Reply to Objection 1: This
argument
proves the beatitudes to be fruits,
but not that all the fruits are beatitudes.
but not that all the fruits are beatitudes.
Summa Theologica
Therefore the beatitudes are
insufficiently enumerated.
Objection 2: Further, not only do the executive gifts belong to the
active life, but also some of the directive gifts, e. g. knowledge and
counsel: yet none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected with
the acts of knowledge or counsel. Therefore the beatitudes are
insufficiently indicated.
Objection 3: Further, among the executive gifts connected with the
active life, fear is said to be connected with poverty, while piety
seems to correspond to the beatitude of mercy: yet nothing is included
directly connected with justice. Therefore the beatitudes are
insufficiently enumerated.
Objection 4: Further, many other beatitudes are mentioned in Holy Writ.
Thus, it is written (Job 5:17): "Blessed is the man whom God
correcteth"; and (Ps. i, 1): "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in
the counsel of the ungodly"; and (Prov. 3:13): "Blessed is the man that
findeth wisdom. " Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently
enumerated.
Objection 5: On the other hand, it seems that too many are mentioned.
For there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes
are indicated.
Objection 6: Further, only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth
chapter of Luke. Therefore the seven or eight mentioned in Matthew 5
are too many.
I answer that, These beatitudes are most suitably enumerated. To make
this evident it must be observed that beatitude has been held to
consist in one of three things: for some have ascribed it to a sensual
life, some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative life [*See
Q[3]]. Now these three kinds of happiness stand in different relations
to future beatitude, by hoping for which we are said to be happy.
Because sensual happiness, being false and contrary to reason, is an
obstacle to future beatitude; while happiness of the active life is a
disposition of future beatitude; and contemplative happiness, if
perfect, is the very essence of future beatitude, and, if imperfect, is
a beginning thereof.
And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain beatitudes as
removing the obstacle of sensual happiness. For a life of pleasure
consists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods,
whether riches or honors; from which man is withdrawn---by a virtue so
that he uses them in moderation---and by a gift, in a more excellent
way, so that he despises them altogether. Hence the first beatitude is:
"Blessed are the poor in spirit," which may refer either to the
contempt of riches, or to the contempt of honors, which results from
humility. Secondly, the sensual life consists in following the bent of
one's passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the
irascible passions man is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that they are
kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason---and by a
gift, in a more excellent manner, so that man, according to God's will,
is altogether undisturbed by them: hence the second beatitude is:
"Blessed are the meek. " From following the concupiscible passions, man
is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that man uses these passions in
moderation---and by gift, so that, if necessary, he casts them aside
altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, he makes a deliberate choice
of sorrow [*Cf. [1673] Q[35], A[3]]; hence the third beatitude is:
"Blessed are they that mourn. "
Active life consists chiefly in man's relations with his neighbor,
either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity. To the former
we are disposed---by a virtue, so that we do not refuse to do our duty
to our neighbor, which pertains to justice---and by a gift, so that we
do the same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of justice with
an ardent desire, even as a hungry and thirsty man eats and drinks with
eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is: "Blessed are they that
hunger and thirst after justice. " With regard to spontaneous favors we
are perfected---by a virtue, so that we give where reason dictates we
should give, e. g. to our friends or others united to us; which pertains
to the virtue of liberality--and by a gift, so that, through reverence
for God, we consider only the needs of those on whom we bestow our
gratuitous bounty: hence it is written (Lk. 14:12,13): "When thou
makest a dinner or supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren," etc
. . . "but . . . call the poor, the maimed," etc. ; which, properly, is
to have mercy: hence the fifth beatitude is: "Blessed are the
merciful. "
Those things which concern the contemplative life, are either final
beatitude itself, or some beginning thereof: wherefore they are
included in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the
effects of the active life, which dispose man for the contemplative
life, are included in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active
life, as regards those virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in
himself, is the cleansing of man's heart, so that it is not defiled by
the passions: hence the sixth beatitude is: "Blessed are the clean of
heart. " But as regards the virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected
in relation to his neighbor, the effect of the active life is peace,
according to Is. 32:17: "The work of justice shall be peace": hence the
seventh beatitude is "Blessed are the peacemakers. "
Reply to Objection 1: The acts of the gifts which belong to the active
life are indicated in the merits: but the acts of the gifts pertaining
to the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, for the reason
given above. Because to "see God" corresponds to the gift of
understanding; and to be like God by being adoptive "children of God,"
corresponds to the gift of wisdom.
Reply to Objection 2: In things pertaining to the active life,
knowledge is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of
operation, as even the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 2). And
therefore, since beatitude implies something ultimate, the beatitudes
do not include the acts of those gifts which direct man in the active
life, such acts, to wit, as are elicited by those gifts, as, e. g. to
counsel is the act of counsel, and to judge, the act of knowledge: but,
on the other hand, they include those operative acts of which the gifts
have the direction, as, e. g. mourning in respect of knowledge, and
mercy in respect of counsel.
Reply to Objection 3: In applying the beatitudes to the gifts we may
consider two things. One is likeness of matter. In this way all the
first five beatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to
their directing principles: whereas they must be distributed among the
executive gifts: so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for justice, and
mercy too, correspond to piety, which perfects man in his relations to
others; meekness to fortitude, for Ambrose says on Lk. 6:22: "It is the
business of fortitude to conquer anger, and to curb indignation,"
fortitude being about the irascible passions: poverty and mourning to
the gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from the lusts and pleasures of
the world.
Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beatitudes: and, in this
way, some of them will have to be assigned differently. Because the
principal motive for meekness is reverence for God, which belongs to
piety. The chief motive for mourning is knowledge, whereby man knows
his failings and those of worldly things, according to Eccles. 1:18:
"He that addeth knowledge, addeth also sorrow [Vulg: labor]. " The
principal motive for hungering after the works of justice is fortitude
of the soul: and the chief motive for being merciful is God's counsel,
according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my counsel be acceptable to the king
[Vulg: to thee, O king]: and redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy
iniquities with works of mercy to the poor. " It is thus that Augustine
assigns them (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4).
Reply to Objection 4: All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Writ must be
reduced to these, either as to the merits or as to the rewards: because
they must all belong either to the active or to the contemplative life.
Accordingly, when we read, "Blessed is the man whom the Lord
correcteth," we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning: when we
read, "Blessed is the man that hath not walked in the counsel of the
ungodly," we must refer it to cleanness of heart: and when we read,
"Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom," this must be referred to the
reward of the seventh beatitude. The same applies to all others that
can be adduced.
Reply to Objection 5: The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and
declaration of all those that precede. Because from the very fact that
a man is confirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it
follows that no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence the
eighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preceding seven.
Reply to Objection 6: Luke relates Our Lord's sermon as addressed to
the multitude (Lk. 6:17). Hence he sets down the beatitudes according
to the capacity of the multitude, who know no other happiness than
pleasure, temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes Our
Lord excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness. The
first of these is abundance of external goods, which he sets aside by
saying: "Blessed are ye poor. " The second is that man be well off as to
his body, in food and drink, and so forth; this he excludes by saying
in the second place: "Blessed are ye that hunger. " The third is that it
should be well with man as to joyfulness of heart, and this he puts
aside by saying: "Blessed are ye that weep now. " The fourth is the
outward favor of man; and this he excludes, saying, fourthly: "Blessed
shall you be, when men shall hate you. " And as Ambrose says on Lk.
6:20, "poverty corresponds to temperance, which is unmoved by delights;
hunger, to justice, since who hungers is compassionate and, through
compassion gives; mourning, to prudence, which deplores perishable
things; endurance of men's hatred belongs to fortitude. "
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Whether the rewards of the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are
unsuitably enumerated. Because the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal
life, contains all good things. Therefore, once given the kingdom of
heaven, no other rewards should be mentioned.
