No More Learning

Objection 1: It would seem that there is one active intellect in all.
For what is separate from the body is not multiplied according to the
number of bodies. But the active intellect is "separate," as the
Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore it is not multiplied in
the many human bodies, but is one for all men.

Objection 2: Further, the active intellect is the cause of the
universal, which is one in many. But that which is the cause of unity
is still more itself one. Therefore the active intellect is the same in
all.

Objection 3: Further, all men agree in the first intellectual concepts.
But to these they assent by the active intellect. Therefore all agree
in one active intellect.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) that the active
intellect is as a light. But light is not the same in the various
things enlightened. Therefore the same active intellect is not in
various men.

I answer that, The truth about this question depends on what we have
already said [644](A[4]). For if the active intellect were not
something belonging to the soul, but were some separate substance,
there would be one active intellect for all men. And this is what they
mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all. But if the
active intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its
powers, we are bound to say that there are as many active intellects as
there are souls, which are multiplied according to the number of men,
as we have said above ([645]Q[76], A[2]). For it is impossible that one
same power belong to various substances.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher proves that the active intellect
is separate, by the fact that the passive intellect is separate:
because, as he says (De Anima iii, 5), "the agent is more noble than
the patient. " Now the passive intellect is said to be separate, because
it is not the act of any corporeal organ. And in the same sense the
active intellect is also called "separate"; but not as a separate
substance.

Reply to Objection 2: The active intellect is the cause of the
universal, by abstracting it from matter. But for this purpose it need
not be the same intellect in all intelligent beings; but it must be one
in its relationship to all those things from which it abstracts the
universal, with respect to which things the universal is one. And this
befits the active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial.

Reply to Objection 3: All things which are of one species enjoy in
common the action which accompanies the nature of the species, and
consequently the power which is the principle of such action; but not
so as that power be identical in all. Now to know the first
intelligible principles is the action belonging to the human species.
Wherefore all men enjoy in common the power which is the principle of
this action: and this power is the active intellect. But there is no
need for it to be identical in all. Yet it must be derived by all from
one principle. And thus the possession by all men in common of the
first principles proves the unity of the separate intellect, which
Plato compares to the sun; but not the unity of the active intellect,
which Aristotle compares to light.
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Whether memory is in the intellectual part of the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that memory is not in the intellectual part
of the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that to the
higher part of the soul belongs those things which are not "common to
man and beast. " But memory is common to man and beast, for he says (De
Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that "beasts can sense corporeal things through the
senses of the body, and commit them to memory. " Therefore memory does
not belong to the intellectual part of the soul.

Objection 2: Further, memory is of the past. But the past is said of
something with regard to a fixed time. Memory, therefore, knows a thing
under a condition of a fixed time; which involves knowledge under the
conditions of "here" and "now. " But this is not the province of the
intellect, but of the sense. Therefore memory is not in the
intellectual part, but only in the sensitive.

Objection 3: Further, in the memory are preserved the species of those
things of which we are not actually thinking. But this cannot happen in
the intellect, because the intellect is reduced to act by the fact that
the intelligible species are received into it. Now the intellect in act
implies understanding in act; and therefore the intellect actually
understands all things of which it has the species. Therefore the
memory is not in the intellectual part.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11) that "memory,
understanding, and will are one mind. "

I answer that, Since it is of the nature of the memory to preserve the
species of those things which are not actually apprehended, we must
first of all consider whether the intelligible species can thus be
preserved in the intellect: because Avicenna held that this was
impossible. For he admitted that this could happen in the sensitive
part, as to some powers, inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal organs,
in which certain species may be preserved apart from actual
apprehension. But in the intellect, which has no corporeal organ,
nothing but what is intelligible exists. Wherefore every thing of which
the likeness exists in the intellect must be actually understood. Thus,
therefore, according to him, as soon as we cease to understand
something actually, the species of that thing ceases to be in our
intellect, and if we wish to understand that thing anew, we must turn
to the active intellect, which he held to be a separate substance, in
order that the intelligible species may thence flow again into our
passive intellect. And from the practice and habit of turning to the
active intellect there is formed, according to him, a certain aptitude
in the passive intellect for turning to the active intellect; which
aptitude he calls the habit of knowledge. According, therefore, to this
supposition, nothing is preserved in the intellectual part that is not
actually understood: wherefore it would not be possible to admit memory
in the intellectual part.

