No More Learning

Now there
are three things in the soul which control action and truth-sensation,
reason, desire.

Of these sensation originates no action; this is plain from the fact
that the lower animals have sensation but no share in action.

What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance
are in desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character
concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both
the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to
be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts.
Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the intellect
which is contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and the
bad state are truth and falsity respectively (for this is the work
of everything intellectual); while of the part which is practical
and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right
desire.

The origin of action-its efficient, not its final cause-is choice,
and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. This
is why choice cannot exist either without reason and intellect or
without a moral state; for good action and its opposite cannot exist
without a combination of intellect and character. Intellect itself,
however, moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end
and is practical; for this rules the productive intellect, as well,
since every one who makes makes for an end, and that which is made
is not an end in the unqualified sense (but only an end in a
particular relation, and the end of a particular operation)-only
that which is done is that; for good action is an end, and desire aims
at this. Hence choice is either desiderative reason or ratiocinative
desire, and such an origin of action is a man. (It is to be noted that
nothing that is past is an object of choice, e. g. no one chooses to
have sacked Troy; for no one deliberates about the past, but about
what is future and capable of being otherwise, while what is past is
not capable of not having taken place; hence Agathon is right in
saying

For this alone is lacking even to God,

To make undone things thathave once been done. )

The work of both the intellectual parts, then, is truth. Therefore
the states that are most strictly those in respect of which each of
these parts will reach truth are the virtues of the two parts.

3

Let us begin, then, from the beginning, and discuss these states
once more. Let it be assumed that the states by virtue of which the
soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial are five in
number, i. e. art, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom,
philosophic wisdom, intuitive reason; we do not include judgement
and opinion because in these we may be mistaken.

Now what scientific knowledge is, if we are to speak exactly and not
follow mere similarities, is plain from what follows. We all suppose
that what we know is not even capable of being otherwise; of things
capable of being otherwise we do not know, when they have passed
outside our observation, whether they exist or not. Therefore the
object of scientific knowledge is of necessity. Therefore it is
eternal; for things that are of necessity in the unqualified sense are
all eternal; and things that are eternal are ungenerated and
imperishable. Again, every science is thought to be capable of being
taught, and its object of being learned. And all teaching starts
from what is already known, as we maintain in the Analytics also;
for it proceeds sometimes through induction and sometimes by
syllogism. Now induction is the starting-point which knowledge even of
the universal presupposes, while syllogism proceeds from universals.
There are therefore starting-points from which syllogism proceeds,
which are not reached by syllogism; it is therefore by induction
that they are acquired. Scientific knowledge is, then, a state of
capacity to demonstrate, and has the other limiting characteristics
which we specify in the Analytics, for it is when a man believes in
a certain way and the starting-points are known to him that he has
scientific knowledge, since if they are not better known to him than
the conclusion, he will have his knowledge only incidentally.

Let this, then, be taken as our account of scientific knowledge.

4

In the variable are included both things made and things done;
making and acting are different (for their nature we treat even the
discussions outside our school as reliable); so that the reasoned
state of capacity to act is different from the reasoned state of
capacity to make. Hence too they are not included one in the other;
for neither is acting making nor is making acting. Now since
architecture is an art and is essentially a reasoned state of capacity
to make, and there is neither any art that is not such a state nor any
such state that is not an art, art is identical with a state of
capacity to make, involving a true course of reasoning. All art is
concerned with coming into being, i. e. with contriving and considering
how something may come into being which is capable of either being
or not being, and whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing
made; for art is concerned neither with things that are, or come
into being, by necessity, nor with things that do so in accordance
with nature (since these have their origin in themselves). Making
and acting being different, art must be a matter of making, not of
acting. And in a sense chance and art are concerned with the same
objects; as Agathon says, 'art loves chance and chance loves art'.
Art, then, as has been is a state concerned with making, involving a
true course of reasoning, and lack of art on the contrary is a state
concerned with making, involving a false course of reasoning; both are
concerned with the variable.

5

Regarding practical wisdom we shall get at the truth by
considering who are the persons we credit with it. Now it is thought
to be the mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate
well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some
particular respect, e. g. about what sorts of thing conduce to health
or to strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life
in general. This is shown by the fact that we credit men with
practical wisdom in some particular respect when they have
calculated well with a view to some good end which is one of those
that are not the object of any art. It follows that in the general
sense also the man who is capable of deliberating has practical
wisdom. Now no one deliberates about things that are invariable, nor
about things that it is impossible for him to do. Therefore, since
scientific knowledge involves demonstration, but there is no
demonstration of things whose first principles are variable (for all
such things might actually be otherwise), and since it is impossible
to deliberate about things that are of necessity, practical wisdom
cannot be scientific knowledge nor art; not science because that which
can be done is capable of being otherwise, not art because action
and making are different kinds of thing. The remaining alternative,
then, is that it is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act
with regard to the things that are good or bad for man. For while
making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action
itself is its end. It is for this reason that we think Pericles and
men like him have practical wisdom, viz. because they can see what
is good for themselves and what is good for men in general; we
consider that those can do this who are good at managing households or
states. (This is why we call temperance (sophrosune) by this name;
we imply that it preserves one's practical wisdom (sozousa tan
phronsin). Now what it preserves is a judgement of the kind we have
described. For it is not any and every judgement that pleasant and
painful objects destroy and pervert, e. g. the judgement that the
triangle has or has not its angles equal to two right angles, but only
judgements about what is to be done. For the originating causes of the
things that are done consist in the end at which they are aimed; but
the man who has been ruined by pleasure or pain forthwith fails to see
any such originating cause-to see that for the sake of this or because
of this he ought to choose and do whatever he chooses and does; for
vice is destructive of the originating cause of action. ) Practical
wisdom, then, must be a reasoned and true state of capacity to act
with regard to human goods. But further, while there is such a thing
as excellence in art, there is no such thing as excellence in
practical wisdom; and in art he who errs willingly is preferable,
but in practical wisdom, as in the virtues, he is the reverse.
Plainly, then, practical wisdom is a virtue and not an art. There
being two parts of the soul that can follow a course of reasoning,
it must be the virtue of one of the two, i. e. of that part which forms
opinions; for opinion is about the variable and so is practical
wisdom. But yet it is not only a reasoned state; this is shown by
the fact that a state of that sort may forgotten but practical
wisdom cannot.

6

Scientific knowledge is judgement about things that are universal
and necessary, and the conclusions of demonstration, and all
scientific knowledge, follow from first principles (for scientific
knowledge involves apprehension of a rational ground). This being
so, the first principle from which what is scientifically known
follows cannot be an object of scientific knowledge, of art, or of
practical wisdom; for that which can be scientifically known can be
demonstrated, and art and practical wisdom deal with things that are
variable. Nor are these first principles the objects of philosophic
wisdom, for it is a mark of the philosopher to have demonstration
about some things. If, then, the states of mind by which we have truth
and are never deceived about things invariable or even variable are
scientific knowlededge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, and
intuitive reason, and it cannot be any of the three (i. e. practical
wisdom, scientific knowledge, or philosophic wisdom), the remaining
alternative is that it is intuitive reason that grasps the first
principles.