Objection 2: Further, the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward,
both of the first and of the eighth beatitude. Therefore, on the same
ground it should have been assigned to all.
Objection 3: Further, the beatitudes are arranged in the ascending
order, as Augustine remarks (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): whereas the
rewards seem to be placed in the descending order, since to "possess
the land" is less than to possess "the kingdom of heaven. " Therefore
these rewards are unsuitably enumerated.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Our Lord Who propounded these
rewards.
I answer that, These rewards are most suitably assigned, considering
the nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three kinds of
happiness indicated above [1674](A[3]). For the first three beatitudes
concerned the withdrawal of man from those things in which sensual
happiness consists: which happiness man desires by seeking the object
of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz. in God, but in
temporal and perishable things. Wherefore the rewards of the first
three beatitudes correspond to these things which some men seek to find
in earthly happiness. For men seek in external things, viz. riches and
honors, a certain excellence and abundance, both of which are implied
in the kingdom of heaven, whereby man attains to excellence and
abundance of good things in God. Hence Our Lord promised the kingdom of
heaven to the poor in spirit. Again, cruel and pitiless men seek by
wrangling and fighting to destroy their enemies so as to gain security
for themselves. Hence Our Lord promised the meek a secure and peaceful
possession of the land of the living, whereby the solid reality of
eternal goods is denoted. Again, men seek consolation for the toils of
the present life, in the lusts and pleasures of the world. Hence Our
Lord promises comfort to those that mourn.
Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness, which are
the works of virtues directing man in his relations to his neighbor:
from which operations some men withdraw through inordinate love of
their own good. Hence Our Lord assigns to these beatitudes rewards in
correspondence with the motives for which men recede from them. For
there are some who recede from acts of justice, and instead of
rendering what is due, lay hands on what is not theirs, that they may
abound in temporal goods. Wherefore Our Lord promised those who hunger
after justice, that they shall have their fill. Some, again, recede
from works of mercy, lest they be busied with other people's misery.
Hence Our Lord promised the merciful that they should obtain mercy, and
be delivered from all misery.
The last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happiness or beatitude:
hence the rewards are assigned in correspondence with the dispositions
included in the merit. For cleanness of the eye disposes one to see
clearly: hence the clean of heart are promised that they shall see God.
Again, to make peace either in oneself or among others, shows a man to
be a follower of God, Who is the God of unity and peace. Hence, as a
reward, he is promised the glory of the Divine sonship, consisting in
perfect union with God through consummate wisdom.
Reply to Objection 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth. ), all these
rewards are one in reality, viz. eternal happiness, which the human
intellect cannot grasp. Hence it was necessary to describe it by means
of various boons known to us, while observing due proportion to the
merits to which those rewards are assigned.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the eighth beatitude is a confirmation of
all the beatitudes, so it deserves all the rewards of the beatitudes.
Hence it returns to the first, that we may understand all the other
rewards to be attributed to it in consequence. Or else, according to
Ambrose (Super Luc. v), the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor
in spirit, as regards the glory of the soul; but to those who suffer
persecution in their bodies, it is promised as regards the glory of the
body.
Reply to Objection 3: The rewards are also arranged in ascending order.
For it is more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply
to have it: since we have many things without possessing them firmly
and peacefully. Again, it is more to be comforted in the kingdom than
to have and possess it, for there are many things the possession of
which is accompanied by sorrow. Again, it is more to have one's fill
than simply to be comforted, because fulness implies abundance of
comfort. And mercy surpasses satiety, for thereby man receives more
than he merited or was able to desire. And yet more is it to see God,
even as he is a greater man who not only dines at court, but also sees
the king's countenance. Lastly, the highest place in the royal palace
belongs to the king's son.
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OF THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the Fruits of the Holy Ghost: under which head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are acts?
(2) Whether they differ from the beatitudes?
(3) Of their number?
(4) Of their opposition to the works of the flesh.
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Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost which the Apostle enumerates (Gal. 5)
are acts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost,
enumerated by the Apostle (Gal. 5:22,23), are not acts. For that which
bears fruit, should not itself be called a fruit, else we should go on
indefinitely. But our actions bear fruit: for it is written (Wis.
3:15): "The fruit of good labor is glorious," and (Jn. 4:36): "He that
reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life everlasting. "
Therefore our actions are not to be called fruits.
Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10), "we enjoy
[*'Fruimur', from which verb we have the Latin 'fructus' and the
English 'fruit'] the things we know, when the will rests by rejoicing
in them. " But our will should not rest in our actions for their own
sake. Therefore our actions should not be called fruits.
Objection 3: Further, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, the Apostle
numbers certain virtues, viz. charity, meekness, faith, and chastity.
Now virtues are not actions but habits, as stated above ([1675]Q[55],
A[1]). Therefore the fruits are not actions.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 12:33): "By the fruit the tree is
known"; that is to say, man is known by his works, as holy men explain
the passage. Therefore human actions are called fruits.
I answer that, The word "fruit" has been transferred from the material
to the spiritual world. Now fruit, among material things, is the
product of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain
sweetness. This fruit has a twofold relation: to the tree that produces
it, and to the man who gathers the fruit from the tree. Accordingly, in
spiritual matters, we may take the word "fruit" in two ways: first, so
that the fruit of man, who is likened to the tree, is that which he
produces; secondly, so that man's fruit is what he gathers.
Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which is last and
gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a tree, and yet these
are not called fruits; but that only which is last, to wit, that which
man intends to derive from the field and from the tree. In this sense
man's fruit is his last end which is intended for his enjoyment.
If, however, by man's fruit we understand a product of man, then human
actions are called fruits: because operation is the second act of the
operator, and gives pleasure if it is suitable to him. If then man's
operation proceeds from man in virtue of his reason, it is said to be
the fruit of his reason: but if it proceeds from him in respect of a
higher power, which is the power of the Holy Ghost, then man's
operation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as of a Divine
seed, for it is written (1 Jn. 3:9): "Whosoever is born of God,
committeth no sin, for His seed abideth in him. "
Reply to Objection 1: Since fruit is something last and final, nothing
hinders one fruit bearing another fruit, even as one end is subordinate
to another. And so our works, in so far as they are produced by the
Holy Ghost working in us, are fruits: but, in so far as they are
referred to the end which is eternal life, they should rather be called
flowers: hence it is written (Ecclus. 24:23): "My flowers are the
fruits of honor and riches. "
Reply to Objection 2: When the will is said to delight in a thing for
its own sake, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that the
expression "for the sake of" be taken to designate the final cause; and
in this way, man delights in nothing for its own sake, except the last
end. Secondly, so that it expresses the formal cause; and in this way,
a man may delight in anything that is delightful by reason of its form.
Thus it is clear that a sick man delights in health, for its own sake,
as in an end; in a nice medicine, not as in an end, but as in something
tasty; and in a nasty medicine, nowise for its own sake, but only for
the sake of something else. Accordingly we must say that man must
delight in God for His own sake, as being his last end, and in virtuous
deeds, not as being his end, but for the sake of their inherent
goodness which is delightful to the virtuous. Hence Ambrose says (De
Parad. xiii) that virtuous deeds are called fruits because "they
refresh those that have them, with a holy and genuine delight. "
Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to
their actions: thus Augustine writes (Tract. xl in Joan. ): "Faith is to
believe what thou seest not"; and (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "Charity
is the movement of the soul in loving God and our neighbor. " It is thus
that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning the fruits.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the fruits differ from the beatitudes?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits do not differ from the
beatitudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated
above ([1676]Q[69], A[1], ad 1). But the gifts perfect man in so far as
he is moved by the Holy Ghost. Therefore the beatitudes themselves are
fruits of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to future
beatitude which is that of actual possession, so are the fruits of the
present life to the beatitudes of the present life, which are based on
hope. Now the fruit of eternal life is identified with future
beatitude. Therefore the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes.
