I will ask you once more to observe the nature of the
influence exercised on warfare by these new methods in
military affairs.
influence exercised on warfare by these new methods in
military affairs.
Treitschke - 1914 - Life and Works
Look at them again and you
will see in them the greatness of war. Not only the life
of man, but also the right and natural emotions of his
inmost soul, his whole ego, are to be sacrificed to a great
patriotic ideal; and herein lies the moral magnificence
of war. If we pursue this idea still further we shall
see that, in spite of its hardness and roughness, war links'
men together in brotherly love, for it levels all differences
of rank, and draws men together by a common sense
of the imminence of death. Every student of history'
knows that to do away with war would be to cripple
human nature. No liberty can exist without an armed
force ready to sacrifice itself for the sake of freedom.
One cannot insist too often on the fact that scholars
never touch upon these questions without presupposing
that the State only exists as a sort of academy of arts
and sciences. This is of course also part of its duty, but
not its most immediate duty. A State which cultivates
its mental powers at the expense of its physical ones
cannot fail to go to ruin.
Generally speaking, we must admit that the greatness
of historical life lies in character rather than in educa-
tion; the driving forces of history are to be found in
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? 142 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
spheres where character is developing. Only brave
nations have any real history. In the hour of trial in
national life it becomes evident that warlike virtues have
the casting vote. There is great truth in the old phrase
which describes war as the exatnen rigorosum of the
States. In war, the States are called upon to show, not
only the extent of their physical, but also of their moral
power, and in a certain measure of their intellectual
capacity. . . . War brings to light all that a nation has
collected in secret. It is not an essential part of the
nature of armies to be always fighting; the noiseless
labour of armament goes on equally in time of peace.
The entire value of the work done for Prussia by Frederick
William I, did not appear until the days of Frederick the
Great, when the tremendous force which had been slowly
collecting suddenly revealed itself to the world at large.
The same is true of the year 1866.
And just because war is nothing more than a powerful
embodiment of politics, its issues are decided, not by
technical factors alone, but chiefly by the policy which
directs it. It is very significant that when Wrangel and
Prittwitz might have been able to get the better of the
Danes in 1848 and 1849, the King, who seems to have
felt horror at the thought of taking such a step, and who,
moreover, feared Russia, did not himself know what he
wanted. An Army can never be expected to fight when
its leaders are in doubt as to the advisibility of a particular
military action. Every war is by nature a radical one,
and in many cases the efficiency of the troops will prove
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? THE ARMY 143
useless in face of the hesitation and aimlessness of the
policy which it serves. Remember the campaign in
Champagne in 1792. The superiority in training of the
Prussian and Austrian troops over the sans culottes was
at that date still very considerable, and in the neigh-
bourhood of Mannheim a single battalion of the Wedell
Regiment prevented two French Divisions from crossing
the Rhine during the whole of one day. But still the
political result of the war was the complete downfall of
the coalition. The Allies were not of one mind; their
policy lacked all definite aim, and the campaign was
being conducted at haphazard. Political considerations
of this kind, which interfere with the strategy of the
leaders, are particularly disastrous in wars conducted
by coalitions, and history has often proved the truth
of the line, "the strong man is strongest when alone. "
In the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 the incompetent
Russian generals, in concert with the talented Prussian
commanders, carried on war to the knife, whereas the
more competent Austrians, who were hindered by the
aimless policy of their country, showed themselves
lukewarm and indifferent. A policy such as that of the
Austrians could not hope to find a better commander
than Schwarzenberg. Many wars have been lost before
they were begun because they were the result of a policy
which did not know its own mind.
Every healthy-minded Army is conscious of a strong
sense of chivalry and personal honour. But under certain
circumstances this military sense of honour becomes
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? 144 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
over-sensitive. Abuses are, of course, to be deplored, but
this touchiness is in itself a wholesome symptom. The duel
is not a thing which can be ignored, even among civilians.
In a democratic community the duel is the last protest
which can be made against a complete subversion of social
manners and customs. A certain restraint is put upon
a man by the thought that he will risk his life by offending
against social usage; and it is better that now and then
a promising young life should be laid down than that
the social morality of a whole people should be brutalised.
A sense of class-honour also fosters 'the great moral
strength which resides in the Army, and which is the
cause of a large part of its effectiveness. The officers
would lose the respect of their subordinates if they did
not show a more ticklish sense of honour and a finer
breeding. Since duelling was abolished in England,
moral coarseness in the Army has been on the increase,
and officers have been known to come to blows in railway
carriages in the very presence of their wives. It is
obvious how greatly such conduct must impair the
respect due from the men to their superiors. The state-
ment of the democrat that a man of the lower classes will
more readily obey his equal than a gentleman is entirely
false. The respect of a soldier for a man of really dis-
tinguished character will always be greater than his
respect for an old corporal. This truth was plainly
demonstrated in the last war, when it was found that
the French officers did not possess enough authority
over their men.
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? THE ARMY 145
As warfare is but the tremendous embodiment of
foreign policy, everything relating to military affairs
must have a very intimate connection with the con-
stitution of the State, and, in its turn, the particular
organization of the Army must determine^which of many
types of warfare shall be followed. Because the Middle
Ages were aristocratic, most of the battles then fought
were between cavalry, which has always been the pre-
eminently aristocratic instrument of war. The results of
this idea may still be observed to-day. (Too great a pre-
ponderance of cavalry is always a sign that the economic
condition of a nation is still defective, and that the power
of the aristocracy in the State is too absolute. . . .
Mechanical weapons have, on the other hand, always
been the especial property of the middle classes. En-
gineering has always flourished among commercial
nations, because they possess both capital and technical
skill. Among the ancients, the Carthagenians were
technically the most important nation in military affairs;
but Rome conquered them in the end, not because her
generals were better, but because of the moral force
which held her National Army together.
For however important technique may be in war, it
never turns the scales unaided. Economic considerations
such as skill in engineering or in systematic collaboration
can never help one to determine the value of an Army.
Still, this is what the commercial nations seek to do,
for they look upon an Army of purely professional soldiers
as the best. It is not technical but abstract and moral
K
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? 146 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
superiority that tells in the long run in war. As far as
physical capacity goes the English soldiers are very
efficient; they are trained to box, and are fed on an
incredibly liberal scale. But even people in England
are realising more and more strongly that there is some-
thing wrong with their Army, and that it cannot be
compared with a National Army because the moral
energies of the people are excluded from it. The world
is not as materialistic as Wellington supposed. Welling-
ton used to say that enthusiasm in an Army could only
produce confusion and other ill-effects. The really
national weapon of England is the Fleet. The martial
enthusiasm of the country--and it is far stronger than
is usually supposed on the Continent, because the idea
of a British universal empire is very general among the
people--must be sought on the men-of-war.
