116
when policy demanded it, he was very sparing of grants from the royal
domain, even to bishops. Of diplomatic cunning he frequently gave proof,
especially in the circumstances of his revolt and in his negotiations with
Paschal II. In particular he had a strong sense of the importance of in-
fluencing opinion. There was nothing unusual in the manifestoes he issued
in justification of his actions on important occasions, but he went farther
than this. He prepared the way. The publication of the anonymous
Tractatus de investitura episcoporum in 1109 preluded his embassy to
Paschal II by expounding to all the righteousness of the imperial claims.
And he went beyond manifestoes. When he started on his journey to
Rome in 1110, he took with him David, afterwards Bishop of Bangor,
as the official historian of the expedition. David's narrative has unfor-
tunately not come down to us, but it was made use of by others, especially
1 She had in all 23 children. By her first marriage she became mother of King
Conrad III and grandmother of Frederick Barbarossa; by her second marriage she
became mother of Henry Jasomirgott, the first Duke of Austria, and of the historian,
Bishop Otto of Freising.


## p. 155 (#201) ############################################

His forced reliance on the nobles
155
by the chronicler Ekkehard. It was assuredly propaganda, not history;
but it was an ingenious and novel way of ensuring an authoritative
description of events calculated to impress contemporary opinion.
To prevent the further decline of imperial authority, he had allied
himself with the two powers responsible for that decline. His real policy
was in no whit different from that of his father, so that he was playing
a hazardous game; and it is doubtful whether, even from his own purely
selfish standpoint, he had taken the wisest course. To obtain the
assistance of the Pope, he had recognised the over-riding authority of the
sacerdotium; he had justified his revolt against his father on the ground
of the unfitness of an excommunicated man to be king, and had used the
papal power of absolution to condone his perjury. To obtain the co-
operation of the nobles, he had to abandon for a time the support of the
towns and the reliance on the ministeriales which had been so valuable to
his father. The nobles were, as usual, anxious to make their fiefs and
offices hereditary, to obtain the recognition of independent powers, and
to prevent the establishment of an over-riding royal justice.
This they
expected to ensure by the participation in the government that Henry
had promised, and in this he humoured them for the time. Their names
appear as witnesses to royal charters; all acts of government, even the
nomination of bishops, are done consilio principum. For their support was
still necessary to him, and he skilfully made use of it to oppose a united
Germany to the claims of his other ally, the Pope. He had allowed the
legates to sit in judgment on his father, and to wreak their vengeance to
the full; he had shewn himself zealous in deposing schismatic bishops at
their dictation. All this was to his interest; but, his father dead, he was
not long in throwing off the mask. It was essential that the bishops
should be loyal subjects, and so he was careful to control elections; and,
worst of all to the mind of Paschal II, he refused to discontinue the
practice of lay investiture. In this, and against all claims of the Pope to
interfere in the affairs of Germany, he had the nobles, lay and ecclesias-
tical, almost to a man enthusiastically on his side.
For the first five years of his reign the issue with the Pope was the
leading question. Apart from Count Robert of Flanders, against whom
Henry had to lead an expedition in 1107, there was no serious disturbance
in Germany. In 1108-9 he was principally occupied on the eastern
frontiers, where he successfully asserted himself in Bohemia but failed
signally in his attempt to intervene in Hungary and Poland. All this time
negotiations with the Pope had been in progress, any satisfactory
result, and at last in 1110 Henry decided to go to Rome to effect a
settlement in person and to obtain the imperial crown. At the diet at
Ratisbon at which he announced his intention, the nobles unanimously
i It is perhaps remarkable that Paschal in 1105, when he had the chance, did not
take the opportunity to obtain assurances from Henry V on investiture or on any
other point.
without any
CH. III.