Objection 3: Further, fruit is essentially something ultimate and
delightful. Now this is the very nature of beatitude, as stated above
([1677]Q[3], A[1];[1678] Q[4], A[1]). Therefore fruit and beatitude
have the same nature, and consequently should not be distinguished from
one another.
On the contrary, Things divided into different species, differ from one
another. But fruits and beatitudes are divided into different parts, as
is clear from the way in which they are enumerated. Therefore the
fruits differ from the beatitudes.
I answer that, More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit.
Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and
delightful; whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and
excellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not vice
versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights:
whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works, and which, by reason
of their perfection, are assigned to the gifts rather than to the
virtues, as already stated ([1679]Q[69], A[1], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves the beatitudes to be fruits,
but not that all the fruits are beatitudes.
Reply to Objection 2: The fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect
simply: hence it nowise differs from future beatitude. On the other
hand the fruits of the present life are not simply ultimate and
perfect; wherefore not all the fruits are beatitudes.
Reply to Objection 3: More is required for a beatitude than for a
fruit, as stated.
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Whether the fruits are suitably enumerated by the Apostle?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits are unsuitably enumerated by
the Apostle (Gal. 5:22,23). Because, elsewhere, he says that there is
only one fruit of the present life; according to Rom. 6:22: "You have
your fruit unto sanctification. " Moreover it is written (Is. 27:9):
"This is all the fruit . . . that the sin . . . be taken away. "
Therefore we should not reckon twelve fruits.
Objection 2: Further, fruit is the product of spiritual seed, as stated
(A[1] ). But Our Lord mentions (Mat. 13:23) a threefold fruit as
growing from a spiritual seed in a good ground, viz. "hundredfold,
sixtyfold," and "thirtyfold. " Therefore one should not reckon twelve
fruits.
Objection 3: Further, the very nature of fruit is to be something
ultimate and delightful. But this does not apply to all the fruits
mentioned by the Apostle: for patience and long-suffering seem to imply
a painful object, while faith is not something ultimate, but rather
something primary and fundamental. Therefore too many fruits are
enumerated.
Objection 4: On the other hand, It seems that they are enumerated
insufficiently and incompletely. For it has been stated [1680](A[2])
that all the beatitudes may be called fruits; yet not all are mentioned
here. Nor is there anything corresponding to the acts of wisdom, and of
many other virtues. Therefore it seems that the fruits are
insufficiently enumerated.
I answer that, The number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the
Apostle is suitable, and that there may be a reference to them in the
twelve fruits of which it is written (Apoc. 22:2): "On both sides of
the river was the tree bearing twelve fruits. " Since, however, a fruit
is something that proceeds from a source as from a seed or root, the
difference between these fruits must be gathered from the various ways
in which the Holy Ghost proceeds in us: which process consists in this,
that the mind of man is set in order, first of all, in regard to
itself; secondly, in regard to things that are near it; thirdly, in
regard to things that are below it.
Accordingly man's mind is well disposed in regard to itself when it has
a good disposition towards good things and towards evil things. Now the
first disposition of the human mind towards the good is effected by
love, which is the first of our emotions and the root of them all, as
stated above ([1681]Q[27], A[4]). Wherefore among the fruits of the
Holy Ghost, we reckon "charity," wherein the Holy Ghost is given in a
special manner, as in His own likeness, since He Himself is love. Hence
it is written (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God is poured forth in our
hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us. " The necessary result of
the love of charity is joy: because every lover rejoices at being
united to the beloved. Now charity has always actual presence in God
Whom it loves, according to 1 Jn. 4:16: "He that abideth in charity,
abideth in God, and God in Him": wherefore the sequel of charity is
"joy. " Now the perfection of joy is peace in two respects. First, as
regards freedom from outward disturbance; for it is impossible to
rejoice perfectly in the beloved good, if one is disturbed in the
enjoyment thereof; and again, if a man's heart is perfectly set at
peace in one object, he cannot be disquieted by any other, since he
accounts all others as nothing; hence it is written (Ps. 118:165):
"Much peace have they that love Thy Law, and to them there is no
stumbling-block," because, to wit, external things do not disturb them
in their enjoyment of God. Secondly, as regards the calm of the
restless desire: for he does not perfectly rejoice, who is not
satisfied with the object of his joy. Now peace implies these two
things, namely, that we be not disturbed by external things, and that
our desires rest altogether in one object. Wherefore after charity and
joy, "peace" is given the third place. In evil things the mind has a
good disposition, in respect of two things. First, by not being
disturbed whenever evil threatens: which pertains to "patience";
secondly, by not being disturbed, whenever good things are delayed;
which belongs to "long suffering," since "to lack good is a kind of
evil" (Ethic. v, 3).
Man's mind is well disposed as regards what is near him, viz. his
neighbor, first, as to the will to do good; and to this belongs
"goodness. " Secondly, as to the execution of well-doing; and to this
belongs "benignity," for the benign are those in whom the salutary
flame [bonus ignis] of love has enkindled the desire to be kind to
their neighbor. Thirdly, as to his suffering with equanimity the evils
his neighbor inflicts on him. To this belongs "meekness," which curbs
anger. Fourthly, in the point of our refraining from doing harm to our
neighbor not only through anger, but also through fraud or deceit. To
this pertains "faith," if we take it as denoting fidelity. But if we
take it for the faith whereby we believe in God, then man is directed
thereby to that which is above him, so that he subject his intellect
and, consequently, all that is his, to God.
Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below him, as regards
external action, by "modesty," whereby we observe the "mode" in all our
words and deeds: as regards internal desires, by "contingency" and
"chastity": whether these two differ because chastity withdraws man
from unlawful desires, contingency also from lawful desires: or because
the continent man is subject to concupiscence, but is not led away;
whereas the chaste man is neither subject to, nor led away from them.
Reply to Objection 1: Sanctification is effected by all the virtues, by
which also sins are taken away. Consequently fruit is mentioned there
in the singular, on account of its being generically one, though
divided into many species which are spoken of as so many fruits.
Reply to Objection 2: The hundredfold, sixtyfold, and thirtyfold fruits
do not differ as various species of virtuous acts, but as various
degrees of perfection, even in the same virtue. Thus contingency of the
married state is said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit; the
contingency of widowhood, by the sixtyfold; and virginal contingency,
by the hundredfold fruit. There are, moreover, other ways in which holy
men distinguish three evangelical fruits according to the three degrees
of virtue: and they speak of three degrees, because the perfection of
anything is considered with respect to its beginning, its middle, and
its end.
Reply to Objection 3: The fact of not being disturbed by painful things
is something to delight in. And as to faith, if we consider it as the
foundation, it has the aspect of being ultimate and delightful, in as
much as it contains certainty: hence a gloss expounds thus: "Faith,
which is certainly about the unseen. "
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says on Gal. 5:22,23, "the Apostle
had no intention of teaching us how many [either works of the flesh, or
fruits of the Spirit] there are; but to show how the former should be
avoided, and the latter sought after. " Hence either more or fewer
fruits might have been mentioned. Nevertheless, all the acts of the
gifts and virtues can be reduced to these by a certain kind of
fittingness, in so far as all the virtues and gifts must needs direct
the mind in one of the above-mentioned ways. Wherefore the acts of
wisdom and of any gifts directing to good, are reduced to charity, joy
and peace. The reason why he mentions these rather than others, is that
these imply either enjoyment of good things, or relief from evils,
which things seem to belong to the notion of fruit.
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Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are contrary to the works of the flesh?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost are not
contrary to the works of the flesh, which the Apostle enumerates (Gal.
