citizens and
conducted
the suicide bombing of the U.
Revolution and War_nodrm
.
identify with.
"32
30 In January 1989, Khomeini also approved a series of legislative reforms that further di- luted the authority of religious experts and gave greater priority to state (as opposed to the- ological) interests. For these quotations and events, see MECS I988, 472-73- 486--88; andl Wright, In the Name ofGod, 172-73-
31 This sudden return to a bellicose ideological posture forced the moderates to adopt more extreme rheftoric themselves, and Rafsanjani at one point suggested that the Palestinians should kill fllve U. S. , French, or British citizens for every Arab killed in the Israeli-occupied West Bank or Gaza Strip. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Near East/South Asia, February 23, 1989, 44-48; MECS 1988, 4% and Wright, In the Name of God, 201.
32 See MECS 1988, 495?
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The condemnation of Rushdie was Khorneini's last important political act. His health deteriorated in the spring and he died on June 3, 1989, at the age of eighty-six. His passing allowed Rafsanjani and the moderates to resume their efforts to adapt the principles of "Islamic government" to con- temporary political conditions. Not surprisingly, the transition to the post- Khorneini era began with new signs of moderation.
The first step was the selection of President Ali Kharnenei to succeed Khorneini as supreme jurisprudent. This decision was a further retreat from Khorneini's original blueprint for Islamic government, because Kharnenei was not an accomplished theologian. A sweeping series of constitutional amendments was approved by a national referendum in July. The new con- stitution dropped the requirement that the supreme jurisprudent be a senior religious leader (thereby legitimizing Kharnenei's selection as Khorneini's successor), abolished the position of prime minister, and strengthened the powers of the presidency. 33 Rafsanjani was elected president by an over- whelming margin in July, further cementing the moderates' hold on power. Rafsanjani emphasized that his main priority would be reconstruction and economic recovery, and his new cabinet was dominated by technocrats cho-
sen for their administrative competence rather than their ideological purity. Although the radicals were not silenced and the pragmatists had not wholly abandoned the principles of the Islamic revolution, the leaders of the regime seemed to be increasingly willing to sacrifice doctrinal purity for the sake of political stability, economic recovery, and international acceptance. 34
The radicals suffered yet another defeat in the 1991 elections, leading ? orne observers to conclude that Rafsanjani's position was more powerful than ever. 35 Yet tlhe scales quickly swung back when Kharnenei announced a crackdown on "Western culture" in the summer of 1992 and reaffirmed the death sentence on Salman Rushdie, Iran's hostility to the United States, and its commitment to spreading the revolution. 36 Kharnenei and the radicals began to strip Rafsanjani of many of the powers he had previously accumu- lated and forced him to abandon his efforts to establish better relations with the Wfst. The radical resurgence was partly a response to Rafsanjani's failed attempts to liberalize the economy, but it also reflected the incomplete insti-
33 See Hunter, Iran after Khomeini, 25-26; MECS 1989 (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1991), 344, 348-53; and Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 34-35.
34 See MECS 1989, 341-62.
35 See R. K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: North and South," ME/ 46, no. 3 (1992), 394-<)5; and Said Amir Arjomand, "A Victory for the Pragmatists: The Islamic Fundamental- ist Reaction in Iran," in Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis, ed. James Piscatori (Chicago: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991 ).
36 On July 29, 1992, Ayatollah Khamenei warned, "One must never believe that the United States, the everlasting enemy of Islam, has put an end to its antagonism. . . . The United States is the main enemy of Islam and will remain so. " Middle East International, no. 431 (August 7, 1992), 13.
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tutionalization of the revolutionary regime and the radicals' fear that fur- ther moves toward moderation would jeopardize their own claim to rule. 37
The Islamic revolution in Iran is still a work in progress. Although the revolution created a strong state apparatus, authority remains divided, and neither the moderates nor the radicals have been able to eliminate the other faction or reduce its base of support. It has thus been difficult for the Islamic Republic to sustain a coherent set of policies, and as we shall see, this en- demic inconsistency has had especially pernicious effects on Iran's foreign relations.
THE FoREIGN RELATIONS OF REvoLUTIONARY IRAN
Foreign Policy under the Shah
Under the shah, Iranian foreign policy was directed toward the long-term goal of becoming a major world power. The foundation of this policy was the shah's alliance with the United States, which had grown in importance after the Nixon administration decided to use Iran as one of its "twin pil- lars" in the Persian Gulf region. This policy fed the shah's own ambitions;
? Iran's oil wealth fueled a massive arms buildup; and the United States be- came inextricably identified with the shah's regime. 38
Predictably, prerevolutionary Iran's relations with the Soviet Union were less favorable. The shah was understandably wary of his large northern neighbor and! perennially worried about leftist subversion within Iran itself. Iran's role as the West's "regional policeman" irritated the Soviets, as did the shah's opposition to revolutionary movements and radical states else- where in the Middle East. 39 Yet despite these disagreements and Iran's close ties with the United States, the Soviet Union and Iran maintained cordial diplomatic and economic relations, and their 1921 treaty of friendship and ? cooperation Jremained in force. 40
37 On these events, see "Iran, the Sequel: New Actors, but the Same lines," New York Times, January 23, 1994, 4:4; and also Middle East International, no. 430 Ouly 24, 1992), 13; no. 432 (Au- gust 21, 1992), 1 1; no. 438 (November 6, 1992), 12; no. 439 (November 20, 1992), 3-5.
38 Useful surveys of the U. S. -Iranian relationship include Mark J. Gasiorowski, U. S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Bill, Eagle and Lion, chaps. 1? ; and R. K. Ramazani, The United States and Iran: The Patterns of In-
fluence (New York: Praeger, 1982).
39 Iran helped! the sultan of Oman suppress the Soviet-backed Dhofar rebellion in the early
1970s, and the shah was especially hostile to Soviet clients such as Carnal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and the Baath parties in Syria and Iraq.
40 See Sepehr Zabih, "Iran's International Posture: De Facto Non-Alignment within a Pro- Western Alliance," MEJ 24, no. 3 ( 1970), 313; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Policy towards Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan: The Dynamics ofInfluence (New York: Praeger, 1982); and Aryeh Yodfat, The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 25-43.