7

Wisdom (1) in the arts we ascribe to their most finished
exponents, e. g. to Phidias as a sculptor and to Polyclitus as a
maker of portrait-statues, and here we mean nothing by wisdom except
excellence in art; but (2) we think that some people are wise in
general, not in some particular field or in any other limited respect,
as Homer says in the Margites,

Him did the gods make neither a digger nor yet a ploughman

Nor wise in anything else.

Therefore wisdom must plainly be the most finished of the forms of
knowledge. It follows that the wise man must not only know what
follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth about
the first principles. Therefore wisdom must be intuitive reason
combined with scientific knowledge-scientific knowledge of the highest
objects which has received as it were its proper completion.

Of the highest objects, we say; for it would be strange to think
that the art of politics, or practical wisdom, is the best
knowledge, since man is not the best thing in the world. Now if what
is healthy or good is different for men and for fishes, but what is
white or straight is always the same, any one would say that what is
wise is the same but what is practically wise is different; for it
is to that which observes well the various matters concerning itself
that one ascribes practical wisdom, and it is to this that one will
entrust such matters. This is why we say that some even of the lower
animals have practical wisdom, viz. those which are found to have a
power of foresight with regard to their own life. It is evident also
that philosophic wisdom and the art of politics cannot be the same;
for if the state of mind concerned with a man's own interests is to be
called philosophic wisdom, there will be many philosophic wisdoms;
there will not be one concerned with the good of all animals (any more
than there is one art of medicine for all existing things), but a
different philosophic wisdom about the good of each species.

But if the argument be that man is the best of the animals, this
makes no difference; for there are other things much more divine in
their nature even than man, e. g. , most conspicuously, the bodies of
which the heavens are framed. From what has been said it is plain,
then, that philosophic wisdom is scientific knowledge, combined with
intuitive reason, of the things that are highest by nature. This is
why we say Anaxagoras, Thales, and men like them have philosophic
but not practical wisdom, when we see them ignorant of what is to
their own advantage, and why we say that they know things that are
remarkable, admirable, difficult, and divine, but useless; viz.
because it is not human goods that they seek.

Practical wisdom on the other hand is concerned with things human
and things about which it is possible to deliberate; for we say this
is above all the work of the man of practical wisdom, to deliberate
well, but no one deliberates about things invariable, nor about things
which have not an end, and that a good that can be brought about by
action. The man who is without qualification good at deliberating is
the man who is capable of aiming in accordance with calculation at the
best for man of things attainable by action. Nor is practical wisdom
concerned with universals only-it must also recognize the particulars;
for it is practical, and practice is concerned with particulars.
This is why some who do not know, and especially those who have
experience, are more practical than others who know; for if a man knew
that light meats are digestible and wholesome, but did not know
which sorts of meat are light, he would not produce health, but the
man who knows that chicken is wholesome is more likely to produce
health.

Now practical wisdom is concerned with action; therefore one
should have both forms of it, or the latter in preference to the
former. But of practical as of philosophic wisdom there must be a
controlling kind.

8

Political wisdom and practical wisdom are the same state of mind,
but their essence is not the same. Of the wisdom concerned with the
city, the practical wisdom which plays a controlling part is
legislative wisdom, while that which is related to this as particulars
to their universal is known by the general name 'political wisdom';
this has to do with action and deliberation, for a decree is a thing
to be carried out in the form of an individual act. This is why the
exponents of this art are alone said to 'take part in politics'; for
these alone 'do things' as manual labourers 'do things'.

Practical wisdom also is identified especially with that form of
it which is concerned with a man himself-with the individual; and this
is known by the general name 'practical wisdom'; of the other kinds
one is called household management, another legislation, the third
politics, and of the latter one part is called deliberative and the
other judicial. Now knowing what is good for oneself will be one
kind of knowledge, but it is very different from the other kinds;
and the man who knows and concerns himself with his own interests is
thought to have practical wisdom, while politicians are thought to
be busybodies; hence the word of Euripides,

But how could I be wise, who might at ease,

Numbered among the army's multitude,

Have had an equal share?

For those who aim too high and do too much.

Those who think thus seek their own good, and consider that one
ought to do so. From this opinion, then, has come the view that such
men have practical wisdom; yet perhaps one's own good cannot exist
without household management, nor without a form of government.
Further, how one should order one's own affairs is not clear and needs
inquiry.

What has been said is confirmed by the fact that while young men
become geometricians and mathematicians and wise in matters like
these, it is thought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be
found. The cause is that such wisdom is concerned not only with
universals but with particulars, which become familiar from
experience, but a young man has no experience, for it is length of
time that gives experience; indeed one might ask this question too,
why a boy may become a mathematician, but not a philosopher or a
physicist. It is because the objects of mathematics exist by
abstraction, while the first principles of these other subjects come
from experience, and because young men have no conviction about the
latter but merely use the proper language, while the essence of
mathematical objects is plain enough to them?

Further, error in deliberation may be either about the universal
or about the particular; we may fall to know either that all water
that weighs heavy is bad, or that this particular water weighs heavy.

That practical wisdom is not scientific knowledge is evident; for it
is, as has been said, concerned with the ultimate particular fact,
since the thing to be done is of this nature. It is opposed, then,
to intuitive reason; for intuitive reason is of the limiting
premisses, for which no reason can be given, while practical wisdom is
concerned with the ultimate particular, which is the object not of
scientific knowledge but of perception-not the perception of qualities
peculiar to one sense but a perception akin to that by which we
perceive that the particular figure before us is a triangle; for in
that direction as well as in that of the major premiss there will be a
limit. But this is rather perception than practical wisdom, though
it is another kind of perception than that of the qualities peculiar
to each sense.

9

There is a difference between inquiry and deliberation; for
deliberation is inquiry into a particular kind of thing. We must grasp
the nature of excellence in deliberation as well whether it is a
form of scientific knowledge, or opinion, or skill in conjecture, or
some other kind of thing. Scientific knowledge it is not; for men do
not inquire about the things they know about, but good deliberation is
a kind of deliberation, and he who deliberates inquires and
calculates. Nor is it skill in conjecture; for this both involves no
reasoning and is something that is quick in its operation, while men
deliberate a long time, and they say that one should carry out quickly
the conclusions of one's deliberation, but should deliberate slowly.
Again, readiness of mind is different from excellence in deliberation;
it is a sort of skill in conjecture. Nor again is excellence in
deliberation opinion of any sort. But since the man who deliberates
badly makes a mistake, while he who deliberates well does so
correctly, excellence in deliberation is clearly a kind of
correctness, but neither of knowledge nor of opinion; for there is
no such thing as correctness of knowledge (since there is no such
thing as error of knowledge), and correctness of opinion is truth; and
at the same time everything that is an object of opinion is already
determined. But again excellence in deliberation involves reasoning.
The remaining alternative, then, is that it is correctness of
thinking; for this is not yet assertion, since, while even opinion
is not inquiry but has reached the stage of assertion, the man who
is deliberating, whether he does so well or ill, is searching for
something and calculating.