5:19, seqq. ). Because contraries are in the same genus. But the works
of the flesh are not called fruits. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit
are not contrary to them.
Objection 2: Further, one thing has a contrary. Now the Apostle
mentions more works of the flesh than fruits of the Spirit. Therefore
the fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh are not contrary to
one another.
Objection 3: Further, among the fruits of the Spirit, the first place
is given to charity, joy, and peace: to which, fornication,
uncleanness, and immodesty, which are the first of the works of the
flesh are not opposed. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not
contrary to the works of the flesh.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 5:17) that "the flesh lusteth
against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh. "
I answer that, The works of the flesh and the fruits of the Spirit may
be taken in two ways. First, in general: and in this way the fruits of
the Holy Ghost considered in general are contrary to the works of the
flesh. Because the Holy Ghost moves the human mind to that which is in
accord with reason, or rather to that which surpasses reason: whereas
the fleshly, viz. the sensitive, appetite draws man to sensible goods
which are beneath him. Wherefore, since upward and downward are
contrary movements in the physical order, so in human actions the works
of the flesh are contrary to the fruits of the Spirit.
Secondly, both fruits and fleshly works as enumerated may be considered
singly, each according to its specific nature. And in this they are not
of necessity contrary each to each: because, as stated above (A[3], ad
4), the Apostle did not intend to enumerate all the works, whether
spiritual or carnal. However, by a kind of adaptation, Augustine,
commenting on Gal. 5:22,23, contrasts the fruits with the carnal works,
each to each. Thus "to fornication, which is the love of satisfying
lust outside lawful wedlock, we may contrast charity, whereby the soul
is wedded to God: wherein also is true chastity. By uncleanness we must
understand whatever disturbances arise from fornication: and to these
the joy of tranquillity is opposed. Idolatry, by reason of which war
was waged against the Gospel of God, is opposed to peace. Against
witchcrafts, enmities, contentions, emulations, wraths and quarrels,
there is longsuffering, which helps us to bear the evils inflicted on
us by those among whom we dwell; while kindness helps us to cure those
evils; and goodness, to forgive them. In contrast to heresy there is
faith; to envy, mildness; to drunkenness and revellings, contingency. "
Reply to Objection 1: That which proceeds from a tree against the
tree's nature, is not called its fruit, but rather its corruption. And
since works of virtue are connatural to reason, while works of vice are
contrary to nature, therefore it is that works of virtue are called
fruits, but not so works of vice.
Reply to Objection 2: "Good happens in one way, evil in all manner of
ways," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): so that to one virtue many
vices are contrary. Consequently we must not be surprised if the works
of the flesh are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit.
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.
__________________________________________________________________
EVIL HABITS, i. e. VICES AND SINS (QQ[71]-89)
OF VICE AND SIN CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES (SIX ARTICLES)
We have in the next place to consider vice and sin: about which six
points have to be considered: (1) Vice and sin considered in
themselves; (2) their distinction; (3) their comparison with one
another; (4) the subject of sin; (5) the cause of sin; (6) the effect
of sin.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether vice is contrary to virtue?
(2) Whether vice is contrary to nature?
(3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act?
(4) Whether a vicious act is compatible with virtue?
(5) Whether every sin includes action?
(6) Of the definition of sin proposed by Augustine (Contra Faust.
xxii): "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether vice is contrary to virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For one
thing has one contrary, as proved in Metaph. x, text. 17. Now sin and
malice are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary to it:
since vice applies also to undue disposition of bodily members or of
any things whatever.
Objection 2: Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of power. But
vice does not denote anything relative to power. Therefore vice is not
contrary to virtue.
Objection 3: Further, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) says that "virtue is
the soul's health. " Now sickness or disease, rather than vice, is
opposed to health. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "vice is
a quality in respect of which the soul is evil. " But "virtue is a
quality which makes its subject good," as was shown above ([1682]Q[55],
AA[3],4). Therefore vice is contrary to virtue.
I answer that, Two things may be considered in virtue---the essence of
virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained. In the essence of virtue
we may consider something directly, and we may consider something
consequently. Virtue implies "directly" a disposition whereby the
subject is well disposed according to the mode of its nature: wherefore
the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that "virtue is a
disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best; and by perfect I
mean that which is disposed according to its nature. " That which virtue
implies "consequently" is that it is a kind of goodness: because the
goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed according to
the mode of its nature. That to which virtue is directed is a good act,
as was shown above ([1683]Q[56], A[3]).
Accordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of
these is "sin," which is opposed to virtue in respect of that to which
virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an inordinate
act; even as an act of virtue is an ordinate and due act: in respect of
that which virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is a kind of
goodness, the contrary of virtue is "malice": while in respect of that
which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its contrary is
"vice": because the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being
disposed in a way befitting its nature: hence Augustine says (De Lib.
Arb. iii): "Whatever is lacking for a thing's natural perfection may be
called a vice. "
Reply to Objection 1: These three things are contrary to virtue, but
not in the same respect: for sin is opposed to virtue, according as the
latter is productive of a good work; malice, according as virtue is a
kind of goodness; while vice is opposed to virtue properly as such.
Reply to Objection 2: Virtue implies not only perfection of power, the
principle of action; but also the due disposition of its subject. The
reason for this is because a thing operates according as it is in act:
so that a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce a good
work. It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: As Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "disease
and sickness are vicious qualities," for in speaking of the body "he
calls it" disease "when the whole body is infected," for instance, with
fever or the like; he calls it sickness "when the disease is attended
with weakness"; and vice "when the parts of the body are not well
compacted together. " And although at times there may be disease in the
body without sickness, for instance, when a man has a hidden complaint
without being hindered outwardly from his wonted occupations; "yet, in
the soul," as he says, "these two things are indistinguishable, except
in thought. " For whenever a man is ill-disposed inwardly, through some
inordinate affection, he is rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his
duties: since "a tree is known by its fruit," i. e. man by his works,
according to Mat. 12:33. But "vice of the soul," as Cicero says (De
Quaest. Tusc. iv), "is a habit or affection of the soul discordant and
inconsistent with itself through life": and this is to be found even
without disease and sickness, e. g. when a man sins from weakness or
passion. Consequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease;
even as virtue extends to more things than health; for health itself is
reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17). Consequently vice is
reckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or
disease.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether vice is contrary to nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. Because
vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above [1684](A[1]). Now virtue is
in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as stated above
(Q[63], AA[1] ,2,3). Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
Objection 2: Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that
which is contrary to nature: thus "a stone never becomes habituated to
upward movement" (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated to
vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
Objection 3: Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in
the greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice is
found in the greater number of men; for it is written (Mat. 7:13):
"Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who
go in thereat. " Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
Objection 4: Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as
stated above [1685](A[1]). Now sin is defined as "a word, deed, or
desire, contrary to the Law of God," as Augustine shows (Contra Faust.
xxii, 27). But the Law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say
that vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): "Every vice,
simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature. "
I answer that, As stated above [1686](A[1]), vice is contrary to
virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed
in a manner befitting its nature, as stated above [1687](A[1]). Hence
the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not
befitting its nature, and for this reason is that thing "vituperated,"
which word is derived from "vice" according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb.
iii, 14).
But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form
from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his species
from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the
order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man,
as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the
nature of man, as man. Now "man's good is to be in accord with reason,
and his evil is to be against reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom.
iv).
insufficiently enumerated.
Objection 2: Further, not only do the executive gifts belong to the
active life, but also some of the directive gifts, e. g. knowledge and
counsel: yet none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected with
the acts of knowledge or counsel. Therefore the beatitudes are
insufficiently indicated.