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Within the Middle East, Iran's foreign policy grew more assertive as its mil- itary and economic power increased. Iran seized several islands in the Persian Gulf in 1971, and its support for the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq forced Bagh- dad to accept its terms in a long-standing dispute over the Shatt al-Arab wa- terway. Relations with Saudi Arabia and the other gulf states were friendly but guarded; although the gulf monarchies shared the shah's opposition to radicalism of any sort, they were also worried by Iran's military power and the shah's regional ambitions. Relations with Egypt improved dramatically after its realignment with the United States, but relations with Syria, Libya, and South Yemen remained hostile. These tensions help explain Iran's tacit
alignment with Israel, based on a combination of factors including shared op- position to the main Arab powers, Israel's interest in the Iranian Jewish com- munity, covert cooperation between the Israeli and Iranian intelligence services, and their shared ties to the United States. 41
Overall, Iran's foreign policy under the shah combined a pro-Western ori- entation with an ambitious effort to build Iran's military power and expand its regional role. The shah's immediate ambitions were limited, however; al- though Iran annexed small portions of foreign territory on several occa- sions, the shah did not seek to transform the existing state system or eliminate any of his immediate neighbors. And though he occasionally in- voked Islamic symbols to attack his Arab opponents, Islam played little or no role in Iran's foreign policy prior to the revolution.
Aims and Ambitions of the Islamic Republic
Although the revolutionary coalition was divided on many issues, there was widespread agreement on the broad outlines of Iran's postrevolu- tionary foreign policy. The new regime was strongly opposed to foreign (especially U. S. ) interference and committed to an explicit policy of non- alignment. Prime Minister Bazargan announced this new policy in February 1979, and the principle of nonalignment was formally enshrined in the Con- stitution of the Islamic Republic later in the year. 42 The constitution commit- ted Iran to work for the unity of all Islamic peoples and openly endorsed efforts to export the revolution to other countries. 43 Although Khomeini at
41 OntheoriginsoftheIranian-Israelirelationship,seeUriBialer,"TheIranianConnection in Israel's Foreign Policy, 1948-1951," ME] 39, no. 2 (1985).
42 The constitution calls for "the complete expulsion of colonialism and the prevention of foreign influence" and explicitly forbids foreign military bases or any agreements "allowing a foreign power to dominate . . . the affairs of the country. " "Constitution of the Islamic Re- public," 189, 201-202.
43 The constitution states that it "provides the basis for trying to perpetuate this revolution both at home and abroad," and it emphasizes the importance of "expanding international re- lations with other Islamic movements . . . to pave the way to form the world unity of follow- ers. " Ibid. , 185.
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times stated that Iran would not use force to spread its revolution, some of his remarks (and those of several of his followers) were less restrained. 44 The new regime also undertook to aid other victims of imperialism, and the new constitution proclaimed that Iran would "protect the struggles of the weak against the arrogant, in any part of the world. "45
These principles constituted a near-total reversal of the shah's foreign pol- icy. In addition to moving to a nonaligned position, the commitment to spreading Khomeini's ideas of Islamic government challenged the legiti- macy of the existing state system and threatened the stability of Iran's im- mediate neighbors. Not surprisingly, the establishment of the Islamic Republic had dramatic effects on Iran's international position.
The United States and Revolutionary Iran
The effects of the revolution were most apparent in Iran's relations with the United States. The revolutionaries blamed the United States for the in- justices of the shah's rule, and they were especially worried that the United States would try to repeat the 1953 coup that had restored the shah to his throne. For their part, the Americans were concerned by the loss of an im- portant ally, the impact of the revolution on world oil supplies, and the pos- sibility that the shah's ouster would permit the Soviet Union to expand its own influence in an important strategic area. 46
Yet U. S. -Iranian relations seemed fairly encouraging at first. Prime Minis- ter Bazargan announced that Iran would continue exporting oil to the United States, and when a group of radical students invaded the U. S. em- bassy compound in Tehran in February 1979, the Bazargan government quickly removed them and tightened security around the embassy. Presi- dent Carter declared that the United States "would attempt to work closely with the existing government of Iran," and U. S. diplomats and intelligence officials maintained extensive contacts with the Bazargan government and tried to cultivate more radical figures such as Bani-Sadr as well. Carter also
44 According to Khomeini, Iran would "export our revolution to the whole world. Until the cry 'There is no God but God' resounds over the whole world, there will be struggle. " Quoted in Wright, In the Name ofGod, 108. In 1981, Foreign Minister Musavi declared that one of the objectives of Iran's foreign policy was to "carry the message of Iran's Islamic revolu- tion to the [entire] world," and Ayatollah Ali Meshkini stated that the goal of the revolution was "to impose the Qur'an over the entire world. " In 1982. , then-president Ali Khamenei called on prayer leaders from forty countries to use their mosques as "prayer, political, cul- tural and military bases," in order to "prepare the ground for the creation of Islamic govern? ments in all countries. " Quoted in Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 4S-49; and Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 2. 34-35.
45 "Constitution of the Islamic Republic," 2. 02. ; and see also Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran, 2. 3-2. 4, and "Khumayni's Islam," 2. 1-2. 2. ; and Rajaee, Islamic Values, 79-th.
46 See Bill, Eagle and Lion, 2. 77--'fS; and Warren Christopher et al. , American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct ofa Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 2. .
? ? ? ? The Iranian Revolution
authorized shipments of gasoline and heating oil to alleviate temporary shortages in Iran and agreed to ship spare parts to the Iranian armed forces in October. 47
There were several obvious points of tension, however. Secretary of De- fense Harold Brown's statement that the United States would use military force "if appropriate" to protect its access to Persian Gulf oil alarmed Iran's new leaders, and the violent reprisals that followed the shah's departure disturbed many American observers. The U. S. Senate condemned the sum- mary executions conducted by the Revolutionary Courts in May-an action Iran denounced as "clear interference. " The new regime refused to accept the credentials of the U. S. ambassador-designate in June, expelled several
U. S. journalists in July, and canceled a $9 billion arms deal in August. 48 Un- able to establish direct contact with Khomeini or his supporters during this period, the Carter administration was forced to pin its hopes on such mod- erates as Bazargan. Bazargan and Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi were in- terested in developing a cordial relationship with the United States, but their authority was evaporating rapidly at this point. The radical clergy op- posed any attempt at a rapprochement, and relations between the two states worsened as the mullahs tightened their hold on power. The final break came when Carter agreed to permit the shah to fly to New York for medical treatment in October. This decision triggered a new wave of anti-U. S. demonstrations and raised new fears that the United States was preparing a counterrevolutionary coup. Bazargan met with U. S. national security advi- sor Brzezinski in an attempt to resolve the dispute, but his efforts ended with the seizure of the U. S. embassy and the onset of a major hostage crisis.
The United States responded to the seizure of its embassy by freezing Iranian assets, organizing an international embargo, and deploying addi- tional military forces in the region. It began transmitting propaganda broad- casts into Iran in order to undermine the Ayatollah and eventually attempted an unsuccessful rescue mission in April 1980. The continuing power struggle in Iran impeded efforts to resolve the crisis through negoti- ation, largely because Bani-Sadr lacked the authority to make a deal and because supporters of a settlement were vulnerable to accusations of insuf- ficient revolutionary zeal. 49 The breakthrough finally came in the fall of 1980, when Iran agreed to release the hostages in exchange for roughly $11 billion in frozen Iranian assets and other financial commitments. 5?
