The court of directors was not so much an
executive
as a
deliberative body.
deliberative body.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
cit.
pp.
384-7.
2 Cf. Metcalfe, op. cit. p. 72.
## p. 197 (#233) ############################################
SIR COLIN CAMPBELL
197
contingent, which Sindhia could no longer restrain, was threatening
that city; but Sir Colin, rejecting the advice of Outram, who urged
him to secure its safety first, resolved to advance, and contented him-
self with leaving a detachment under General Windham to oppose
Tantia. On the 13th his force, numbering about five thousand men,
encamped at the Alambagh. The chief engineer advised him to adopt
the plan which Havelock had proposed—to cross the Gumti and
recross it near the residency. Though this route traversed open ground,
where the heavy guns could act and the enemy were not prepared,
he preferred the advice of Outram, who recommended him to cross
the canal near its junction with the river, and thence to follow the
route by which the main body had advanced in September. On the
16th the army crossed the canal. The enemy, deluded by a recon-
naissance which Sir Colin had made on his left, offered no opposition
till the advanced guard, moving in a narrow lane, was deluged by a
hail of bullets from the Sikandar Bagh on its right. For the moment
the situation seemed almost desperate: but by herculean efforts a
troop of horse artillery clambered up the bank on the side of the lane;
heavy guns were dragged through an opening which the sappers cut;
and within an hour a breach appeared. The defenders, trapped
between the assailants and others who had forced an entrance through
a door, were gradually overpowered, and by sunset the survivors,
crowding into the towers at the angles of the building, were utterly
destroyed. Nearer the residency, the Shah Najif, a large mosque,
standing in a garden surrounded by a wall, withstood the heaviest
artillery, and Sir Colin had ordered the guns to be withdrawn when
a Highland regiment passed through a cleft which had fortunately
been discovered in the wall, and found that the garrison had fled.
Havelock had already captured buildings on the east of the residency:
next day the only remaining strongholds that barred the advance
were stormed; and in the afternoon the relieving army joined the
garrison. Two days later, Sir Colin having secured his left fank, the
women and children, the sick and the wounded, were removed.
Outram and Havelock besought him to seize the Kaisar Bagh and
thus re-establish British supremacy; but, although the formidable
citadel was breached within three days, he refused to leave behind
the small force for which they asked, insisting that his entire army
would be needed to secure Cawnpore. The garrison therefore
evacuated the entrenchment; and two days later Havelock, weakened
by privation, succumbed to dysentery. On the 27th Sir Colin, leaving
Outram at the Alambagh to withstand the rebels until he should
himself return to crush them, marched with the convoy for Cawnpore.
The low tremulous sound which tells that artillery is at work at some
distant place was plainly heard.
Sir Colin had ordered Windham to occupy and strengthen the
entrenchment which Havelock had constructed, to send on to Luck-
## p. 198 (#234) ############################################
198
THE MUTINY
now any British infantry that might join him, and, if Tantia should
threaten to attack him, to extend his force conspicuously in advance
of the entrenchment, but not to assume the offensive unless there
should be no other way of saving the position from bombardment.
Learning that Tantia was near, Windham obtained leave to retain
a portion of the expected reinforcements; but within the next few
days various reports led him to fear that his chief had suffered a
reverse. Knowing that if he himself should be attacked, the defensivo
display prescribed by Sir Colin would be of no avail, he had prepared
and forwarded for approval a plan for destroying iwo of the most
important posts which Tantia occupied; but, owing to the interruption
of communication, he received no reply. Though he shrank from
executing this plan on his own responsibility, he attacked and defeated
a detachment which Tantia personally commanded, but immediately
retreated and selected a more defensible encamping-ground, west of
the town. Hearing that all had gone well at Lucknow, he hoped that
Tantia would not venture to attack him before Sir Colin returned.
Tantia, however, knew that Windham would not have followed up
a victory by retreat if he had not felt anxious; his own force was
enormously superior; and in the next two days he twice defeated
Windham, who failed at the critical moment to support his best
officer, and was ill-served by another. Sir Colin, who received urgent
letters on his march, rode on, fearing that the bridge might have been
destroyed, in advance of the column, and at sunset saw the battle still
raging and flames rushing up above the city. But Windham had pre-
served two vital points: not only the bridge, but also the entrenchment
remained intact. Next morning Tantia opened fire upon the bridge;
but his artillery was overpowered, and Sir Colin's army, with the
convov, safely crossed. For a week he remained on the defensive,
to allow the convoy to get out of danger; but on 6 December he gained
a victory which would
have been decisive if the chief of the staff had
not missed a chance of cutting off the retreat of two-thirds of Tantia's
army.
While Sir Colin, kept inactive by want of carriage, was awaiting
the return of the carts that had transported the convoy to Allahabad,
he thought out his plans for the rest of the campaign. Before he could
reconquer Rohilkhand and Oudh, it was necessary to get control of
the Duab. As three of the important points—Delhi, Agra and Alla-
habad—were already in his possession, it only remained to secure the
fourth, Fatel. garh, on the Ganges, east of Agra. This was accomplished
by converging columns, which drove numbers of reliels into Rohil-
khand, whereon many of the villagers supported the re-established
civil officers. Sir Colin desired to utilise the remaining months of cool
weather for the reconquest of Rohilkhand; for, knowing that the
subjugation of Oudh would require a longer time, he was unwilling
to expose his troops to the hardships of campaigning in the summer,
a
## p. 199 (#235) ############################################
LUCKNOW RETAKEN
199
a
and he believed that it would be safe to wait until the autumn if the
rebels were prevented from invading other provinces. But Canning
pointed out that military must give place to political reasons. To
restore order in Rohilkhand, which had long been under British rule,
was a matter of police: Oudh represented a deposed dynasty, and all
India was waiting to see whether the British could regain their
sovereignty. Sir Colin loyally obeyed. In order to maintain his hold
upon the Doab and to cover the march of reinforcements to Cawnpore,
where they were to concentrate before advancing against Lucknow,
he retained the position at Fatehgarh, and made an arrangement with
John Lawrence, in accordance with which a force was to hold
Rohilkhand in check until it should be time to reconquer it.
Ever since Sir Colin left Lucknow, Outram had defended the
Alambagh against a force which outnumbered his in the proportion
of thirty to one, thus nullifying the aciivity of a hundred and twenty
thousand rebels, preserving the safety of Cawnpore, and preparing
for Sir Colin's return. On 28 February, 1858, Sir Colin left Cawnpore,
where he had been superintending preparations for the siege of Luck-
now, and marched to Banthira, near the Alambagh, where the whole
army—the most powerful that a British general had ever commanded
in India—was assembled. A Gurkha force, under Jang Bahadur, the
virtual ruler of Nepal, and a column under General Franks, which
had conjointly enabled the civil authorities to resume their work in
the Benares and Allahabad divisions, were coming to take part in the
siege. Lucknow had been strengthened by the destruction of the
bridges over the canal and by three successive entrenchments which
protected the eastern side of the city, the innermost covering the
Kaisar Bagh. But the rebels had made one fatal blunder. As neither
Havelock nor Sir Colin had operated beyond the Gumti, they had
neglected the defence of the northern side. Sir Colin accordingly
adopted a plan devised by the chief engineer, Brigadier Robert
Napier. While he himself crossed the canal and, turning the enemy's
right flank, moved against the Kaisar Bagh along the Hazrat Ganj,
by which the Highlanders had advanced in September, Outram was
to cross the river and take the left flank in reverse. Aided by Outram's
enfilading fire, Sir C-lin's force found the first line of works abandoned,
then, turning the others, sapped through the houses on the left of the
Hazrat Ganj, and finally captured the Kaisar Bagh, the Chattar
Manzil, and other palaces on its right: but three successive oppor-
tunities of cutting off large rebel bands were lost. Outram, who asked
leave to recross the river and attack the rebels while they were de-
moralised by the loss of the citadel, was forbidden to do so unless he
would promise not to lose a single man; and in the next few days some
thirty thousand were allowed through mismanagement to escape.
When, on 21 March, the city was again in British hands, the province
remained in possession of the enemy.
## p. 200 (#236) ############################################
200
THE MUTINY
Meanwhile Canning had committed an error which made re-
conquest still more difficult. Before the siege began he forwarded to
Outram a proclamation, to be addressed after the capture of the city
to the civil population, confiscating all lands except those held by a
few loyalists, offering immunity from disgrace to all who had not
murdered Europeans and who should instantly submit, but warning
them that for any additional boon they must trust to the mercy of the
government. Outram, reminding him that in the original settlement
the talukdars had been unjustly treated, declared that if nothing more
than their lives and freedom from imprisonment were offered, they
would be driven to wage a guerrilla war, whereas if the possession of
their lands were guaranteed to them, they would assist in restoring
order. The only concession which Canning could be induced to make
(though John Lawrence had pleaded for an amnesty to all mutineers
and rebels who had not committed murder) was to insert a clause
promising that those who would support the government immediately
might expect a large measureof indulgence. The promise was generally
disregarded, and the bolder spirits determined to resist to the last.
Before the recovery of Lucknow, Kunwar Singh, undaunted by the
defeat which he had suffered near Arrah, had taken advantage of the
withdrawal of troops, who were needed for the siege, to invade the
Benares division. Sir Colin sent a force to the rescue, and soon after-
wards the old Rajput died; but throughout the summer and the
autumn his followers maintained a guerrilla war in western Bihar.
The lack of the amnesty for which Lawrence pleaded was sorely felt.
"We must cling together”, said a prisoner, “for when we go home we
are hunted down and hanged. ” Detached parties, when they could
be brought to action, were invariably defeated; but the rebels, as a
whole, were too swift to be caught. When they were confined by seven
converging columns within a narrow space, and success seemed
certain, one column was delayed, and the entire body escaped through
the gap. It was not until October, when the younger Havelock per-
suaded his chief to try the effect of mounted infantry, whom he had
himself hastily trained, that they were driven into the Kaimur hills,
where, before the end of the year, their organisation was destroyed.
To understand how Sir Colin was able to undertake securely the
reconquest of Rohilkhand and Oudh, it is necessary to trace the course
of events in the Bombay Presidency and the central provinces. Lord
Elphinstone, the governor of Bombay, equipped a column to support
the Central India Agency, and throughout the Mutiny regarded the
interests of his own charge as subordinate to those of the empire. The
Bombay army, on the whole, was tolerably staunch. In Bombay itself,
though the sepoys were in a mutinous temper, order was preserved
by the skilful management of the superintendent of police. A plot
was discovered in the recently annexed state, Satara, and the con-
spirators were punished. But the principal danger was in the southern
## p. 201 (#237) ############################################
CENTRAL INDIA
201
Maratha country, where many landowners had been aggrieved by
the action of the Inam Commission, and the people were excited by
the momentary triumph of the Nana. A mutiny occurred at Kolha-
pur; intercepted letters revealed a Muhammadan conspiracy; and
emissaries from the Nana caused a local rebellion: but order was
restored by Colonel Le Grand Jacob, whom the governor had en-
trusted with discretionary power. 1
In Central India the most important point was Indore, the capital
of the Maratha prince, Holkar, who, in the absence of the agent,
Sir Robert Hamilton, was under the supervision of Colonel Durand.
The only British troops available were the gunners of a single battery
at the neighbouring station of Mhow; but on hearing of the outbreak
at Meerut, Durand summoned a detachment of Bhils and a force
belonging to the contingent that protected the begam of Bhopal,
while Holkar contributed a small force. Towards the end of June
Durand learned that the column which Elphinstone had equipped
could not advance, and on 1 July Holkar’s troops, who were imme-
diately joined by the infantry of the Malwa and Bhopal contingents,
mutinied. The Bhils and the Bhopal cavalry did nothing, and Durand
was forced to retreat with the women and children under the escort
of the cavalry who, though not actively mutinous, refused to remain.
