25c-d In order to have aberration cease with regard to the past, the future, and the
interval
in between.
Abhidharmakosabhasyam-Vol-2-Vasubandhu-Poussin-Pruden-1991
Apparitional beings, through their desire for residence there.
But how can one desire a residence in hell?
[The mind of an intermediate being is troubled by lust and hatred, as we have seen, when it goes to be reincarnated in a womb. ] In the present case, an intermediate being is also troubled in mind and misunderstands. He is tormented by the cold of rain and wind: he sees a place burning
? with hot fires and through his desire for warmth, he runs there. Or he is tormented by the heat of the sun and hot winds: he sees a cold place of frozen fires, and through his desire for coolness, he runs there.
137
According to the ancient masters, he sees these things in order to
138 experience the retribution of aaions that should be retributed in hell;
he sees beings similar to him and he runs to the place where they are.
***
Intermediate heavenly beings--those who go towards a heavenly realm of rebirth--go high, like one rising up from a seat. Humans, animals, Pretas, and intermediate beings go in the manner in which humans, etc, go.
15d Beings in hell hang from their feet.
As the stanza says, "Those who insult Rsis, ascetics and penitents
139 fall into hell head first. "
***
We have said that the intermediary beings who are reincarnated in a feminine womb (jardyuja and andaja) go there troubled in mind, through their desire for sex. Is this a general rule?
No. The Sutra teaches that there are four ways to descend into, 14
(abide and leave) the womb (garbhdvakrdnti). ?
16. The first enter in full consciousness; the second, further, dwell in full consciousness; the third, further, leave in full consciousness; the fourth accomplishes all these steps with a troubled mind. Beings born from eggs are always of this last class.
The first do not dwell and do not leave in full consciousness; the second do not leave in full consciousness; the third, in all these moments,
are in full consciousness; the fourth are, in all these aaions, without full
consciousness. Here are the four garbhdvakrddntis that the author 141
teaches, in his sloka in an order different from that of the Sutra. Beings born from eggs are always troubled in mind.
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But can we say that a being born from an egg enters into a womb?
Without doubt. One who is born from an egg is now entering into a
142 womb. Or rather we have here an anticipatory designation. In the
same way that the Sutra says samskrtam abhisamskaroti, and, in the world, one says, "to cook the rice porridge," or "to grind the flour. "
***
What does the full consciousness and the absence of full con- sciousness in the entering, in the abiding, and in the leaving consist of?
A being with little merit enters because he thinks, "The wind blows, the heavens rain; it is cold; it storms; people are in an uproar," and because, wishing to avoid these wearinesses, he believes that he is entering into a shelter, a thicket, a hut of roots and leaves, or rather he takes shelter at the foot of a tree or against a wall. Then he imagines himself resting in this thicket, in this hut, and eventually leaves it. There is an error of ideas and resolution. The same for a being rich in merits, who believes he is entering a park, a garden, a palace, a terrace, or a pavilion; he believes this and he rests there and eventually leaves it.
A being who has full consciousness knows that he enters into the
143 womb, that he dwells there, and that he leaves it.
###
The Sutra also teaches
17. Three garbhavakrantis,--the Cakravartin and the two Svayambhus,--by reason of their great purity of action, of
144 knowledge, and of action and knowledge.
The two Svayambhus are the Pratyekabuddhas and the Sambuddha. All these designations are "anticipatory": one means to speak of a being, who, in this existence, will become a Cakravartin, etc.
The Cakravartin enters in full consciousness, but does not reside in full consciousness and does not leave in full consciousness. The Pratyekabuddha resides in full consciousness, but does not leave in full consciousness. The Buddha is always in full consciousness.
The first has a great outflowing of merit and he is made resplendent
? through aaions; the second has knowledge obtained through in- struction, reflection and mediation; and the third has merit, instruction, etc: both action and knowledge.
The fourth garbhdvakrdnti, that of not full consciousness, pertains to beings without great aaions and great knowledge.
###
145
The non-Buddhists, who believe in an atman, say, "If you admit
that a being (sattva) goes to another world, then the atman in which I believe is proved"
In order to refute this doarine, the author says, 146
The atman in which you believe, an entity that abandons the skandhas of one existence and takes up the skandhas of another existence, an internal agent of aaion, a Purusa,--this atman does not exist. In faa the Blessed One said, "Aaions exist, and results exist, but there is no agent who abandons these skandhas here and takes up those skandhas there, independently of the casual relationship of the dharmas. What is this causal relationship? Namely, if this exists, then that exists; through the arising of this, there is the arising of that; Pratitya- samutpada? (French trans, v. p. 57, ix. p. 260).
Is there then, ask the non-Buddhists, a type of atman that you do not negate?
18a-d. Only the skandhas, conditioned by defilement and aaion, go reincarnating themselves by means of the series of inter- mediate existences. As an example: the lamp.
We do not deny an atman that exists through designation, an atman that is only a name given to the skandhas. But far from us is the thought that the skandhas pass into another world! They are momentary, and incapable of transmigrating. We say that, in the absence of any atman, of any permanent principal, the series of conditioned skandhas, "made up" of defilements and aaions (i. l5a, on abhisamskrta), enters into the mother's womb; and that this series, from death to birth, is prolongued and displaced by a series that constitutes intermediate existence.
18a. The atman does not exist.