47 See Bill, Eagle and Lion, 286-3-9 .
48 Ibid. , 28o-82.
49 "Chronology," ME] 34, no. 4 (198o), 475? The sheer difficulty of communicating with the
Iranian regime was a serious obstacle as well, and virtually all accounts of the hostage crisis em- phasize the confusion that U. S. negotiators faced in trying to deal with the Islamic Republic.
50 The most complete account of the hostage negotiators (though written entirely from the U. S. perspective), is Christopher et al. , American Hostages in Iran. See also Sick, All Fall Down,
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By confirming each side's impression that the other was unremittingly hostile, the hostage crisis cast an enduring shadow over U. S. -Iranian re- lations. U. S. pressure on Iran strengthened the revolutionaries' image of American hostility, and the radical clergy used the threat of the "Great Satan" to undermine Bazargan and Bani-Sadr and to consolidate their own positions. 51 The abortive rescue mission also revealed that the United States still controlled significant intelligence assets within the country and reinforced Iranian fears of U. S. military action, while Iran's bellicose rhetoric and disregard for traditional diplomatic norms solidi-
fied its reputation as an aggressive revolutionary state. Iran's subsequen? actions (such as its support for the Lebanese Shiites who kidnapped sev- eral U. S.
citizens and conducted the suicide bombing of the U. S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983) merely sealed Iran's aggressive reputation in Washington.
These developments convinced the United States to increase its sup- port for conservative Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia and to tilt to- wards Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. Initially concerned that an Iraqi victory would upset the regional balance of power, the U. S. government had quietly allowed Israel to ship several billion dollars' worth of U. S. arms and spare parts to Iran in 1981 and 1982. When the tide of battle turned in llran's favor, however, the U. S. State Department began a diplo- matic campaign to persuade other states to deny military equipment to Iran. The United States began providing intelligence information to Iraq in 1982 and replenished the stockpiles of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait when they transferred U. S. -made weaponry to Baghdad. The United States reestablished diplomatic relations with Iraq in 1984 and began covertly supporting Iranian exile groups during this period as well. 52
chaps. 9-15; Bill, Eagle and Lion, 293-304; Pierre Salinger, America Held Hostage: The Secret Negotiations (Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday, 1981); Brzezinski, Power and Principle, chap. 13; and Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year ofthe Carter Presidency (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1982).
51 As Rafsanjani remarked after the hostage settlement, "America continues to remain our enemy, and, accordingly, we are America's enemy. . . . This will continue for a long time. " Quoted in Menashri, Iran, 205; and see also Campbell and Darvich, "Global Implications of the Iranian Revolution," 49?
52 See Anthony Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1 984-1987: Strategic Im- plications and Policy Options (London: Jane's, 1987), esp. 79; "U. S. Said to Aid Iranian Exiles in Combat and Political Units," and "U. S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early in Its War against Iran," New York Times, March 7, 1982, A1, A12; January 26, 1992, At, A4; Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (London: Routledge, 1991), 96; Ralph King, The Iran-Iraq War: The Political Implications, Adelphi Paper no. 219 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), 53?
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The main departure from this policy was the notorious Iran-contra arms deal. 53 This initiative rested on the hope that supplying arms would strengthen "moderate forces" within the Islamic Republic, who would help obtain the release of the U. S. hostages in Lebanon and work to improve U. S. -Iranian relations. This goal also reflected U. S. concerns that Iran was in- creasingly vulnerable to Soviet pressure or subversion, as well as the expec- tation that the threat from Moscow would make Iran more receptive to U. S. overtures. 54
In the summer of 1985, U. S. and Israeli officials began negotiating to sell advanced weapons to Iran in exchange for the release of U. S. citizens held by pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon. Lacking both direct access to the revolu- tionary government and accurate information about internal developments within Iran, the U. S. government-or more precisely, the cabal within the National Security Council that conducted the negotiations-decided to use a shady Iranian arms merchant, Manucher Ghorbanifar, as their principal intermediary. The initiative was soon taken over by Oliver North, a marine officer assigned to the U. S. National Security Council, and he and former U. S. national security advisor Robert C. McFarlane eventually made a secret visit to Tehran in May 1986 in an unsuccessful venture to get the hostages released. The continuing power struggle between moderates and extremists in Iran brought the negotiations to an end in November 1986, but not before the U. S. had sent Iran nearly sixteen hundred antitank missiles, assorted spare parts, and valuable intelligence information on Iraqi military deploy- ments.
The attempt to trade arms for hostages improved neither the situation in Lebanon, the position of the Iranian "moderates," nor the state of U. S. -Iranian relations. Although the Shiites released one U. S. hostage in September 1985
53 The best account of the Iran-contra affair is Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran- Contra Affairs (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991). See also James A. Bill, "The U. S. Over- ture to Iran, 1985-86: An Analysis," in Keddie and Gasiorowski, Neither East Nor West, 166-7- 9;PeterKornbluhandMalcolmByrne,eds. ,TheIran-ContraScandal:TheDeclassifiedHis- tory (New York: New Press, 1993); and Samuel Segev, The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel's Role in tlze Iran-Contra Affair (New York: Free Press, 1988).
54 At the request of the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency pre- pared a new intelligence estimate on Iran in May 1985. It predicted that "the Khomeini regime will face serious instability," warned that Tehran's leadership "seems to have con- cluded that improvement of relations with the Soviet Union is essential to Iranian interest," and recommended that the United States begin active efforts compete for influence in Iran. In response, a National Security Council memorandum suggested that U. S. allies be encouraged to provide Iran with "selected military equipment . . . on a case-i? y-case basis. " The texts of these memoranda are printed in the Report of the President's Special Review Board ("Tower Commission" ), February 26, 1987, B-6:7; B-7:8; and the Joint Hearings before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran and the Senate Select Committee on Se- cret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, 1ooth Congress, 1st sess. (Wash- ington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1988), vol. 100-10:512-18.
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and another in July 1986, they replaced them by kidnapping two more U. S. citizens in September 1986. The exposure of the secret arms shipments em- barrassed the Reagan administration and alarmed its Arab allies, who saw the initiative as a hypocritical departure that undercut efforts to contain Iran. Moreover, the revelation that Iranian government officials had held secret ne- gotiations with the "Great Satan" revived Iranian fears about U. S. influence and forced pragmatists such as Rafsanjani to revert to more hard-line posi- tions. In sum, the "arms for hostages" scheme was a fiasco from start to finish.