But excellence in deliberation is a certain correctness of
deliberation; hence we must first inquire what deliberation is and
what it is about. And, there being more than one kind of
correctness, plainly excellence in deliberation is not any and every
kind; for (1) the incontinent man and the bad man, if he is clever,
will reach as a result of his calculation what he sets before himself,
so that he will have deliberated correctly, but he will have got for
himself a great evil. Now to have deliberated well is thought to be
a good thing; for it is this kind of correctness of deliberation
that is excellence in deliberation, viz. that which tends to attain
what is good. But (2) it is possible to attain even good by a false
syllogism, and to attain what one ought to do but not by the right
means, the middle term being false; so that this too is not yet
excellence in deliberation this state in virtue of which one attains
what one ought but not by the right means. Again (3) it is possible to
attain it by long deliberation while another man attains it quickly.
Therefore in the former case we have not yet got excellence in
deliberation, which is rightness with regard to the
expedient-rightness in respect both of the end, the manner, and the
time. (4) Further it is possible to have deliberated well either in
the unqualified sense or with reference to a particular end.
Excellence in deliberation in the unqualified sense, then, is that
which succeeds with reference to what is the end in the unqualified
sense, and excellence in deliberation in a particular sense is that
which succeeds relatively to a particular end. If, then, it is
characteristic of men of practical wisdom to have deliberated well,
excellence in deliberation will be correctness with regard to what
conduces to the end of which practical wisdom is the true
apprehension.

10

Understanding, also, and goodness of understanding, in virtue of
which men are said to be men of understanding or of good
understanding, are neither entirely the same as opinion or
scientific knowledge (for at that rate all men would have been men
of understanding), nor are they one of the particular sciences, such
as medicine, the science of things connected with health, or geometry,
the science of spatial magnitudes. For understanding is neither
about things that are always and are unchangeable, nor about any and
every one of the things that come into being, but about things which
may become subjects of questioning and deliberation. Hence it is about
the same objects as practical wisdom; but understanding and
practical wisdom are not the same. For practical wisdom issues
commands, since its end is what ought to be done or not to be done;
but understanding only judges. (Understanding is identical with
goodness of understanding, men of understanding with men of good
understanding. ) Now understanding is neither the having nor the
acquiring of practical wisdom; but as learning is called understanding
when it means the exercise of the faculty of knowledge, so
'understanding' is applicable to the exercise of the faculty of
opinion for the purpose of judging of what some one else says about
matters with which practical wisdom is concerned-and of judging
soundly; for 'well' and 'soundly' are the same thing. And from this
has come the use of the name 'understanding' in virtue of which men
are said to be 'of good understanding', viz. from the application of
the word to the grasping of scientific truth; for we often call such
grasping understanding.

11

What is called judgement, in virtue of which men are said to 'be
sympathetic judges' and to 'have judgement', is the right
discrimination of the equitable. This is shown by the fact that we say
the equitable man is above all others a man of sympathetic
judgement, and identify equity with sympathetic judgement about
certain facts. And sympathetic judgement is judgement which
discriminates what is equitable and does so correctly; and correct
judgement is that which judges what is true.

Now all the states we have considered converge, as might be
expected, to the same point; for when we speak of judgement and
understanding and practical wisdom and intuitive reason we credit
the same people with possessing judgement and having reached years
of reason and with having practical wisdom and understanding. For
all these faculties deal with ultimates, i. e. with particulars; and
being a man of understanding and of good or sympathetic judgement
consists in being able judge about the things with which practical
wisdom is concerned; for the equities are common to all good men in
relation to other men. Now all things which have to be done are
included among particulars or ultimates; for not only must the man
of practical wisdom know particular facts, but understanding and
judgement are also concerned with things to be done, and these are
ultimates. And intuitive reason is concerned with the ultimates in
both directions; for both the first terms and the last are objects
of intuitive reason and not of argument, and the intuitive reason
which is presupposed by demonstrations grasps the unchangeable and
first terms, while the intuitive reason involved in practical
reasonings grasps the last and variable fact, i. e. the minor
premiss. For these variable facts are the starting-points for the
apprehension of the end, since the universals are reached from the
particulars; of these therefore we must have perception, and this
perception is intuitive reason.

This is why these states are thought to be natural endowments-why,
while no one is thought to be a philosopher by nature, people are
thought to have by nature judgement, understanding, and intuitive
reason. This is shown by the fact that we think our powers
correspond to our time of life, and that a particular age brings
with it intuitive reason and judgement; this implies that nature is
the cause. (Hence intuitive reason is both beginning and end; for
demonstrations are from these and about these. ) Therefore we ought
to attend to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced
and older people or of people of practical wisdom not less than to
demonstrations; for because experience has given them an eye they
see aright.

We have stated, then, what practical and philosophic wisdom are, and
with what each of them is concerned, and we have said that each is the
virtue of a different part of the soul.

12

Difficulties might be raised as to the utility of these qualities of
mind. For (1) philosophic wisdom will contemplate none of the things
that will make a man happy (for it is not concerned with any coming
into being), and though practical wisdom has this merit, for what
purpose do we need it? Practical wisdom is the quality of mind
concerned with things just and noble and good for man, but these are
the things which it is the mark of a good man to do, and we are none
the more able to act for knowing them if the virtues are states of
character, just as we are none the better able to act for knowing
the things that are healthy and sound, in the sense not of producing
but of issuing from the state of health; for we are none the more able
to act for having the art of medicine or of gymnastics. But (2) if
we are to say that a man should have practical wisdom not for the sake
of knowing moral truths but for the sake of becoming good, practical
wisdom will be of no use to those who are good; again it is of no
use to those who have not virtue; for it will make no difference
whether they have practical wisdom themselves or obey others who
have it, and it would be enough for us to do what we do in the case of
health; though we wish to become healthy, yet we do not learn the
art of medicine. (3) Besides this, it would be thought strange if
practical wisdom, being inferior to philosophic wisdom, is to be put
in authority over it, as seems to be implied by the fact that the
art which produces anything rules and issues commands about that
thing.

These, then, are the questions we must discuss; so far we have
only stated the difficulties.

(1) Now first let us say that in themselves these states must be
worthy of choice because they are the virtues of the two parts of
the soul respectively, even if neither of them produce anything.

(2) Secondly, they do produce something, not as the art of
medicine produces health, however, but as health produces health; so
does philosophic wisdom produce happiness; for, being a part of virtue
entire, by being possessed and by actualizing itself it makes a man
happy.

(3) Again, the work of man is achieved only in accordance with
practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim
at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means.
(Of the fourth part of the soul-the nutritive-there is no such virtue;
for there is nothing which it is in its power to do or not to do. )

(4) With regard to our being none the more able to do because of our
practical wisdom what is noble and just, let us begin a little further
back, starting with the following principle. As we say that some
people who do just acts are not necessarily just, i. e. those who do
the acts ordained by the laws either unwillingly or owing to ignorance
or for some other reason and not for the sake of the acts themselves
(though, to be sure, they do what they should and all the things
that the good man ought), so is it, it seems, that in order to be good
one must be in a certain state when one does the several acts, i. e.
one must do them as a result of choice and for the sake of the acts
themselves. Now virtue makes the choice right, but the question of the
things which should naturally be done to carry out our choice
belongs not to virtue but to another faculty. We must devote our
attention to these matters and give a clearer statement about them.
There is a faculty which is called cleverness; and this is such as
to be able to do the things that tend towards the mark we have set
before ourselves, and to hit it. Now if the mark be noble, the
cleverness is laudable, but if the mark be bad, the cleverness is mere
smartness; hence we call even men of practical wisdom clever or smart.
Practical wisdom is not the faculty, but it does not exist without
this faculty. And this eye of the soul acquires its formed state not
without the aid of virtue, as has been said and is plain; for the
syllogisms which deal with acts to be done are things which involve
a starting-point, viz. 'since the end, i. e. what is best, is of such
and such a nature', whatever it may be (let it for the sake of
argument be what we please); and this is not evident except to the
good man; for wickedness perverts us and causes us to be deceived
about the starting-points of action. Therefore it is evident that it
is impossible to be practically wise without being good.