Objection 3: Further, among the executive gifts connected with the
active life, fear is said to be connected with poverty, while piety
seems to correspond to the beatitude of mercy: yet nothing is included
directly connected with justice. Therefore the beatitudes are
insufficiently enumerated.
Objection 4: Further, many other beatitudes are mentioned in Holy Writ.
Thus, it is written (Job 5:17): "Blessed is the man whom God
correcteth"; and (Ps. i, 1): "Blessed is the man who hath not walked in
the counsel of the ungodly"; and (Prov. 3:13): "Blessed is the man that
findeth wisdom. " Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently
enumerated.
Objection 5: On the other hand, it seems that too many are mentioned.
For there are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes
are indicated.
Objection 6: Further, only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth
chapter of Luke. Therefore the seven or eight mentioned in Matthew 5
are too many.
I answer that, These beatitudes are most suitably enumerated. To make
this evident it must be observed that beatitude has been held to
consist in one of three things: for some have ascribed it to a sensual
life, some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative life [*See
Q[3]]. Now these three kinds of happiness stand in different relations
to future beatitude, by hoping for which we are said to be happy.
Because sensual happiness, being false and contrary to reason, is an
obstacle to future beatitude; while happiness of the active life is a
disposition of future beatitude; and contemplative happiness, if
perfect, is the very essence of future beatitude, and, if imperfect, is
a beginning thereof.
And so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain beatitudes as
removing the obstacle of sensual happiness. For a life of pleasure
consists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods,
whether riches or honors; from which man is withdrawn---by a virtue so
that he uses them in moderation---and by a gift, in a more excellent
way, so that he despises them altogether. Hence the first beatitude is:
"Blessed are the poor in spirit," which may refer either to the
contempt of riches, or to the contempt of honors, which results from
humility. Secondly, the sensual life consists in following the bent of
one's passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following the
irascible passions man is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that they are
kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason---and by a
gift, in a more excellent manner, so that man, according to God's will,
is altogether undisturbed by them: hence the second beatitude is:
"Blessed are the meek. " From following the concupiscible passions, man
is withdrawn---by a virtue, so that man uses these passions in
moderation---and by gift, so that, if necessary, he casts them aside
altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, he makes a deliberate choice
of sorrow [*Cf. [1673] Q[35], A[3]]; hence the third beatitude is:
"Blessed are they that mourn. "
Active life consists chiefly in man's relations with his neighbor,
either by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity. To the former
we are disposed---by a virtue, so that we do not refuse to do our duty
to our neighbor, which pertains to justice---and by a gift, so that we
do the same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of justice with
an ardent desire, even as a hungry and thirsty man eats and drinks with
eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is: "Blessed are they that
hunger and thirst after justice. " With regard to spontaneous favors we
are perfected---by a virtue, so that we give where reason dictates we
should give, e. g. to our friends or others united to us; which pertains
to the virtue of liberality--and by a gift, so that, through reverence
for God, we consider only the needs of those on whom we bestow our
gratuitous bounty: hence it is written (Lk. 14:12,13): "When thou
makest a dinner or supper, call not thy friends, nor thy brethren," etc
. . . "but . . . call the poor, the maimed," etc. ; which, properly, is
to have mercy: hence the fifth beatitude is: "Blessed are the
merciful. "
Those things which concern the contemplative life, are either final
beatitude itself, or some beginning thereof: wherefore they are
included in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the
effects of the active life, which dispose man for the contemplative
life, are included in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active
life, as regards those virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in
himself, is the cleansing of man's heart, so that it is not defiled by
the passions: hence the sixth beatitude is: "Blessed are the clean of
heart. " But as regards the virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected
in relation to his neighbor, the effect of the active life is peace,
according to Is. 32:17: "The work of justice shall be peace": hence the
seventh beatitude is "Blessed are the peacemakers. "
Reply to Objection 1: The acts of the gifts which belong to the active
life are indicated in the merits: but the acts of the gifts pertaining
to the contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, for the reason
given above. Because to "see God" corresponds to the gift of
understanding; and to be like God by being adoptive "children of God,"
corresponds to the gift of wisdom.
Reply to Objection 2: In things pertaining to the active life,
knowledge is not sought for its own sake, but for the sake of
operation, as even the Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 2). And
therefore, since beatitude implies something ultimate, the beatitudes
do not include the acts of those gifts which direct man in the active
life, such acts, to wit, as are elicited by those gifts, as, e. g. to
counsel is the act of counsel, and to judge, the act of knowledge: but,
on the other hand, they include those operative acts of which the gifts
have the direction, as, e. g. mourning in respect of knowledge, and
mercy in respect of counsel.
Reply to Objection 3: In applying the beatitudes to the gifts we may
consider two things. One is likeness of matter. In this way all the
first five beatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to
their directing principles: whereas they must be distributed among the
executive gifts: so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for justice, and
mercy too, correspond to piety, which perfects man in his relations to
others; meekness to fortitude, for Ambrose says on Lk. 6:22: "It is the
business of fortitude to conquer anger, and to curb indignation,"
fortitude being about the irascible passions: poverty and mourning to
the gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from the lusts and pleasures of
the world.
Secondly, we may consider the motives of the beatitudes: and, in this
way, some of them will have to be assigned differently. Because the
principal motive for meekness is reverence for God, which belongs to
piety. The chief motive for mourning is knowledge, whereby man knows
his failings and those of worldly things, according to Eccles. 1:18:
"He that addeth knowledge, addeth also sorrow [Vulg: labor]. " The
principal motive for hungering after the works of justice is fortitude
of the soul: and the chief motive for being merciful is God's counsel,
according to Dan. 4:24: "Let my counsel be acceptable to the king
[Vulg: to thee, O king]: and redeem thou thy sins with alms, and thy
iniquities with works of mercy to the poor. " It is thus that Augustine
assigns them (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4).
Reply to Objection 4: All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Writ must be
reduced to these, either as to the merits or as to the rewards: because
they must all belong either to the active or to the contemplative life.
Accordingly, when we read, "Blessed is the man whom the Lord
correcteth," we must refer this to the beatitude of mourning: when we
read, "Blessed is the man that hath not walked in the counsel of the
ungodly," we must refer it to cleanness of heart: and when we read,
"Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom," this must be referred to the
reward of the seventh beatitude. The same applies to all others that
can be adduced.
Reply to Objection 5: The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and
declaration of all those that precede. Because from the very fact that
a man is confirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it
follows that no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence the
eighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preceding seven.
Reply to Objection 6: Luke relates Our Lord's sermon as addressed to
the multitude (Lk. 6:17). Hence he sets down the beatitudes according
to the capacity of the multitude, who know no other happiness than
pleasure, temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes Our
Lord excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness. The
first of these is abundance of external goods, which he sets aside by
saying: "Blessed are ye poor. " The second is that man be well off as to
his body, in food and drink, and so forth; this he excludes by saying
in the second place: "Blessed are ye that hunger. " The third is that it
should be well with man as to joyfulness of heart, and this he puts
aside by saying: "Blessed are ye that weep now. " The fourth is the
outward favor of man; and this he excludes, saying, fourthly: "Blessed
shall you be, when men shall hate you. " And as Ambrose says on Lk.
6:20, "poverty corresponds to temperance, which is unmoved by delights;
hunger, to justice, since who hungers is compassionate and, through
compassion gives; mourning, to prudence, which deplores perishable
things; endurance of men's hatred belongs to fortitude. "
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the rewards of the beatitudes are suitably enumerated?
Objection 1: It would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are
unsuitably enumerated. Because the kingdom of heaven, which is eternal
life, contains all good things. Therefore, once given the kingdom of
heaven, no other rewards should be mentioned.
Objection 2: Further, the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward,
both of the first and of the eighth beatitude. Therefore, on the same
ground it should have been assigned to all.