Rafsanjani made several cautious overtures to the United States early in 1987, but relations between the two countries deteriorated after the "arms for hostages" scheme unraveled. 55 In an attempt to cut Iraq's oil revenues and reduce Arab support for Baghdad, Iran had begun laying mines in the Persian Gulf and threatening to attack oil shipments from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. To restore its credibility with the gulf Arabs and bring additional pressure to bear on Iran, the U. S. eventually agreed to place Kuwaiti tankers under U. S. registry and provide a naval escort for tankers using Kuwaiti and Saudi ports. This decision led to repeated confrontations between the U. S. and Iranian forces: a U. S. fighter fired on an Iranian F-14 in August, and U. S. naval units sank an Iranian ship laying mines in the gulf the following month. In October, U. S. naval forces sank three Iranian gunboats after they fired on a U. S. helicopter and destroyed several Iranian oil platforms in re- taliation for missile attacks on two U. S. tankers. The Senate banned oil im- ports from Iran in September, and President Reagan announced a complete ban on Iranian imports and an embargo on "militarily useful" exports in October, while minor clashes between U. S. and Iranian forces continued into the following year. Finally, the U. S. destroyer Vincennes mistakenly shot
down an Iranian civilian airliner on July 2, killing all 290 people aboard.
The tragedy brought defiant protests from Tehran, but it also seems to have convinced Khomeini to end the war. Rafsanjani announced that con- cluding the war would allow Iran to follow a more "open" foreign policy, but in fact it did not lead to a significant improvement in U. S. -Iranian rela- tions. The hostages in Lebanon remained a sore point and U. S. officials were no longer willing to make concessions to hasten their release. The United States rejected an Iranian offer to mediate in exchange for the release of ad- ditional Iranian assets in August, and the Iranian government denounced a conciliatory letter from former president Carter to Khomeini and Rafsanjani as a "new trick. " Although Iran's deputy foreign minister hinted that rela- tions with the United States might be restored, Rafsanjani declared that
55 In April, Rafsanjani declared that normal relations with the United States would be pos- sible once it stopped threatening Iran. He later stated that Iran would help obtain the release of U. S. hostages in Lebanon if the Americans showed goodwill by releasing frozen Iranian as- sets, adding that relations need not remain poor "until doomsday. " "Chronology," MEJ 41, no. 4 (1987), 6o1.
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public opinion was still not ready for such a step. Finally, the radical turn signaled by Khomeini's condemnation of author Salman Rushdie in Febru- ary ended any possibility of a rapprochement between the two states. 56
Khomeini's death began a brief period of moderation in Iran's foreign policy, but relations with the United States stayed chilly at best. In August, however, Rafsanjani made a public speech declaring that the hostage prob- lem could be solved peacefully, and Iran reportedly helped obtain the re- ? lease of two U. S. hostages later in the year. 57 Iran remained neutral in the 1991 Gulf War (though it did express concern about the enormous Western presence in tine Persian Gulf region) and Rafsanjani made several cautious overtures to frhe United States as part of his effort to resuscitate Iran's stag- nant economy and end its international isolation. 58
These veiled feelers failed to elicit a favorable response from Washington, however, and a radical resurgence in 1992 soon removed any possibility of a detente. Although Rafsanjani expressed his continued desire for improved! relations with the West and specifically requested "goodwill gestures" from the United States, his efforts were hamstrung by radical opposition within Iran and by U. S. concerns about Iran's support for international terrorism and the potential spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Indeed, the Clinton ad- ministration labeled Iran "an international outlaw" and a "pariah" in May
1993, as part of a policy of "dual containment" aimed equally at Baghdad and Tehran. 59 Despite the costs to both powers, in short, relations between
56 See Wright, In the Name ofGod, 256-57; "Iranian Dismisses Prospects of Thaw with Wash- ington," New York Times, February 6, 1989, At. Minister of the Interior Ali Akbar Mohtashemi blamed U. S. and British intelligence agencies for the publication of Rushdie's book and called it part of a "new war against Islam," and Khomeini declared that it was useless for Iran to act in a pragmatic manner thinking that the West would "humanely reciprocate. " "Chronology," MEJ 63, no. 3 (1989), 483.
57 The United States also paid Iran $287 million for military equipment ordered by the shah but never delivered, thereby resolving the last financial dispute stemming from the 1980 hostage crisis. See MECS 1991 (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1992), 32-33; Hunter, Iran after Khomeini, 123.
58 In April t9<)0, one of Rafsanjani's associates wrote an article calling for improved relations with the U. S. , all\d another advisor told a New York Times reporter that Washington and Tehran could enjoy a "marriage of convenience. " In March 1991, Rafsanjani declared that the U. S. presence in the Persian Gulf was "not useful" but also "not a threat to Iran," and he later sug- gested that Iran needed a "prudent policy" so it could "help people without being accused of engaging in terrorism, without anyone being able to call us fanatics. " The radical clerics were uncompromising, however, and even Rafsanjani suggested that the United States would have to make the first move in order to overcome Iranian suspicions. See MECS 1991, 384-86, 394-<)6; and Hooshang Amirahradi, "Iran and the Persian Gulf Crisis," in his and Nader Entessar's edited Iran and the Arab World (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), 10<)-tO, n8-19.
59 U. S. concerns increased after the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in February 1993 and were reinforced by Tehran's vocal support for the fundamentalist movements in Sudan, Egypt, and Algeria. See Middle East International, no. 444 (February 19, 1993), to; no. 452 Uune 1 1 , 1993), 3-4; . and no. 453 Uune 25, 1993), 12-13; "Fearing More Hos- tility from Iran, U. S. Considers Moves to Isolate It," New York Times, May 27, 1993, At, A4.
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the United States and Iran remained estranged more than fifteen years after the fall of the shah. 60
The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran
The Soviet Union welcomed the Iranian Revolution at first, because it overthrew an important U. S. ally and gave the Soviets an opportunity to ex- pand their own influence. As the campaign to oust the shah gathered mo- mentum in the fall of 1978, Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev stated that the Soviet Union opposed "foreign interference by anyone. " The warning was reiterated in January 1980 and Brezhnev informed the Bazargan govern- ment that he hoped "good neighborly relations will develop fruitfully. "61 Iranian foreign minister Karim Sanjavi replied that Iran "genuinely wants friendly relations with the USSR," and the Soviet government subsequently vetoed a UN Security Council resolution calling for economic sanctions in response to the detention of the U. S. hostages.