13

We must therefore consider virtue also once more; for virtue too
is similarly related; as practical wisdom is to cleverness-not the
same, but like it-so is natural virtue to virtue in the strict
sense. For all men think that each type of character belongs to its
possessors in some sense by nature; for from the very moment of
birth we are just or fitted for selfcontrol or brave or have the other
moral qualities; but yet we seek something else as that which is
good in the strict sense-we seek for the presence of such qualities in
another way. For both children and brutes have the natural
dispositions to these qualities, but without reason these are
evidently hurtful. Only we seem to see this much, that, while one
may be led astray by them, as a strong body which moves without
sight may stumble badly because of its lack of sight, still, if a
man once acquires reason, that makes a difference in action; and his
state, while still like what it was, will then be virtue in the strict
sense. Therefore, as in the part of us which forms opinions there
are two types, cleverness and practical wisdom, so too in the moral
part there are two types, natural virtue and virtue in the strict
sense, and of these the latter involves practical wisdom. This is
why some say that all the virtues are forms of practical wisdom, and
why Socrates in one respect was on the right track while in another he
went astray; in thinking that all the virtues were forms of
practical wisdom he was wrong, but in saying they implied practical
wisdom he was right. This is confirmed by the fact that even now all
men, when they define virtue, after naming the state of character
and its objects add 'that (state) which is in accordance with the
right rule'; now the right rule is that which is in accordance with
practical wisdom. All men, then, seem somehow to divine that this kind
of state is virtue, viz. that which is in accordance with practical
wisdom. But we must go a little further. For it is not merely the
state in accordance with the right rule, but the state that implies
the presence of the right rule, that is virtue; and practical wisdom
is a right rule about such matters. Socrates, then, thought the
virtues were rules or rational principles (for he thought they were,
all of them, forms of scientific knowledge), while we think they
involve a rational principle.

It is clear, then, from what has been said, that it is not
possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom,
nor practically wise without moral virtue. But in this way we may also
refute the dialectical argument whereby it might be contended that the
virtues exist in separation from each other; the same man, it might be
said, is not best equipped by nature for all the virtues, so that he
will have already acquired one when he has not yet acquired another.
This is possible in respect of the natural virtues, but not in respect
of those in respect of which a man is called without qualification
good; for with the presence of the one quality, practical wisdom, will
be given all the virtues. And it is plain that, even if it were of
no practical value, we should have needed it because it is the
virtue of the part of us in question; plain too that the choice will
not be right without practical wisdom any more than without virtue;
for the one deter, mines the end and the other makes us do the
things that lead to the end.

But again it is not supreme over philosophic wisdom, i. e. over the
superior part of us, any more than the art of medicine is over health;
for it does not use it but provides for its coming into being; it
issues orders, then, for its sake, but not to it. Further, to maintain
its supremacy would be like saying that the art of politics rules
the gods because it issues orders about all the affairs of the state.

BOOK VII

1

LET us now make a fresh beginning and point out that of moral states
to be avoided there are three kinds-vice, incontinence, brutishness.
The contraries of two of these are evident,-one we call virtue, the
other continence; to brutishness it would be most fitting to oppose
superhuman virtue, a heroic and divine kind of virtue, as Homer has
represented Priam saying of Hector that he was very good,

For he seemed not, he,

The child of a mortal man, but as one that of God's seed came.

Therefore if, as they say, men become gods by excess of virtue, of
this kind must evidently be the state opposed to the brutish state;
for as a brute has no vice or virtue, so neither has a god; his
state is higher than virtue, and that of a brute is a different kind
of state from vice.

Now, since it is rarely that a godlike man is found-to use the
epithet of the Spartans, who when they admire any one highly call
him a 'godlike man'-so too the brutish type is rarely found among men;
it is found chiefly among barbarians, but some brutish qualities are
also produced by disease or deformity; and we also call by this evil
name those men who go beyond all ordinary standards by reason of vice.
Of this kind of disposition, however, we must later make some mention,
while we have discussed vice before we must now discuss incontinence
and softness (or effeminacy), and continence and endurance; for we
must treat each of the two neither as identical with virtue or
wickedness, nor as a different genus. We must, as in all other
cases, set the observed facts before us and, after first discussing
the difficulties, go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all the
common opinions about these affections of the mind, or, failing
this, of the greater number and the most authoritative; for if we both
refute the objections and leave the common opinions undisturbed, we
shall have proved the case sufficiently.

Now (1) both continence and endurance are thought to be included
among things good and praiseworthy, and both incontinence and soft,
ness among things bad and blameworthy; and the same man is thought
to be continent and ready to abide by the result of his
calculations, or incontinent and ready to abandon them. And (2) the
incontinent man, knowing that what he does is bad, does it as a result
of passion, while the continent man, knowing that his appetites are
bad, refuses on account of his rational principle to follow them (3)
The temperate man all men call continent and disposed to endurance,
while the continent man some maintain to be always temperate but
others do not; and some call the self-indulgent man incontinent and
the incontinent man selfindulgent indiscriminately, while others
distinguish them. (4) The man of practical wisdom, they sometimes say,
cannot be incontinent, while sometimes they say that some who are
practically wise and clever are incontinent. Again (5) men are said to
be incontinent even with respect to anger, honour, and gain. -These,
then, are the things that are said.

2

Now we may ask (1) how a man who judges rightly can behave
incontinently. That he should behave so when he has knowledge, some
say is impossible; for it would be strange-so Socrates thought-if when
knowledge was in a man something else could master it and drag it
about like a slave. For Socrates was entirely opposed to the view in
question, holding that there is no such thing as incontinence; no one,
he said, when he judges acts against what he judges best-people act so
only by reason of ignorance. Now this view plainly contradicts the
observed facts, and we must inquire about what happens to such a
man; if he acts by reason of ignorance, what is the manner of his
ignorance? For that the man who behaves incontinently does not, before
he gets into this state, think he ought to act so, is evident. But
there are some who concede certain of Socrates' contentions but not
others; that nothing is stronger than knowledge they admit, but not
that on one acts contrary to what has seemed to him the better course,
and therefore they say that the incontinent man has not knowledge when
he is mastered by his pleasures, but opinion. But if it is opinion and
not knowledge, if it is not a strong conviction that resists but a
weak one, as in men who hesitate, we sympathize with their failure
to stand by such convictions against strong appetites; but we do not
sympathize with wickedness, nor with any of the other blameworthy
states. Is it then practical wisdom whose resistance is mastered? That
is the strongest of all states. But this is absurd; the same man
will be at once practically wise and incontinent, but no one would say
that it is the part of a practically wise man to do willingly the
basest acts. Besides, it has been shown before that the man of
practical wisdom is one who will act (for he is a man concerned with
the individual facts) and who has the other virtues.