To reach Mhow was impossible, for the approach to the road was
commanded by the mutineers; and the cavalry insisted on going to
Sehore in Bhopal. The commandant at Mhow, however, supported
by Holkar, who, if he had before been half-hearted, now proved him-
self loyal, assumed the duties of the agent and restored order in his
own district, though in the surrounding country anarchy was rampant.
Durand himself, moving southward from Sehore, joined the column
dispatched by Elphinstone, which he thenceforth commanded, at
Asirgarh, and returned to Mhow, where he was kept inactive by stress
of weather. When the dry season began he marched northward,
quelled the insurrection in Malwa, and in December returned to
Indore, where, before transferring his charge to Hamilton, he insisted
that all who had been concerned in the mutiny should be punished. 2
Another Maratha, the widow of the raja of Jhansi whose dominions
Dalhousie had annexed, had already planned revenge. Within a
month of the outbreak at Meerut the garrison mutinied; a general
massacre of Europeans followed; and the rani, buying over the sepoys,
who had threatened to set up a rival, fortified her city, raised an army,
and prepared to defend her country to the last. 3
In Bundelkhand, although many of the chiefs rebelled, Lieutenant
Osborne, the political officer at Rewah, conducted affairs so skilfully
that communication between Bombay and Calcutta remained un-
1 Cf. Jacob, Western India before and during the Mutinies, pp. 148 sqq.
2 Cf. H. M. Durand, Life of Sir isenry Durand, 1, 197. 599:
• Holmes, op. cit. pp. 791 sqq. and references there ciced.
## p. 202 (#238) ############################################
202
THE MUTINY
broken. In the Sagor and Narbada territories, south of Bundel-
khand, disturbances were general, but farther south, in the recently
annexed province of Nagpur, the authorities sternly repressed the
first symptoms of disorder. In Hyderabad, where were congregated
numerous Muslim fanatics, the resident, Major Davidson, supported
by the Nizam's able minister, Salar Jang, kept the peace, despite active
propaganda; and a band of Rohillas, who attacked the residency, was
scattered by a shower of canister from the Madras Horse Artillery,
who, like all the troops of that presidency, were staunch. It was
reserved for Sir Hugh Rose to restore British supremacy in the heart
of the peninsula and to prepare the way for the final efforts of Sir Colin
Campbell
In accordance with a plan formed by Sir Robert Hamilton, a
Bombay column, under Rose, was to march from Mhow by way of
Jhansi to Kalpi, while a Madras column, under General Whitlock,
marched northward across Bundelkhand. Leaving Mhow on
.
6 January, 1858, Rose joined his and brigade at Sehore. Capturing
rebel forts and defeating all whom he encountered in the field while the
ist brigade on his left cleared the great road from Bombay, he was
within a day's march from Jhansi when he received a dispatch from
Sir Colin, ordering him to turn aside and succour a chief who was
besieged by the Gwalior contingent under Tantia Topi. Fortunately
Hamilton, who, as a political officer, ventured to use his own discre-
tion, directed him to disregard this order, and two days later the siege
of Jhansi began. Within the next four days the whole of the ist brigade
and the siege-train arrived. Even at night the besiegers lay on their
arms and by day were dazzled by the glare and half-stifled by the
scorching wind. The besieged never ceased firing except at night, and
even women were seen working in their batteries. The siege had lasted
nine days when Tantia appeared with twenty-two thousand men.
Without suspending the bombardment, Sir Hugh collected all the
men whom he could spare, and on the following day defeated him.
Two days later, after a desperate resistance, the city was taken by
assault, and on the following night the rani, quitting the fort, rode
with a few attendants for Kalpi. After halting for nearly three weeks
to collect supplies and ammunition, Sir Hugh, though the sick list
was daily lengthening, resumed his march, defeated Tantia again in
the battle of Kunch, and prepared to finish the campaign. Whitlock,
partly owing to his own inactivity, was too late to join him; but Sir Colin
sent a force to his support. Half of his own troops were sick, all were
ailing, and he himself had suffered repeatedly from sunstroke; but on
22 May a final victory gave him possession of Kalpi. He was looking
forward to a period of rest which might enable him to recruit his
health when he heard of an event which caused a sensation throughout
India. The rani and Tantia, boldly marching with the remnant of
1 Holmes, op. cit. pp. 498 sqq. Cf. Meadows Tavlor, op. cit. p. 3&? .
## p. 203 (#239) ############################################
ROSE'S CAMPAIGN
203
their force to Gwalior, where Sindhia's army deserted to them, seized
the fortress and proclaimed the Nana as Peshwa. The main artery of
communication between Bombay and the North-Western Provinces
was in danger. Sir Hugh instantly took the field again, won a battle
on the outskirts of Gwalior, in which the rani, whom he esteemed as
“the best and bravest military leader of the rebels”, fell, defeated
Tantia on the following day, and restored Sindhia to his throne.
Tantia with four thousand men fled into Rajputana, and during the
next eight months, crossing and recrossing the Chambal, the Nar-
bada, and other rivers, doubling again and again like a hunted
hare, but still hoping to find support for his master, he contrived,
thanks to the marvellous speed of his followers, to escape the many
columns that pursued him. Early in 1859 the fugitives who had not
dispersed surrendered, and a few weeks later Tantia, betrayed as he
wandered in the jungle by a feudatory of Sindhia, was taken in his
sleep. Condemned by a court-martial on the charge of rebellion, he
was hanged on 18 April at Sipri in the Gwalior state. 1
The campaign of Sir Hugh Rose had relieved Sir Colin Campbell
from anxiety for his rear. After the recapture of Lucknow he pro-
posed to undertake forthwith the reconquest of Oudh, which his own
remissness had made necessary; but Canning replied that the Hindus
of Rohilkhand, who were almost all friendly, might turn against the
government if it delayed to overthrow Khan Bahadur Khan. Three
columns, supported by that which had guarded Fatehgarh, converged
on Bareilly, and by the end of May, although the moulvi of Faizabad,
who had led the assailants of Outram at the Alambagh, gave con-
siderable trouble, Rohilkhand was completely subdued. In Oudh,
where the peasant cultivators, hardly noticing the movements of the
rebels, were busy in the fields, the mutineers, the troops of the deposed
king, the talukdars' clansmen, and the Muhammadan zealots formed
distinct groups. A force which had been detached by Sir Colin did
what was possible, and many talukdars, trusting to the assurances of
Montgomery, who had succeeded Outram, that their land should not
be confiscated, tendered their submission; but the number that re-
mained in arms was still considerable. In October, when the weather
became cool, and the sepoys had mostly dispersed, Sir Colin began
his campaign. Success was less swift than it might have been if he had
followed the advice of Outram, who, pointing to the example of the
younger Havelock, urged him to form a corps of mounted infantry;
but the cordon with which he surrounded the province was of over-
whelming strength, and by the end of December the rebels had been
driven into Nepal. Still, in many parts of the peninsula small columns
were employed in hunting down marauders; and it was not until the
end of 1859 that India was restored to something like its normal state.
It remains to consider certain questions relating to the Mutiny, the
1 Cf. Holmes, op. cit. pp. 503 sqq. and references there cited.
## p. 204 (#240) ############################################
204
THE MUTINY
isolated rebellions connected with it, and the disturbances to which it
gave rise among the civil population. Before the story of the greased
cartridges was circulated, there was no definite plot for a general
rising of the Bengal army, and it is improbable that such a plot was
formed even after the first mutinies. For, though Cracroft Wilson,
the judge of Moradabad, collected evidence which convinced him
that 31 May had been fixed for a simultaneous revolt, and that the
plan was marred by the premature outbreak at Meerut, John Lawrence
found in the numerous intercepted letters written by sepoys not the
faintest hint of an organised conspiracy, while none of the faithful
sepoys, none of the condemned mutineers who might have saved their
lives by disclosing it, if it had existed, knew anything about it. In
reply to questions put to prisoners in the North-Western Provinces,
the cartridge, and it alone, was named as a grievance.
While the mutincers lacked a head, many were half-hearted and
fought reluctantly against the leaders whom they had been accus-
tomed to obcy; and between the various groups there was a want of
concert. Sikhs, Panjabis, Gurkhas fought whole-heartedly against
them. Even so, however, the prospects of the British would have been
almost desperate if Indian princes-particularly the rajas of Patiala,
Jhind and Nabha-had not given invaluable aid. Colin Campbell
made serious mistakes and lost precious opportunities; but his critics,
who contrasted him with the men who, without help from England,
had repelled the first onslaught of the mutineers, and complained
that with forces enormously superior he was slow in extinguishing the
revolt, forgot that his task, in itself even harder than theirs, was
rendered still more difficult by the delay in offering an amnesty and
by the confiscation proclaimed by Lord Canning.
Although many whose pride was offended by the domination of an
alien and infidel race, or who had personal objects to gain, desired
the overthrow of the British raj, diversities of race, rank, status, aim
and, above all, religion made it impossible for them to combine.
Aggrieved chiefs, such as Kunwar Singh, dispossessed land-holders,
villagers who objected to taxation, hereditary thieves, budmashes of
every kind took advantage of the prostration of authority to redress
their grievances, to rob, or to gratify private animosities; but civil
disturbances, except in a few isolated regions and on the part of a few
embittered or fanatical groups, never amounted to rebellion. After
the Mutiny broke out, the titular king of Delhi was proclaimed head
of a movement by which Muhammadan zealots hoped to regain
supremacy; but this probably deterred many to whom Muhammadan
rule was abhorrent from supporting the mutineers. The Nana, pro-
fiting by the military rising which he had helped to encourage,
became the representative of those Marathas who desired to restore
the power once exercised by the Peshwa. Among the states which
Dalhousie had annexed rebellion broke out in Jhansi and Oudh
a
## p. 205 (#241) ############################################
DALHOUSIE'S ALLEGED RESPONSIBILITY
205
alone; and in Oudh it was due not to annexation, but to the harshness
with which the talukdars were treated, to the failure of Havelock's
earlier attempts to relieve the residency, to the abandonment of
Lucknow, justifiable though it may have been, by Sir Colin Campbell,
to the errors which he committed during the siege, and to Canning's
impolitic proclamation. These rebellions arose in consequence of the
Mutiny, and there is no evidence that any of the rebels, except the
Nana, conspired before it began.
Dalhousie, except in so far as he had failed to remedy the indisci-
pline of the army, which was rather the business of the commander-
in-chief than of the governor-general, and had neglected to safeguard
Delhi and Allahabad, was unjustly blamed, and has been fully
vindicated. Even the annexation of Jhansi would have been harmless
if it had been supported by armed force; the increase of European
troops, for which he had in vain pleaded, would have at least averted
the worst calamities of the Mutiny; while by the construction of roads
and telegraphs, and by the administration which he bestowed upon
the Panjab, he contributed much to the power by which the Mutiny
was quelled.
Even before the reconquest of Oudh an event had occurred which,
while it marked the restoration of British supremacy, inaugurated a
new period of Indian history. The East India Company, upon which
all political parties in England agreed in throwing the blame of the
Mutiny, was abolished; and India was to be ruled in the name of the
queen. A proclamation, prepared under her direction, announced
that the government of India had been assumed by the queen; that
Lord Canning was to be the first viceroy, and that all officers who had
been in the service of the Company were confirmed in their offices;
that all treaties made by the Company with Indian princes were to
be maintained; that the queen desired no extension of territory,
promised full religious toleration to her Indian subjects, and would
always respect their ancient usages; that she offered pardon to all
rebels and mutineers who had not directly taken part in the murder of
Europeans; and that she would constantly endeavour to promote the
prosperity of her Indian dominions.
## p. 206 (#242) ############################################
CHAPTER XI
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
The government of India is an amazingly complex and dual form of adminis-
tration. It has two chiefs, the secretary of state here, the man at the desk and on
the front bench in this country; and the viceroy, the man on the spot in India. It
is the latter who, at any rate in India, is invested with paramount power; but the
final responsibility rests with the secretary of state. 1
In his British Government in India Lord Curzon further observes :
This dualism has arisen not merely from the simultaneous existence of one half
of the government in England, and the other half in India, for that is a feature of
the administration from a sovereign centre of all dependencies or dominions, but
from the subdivision of that authority both in England and in India. ?