30 In January 1989, Khomeini also approved a series of legislative reforms that further di- luted the authority of religious experts and gave greater priority to state (as opposed to the- ological) interests. For these quotations and events, see MECS I988, 472-73- 486--88; andl Wright, In the Name ofGod, 172-73-
31 This sudden return to a bellicose ideological posture forced the moderates to adopt more extreme rheftoric themselves, and Rafsanjani at one point suggested that the Palestinians should kill fllve U. S. , French, or British citizens for every Arab killed in the Israeli-occupied West Bank or Gaza Strip. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Near East/South Asia, February 23, 1989, 44-48; MECS 1988, 4% and Wright, In the Name of God, 201.
32 See MECS 1988, 495?
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The condemnation of Rushdie was Khorneini's last important political act. His health deteriorated in the spring and he died on June 3, 1989, at the age of eighty-six. His passing allowed Rafsanjani and the moderates to resume their efforts to adapt the principles of "Islamic government" to con- temporary political conditions. Not surprisingly, the transition to the post- Khorneini era began with new signs of moderation.
The first step was the selection of President Ali Kharnenei to succeed Khorneini as supreme jurisprudent. This decision was a further retreat from Khorneini's original blueprint for Islamic government, because Kharnenei was not an accomplished theologian. A sweeping series of constitutional amendments was approved by a national referendum in July. The new con- stitution dropped the requirement that the supreme jurisprudent be a senior religious leader (thereby legitimizing Kharnenei's selection as Khorneini's successor), abolished the position of prime minister, and strengthened the powers of the presidency. 33 Rafsanjani was elected president by an over- whelming margin in July, further cementing the moderates' hold on power. Rafsanjani emphasized that his main priority would be reconstruction and economic recovery, and his new cabinet was dominated by technocrats cho-
sen for their administrative competence rather than their ideological purity. Although the radicals were not silenced and the pragmatists had not wholly abandoned the principles of the Islamic revolution, the leaders of the regime seemed to be increasingly willing to sacrifice doctrinal purity for the sake of political stability, economic recovery, and international acceptance. 34
The radicals suffered yet another defeat in the 1991 elections, leading ? orne observers to conclude that Rafsanjani's position was more powerful than ever. 35 Yet tlhe scales quickly swung back when Kharnenei announced a crackdown on "Western culture" in the summer of 1992 and reaffirmed the death sentence on Salman Rushdie, Iran's hostility to the United States, and its commitment to spreading the revolution. 36 Kharnenei and the radicals began to strip Rafsanjani of many of the powers he had previously accumu- lated and forced him to abandon his efforts to establish better relations with the Wfst. The radical resurgence was partly a response to Rafsanjani's failed attempts to liberalize the economy, but it also reflected the incomplete insti-
33 See Hunter, Iran after Khomeini, 25-26; MECS 1989 (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1991), 344, 348-53; and Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 34-35.
34 See MECS 1989, 341-62.
35 See R. K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: North and South," ME/ 46, no. 3 (1992), 394-<)5; and Said Amir Arjomand, "A Victory for the Pragmatists: The Islamic Fundamental- ist Reaction in Iran," in Islamic Fundamentalism and the Gulf Crisis, ed. James Piscatori (Chicago: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991 ).
36 On July 29, 1992, Ayatollah Khamenei warned, "One must never believe that the United States, the everlasting enemy of Islam, has put an end to its antagonism. . . . The United States is the main enemy of Islam and will remain so. " Middle East International, no. 431 (August 7, 1992), 13.
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tutionalization of the revolutionary regime and the radicals' fear that fur- ther moves toward moderation would jeopardize their own claim to rule. 37
The Islamic revolution in Iran is still a work in progress. Although the revolution created a strong state apparatus, authority remains divided, and neither the moderates nor the radicals have been able to eliminate the other faction or reduce its base of support. It has thus been difficult for the Islamic Republic to sustain a coherent set of policies, and as we shall see, this en- demic inconsistency has had especially pernicious effects on Iran's foreign relations.
THE FoREIGN RELATIONS OF REvoLUTIONARY IRAN
Foreign Policy under the Shah
Under the shah, Iranian foreign policy was directed toward the long-term goal of becoming a major world power. The foundation of this policy was the shah's alliance with the United States, which had grown in importance after the Nixon administration decided to use Iran as one of its "twin pil- lars" in the Persian Gulf region. This policy fed the shah's own ambitions;
? Iran's oil wealth fueled a massive arms buildup; and the United States be- came inextricably identified with the shah's regime. 38
Predictably, prerevolutionary Iran's relations with the Soviet Union were less favorable. The shah was understandably wary of his large northern neighbor and! perennially worried about leftist subversion within Iran itself. Iran's role as the West's "regional policeman" irritated the Soviets, as did the shah's opposition to revolutionary movements and radical states else- where in the Middle East. 39 Yet despite these disagreements and Iran's close ties with the United States, the Soviet Union and Iran maintained cordial diplomatic and economic relations, and their 1921 treaty of friendship and ? cooperation Jremained in force. 40
37 On these events, see "Iran, the Sequel: New Actors, but the Same lines," New York Times, January 23, 1994, 4:4; and also Middle East International, no. 430 Ouly 24, 1992), 13; no. 432 (Au- gust 21, 1992), 1 1; no. 438 (November 6, 1992), 12; no. 439 (November 20, 1992), 3-5.
38 Useful surveys of the U. S. -Iranian relationship include Mark J. Gasiorowski, U. S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Bill, Eagle and Lion, chaps. 1? ; and R. K. Ramazani, The United States and Iran: The Patterns of In-
fluence (New York: Praeger, 1982).
39 Iran helped! the sultan of Oman suppress the Soviet-backed Dhofar rebellion in the early
1970s, and the shah was especially hostile to Soviet clients such as Carnal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and the Baath parties in Syria and Iraq.
40 See Sepehr Zabih, "Iran's International Posture: De Facto Non-Alignment within a Pro- Western Alliance," MEJ 24, no. 3 ( 1970), 313; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Policy towards Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan: The Dynamics ofInfluence (New York: Praeger, 1982); and Aryeh Yodfat, The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran (London: Croom Helm, 1984), 25-43.
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Within the Middle East, Iran's foreign policy grew more assertive as its mil- itary and economic power increased. Iran seized several islands in the Persian Gulf in 1971, and its support for the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq forced Bagh- dad to accept its terms in a long-standing dispute over the Shatt al-Arab wa- terway. Relations with Saudi Arabia and the other gulf states were friendly but guarded; although the gulf monarchies shared the shah's opposition to radicalism of any sort, they were also worried by Iran's military power and the shah's regional ambitions. Relations with Egypt improved dramatically after its realignment with the United States, but relations with Syria, Libya, and South Yemen remained hostile. These tensions help explain Iran's tacit
alignment with Israel, based on a combination of factors including shared op- position to the main Arab powers, Israel's interest in the Iranian Jewish com- munity, covert cooperation between the Israeli and Iranian intelligence services, and their shared ties to the United States. 41
Overall, Iran's foreign policy under the shah combined a pro-Western ori- entation with an ambitious effort to build Iran's military power and expand its regional role. The shah's immediate ambitions were limited, however; al- though Iran annexed small portions of foreign territory on several occa- sions, the shah did not seek to transform the existing state system or eliminate any of his immediate neighbors. And though he occasionally in- voked Islamic symbols to attack his Arab opponents, Islam played little or no role in Iran's foreign policy prior to the revolution.