## p. 156 (#202) ############################################

156
Victory over the Pope. His German policy
pledged themselves of their free will to accompany him. The summons
to the expedition was universally obeyed, and it was at the head of an
imposing army that he entered Italy in August. The absence of incident
in Germany in these years, and the ready response to the summons, shew
the unity of the country both under the king and against the Pope. The
events of 1110-11 established his authority in Italy and over the Pope as
well. He wrung from the Pope the concession of investiture and received
from him the imperial crown. Countess Matilda shewed herself well-
disposed; the Normans in South Italy were overawed by the size of his
army. At the end of 1111 his power in both kingdoms was at its height.
But it rested on insecure foundations. He had dominated the Pope by
violence, and had extracted from him a concession which provoked the un-
yielding hostility of the Church party. Already in 1112 Paschal retracted
his concession, and in Burgundy in the same year Archbishop Guy of
Vienne declared investiture to be a heresy and anathematised the Emperor,
undeterred by the efforts of Henry to rouse the nobles and bishops of
Burgundy against him; while Archbishop Conrad of Salzburg, who had
always opposed Henry's ecclesiastical policy, abandoned his see and took
refuge with Countess Matilda. Moreover, Henry's government of Germany
was only government by consent; it depended on the good-will of the
princes. Some of the bishops were alienated by his treatment of Paschal II;
the lay nobles, who had concurred in his ecclesiastical policy, were justly
apprehensive of the independence and high-handedness of his actions
in 1111.
He was determined to free himself from their tutelage, now that they
had served his purpose. So he returned to the policy of his father of
relying on ministeriales and lesser nobles, whose share in the government,
dependent as they were on his favour, would be effective in his interests
and not in their own. Above all, he concentrated on the royal domain,
and was so sparing in his grants that he gave the appearance of miser-
liness. He had not followed the common practice of making himself
popular by large donations on his accession. He bountifully rewarded
faithful service, but that was all. Such grants as he made to ecclesiastical
foundations were usually of little importance and for purely religious
purposes. The bishops fared especially badly under his regime, but, with
the working of the leaven of reform and the increasing authority of the
Papacy, they were becoming less reliable as agents of monarchical govern-
ment. To him, as to his father, the building of castles was a necessary step
to protect the royal estates from the continual encroachments of the nobles.
They too had adopted the same method of protecting their own domains,
and against this usurpation of his prerogative he used his best endeavours,
on the whole not unsuccessfully. It was, however, one of the causes of
friction between him and his two chief enemies–Duke Lothar of Saxony
and Archbishop Adalbert of Mayence. Like his father again, the rich
domain in Saxony at first attracted his main attention; it was there that


## p. 157 (#203) ############################################

The revolt of Saxony
157
he went immediately after the successful inauguration of his revolt in
Bavaria in 1105. But after his defeat in 1115 Saxony had to be abandoned.
He then turned to a new quarter, to the south-west, where lay the rich
lands of the middle and upper Rhine. We find him engaged in exchanges,
revocations of previous grants, even confiscations, which all point to the
policy of creating in this new region a centralised and compact domain.
Finally, he attempted to revive the alliance with the towns. Especially
to Spires in 1111 and to Worms in 1114 he gave important charters',
which raised the status and independence of the citizens by removing the
most vexatious of the seignorial powers over their persons and property.
He could not, however, count on their loyalty. Worms revolted more
than once, Mayence was won over by privileges from its archbishop,
Cologne was sometimes for and sometimes against him. He was unable
to win their confidence fully or to inspire the devotion that had been so
serviceable to his father.
In all this he was engaged in building up his resources, and in
attempting to establish a basis for the royal authority which would make
it independent of princely support. But he was by no means content
merely to shake off their control. He was determined to enforce the
recognition of his sovereign rights, and opposition only enraged him and
revealed the arbitrary tendency of his ideas. In January 1112, at Merse-
burg, he intervened as supreme judge to prohibit the unjust imprisonment
of Count Frederick of Stade by Duke Lothar of Saxony and Margrave
Rudolf of the North Mark. When they refused obedience to his judg-
ment, they were deprived of their dignities, which were only restored
after they had made submission and released Frederick. Two other
Saxon counts were punished with close confinement for a breach of the
peace. In July, at Mayence, he exercised another sovereign right in
sequestrating the fiefs of Count Udalric of Weimar who had died with-
out heirs; he also, it seems, with the consent of a diet, added the
allodial territory to the royal domain. Siegfried, Count-Palatine of the
Rhine, claimed to succeed as next-of-kin to Udalric; and, in his disap-
pointment, he started a conspiracy among the Saxon and Thuringian
nobles, which was joined by Lothar and Margrave Rudolf, and eventually
the whole of Saxony was ablaze with revolt. Finally, as Henry was pre-
paring an expedition to Saxony, came the breach with his former
chancellor, now the greatest ecclesiastic in the land, Archbishop Adalbert
of Mayence
1 F. Keutgen, Urkunden zur städtischen Verfassungsgeschichte, Berlin, 1901, pp.
2 The province of Mayence covered nearly half the German kingdom. It included
14 (or, if Bamberg is taken into account, 15) suffragan bishoprics and extended as
far as southern Saxony and Bohemia, and southwards to Chur at the Italian frontier.
The archbishop had precedence over all nobles, lay and ecclesiastical, and as the
leading official played the principal part at royal elections. The potentialities of this
exalted office had been obscured by the mediocrity of the three previous archbishops
14 sqq.
CH, III.