But this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of Aristotle. For
he says (De Anima iii, 4) that, when the passive intellect "is
identified with each thing as knowing it, it is said to be in act," and
that "this happens when it can operate of itself. And, even then, it is
in potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning and
discovering. " Now, the passive intellect is said to be each thing,
inasmuch as it receives the intelligible species of each thing. To the
fact, therefore, that it receives the species of intelligible things it
owes its being able to operate when it wills, but not so that it be
always operating: for even then is it in potentiality in a certain
sense, though otherwise than before the act of understanding---namely,
in the sense that whoever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to
actual consideration.

The foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason. For what is received
into something is received according to the conditions of the
recipient. But the intellect is of a more stable nature, and is more
immovable than corporeal nature. If, therefore, corporeal matter holds
the forms which it receives, not only while it actually does something
through them, but also after ceasing to act through them, much more
cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive the species
unchangeably and lastingly, whether it receive them from things
sensible, or derive them from some superior intellect. Thus, therefore,
if we take memory only for the power of retaining species, we must say
that it is in the intellectual part. But if in the notion of memory we
include its object as something past, then the memory is not in the
intellectual, but only in the sensitive part, which apprehends
individual things. For past, as past, since it signifies being under a
condition of fixed time, is something individual.

Reply to Objection 1: Memory, if considered as retentive of species, is
not common to us and other animals. For species are not retained in the
sensitive part of the soul only, but rather in the body and soul
united: since the memorative power is the act of some organ. But the
intellect in itself is retentive of species, without the association of
any corporeal organ. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4)
that "the soul is the seat of the species, not the whole soul, but the
intellect. "

Reply to Objection 2: The condition of past may be referred to two
things---namely, to the object which is known, and to the act of
knowledge. These two are found together in the sensitive part, which
apprehends something from the fact of its being immuted by a present
sensible: wherefore at the same time an animal remembers to have sensed
before in the past, and to have sensed some past sensible thing. But as
concerns the intellectual part, the past is accidental, and is not in
itself a part of the object of the intellect. For the intellect
understands man, as man: and to man, as man, it is accidental that he
exist in the present, past, or future. But on the part of the act, the
condition of past, even as such, may be understood to be in the
intellect, as well as in the senses. Because our soul's act of
understanding is an individual act, existing in this or that time,
inasmuch as a man is said to understand now, or yesterday, or tomorrow.
And this is not incompatible with the intellectual nature: for such an
act of understanding, though something individual, is yet an immaterial
act, as we have said above of the intellect ([646]Q[76], A[1]); and
therefore, as the intellect understands itself, though it be itself an
individual intellect, so also it understands its act of understanding,
which is an individual act, in the past, present, or future. In this
way, then, the notion of memory, in as far as it regards past events,
is preserved in the intellect, forasmuch as it understands that it
previously understood: but not in the sense that it understands the
past as something "here" and "now. "

Reply to Objection 3: The intelligible species is sometimes in the
intellect only in potentiality, and then the intellect is said to be in
potentiality. Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect as
regards the ultimate completion of the act, and then it understands in
act. And sometimes the intelligible species is in a middle state,
between potentiality and act: and then we have habitual knowledge. In
this way the intellect retains the species, even when it does not
understand in act.
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Whether the intellectual memory is a power distinct from the intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct
from the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns to the soul
memory, understanding, and will. But it is clear that the memory is a
distinct power from the will. Therefore it is also distinct from the
intellect.

Objection 2: Further, the reason of distinction among the powers in the
sensitive part is the same as in the intellectual part. But memory in
the sensitive part is distinct from sense, as we have said ([647]Q[78],
A[4]). Therefore memory in the intellectual part is distinct from the
intellect.