(2) Further, if continence involves having strong and bad appetites,
the temperate man will not be continent nor the continent man
temperate; for a temperate man will have neither excessive nor bad
appetites. But the continent man must; for if the appetites are
good, the state of character that restrains us from following them
is bad, so that not all continence will be good; while if they are
weak and not bad, there is nothing admirable in resisting them, and if
they are weak and bad, there is nothing great in resisting these
either.

(3) Further, if continence makes a man ready to stand by any and
every opinion, it is bad, i. e. if it makes him stand even by a false
opinion; and if incontinence makes a man apt to abandon any and
every opinion, there will be a good incontinence, of which
Sophocles' Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes will be an instance; for
he is to be praised for not standing by what Odysseus persuaded him to
do, because he is pained at telling a lie.

(4) Further, the sophistic argument presents a difficulty; the
syllogism arising from men's wish to expose paradoxical results
arising from an opponent's view, in order that they may be admired
when they succeed, is one that puts us in a difficulty (for thought is
bound fast when it will not rest because the conclusion does not
satisfy it, and cannot advance because it cannot refute the argument).
There is an argument from which it follows that folly coupled with
incontinence is virtue; for a man does the opposite of what he judges,
owing to incontinence, but judges what is good to be evil and
something that he should not do, and consequence he will do what is
good and not what is evil.

(5) Further, he who on conviction does and pursues and chooses
what is pleasant would be thought to be better than one who does so as
a result not of calculation but of incontinence; for he is easier to
cure since he may be persuaded to change his mind. But to the
incontinent man may be applied the proverb 'when water chokes, what is
one to wash it down with? ' If he had been persuaded of the rightness
of what he does, he would have desisted when he was persuaded to
change his mind; but now he acts in spite of his being persuaded of
something quite different.

(6) Further, if incontinence and continence are concerned with any
and every kind of object, who is it that is incontinent in the
unqualified sense? No one has all the forms of incontinence, but we
say some people are incontinent without qualification.

3

Of some such kind are the difficulties that arise; some of these
points must be refuted and the others left in possession of the field;
for the solution of the difficulty is the discovery of the truth.
(1) We must consider first, then, whether incontinent people act
knowingly or not, and in what sense knowingly; then (2) with what
sorts of object the incontinent and the continent man may be said to
be concerned (i. e. whether with any and every pleasure and pain or
with certain determinate kinds), and whether the continent man and the
man of endurance are the same or different; and similarly with
regard to the other matters germane to this inquiry. The
starting-point of our investigation is (a) the question whether the
continent man and the incontinent are differentiated by their
objects or by their attitude, i. e. whether the incontinent man is
incontinent simply by being concerned with such and such objects,
or, instead, by his attitude, or, instead of that, by both these
things; (b) the second question is whether incontinence and continence
are concerned with any and every object or not. The man who is
incontinent in the unqualified sense is neither concerned with any and
every object, but with precisely those with which the self-indulgent
man is concerned, nor is he characterized by being simply related to
these (for then his state would be the same as self-indulgence), but
by being related to them in a certain way. For the one is led on in
accordance with his own choice, thinking that he ought always to
pursue the present pleasure; while the other does not think so, but
yet pursues it.

(1) As for the suggestion that it is true opinion and not
knowledge against which we act incontinently, that makes no difference
to the argument; for some people when in a state of opinion do not
hesitate, but think they know exactly. If, then, the notion is that
owing to their weak conviction those who have opinion are more
likely to act against their judgement than those who know, we answer
that there need be no difference between knowledge and opinion in this
respect; for some men are no less convinced of what they think than
others of what they know; as is shown by the of Heraclitus. But (a),
since we use the word 'know' in two senses (for both the man who has
knowledge but is not using it and he who is using it are said to
know), it will make a difference whether, when a man does what he
should not, he has the knowledge but is not exercising it, or is
exercising it; for the latter seems strange, but not the former.

(b) Further, since there are two kinds of premisses, there is
nothing to prevent a man's having both premisses and acting against
his knowledge, provided that he is using only the universal premiss
and not the particular; for it is particular acts that have to be
done. And there are also two kinds of universal term; one is
predicable of the agent, the other of the object; e. g. 'dry food is
good for every man', and 'I am a man', or 'such and such food is dry';
but whether 'this food is such and such', of this the incontinent
man either has not or is not exercising the knowledge. There will,
then, be, firstly, an enormous difference between these manners of
knowing, so that to know in one way when we act incontinently would
not seem anything strange, while to know in the other way would be
extraordinary.

And further (c) the possession of knowledge in another sense than
those just named is something that happens to men; for within the case
of having knowledge but not using it we see a difference of state,
admitting of the possibility of having knowledge in a sense and yet
not having it, as in the instance of a man asleep, mad, or drunk.
But now this is just the condition of men under the influence of
passions; for outbursts of anger and sexual appetites and some other
such passions, it is evident, actually alter our bodily condition, and
in some men even produce fits of madness. It is plain, then, that
incontinent people must be said to be in a similar condition to men
asleep, mad, or drunk. The fact that men use the language that flows
from knowledge proves nothing; for even men under the influence of
these passions utter scientific proofs and verses of Empedocles, and
those who have just begun to learn a science can string together its
phrases, but do not yet know it; for it has to become part of
themselves, and that takes time; so that we must suppose that the
use of language by men in an incontinent state means no more than
its utterance by actors on the stage. (d) Again, we may also view
the cause as follows with reference to the facts of human nature.
The one opinion is universal, the other is concerned with the
particular facts, and here we come to something within the sphere of
perception; when a single opinion results from the two, the soul
must in one type of case affirm the conclusion, while in the case of
opinions concerned with production it must immediately act (e. g. if
'everything sweet ought to be tasted', and 'this is sweet', in the
sense of being one of the particular sweet things, the man who can act
and is not prevented must at the same time actually act
accordingly). When, then, the universal opinion is present in us
forbidding us to taste, and there is also the opinion that 'everything
sweet is pleasant', and that 'this is sweet' (now this is the
opinion that is active), and when appetite happens to be present in
us, the one opinion bids us avoid the object, but appetite leads us
towards it (for it can move each of our bodily parts); so that it
turns out that a man behaves incontinently under the influence (in a
sense) of a rule and an opinion, and of one not contrary in itself,
but only incidentally-for the appetite is contrary, not the opinion-to
the right rule. It also follows that this is the reason why the
lower animals are not incontinent, viz. because they have no universal
judgement but only imagination and memory of particulars.

The explanation of how the ignorance is dissolved and the
incontinent man regains his knowledge, is the same as in the case of
the man drunk or asleep and is not peculiar to this condition; we must
go to the students of natural science for it. Now, the last premiss
both being an opinion about a perceptible object, and being what
determines our actions this a man either has not when he is in the
state of passion, or has it in the sense in which having knowledge did
not mean knowing but only talking, as a drunken man may utter the
verses of Empedocles. And because the last term is not universal nor
equally an object of scientific knowledge with the universal term, the
position that Socrates sought to establish actually seems to result;
for it is not in the presence of what is thought to be knowledge
proper that the affection of incontinence arises (nor is it this
that is 'dragged about' as a result of the state of passion), but in
that of perceptual knowledge.

This must suffice as our answer to the question of action with and
without knowledge, and how it is possible to behave incontinently with
knowledge.

4

(2) We must next discuss whether there is any one who is incontinent
without qualification, or all men who are incontinent are so in a
particular sense, and if there is, with what sort of objects he is
concerned. That both continent persons and persons of endurance, and
incontinent and soft persons, are concerned with pleasures and
pains, is evident.