The subject of this chapter is the history of the London branch of
British administration in India from 1858, the memorable year which
was marked by the end of the Mutiny and the proclamation of Lord
Canning as first viceroy and governor-general for the crown, to 1918,
the
year
which
saw the conclusion of the great war.
In February, 1858, a weighty and dignified petition was presented
to both houses of parliament on behalf of the East India Company.
It failed to avert the impending sentence, but certainly influenced
subsequent legislation.
The petitioners assumed that the minister of the crown who would
henceforward conduct the home portion of the administration of
India would be assisted by a council composed of statesmen ex-
perienced in Indian affairs. The knowledge necessary for governing
a foreign country, and in particular a country like India, could not
possibly be possessed by anyone who had not devoted a considerable
portion of his life to the acquisition of it. The council should be
qualified not only to advise the minister, “but also by its advice
to exercise a certain degree of moral check". The minister would
generally be unacquainted with India and would constantly be ex-
posed to solicitations from individuals and bodies
either entirely ignorant of that country or knowing enough of it to imposc on those
who knew still less than themselves and having very frequently objects in view
other than the good government of India.
British public opinion was necessarily unacquainted with Indian
affairs and therefore liable to be misled. The responsible minister's
council should, therefore, derive sufficient weight from its constitution
1 Lord Curzon, Hansard, 13 July, 1917, XXV, 1027-8.
2 11, 67.
3 Hansard, 1858, CXLVIII, Appendix.
## p. 207 (#243) ############################################
THE COMPANY'S PETITION
207
to be a substantial barrier against inroads of self-interest and ignorance
in England from which parliament could hardly be expected to afford
a sufficient protection. The council must be so constituted as to be
personallyindependent of the minister, and should feel itself responsible
for recording an opinion on any Indian subject and pressing that
opinion on the minister whether it was agreeable to him or not. The
minister when overruling his council must be bound to record his
views. Thus the council would be a check and not a screen. Otherwise
it would merely serve to weaken the minister's responsibility and “to
give the colourable sanction of prudence and experience to measures
in the framing of which these qualities have had no share”.
A council composed of crown nominees would not preserve the
independence of judgment which had marked the court of directors.
If a substantial portion of the old spirit was to remain, a majority at
least of the council which would assist the new minister for India
should hold their seats independently of his appointment. That body
should not be smaller in numbers than the existing court of eighteen
directors. The petitioners went on to plead for the continuance of
the existing system, to urge that the present home government of India
was not really a double government, as the final word always rested
with the cabinet, and that a new arrangement which in any way
checked the minister's discretion would be liable to a similar reproach.
This reproach, however, originated
in an entire misconception of the functions devolving on the home government of
India, and in the application to it of the principles applicable to purely executive
departments.
The executive government of India was and must be situated in India
itself.
The court of directors was not so much an executive as a
deliberative body. Its principal function and that of the home govern-
ment generally was not to direct the details of administration, but to
scrutinise and revise the past acts of the Indian government; to lay
down principles and issue general instructions for their future guidance
and to give or refuse sanction to great political measures which were
referred home for approval. Such functions admitted of and required
the concurrence of more judgments than one. They were more
analogous to the functions of parliament than to those of an executive
board; and it was considered an excellence in parliament to be not
merely a double but a triple government. The petitioners ended by
praying that no change should be made in the constitution of the
Indian government until the conclusion of “the present unhappy
disturbances or without a full previous enquiry into the operations of
the present system”.
But both the great political parties in parliament were resolved
that there should be no delay in completing the process which had
definitely begun in 1853. It was an obvious anachronism that a
a
## p. 208 (#244) ############################################
208
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
chartered company should take part in administering a great empire.
It was wrong that there should be a Company's army and a royal
army, an Indian and a royal navy. In India itself the prestige of the
Company had lately suffered irretrievable damage. 1 Immediately
after the presentation of the Company's petition, Lord Palmerston,
then prime minister, introduced his bill for transferring the govern-
ment of India entirely to the crown. But when the bill had been read
a second time he was turned out of office on the Conspiracy to Murder
Bill, and was succeeded by Lord Derby. Then Disraeli, who came in
as Derby's chancellor of the exchequer, introduced a new bill which
provided the Indian minister with a council composed partly of
crown nominees and partly of persons to be elected by two con-
stituencies, one consisting of men who had served in India or possessed
financial interests in that country, the other made up from the parlia-
mentary electors of the leading commercial cities of the United
Kingdom, London, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow and Belfast.
These proposals, for which Lord Ellenborough, then president of the
Board of Control, was largely responsible, were received with general
ridicules and were dropped. Ellenborough’s dispatch to Canning
regarding the Oudh proclamation caused his own resignation. His
successor, Lord Stanley, piloted certain resolutions through the House
of Commons which formed the basis for a measure destined to regulate
the government of India from London for sixty-two years. Its main
provisions were:
(a) The place of the Board of Control and court of directors would
be taken by a secretary of state in council. The new secretary would
be assisted by a “Council of India” consisting of fifteen members, of
whom eight were to be appointed by the crown and seven were to be
elected by the directors of the East India Company. The majority of
both appointed and elected members were to be persons who had
served or resided in India for ten years at least, and had not left the
country more than ten years before their appointment. Future
appointments or elections were to be so regulated that nine at least
of the members of council should hold these qualifications. Future
vacancies in crown appointments would be filled by crown nominees;
vacancies among the seven members elected by the directors would be
filled by persons co-opted by the council. No member could sit or
vote in parliament. All would hold office during good behaviour and
could be removed only on petition by both houses of parliament.
(6) The council would conduct Indian business transacted in the
United Kingdom and would correspond with the Government of
India, but would not possess the initiative which had all along rested
with the court of directors. It could give its opinion only on questions
1 Martineau, Life of Frere, I, 230.
2 Hansard, 1857-8, CXLVIII, 1276.
3 Idem, cxLix, 1675; cf. also 1677.
• Monypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli, iv, 138, 164-5.
>
## p. 209 (#245) ############################################
THE INDIA ACT OF 1858
209
referred to it by the secretary of state, who would preside over meetings
with power to overrule should he be unable to obtain agreement. In
such an event he might require that his opinion and the reasons for it
should be entered in the minutes of the proceedings, and any member
who had been present at the meeting could exercise the same privilege.
(c) The secretary of state might constitute committees of his council
for the more convenient transaction of business, and might distribute
departments of business among those committees. He would direct
the manner in which all business should be conducted. The council
would meet once at least every seven days and could do no business
without a quorum of five.
(d) Con. munications from the secretary of state to the governor-
general, and orders proposed to bi made in the United Kingdom by
the secretary of state, must, subject to certain provisions, be either
submitted to a meeting of the council or be deposited in the council-
room for seven days before issue. Any member of council might record
his opinion on any such communication or order in a minute-book
kept for the purpose, and a copy of such entry would be sent forth with
to the secretary of state. If a majority minuted against a communica-
tion or order, the secretary of state must, if adhering to such com-
munication or order, record his reasons.
(e) Orders of the secretary of state relating to expenditure and
loans required the concurrence of a majority of the Council of India.
The revenues of India, which would be charged with a dividend on
the Company's stock and with their debts, could only be used for the
purposes of the government of India. Clause 41 of the act provided
that no grant or appropriation of any part of such revenues or of any
property coming into the possession of the secretary of state in council
should be made without the concurrence of a majority of votes at a
meeting of the council. All powers of issuing securities for money in
the United Kingdom vested in the secretary of state in council must
be exercised by the former with concurrence of a majority of votes at
a council meeting.
(s) The salary of the secretary of state and the cost of his office
would be charged to the revenues of India. A statement of “moral
and material progress” would be annually submitted to parliament.
The secretary of state would every year lay Indian accounts before
parliament, on occasions which became famous as “budget debates",
although in fact they were simply reviews of Indian affairs.
(8) It was provided that urgent communications or orders which
did not, under the terms of the act, require the concurrence of a
majority of council votes, might issue on the authority of the secretary
of state alone without reference to the council. But in such cases the
secretary would record the reason for urgency and give notice thereof
to the members of the council.
(h) Orders concerning the levying of war or the making of peace,
CHI VI
14
## p. 210 (#246) ############################################
210
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
>
or the treating or negotiating with any prince or state, which virtually
gave effect to cabinet decisions and did not require the support of a
majority of council votes, might be marked as "secret” and sent off
on the authority of the secretary alone without any notice or reference
to the council. “Secret” dispatches from the governor-general in
council or the governors of Madras or Bombay relating to such
matters need not be communicated to the Council of India.
(i) Appointment to the offices of governor-general and governors
of presidencies vested in the crown. The governor-general would
appoint lieutenant-governors to provinces subject to the approval of
Her Majesty. Members of the various councils in India would be
appointed by the secretary of state in council.
(j) The naval and military forces of the Company were transferred
to the crown, their separate local character being retained. It was
directed by clause 55 that except for the purpose of preventing or
repelling invasion, or under other sudden or urgent necessity, Indian
revenues should not be applicable for military operations outside
India without the consent of parliament.
The basic principles of the bill were fully discussed in parliament. 1
The object was to vest full charge of the government of India in the
crown “in order that the direct superintendence of the whole empire
might be placed under one executive authority". The new secretary
of state would be a member of the cabinet. His individual responsi-
bility was essential. His decision would be final on all matters. But
he should not be allowed to choose all his councillors, for the council
should possess considerable independence. It must exercise "moral
control” 3 As Sir Henry Maine subsequently observed, the ultimate
power of the secretary of state was regarded with apprehension by
certain spcakers in the House of Commons. On 23 June the directors
drew up a letter criticising the bill and stating that in their opinion
the council should have more than a consultative voice in all questions
regarding expenditure. In such cases the secretary of state should not
be able to exercise his overruling power. Precautionary provisions
were then engrafted on the bill and appeared as clauses 41 and 55. 4
The semi-independent status accorded to the Council of India by
the cabinet was approved by Mr Gladstone for the opposition. In
order“to clothe this new body with all the moral weight and influence
that was consistent with retaining intact the responsibility of the
secretary of state”, he recommended that its first members should be
named in the bill. Each nomination would thus receive the express
approval of parliament. This would give the council a start which
would secure for it a good character hereafter. It needed all possible
weight at this time of transition from one form of government to
)
3 Idem, CLI, 323.
1 Hansard, 1858, CXLIX, CL. 2 Idem, CL, 2066.
• Unpublished memorandum, dated 8 November, 1880.
5 Hansard, CLI, 470, 757-8.
## p. 211 (#247) ############################################
THE DEBATES OF 1858
211
another and there were precedents for such procedure. The proposal
was rejected by the cabinet, mainly on the ground that, if accepted, it
would deprive the court of directors of the power of electing any
members of the new body. The government wished to avoid needless
changes. It had found in the court of directors a council in being
which consisted partly of crown nominees and partly of persons elected
by the Company's court of proprietors. It would practically con-
tinue this council, increasing the number of nominees and reducing
the number of elected members so as nearly to equalise the two
varieties. 1
Both the cabinet and parliament desired to deal tenderly with the
Company which had fallen before “he inevitable consequences of
time, change and progress", 2 and to set up a substantial barrier
against inroads of unbalanced sentiment and attempts to debit the
revenues of India with unfair charges. India must not be brought
into the cockpit of party politics. The members of the Council of India
must be “neither the masters nor the puppets but the valuable
advisers of the new minister" 3
While, however, the council would be invested with an appreciable
degree of independence and would be so large as to represent the
various presidencies and public services in India, it would have no
powers of initiative, and would, in the main, confine its attention to
such questions of policy and matters of first-class interest as were laid
before it by its president, who in “secret" affairs could act by himself
entirely apart from his councillors. He was a member of the cabinet
which could not be forced to take into its confidence any given
number of persons whom it did not wish of its own accord to con-
sult. The president of the Board of Control had always possessed
the privilege of communicating with the governor-general through
the secret committee of the court of directors in regard to “secret”
business. 5
Secret orders, however, concerning the levying of war and other
matters might involve considerable expenditure from Indian revenues.