Objection 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xi, 7),
memory, understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one flows
from the other. But this could not be if memory and intellect were the
same power. Therefore they are not the same power.

On the contrary, From its nature the memory is the treasury or
storehouse of species. But the Philosopher (De Anima iii) attributes
this to the intellect, as we have said (A[6], ad 1). Therefore the
memory is not another power from the intellect.

I answer that, As has been said above ([648]Q[77], A[3]), the powers of
the soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their
objects: since each power is defined in reference to that thing to
which it is directed and which is its object. It has also been said
above ([649]Q[59], A[4]) that if any power by its nature be directed to
an object according to the common ratio of the object, that power will
not be differentiated according to the individual differences of that
object: just as the power of sight, which regards its object under the
common ratio of color, is not differentiated by differences of black
and white. Now, the intellect regards its object under the common ratio
of being: since the passive intellect is that "in which all are in
potentiality. " Wherefore the passive intellect is not differentiated by
any difference of being. Nevertheless there is a distinction between
the power of the active intellect and of the passive intellect: because
as regards the same object, the active power which makes the object to
be in act must be distinct from the passive power, which is moved by
the object existing in act. Thus the active power is compared to its
object as a being in act is to a being in potentiality; whereas the
passive power, on the contrary, is compared to its object as being in
potentiality is to a being in act. Therefore there can be no other
difference of powers in the intellect, but that of passive and active.
Wherefore it is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the
intellect: for it belongs to the nature of a passive power to retain as
well as to receive.

Reply to Objection 1: Although it is said (3 Sent. D, 1) that memory,
intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with
the meaning of Augustine, who says expressly (De Trin. xiv) that "if we
take memory, intelligence, and will as always present in the soul,
whether we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the
memory only. And by intelligence I mean that by which we understand
when actually thinking; and by will I mean that love or affection which
unites the child and its parent. " Wherefore it is clear that Augustine
does not take the above three for three powers; but by memory he
understands the soul's habit of retention; by intelligence, the act of
the intellect; and by will, the act of the will.

Reply to Objection 2: Past and present may differentiate the sensitive
powers, but not the intellectual powers, for the reason give above.

Reply to Objection 3: Intelligence arises from memory, as act from
habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to a
power.
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Whether the reason is distinct from the intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the reason is a distinct power from the
intellect. For it is stated in De Spiritu et Anima that "when we wish
to rise from lower things to higher, first the sense comes to our aid,
then imagination, then reason, then the intellect. " Therefore the
reason is distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense.

Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6), that intellect
is compared to reason, as eternity to time. But it does not belong to
the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason
and intellect are not the same power.

Objection 3: Further, man has intellect in common with the angels, and
sense in common with the brutes. But reason, which is proper to man,
whence he is called a rational animal, is a power distinct from sense.
Therefore is it equally true to say that it is distinct from the
intellect, which properly belongs to the angel: whence they are called
intellectual.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 20) that "that in
which man excels irrational animals is reason, or mind, or intelligence
or whatever appropriate name we like to give it. " Therefore, reason,
intellect and mind are one power.

I answer that, Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers.
We shall understand this clearly if we consider their respective
actions. For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth:
and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, so as
to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels, who according to
their nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible truth, have no
need to advance from one thing to another; but apprehend the truth
simply and without mental discussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
vii). But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by
advancing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called
rational. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding, as
movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession; of which one belongs
to the perfect, the other to the imperfect. And since movement always
proceeds from something immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence
it is that human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, advances
from certain things simply understood---namely, the first principles;
and, again, by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles,
in the light of which it examines what it has found. Now it is clear
that rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but
to one and the same, even in natural things: since by the same nature a
thing is moved towards a certain place. Much more, therefore, by the
same power do we understand and reason: and so it is clear that in man
reason and intellect are the same power.