Now of the things that produce pleasure some are necessary, while
others are worthy of choice in themselves but admit of excess, the
bodily causes of pleasure being necessary (by such I mean both those
concerned with food and those concerned with sexual intercourse,
i. e. the bodily matters with which we defined self-indulgence and
temperance as being concerned), while the others are not necessary but
worthy of choice in themselves (e. g. victory, honour, wealth, and good
and pleasant things of this sort). This being so, (a) those who go
to excess with reference to the latter, contrary to the right rule
which is in themselves, are not called incontinent simply, but
incontinent with the qualification 'in respect of money, gain, honour,
or anger',-not simply incontinent, on the ground that they are
different from incontinent people and are called incontinent by reason
of a resemblance. (Compare the case of Anthropos (Man), who won a
contest at the Olympic games; in his case the general definition of
man differed little from the definition peculiar to him, but yet it
was different. ) This is shown by the fact that incontinence either
without qualification or in respect of some particular bodily pleasure
is blamed not only as a fault but as a kind of vice, while none of the
people who are incontinent in these other respects is so blamed.

But (b) of the people who are incontinent with respect to bodily
enjoyments, with which we say the temperate and the self-indulgent man
are concerned, he who pursues the excesses of things pleasant-and
shuns those of things painful, of hunger and thirst and heat and
cold and all the objects of touch and taste-not by choice but contrary
to his choice and his judgement, is called incontinent, not with the
qualification 'in respect of this or that', e. g. of anger, but just
simply. This is confirmed by the fact that men are called 'soft'
with regard to these pleasures, but not with regard to any of the
others. And for this reason we group together the incontinent and
the self-indulgent, the continent and the temperate man-but not any of
these other types-because they are concerned somehow with the same
pleasures and pains; but though these are concerned with the same
objects, they are not similarly related to them, but some of them make
a deliberate choice while the others do not.

This is why we should describe as self-indulgent rather the man
who without appetite or with but a slight appetite pursues the
excesses of pleasure and avoids moderate pains, than the man who
does so because of his strong appetites; for what would the former do,
if he had in addition a vigorous appetite, and a violent pain at the
lack of the 'necessary' objects?

Now of appetites and pleasures some belong to the class of things
generically noble and good-for some pleasant things are by nature
worthy of choice, while others are contrary to these, and others are
intermediate, to adopt our previous distinction-e. g. wealth, gain,
victory, honour. And with reference to all objects whether of this
or of the intermediate kind men are not blamed for being affected by
them, for desiring and loving them, but for doing so in a certain way,
i. e. for going to excess. (This is why all those who contrary to the
rule either are mastered by or pursue one of the objects which are
naturally noble and good, e. g. those who busy themselves more than
they ought about honour or about children and parents, (are not
wicked); for these too are good, and those who busy themselves about
them are praised; but yet there is an excess even in them-if like
Niobe one were to fight even against the gods, or were to be as much
devoted to one's father as Satyrus nicknamed 'the filial', who was
thought to be very silly on this point. ) There is no wickedness, then,
with regard to these objects, for the reason named, viz. because
each of them is by nature a thing worthy of choice for its own sake;
yet excesses in respect of them are bad and to be avoided. Similarly
there is no incontinence with regard to them; for incontinence is
not only to be avoided but is also a thing worthy of blame; but
owing to a similarity in the state of feeling people apply the name
incontinence, adding in each case what it is in respect of, as we
may describe as a bad doctor or a bad actor one whom we should not
call bad, simply. As, then, in this case we do not apply the term
without qualification because each of these conditions is no
shadness but only analogous to it, so it is clear that in the other
case also that alone must be taken to be incontinence and continence
which is concerned with the same objects as temperance and
self-indulgence, but we apply the term to anger by virtue of a
resemblance; and this is why we say with a qualification
'incontinent in respect of anger' as we say 'incontinent in respect of
honour, or of gain'.

5

(1) Some things are pleasant by nature, and of these (a) some are so
without qualification, and (b) others are so with reference to
particular classes either of animals or of men; while (2) others are
not pleasant by nature, but (a) some of them become so by reason of
injuries to the system, and (b) others by reason of acquired habits,
and (c) others by reason of originally bad natures. This being so,
it is possible with regard to each of the latter kinds to discover
similar states of character to those recognized with regard to the
former; I mean (A) the brutish states, as in the case of the female
who, they say, rips open pregnant women and devours the infants, or of
the things in which some of the tribes about the Black Sea that have
gone savage are said to delight-in raw meat or in human flesh, or in
lending their children to one another to feast upon-or of the story
told of Phalaris.

These states are brutish, but (B) others arise as a result of
disease (or, in some cases, of madness, as with the man who sacrificed
and ate his mother, or with the slave who ate the liver of his
fellow), and others are morbid states (C) resulting from custom,
e. g. the habit of plucking out the hair or of gnawing the nails, or
even coals or earth, and in addition to these paederasty; for these
arise in some by nature and in others, as in those who have been the
victims of lust from childhood, from habit.

Now those in whom nature is the cause of such a state no one would
call incontinent, any more than one would apply the epithet to women
because of the passive part they play in copulation; nor would one
apply it to those who are in a morbid condition as a result of
habit. To have these various types of habit is beyond the limits of
vice, as brutishness is too; for a man who has them to master or be
mastered by them is not simple (continence or) incontinence but that
which is so by analogy, as the man who is in this condition in respect
of fits of anger is to be called incontinent in respect of that
feeling but not incontinent simply. For every excessive state
whether of folly, of cowardice, of self-indulgence, or of bad
temper, is either brutish or morbid; the man who is by nature apt to
fear everything, even the squeak of a mouse, is cowardly with a
brutish cowardice, while the man who feared a weasel did so in
consequence of disease; and of foolish people those who by nature
are thoughtless and live by their senses alone are brutish, like
some races of the distant barbarians, while those who are so as a
result of disease (e. g. of epilepsy) or of madness are morbid. Of
these characteristics it is possible to have some only at times, and
not to be mastered by them. e. g. Phalaris may have restrained a desire
to eat the flesh of a child or an appetite for unnatural sexual
pleasure; but it is also possible to be mastered, not merely to have
the feelings. Thus, as the wickedness which is on the human level is
called wickedness simply, while that which is not is called wickedness
not simply but with the qualification 'brutish' or 'morbid', in the
same way it is plain that some incontinence is brutish and some
morbid, while only that which corresponds to human self-indulgence
is incontinence simply.

That incontinence and continence, then, are concerned only with
the same objects as selfindulgence and temperance and that what is
concerned with other objects is a type distinct from incontinence, and
called incontinence by a metaphor and not simply, is plain.

6

That incontinence in respect of anger is less disgraceful than
that in respect of the appetites is what we will now proceed to see.
(1) Anger seems to listen to argument to some extent, but to mishear
it, as do hasty servants who run out before they have heard the
whole of what one says, and then muddle the order, or as dogs bark
if there is but a knock at the door, before looking to see if it is
a friend; so anger by reason of the warmth and hastiness of its
nature, though it hears, does not hear an order, and springs to take
revenge. For argument or imagination informs us that we have been
insulted or slighted, and anger, reasoning as it were that anything
like this must be fought against, boils up straightway; while
appetite, if argument or perception merely says that an object is
pleasant, springs to the enjoyment of it. Therefore anger obeys the
argument in a sense, but appetite does not. It is therefore more
disgraceful; for the man who is incontinent in respect of anger is
in a sense conquered by argument, while the other is conquered by
appetite and not by argument.