Aims and Ambitions of the Islamic Republic
Although the revolutionary coalition was divided on many issues, there was widespread agreement on the broad outlines of Iran's postrevolu- tionary foreign policy. The new regime was strongly opposed to foreign (especially U. S. ) interference and committed to an explicit policy of non- alignment. Prime Minister Bazargan announced this new policy in February 1979, and the principle of nonalignment was formally enshrined in the Con- stitution of the Islamic Republic later in the year. 42 The constitution commit- ted Iran to work for the unity of all Islamic peoples and openly endorsed efforts to export the revolution to other countries. 43 Although Khomeini at
41 OntheoriginsoftheIranian-Israelirelationship,seeUriBialer,"TheIranianConnection in Israel's Foreign Policy, 1948-1951," ME] 39, no. 2 (1985).
42 The constitution calls for "the complete expulsion of colonialism and the prevention of foreign influence" and explicitly forbids foreign military bases or any agreements "allowing a foreign power to dominate . . . the affairs of the country. " "Constitution of the Islamic Re- public," 189, 201-202.
43 The constitution states that it "provides the basis for trying to perpetuate this revolution both at home and abroad," and it emphasizes the importance of "expanding international re- lations with other Islamic movements . . . to pave the way to form the world unity of follow- ers. " Ibid. , 185.
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times stated that Iran would not use force to spread its revolution, some of his remarks (and those of several of his followers) were less restrained. 44 The new regime also undertook to aid other victims of imperialism, and the new constitution proclaimed that Iran would "protect the struggles of the weak against the arrogant, in any part of the world. "45
These principles constituted a near-total reversal of the shah's foreign pol- icy. In addition to moving to a nonaligned position, the commitment to spreading Khomeini's ideas of Islamic government challenged the legiti- macy of the existing state system and threatened the stability of Iran's im- mediate neighbors. Not surprisingly, the establishment of the Islamic Republic had dramatic effects on Iran's international position.
The United States and Revolutionary Iran
The effects of the revolution were most apparent in Iran's relations with the United States. The revolutionaries blamed the United States for the in- justices of the shah's rule, and they were especially worried that the United States would try to repeat the 1953 coup that had restored the shah to his throne. For their part, the Americans were concerned by the loss of an im- portant ally, the impact of the revolution on world oil supplies, and the pos- sibility that the shah's ouster would permit the Soviet Union to expand its own influence in an important strategic area. 46
Yet U. S. -Iranian relations seemed fairly encouraging at first. Prime Minis- ter Bazargan announced that Iran would continue exporting oil to the United States, and when a group of radical students invaded the U. S. em- bassy compound in Tehran in February 1979, the Bazargan government quickly removed them and tightened security around the embassy. Presi- dent Carter declared that the United States "would attempt to work closely with the existing government of Iran," and U. S. diplomats and intelligence officials maintained extensive contacts with the Bazargan government and tried to cultivate more radical figures such as Bani-Sadr as well. Carter also
44 According to Khomeini, Iran would "export our revolution to the whole world. Until the cry 'There is no God but God' resounds over the whole world, there will be struggle. " Quoted in Wright, In the Name ofGod, 108. In 1981, Foreign Minister Musavi declared that one of the objectives of Iran's foreign policy was to "carry the message of Iran's Islamic revolu- tion to the [entire] world," and Ayatollah Ali Meshkini stated that the goal of the revolution was "to impose the Qur'an over the entire world. " In 1982. , then-president Ali Khamenei called on prayer leaders from forty countries to use their mosques as "prayer, political, cul- tural and military bases," in order to "prepare the ground for the creation of Islamic govern? ments in all countries. " Quoted in Menashri, "Khomeini's Vision," 4S-49; and Bakhash, Reign of the Ayatollahs, 2. 34-35.
45 "Constitution of the Islamic Republic," 2. 02. ; and see also Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran, 2. 3-2. 4, and "Khumayni's Islam," 2. 1-2. 2. ; and Rajaee, Islamic Values, 79-th.
46 See Bill, Eagle and Lion, 2. 77--'fS; and Warren Christopher et al. , American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct ofa Crisis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 2. .
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authorized shipments of gasoline and heating oil to alleviate temporary shortages in Iran and agreed to ship spare parts to the Iranian armed forces in October. 47
There were several obvious points of tension, however. Secretary of De- fense Harold Brown's statement that the United States would use military force "if appropriate" to protect its access to Persian Gulf oil alarmed Iran's new leaders, and the violent reprisals that followed the shah's departure disturbed many American observers. The U. S. Senate condemned the sum- mary executions conducted by the Revolutionary Courts in May-an action Iran denounced as "clear interference. " The new regime refused to accept the credentials of the U. S. ambassador-designate in June, expelled several
U. S. journalists in July, and canceled a $9 billion arms deal in August. 48 Un- able to establish direct contact with Khomeini or his supporters during this period, the Carter administration was forced to pin its hopes on such mod- erates as Bazargan. Bazargan and Foreign Minister Ibrahim Yazdi were in- terested in developing a cordial relationship with the United States, but their authority was evaporating rapidly at this point. The radical clergy op- posed any attempt at a rapprochement, and relations between the two states worsened as the mullahs tightened their hold on power. The final break came when Carter agreed to permit the shah to fly to New York for medical treatment in October. This decision triggered a new wave of anti-U. S. demonstrations and raised new fears that the United States was preparing a counterrevolutionary coup. Bazargan met with U. S. national security advi- sor Brzezinski in an attempt to resolve the dispute, but his efforts ended with the seizure of the U. S. embassy and the onset of a major hostage crisis.
The United States responded to the seizure of its embassy by freezing Iranian assets, organizing an international embargo, and deploying addi- tional military forces in the region. It began transmitting propaganda broad- casts into Iran in order to undermine the Ayatollah and eventually attempted an unsuccessful rescue mission in April 1980. The continuing power struggle in Iran impeded efforts to resolve the crisis through negoti- ation, largely because Bani-Sadr lacked the authority to make a deal and because supporters of a settlement were vulnerable to accusations of insuf- ficient revolutionary zeal. 49 The breakthrough finally came in the fall of 1980, when Iran agreed to release the hostages in exchange for roughly $11 billion in frozen Iranian assets and other financial commitments. 5?