Reply to Objection 1: That enumeration is made according to the order
of actions, not according to the distinction of powers. Moreover, that
book is not of great authority.

Reply to Objection 2: The answer is clear from what we have said. For
eternity is compared to time as immovable to movable. And thus Boethius
compared the intellect to eternity, and reason to time.

Reply to Objection 3: Other animals are so much lower than man that
they cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But
man attains, although imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible
truth, which angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of
knowledge is not of a different genus fro that which is in the human
reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect.
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Whether the higher and lower reason are distinct powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the higher and lower reason are
distinct powers. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7), that the image
of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in the
lower. But the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore the higher
and lower reason are two powers.

Objection 2: Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, the lower reason
flows from the higher, and is ruled and directed by it. Therefore the
higher reason is another power from the lower.

Objection 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 1) that "the
scientific part" of the soul, by which the soul knows necessary things,
is another principle, and another part from the "opinionative" and
"reasoning" part by which it knows contingent things. And he proves
this from the principle that for those things which are "generically
different, generically different parts of the soul are ordained. " Now
contingent and necessary are generically different, as corruptible and
incorruptible. Since, therefore, necessary is the same as eternal, and
temporal the same as contingent, it seems that what the Philosopher
calls the "scientific" part must be the same as the higher reason,
which, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the
consideration and consultation of things eternal"; and that what the
Philosopher calls the "reasoning" or "opinionative" part is the same as
the lower reason, which, according to Augustine, "is intent on the
disposal of temporal things. " Therefore the higher reason is another
power than the lower.

Objection 4: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "opinion
rises from the imagination: then the mind by judging of the truth or
error of the opinion discovers the truth: whence" men's (mind) "is
derived from" metiendo [measuring]. "And therefore the intellect
regards those things which are already subject to judgment and true
decision. " Therefore the opinionative power, which is the lower reason,
is distinct from the mind and the intellect, by which we may understand
the higher reason.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "the higher and
lower reason are only distinct by their functions. " Therefore they are
not two powers.

I answer that, The higher and lower reason, as they are understood by
Augustine, can in no way be two powers of the soul. For he says that
"the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and
consultation of things eternal": forasmuch as in contemplation it sees
them in themselves, and in consultation it takes its rules of action
from them. But he calls the lower reason that which "is intent on the
disposal of temporal things. " Now these two---namely, eternal and
temporal ---are related to our knowledge in this way, that one of them
is the means of knowing the other. For by way of discovery, we come
through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal,
according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. 1:20), "The invisible
things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are
made": while by way of judgment, from eternal things already known, we
judge of temporal things, and according to laws of things eternal we
dispose of temporal things.

But it may happen that the medium and what is attained thereby belong
to different habits: as the first indemonstrable principles belong to
the habit of the intellect; whereas the conclusions which we draw from
them belong to the habit of science. And so it happens that from the
principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in another science---for
example, perspective. But the power of the reason is such that both
medium and term belong to it. For the act of the reason is, as it were,
a movement from one thing to another. But the same movable thing passes
through the medium and reaches the end. Wherefore the higher and lower
reasons are one and the same power. But according to Augustine they are
distinguished by the functions of their actions, and according to their
various habits: for wisdom is attributed to the higher reason, science
to the lower.

Reply to Objection 1: We speak of parts, in whatever way a thing is
divided. And so far as reason is divided according to its various acts,
the higher and lower reason are called parts; but not because they are
different powers.

Reply to Objection 2: The lower reason is said to flow from the higher,
or to be ruled by it, as far as the principles made use of by the lower
reason are drawn from and directed by the principles of the higher
reason.