It was so newhat difficult to see how members of council could in such
cases discharge their statutory responsibilities.
While it was hoped that all these arrangements would conduce to
the better government of India, the cabinet was convinced that, in
Lord Derby's words, "the government of India must be, on the whole,
carried out in India itself”. 6 Interference should be on as small a
scale as possible; although, apart from the large amount of Indian
business which was necessarily transacted in England, since parlia-
ment was responsible to the nation for the administration of India, it
must discharge its responsibilities conscientiously.
1 Hansard, Cli, 759-60.
; Idem, CLI, 1454-5;
• Lec-Warner, Dalhousie, 1, 107-8.
Idem, cxLix, 820.
• Idem, CLI, 1457-8.
• Hansard, CLI, 1448.
14-2
## p. 212 (#248) ############################################
212
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858-1918
The Act“for the better government of India” (21 & 22 Vict. c. 106)
received the royal assent on 2 August, 1858; and a month later the
directors issued their last instructions to their servants in the East and
in memorable words commended their splendid trust to the care of
the sovereign of Great Britain.
Let Her Majesty appreciate the gift-let her take the vast country and the
teeming millions of India under Her direct control; but let Her not forget the great
corporation from which she has received them nor the lessons to be learnt from its
success.
Lord Stanley, afterwards Earl of Derby, who, as president of the
Board of Control, had piloted the bill of 1858 through the House of
Commons, was the first secretary of state for India. With the board's
two secretaries, he migrated to a new India Office which took the
place of the Company's East India House. The secretaries became
the first Parliamentary and Permanent Under-Sccretaries of State for
India. Resigning in 1859 with the Conservative cabinet, Stanley was
succeeded by Sir Charles Wood, who, as president of the Board of
Control, had been responsible for the Charter Act of 1853 and the
education dispatch of 1854, and now held office till 1866 with excellent
results. He was a single-minded man, of great knowledge, patience
and judgment, and was largely responsible for the success with which
Indian affairs were conducted during a very difficult period of transi-
tion and reconstruction. The arrangements for the councils of the
governor-general and those of the governors of Madras and Bombay,
the setting up of new High Courts of Judicature, the reorganisation
of finances, the codification of the law, railway extension, the amal-
gamation of the queen's and the Company's British regiments, the
determination of the number of British troops to be quartered in India,
the adjustment of numerous conflicting interests, all demanded careful
consideration in London. The council was a very strong one, including
ex-directors and men who had earned distinction in the Mutiny
period. Although there were necessarily differences of opinion and
outlook from time to time, although the transaction of business by
committees sometimes caused irritating delays, although time was
sometimes wasted over trifling financial questions which could better
have been decided in India, some years after quitting office Wood,
who had meantime become Lord Halifax, told the House of Lords
that any secretary of state who firmly and honestly discharged his
duties would never experience the slightest difficulty with his council. 4
On a subsequent occasion he
deprecated any measure which could diminish the independence and self-respect
of the council, for a strong council was needed to give the secretary of state the
support requisite for resisting party pressure, a pressure not always applied in a
manner beneficial to India. 5
i Foster, East India House, pp. 153-4.
2 Cf. Hansard, cxlviii, 1298.
• Martineau, op. cit. 1, 447.
• Hansard, cxcv, 1085. • Idem, cxcvi, 693.
6
## p. 213 (#249) ############################################
THE LEGISLATION OF 1869
213
In 1866, however, a more brilliant and impulsive, but less patient and
experienced, secretary of state presided at the council-board. Lord
Salisbury (then Lord Cranborne), while in office, avoided an open
breach with his council. But afterwards, when speaking in the House
of Lords as Marquis of Salisbury on 11 March, 1869, on“ the Governor-
general of India Bill”, he expressed his belief that the “tutelage” in
which the secretary of state for India was held by his council was
injurious to the good government of that country. In such matters
as railway guarantees and other commercial affairs the council's
"veto” was a protection, but, with that exception, responsibility
should lie with the secretary of state alone. Opportunity should be
taken of another bill then pending to clear up "the mystery” which
enabled the council, under cover of vetoing money questions, to inter-
fere in every other measure on the plea that it involved money con-
siderations and thus to become "an incubus on the minister". 1
On this occasion Lord Salisbury was followed by his successor in
office, the Duke of Argyll, who assured him that there was no mystery.
The true interpretation of the law was that the secretary of state was
“absolutely supreme" in financial, as in other matters, and could
overrule his council whenever he thought fit to do so. The duke was
aware of no case in which the council had set up its authority in
opposition to the will of the secretary of state. On 19 April, in bringing
forward the “Government of India Act Amendment Bill”, he ex-
plained to the House the history of clause 41 in the act of 1858 which
had given rise to Lord Salisbury's contention. Considerable discussion
followed, and extended over 29 April, when the bill was read a second
time, to 13 May, when Lord Salisbury moved and withdrew an
amendment. The subject revived in a debate in the House of Com-
mons on 17 August, 1880, when it was raised by Fawcett, the econo-
mist, afterwards postmaster-general. ? The view eventually taken was
that the true intentions of parliament in enacting clause 41 of the act
of 1858 were to impose constitutional restraint on the powers of the
secretary of state with respect to the expenditure of money, but by no
means to extend the effective assertion of this restraint to all cases,
especially where imperial questions were concerned. The secretary of
state was a member of the cabinet and in cabinet questions the views
of the cabinet must prevail. It was never intended that the council
should be able to resist the cabinet by stopping supplies. Vis-à-vis the
secretary of state, as representing the latter, the Council of India
possessed no veto. As Sir Henry Maine expressed it, “any such
power given to the council and exercised by it would produce before
long a combination of both the great English parties to sweep away
the council itself". 3
In the course of the debate in the House of Lords on 13 May, 1869,
· Hansard, cxciv, 1074.
· Idem, CCLV, 1453.
3 Unpublished memorandum.
## p. 214 (#250) ############################################
214
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858-1918
1
the Duke of Argyll stated that Lord Salisbury had been moved to
raise the question by the opposition which his council had offered to
a project put forward by certain commercial bodies to which the
secretary of state had agreed. The council had been supported by the
Government of India, but had eventually given way. In any case,
clause 41 of the act of 1858 survived Lord Salisbury's assault.
The Government of India Act Amendment Bill", which pro-
duced the Lords debate of 13 May, 1869, contained proposals for
altering the life-tenure of members of the Council of India to one of
ten years, which might, for reasons of public advantage, be extended
to fifteen years. The secretary of state justified his recommendation by
the rapid changes which were taking place in India, largely as a result
of extending railway communications, and by the need of not only
intimate but recent Indian experience on his council. His views
were accepted by the House. Lord Salisbury moved an amendment
to the bill proposing that in future all members of the council should
be appointed by the crown. None should be co-opted by the council
itself. The amend. nent was carried and embodied in the bill, together
with a provision transferring from the secretary of state in council
to the crown the right of filling vacancies on the councils of the
governor-general and governors in India. The general effect of the
legislation and debates of 1869 was to strengthen the position of the
secretary of state vis-à-vis his council. His position vis-à-vis the Govern-
ment of India was fortified by the completion in 1870 of a direct
telegraph line between India and England by submarine cable through
the Red Sea. He could thus less than ever be confronted with accom-
plished facts.
For years after 1869 the history of the Council of India was un-
eventful. When Lord Salisbury again presided over the India Office
(1874-7) his Afghan and North-West Frontier policy, especially the
occupation of Quetta and the separation of the trans-Indus districts
from the Panjab, was strongly opposed by members of his council who
followed Lord Lawrence's lead. 3 But a secretary of state who could
rely on cabinet support could now certainly get his way. Although,
according to Lord Salisbury's biographer, he was a believer “in the
virtue of a single inspiration and in the evil of hampering it by the
intrusion of competing ideas”, he was exercised by the problem of
combining an independence of initiative in the government of India
with his own responsibility for final decision, and considered that
it could be solved only by private correspondence between himself
and the viceroy. " He carried this doctrine to lengths to which Lord
Northbrook refused to follow him.
Lord Northbrook recognised the subordinate position of the viceroy but held
that parliament had confurred certain rights, not orily on the viceroy, but on his
1 Hansard, cxcvi, 700.
? Idem, cxcv, 1077-8. Cf. Martineau, op. cit. I, 356–7.
: Lady Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Lord Salisbury, 11, 159. • Idem, pp. 65-6.
a
>
## p. 215 (#251) ############################################
POLICY OF THE INDIA OFFICE
215
council, which differentiated the latter in a very notable degree from subordinate
officials. 1
Lord Cromer has stated that Lord Salisbury was disposed to reject,
and, he thought, to underrate, the value of the views of Anglo-Indian
officials.
This does not appear to have been the practice of some of his
successors. Lord George Hamilton, who first as under-secretary and
afterwards as secretary of state introduced thirteen Indian budgets in
the House of Commons, writes that the Council of India was really a
cabinet with the important exception that its procedure and powers
were prescribed by an act of parliament. It had absolute control over
Indian expenditure. It preserved an unbroken record of the reasons
for expenditure of all kinds and performed the business of checking
far more effectively than the treasury, obtaining better results from
the expenditure sanctioned. 2 Lord Randolph Churchill found the
council "an invaluable instrument”. 3
As regards the general policy of the India Office in the latter years
of the nineteenth century, although relations between India and
England had become more intimate, involving a constantly increasing
degree of interference, and though the cases in which final orders
could be passed in India had become less frequent, yet the secretary
of state did not constantly interfere in the ordinary work of Indian
administration, but mainly confined his action to answering references
from the Indian government. Apart from great political or financia)
questions, the number or nature of these references depended on the
character of the governor-general for the time being. The secretary
of state initiated almost nothing. In domestic affairs the Indian
government was almost independent so long as it was content to
carry on without largely increasing the cost of existing establishments
or incurring new and heavy charges. The secretary of state had no
disposition to interfere needlessly in the details of administration in
India, but was sometimes subjected to pressure which could with
difficulty be resisted. On such occasions the council was extremely
useful. It further assisted in preserving continuity of administrative
principles in India where the official personnel was necessarily always
changing. "
The views of the majority of the Council of India on the subject of
divided control of the India army provoked the impatience of Lord
Ripon who, at the close of the first year of his viceroyalty, complained
of the increasing interference of the India Office which he ascribed to
the “subordinates", and the fact that Lord Hartington, then secretary,
was overworked with other than Indian business. But had the same
1 Mallet, Life of Northbrook, p. 91.
2 Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections (1874-1880), pp. 307-8.
• Winston Churchill, Life of Lord Randolph Churchill, 1, 475.
• Strachey, India, pp. 74 81 (1911 ed. ).
## p. 216 (#252) ############################################
216 THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
viceroy received the warning drawn up by Sir Henry Maine, the most
prominent member of the then existent Council of India, relating to
the projected Ilbert bill, he might have been saved from a course of
action which he lived to regret bitterly. The council had in 1883
desired Lord Hartington, then secretary of state, to transmit Maine's
“secret” memorandum to the viceroy; but this was not done, and
they were subsequently consoled by Lord Kimberley, Hartington's
successor, with the just reminder that they should formally have
conveyed the warning themselves. 1
Meantime the constitution of the council was slightly altered. In
1876 the secretary of state was allowed to appoint not more than three
special experts (legal or financial) on the old tenure of good behaviour.
In 1889 he was allowed to abstain from filling vacancies until the
number of members should be reduced to ten. Reduction was asked
for in the interest of economy. In the previous year the council had
been joined by nne of its most distinguished members, Sir Alfred
Lyall, described by Lord George Hamilton as his “right-hand
adviser”, who held office for fifteen years and has left us some passing
impressions of its proceedings. Fresh from governing great provinces
he wrote:
The India Office is comfortable and convenient, but rather depressing: in the
first place, death visits the council rather frequently: secondly, we have all rather
the look of oid hulks laid up in dock,
and are men who have.