47 See Bill, Eagle and Lion, 286-3-9 .
48 Ibid. , 28o-82.
49 "Chronology," ME] 34, no. 4 (198o), 475? The sheer difficulty of communicating with the
Iranian regime was a serious obstacle as well, and virtually all accounts of the hostage crisis em- phasize the confusion that U. S. negotiators faced in trying to deal with the Islamic Republic.
50 The most complete account of the hostage negotiators (though written entirely from the U. S. perspective), is Christopher et al. , American Hostages in Iran. See also Sick, All Fall Down,
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By confirming each side's impression that the other was unremittingly hostile, the hostage crisis cast an enduring shadow over U. S. -Iranian re- lations. U. S. pressure on Iran strengthened the revolutionaries' image of American hostility, and the radical clergy used the threat of the "Great Satan" to undermine Bazargan and Bani-Sadr and to consolidate their own positions. 51 The abortive rescue mission also revealed that the United States still controlled significant intelligence assets within the country and reinforced Iranian fears of U. S. military action, while Iran's bellicose rhetoric and disregard for traditional diplomatic norms solidi-
fied its reputation as an aggressive revolutionary state. Iran's subsequen? actions (such as its support for the Lebanese Shiites who kidnapped sev- eral U. S.
citizens and conducted the suicide bombing of the U. S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983) merely sealed Iran's aggressive reputation in Washington.
These developments convinced the United States to increase its sup- port for conservative Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia and to tilt to- wards Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. Initially concerned that an Iraqi victory would upset the regional balance of power, the U. S. government had quietly allowed Israel to ship several billion dollars' worth of U. S. arms and spare parts to Iran in 1981 and 1982. When the tide of battle turned in llran's favor, however, the U. S. State Department began a diplo- matic campaign to persuade other states to deny military equipment to Iran. The United States began providing intelligence information to Iraq in 1982 and replenished the stockpiles of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait when they transferred U. S. -made weaponry to Baghdad. The United States reestablished diplomatic relations with Iraq in 1984 and began covertly supporting Iranian exile groups during this period as well. 52
chaps. 9-15; Bill, Eagle and Lion, 293-304; Pierre Salinger, America Held Hostage: The Secret Negotiations (Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday, 1981); Brzezinski, Power and Principle, chap. 13; and Hamilton Jordan, Crisis: The Last Year ofthe Carter Presidency (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1982).
51 As Rafsanjani remarked after the hostage settlement, "America continues to remain our enemy, and, accordingly, we are America's enemy. . . . This will continue for a long time. " Quoted in Menashri, Iran, 205; and see also Campbell and Darvich, "Global Implications of the Iranian Revolution," 49?
52 See Anthony Cordesman, The Iran-Iraq War and Western Security, 1 984-1987: Strategic Im- plications and Policy Options (London: Jane's, 1987), esp. 79; "U. S. Said to Aid Iranian Exiles in Combat and Political Units," and "U. S. Secretly Gave Aid to Iraq Early in Its War against Iran," New York Times, March 7, 1982, A1, A12; January 26, 1992, At, A4; Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict (London: Routledge, 1991), 96; Ralph King, The Iran-Iraq War: The Political Implications, Adelphi Paper no. 219 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), 53?
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The main departure from this policy was the notorious Iran-contra arms deal. 53 This initiative rested on the hope that supplying arms would strengthen "moderate forces" within the Islamic Republic, who would help obtain the release of the U. S. hostages in Lebanon and work to improve U. S. -Iranian relations. This goal also reflected U. S. concerns that Iran was in- creasingly vulnerable to Soviet pressure or subversion, as well as the expec- tation that the threat from Moscow would make Iran more receptive to U. S. overtures. 54
In the summer of 1985, U. S. and Israeli officials began negotiating to sell advanced weapons to Iran in exchange for the release of U. S. citizens held by pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon. Lacking both direct access to the revolu- tionary government and accurate information about internal developments within Iran, the U. S. government-or more precisely, the cabal within the National Security Council that conducted the negotiations-decided to use a shady Iranian arms merchant, Manucher Ghorbanifar, as their principal intermediary. The initiative was soon taken over by Oliver North, a marine officer assigned to the U. S. National Security Council, and he and former U. S. national security advisor Robert C. McFarlane eventually made a secret visit to Tehran in May 1986 in an unsuccessful venture to get the hostages released. The continuing power struggle between moderates and extremists in Iran brought the negotiations to an end in November 1986, but not before the U. S. had sent Iran nearly sixteen hundred antitank missiles, assorted spare parts, and valuable intelligence information on Iraqi military deploy- ments.
The attempt to trade arms for hostages improved neither the situation in Lebanon, the position of the Iranian "moderates," nor the state of U. S. -Iranian relations. Although the Shiites released one U. S. hostage in September 1985
53 The best account of the Iran-contra affair is Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran- Contra Affairs (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991). See also James A. Bill, "The U. S. Over- ture to Iran, 1985-86: An Analysis," in Keddie and Gasiorowski, Neither East Nor West, 166-7- 9;PeterKornbluhandMalcolmByrne,eds. ,TheIran-ContraScandal:TheDeclassifiedHis- tory (New York: New Press, 1993); and Samuel Segev, The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel's Role in tlze Iran-Contra Affair (New York: Free Press, 1988).
54 At the request of the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency pre- pared a new intelligence estimate on Iran in May 1985. It predicted that "the Khomeini regime will face serious instability," warned that Tehran's leadership "seems to have con- cluded that improvement of relations with the Soviet Union is essential to Iranian interest," and recommended that the United States begin active efforts compete for influence in Iran. In response, a National Security Council memorandum suggested that U. S. allies be encouraged to provide Iran with "selected military equipment . . . on a case-i? y-case basis. " The texts of these memoranda are printed in the Report of the President's Special Review Board ("Tower Commission" ), February 26, 1987, B-6:7; B-7:8; and the Joint Hearings before the House Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran and the Senate Select Committee on Se- cret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, 1ooth Congress, 1st sess. (Wash- ington, D. C. : U. S. Government Printing Office, 1988), vol. 100-10:512-18.
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and another in July 1986, they replaced them by kidnapping two more U. S. citizens in September 1986. The exposure of the secret arms shipments em- barrassed the Reagan administration and alarmed its Arab allies, who saw the initiative as a hypocritical departure that undercut efforts to contain Iran. Moreover, the revelation that Iranian government officials had held secret ne- gotiations with the "Great Satan" revived Iranian fears about U. S. influence and forced pragmatists such as Rafsanjani to revert to more hard-line posi- tions. In sum, the "arms for hostages" scheme was a fiasco from start to finish.