Reply to Objection 3: The "scientific" part, of which the Philosopher
speaks, is not the same as the higher reason: for necessary truths are
found even among temporal things, of which natural science and
mathematics treat. And the "opinionative" and "ratiocinative" part is
more limited than the lower reason; for it regards only things
contingent. Neither must we say, without any qualification, that a
power, by which the intellect knows necessary things, is distinct from
a power by which it knows contingent things: because it knows both
under the same objective aspect---namely, under the aspect of being and
truth. Wherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have perfect
being in truth; since it penetrates to their very essence, from which
it demonstrates their proper accidents. On the other hand, it knows
contingent things, but imperfectly; forasmuch as they have but
imperfect being and truth. Now perfect and imperfect in the action do
not vary the power, but they vary the actions as to the mode of acting,
and consequently the principles of the actions and the habits
themselves. And therefore the Philosopher postulates two lesser parts
of the soul---namely, the "scientific" and the "ratiocinative," not
because they are two powers, but because they are distinct according to
a different aptitude for receiving various habits, concerning the
variety of which he inquires. For contingent and necessary, though
differing according to their proper genera, nevertheless agree in the
common aspect of being, which the intellect considers, and to which
they are variously compared as perfect and imperfect.

Reply to Objection 4: That distinction given by Damascene is according
to the variety of acts, not according to the variety of powers. For
"opinion" signifies an act of the intellect which leans to one side of
a contradiction, whilst in fear of the other. While to "judge" or
"measure" [mensurare] is an act of the intellect, applying certain
principles to examine propositions. From this is taken the word "mens"
[mind]. Lastly, to "understand" is to adhere to the formed judgment
with approval.
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Whether intelligence is a power distinct from intellect?

Objection 1: It would seem that the intelligence is another power than
the intellect. For we read in De Spiritu et Anima that "when we wish to
rise from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid,
then imagination, then reason, then intellect, and afterwards
intelligence. " But imagination and sense are distinct powers. Therefore
also intellect and intelligence are distinct.

Objection 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. v, 4) that "sense
considers man in one way, imagination in another, reason in another,
intelligence in another. " But intellect is the same power as reason.
Therefore, seemingly, intelligence is a distinct power from intellect,
as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense.

Objection 3: Further, "actions came before powers," as the Philosopher
says (De Anima ii, 4). But intelligence is an act separate from others
attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that
"the first movement is called intelligence; but that intelligence which
is about a certain thing is called intention; that which remains and
conforms the soul to that which is understood is called invention, and
invention when it remains in the same man, examining and judging of
itself, is called phronesis [that is, wisdom], and phronesis if dilated
makes thought, that is, orderly internal speech; from which, they say,
comes speech expressed by the tongue. " Therefore it seems that
intelligence is some special power.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 6) that
"intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is nothing
false. " But the knowledge of these things belongs to the intellect.
Therefore intelligence is not another power than the intellect.

I answer that, This word "intelligence" properly signifies the
intellect's very act, which is to understand. However, in some works
translated from the Arabic, the separate substances which we call
angels are called "intelligences," and perhaps for this reason, that
such substances are always actually understanding. But in works
translated from the Greek, they are called "intellects" or "minds. "
Thus intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as power is from
power; but as act is from power. And such a division is recognized even
by the philosophers. For sometimes they assign four
intellects---namely, the "active" and "passive" intellects, the
intellect "in habit," and the "actual" intellect. Of which four the
active and passive intellects are different powers; just as in all
things the active power is distinct from the passive. But three of
these are distinct, as three states of the passive intellect, which is
sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it is called passive;
sometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge, and thus it is
called intellect in habit; and sometimes it is in the second act, which
is to consider, and thus it is called intellect in act, or actual
intellect.

Reply to Objection 1: If this authority is accepted, intelligence there
means the act of the intellect. And thus it is divided against
intellect as act against power.

Reply to Objection 2: Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act
of the intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he
also says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence
alone belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand all things
without any investigation.