2 Cf. Metcalfe, op. cit. p. 72.
## p. 197 (#233) ############################################
SIR COLIN CAMPBELL
197
contingent, which Sindhia could no longer restrain, was threatening
that city; but Sir Colin, rejecting the advice of Outram, who urged
him to secure its safety first, resolved to advance, and contented him-
self with leaving a detachment under General Windham to oppose
Tantia. On the 13th his force, numbering about five thousand men,
encamped at the Alambagh. The chief engineer advised him to adopt
the plan which Havelock had proposed—to cross the Gumti and
recross it near the residency. Though this route traversed open ground,
where the heavy guns could act and the enemy were not prepared,
he preferred the advice of Outram, who recommended him to cross
the canal near its junction with the river, and thence to follow the
route by which the main body had advanced in September. On the
16th the army crossed the canal. The enemy, deluded by a recon-
naissance which Sir Colin had made on his left, offered no opposition
till the advanced guard, moving in a narrow lane, was deluged by a
hail of bullets from the Sikandar Bagh on its right. For the moment
the situation seemed almost desperate: but by herculean efforts a
troop of horse artillery clambered up the bank on the side of the lane;
heavy guns were dragged through an opening which the sappers cut;
and within an hour a breach appeared. The defenders, trapped
between the assailants and others who had forced an entrance through
a door, were gradually overpowered, and by sunset the survivors,
crowding into the towers at the angles of the building, were utterly
destroyed. Nearer the residency, the Shah Najif, a large mosque,
standing in a garden surrounded by a wall, withstood the heaviest
artillery, and Sir Colin had ordered the guns to be withdrawn when
a Highland regiment passed through a cleft which had fortunately
been discovered in the wall, and found that the garrison had fled.
Havelock had already captured buildings on the east of the residency:
next day the only remaining strongholds that barred the advance
were stormed; and in the afternoon the relieving army joined the
garrison. Two days later, Sir Colin having secured his left fank, the
women and children, the sick and the wounded, were removed.
Outram and Havelock besought him to seize the Kaisar Bagh and
thus re-establish British supremacy; but, although the formidable
citadel was breached within three days, he refused to leave behind
the small force for which they asked, insisting that his entire army
would be needed to secure Cawnpore. The garrison therefore
evacuated the entrenchment; and two days later Havelock, weakened
by privation, succumbed to dysentery. On the 27th Sir Colin, leaving
Outram at the Alambagh to withstand the rebels until he should
himself return to crush them, marched with the convoy for Cawnpore.
The low tremulous sound which tells that artillery is at work at some
distant place was plainly heard.
Sir Colin had ordered Windham to occupy and strengthen the
entrenchment which Havelock had constructed, to send on to Luck-
## p. 198 (#234) ############################################
198
THE MUTINY
now any British infantry that might join him, and, if Tantia should
threaten to attack him, to extend his force conspicuously in advance
of the entrenchment, but not to assume the offensive unless there
should be no other way of saving the position from bombardment.
Learning that Tantia was near, Windham obtained leave to retain
a portion of the expected reinforcements; but within the next few
days various reports led him to fear that his chief had suffered a
reverse. Knowing that if he himself should be attacked, the defensivo
display prescribed by Sir Colin would be of no avail, he had prepared
and forwarded for approval a plan for destroying iwo of the most
important posts which Tantia occupied; but, owing to the interruption
of communication, he received no reply. Though he shrank from
executing this plan on his own responsibility, he attacked and defeated
a detachment which Tantia personally commanded, but immediately
retreated and selected a more defensible encamping-ground, west of
the town. Hearing that all had gone well at Lucknow, he hoped that
Tantia would not venture to attack him before Sir Colin returned.
Tantia, however, knew that Windham would not have followed up
a victory by retreat if he had not felt anxious; his own force was
enormously superior; and in the next two days he twice defeated
Windham, who failed at the critical moment to support his best
officer, and was ill-served by another. Sir Colin, who received urgent
letters on his march, rode on, fearing that the bridge might have been
destroyed, in advance of the column, and at sunset saw the battle still
raging and flames rushing up above the city. But Windham had pre-
served two vital points: not only the bridge, but also the entrenchment
remained intact. Next morning Tantia opened fire upon the bridge;
but his artillery was overpowered, and Sir Colin's army, with the
convov, safely crossed. For a week he remained on the defensive,
to allow the convoy to get out of danger; but on 6 December he gained
a victory which would
have been decisive if the chief of the staff had
not missed a chance of cutting off the retreat of two-thirds of Tantia's
army.
While Sir Colin, kept inactive by want of carriage, was awaiting
the return of the carts that had transported the convoy to Allahabad,
he thought out his plans for the rest of the campaign. Before he could
reconquer Rohilkhand and Oudh, it was necessary to get control of
the Duab. As three of the important points—Delhi, Agra and Alla-
habad—were already in his possession, it only remained to secure the
fourth, Fatel. garh, on the Ganges, east of Agra. This was accomplished
by converging columns, which drove numbers of reliels into Rohil-
khand, whereon many of the villagers supported the re-established
civil officers. Sir Colin desired to utilise the remaining months of cool
weather for the reconquest of Rohilkhand; for, knowing that the
subjugation of Oudh would require a longer time, he was unwilling
to expose his troops to the hardships of campaigning in the summer,
a
## p. 199 (#235) ############################################
LUCKNOW RETAKEN
199
a
and he believed that it would be safe to wait until the autumn if the
rebels were prevented from invading other provinces. But Canning
pointed out that military must give place to political reasons. To
restore order in Rohilkhand, which had long been under British rule,
was a matter of police: Oudh represented a deposed dynasty, and all
India was waiting to see whether the British could regain their
sovereignty. Sir Colin loyally obeyed. In order to maintain his hold
upon the Doab and to cover the march of reinforcements to Cawnpore,
where they were to concentrate before advancing against Lucknow,
he retained the position at Fatehgarh, and made an arrangement with
John Lawrence, in accordance with which a force was to hold
Rohilkhand in check until it should be time to reconquer it.
Ever since Sir Colin left Lucknow, Outram had defended the
Alambagh against a force which outnumbered his in the proportion
of thirty to one, thus nullifying the aciivity of a hundred and twenty
thousand rebels, preserving the safety of Cawnpore, and preparing
for Sir Colin's return. On 28 February, 1858, Sir Colin left Cawnpore,
where he had been superintending preparations for the siege of Luck-
now, and marched to Banthira, near the Alambagh, where the whole
army—the most powerful that a British general had ever commanded
in India—was assembled. A Gurkha force, under Jang Bahadur, the
virtual ruler of Nepal, and a column under General Franks, which
had conjointly enabled the civil authorities to resume their work in
the Benares and Allahabad divisions, were coming to take part in the
siege. Lucknow had been strengthened by the destruction of the
bridges over the canal and by three successive entrenchments which
protected the eastern side of the city, the innermost covering the
Kaisar Bagh. But the rebels had made one fatal blunder. As neither
Havelock nor Sir Colin had operated beyond the Gumti, they had
neglected the defence of the northern side. Sir Colin accordingly
adopted a plan devised by the chief engineer, Brigadier Robert
Napier. While he himself crossed the canal and, turning the enemy's
right flank, moved against the Kaisar Bagh along the Hazrat Ganj,
by which the Highlanders had advanced in September, Outram was
to cross the river and take the left flank in reverse. Aided by Outram's
enfilading fire, Sir C-lin's force found the first line of works abandoned,
then, turning the others, sapped through the houses on the left of the
Hazrat Ganj, and finally captured the Kaisar Bagh, the Chattar
Manzil, and other palaces on its right: but three successive oppor-
tunities of cutting off large rebel bands were lost. Outram, who asked
leave to recross the river and attack the rebels while they were de-
moralised by the loss of the citadel, was forbidden to do so unless he
would promise not to lose a single man; and in the next few days some
thirty thousand were allowed through mismanagement to escape.
When, on 21 March, the city was again in British hands, the province
remained in possession of the enemy.
## p. 200 (#236) ############################################
200
THE MUTINY
Meanwhile Canning had committed an error which made re-
conquest still more difficult. Before the siege began he forwarded to
Outram a proclamation, to be addressed after the capture of the city
to the civil population, confiscating all lands except those held by a
few loyalists, offering immunity from disgrace to all who had not
murdered Europeans and who should instantly submit, but warning
them that for any additional boon they must trust to the mercy of the
government. Outram, reminding him that in the original settlement
the talukdars had been unjustly treated, declared that if nothing more
than their lives and freedom from imprisonment were offered, they
would be driven to wage a guerrilla war, whereas if the possession of
their lands were guaranteed to them, they would assist in restoring
order. The only concession which Canning could be induced to make
(though John Lawrence had pleaded for an amnesty to all mutineers
and rebels who had not committed murder) was to insert a clause
promising that those who would support the government immediately
might expect a large measureof indulgence. The promise was generally
disregarded, and the bolder spirits determined to resist to the last.
Before the recovery of Lucknow, Kunwar Singh, undaunted by the
defeat which he had suffered near Arrah, had taken advantage of the
withdrawal of troops, who were needed for the siege, to invade the
Benares division. Sir Colin sent a force to the rescue, and soon after-
wards the old Rajput died; but throughout the summer and the
autumn his followers maintained a guerrilla war in western Bihar.
The lack of the amnesty for which Lawrence pleaded was sorely felt.
"We must cling together”, said a prisoner, “for when we go home we
are hunted down and hanged. ” Detached parties, when they could
be brought to action, were invariably defeated; but the rebels, as a
whole, were too swift to be caught. When they were confined by seven
converging columns within a narrow space, and success seemed
certain, one column was delayed, and the entire body escaped through
the gap. It was not until October, when the younger Havelock per-
suaded his chief to try the effect of mounted infantry, whom he had
himself hastily trained, that they were driven into the Kaimur hills,
where, before the end of the year, their organisation was destroyed.
To understand how Sir Colin was able to undertake securely the
reconquest of Rohilkhand and Oudh, it is necessary to trace the course
of events in the Bombay Presidency and the central provinces. Lord
Elphinstone, the governor of Bombay, equipped a column to support
the Central India Agency, and throughout the Mutiny regarded the
interests of his own charge as subordinate to those of the empire. The
Bombay army, on the whole, was tolerably staunch. In Bombay itself,
though the sepoys were in a mutinous temper, order was preserved
by the skilful management of the superintendent of police. A plot
was discovered in the recently annexed state, Satara, and the con-
spirators were punished. But the principal danger was in the southern
## p. 201 (#237) ############################################
CENTRAL INDIA
201
Maratha country, where many landowners had been aggrieved by
the action of the Inam Commission, and the people were excited by
the momentary triumph of the Nana. A mutiny occurred at Kolha-
pur; intercepted letters revealed a Muhammadan conspiracy; and
emissaries from the Nana caused a local rebellion: but order was
restored by Colonel Le Grand Jacob, whom the governor had en-
trusted with discretionary power. 1
In Central India the most important point was Indore, the capital
of the Maratha prince, Holkar, who, in the absence of the agent,
Sir Robert Hamilton, was under the supervision of Colonel Durand.
The only British troops available were the gunners of a single battery
at the neighbouring station of Mhow; but on hearing of the outbreak
at Meerut, Durand summoned a detachment of Bhils and a force
belonging to the contingent that protected the begam of Bhopal,
while Holkar contributed a small force. Towards the end of June
Durand learned that the column which Elphinstone had equipped
could not advance, and on 1 July Holkar’s troops, who were imme-
diately joined by the infantry of the Malwa and Bhopal contingents,
mutinied. The Bhils and the Bhopal cavalry did nothing, and Durand
was forced to retreat with the women and children under the escort
of the cavalry who, though not actively mutinous, refused to remain.
To reach Mhow was impossible, for the approach to the road was
commanded by the mutineers; and the cavalry insisted on going to
Sehore in Bhopal. The commandant at Mhow, however, supported
by Holkar, who, if he had before been half-hearted, now proved him-
self loyal, assumed the duties of the agent and restored order in his
own district, though in the surrounding country anarchy was rampant.