## p. 158 (#204) ############################################

158
Archbishop Adalbert of Mayence
Adalbert, son of Count Sigehard of Saarbrücken, owed his rise to fame
almost entirely to the favour of Henry V. By him he had been appointed
chancellor in 1106, before the death of Henry IV, and had received
lavish preferment and grants from his master. On Archbishop Ruthard's
death in 1109, Adalbert was nominated as his successor by the king, who,
perhaps because he did not wish to be deprived of Adalbert's assistance
on his important expedition to Italy, deferred investiture; the see
remained vacant for two years, during which Henry, by virtue of his
rights of regalia, doubtless enjoyed its revenues. On his return to
Germany in 1111, he immediately invested Adalbert, who thereupon
entered into possession of the temporalities of the archbishop, though not
yet consecrated. At once a change was manifest. As chancellor he had
been an ardent imperialist, the right-hand man of the king, who recognised
his services and rewarded them with his confidence and with material
benefits. He was probably the chosen instrument of Henry's policy
of emancipation from the control of the nobles. But as archbishop his
interests diverged, his ambition led him to independence, and the cause
of the princes became his. He took a strong Church line, and professed
an ultra-papalist standpoint, though it was he who had been chiefly con-
cerned in all the leading events of 1111; it was interest and not principle
that influenced his change of view. Personal ambition was the mark of
his career. His great aim was to establish an independent principality.
At first he planned this in the Rhine district, and, as this brought him
into contact with the royal domain, he was soon in conflict with the king.
Thwarted in this endeavour, he later turned his attention with more
success to the eastern possessions of his see, in Hesse, Thuringia, and
Saxony?
In November 1112 the breach took place which definitely ranged
Adalbert on the side of the king's enemies. It was only a year after his
investiture, but Adalbert had already had time to realise his new
environment and to adopt his new outlook. It is probable that a leading
cause of friction was the king's exercise of the rights of regalia during the
two years' vacancy. The final cause seems to have been a quarrel over
two castles in the palatinate, which Adalbert refused to abandon. At
any rate the breach was complete, and the king's indignation, which
found expression in a violent manifesto? , was unbounded. He, like
in this period-Siegfried, Werner, and Ruthard. Adalbert seized upon them at once,
and founded the greatness of his successors.
1 Cf. K. H. Schmitt, Erzbischof Adalbert I von Mainz als Territorialfürst
(Arbeiten zur deutschen Rechts- und Verfassungsgeschichte, No. 11), Berlin, 1920.
2 Meyer von Knonau, Jahrbücher Heinrichs IV und V, Vol. vi, p. 263. Doubtless
Henry IV had exercised the same rights during the exiles of Siegfried and Ruthard,
and it is probable that there had resulted serious encroachments on the temporalities
of the see, which Adalbert was attempting to recover.
3 Published by Giesebrecht, Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserzeit, Vol. 1, pp.
1269 sq.