(2) Further, we pardon people more easily for following natural
desires, since we pardon them more easily for following such appetites
as are common to all men, and in so far as they are common; now
anger and bad temper are more natural than the appetites for excess,
i. e. for unnecessary objects. Take for instance the man who defended
himself on the charge of striking his father by saying 'yes, but he
struck his father, and he struck his, and' (pointing to his child)
'this boy will strike me when he is a man; it runs in the family';
or the man who when he was being dragged along by his son bade him
stop at the doorway, since he himself had dragged his father only as
far as that.

(2) Further, those who are more given to plotting against others are
more criminal. Now a passionate man is not given to plotting, nor is
anger itself-it is open; but the nature of appetite is illustrated
by what the poets call Aphrodite, 'guile-weaving daughter of
Cyprus', and by Homer's words about her 'embroidered girdle':

And the whisper of wooing is there,

Whose subtlety stealeth the wits of the wise, how prudent soe'er.

Therefore if this form of incontinence is more criminal and
disgraceful than that in respect of anger, it is both incontinence
without qualification and in a sense vice.

(4) Further, no one commits wanton outrage with a feeling of pain,
but every one who acts in anger acts with pain, while the man who
commits outrage acts with pleasure. If, then, those acts at which it
is most just to be angry are more criminal than others, the
incontinence which is due to appetite is the more criminal; for
there is no wanton outrage involved in anger.

Plainly, then, the incontinence concerned with appetite is more
disgraceful than that concerned with anger, and continence and
incontinence are concerned with bodily appetites and pleasures; but we
must grasp the differences among the latter themselves. For, as has
been said at the beginning, some are human and natural both in kind
and in magnitude, others are brutish, and others are due to organic
injuries and diseases. Only with the first of these are temperance and
self-indulgence concerned; this is why we call the lower animals
neither temperate nor self-indulgent except by a metaphor, and only if
some one race of animals exceeds another as a whole in wantonness,
destructiveness, and omnivorous greed; these have no power of choice
or calculation, but they are departures from the natural norm, as,
among men, madmen are. Now brutishness is a less evil than vice,
though more alarming; for it is not that the better part has been
perverted, as in man,-they have no better part. Thus it is like
comparing a lifeless thing with a living in respect of badness; for
the badness of that which has no originative source of movement is
always less hurtful, and reason is an originative source. Thus it is
like comparing injustice in the abstract with an unjust man. Each is
in some sense worse; for a bad man will do ten thousand times as
much evil as a brute.

7

With regard to the pleasures and pains and appetites and aversions
arising through touch and taste, to which both self-indulgence and
temperance were formerly narrowed down, it possible to be in such a
state as to be defeated even by those of them which most people
master, or to master even those by which most people are defeated;
among these possibilities, those relating to pleasures are
incontinence and continence, those relating to pains softness and
endurance. The state of most people is intermediate, even if they lean
more towards the worse states.

Now, since some pleasures are necessary while others are not, and
are necessary up to a point while the excesses of them are not, nor
the deficiencies, and this is equally true of appetites and pains, the
man who pursues the excesses of things pleasant, or pursues to
excess necessary objects, and does so by choice, for their own sake
and not at all for the sake of any result distinct from them, is
self-indulgent; for such a man is of necessity unlikely to repent, and
therefore incurable, since a man who cannot repent cannot be cured.
The man who is deficient in his pursuit of them is the opposite of
self-indulgent; the man who is intermediate is temperate. Similarly,
there is the man who avoids bodily pains not because he is defeated by
them but by choice. (Of those who do not choose such acts, one kind of
man is led to them as a result of the pleasure involved, another
because he avoids the pain arising from the appetite, so that these
types differ from one another. Now any one would think worse of a
man with no appetite or with weak appetite were he to do something
disgraceful, than if he did it under the influence of powerful
appetite, and worse of him if he struck a blow not in anger than if he
did it in anger; for what would he have done if he had been strongly
affected? This is why the self-indulgent man is worse than the
incontinent. ) of the states named, then, the latter is rather a kind
of softness; the former is self-indulgence. While to the incontinent
man is opposed the continent, to the soft is opposed the man of
endurance; for endurance consists in resisting, while continence
consists in conquering, and resisting and conquering are different, as
not being beaten is different from winning; this is why continence
is also more worthy of choice than endurance. Now the man who is
defective in respect of resistance to the things which most men both
resist and resist successfully is soft and effeminate; for
effeminacy too is a kind of softness; such a man trails his cloak to
avoid the pain of lifting it, and plays the invalid without thinking
himself wretched, though the man he imitates is a wretched man.

The case is similar with regard to continence and incontinence.
For if a man is defeated by violent and excessive pleasures or
pains, there is nothing wonderful in that; indeed we are ready to
pardon him if he has resisted, as Theodectes' Philoctetes does when
bitten by the snake, or Carcinus' Cercyon in the Alope, and as
people who try to restrain their laughter burst out into a guffaw,
as happened to Xenophantus. But it is surprising if a man is
defeated by and cannot resist pleasures or pains which most men can
hold out against, when this is not due to heredity or disease, like
the softness that is hereditary with the kings of the Scythians, or
that which distinguishes the female sex from the male.

The lover of amusement, too, is thought to be self-indulgent, but is
really soft. For amusement is a relaxation, since it is a rest from
work; and the lover of amusement is one of the people who go to excess
in this.

Of incontinence one kind is impetuosity, another weakness. For
some men after deliberating fail, owing to their emotion, to stand
by the conclusions of their deliberation, others because they have not
deliberated are led by their emotion; since some men (just as people
who first tickle others are not tickled themselves), if they have
first perceived and seen what is coming and have first roused
themselves and their calculative faculty, are not defeated by their
emotion, whether it be pleasant or painful. It is keen and excitable
people that suffer especially from the impetuous form of incontinence;
for the former by reason of their quickness and the latter by reason
of the violence of their passions do not await the argument, because
they are apt to follow their imagination.

8

The self-indulgent man, as was said, is not apt to repent; for he
stands by his choice; but incontinent man is likely to repent. This is
why the position is not as it was expressed in the formulation of
the problem, but the selfindulgent man is incurable and the
incontinent man curable; for wickedness is like a disease such as
dropsy or consumption, while incontinence is like epilepsy; the former
is a permanent, the latter an intermittent badness. And generally
incontinence and vice are different in kind; vice is unconscious of
itself, incontinence is not (of incontinent men themselves, those
who become temporarily beside themselves are better than those who
have the rational principle but do not abide by it, since the latter
are defeated by a weaker passion, and do not act without previous
deliberation like the others); for the incontinent man is like the
people who get drunk quickly and on little wine, i. e. on less than
most people.

Evidently, then, incontinence is not vice (though perhaps it is so
in a qualified sense); for incontinence is contrary to choice while
vice is in accordance with choice; not but what they are similar in
respect of the actions they lead to; as in the saying of Demodocus
about the Milesians, 'the Milesians are not without sense, but they do
the things that senseless people do', so too incontinent people are
not criminal, but they will do criminal acts.