Durand himself, moving southward from Sehore, joined the column
dispatched by Elphinstone, which he thenceforth commanded, at
Asirgarh, and returned to Mhow, where he was kept inactive by stress
of weather. When the dry season began he marched northward,
quelled the insurrection in Malwa, and in December returned to
Indore, where, before transferring his charge to Hamilton, he insisted
that all who had been concerned in the mutiny should be punished. 2
Another Maratha, the widow of the raja of Jhansi whose dominions
Dalhousie had annexed, had already planned revenge. Within a
month of the outbreak at Meerut the garrison mutinied; a general
massacre of Europeans followed; and the rani, buying over the sepoys,
who had threatened to set up a rival, fortified her city, raised an army,
and prepared to defend her country to the last. 3
In Bundelkhand, although many of the chiefs rebelled, Lieutenant
Osborne, the political officer at Rewah, conducted affairs so skilfully
that communication between Bombay and Calcutta remained un-
1 Cf. Jacob, Western India before and during the Mutinies, pp. 148 sqq.
2 Cf. H. M. Durand, Life of Sir isenry Durand, 1, 197. 599:
• Holmes, op. cit. pp. 791 sqq. and references there ciced.
## p. 202 (#238) ############################################
202
THE MUTINY
broken. In the Sagor and Narbada territories, south of Bundel-
khand, disturbances were general, but farther south, in the recently
annexed province of Nagpur, the authorities sternly repressed the
first symptoms of disorder. In Hyderabad, where were congregated
numerous Muslim fanatics, the resident, Major Davidson, supported
by the Nizam's able minister, Salar Jang, kept the peace, despite active
propaganda; and a band of Rohillas, who attacked the residency, was
scattered by a shower of canister from the Madras Horse Artillery,
who, like all the troops of that presidency, were staunch. It was
reserved for Sir Hugh Rose to restore British supremacy in the heart
of the peninsula and to prepare the way for the final efforts of Sir Colin
Campbell
In accordance with a plan formed by Sir Robert Hamilton, a
Bombay column, under Rose, was to march from Mhow by way of
Jhansi to Kalpi, while a Madras column, under General Whitlock,
marched northward across Bundelkhand. Leaving Mhow on
.
6 January, 1858, Rose joined his and brigade at Sehore. Capturing
rebel forts and defeating all whom he encountered in the field while the
ist brigade on his left cleared the great road from Bombay, he was
within a day's march from Jhansi when he received a dispatch from
Sir Colin, ordering him to turn aside and succour a chief who was
besieged by the Gwalior contingent under Tantia Topi. Fortunately
Hamilton, who, as a political officer, ventured to use his own discre-
tion, directed him to disregard this order, and two days later the siege
of Jhansi began. Within the next four days the whole of the ist brigade
and the siege-train arrived. Even at night the besiegers lay on their
arms and by day were dazzled by the glare and half-stifled by the
scorching wind. The besieged never ceased firing except at night, and
even women were seen working in their batteries. The siege had lasted
nine days when Tantia appeared with twenty-two thousand men.
Without suspending the bombardment, Sir Hugh collected all the
men whom he could spare, and on the following day defeated him.
Two days later, after a desperate resistance, the city was taken by
assault, and on the following night the rani, quitting the fort, rode
with a few attendants for Kalpi. After halting for nearly three weeks
to collect supplies and ammunition, Sir Hugh, though the sick list
was daily lengthening, resumed his march, defeated Tantia again in
the battle of Kunch, and prepared to finish the campaign. Whitlock,
partly owing to his own inactivity, was too late to join him; but Sir Colin
sent a force to his support. Half of his own troops were sick, all were
ailing, and he himself had suffered repeatedly from sunstroke; but on
22 May a final victory gave him possession of Kalpi. He was looking
forward to a period of rest which might enable him to recruit his
health when he heard of an event which caused a sensation throughout
India. The rani and Tantia, boldly marching with the remnant of
1 Holmes, op. cit. pp. 498 sqq. Cf. Meadows Tavlor, op. cit. p. 3&? .
## p. 203 (#239) ############################################
ROSE'S CAMPAIGN
203
their force to Gwalior, where Sindhia's army deserted to them, seized
the fortress and proclaimed the Nana as Peshwa. The main artery of
communication between Bombay and the North-Western Provinces
was in danger. Sir Hugh instantly took the field again, won a battle
on the outskirts of Gwalior, in which the rani, whom he esteemed as
“the best and bravest military leader of the rebels”, fell, defeated
Tantia on the following day, and restored Sindhia to his throne.
Tantia with four thousand men fled into Rajputana, and during the
next eight months, crossing and recrossing the Chambal, the Nar-
bada, and other rivers, doubling again and again like a hunted
hare, but still hoping to find support for his master, he contrived,
thanks to the marvellous speed of his followers, to escape the many
columns that pursued him. Early in 1859 the fugitives who had not
dispersed surrendered, and a few weeks later Tantia, betrayed as he
wandered in the jungle by a feudatory of Sindhia, was taken in his
sleep. Condemned by a court-martial on the charge of rebellion, he
was hanged on 18 April at Sipri in the Gwalior state. 1
The campaign of Sir Hugh Rose had relieved Sir Colin Campbell
from anxiety for his rear. After the recapture of Lucknow he pro-
posed to undertake forthwith the reconquest of Oudh, which his own
remissness had made necessary; but Canning replied that the Hindus
of Rohilkhand, who were almost all friendly, might turn against the
government if it delayed to overthrow Khan Bahadur Khan. Three
columns, supported by that which had guarded Fatehgarh, converged
on Bareilly, and by the end of May, although the moulvi of Faizabad,
who had led the assailants of Outram at the Alambagh, gave con-
siderable trouble, Rohilkhand was completely subdued. In Oudh,
where the peasant cultivators, hardly noticing the movements of the
rebels, were busy in the fields, the mutineers, the troops of the deposed
king, the talukdars' clansmen, and the Muhammadan zealots formed
distinct groups. A force which had been detached by Sir Colin did
what was possible, and many talukdars, trusting to the assurances of
Montgomery, who had succeeded Outram, that their land should not
be confiscated, tendered their submission; but the number that re-
mained in arms was still considerable. In October, when the weather
became cool, and the sepoys had mostly dispersed, Sir Colin began
his campaign. Success was less swift than it might have been if he had
followed the advice of Outram, who, pointing to the example of the
younger Havelock, urged him to form a corps of mounted infantry;
but the cordon with which he surrounded the province was of over-
whelming strength, and by the end of December the rebels had been
driven into Nepal. Still, in many parts of the peninsula small columns
were employed in hunting down marauders; and it was not until the
end of 1859 that India was restored to something like its normal state.
It remains to consider certain questions relating to the Mutiny, the
1 Cf. Holmes, op. cit. pp. 503 sqq. and references there cited.
## p. 204 (#240) ############################################
204
THE MUTINY
isolated rebellions connected with it, and the disturbances to which it
gave rise among the civil population. Before the story of the greased
cartridges was circulated, there was no definite plot for a general
rising of the Bengal army, and it is improbable that such a plot was
formed even after the first mutinies. For, though Cracroft Wilson,
the judge of Moradabad, collected evidence which convinced him
that 31 May had been fixed for a simultaneous revolt, and that the
plan was marred by the premature outbreak at Meerut, John Lawrence
found in the numerous intercepted letters written by sepoys not the
faintest hint of an organised conspiracy, while none of the faithful
sepoys, none of the condemned mutineers who might have saved their
lives by disclosing it, if it had existed, knew anything about it. In
reply to questions put to prisoners in the North-Western Provinces,
the cartridge, and it alone, was named as a grievance.
While the mutincers lacked a head, many were half-hearted and
fought reluctantly against the leaders whom they had been accus-
tomed to obcy; and between the various groups there was a want of
concert. Sikhs, Panjabis, Gurkhas fought whole-heartedly against
them. Even so, however, the prospects of the British would have been
almost desperate if Indian princes-particularly the rajas of Patiala,
Jhind and Nabha-had not given invaluable aid. Colin Campbell
made serious mistakes and lost precious opportunities; but his critics,
who contrasted him with the men who, without help from England,
had repelled the first onslaught of the mutineers, and complained
that with forces enormously superior he was slow in extinguishing the
revolt, forgot that his task, in itself even harder than theirs, was
rendered still more difficult by the delay in offering an amnesty and
by the confiscation proclaimed by Lord Canning.
Although many whose pride was offended by the domination of an
alien and infidel race, or who had personal objects to gain, desired
the overthrow of the British raj, diversities of race, rank, status, aim
and, above all, religion made it impossible for them to combine.
Aggrieved chiefs, such as Kunwar Singh, dispossessed land-holders,
villagers who objected to taxation, hereditary thieves, budmashes of
every kind took advantage of the prostration of authority to redress
their grievances, to rob, or to gratify private animosities; but civil
disturbances, except in a few isolated regions and on the part of a few
embittered or fanatical groups, never amounted to rebellion. After
the Mutiny broke out, the titular king of Delhi was proclaimed head
of a movement by which Muhammadan zealots hoped to regain
supremacy; but this probably deterred many to whom Muhammadan
rule was abhorrent from supporting the mutineers. The Nana, pro-
fiting by the military rising which he had helped to encourage,
became the representative of those Marathas who desired to restore
the power once exercised by the Peshwa. Among the states which
Dalhousie had annexed rebellion broke out in Jhansi and Oudh
a
## p. 205 (#241) ############################################
DALHOUSIE'S ALLEGED RESPONSIBILITY
205
alone; and in Oudh it was due not to annexation, but to the harshness
with which the talukdars were treated, to the failure of Havelock's
earlier attempts to relieve the residency, to the abandonment of
Lucknow, justifiable though it may have been, by Sir Colin Campbell,
to the errors which he committed during the siege, and to Canning's
impolitic proclamation. These rebellions arose in consequence of the
Mutiny, and there is no evidence that any of the rebels, except the
Nana, conspired before it began.
Dalhousie, except in so far as he had failed to remedy the indisci-
pline of the army, which was rather the business of the commander-
in-chief than of the governor-general, and had neglected to safeguard
Delhi and Allahabad, was unjustly blamed, and has been fully
vindicated. Even the annexation of Jhansi would have been harmless
if it had been supported by armed force; the increase of European
troops, for which he had in vain pleaded, would have at least averted
the worst calamities of the Mutiny; while by the construction of roads
and telegraphs, and by the administration which he bestowed upon
the Panjab, he contributed much to the power by which the Mutiny
was quelled.
Even before the reconquest of Oudh an event had occurred which,
while it marked the restoration of British supremacy, inaugurated a
new period of Indian history. The East India Company, upon which
all political parties in England agreed in throwing the blame of the
Mutiny, was abolished; and India was to be ruled in the name of the
queen. A proclamation, prepared under her direction, announced
that the government of India had been assumed by the queen; that
Lord Canning was to be the first viceroy, and that all officers who had
been in the service of the Company were confirmed in their offices;
that all treaties made by the Company with Indian princes were to
be maintained; that the queen desired no extension of territory,
promised full religious toleration to her Indian subjects, and would
always respect their ancient usages; that she offered pardon to all
rebels and mutineers who had not directly taken part in the murder of
Europeans; and that she would constantly endeavour to promote the
prosperity of her Indian dominions.
## p. 206 (#242) ############################################
CHAPTER XI
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
The government of India is an amazingly complex and dual form of adminis-
tration. It has two chiefs, the secretary of state here, the man at the desk and on
the front bench in this country; and the viceroy, the man on the spot in India. It
is the latter who, at any rate in India, is invested with paramount power; but the
final responsibility rests with the secretary of state. 1
In his British Government in India Lord Curzon further observes :
This dualism has arisen not merely from the simultaneous existence of one half
of the government in England, and the other half in India, for that is a feature of
the administration from a sovereign centre of all dependencies or dominions, but
from the subdivision of that authority both in England and in India. ?