In considering these questions we must never lose sight
of the purely moral value of the National Army as opposed
to its purely national and political value. We must be
quite clear as to whether the perpetual complaints of
the great cost of our military system are justified. It is
certain that the blood-tax imposed by the military burden
is the greatest which a nation can be called upon to bear.
But we must never forget that there are, and ought to
be, things which are above all price. Moral possessions
have no price, and it is therefore unreasonable to try
to reckon the value of the honour and power of the State
in terms of money. Money can never represent what we
lost when the flower of our youthful manhood fell on
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? THE ARMY 147
the battle-fields of France. It is unworthy to judge the
possessions of the soul as if they were material. A great
nation is acting in a right and reasonable way if it seeks to
give expression to the idea of the State, which stands for
power, in the form of a well-ordered military organization.
Without it trade and intercourse could not prosper.
If one were to try to imagine the country without the
Army which protects our civil peace it would be im-
possible to say how great would be the decrease in our
national revenues.
Under ordinary circumstances the right to bear arms
must always be looked upon as the privilege of a free
man. It was only during the last period of the Roman
Empire that the system of keeping mercenaries was
adopted. And as mercenary troops consisted, except
for their officers, of the lowest dregs of society, the idea
soon became prevalent that military service was a dis-
grace, and the free citizen began to show himself anxious
not to take part in it. This conception of the mercenary
system has gone on perpetuating itself through the
ages, and its after-effects have been strikingly demon-
strated even in our own day. Our century has been
called upon to witness, in the formation of the National
and Civil Guards, the most immoral and unreasonable
developments of which the military system is capable.
The citizens imagined themselves too good to bear arms
against the enemies of their country, but they were not
averse to playing at soldiers at home, and even to being
able to defend their purse if it should happen to be in
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? 148 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
danger. Hence the truly disgusting invention of the
National Guard, and the inhuman legal provision that in
the event of a popular disturbance the adored rabble
might receive an immediate shaking at the hands of the
Guard. The Army was only to interfere if things became
serious. This shows a complete failure to realise the
moral nobility of the duty of defence. The right to bear
arms will ever remain the honorary privilege of the free
man. All noble minds have more or less recognised the
truth that " the God Who created iron did not wish men
to be thralls. " And it is the task of all reasonable
political systems to keep this idea in honour.
II.
The example of the German National Army has had an
irresistible influence on the rest of Europe. The ridicule
heaped on it in previous decades has now been shown to
be unwarranted. It was the custom abroad to look down
on the Prussian territorial system (Landwehr) and on the
Prussian boy Army. Things are very different now.
We know now that moral factors in warfare weigh more
heavily than technical excellence; and it is further evi-
dent that the ever-increasing technical experience of life
in barracks brings with it a corresponding brutalisation of
the moral instincts. The veteran sergeants of France were
in no way superior to the German troops, as the French
had expected. We may say with truth that the problem
of giving a military education to the strength of the nation
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? THE ARMY 149
and of making full use of the trained Army was first
seriously dealt with in Germany. Our Army constitutes
a peculiar and necessary continuation of the scholastic
system. For many people it would be impossible to
devise a better means of education. For such persons,
living as they do in a period in which mental restraint
is lacking, the drill and enforced cleanliness and strict
military discipline are indispensable from every point
of view. Carlyle prophesied that the Prussian concep-
tion of universal military service would go the round of
the globe. Since 1866 and 1870, when the organization
of the Prussian Army stood its trial so brilliantly, nearly
all the other great Powers of the Continent have sought
to imitate its methods.
But imitation abroad is not as easy as was supposed,
because the Prussian Army is really a nation in arms, and
the peculiarities and refinements of the national character
are naturally exemplified in it. Above all, a system of
this kind cannot be established unless the nation pos-
sesses a certain degree of political freedom, is satisfied
with the existing regime, and can count on social freedom
in the Government. A natural respect for superior
education is also necessary, for without it the institution
of the One-year Volunteers would be unthinkable This
system has been introduced simply in order to make it
economically and morally possible for young men belong-
ing to the educated classes to serve in the ranks. In
France this voluntary system has proved a failure, because
an external equality between different classes of men
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? 150 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
has been insisted upon. In Germany we could hardly
do without it. Quite apart from the fact that our supply
of professional officers is not nearly large enough in the
event of war, the educated young men whom the One-
year Voluntary Service transforms into territorial or
reserve officers, and who stand in many ways in a closer
relationship to the people than the professional officers,
form a natural link between the latter and the rank and
file of the Army.
The heavy burden of universal military service can be
lightened in a certain measure by decentralization,
which usually enables a man to serve in his native
province. Our Provincial Army Corps have, on the whole,
quite justified their existence. They should remain the
rule; and as a wholesome counterweight we have in
the Guard a corps which includes men from all parts of
the country, and forms a crack regiment, one of whose
functions it is to spur on the rest of the Army. The
rigid centralization of France makes the existence of
Provincial Army Corps such as ours an impossibility.
The natives of Normandy and of the Pyrenees there stand
side by side in the same regiment. In Germany, on the
other hand, common nationality is rightly looked upon
as a strong cement which will ensure the solidarity of
separate bodies of troops. This universal military ser-
vice, if it is to preserve the existence of the State, must
naturally presuppose unity in the nation as a whole.
One or two isolated little provinces, peopled by foreign
races, do not greatly affect the question, and a few simple
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? THE ARMY 151
precautions will do away with any threatened danger
from those quarters. In Austria things are more serious,
because there the officers in the Reserve are the weak
point of the Army. They are good Czechs, good Germans,
and good Magyars, but not good Austrians; and this
flaw may some day bring about disastrous consequences.
In all these matters of military organization we were
until quite lately the leaders of the other nations. During
the last few years the neighbouring States have made
such strenuous efforts to obtain military power that we
have been obliged to go further--this time in imitation
of other nations. The furthest limits to this onward
movement are imposed by the nature of things, and the
enormous physical strength of the Germanic race will
see to it that we have a perpetual advantage in this
respect over the less fruitful nations. The French have
nearly reached the utmost limits of their capacity; the
Germans possess, in this respect, far wider elbow-room.