Rafsanjani made several cautious overtures to the United States early in 1987, but relations between the two countries deteriorated after the "arms for hostages" scheme unraveled. 55 In an attempt to cut Iraq's oil revenues and reduce Arab support for Baghdad, Iran had begun laying mines in the Persian Gulf and threatening to attack oil shipments from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. To restore its credibility with the gulf Arabs and bring additional pressure to bear on Iran, the U. S. eventually agreed to place Kuwaiti tankers under U. S. registry and provide a naval escort for tankers using Kuwaiti and Saudi ports. This decision led to repeated confrontations between the U. S. and Iranian forces: a U. S. fighter fired on an Iranian F-14 in August, and U. S. naval units sank an Iranian ship laying mines in the gulf the following month. In October, U. S. naval forces sank three Iranian gunboats after they fired on a U. S. helicopter and destroyed several Iranian oil platforms in re- taliation for missile attacks on two U. S. tankers. The Senate banned oil im- ports from Iran in September, and President Reagan announced a complete ban on Iranian imports and an embargo on "militarily useful" exports in October, while minor clashes between U. S. and Iranian forces continued into the following year. Finally, the U. S. destroyer Vincennes mistakenly shot
down an Iranian civilian airliner on July 2, killing all 290 people aboard.
The tragedy brought defiant protests from Tehran, but it also seems to have convinced Khomeini to end the war. Rafsanjani announced that con- cluding the war would allow Iran to follow a more "open" foreign policy, but in fact it did not lead to a significant improvement in U. S. -Iranian rela- tions. The hostages in Lebanon remained a sore point and U. S. officials were no longer willing to make concessions to hasten their release. The United States rejected an Iranian offer to mediate in exchange for the release of ad- ditional Iranian assets in August, and the Iranian government denounced a conciliatory letter from former president Carter to Khomeini and Rafsanjani as a "new trick. " Although Iran's deputy foreign minister hinted that rela- tions with the United States might be restored, Rafsanjani declared that
55 In April, Rafsanjani declared that normal relations with the United States would be pos- sible once it stopped threatening Iran. He later stated that Iran would help obtain the release of U. S. hostages in Lebanon if the Americans showed goodwill by releasing frozen Iranian as- sets, adding that relations need not remain poor "until doomsday. " "Chronology," MEJ 41, no. 4 (1987), 6o1.
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public opinion was still not ready for such a step. Finally, the radical turn signaled by Khomeini's condemnation of author Salman Rushdie in Febru- ary ended any possibility of a rapprochement between the two states. 56
Khomeini's death began a brief period of moderation in Iran's foreign policy, but relations with the United States stayed chilly at best. In August, however, Rafsanjani made a public speech declaring that the hostage prob- lem could be solved peacefully, and Iran reportedly helped obtain the re- ? lease of two U. S. hostages later in the year. 57 Iran remained neutral in the 1991 Gulf War (though it did express concern about the enormous Western presence in tine Persian Gulf region) and Rafsanjani made several cautious overtures to frhe United States as part of his effort to resuscitate Iran's stag- nant economy and end its international isolation. 58
These veiled feelers failed to elicit a favorable response from Washington, however, and a radical resurgence in 1992 soon removed any possibility of a detente. Although Rafsanjani expressed his continued desire for improved! relations with the West and specifically requested "goodwill gestures" from the United States, his efforts were hamstrung by radical opposition within Iran and by U. S. concerns about Iran's support for international terrorism and the potential spread of Islamic fundamentalism. Indeed, the Clinton ad- ministration labeled Iran "an international outlaw" and a "pariah" in May
1993, as part of a policy of "dual containment" aimed equally at Baghdad and Tehran. 59 Despite the costs to both powers, in short, relations between
56 See Wright, In the Name ofGod, 256-57; "Iranian Dismisses Prospects of Thaw with Wash- ington," New York Times, February 6, 1989, At. Minister of the Interior Ali Akbar Mohtashemi blamed U. S. and British intelligence agencies for the publication of Rushdie's book and called it part of a "new war against Islam," and Khomeini declared that it was useless for Iran to act in a pragmatic manner thinking that the West would "humanely reciprocate. " "Chronology," MEJ 63, no. 3 (1989), 483.
57 The United States also paid Iran $287 million for military equipment ordered by the shah but never delivered, thereby resolving the last financial dispute stemming from the 1980 hostage crisis. See MECS 1991 (Boulder, Colo. : Westview, 1992), 32-33; Hunter, Iran after Khomeini, 123.
58 In April t9<)0, one of Rafsanjani's associates wrote an article calling for improved relations with the U. S. , all\d another advisor told a New York Times reporter that Washington and Tehran could enjoy a "marriage of convenience. " In March 1991, Rafsanjani declared that the U. S. presence in the Persian Gulf was "not useful" but also "not a threat to Iran," and he later sug- gested that Iran needed a "prudent policy" so it could "help people without being accused of engaging in terrorism, without anyone being able to call us fanatics. " The radical clerics were uncompromising, however, and even Rafsanjani suggested that the United States would have to make the first move in order to overcome Iranian suspicions. See MECS 1991, 384-86, 394-<)6; and Hooshang Amirahradi, "Iran and the Persian Gulf Crisis," in his and Nader Entessar's edited Iran and the Arab World (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), 10<)-tO, n8-19.
59 U. S. concerns increased after the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in February 1993 and were reinforced by Tehran's vocal support for the fundamentalist movements in Sudan, Egypt, and Algeria. See Middle East International, no. 444 (February 19, 1993), to; no. 452 Uune 1 1 , 1993), 3-4; . and no. 453 Uune 25, 1993), 12-13; "Fearing More Hos- tility from Iran, U. S. Considers Moves to Isolate It," New York Times, May 27, 1993, At, A4.
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the United States and Iran remained estranged more than fifteen years after the fall of the shah. 60
The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran
The Soviet Union welcomed the Iranian Revolution at first, because it overthrew an important U. S. ally and gave the Soviets an opportunity to ex- pand their own influence. As the campaign to oust the shah gathered mo- mentum in the fall of 1978, Soviet premier Leonid Brezhnev stated that the Soviet Union opposed "foreign interference by anyone. " The warning was reiterated in January 1980 and Brezhnev informed the Bazargan govern- ment that he hoped "good neighborly relations will develop fruitfully. "61 Iranian foreign minister Karim Sanjavi replied that Iran "genuinely wants friendly relations with the USSR," and the Soviet government subsequently vetoed a UN Security Council resolution calling for economic sanctions in response to the detention of the U. S. hostages.