The subject of this chapter is the history of the London branch of
British administration in India from 1858, the memorable year which
was marked by the end of the Mutiny and the proclamation of Lord
Canning as first viceroy and governor-general for the crown, to 1918,
the
year
which
saw the conclusion of the great war.
In February, 1858, a weighty and dignified petition was presented
to both houses of parliament on behalf of the East India Company.
It failed to avert the impending sentence, but certainly influenced
subsequent legislation.
The petitioners assumed that the minister of the crown who would
henceforward conduct the home portion of the administration of
India would be assisted by a council composed of statesmen ex-
perienced in Indian affairs. The knowledge necessary for governing
a foreign country, and in particular a country like India, could not
possibly be possessed by anyone who had not devoted a considerable
portion of his life to the acquisition of it. The council should be
qualified not only to advise the minister, “but also by its advice
to exercise a certain degree of moral check". The minister would
generally be unacquainted with India and would constantly be ex-
posed to solicitations from individuals and bodies
either entirely ignorant of that country or knowing enough of it to imposc on those
who knew still less than themselves and having very frequently objects in view
other than the good government of India.
British public opinion was necessarily unacquainted with Indian
affairs and therefore liable to be misled. The responsible minister's
council should, therefore, derive sufficient weight from its constitution
1 Lord Curzon, Hansard, 13 July, 1917, XXV, 1027-8.
2 11, 67.
3 Hansard, 1858, CXLVIII, Appendix.
## p. 207 (#243) ############################################
THE COMPANY'S PETITION
207
to be a substantial barrier against inroads of self-interest and ignorance
in England from which parliament could hardly be expected to afford
a sufficient protection. The council must be so constituted as to be
personallyindependent of the minister, and should feel itself responsible
for recording an opinion on any Indian subject and pressing that
opinion on the minister whether it was agreeable to him or not. The
minister when overruling his council must be bound to record his
views. Thus the council would be a check and not a screen. Otherwise
it would merely serve to weaken the minister's responsibility and “to
give the colourable sanction of prudence and experience to measures
in the framing of which these qualities have had no share”.
A council composed of crown nominees would not preserve the
independence of judgment which had marked the court of directors.
If a substantial portion of the old spirit was to remain, a majority at
least of the council which would assist the new minister for India
should hold their seats independently of his appointment. That body
should not be smaller in numbers than the existing court of eighteen
directors. The petitioners went on to plead for the continuance of
the existing system, to urge that the present home government of India
was not really a double government, as the final word always rested
with the cabinet, and that a new arrangement which in any way
checked the minister's discretion would be liable to a similar reproach.
This reproach, however, originated
in an entire misconception of the functions devolving on the home government of
India, and in the application to it of the principles applicable to purely executive
departments.
The executive government of India was and must be situated in India
itself.
The court of directors was not so much an executive as a
deliberative body. Its principal function and that of the home govern-
ment generally was not to direct the details of administration, but to
scrutinise and revise the past acts of the Indian government; to lay
down principles and issue general instructions for their future guidance
and to give or refuse sanction to great political measures which were
referred home for approval. Such functions admitted of and required
the concurrence of more judgments than one. They were more
analogous to the functions of parliament than to those of an executive
board; and it was considered an excellence in parliament to be not
merely a double but a triple government. The petitioners ended by
praying that no change should be made in the constitution of the
Indian government until the conclusion of “the present unhappy
disturbances or without a full previous enquiry into the operations of
the present system”.
But both the great political parties in parliament were resolved
that there should be no delay in completing the process which had
definitely begun in 1853. It was an obvious anachronism that a
a
## p. 208 (#244) ############################################
208
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
chartered company should take part in administering a great empire.
It was wrong that there should be a Company's army and a royal
army, an Indian and a royal navy. In India itself the prestige of the
Company had lately suffered irretrievable damage. 1 Immediately
after the presentation of the Company's petition, Lord Palmerston,
then prime minister, introduced his bill for transferring the govern-
ment of India entirely to the crown. But when the bill had been read
a second time he was turned out of office on the Conspiracy to Murder
Bill, and was succeeded by Lord Derby. Then Disraeli, who came in
as Derby's chancellor of the exchequer, introduced a new bill which
provided the Indian minister with a council composed partly of
crown nominees and partly of persons to be elected by two con-
stituencies, one consisting of men who had served in India or possessed
financial interests in that country, the other made up from the parlia-
mentary electors of the leading commercial cities of the United
Kingdom, London, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow and Belfast.
These proposals, for which Lord Ellenborough, then president of the
Board of Control, was largely responsible, were received with general
ridicules and were dropped. Ellenborough’s dispatch to Canning
regarding the Oudh proclamation caused his own resignation. His
successor, Lord Stanley, piloted certain resolutions through the House
of Commons which formed the basis for a measure destined to regulate
the government of India from London for sixty-two years. Its main
provisions were:
(a) The place of the Board of Control and court of directors would
be taken by a secretary of state in council. The new secretary would
be assisted by a “Council of India” consisting of fifteen members, of
whom eight were to be appointed by the crown and seven were to be
elected by the directors of the East India Company. The majority of
both appointed and elected members were to be persons who had
served or resided in India for ten years at least, and had not left the
country more than ten years before their appointment. Future
appointments or elections were to be so regulated that nine at least
of the members of council should hold these qualifications. Future
vacancies in crown appointments would be filled by crown nominees;
vacancies among the seven members elected by the directors would be
filled by persons co-opted by the council. No member could sit or
vote in parliament. All would hold office during good behaviour and
could be removed only on petition by both houses of parliament.
(6) The council would conduct Indian business transacted in the
United Kingdom and would correspond with the Government of
India, but would not possess the initiative which had all along rested
with the court of directors. It could give its opinion only on questions
1 Martineau, Life of Frere, I, 230.
2 Hansard, 1857-8, CXLVIII, 1276.
3 Idem, cxLix, 1675; cf. also 1677.
• Monypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli, iv, 138, 164-5.
>
## p. 209 (#245) ############################################
THE INDIA ACT OF 1858
209
referred to it by the secretary of state, who would preside over meetings
with power to overrule should he be unable to obtain agreement. In
such an event he might require that his opinion and the reasons for it
should be entered in the minutes of the proceedings, and any member
who had been present at the meeting could exercise the same privilege.
(c) The secretary of state might constitute committees of his council
for the more convenient transaction of business, and might distribute
departments of business among those committees. He would direct
the manner in which all business should be conducted. The council
would meet once at least every seven days and could do no business
without a quorum of five.
(d) Con. munications from the secretary of state to the governor-
general, and orders proposed to bi made in the United Kingdom by
the secretary of state, must, subject to certain provisions, be either
submitted to a meeting of the council or be deposited in the council-
room for seven days before issue. Any member of council might record
his opinion on any such communication or order in a minute-book
kept for the purpose, and a copy of such entry would be sent forth with
to the secretary of state. If a majority minuted against a communica-
tion or order, the secretary of state must, if adhering to such com-
munication or order, record his reasons.
(e) Orders of the secretary of state relating to expenditure and
loans required the concurrence of a majority of the Council of India.
The revenues of India, which would be charged with a dividend on
the Company's stock and with their debts, could only be used for the
purposes of the government of India. Clause 41 of the act provided
that no grant or appropriation of any part of such revenues or of any
property coming into the possession of the secretary of state in council
should be made without the concurrence of a majority of votes at a
meeting of the council. All powers of issuing securities for money in
the United Kingdom vested in the secretary of state in council must
be exercised by the former with concurrence of a majority of votes at
a council meeting.
(s) The salary of the secretary of state and the cost of his office
would be charged to the revenues of India. A statement of “moral
and material progress” would be annually submitted to parliament.
The secretary of state would every year lay Indian accounts before
parliament, on occasions which became famous as “budget debates",
although in fact they were simply reviews of Indian affairs.
(8) It was provided that urgent communications or orders which
did not, under the terms of the act, require the concurrence of a
majority of council votes, might issue on the authority of the secretary
of state alone without reference to the council. But in such cases the
secretary would record the reason for urgency and give notice thereof
to the members of the council.
(h) Orders concerning the levying of war or the making of peace,
CHI VI
14
## p. 210 (#246) ############################################
210
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
>
or the treating or negotiating with any prince or state, which virtually
gave effect to cabinet decisions and did not require the support of a
majority of council votes, might be marked as "secret” and sent off
on the authority of the secretary alone without any notice or reference
to the council. “Secret” dispatches from the governor-general in
council or the governors of Madras or Bombay relating to such
matters need not be communicated to the Council of India.
(i) Appointment to the offices of governor-general and governors
of presidencies vested in the crown. The governor-general would
appoint lieutenant-governors to provinces subject to the approval of
Her Majesty. Members of the various councils in India would be
appointed by the secretary of state in council.
(j) The naval and military forces of the Company were transferred
to the crown, their separate local character being retained. It was
directed by clause 55 that except for the purpose of preventing or
repelling invasion, or under other sudden or urgent necessity, Indian
revenues should not be applicable for military operations outside
India without the consent of parliament.
The basic principles of the bill were fully discussed in parliament. 1
The object was to vest full charge of the government of India in the
crown “in order that the direct superintendence of the whole empire
might be placed under one executive authority". The new secretary
of state would be a member of the cabinet. His individual responsi-
bility was essential. His decision would be final on all matters. But
he should not be allowed to choose all his councillors, for the council
should possess considerable independence. It must exercise "moral
control” 3 As Sir Henry Maine subsequently observed, the ultimate
power of the secretary of state was regarded with apprehension by
certain spcakers in the House of Commons. On 23 June the directors
drew up a letter criticising the bill and stating that in their opinion
the council should have more than a consultative voice in all questions
regarding expenditure. In such cases the secretary of state should not
be able to exercise his overruling power. Precautionary provisions
were then engrafted on the bill and appeared as clauses 41 and 55. 4
The semi-independent status accorded to the Council of India by
the cabinet was approved by Mr Gladstone for the opposition. In
order“to clothe this new body with all the moral weight and influence
that was consistent with retaining intact the responsibility of the
secretary of state”, he recommended that its first members should be
named in the bill. Each nomination would thus receive the express
approval of parliament. This would give the council a start which
would secure for it a good character hereafter. It needed all possible
weight at this time of transition from one form of government to
)
3 Idem, CLI, 323.
1 Hansard, 1858, CXLIX, CL. 2 Idem, CL, 2066.
• Unpublished memorandum, dated 8 November, 1880.
5 Hansard, CLI, 470, 757-8.
## p. 211 (#247) ############################################
THE DEBATES OF 1858
211
another and there were precedents for such procedure. The proposal
was rejected by the cabinet, mainly on the ground that, if accepted, it
would deprive the court of directors of the power of electing any
members of the new body. The government wished to avoid needless
changes. It had found in the court of directors a council in being
which consisted partly of crown nominees and partly of persons elected
by the Company's court of proprietors. It would practically con-
tinue this council, increasing the number of nominees and reducing
the number of elected members so as nearly to equalise the two
varieties. 1
Both the cabinet and parliament desired to deal tenderly with the
Company which had fallen before “he inevitable consequences of
time, change and progress", 2 and to set up a substantial barrier
against inroads of unbalanced sentiment and attempts to debit the
revenues of India with unfair charges. India must not be brought
into the cockpit of party politics. The members of the Council of India
must be “neither the masters nor the puppets but the valuable
advisers of the new minister" 3
While, however, the council would be invested with an appreciable
degree of independence and would be so large as to represent the
various presidencies and public services in India, it would have no
powers of initiative, and would, in the main, confine its attention to
such questions of policy and matters of first-class interest as were laid
before it by its president, who in “secret" affairs could act by himself
entirely apart from his councillors. He was a member of the cabinet
which could not be forced to take into its confidence any given
number of persons whom it did not wish of its own accord to con-
sult. The president of the Board of Control had always possessed
the privilege of communicating with the governor-general through
the secret committee of the court of directors in regard to “secret”
business. 5
Secret orders, however, concerning the levying of war and other
matters might involve considerable expenditure from Indian revenues.