I will ask you once more to observe the nature of the
influence exercised on warfare by these new methods in
military affairs. The general tendency of this system
is towards peace. A nation in arms is not as easily
drawn away from its social occupations to take part in a
frivolous war as a Conscript Army would be. Wars will
become rarer and of shorter duration, although more
bloody. Desire to return home will drive the Army to
advance. The temper of the Prussian soldiers in the
summer of 1866, expressed in the words, "Let us press
on towards the Danube, so that we may get home
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? 152 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
again soon," should be looked upon as the normal temper
of a courageous and, at the same time, peace-loving
National Army. There can be no difficulty to-day in
understanding the bold spirit in warfare which seeks,
above all, to plunge a dagger into the heart of the enemy.
It may be said that nothing is absolutely impossible to
a National Army of this kind when the nation can look
back over a glorious past. The experiences of our two
last wars, especially in the battles of Koniggratz and
Mars la Tour, have proved this to be true. We saw, at
the battle of Sadowa, that fourteen Prussian battalions
could stand against something like forty-two Austrian
ones; and the Franco-Prussian War furnished us with
numerous instances of decisive battles in which we
fought facing our own frontiers, so that if we had lost
we should have been driven back into the interior of the
enemy's country. (In the case of a modern National
Army the duty of sparing men is entirely swallowed up
in the higher duty of annihilating the enemy. The fear
of desertion need not be entertained; the Army can be
billeted wherever it is.
The famous saying of Montecucoli, cited even by
Frederick the Great, belongs to a period now entirely
past. Montecucoli had said that in order to wage
war a nation must have money, and money, and yet
more money. It is true that a great deal of money is
needed for the preparations involved by war; but when
fighting has once begun, the conqueror can do without
ready money. He can simply fall back on the resources
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? THE ARMY 153
of the occupied territory, and may even abstain from
paying his troops for the moment. Once when Bliicher
imposed a huge war-contribution on the French in order
to feed his hungry soldiers, the King sent an order for-
bidding him to embitter the French too much, and
promising that the soldiers' pay should be procured in
Prussia. Bliicher replied, "Your Majesty's Army is
not a mercenary army. Even if I am not permitted to
take money from a hostile country, we will not be an
unnecessary burden to our mother country. " It is a
well-known fact that Napoleon began the campaign of
1806 with a war-chest of forty thousand francs, and in
1813 we were ourselves in a far worse plight. We had,
at the beginning, only two thousand thalers (about three
hundred pounds sterling) in cash; but the first thing we
did was to turn the pecuniary resources of the Saxons
into ready money, and so we went on. <<
A certain self-reliance on the part of under-commanders
has become a necessity in the enormous National Army
of the present day. General Manteuffel once told me
that on the misty morning of the battle of Noisseville
he was only able to give quite general directions; for the
rest, he relied entirely on the initiative and sense of
responsibility of his generals. The final stages in the
development of war on the principle of universal service
have not yet been reached, and the world has not, as yet,
beheld a war between two National Armies. During the
first half of the last great war we witnessed a meeting
between a really National Army and a Conscript Army,
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? 154 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
and, later, an improvised Militia. The spectacle of the
encounter between two perfectly trained National Armies,
which we have yet to see, will certainly be a gigantic one.
The world will then witness enormous losses and enor-
mous gains. And, if we consider the multitude of new
technical devices produced in these modern times, we
must realise that future wars will give rise to far more
astounding revelations than any during the Franco-
Prussian War.
The new means of transport are especially important
in modern warfare. A State cannot have too many
railways for military purposes. An immediate occupa-
tion of an enemy's country is especially important in
modem warfare, for it puts an effective stop to all recruit-
ing. One of Napoleon III's most serious mistakes in
1870 was that he failed to occupy at least a portion
of the left bank of the Rhine. We could not, at the
outset, have prevented him from doing so, and this fact
is openly stated in the Introduction to the History of the
War composed by the general staff, which Moltke no
doubt wrote himself. We should, by that means, have
lost two army corps from our Field Army.
It is certain, then, that the more railways lead to the
frontier the better. But I must here repeat that every-
thing has its natural limits. It is true that an extensive
railway system facilitates the collection of an Army on
the frontier the moment war is declared; but during the
war its use is far more restricted. It is quite easy for a
scouting party to make a railway impracticable for a
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? THE ARMY 155
long time. The working capacity of a railway is also
limited, and it can only transport a given number of men
and guns in each day. Our general staff has calculated
that an Army of 60,000 men can cover thirty miles as
quickly on foot as by train. It is often more useful for
the troops to spend this time in marching. It thus
follows that railway transport is only an advantage
when the distances to be covered are great, and even
then the advantage is sometimes doubtful. If a line
of advance is to be kept secret, the troops must march.
This is proved by Bourbaki's unsuccessful expedition
against Southern Alsace. He collected his Army in
trains, and tried to bring it up in that way as far as the
Vosges. All our officers are of opinion that if the troops
had gone on foot the German outposts of the small
detachments on the western spurs of the Vosges would
not have observed them soon enough. As it was, our
Uhlan patrols on the heights were able to report a
noticeable activity on the railway lines in the valley,
and General Werder thus had time to draw in his men,
and cause them to take up a defensive position. The
old truth that very much depends on the marching
capacity of an efficient body of infantry still holds good
in modern warfare.
Our ideas regarding the importance of the fortress
have, on the other hand, undergone a complete change.
The time has long vanished when every town was a
fortress, and a long campaign in a hostile country usually
ended by taking the form of siege-warfare. To-day the
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? 156 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
question is even being asked, " Are fortresses any longer
of practical use? " The Germans answer this question
far more sensibly than the French. France surrounded
herself with a tremendous rampart of fortresses, reaching
from Sedan to Belfort, and thus believed herself shut
off from Germany as by a Chinese wall. But in so long
a line there must somewhere be a weak spot, which the
Germans will certainly end by finding. There is, how-
ever, an even more important consideration. Walls
cannot defend themselves, and if they are to be effectually
defended the great fortresses need a huge garrison, which
is thus lost to the Field Army. The Germans are of
opinion that small barrier-forts are necessary, and may
be useful even to-day. A little mountain fortress of
this kind situated on a defile can, under certain circum-
stances, cut the enemy off from using a whole system
of roads.