Objection 3: Further, the beatitudes are arranged in the ascending
order, as Augustine remarks (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): whereas the
rewards seem to be placed in the descending order, since to "possess
the land" is less than to possess "the kingdom of heaven. " Therefore
these rewards are unsuitably enumerated.
On the contrary, stands the authority of Our Lord Who propounded these
rewards.
I answer that, These rewards are most suitably assigned, considering
the nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three kinds of
happiness indicated above [1674](A[3]). For the first three beatitudes
concerned the withdrawal of man from those things in which sensual
happiness consists: which happiness man desires by seeking the object
of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz. in God, but in
temporal and perishable things. Wherefore the rewards of the first
three beatitudes correspond to these things which some men seek to find
in earthly happiness. For men seek in external things, viz. riches and
honors, a certain excellence and abundance, both of which are implied
in the kingdom of heaven, whereby man attains to excellence and
abundance of good things in God. Hence Our Lord promised the kingdom of
heaven to the poor in spirit. Again, cruel and pitiless men seek by
wrangling and fighting to destroy their enemies so as to gain security
for themselves. Hence Our Lord promised the meek a secure and peaceful
possession of the land of the living, whereby the solid reality of
eternal goods is denoted. Again, men seek consolation for the toils of
the present life, in the lusts and pleasures of the world. Hence Our
Lord promises comfort to those that mourn.
Two other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness, which are
the works of virtues directing man in his relations to his neighbor:
from which operations some men withdraw through inordinate love of
their own good. Hence Our Lord assigns to these beatitudes rewards in
correspondence with the motives for which men recede from them. For
there are some who recede from acts of justice, and instead of
rendering what is due, lay hands on what is not theirs, that they may
abound in temporal goods. Wherefore Our Lord promised those who hunger
after justice, that they shall have their fill. Some, again, recede
from works of mercy, lest they be busied with other people's misery.
Hence Our Lord promised the merciful that they should obtain mercy, and
be delivered from all misery.
The last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happiness or beatitude:
hence the rewards are assigned in correspondence with the dispositions
included in the merit. For cleanness of the eye disposes one to see
clearly: hence the clean of heart are promised that they shall see God.
Again, to make peace either in oneself or among others, shows a man to
be a follower of God, Who is the God of unity and peace. Hence, as a
reward, he is promised the glory of the Divine sonship, consisting in
perfect union with God through consummate wisdom.
Reply to Objection 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth. ), all these
rewards are one in reality, viz. eternal happiness, which the human
intellect cannot grasp. Hence it was necessary to describe it by means
of various boons known to us, while observing due proportion to the
merits to which those rewards are assigned.
Reply to Objection 2: Just as the eighth beatitude is a confirmation of
all the beatitudes, so it deserves all the rewards of the beatitudes.
Hence it returns to the first, that we may understand all the other
rewards to be attributed to it in consequence. Or else, according to
Ambrose (Super Luc. v), the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor
in spirit, as regards the glory of the soul; but to those who suffer
persecution in their bodies, it is promised as regards the glory of the
body.
Reply to Objection 3: The rewards are also arranged in ascending order.
For it is more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply
to have it: since we have many things without possessing them firmly
and peacefully. Again, it is more to be comforted in the kingdom than
to have and possess it, for there are many things the possession of
which is accompanied by sorrow. Again, it is more to have one's fill
than simply to be comforted, because fulness implies abundance of
comfort. And mercy surpasses satiety, for thereby man receives more
than he merited or was able to desire. And yet more is it to see God,
even as he is a greater man who not only dines at court, but also sees
the king's countenance. Lastly, the highest place in the royal palace
belongs to the king's son.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST (FOUR ARTICLES)
We must now consider the Fruits of the Holy Ghost: under which head
there are four points of inquiry:
(1) Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are acts?
(2) Whether they differ from the beatitudes?
(3) Of their number?
(4) Of their opposition to the works of the flesh.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost which the Apostle enumerates (Gal. 5)
are acts?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost,
enumerated by the Apostle (Gal. 5:22,23), are not acts. For that which
bears fruit, should not itself be called a fruit, else we should go on
indefinitely. But our actions bear fruit: for it is written (Wis.
3:15): "The fruit of good labor is glorious," and (Jn. 4:36): "He that
reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life everlasting. "
Therefore our actions are not to be called fruits.
Objection 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10), "we enjoy
[*'Fruimur', from which verb we have the Latin 'fructus' and the
English 'fruit'] the things we know, when the will rests by rejoicing
in them. " But our will should not rest in our actions for their own
sake. Therefore our actions should not be called fruits.
Objection 3: Further, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, the Apostle
numbers certain virtues, viz. charity, meekness, faith, and chastity.
Now virtues are not actions but habits, as stated above ([1675]Q[55],
A[1]). Therefore the fruits are not actions.
On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 12:33): "By the fruit the tree is
known"; that is to say, man is known by his works, as holy men explain
the passage. Therefore human actions are called fruits.
I answer that, The word "fruit" has been transferred from the material
to the spiritual world. Now fruit, among material things, is the
product of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain
sweetness. This fruit has a twofold relation: to the tree that produces
it, and to the man who gathers the fruit from the tree. Accordingly, in
spiritual matters, we may take the word "fruit" in two ways: first, so
that the fruit of man, who is likened to the tree, is that which he
produces; secondly, so that man's fruit is what he gathers.
Yet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which is last and
gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a tree, and yet these
are not called fruits; but that only which is last, to wit, that which
man intends to derive from the field and from the tree. In this sense
man's fruit is his last end which is intended for his enjoyment.
If, however, by man's fruit we understand a product of man, then human
actions are called fruits: because operation is the second act of the
operator, and gives pleasure if it is suitable to him. If then man's
operation proceeds from man in virtue of his reason, it is said to be
the fruit of his reason: but if it proceeds from him in respect of a
higher power, which is the power of the Holy Ghost, then man's
operation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as of a Divine
seed, for it is written (1 Jn. 3:9): "Whosoever is born of God,
committeth no sin, for His seed abideth in him. "
Reply to Objection 1: Since fruit is something last and final, nothing
hinders one fruit bearing another fruit, even as one end is subordinate
to another. And so our works, in so far as they are produced by the
Holy Ghost working in us, are fruits: but, in so far as they are
referred to the end which is eternal life, they should rather be called
flowers: hence it is written (Ecclus. 24:23): "My flowers are the
fruits of honor and riches. "
Reply to Objection 2: When the will is said to delight in a thing for
its own sake, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that the
expression "for the sake of" be taken to designate the final cause; and
in this way, man delights in nothing for its own sake, except the last
end. Secondly, so that it expresses the formal cause; and in this way,
a man may delight in anything that is delightful by reason of its form.
Thus it is clear that a sick man delights in health, for its own sake,
as in an end; in a nice medicine, not as in an end, but as in something
tasty; and in a nasty medicine, nowise for its own sake, but only for
the sake of something else. Accordingly we must say that man must
delight in God for His own sake, as being his last end, and in virtuous
deeds, not as being his end, but for the sake of their inherent
goodness which is delightful to the virtuous. Hence Ambrose says (De
Parad. xiii) that virtuous deeds are called fruits because "they
refresh those that have them, with a holy and genuine delight. "
Reply to Objection 3: Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to
their actions: thus Augustine writes (Tract. xl in Joan. ): "Faith is to
believe what thou seest not"; and (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10): "Charity
is the movement of the soul in loving God and our neighbor. " It is thus
that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning the fruits.
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Whether the fruits differ from the beatitudes?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits do not differ from the
beatitudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated
above ([1676]Q[69], A[1], ad 1). But the gifts perfect man in so far as
he is moved by the Holy Ghost. Therefore the beatitudes themselves are
fruits of the Holy Ghost.