## p. 159 (#205) ############################################

Henry's victory in 1113. The revolt of 1115
159
Henry II of England afterwards, raised his faithful chancellor to be the
leading archbishop of his kingdom, expecting to gain a powerful supporter,
and found in him his most dangerous opponent. Adalbert set off to join
his new associates in Saxony; the king was marching thither at the same
time, and their ways converged. The quarrel broke out afresh. Adalbert
firmly refused to yield what he held; he was taken prisoner and exposed
to severe privations. This arbitrary act, in which the judgment of the
princes played no part, increased the alarm and suspicion which had
already caused revolt to break out in Saxony.
The first revolt against Henry V was ill-organised, and was effectively
suppressed in 1113. The royal army under Count Hoier of Mansfeld won
a decisive victory at Warmstadt near Quedlinburg. Siegfried died of
wounds, and the palatinate of the Rhine was conferred on Henry's faith-
ful supporter, Count Godfrey of Calw. Count Wiprecht of Groitsch was
taken prisoner and condemned to death; the sentence was commuted to
three years' imprisonment, but his possessions were confiscated and his
two sons rendered homeless. Of the other leaders, Count Louis of
Thuringia and Bishop Reinhard of Halberstadt made submission and
received the royal pardon. Henry was triumphant, and hoped that
Adalbert would have learnt from their failure and his own sufferings the
folly of resistance; the archbishop was brought before the king at
Worms, but he refused to yield and was taken back to his prison. The
next year, on 7 January 1114, the Emperor celebrated his victory by his
marriage at Mayence with Matilda, the eleven-year-old daughter of
Henry I of England. To Mayence came Duke Lothar to make humble
submission and to be restored to favour. But the concord was immediately
broken by Henry's sudden and arbitrary imprisonment of Count Louis
of Thuringia. This further breach of the custom, by which the nobles
claimed to be condemned only by the sentence of their peers, roused
wide-spread resentment, and in other quarters besides Saxony. To
Henry's arbitrary treatment of the archbishop and the count may be
ascribed the disasters that immediately followed.
They started in an unexpected quarter. Henry had just commenced
a punitive expedition against the Frisians in May, when the town of
Cologne suddenly revolted. It was not left alone to face the wrath of the
Emperor. Not only the Archbishop, Frederick, but also the leading
nobles of Lorraine, the lower Rhine, and Westphalia joined in the
insurrection. Henry failed before Cologne, and on 1 October was
decisively defeated at Andernach in Westphalia. The news of his defeat
gave the necessary encouragement to the disaffected nobles in East Saxony
and Thuringia. This time the revolt was better organised, with Duke
Lothar at the head, and all the other nobles, lay and ecclesiastical,
participating. The two armies met at Welfesholze on 11 February 1115,
and again Henry suffered a severe defeat. Utterly discomfited, he was
forced to abandon Saxony and retire to Mayence, where he negotiated for
CH. III.