The Saxon fortress of Konigstein, for instance, is not
impregnable, but a siege of the place might drag on
indefinitely. It was from this fortress that a successful
attempt was made in 1866 to destroy the important
railway from Dresden to Prague, so that the Prussians
were unable to use it for a fortnight. The railway could
not be repaired because the batteries of the fortress
commanded the line. The advance of the Prussians
into Bohemia was thus made very difficult. The fortress
of Bitsch, in the Vosges, plays a very similar part. Little
mountain strongholds will thus continue to be of service
for some time to come.
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? THE ARMY 157
On the other hand, it is necessary to maintain the
large strongholds known as army fortresses, in order to
have places of refuge for a whole Army, and especially
so that one may there shelter and replenish a beaten
Army. Strasburg and Metz exist for this purpose.
All our officers agree, however, that we must not have
too many fortresses of this type. Many deny that they \
have any use at all, for decisive actions in war are always
fought in the open field, and any military system which
lessens our forces in the field presents very serious draw-
backs. A fortress of this kind needs a large garrison
even when no enemy is in the neighbourhood. We are
always brought back to the fact that National Armies,
which are so full of moral energy, must be looked upon
as pre-eminently capable of assuming a vigorous offensive.
I will conclude by pointing out, very briefly, that the
Fleet has begun to assume a far more important posi-
tion--not, in the first place, as an essential factor in a
European war, for no one believes now that a war between
great Powers could be decided by a naval battle--but
as a protection for the merchant navy and the colonies.
The task of ruling countries on the other side of the
Atlantic will, from henceforth, be the chief duty of
European fleets. For, since the object of human culture
must be to assert the supremacy of the white races on
the entire globe, the importance of a people will finally
depend on the share it takes in the rule of the trans-
atlantic world. It is on this account that the importance
of the Fleet has so largely increased during our own day.
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? INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Is there really such a thing as international law? Cer-
tainly there are two common theories of international
relations, each contradictory to the other, each quite
untenable. One, the so-called naturalistic theory, dates
from Machiavelli. It is based on the notion that the State
is merely might personified, that it has the right to do
anything that is profitable to it. On this view the State
cannot fetter itself by international law; its relations
with other States depend simply on the respective strength
which it and they possess. This theory leads to an
absurdity. It it of course true that the State implies
physical might. But if a State be that and nothing else,
if it pay no heed to reason or to conscience, it will never
maintain itself in a proper condition of safety. Even
naturalistic thinkers allow that it is a function of the State
to preserve internal order; that it cannot do if it refuses
to obey any law in its relations with other States. Its
deliberate contempt for good faith, loyalty, and treaty
agreements in external relations would raise a crowd of
enemies, and prevent it from fulfilling its purpose--the
embodiment of physical force. Even Machiavelli's ideal,
Caesar Borgia, ultimately fell into the pit which he had
digged for others For the end and object of the State's
158
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? INTERNATIONAL LAW 159
existence is not physical might; it embodies might only
in order that it may protect and develop the nobler aspects
of mankind. Thus the doctrine of pure might is a vain
doctrine; it is immoral because it cannot justify its
own existence.
Directly contrary to this view of the State is another--
an equally false view. This is the " moral " conception
due to German liberalism. The State is here regarded
as a good little boy, to be washed, brushed, and sent to
school; he must have his ears pulled to keep him good,
and in return he is to be thankful, just-minded, and Heaven
knows what else. This German doctrinaire theory has
done as much harm to our political thinking as to other
forms of German life. All our political sins can be traced
back to the notion--natural enough in a learned nation--
that the pronouncement of some scientific truth is ade-
quate to turn the world's course into a new channel.
That notion underlies the German spirit of scientific
research; it also underlies our tendency to all manner of
practical blunders. The doctrinaire exponent of interna-
tional law fondly imagines that he need only emit a few
aphorisms and that the nations of the world will forth-
with, as reasonable men, accept them. We forget that
stupidity and passion matter, and have always mattered,
in history. Who, after all, can fail to see the growth
of national passions during the nineteenth century?
And whence do individuals--Rotteck, Bluntschli, Heffter,
and others--say to States peremptorily, "Thou shalt "?
No single man stands high enough to impose his doctrines
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? 160 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
on all States; he must be ready to see his theories crossed
or crushed by actual life. The delusion that there can be
such a thing as hypothetical law is at the root of these
errors. Positive law is the only law that has real existence.
Until the general public has grown convinced of the truth
and righteousness of various legal principles the function
of learned men is really limited to preparing the way.
Were we to pursue the abstract conception of the State
to its logical conclusion we should find ourselves demand-
ing a supreme authority with world-wide power. The
authority would be such as that claimed by the Papal
See--an authority not of this world, represented by the
Vicegerent of Christ and ruling in the name of God. That
is the sort of authority which we do not want on earth;
our beautiful world should be a world of liberty. Never-
theless, it is only ultramontane thinkers who have con-
sistently worked out to its logical issue the weak and
sentimental view of international law which we at this
moment are considering. That logical issue has been
rightly stated in the great "Codex" of the Jesuits;
according to it, the world is, as it were, an ethnarchy in
which the nations form an ideal community, while the
Pope, as ethnarch, wields over them a coercive power,
keeping each State within bounds by spiritual warnings
and ghostly power. That is the one practical conclusion
deducible from the premise that the State is a body liable
to external coercion. No system of international law can,
merely because it has a scientific basis, restrain a sovereign
State.
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? INTERNATIONAL LAW 161
So, then, these two extreme views are both unworkable
in practice. Let us see if we can in their place set up a
theory of international law based on historical foundations-
First and before all we must recognise clearly that we
must not overweight our human nature with demands
which our weakness cannot meet. That mistake is respon-
sible for the perversion of many an idealist into a
disillusioned fanatic. The man who declaims that might
and the mailed fist alone decide the rivalry of nations is
often a soured fanatic who in his youth smoked away at
the pipe of peace, discovered that that was too good for
this poor world, rushed off to the other extreme, and now
declares that the basis of all things is brutality and
cynicism. No doubt all great political thinkers show a
touch of cynical contempt for mankind, and when this
contempt is not too deep it has its justification. But it
is only the man who does not ask the impossible from
human nature who can really awaken the finer energies
which, despite all frailties and brutish instincts, lie dor-
mant in man.