It was so newhat difficult to see how members of council could in such
cases discharge their statutory responsibilities.
While it was hoped that all these arrangements would conduce to
the better government of India, the cabinet was convinced that, in
Lord Derby's words, "the government of India must be, on the whole,
carried out in India itself”. 6 Interference should be on as small a
scale as possible; although, apart from the large amount of Indian
business which was necessarily transacted in England, since parlia-
ment was responsible to the nation for the administration of India, it
must discharge its responsibilities conscientiously.
1 Hansard, Cli, 759-60.
; Idem, CLI, 1454-5;
• Lec-Warner, Dalhousie, 1, 107-8.
Idem, cxLix, 820.
• Idem, CLI, 1457-8.
• Hansard, CLI, 1448.
14-2
## p. 212 (#248) ############################################
212
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858-1918
The Act“for the better government of India” (21 & 22 Vict. c. 106)
received the royal assent on 2 August, 1858; and a month later the
directors issued their last instructions to their servants in the East and
in memorable words commended their splendid trust to the care of
the sovereign of Great Britain.
Let Her Majesty appreciate the gift-let her take the vast country and the
teeming millions of India under Her direct control; but let Her not forget the great
corporation from which she has received them nor the lessons to be learnt from its
success.
Lord Stanley, afterwards Earl of Derby, who, as president of the
Board of Control, had piloted the bill of 1858 through the House of
Commons, was the first secretary of state for India. With the board's
two secretaries, he migrated to a new India Office which took the
place of the Company's East India House. The secretaries became
the first Parliamentary and Permanent Under-Sccretaries of State for
India. Resigning in 1859 with the Conservative cabinet, Stanley was
succeeded by Sir Charles Wood, who, as president of the Board of
Control, had been responsible for the Charter Act of 1853 and the
education dispatch of 1854, and now held office till 1866 with excellent
results. He was a single-minded man, of great knowledge, patience
and judgment, and was largely responsible for the success with which
Indian affairs were conducted during a very difficult period of transi-
tion and reconstruction. The arrangements for the councils of the
governor-general and those of the governors of Madras and Bombay,
the setting up of new High Courts of Judicature, the reorganisation
of finances, the codification of the law, railway extension, the amal-
gamation of the queen's and the Company's British regiments, the
determination of the number of British troops to be quartered in India,
the adjustment of numerous conflicting interests, all demanded careful
consideration in London. The council was a very strong one, including
ex-directors and men who had earned distinction in the Mutiny
period. Although there were necessarily differences of opinion and
outlook from time to time, although the transaction of business by
committees sometimes caused irritating delays, although time was
sometimes wasted over trifling financial questions which could better
have been decided in India, some years after quitting office Wood,
who had meantime become Lord Halifax, told the House of Lords
that any secretary of state who firmly and honestly discharged his
duties would never experience the slightest difficulty with his council. 4
On a subsequent occasion he
deprecated any measure which could diminish the independence and self-respect
of the council, for a strong council was needed to give the secretary of state the
support requisite for resisting party pressure, a pressure not always applied in a
manner beneficial to India. 5
i Foster, East India House, pp. 153-4.
2 Cf. Hansard, cxlviii, 1298.
• Martineau, op. cit. 1, 447.
• Hansard, cxcv, 1085. • Idem, cxcvi, 693.
6
## p. 213 (#249) ############################################
THE LEGISLATION OF 1869
213
In 1866, however, a more brilliant and impulsive, but less patient and
experienced, secretary of state presided at the council-board. Lord
Salisbury (then Lord Cranborne), while in office, avoided an open
breach with his council. But afterwards, when speaking in the House
of Lords as Marquis of Salisbury on 11 March, 1869, on“ the Governor-
general of India Bill”, he expressed his belief that the “tutelage” in
which the secretary of state for India was held by his council was
injurious to the good government of that country. In such matters
as railway guarantees and other commercial affairs the council's
"veto” was a protection, but, with that exception, responsibility
should lie with the secretary of state alone. Opportunity should be
taken of another bill then pending to clear up "the mystery” which
enabled the council, under cover of vetoing money questions, to inter-
fere in every other measure on the plea that it involved money con-
siderations and thus to become "an incubus on the minister". 1
On this occasion Lord Salisbury was followed by his successor in
office, the Duke of Argyll, who assured him that there was no mystery.
The true interpretation of the law was that the secretary of state was
“absolutely supreme" in financial, as in other matters, and could
overrule his council whenever he thought fit to do so. The duke was
aware of no case in which the council had set up its authority in
opposition to the will of the secretary of state. On 19 April, in bringing
forward the “Government of India Act Amendment Bill”, he ex-
plained to the House the history of clause 41 in the act of 1858 which
had given rise to Lord Salisbury's contention. Considerable discussion
followed, and extended over 29 April, when the bill was read a second
time, to 13 May, when Lord Salisbury moved and withdrew an
amendment. The subject revived in a debate in the House of Com-
mons on 17 August, 1880, when it was raised by Fawcett, the econo-
mist, afterwards postmaster-general. ? The view eventually taken was
that the true intentions of parliament in enacting clause 41 of the act
of 1858 were to impose constitutional restraint on the powers of the
secretary of state with respect to the expenditure of money, but by no
means to extend the effective assertion of this restraint to all cases,
especially where imperial questions were concerned. The secretary of
state was a member of the cabinet and in cabinet questions the views
of the cabinet must prevail. It was never intended that the council
should be able to resist the cabinet by stopping supplies. Vis-à-vis the
secretary of state, as representing the latter, the Council of India
possessed no veto. As Sir Henry Maine expressed it, “any such
power given to the council and exercised by it would produce before
long a combination of both the great English parties to sweep away
the council itself". 3
In the course of the debate in the House of Lords on 13 May, 1869,
· Hansard, cxciv, 1074.
· Idem, CCLV, 1453.
3 Unpublished memorandum.
## p. 214 (#250) ############################################
214
THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858-1918
1
the Duke of Argyll stated that Lord Salisbury had been moved to
raise the question by the opposition which his council had offered to
a project put forward by certain commercial bodies to which the
secretary of state had agreed. The council had been supported by the
Government of India, but had eventually given way. In any case,
clause 41 of the act of 1858 survived Lord Salisbury's assault.
The Government of India Act Amendment Bill", which pro-
duced the Lords debate of 13 May, 1869, contained proposals for
altering the life-tenure of members of the Council of India to one of
ten years, which might, for reasons of public advantage, be extended
to fifteen years. The secretary of state justified his recommendation by
the rapid changes which were taking place in India, largely as a result
of extending railway communications, and by the need of not only
intimate but recent Indian experience on his council. His views
were accepted by the House. Lord Salisbury moved an amendment
to the bill proposing that in future all members of the council should
be appointed by the crown. None should be co-opted by the council
itself. The amend. nent was carried and embodied in the bill, together
with a provision transferring from the secretary of state in council
to the crown the right of filling vacancies on the councils of the
governor-general and governors in India. The general effect of the
legislation and debates of 1869 was to strengthen the position of the
secretary of state vis-à-vis his council. His position vis-à-vis the Govern-
ment of India was fortified by the completion in 1870 of a direct
telegraph line between India and England by submarine cable through
the Red Sea. He could thus less than ever be confronted with accom-
plished facts.
For years after 1869 the history of the Council of India was un-
eventful. When Lord Salisbury again presided over the India Office
(1874-7) his Afghan and North-West Frontier policy, especially the
occupation of Quetta and the separation of the trans-Indus districts
from the Panjab, was strongly opposed by members of his council who
followed Lord Lawrence's lead. 3 But a secretary of state who could
rely on cabinet support could now certainly get his way. Although,
according to Lord Salisbury's biographer, he was a believer “in the
virtue of a single inspiration and in the evil of hampering it by the
intrusion of competing ideas”, he was exercised by the problem of
combining an independence of initiative in the government of India
with his own responsibility for final decision, and considered that
it could be solved only by private correspondence between himself
and the viceroy. " He carried this doctrine to lengths to which Lord
Northbrook refused to follow him.
Lord Northbrook recognised the subordinate position of the viceroy but held
that parliament had confurred certain rights, not orily on the viceroy, but on his
1 Hansard, cxcvi, 700.
? Idem, cxcv, 1077-8. Cf. Martineau, op. cit. I, 356–7.
: Lady Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Lord Salisbury, 11, 159. • Idem, pp. 65-6.
a
>
## p. 215 (#251) ############################################
POLICY OF THE INDIA OFFICE
215
council, which differentiated the latter in a very notable degree from subordinate
officials. 1
Lord Cromer has stated that Lord Salisbury was disposed to reject,
and, he thought, to underrate, the value of the views of Anglo-Indian
officials.
This does not appear to have been the practice of some of his
successors. Lord George Hamilton, who first as under-secretary and
afterwards as secretary of state introduced thirteen Indian budgets in
the House of Commons, writes that the Council of India was really a
cabinet with the important exception that its procedure and powers
were prescribed by an act of parliament. It had absolute control over
Indian expenditure. It preserved an unbroken record of the reasons
for expenditure of all kinds and performed the business of checking
far more effectively than the treasury, obtaining better results from
the expenditure sanctioned. 2 Lord Randolph Churchill found the
council "an invaluable instrument”. 3
As regards the general policy of the India Office in the latter years
of the nineteenth century, although relations between India and
England had become more intimate, involving a constantly increasing
degree of interference, and though the cases in which final orders
could be passed in India had become less frequent, yet the secretary
of state did not constantly interfere in the ordinary work of Indian
administration, but mainly confined his action to answering references
from the Indian government. Apart from great political or financia)
questions, the number or nature of these references depended on the
character of the governor-general for the time being. The secretary
of state initiated almost nothing. In domestic affairs the Indian
government was almost independent so long as it was content to
carry on without largely increasing the cost of existing establishments
or incurring new and heavy charges. The secretary of state had no
disposition to interfere needlessly in the details of administration in
India, but was sometimes subjected to pressure which could with
difficulty be resisted. On such occasions the council was extremely
useful. It further assisted in preserving continuity of administrative
principles in India where the official personnel was necessarily always
changing. "
The views of the majority of the Council of India on the subject of
divided control of the India army provoked the impatience of Lord
Ripon who, at the close of the first year of his viceroyalty, complained
of the increasing interference of the India Office which he ascribed to
the “subordinates", and the fact that Lord Hartington, then secretary,
was overworked with other than Indian business. But had the same
1 Mallet, Life of Northbrook, p. 91.
2 Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections (1874-1880), pp. 307-8.
• Winston Churchill, Life of Lord Randolph Churchill, 1, 475.
• Strachey, India, pp. 74 81 (1911 ed. ).
## p. 216 (#252) ############################################
216 THE HOME GOVERNMENT, 1858–1918
viceroy received the warning drawn up by Sir Henry Maine, the most
prominent member of the then existent Council of India, relating to
the projected Ilbert bill, he might have been saved from a course of
action which he lived to regret bitterly. The council had in 1883
desired Lord Hartington, then secretary of state, to transmit Maine's
“secret” memorandum to the viceroy; but this was not done, and
they were subsequently consoled by Lord Kimberley, Hartington's
successor, with the just reminder that they should formally have
conveyed the warning themselves. 1
Meantime the constitution of the council was slightly altered. In
1876 the secretary of state was allowed to appoint not more than three
special experts (legal or financial) on the old tenure of good behaviour.
In 1889 he was allowed to abstain from filling vacancies until the
number of members should be reduced to ten. Reduction was asked
for in the interest of economy. In the previous year the council had
been joined by nne of its most distinguished members, Sir Alfred
Lyall, described by Lord George Hamilton as his “right-hand
adviser”, who held office for fifteen years and has left us some passing
impressions of its proceedings. Fresh from governing great provinces
he wrote:
The India Office is comfortable and convenient, but rather depressing: in the
first place, death visits the council rather frequently: secondly, we have all rather
the look of oid hulks laid up in dock,
and are men who have.