Reply to Objection 3: All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong
to one power---namely, the intellectual power. For this power first of
all only apprehends something; and this act is called "intelligence. "
Secondly, it directs what it apprehends to the knowledge of something
else, or to some operation; and this is called "intention. " And when it
goes on in search of what it "intends," it is called "invention. " When,
by reference to something known for certain, it examines what it has
found, it is said to know or to be wise, which belongs to "phronesis"
or "wisdom"; for "it belongs to the wise man to judge," as the
Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). And when once it has obtained
something for certain, as being fully examined, it thinks about the
means of making it known to others; and this is the ordering of
"interior speech," from which proceeds "external speech. " For every
difference of acts does not make the powers vary, but only what cannot
be reduced to the one same principle, as we have said above
([650]Q[78], A[4]).
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Whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the speculative and practical
intellects are distinct powers. For the apprehensive and motive are
different kinds of powers, as is clear from De Anima ii, 3. But the
speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power; while the
practical intellect is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct
powers.

Objection 2: Further, the different nature of the object differentiates
the power. But the object of the speculative intellect is "truth," and
of the practical is "good"; which differ in nature. Therefore the
speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers.

Objection 3: Further, in the intellectual part, the practical intellect
is compared to the speculative, as the estimative is to the imaginative
power in the sensitive part. But the estimative differs from the
imaginative, as power form power, as we have said above ([651]Q[78],
A[4]). Therefore also the speculative intellect differs from the
practical.

On the contrary, The speculative intellect by extension becomes
practical (De Anima iii, 10). But one power is not changed into
another. Therefore the speculative and practical intellects are not
distinct powers.

I answer that, The speculative and practical intellects are not
distinct powers. The reason of which is that, as we have said above
([652]Q[77], A[3]), what is accidental to the nature of the object of a
power, does not differentiate that power; for it is accidental to a
thing colored to be man, or to be great or small; hence all such things
are apprehended by the same power of sight. Now, to a thing apprehended
by the intellect, it is accidental whether it be directed to operation
or not, and according to this the speculative and practical intellects
differ. For it is the speculative intellect which directs what it
apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration of truth; while
the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to
operation. And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10);
that "the speculative differs from the practical in its end. " Whence
each is named from its end: the one speculative, the other
practical---i. e. operative.

Reply to Objection 1: The practical intellect is a motive power, not as
executing movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to it
according to its mode of apprehension.

Reply to Objection 2: Truth and good include one another; for truth is
something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is
something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore as
the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the aspect
of good, for example, when some one desires to know the truth; so the
object of the practical intellect is good directed to the operation,
and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect knows truth,
just as the speculative, but it directs the known truth to operation.

Reply to Objection 3: Many differences differentiate the sensitive
powers, which do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as we have
said above (A[7] , ad 2; [653]Q[77], A[3], ad 4).
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Whether synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from the others?

Objection 1: It would seem that "synderesis" is a special power,
distinct from the others. For those things which fall under one
division, seem to be of the same genus. But in the gloss of Jerome on
Ezech. 1:6, "synderesis" is divided against the irascible, the
concupiscible, and the rational, which are powers. Therefore
"synderesis" is a power.

Objection 2: Further, opposite things are of the same genus. But
"synderesis" and sensuality seem to be opposed to one another because
"synderesis" always incites to good; while sensuality always incites to
evil: whence it is signified by the serpent, as is clear from Augustine
(De Trin. xii, 12,13). It seems, therefore, that 'synderesis' is a
power just as sensuality is.

Objection 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 10) that in the
natural power of judgment there are certain "rules and seeds of virtue,
both true and unchangeable. " And this is what we call synderesis.
Since, therefore, the unchangeable rules which guide our judgment
belong to the reason as to its higher part, as Augustine says (De Trin.
xii, 2), it seems that "synderesis" is the same as reason: and thus it
is a power.

On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2),
"rational powers regard opposite things. " But "synderesis" does not
regard opposites, but inclines to good only. Therefore "synderesis" is
not a power. For if it were a power it would be a rational power, since
it is not found in brute animals.