With this in mind, we must set to work historically and
consider the State as it actually is. It is physical force;
but it is also an institution aiming at the betterment of
mankind. In so far as it is physical force it has a
natural tendency to grab as many possessions as may
seem to it desirable. But every State will nevertheless
show of its own accord a real regard for neighbouring
States. Prudent calculation and a mutual recognition
of advantages will gradually foster an ever-growing sense
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will see in them the greatness of war. Not only the life
of man, but also the right and natural emotions of his
inmost soul, his whole ego, are to be sacrificed to a great
patriotic ideal; and herein lies the moral magnificence
of war. If we pursue this idea still further we shall
see that, in spite of its hardness and roughness, war links'
men together in brotherly love, for it levels all differences
of rank, and draws men together by a common sense
of the imminence of death. Every student of history'
knows that to do away with war would be to cripple
human nature. No liberty can exist without an armed
force ready to sacrifice itself for the sake of freedom.
One cannot insist too often on the fact that scholars
never touch upon these questions without presupposing
that the State only exists as a sort of academy of arts
and sciences. This is of course also part of its duty, but
not its most immediate duty. A State which cultivates
its mental powers at the expense of its physical ones
cannot fail to go to ruin.
Generally speaking, we must admit that the greatness
of historical life lies in character rather than in educa-
tion; the driving forces of history are to be found in
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? 142 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
spheres where character is developing. Only brave
nations have any real history. In the hour of trial in
national life it becomes evident that warlike virtues have
the casting vote. There is great truth in the old phrase
which describes war as the exatnen rigorosum of the
States. In war, the States are called upon to show, not
only the extent of their physical, but also of their moral
power, and in a certain measure of their intellectual
capacity. . . . War brings to light all that a nation has
collected in secret. It is not an essential part of the
nature of armies to be always fighting; the noiseless
labour of armament goes on equally in time of peace.
The entire value of the work done for Prussia by Frederick
William I, did not appear until the days of Frederick the
Great, when the tremendous force which had been slowly
collecting suddenly revealed itself to the world at large.
The same is true of the year 1866.
And just because war is nothing more than a powerful
embodiment of politics, its issues are decided, not by
technical factors alone, but chiefly by the policy which
directs it. It is very significant that when Wrangel and
Prittwitz might have been able to get the better of the
Danes in 1848 and 1849, the King, who seems to have
felt horror at the thought of taking such a step, and who,
moreover, feared Russia, did not himself know what he
wanted. An Army can never be expected to fight when
its leaders are in doubt as to the advisibility of a particular
military action. Every war is by nature a radical one,
and in many cases the efficiency of the troops will prove
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? THE ARMY 143
useless in face of the hesitation and aimlessness of the
policy which it serves. Remember the campaign in
Champagne in 1792. The superiority in training of the
Prussian and Austrian troops over the sans culottes was
at that date still very considerable, and in the neigh-
bourhood of Mannheim a single battalion of the Wedell
Regiment prevented two French Divisions from crossing
the Rhine during the whole of one day. But still the
political result of the war was the complete downfall of
the coalition. The Allies were not of one mind; their
policy lacked all definite aim, and the campaign was
being conducted at haphazard. Political considerations
of this kind, which interfere with the strategy of the
leaders, are particularly disastrous in wars conducted
by coalitions, and history has often proved the truth
of the line, "the strong man is strongest when alone. "
In the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 the incompetent
Russian generals, in concert with the talented Prussian
commanders, carried on war to the knife, whereas the
more competent Austrians, who were hindered by the
aimless policy of their country, showed themselves
lukewarm and indifferent. A policy such as that of the
Austrians could not hope to find a better commander
than Schwarzenberg. Many wars have been lost before
they were begun because they were the result of a policy
which did not know its own mind.
Every healthy-minded Army is conscious of a strong
sense of chivalry and personal honour. But under certain
circumstances this military sense of honour becomes
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? 144 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
over-sensitive. Abuses are, of course, to be deplored, but
this touchiness is in itself a wholesome symptom. The duel
is not a thing which can be ignored, even among civilians.
In a democratic community the duel is the last protest
which can be made against a complete subversion of social
manners and customs. A certain restraint is put upon
a man by the thought that he will risk his life by offending
against social usage; and it is better that now and then
a promising young life should be laid down than that
the social morality of a whole people should be brutalised.
A sense of class-honour also fosters 'the great moral
strength which resides in the Army, and which is the
cause of a large part of its effectiveness. The officers
would lose the respect of their subordinates if they did
not show a more ticklish sense of honour and a finer
breeding. Since duelling was abolished in England,
moral coarseness in the Army has been on the increase,
and officers have been known to come to blows in railway
carriages in the very presence of their wives. It is
obvious how greatly such conduct must impair the
respect due from the men to their superiors. The state-
ment of the democrat that a man of the lower classes will
more readily obey his equal than a gentleman is entirely
false. The respect of a soldier for a man of really dis-
tinguished character will always be greater than his
respect for an old corporal. This truth was plainly
demonstrated in the last war, when it was found that
the French officers did not possess enough authority
over their men.
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? THE ARMY 145
As warfare is but the tremendous embodiment of
foreign policy, everything relating to military affairs
must have a very intimate connection with the con-
stitution of the State, and, in its turn, the particular
organization of the Army must determine^which of many
types of warfare shall be followed. Because the Middle
Ages were aristocratic, most of the battles then fought
were between cavalry, which has always been the pre-
eminently aristocratic instrument of war. The results of
this idea may still be observed to-day. (Too great a pre-
ponderance of cavalry is always a sign that the economic
condition of a nation is still defective, and that the power
of the aristocracy in the State is too absolute. . . .
Mechanical weapons have, on the other hand, always
been the especial property of the middle classes. En-
gineering has always flourished among commercial
nations, because they possess both capital and technical
skill. Among the ancients, the Carthagenians were
technically the most important nation in military affairs;
but Rome conquered them in the end, not because her
generals were better, but because of the moral force
which held her National Army together.
For however important technique may be in war, it
never turns the scales unaided. Economic considerations
such as skill in engineering or in systematic collaboration
can never help one to determine the value of an Army.
Still, this is what the commercial nations seek to do,
for they look upon an Army of purely professional soldiers
as the best. It is not technical but abstract and moral
K
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? 146 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
superiority that tells in the long run in war. As far as
physical capacity goes the English soldiers are very
efficient; they are trained to box, and are fed on an
incredibly liberal scale. But even people in England
are realising more and more strongly that there is some-
thing wrong with their Army, and that it cannot be
compared with a National Army because the moral
energies of the people are excluded from it. The world
is not as materialistic as Wellington supposed. Welling-
ton used to say that enthusiasm in an Army could only
produce confusion and other ill-effects. The really
national weapon of England is the Fleet. The martial
enthusiasm of the country--and it is far stronger than
is usually supposed on the Continent, because the idea
of a British universal empire is very general among the
people--must be sought on the men-of-war.