## p. 160 (#206) ############################################

160
Henry's second expedition to Italy
peace; but Lothar refused his terms. And meanwhile the Saxons revived
their old alliance with the Church party, which was able to take advantage
of Henry's defeat to raise its head in Germany once more. First the
Cardinal-bishop Cuno pronounced excommunication on Henry at Cologne
and in Saxony; then the Cardinal-priest Theodoric, who had been sent as
papal legate to Hungary, came by invitation to a diet at Goslar, and re-
peated the same sentence. In the north and north-west Henry was practi-
cally friendless. But he was not reduced to the humiliation of his father in
1073 and 1076. The southern nobles did not join in the revolt; and,
though only his nephew Duke Frederick of Swabia was actively on his
side, the other leading princes at any rate remained neutral. They did
not make use of his weakness to acquire a share in the government.
At this moment the death of Countess Matilda of Tuscany (24 July)
made it imperative for Henry to proceed to Italy to make good his claim
to her inheritance. It was all the more necessary to procure peace in
Germany. A diet for this purpose was summoned to meet at Mayence
on 1 November. Henry waited there in vain; his enemies refused to
appear, and only a few bishops obeyed the summons. Taking advantage
of his weakness, the people of Mayence suddenly assailed him in force and
compelled him to release their archbishop, giving securities for his good
behaviour; and at Spires in December Adalbert was reconciled with the
Emperor, taking an oath of fealty and giving his nephews as hostages.
The hardships suffered during his three years' imprisonment had not
daunted the spirit of the archbishop. Neither his oath nor the safety of
his nephews deterred him from his purpose of active hostility. He went
at once to Cologne, where the bishops under Archbishop Frederick, the
nobles under Duke Lothar, were awaiting the arrival of the Cardinal-
legate Theodoric to complete the plans of the new alliance. The legate
died on the journey, and Adalbert soon dominated the proceedings. First
of all he was consecrated archbishop by Bishop Otto of Bamberg; for,
though he had been invested four years previously, he had not yet
received consecration. Then, in conjunction with Archbishop Frederick
of Cologne, he held a synod at which the ban of the Church was
pronounced against the Emperor. Henry sent Bishop Erlung of Würz-
burg to negotiate on his behalf, but Erlung himself was won over, and
on his return refrained from communion with the Emperor. In revenge
Henry deprived him of the semi-ducal position held by the Bishops of
Würzburg in Eastern Franconia, and conferred the judicial authority
there, with the rank of duke, on his nephew Conrad, brother of Duke
Frederick of Swabia! .
In spite of the dangerous situation in Germany, Henry embarked on
his second expedition to Italy in Lent 1116 and was absent for two years.
In the acquisition of Matilda's allodial territories, as well as the disposition
1 This iudiciaria potestas was, however, restored to the bishop in 1120. Conrad
seems to have retained the ducal title.


## p. 161 (#207) ############################################

Ecclesiastical opposition in Germany
161
of the fiefs she had held from the Empire, he obtained considerable ad-
vantages. He was able naturally to increase the royal domain, to acquire
a new source of revenue, and also to gain adherents among the towns by
generous grants of charters. His further attempt to crush papal resistance
and to establish an anti-Pope was, as usual, a failure. His absence made
little difference to Germany. The north was hopeless from his point of
view, and the southern nobles remained quiet. The government of
Germany was entrusted by him to Duke Frederick of Swabia and Godfrey,
Count-Palatine of the Rhine. They performed faithfully and with no
small success the task entrusted to them. The position rather improved
than otherwise; the area of disturbance was at any rate diminished. The
centre and mainspring of revolt was Archbishop Adalbert; his settled
determination was to injure the royal power by every means at his dis-
posal, to win over or to ruin all Henry's supporters. Without him the
desire for peace might have prevailed, but he kept alive the civil war.
We read of continual fighting, though always on a small scale, of sieges
and counter-sieges, of attempts at negotiation that came to nothing, and
of a general disregard for law and order which gave to the robber and the
brigand an undreamt-of security.
At last, however, events in Italy affected the German situation and
necessitated the Emperor's return. The definite revival of the schism
between Empire and Papacy with the excommunication of Henry V by
Pope Gelasius II in April 1118, and the activity of the Cardinal-bishop
Cuno as papal legate,gave renewed vigour to the Church party in Germany.
Adalbert ensured the fidelity of Mayence by an important grant of
privileges, and the Bishops of Worms and Spires (the latter his own
brother) now joined him. The episcopate as a whole was no longer sub-
servient to the Emperor, whose control of elections had been considerably
weakened; while Adalbert, on the other hand, by his appointment this
year as papal legate, gained increased authority over it. The anti-
imperialists, lay and ecclesiastical, now revived the plan of 1076 of a diet,
to be held at Würzburg, to which the Emperor was to be summoned to
answer the charges against him. Henry returned from Italy in August,
just in time to prevent this, and his appearance in Lorraine speedily
restored the balance in his favour. The situation did not permit of his
acting with the masterfulness that had given so much offence before, but
his diplomatic skill was able to make use of the strong desire for peace.
He gave earnest of his own intentions when he opened negotiations with
the new Pope, Calixtus II, in 1119; he could hardly be blamed for their
failure, and he was little affected by the renewal of excommunication. In
Lower Lorraine his position decidedly improved, especially when the town
of Cologne declared for him and expelled its archbishop. Frederick made
his way to Saxony, but even that duchy was no longer a sure refuge for
the Emperor's enemies. For Henry himself was at Goslar in January 1120,
able to visit his Saxon domain for the first time since his defeat in 1115;
C. MED, H, VOL. V. CH. III.
11