Objection 2: Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to future
beatitude which is that of actual possession, so are the fruits of the
present life to the beatitudes of the present life, which are based on
hope. Now the fruit of eternal life is identified with future
beatitude. Therefore the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes.
Objection 3: Further, fruit is essentially something ultimate and
delightful. Now this is the very nature of beatitude, as stated above
([1677]Q[3], A[1];[1678] Q[4], A[1]). Therefore fruit and beatitude
have the same nature, and consequently should not be distinguished from
one another.
On the contrary, Things divided into different species, differ from one
another. But fruits and beatitudes are divided into different parts, as
is clear from the way in which they are enumerated. Therefore the
fruits differ from the beatitudes.
I answer that, More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit.
Because it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and
delightful; whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and
excellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not vice
versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one delights:
whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works, and which, by reason
of their perfection, are assigned to the gifts rather than to the
virtues, as already stated ([1679]Q[69], A[1], ad 1).
Reply to Objection 1: This argument proves the beatitudes to be fruits,
but not that all the fruits are beatitudes.
Reply to Objection 2: The fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect
simply: hence it nowise differs from future beatitude. On the other
hand the fruits of the present life are not simply ultimate and
perfect; wherefore not all the fruits are beatitudes.
Reply to Objection 3: More is required for a beatitude than for a
fruit, as stated.
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Whether the fruits are suitably enumerated by the Apostle?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits are unsuitably enumerated by
the Apostle (Gal. 5:22,23). Because, elsewhere, he says that there is
only one fruit of the present life; according to Rom. 6:22: "You have
your fruit unto sanctification. " Moreover it is written (Is. 27:9):
"This is all the fruit . . . that the sin . . . be taken away. "
Therefore we should not reckon twelve fruits.
Objection 2: Further, fruit is the product of spiritual seed, as stated
(A[1] ). But Our Lord mentions (Mat. 13:23) a threefold fruit as
growing from a spiritual seed in a good ground, viz. "hundredfold,
sixtyfold," and "thirtyfold. " Therefore one should not reckon twelve
fruits.
Objection 3: Further, the very nature of fruit is to be something
ultimate and delightful. But this does not apply to all the fruits
mentioned by the Apostle: for patience and long-suffering seem to imply
a painful object, while faith is not something ultimate, but rather
something primary and fundamental. Therefore too many fruits are
enumerated.
Objection 4: On the other hand, It seems that they are enumerated
insufficiently and incompletely. For it has been stated [1680](A[2])
that all the beatitudes may be called fruits; yet not all are mentioned
here. Nor is there anything corresponding to the acts of wisdom, and of
many other virtues. Therefore it seems that the fruits are
insufficiently enumerated.
I answer that, The number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the
Apostle is suitable, and that there may be a reference to them in the
twelve fruits of which it is written (Apoc. 22:2): "On both sides of
the river was the tree bearing twelve fruits. " Since, however, a fruit
is something that proceeds from a source as from a seed or root, the
difference between these fruits must be gathered from the various ways
in which the Holy Ghost proceeds in us: which process consists in this,
that the mind of man is set in order, first of all, in regard to
itself; secondly, in regard to things that are near it; thirdly, in
regard to things that are below it.
Accordingly man's mind is well disposed in regard to itself when it has
a good disposition towards good things and towards evil things. Now the
first disposition of the human mind towards the good is effected by
love, which is the first of our emotions and the root of them all, as
stated above ([1681]Q[27], A[4]). Wherefore among the fruits of the
Holy Ghost, we reckon "charity," wherein the Holy Ghost is given in a
special manner, as in His own likeness, since He Himself is love. Hence
it is written (Rom. 5:5): "The charity of God is poured forth in our
hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us. " The necessary result of
the love of charity is joy: because every lover rejoices at being
united to the beloved. Now charity has always actual presence in God
Whom it loves, according to 1 Jn. 4:16: "He that abideth in charity,
abideth in God, and God in Him": wherefore the sequel of charity is
"joy. " Now the perfection of joy is peace in two respects. First, as
regards freedom from outward disturbance; for it is impossible to
rejoice perfectly in the beloved good, if one is disturbed in the
enjoyment thereof; and again, if a man's heart is perfectly set at
peace in one object, he cannot be disquieted by any other, since he
accounts all others as nothing; hence it is written (Ps. 118:165):
"Much peace have they that love Thy Law, and to them there is no
stumbling-block," because, to wit, external things do not disturb them
in their enjoyment of God. Secondly, as regards the calm of the
restless desire: for he does not perfectly rejoice, who is not
satisfied with the object of his joy. Now peace implies these two
things, namely, that we be not disturbed by external things, and that
our desires rest altogether in one object. Wherefore after charity and
joy, "peace" is given the third place. In evil things the mind has a
good disposition, in respect of two things. First, by not being
disturbed whenever evil threatens: which pertains to "patience";
secondly, by not being disturbed, whenever good things are delayed;
which belongs to "long suffering," since "to lack good is a kind of
evil" (Ethic. v, 3).
Man's mind is well disposed as regards what is near him, viz. his
neighbor, first, as to the will to do good; and to this belongs
"goodness. " Secondly, as to the execution of well-doing; and to this
belongs "benignity," for the benign are those in whom the salutary
flame [bonus ignis] of love has enkindled the desire to be kind to
their neighbor. Thirdly, as to his suffering with equanimity the evils
his neighbor inflicts on him. To this belongs "meekness," which curbs
anger. Fourthly, in the point of our refraining from doing harm to our
neighbor not only through anger, but also through fraud or deceit. To
this pertains "faith," if we take it as denoting fidelity. But if we
take it for the faith whereby we believe in God, then man is directed
thereby to that which is above him, so that he subject his intellect
and, consequently, all that is his, to God.
Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below him, as regards
external action, by "modesty," whereby we observe the "mode" in all our
words and deeds: as regards internal desires, by "contingency" and
"chastity": whether these two differ because chastity withdraws man
from unlawful desires, contingency also from lawful desires: or because
the continent man is subject to concupiscence, but is not led away;
whereas the chaste man is neither subject to, nor led away from them.
Reply to Objection 1: Sanctification is effected by all the virtues, by
which also sins are taken away. Consequently fruit is mentioned there
in the singular, on account of its being generically one, though
divided into many species which are spoken of as so many fruits.
Reply to Objection 2: The hundredfold, sixtyfold, and thirtyfold fruits
do not differ as various species of virtuous acts, but as various
degrees of perfection, even in the same virtue. Thus contingency of the
married state is said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit; the
contingency of widowhood, by the sixtyfold; and virginal contingency,
by the hundredfold fruit. There are, moreover, other ways in which holy
men distinguish three evangelical fruits according to the three degrees
of virtue: and they speak of three degrees, because the perfection of
anything is considered with respect to its beginning, its middle, and
its end.
Reply to Objection 3: The fact of not being disturbed by painful things
is something to delight in. And as to faith, if we consider it as the
foundation, it has the aspect of being ultimate and delightful, in as
much as it contains certainty: hence a gloss expounds thus: "Faith,
which is certainly about the unseen. "
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says on Gal. 5:22,23, "the Apostle
had no intention of teaching us how many [either works of the flesh, or
fruits of the Spirit] there are; but to show how the former should be
avoided, and the latter sought after. " Hence either more or fewer
fruits might have been mentioned. Nevertheless, all the acts of the
gifts and virtues can be reduced to these by a certain kind of
fittingness, in so far as all the virtues and gifts must needs direct
the mind in one of the above-mentioned ways. Wherefore the acts of
wisdom and of any gifts directing to good, are reduced to charity, joy
and peace. The reason why he mentions these rather than others, is that
these imply either enjoyment of good things, or relief from evils,
which things seem to belong to the notion of fruit.