In considering these questions we must never lose sight
of the purely moral value of the National Army as opposed
to its purely national and political value. We must be
quite clear as to whether the perpetual complaints of
the great cost of our military system are justified. It is
certain that the blood-tax imposed by the military burden
is the greatest which a nation can be called upon to bear.
But we must never forget that there are, and ought to
be, things which are above all price. Moral possessions
have no price, and it is therefore unreasonable to try
to reckon the value of the honour and power of the State
in terms of money. Money can never represent what we
lost when the flower of our youthful manhood fell on
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? THE ARMY 147
the battle-fields of France. It is unworthy to judge the
possessions of the soul as if they were material. A great
nation is acting in a right and reasonable way if it seeks to
give expression to the idea of the State, which stands for
power, in the form of a well-ordered military organization.
Without it trade and intercourse could not prosper.
If one were to try to imagine the country without the
Army which protects our civil peace it would be im-
possible to say how great would be the decrease in our
national revenues.
Under ordinary circumstances the right to bear arms
must always be looked upon as the privilege of a free
man. It was only during the last period of the Roman
Empire that the system of keeping mercenaries was
adopted. And as mercenary troops consisted, except
for their officers, of the lowest dregs of society, the idea
soon became prevalent that military service was a dis-
grace, and the free citizen began to show himself anxious
not to take part in it. This conception of the mercenary
system has gone on perpetuating itself through the
ages, and its after-effects have been strikingly demon-
strated even in our own day. Our century has been
called upon to witness, in the formation of the National
and Civil Guards, the most immoral and unreasonable
developments of which the military system is capable.
The citizens imagined themselves too good to bear arms
against the enemies of their country, but they were not
averse to playing at soldiers at home, and even to being
able to defend their purse if it should happen to be in
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? 148 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
danger. Hence the truly disgusting invention of the
National Guard, and the inhuman legal provision that in
the event of a popular disturbance the adored rabble
might receive an immediate shaking at the hands of the
Guard. The Army was only to interfere if things became
serious. This shows a complete failure to realise the
moral nobility of the duty of defence. The right to bear
arms will ever remain the honorary privilege of the free
man. All noble minds have more or less recognised the
truth that " the God Who created iron did not wish men
to be thralls. " And it is the task of all reasonable
political systems to keep this idea in honour.
II.
The example of the German National Army has had an
irresistible influence on the rest of Europe. The ridicule
heaped on it in previous decades has now been shown to
be unwarranted. It was the custom abroad to look down
on the Prussian territorial system (Landwehr) and on the
Prussian boy Army. Things are very different now.
We know now that moral factors in warfare weigh more
heavily than technical excellence; and it is further evi-
dent that the ever-increasing technical experience of life
in barracks brings with it a corresponding brutalisation of
the moral instincts. The veteran sergeants of France were
in no way superior to the German troops, as the French
had expected. We may say with truth that the problem
of giving a military education to the strength of the nation
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? THE ARMY 149
and of making full use of the trained Army was first
seriously dealt with in Germany. Our Army constitutes
a peculiar and necessary continuation of the scholastic
system. For many people it would be impossible to
devise a better means of education. For such persons,
living as they do in a period in which mental restraint
is lacking, the drill and enforced cleanliness and strict
military discipline are indispensable from every point
of view. Carlyle prophesied that the Prussian concep-
tion of universal military service would go the round of
the globe. Since 1866 and 1870, when the organization
of the Prussian Army stood its trial so brilliantly, nearly
all the other great Powers of the Continent have sought
to imitate its methods.
But imitation abroad is not as easy as was supposed,
because the Prussian Army is really a nation in arms, and
the peculiarities and refinements of the national character
are naturally exemplified in it. Above all, a system of
this kind cannot be established unless the nation pos-
sesses a certain degree of political freedom, is satisfied
with the existing regime, and can count on social freedom
in the Government. A natural respect for superior
education is also necessary, for without it the institution
of the One-year Volunteers would be unthinkable This
system has been introduced simply in order to make it
economically and morally possible for young men belong-
ing to the educated classes to serve in the ranks. In
France this voluntary system has proved a failure, because
an external equality between different classes of men
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? 150 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
has been insisted upon. In Germany we could hardly
do without it. Quite apart from the fact that our supply
of professional officers is not nearly large enough in the
event of war, the educated young men whom the One-
year Voluntary Service transforms into territorial or
reserve officers, and who stand in many ways in a closer
relationship to the people than the professional officers,
form a natural link between the latter and the rank and
file of the Army.
The heavy burden of universal military service can be
lightened in a certain measure by decentralization,
which usually enables a man to serve in his native
province. Our Provincial Army Corps have, on the whole,
quite justified their existence. They should remain the
rule; and as a wholesome counterweight we have in
the Guard a corps which includes men from all parts of
the country, and forms a crack regiment, one of whose
functions it is to spur on the rest of the Army. The
rigid centralization of France makes the existence of
Provincial Army Corps such as ours an impossibility.
The natives of Normandy and of the Pyrenees there stand
side by side in the same regiment. In Germany, on the
other hand, common nationality is rightly looked upon
as a strong cement which will ensure the solidarity of
separate bodies of troops. This universal military ser-
vice, if it is to preserve the existence of the State, must
naturally presuppose unity in the nation as a whole.
One or two isolated little provinces, peopled by foreign
races, do not greatly affect the question, and a few simple
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? THE ARMY 151
precautions will do away with any threatened danger
from those quarters. In Austria things are more serious,
because there the officers in the Reserve are the weak
point of the Army. They are good Czechs, good Germans,
and good Magyars, but not good Austrians; and this
flaw may some day bring about disastrous consequences.
In all these matters of military organization we were
until quite lately the leaders of the other nations. During
the last few years the neighbouring States have made
such strenuous efforts to obtain military power that we
have been obliged to go further--this time in imitation
of other nations. The furthest limits to this onward
movement are imposed by the nature of things, and the
enormous physical strength of the Germanic race will
see to it that we have a perpetual advantage in this
respect over the less fruitful nations. The French have
nearly reached the utmost limits of their capacity; the
Germans possess, in this respect, far wider elbow-room.