Now, since the incontinent man is apt to pursue, not on
conviction, bodily pleasures that are excessive and contrary to the
right rule, while the self-indulgent man is convinced because he is
the sort of man to pursue them, it is on the contrary the former
that is easily persuaded to change his mind, while the latter is
not. For virtue and vice respectively preserve and destroy the first
principle, and in actions the final cause is the first principle, as
the hypotheses are in mathematics; neither in that case is it argument
that teaches the first principles, nor is it so here-virtue either
natural or produced by habituation is what teaches right opinion about
the first principle. Such a man as this, then, is temperate; his
contrary is the self-indulgent.

But there is a sort of man who is carried away as a result of
passion and contrary to the right rule-a man whom passion masters so
that he does not act according to the right rule, but does not
master to the extent of making him ready to believe that he ought to
pursue such pleasures without reserve; this is the incontinent man,
who is better than the self-indulgent man, and not bad without
qualification; for the best thing in him, the first principle, is
preserved. And contrary to him is another kind of man, he who abides
by his convictions and is not carried away, at least as a result of
passion. It is evident from these considerations that the latter is
a good state and the former a bad one.

9

Is the man continent who abides by any and every rule and any and
every choice, or the man who abides by the right choice, and is he
incontinent who abandons any and every choice and any and every
rule, or he who abandons the rule that is not false and the choice
that is right; this is how we put it before in our statement of the
problem. Or is it incidentally any and every choice but per se the
true rule and the right choice by which the one abides and the other
does not? If any one chooses or pursues this for the sake of that, per
se he pursues and chooses the latter, but incidentally the former. But
when we speak without qualification we mean what is per se.
Therefore in a sense the one abides by, and the other abandons, any
and every opinion; but without qualification, the true opinion.

There are some who are apt to abide by their opinion, who are called
strong-headed, viz. those who are hard to persuade in the first
instance and are not easily persuaded to change; these have in them
something like the continent man, as the prodigal is in a way like the
liberal man and the rash man like the confident man; but they are
different in many respects. For it is to passion and appetite that the
one will not yield, since on occasion the continent man will be easy
to persuade; but it is to argument that the others refuse to yield,
for they do form appetites and many of them are led by their
pleasures. Now the people who are strong-headed are the opinionated,
the ignorant, and the boorish-the opinionated being influenced by
pleasure and pain; for they delight in the victory they gain if they
are not persuaded to change, and are pained if their decisions
become null and void as decrees sometimes do; so that they are liker
the incontinent than the continent man.

But there are some who fail to abide by their resolutions, not as
a result of incontinence, e. g. Neoptolemus in Sophocles'
Philoctetes; yet it was for the sake of pleasure that he did not stand
fast-but a noble pleasure; for telling the truth was noble to him, but
he had been persuaded by Odysseus to tell the lie. For not every one
who does anything for the sake of pleasure is either self-indulgent or
bad or incontinent, but he who does it for a disgraceful pleasure.

Since there is also a sort of man who takes less delight than he
should in bodily things, and does not abide by the rule, he who is
intermediate between him and the incontinent man is the continent man;
for the incontinent man fails to abide by the rule because he delights
too much in them, and this man because he delights in them too little;
while the continent man abides by the rule and does not change on
either account. Now if continence is good, both the contrary states
must be bad, as they actually appear to be; but because the other
extreme is seen in few people and seldom, as temperance is thought
to be contrary only to self-indulgence, so is continence to
incontinence.

Since many names are applied analogically, it is by analogy that
we have come to speak of the 'continence' the temperate man; for
both the continent man and the temperate man are such as to do nothing
contrary to the rule for the sake of the bodily pleasures, but the
former has and the latter has not bad appetites, and the latter is
such as not to feel pleasure contrary to the rule, while the former is
such as to feel pleasure but not to be led by it. And the incontinent
and the self-indulgent man are also like another; they are different,
but both pursue bodily pleasures- the latter, however, also thinking
that he ought to do so, while the former does not think this.

10

Nor can the same man have practical wisdom and be incontinent; for
it has been shown' that a man is at the same time practically wise,
and good in respect of character. Further, a man has practical
wisdom not by knowing only but by being able to act; but the
incontinent man is unable to act-there is, however, nothing to prevent
a clever man from being incontinent; this is why it is sometimes
actually thought that some people have practical wisdom but are
incontinent, viz. because cleverness and practical wisdom differ in
the way we have described in our first discussions, and are near
together in respect of their reasoning, but differ in respect of their
purpose-nor yet is the incontinent man like the man who knows and is
contemplating a truth, but like the man who is asleep or drunk. And he
acts willingly (for he acts in a sense with knowledge both of what
he does and of the end to which he does it), but is not wicked,
since his purpose is good; so that he is half-wicked. And he is not
a criminal; for he does not act of malice aforethought; of the two
types of incontinent man the one does not abide by the conclusions
of his deliberation, while the excitable man does not deliberate at
all. And thus the incontinent man like a city which passes all the
right decrees and has good laws, but makes no use of them, as in
Anaxandrides' jesting remark,

The city willed it, that cares nought for laws;

but the wicked man is like a city that uses its laws, but has wicked
laws to use.

Now incontinence and continence are concerned with that which is
in excess of the state characteristic of most men; for the continent
man abides by his resolutions more and the incontinent man less than
most men can.

Of the forms of incontinence, that of excitable people is more
curable than that of those who deliberate but do not abide by their
decisions, and those who are incontinent through habituation are
more curable than those in whom incontinence is innate; for it is
easier to change a habit than to change one's nature; even habit is
hard to change just because it is like nature, as Evenus says:

I say that habit's but a long practice, friend,

And this becomes men's nature in the end.

We have now stated what continence, incontinence, endurance, and
softness are, and how these states are related to each other.

11

The study of pleasure and pain belongs to the province of the
political philosopher; for he is the architect of the end, with a view
to which we call one thing bad and another good without qualification.
Further, it is one of our necessary tasks to consider them; for not
only did we lay it down that moral virtue and vice are concerned
with pains and pleasures, but most people say that happiness
involves pleasure; this is why the blessed man is called by a name
derived from a word meaning enjoyment.

Now (1) some people think that no pleasure is a good, either in
itself or incidentally, since the good and pleasure are not the
same; (2) others think that some pleasures are good but that most
are bad. (3) Again there is a third view, that even if all pleasures
are good, yet the best thing in the world cannot be pleasure. (1)
The reasons given for the view that pleasure is not a good at all
are (a) that every pleasure is a perceptible process to a natural
state, and that no process is of the same kind as its end, e. g. no
process of building of the same kind as a house. (b) A temperate man
avoids pleasures. (c) A man of practical wisdom pursues what is free
from pain, not what is pleasant. (d) The pleasures are a hindrance
to thought, and the more so the more one delights in them, e. g. in
sexual pleasure; for no one could think of anything while absorbed
in this. (e) There is no art of pleasure; but every good is the
product of some art. (f) Children and the brutes pursue pleasures. (2)
The reasons for the view that not all pleasures are good are that
(a) there are pleasures that are actually base and objects of
reproach, and (b) there are harmful pleasures; for some pleasant
things are unhealthy. (3) The reason for the view that the best
thing in the world is not pleasure is that pleasure is not an end
but a process.