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Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are contrary to the works of the flesh?
Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost are not
contrary to the works of the flesh, which the Apostle enumerates (Gal.
5:19, seqq. ). Because contraries are in the same genus. But the works
of the flesh are not called fruits. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit
are not contrary to them.
Objection 2: Further, one thing has a contrary. Now the Apostle
mentions more works of the flesh than fruits of the Spirit. Therefore
the fruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh are not contrary to
one another.
Objection 3: Further, among the fruits of the Spirit, the first place
is given to charity, joy, and peace: to which, fornication,
uncleanness, and immodesty, which are the first of the works of the
flesh are not opposed. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not
contrary to the works of the flesh.
On the contrary, The Apostle says (Gal. 5:17) that "the flesh lusteth
against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh. "
I answer that, The works of the flesh and the fruits of the Spirit may
be taken in two ways. First, in general: and in this way the fruits of
the Holy Ghost considered in general are contrary to the works of the
flesh. Because the Holy Ghost moves the human mind to that which is in
accord with reason, or rather to that which surpasses reason: whereas
the fleshly, viz. the sensitive, appetite draws man to sensible goods
which are beneath him. Wherefore, since upward and downward are
contrary movements in the physical order, so in human actions the works
of the flesh are contrary to the fruits of the Spirit.
Secondly, both fruits and fleshly works as enumerated may be considered
singly, each according to its specific nature. And in this they are not
of necessity contrary each to each: because, as stated above (A[3], ad
4), the Apostle did not intend to enumerate all the works, whether
spiritual or carnal. However, by a kind of adaptation, Augustine,
commenting on Gal. 5:22,23, contrasts the fruits with the carnal works,
each to each. Thus "to fornication, which is the love of satisfying
lust outside lawful wedlock, we may contrast charity, whereby the soul
is wedded to God: wherein also is true chastity. By uncleanness we must
understand whatever disturbances arise from fornication: and to these
the joy of tranquillity is opposed. Idolatry, by reason of which war
was waged against the Gospel of God, is opposed to peace. Against
witchcrafts, enmities, contentions, emulations, wraths and quarrels,
there is longsuffering, which helps us to bear the evils inflicted on
us by those among whom we dwell; while kindness helps us to cure those
evils; and goodness, to forgive them. In contrast to heresy there is
faith; to envy, mildness; to drunkenness and revellings, contingency. "
Reply to Objection 1: That which proceeds from a tree against the
tree's nature, is not called its fruit, but rather its corruption. And
since works of virtue are connatural to reason, while works of vice are
contrary to nature, therefore it is that works of virtue are called
fruits, but not so works of vice.
Reply to Objection 2: "Good happens in one way, evil in all manner of
ways," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): so that to one virtue many
vices are contrary. Consequently we must not be surprised if the works
of the flesh are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit.
The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.
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EVIL HABITS, i. e. VICES AND SINS (QQ[71]-89)
OF VICE AND SIN CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES (SIX ARTICLES)
We have in the next place to consider vice and sin: about which six
points have to be considered: (1) Vice and sin considered in
themselves; (2) their distinction; (3) their comparison with one
another; (4) the subject of sin; (5) the cause of sin; (6) the effect
of sin.
Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether vice is contrary to virtue?
(2) Whether vice is contrary to nature?
(3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act?
(4) Whether a vicious act is compatible with virtue?
(5) Whether every sin includes action?
(6) Of the definition of sin proposed by Augustine (Contra Faust.
xxii): "Sin is a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law. "
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Whether vice is contrary to virtue?
Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For one
thing has one contrary, as proved in Metaph. x, text. 17. Now sin and
malice are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary to it:
since vice applies also to undue disposition of bodily members or of
any things whatever.
Objection 2: Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of power. But
vice does not denote anything relative to power. Therefore vice is not
contrary to virtue.
Objection 3: Further, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) says that "virtue is
the soul's health. " Now sickness or disease, rather than vice, is
opposed to health. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that "vice is
a quality in respect of which the soul is evil. " But "virtue is a
quality which makes its subject good," as was shown above ([1682]Q[55],
AA[3],4). Therefore vice is contrary to virtue.
I answer that, Two things may be considered in virtue---the essence of
virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained. In the essence of virtue
we may consider something directly, and we may consider something
consequently. Virtue implies "directly" a disposition whereby the
subject is well disposed according to the mode of its nature: wherefore
the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that "virtue is a
disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best; and by perfect I
mean that which is disposed according to its nature. " That which virtue
implies "consequently" is that it is a kind of goodness: because the
goodness of a thing consists in its being well disposed according to
the mode of its nature. That to which virtue is directed is a good act,
as was shown above ([1683]Q[56], A[3]).
Accordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of
these is "sin," which is opposed to virtue in respect of that to which
virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an inordinate
act; even as an act of virtue is an ordinate and due act: in respect of
that which virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is a kind of
goodness, the contrary of virtue is "malice": while in respect of that
which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its contrary is
"vice": because the vice of a thing seems to consist in its not being
disposed in a way befitting its nature: hence Augustine says (De Lib.
Arb. iii): "Whatever is lacking for a thing's natural perfection may be
called a vice. "
Reply to Objection 1: These three things are contrary to virtue, but
not in the same respect: for sin is opposed to virtue, according as the
latter is productive of a good work; malice, according as virtue is a
kind of goodness; while vice is opposed to virtue properly as such.
Reply to Objection 2: Virtue implies not only perfection of power, the
principle of action; but also the due disposition of its subject. The
reason for this is because a thing operates according as it is in act:
so that a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce a good
work. It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue.
Reply to Objection 3: As Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), "disease
and sickness are vicious qualities," for in speaking of the body "he
calls it" disease "when the whole body is infected," for instance, with
fever or the like; he calls it sickness "when the disease is attended
with weakness"; and vice "when the parts of the body are not well
compacted together. " And although at times there may be disease in the
body without sickness, for instance, when a man has a hidden complaint
without being hindered outwardly from his wonted occupations; "yet, in
the soul," as he says, "these two things are indistinguishable, except
in thought. " For whenever a man is ill-disposed inwardly, through some
inordinate affection, he is rendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his
duties: since "a tree is known by its fruit," i. e. man by his works,
according to Mat. 12:33. But "vice of the soul," as Cicero says (De
Quaest. Tusc. iv), "is a habit or affection of the soul discordant and
inconsistent with itself through life": and this is to be found even
without disease and sickness, e. g. when a man sins from weakness or
passion. Consequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease;
even as virtue extends to more things than health; for health itself is
reckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17). Consequently vice is
reckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or
disease.
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Whether vice is contrary to nature?
Objection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature. Because
vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above [1684](A[1]). Now virtue is
in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as stated above
(Q[63], AA[1] ,2,3). Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
Objection 2: Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that
which is contrary to nature: thus "a stone never becomes habituated to
upward movement" (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated to
vice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
Objection 3: Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in
the greater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice is
found in the greater number of men; for it is written (Mat. 7:13):
"Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who
go in thereat. " Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.
Objection 4: Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as
stated above [1685](A[1]). Now sin is defined as "a word, deed, or
desire, contrary to the Law of God," as Augustine shows (Contra Faust.
xxii, 27). But the Law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say
that vice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): "Every vice,
simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature. "
I answer that, As stated above [1686](A[1]), vice is contrary to
virtue. Now the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed
in a manner befitting its nature, as stated above [1687](A[1]). Hence
the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not
befitting its nature, and for this reason is that thing "vituperated,"
which word is derived from "vice" according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb.
iii, 14).
But it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the form
from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his species
from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary to the
order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature of man,
as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord with the
nature of man, as man. Now "man's good is to be in accord with reason,
and his evil is to be against reason," as Dionysius states (Div. Nom.
iv).