I will ask you once more to observe the nature of the
influence exercised on warfare by these new methods in
military affairs. The general tendency of this system
is towards peace. A nation in arms is not as easily
drawn away from its social occupations to take part in a
frivolous war as a Conscript Army would be. Wars will
become rarer and of shorter duration, although more
bloody. Desire to return home will drive the Army to
advance. The temper of the Prussian soldiers in the
summer of 1866, expressed in the words, "Let us press
on towards the Danube, so that we may get home
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? 152 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
again soon," should be looked upon as the normal temper
of a courageous and, at the same time, peace-loving
National Army. There can be no difficulty to-day in
understanding the bold spirit in warfare which seeks,
above all, to plunge a dagger into the heart of the enemy.
It may be said that nothing is absolutely impossible to
a National Army of this kind when the nation can look
back over a glorious past. The experiences of our two
last wars, especially in the battles of Koniggratz and
Mars la Tour, have proved this to be true. We saw, at
the battle of Sadowa, that fourteen Prussian battalions
could stand against something like forty-two Austrian
ones; and the Franco-Prussian War furnished us with
numerous instances of decisive battles in which we
fought facing our own frontiers, so that if we had lost
we should have been driven back into the interior of the
enemy's country. (In the case of a modern National
Army the duty of sparing men is entirely swallowed up
in the higher duty of annihilating the enemy. The fear
of desertion need not be entertained; the Army can be
billeted wherever it is.
The famous saying of Montecucoli, cited even by
Frederick the Great, belongs to a period now entirely
past. Montecucoli had said that in order to wage
war a nation must have money, and money, and yet
more money. It is true that a great deal of money is
needed for the preparations involved by war; but when
fighting has once begun, the conqueror can do without
ready money. He can simply fall back on the resources
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? THE ARMY 153
of the occupied territory, and may even abstain from
paying his troops for the moment. Once when Bliicher
imposed a huge war-contribution on the French in order
to feed his hungry soldiers, the King sent an order for-
bidding him to embitter the French too much, and
promising that the soldiers' pay should be procured in
Prussia. Bliicher replied, "Your Majesty's Army is
not a mercenary army. Even if I am not permitted to
take money from a hostile country, we will not be an
unnecessary burden to our mother country. " It is a
well-known fact that Napoleon began the campaign of
1806 with a war-chest of forty thousand francs, and in
1813 we were ourselves in a far worse plight. We had,
at the beginning, only two thousand thalers (about three
hundred pounds sterling) in cash; but the first thing we
did was to turn the pecuniary resources of the Saxons
into ready money, and so we went on. <<
A certain self-reliance on the part of under-commanders
has become a necessity in the enormous National Army
of the present day. General Manteuffel once told me
that on the misty morning of the battle of Noisseville
he was only able to give quite general directions; for the
rest, he relied entirely on the initiative and sense of
responsibility of his generals. The final stages in the
development of war on the principle of universal service
have not yet been reached, and the world has not, as yet,
beheld a war between two National Armies. During the
first half of the last great war we witnessed a meeting
between a really National Army and a Conscript Army,
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? 154 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
and, later, an improvised Militia. The spectacle of the
encounter between two perfectly trained National Armies,
which we have yet to see, will certainly be a gigantic one.
The world will then witness enormous losses and enor-
mous gains. And, if we consider the multitude of new
technical devices produced in these modern times, we
must realise that future wars will give rise to far more
astounding revelations than any during the Franco-
Prussian War.
The new means of transport are especially important
in modern warfare. A State cannot have too many
railways for military purposes. An immediate occupa-
tion of an enemy's country is especially important in
modem warfare, for it puts an effective stop to all recruit-
ing. One of Napoleon III's most serious mistakes in
1870 was that he failed to occupy at least a portion
of the left bank of the Rhine. We could not, at the
outset, have prevented him from doing so, and this fact
is openly stated in the Introduction to the History of the
War composed by the general staff, which Moltke no
doubt wrote himself. We should, by that means, have
lost two army corps from our Field Army.
It is certain, then, that the more railways lead to the
frontier the better. But I must here repeat that every-
thing has its natural limits. It is true that an extensive
railway system facilitates the collection of an Army on
the frontier the moment war is declared; but during the
war its use is far more restricted. It is quite easy for a
scouting party to make a railway impracticable for a
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? THE ARMY 155
long time. The working capacity of a railway is also
limited, and it can only transport a given number of men
and guns in each day. Our general staff has calculated
that an Army of 60,000 men can cover thirty miles as
quickly on foot as by train. It is often more useful for
the troops to spend this time in marching. It thus
follows that railway transport is only an advantage
when the distances to be covered are great, and even
then the advantage is sometimes doubtful. If a line
of advance is to be kept secret, the troops must march.
This is proved by Bourbaki's unsuccessful expedition
against Southern Alsace. He collected his Army in
trains, and tried to bring it up in that way as far as the
Vosges. All our officers are of opinion that if the troops
had gone on foot the German outposts of the small
detachments on the western spurs of the Vosges would
not have observed them soon enough. As it was, our
Uhlan patrols on the heights were able to report a
noticeable activity on the railway lines in the valley,
and General Werder thus had time to draw in his men,
and cause them to take up a defensive position. The
old truth that very much depends on the marching
capacity of an efficient body of infantry still holds good
in modern warfare.
Our ideas regarding the importance of the fortress
have, on the other hand, undergone a complete change.
The time has long vanished when every town was a
fortress, and a long campaign in a hostile country usually
ended by taking the form of siege-warfare. To-day the
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? 156 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
question is even being asked, " Are fortresses any longer
of practical use? " The Germans answer this question
far more sensibly than the French. France surrounded
herself with a tremendous rampart of fortresses, reaching
from Sedan to Belfort, and thus believed herself shut
off from Germany as by a Chinese wall. But in so long
a line there must somewhere be a weak spot, which the
Germans will certainly end by finding. There is, how-
ever, an even more important consideration. Walls
cannot defend themselves, and if they are to be effectually
defended the great fortresses need a huge garrison, which
is thus lost to the Field Army. The Germans are of
opinion that small barrier-forts are necessary, and may
be useful even to-day. A little mountain fortress of
this kind situated on a defile can, under certain circum-
stances, cut the enemy off from using a whole system
of roads.
The Saxon fortress of Konigstein, for instance, is not
impregnable, but a siege of the place might drag on
indefinitely. It was from this fortress that a successful
attempt was made in 1866 to destroy the important
railway from Dresden to Prague, so that the Prussians
were unable to use it for a fortnight. The railway could
not be repaired because the batteries of the fortress
commanded the line. The advance of the Prussians
into Bohemia was thus made very difficult. The fortress
of Bitsch, in the Vosges, plays a very similar part. Little
mountain strongholds will thus continue to be of service
for some time to come.