## p. 162 (#208) ############################################

162
The Diet of Würzburg
and a number of Saxon nobles, including Duke Lothar, were with him at
court. The bishops, obedient to the papal sentence, held aloof, but the
lay nobles were anxious above all for peace, though a peace of their own
making. Henry wisely took no steps to revenge himself for the excommuni-
cation, and, by withholding support from the anti-Pope, facilitated the
re-opening of negotiations. Adalbert alone was stubborn against recon-
ciliation, but his very obstinacy caused the German princes to take action.
When in June 1121 he marched with an army from Saxony to the relief
of Mayence, which was threatened by the Emperor, they intervened de-
cisively for peace, and a diet was summoned to meet at Würzburg.
The diet met on 29 September, and an armistice was arranged which,
besides re-establishing order in Germany, created the necessary conditions
precedent to a settlement of the issue between Pope and Emperor. Henry
was to recognise the Pope, and meanwhile king, churches, and individuals
were to be in undisturbed possession of their rights and lands; bishops
who had been canonically elected and consecrated were to be left in peace-
ful occupation of their sees, and the Bishops of Worms and Spires were
to be reinstated, though the town of Worms was to remain in royal
hands; prisoners and hostages were to be mutually restored. The princes
then bound themselves to use their mediation between Emperor and Pope
to bring about a settlement on the question of investiture which would
not impair the honour of the kingdom, and on the other hand to act in
concert against any attempt of the king to avenge himself on any of his
enemies. The Bavarian nobles, who were not present at Würzburg, gave
their assent to these conditions on 1 November. The princes had thus
taken affairs into their own hands, and by their unanimity had restored
peace and order to the kingdom. In this they rendered it a great service,
and probably the same result could have been achieved in no other way.
But it was a restoration of their control of the government, and was a
measure of the weakness of the royal authority. The king had no alter-
native but to acquiesce; and indeed he welcomed their intervention as a
means of extricating himself from the impasse in his relations with the
Pope. An embassy was sent at the beginning of 1122 to Rome, where it
was well received by Calixtus, and three cardinal-legates with full powers
were dispatched to Germany! Archbishop Adalbert alone, in spite of a
letter from the Pope expressing his earnest desire for peace, did his best
to prevent a reconciliation, and made what use he could of the disputed
election at Würzburg which followed on the death of Bishop Erlung.
But the papal legates resisted his attempts to promote discord, and by
their tactful management of the difficult preliminaries were able to get
general consent to the holding of a council. This was summoned by them
to meet at Mayence on 8 September. The place of meeting was, however,
naturally distasteful to Henry, and, as a concession to him, the Council
eventually took place at Worms on 23 September 1122.
1 Of these legates, two became Popes—Honorius II and Innocent II.


## p. 163 (#209) ############################################

The Concordat of Worms
163
The Concordat of Worms was a treaty for peace between the two
great powers, the spiritual and the temporal heads of Western Christendom.
As such it gave public recognition to the position the Papacy had
acquired in the course of the struggle. It gave recognition too to another
fact—the distinction between the spiritual and the temporal functions of
the episcopate.