I answer that, "Synderesis" is not a power but a habit; though some
held that it is a power higher than reason; while others [*Cf.
Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. II, Q[73]] said that it is reason
itself, not as reason, but as a nature. In order to make this clear we
must observe that, as we have said above [654](A[8]), man's act of
reasoning, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the
understanding of certain things---namely, those which are naturally
known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an
immovable principle---and ends also at the understanding, inasmuch as
by means of those principles naturally known, we judge of those things
which we have discovered by reasoning. Now it is clear that, as the
speculative reason argues about speculative things, so that practical
reason argues about practical things. Therefore we must have, bestowed
on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical
principles. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by
nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which
is called "the understanding of principles," as the Philosopher
explains (Ethic. vi, 6). Wherefore the first practical principles,
bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a
special natural habit, which we call "synderesis. " Whence "synderesis"
is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through
first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have
discovered. It is therefore clear that "synderesis" is not a power, but
a natural habit.

Reply to Objection 1: The division given by Jerome is taken from the
variety of acts, and not from the variety of powers; and various acts
can belong to one power.

Reply to Objection 2: In like manner, the opposition of sensuality to
"synderesis" is an opposition of acts, and not of the different species
of one genus.

Reply to Objection 3: Those unchangeable notions are the first
practical principles, concerning which no one errs; and they are
attributed to reason as to a power, and to "synderesis" as to a habit.
Wherefore we judge naturally both by our reason and by "synderesis. "
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Whether conscience be a power?

Objection 1: It would seem that conscience is a power; for Origen says
[*Commentary on Rom. 2:15] that "conscience is a correcting and guiding
spirit accompanying the soul, by which it is led away from evil and
made to cling to good. " But in the soul, spirit designates a
power---either the mind itself, according to the text (Eph. 4:13), "Be
ye renewed in the spirit of your mind"---or the imagination, whence
imaginary vision is called spiritual, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.
xii, 7,24). Therefore conscience is a power.

Objection 2: Further, nothing is a subject of sin, except a power of
the soul. But conscience is a subject of sin; for it is said of some
that "their mind and conscience are defiled" (Titus 1:15). Therefore it
seems that conscience is a power.

Objection 3: Further, conscience must of necessity be either an act, a
habit, or a power. But it is not an act; for thus it would not always
exist in man. Nor is it a habit; for conscience is not one thing but
many, since we are directed in our actions by many habits of knowledge.
Therefore conscience is a power.

On the contrary, Conscience can be laid aside. But a power cannot be
laid aside. Therefore conscience is not a power.

I answer that, Properly speaking, conscience is not a power, but an
act. This is evident both from the very name and from those things
which in the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience. For
conscience, according to the very nature of the word, implies the
relation of knowledge to something: for conscience may be resolved into
"cum alio scientia," i. e. knowledge applied to an individual case. But
the application of knowledge to something is done by some act.
Wherefore from this explanation of the name it is clear that conscience
is an act.

The same is manifest from those things which are attributed to
conscience. For conscience is said to witness, to bind, or incite, and
also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. And all these follow the
application of knowledge or science to what we do: which application is
made in three ways. One way in so far as we recognize that we have done
or not done something; "Thy conscience knoweth that thou hast often
spoken evil of others" (Eccles. 7:23), and according to this,
conscience is said to witness. In another way, so far as through the
conscience we judge that something should be done or not done; and in
this sense, conscience is said to incite or to bind. In the third way,
so far as by conscience we judge that something done is well done or
ill done, and in this sense conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or
torment. Now, it is clear that all these things follow the actual
application of knowledge to what we do. Wherefore, properly speaking,
conscience denominates an act. But since habit is a principle of act,
sometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural
habit---namely, 'synderesis': thus Jerome calls 'synderesis' conscience
(Gloss. Ezech. 1:6); Basil [*Hom. in princ. Proverb. ], the "natural
power of judgment," and Damascene [*De Fide Orth. iv. 22] says that it
is the "law of our intellect. " For it is customary for causes and
effects to be called after one another.

Reply to Objection 1: Conscience is called a spirit, so far as spirit
is the same as mind; because conscience is a certain pronouncement of
the mind.

Reply to Objection 2: The conscience is said to be defiled, not as a
subject, but as the thing known is in knowledge; so far as someone
knows he is defiled.