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? THE ARMY 157
On the other hand, it is necessary to maintain the
large strongholds known as army fortresses, in order to
have places of refuge for a whole Army, and especially
so that one may there shelter and replenish a beaten
Army. Strasburg and Metz exist for this purpose.
All our officers agree, however, that we must not have
too many fortresses of this type. Many deny that they \
have any use at all, for decisive actions in war are always
fought in the open field, and any military system which
lessens our forces in the field presents very serious draw-
backs. A fortress of this kind needs a large garrison
even when no enemy is in the neighbourhood. We are
always brought back to the fact that National Armies,
which are so full of moral energy, must be looked upon
as pre-eminently capable of assuming a vigorous offensive.
I will conclude by pointing out, very briefly, that the
Fleet has begun to assume a far more important posi-
tion--not, in the first place, as an essential factor in a
European war, for no one believes now that a war between
great Powers could be decided by a naval battle--but
as a protection for the merchant navy and the colonies.
The task of ruling countries on the other side of the
Atlantic will, from henceforth, be the chief duty of
European fleets. For, since the object of human culture
must be to assert the supremacy of the white races on
the entire globe, the importance of a people will finally
depend on the share it takes in the rule of the trans-
atlantic world. It is on this account that the importance
of the Fleet has so largely increased during our own day.
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? INTERNATIONAL LAW.
Is there really such a thing as international law? Cer-
tainly there are two common theories of international
relations, each contradictory to the other, each quite
untenable. One, the so-called naturalistic theory, dates
from Machiavelli. It is based on the notion that the State
is merely might personified, that it has the right to do
anything that is profitable to it. On this view the State
cannot fetter itself by international law; its relations
with other States depend simply on the respective strength
which it and they possess. This theory leads to an
absurdity. It it of course true that the State implies
physical might. But if a State be that and nothing else,
if it pay no heed to reason or to conscience, it will never
maintain itself in a proper condition of safety. Even
naturalistic thinkers allow that it is a function of the State
to preserve internal order; that it cannot do if it refuses
to obey any law in its relations with other States. Its
deliberate contempt for good faith, loyalty, and treaty
agreements in external relations would raise a crowd of
enemies, and prevent it from fulfilling its purpose--the
embodiment of physical force. Even Machiavelli's ideal,
Caesar Borgia, ultimately fell into the pit which he had
digged for others For the end and object of the State's
158
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? INTERNATIONAL LAW 159
existence is not physical might; it embodies might only
in order that it may protect and develop the nobler aspects
of mankind. Thus the doctrine of pure might is a vain
doctrine; it is immoral because it cannot justify its
own existence.
Directly contrary to this view of the State is another--
an equally false view. This is the " moral " conception
due to German liberalism. The State is here regarded
as a good little boy, to be washed, brushed, and sent to
school; he must have his ears pulled to keep him good,
and in return he is to be thankful, just-minded, and Heaven
knows what else. This German doctrinaire theory has
done as much harm to our political thinking as to other
forms of German life. All our political sins can be traced
back to the notion--natural enough in a learned nation--
that the pronouncement of some scientific truth is ade-
quate to turn the world's course into a new channel.
That notion underlies the German spirit of scientific
research; it also underlies our tendency to all manner of
practical blunders. The doctrinaire exponent of interna-
tional law fondly imagines that he need only emit a few
aphorisms and that the nations of the world will forth-
with, as reasonable men, accept them. We forget that
stupidity and passion matter, and have always mattered,
in history. Who, after all, can fail to see the growth
of national passions during the nineteenth century?
And whence do individuals--Rotteck, Bluntschli, Heffter,
and others--say to States peremptorily, "Thou shalt "?
No single man stands high enough to impose his doctrines
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? 160 TREITSCHKE: HIS LIFE AND WORKS
on all States; he must be ready to see his theories crossed
or crushed by actual life. The delusion that there can be
such a thing as hypothetical law is at the root of these
errors. Positive law is the only law that has real existence.
Until the general public has grown convinced of the truth
and righteousness of various legal principles the function
of learned men is really limited to preparing the way.
Were we to pursue the abstract conception of the State
to its logical conclusion we should find ourselves demand-
ing a supreme authority with world-wide power. The
authority would be such as that claimed by the Papal
See--an authority not of this world, represented by the
Vicegerent of Christ and ruling in the name of God. That
is the sort of authority which we do not want on earth;
our beautiful world should be a world of liberty. Never-
theless, it is only ultramontane thinkers who have con-
sistently worked out to its logical issue the weak and
sentimental view of international law which we at this
moment are considering. That logical issue has been
rightly stated in the great "Codex" of the Jesuits;
according to it, the world is, as it were, an ethnarchy in
which the nations form an ideal community, while the
Pope, as ethnarch, wields over them a coercive power,
keeping each State within bounds by spiritual warnings
and ghostly power. That is the one practical conclusion
deducible from the premise that the State is a body liable
to external coercion. No system of international law can,
merely because it has a scientific basis, restrain a sovereign
State.
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? INTERNATIONAL LAW 161
So, then, these two extreme views are both unworkable
in practice. Let us see if we can in their place set up a
theory of international law based on historical foundations-
First and before all we must recognise clearly that we
must not overweight our human nature with demands
which our weakness cannot meet. That mistake is respon-
sible for the perversion of many an idealist into a
disillusioned fanatic. The man who declaims that might
and the mailed fist alone decide the rivalry of nations is
often a soured fanatic who in his youth smoked away at
the pipe of peace, discovered that that was too good for
this poor world, rushed off to the other extreme, and now
declares that the basis of all things is brutality and
cynicism. No doubt all great political thinkers show a
touch of cynical contempt for mankind, and when this
contempt is not too deep it has its justification. But it
is only the man who does not ask the impossible from
human nature who can really awaken the finer energies
which, despite all frailties and brutish instincts, lie dor-
mant in man.
With this in mind, we must set to work historically and
consider the State as it actually is. It is physical force;
but it is also an institution aiming at the betterment of
mankind. In so far as it is physical force it has a
natural tendency to grab as many possessions as may
seem to it desirable. But every State will nevertheless
show of its own accord a real regard for neighbouring
States. Prudent calculation and a mutual recognition
of advantages will gradually foster an ever-growing sense
L
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