Reply to Objection 3: Although an act does not always remain in itself,
yet it always remains in its cause, which is power and habit. Now all
the habits by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless
have their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first
principles, which is called "synderesis. " And for this special reason,
this habit is sometimes called conscience, as we have said above.
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OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL (TWO ARTICLES)

Next we consider the appetitive powers, concerning which there are four
heads of consideration: first, the appetitive powers in general;
second, sensuality; third, the will; fourth, the free-will. Under the
first there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the appetite should be considered a special power of the
soul?

(2) Whether the appetite should be divided into intellectual and
sensitive as distinct powers?
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Whether the appetite is a special power of the soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that the appetite is not a special power of
the soul. For no power of the soul is to be assigned for those things
which are common to animate and to inanimate things. But appetite is
common to animate and inanimate things: since "all desire good," as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore the appetite is not a special
power of the soul.

Objection 2: Further, powers are differentiated by their objects. But
what we desire is the same as what we know. Therefore the appetitive
power is not distinct from the apprehensive power.

Objection 3: Further, the common is not divided from the proper. But
each power of the soul desires some particular desirable thing---namely
its own suitable object. Therefore, with regard to this object which is
the desirable in general, we should not assign some particular power
distinct from the others, called the appetitive power.

On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes (De Anima ii, 3) the
appetitive from the other powers. Damascene also (De Fide Orth. ii, 22)
distinguishes the appetitive from the cognitive powers.

I answer that, It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the
soul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination
follows every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to
rise, and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to have a more
perfect existence in those things which participate knowledge than in
those which lack knowledge. For in those which lack knowledge, the form
is found to determine each thing only to its own being---that is, to
its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural
inclination, which is called the natural appetite. But in those things
which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being
by its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive
of the species of other things: for example, sense receives the species
of all things sensible, and the intellect, of all things intelligible,
so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and
intellect: and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in a way,
approach to a likeness to God, "in Whom all things pre-exist," as
Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).

Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a
higher manner and above the manner of natural forms; so must there be
in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is
called the natural appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to
the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to
desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by
its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive power
to the soul.

Reply to Objection 1: Appetite is found in things which have knowledge,
above the common manner in which it is found in all things, as we have
said above. Therefore it is necessary to assign to the soul a
particular power.

Reply to Objection 2: What is apprehended and what is desired are the
same in reality, but differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended as
something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable
or good. Now, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not
material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers.

Reply to Objection 3: Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and
has a natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by
the natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself. Above
which natural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows the
apprehension, and by which something is desired not as suitable to this
or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing; but
simply as suitable to the animal.
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Whether the sensitive and intellectual appetites are distinct powers?

Objection 1: It would seem that the sensitive and intellectual
appetites are not distinct powers. For powers are not differentiated by
accidental differences, as we have seen above ([655]Q[77], A[3]). But
it is accidental to the appetible object whether it be apprehended by
the sense or by the intellect. Therefore the sensitive and intellectual
appetites are not distinct powers.

Objection 2: Further, intellectual knowledge is of universals; and so
it is distinct from sensitive knowledge, which is of individual things.
But there is no place for this distinction in the appetitive part: for
since the appetite is a movement of the soul to individual things,
seemingly every act of the appetite regards an individual thing.
Therefore the intellectual appetite is not distinguished from the
sensitive.

Objection 3: Further, as under the apprehensive power, the appetitive
is subordinate as a lower power, so also is the motive power. But the
motive power which in man follows the intellect is not distinct from
the motive power which in animals follows sense. Therefore, for a like
reason, neither is there distinction in the appetitive part.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9) distinguishes a
double appetite, and says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite
moves the lower.

I answer that, We must needs say that the intellectual appetite is a
distinct power from the sensitive appetite. For the appetitive power is
a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended:
wherefore the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved,
while the appetite is a mover moved, as the Philosopher says in De
Anima iii, 10 and Metaph. xii (Did. xi, 7).