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19a-c. In conformity with its projecting cause the series grows gradually, and, by virtue of the defilements and actions it goes again to another world
Actions the nature of which is to be retributed in life (dyusya
karman, ii. l0a) differ according to beings: all the series of skandhas are
not then projected at the same time in the existence where they have
arisen. The series continues then to increase to the extent that it was
projeaed This growth is gradual, as Scripture teaches: "There is first
the kalala; the arbuda arises from the kalala\ the pe? in arises from the
arbuda\ the ghana arises from the pesin; and from the ghana there arises
the prasakha, hair, body-hair, the nails, etc. , and the material organs with 147
their supports. " The kalala, etc. , are the five stages of the embryo, embryo.
148
Then, when the embryo, this throne, is ripe, there arises within
the womb winds arisen from the maturity of action which causes the embryo to turn and places it towards the portal of its birth: it is difficult to move like a great mass of hidden impurity. Sometimes, either through the unfavorable conditions of the mother's eating, or by reason of actions, the embryo perishes. Then an expert woman, after having anointed them with all sorts of drugs, puts her hands filled with a sharpened blade into this wound hideous, bad-smelling, and wet with all sorts of impurities which is the womb. She pulls out the embryo after having cut it up limb by limb. And the series of the embryo, by virtue of aparaparyayavedaniya action (iv. 50b), goes somewhere else.
Or else the birth is fortunate. The mother and the servants take the
new-born baby into their hands which are like knives and acids for this
149 body now as sensible as an open wound One washes the child; one
nourished it with milk and fresh butter, and later with solid foods: thus
15
does he grow. By reason of this development, ? the organs mature and
the defilements enter into activity, from whence actions arise. And when the body perishes, the series passes into another existence by reason of these defilements and actions, through the medium of the intermediate existence, as mentioned previously.
151 19d. In this way the circle of existence is without beginning.
Arising by reason of the defilements and actions; defilements and actions by reason of arising; arising by reason of the defilements and
? actions: the circle of existences is thus without beginning. In order for it to begin, it would be necessary for the first item to have no cause: and if one dharma arises without a cause, then all dharmas would arise without causes. Now the determination of time and place show that a seed produces a shoot, that a fire produces cooking: hence there is no arising that does not have causes. On the other hand, the theory of a single and permanent cause has been refuted above (ii. 65): hence the cycle of existence has no beginning.
But birth, coming from causes, would not take place if its causes are destroyed, in the same way that a shoot would not arise if its seed is burned.
***
The series of skandhas develops in three existences,
20a. Pratityasamutpada or dependent orgination has twelve
152 parts in three sections or time periods.
The twelve parts of dependent origination are ignorance (avidya), the samskaras, the consciousness, namarupa, the six ayatanas, contact, sensation, desire, attachment, existence, birth, and old age and death.
20b. Two for the first, two for the third, and eight for the middle.
Ignorance and the samskdras existed in a past existence, birth and old age and death will exist in a future existence, and the eight other parts exist in the present existence.
Are the middle parts to be found in the present existence of all
153 creatures?
No, they are not. Why is this?
20c. At least to consider the series that has all of its parts.
This refers to a "complete person," aparipurin, that passes through all of the states that constitute these parts. Such persons are not beings who die before their time, [for example, in the course of their embryonic life], nor are they beings of Rupadhatu or Arupyadhatu. It is certain that the Sutra that enumerates these eight parts refers to beings in
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Kamadhatu: the Mahdniddnaparyayasutra says, "Ananda, if the con- sciousness were not to descend into the mother's w o m b . . . " {Dtgha,
ii. 63).
Pratityasamutpada can be divided into two parts: past existence (1-2) and its effects (3-7); and the causes of future existence (8-10) and future existence (11-12).
What are, in this conception of Pratityasamutpada, its different parts?
134 21a. Ignorance is, in a previous life, the state of defilement.
[Ignorance does not refer to an isolated state of ignorance, iii. p. 87, 90, v. 12, nor merely to the totality of the defilements, "all the kief as"] but rather, in a previous life, the series (with its five skandhas) which is defiled, the condition of defilement (klesa-avastha). All the defilements in fact accompany ignorance, and are activated through ignorance. In the same way, when one says that the king is coming, one understands that his courtiers are accompanying him.
21b. The samskdras are, in a previous life, the state of action. The series of the previous life, which does good, bad, or neutral
actions, constitute the samskdras.
21c. The consciousness is the skandhas at conception.
The five skandhas, in the womb, at the moment of reincarnation (pratisamdhi) or arising constitute consciousness.
21d-22a. Ndmarupa (is the series) from this moment on, until the production of the six dyatanas.
Ndmarupa is made up of the five skandhas, in the womb, from
arising, as long as the six organs are not manifested. It is proper to say,
"as long as the four organs . . . ," [for the mana-dyatana and the 155
kdya-dyatana exist from arising or conception, pratisamdhiksane]; it is now at the moment when the four organs, eye, etc. , appear that these
156 two preexisting organs are found to be "arranged" [in a group of six],
? 22b. Six ay asanas before coming together of the three or contact.
The six ayatanas are the five skandhas from the first appearance of the organs until the moment when the coming together of the organ, the object of consciousness, and the consciousness takes place.
22c-d There is sparfa, or contact, until the moment when the capacity to distinguish the cause of pleasure, of suffering, etc. , is acquired
Contact [which begins at birth] lasts until the moment when the infant becomes capable of distinguishing,"This is a cause of pleasure. . . "
23a. There is contact before sexual union.
Contact, which the Karika terms vibti, exists for as long as desire for sexual union is not in aaion. [This state is termed vedand, sensation, because one experiences the cause of vedand: it is hence avasthd vedandprakarsinl]
23b. Desire ("thirst") is the state of one who desires pleasure and sexual union.
There is then in activity concupiscence relative to the objects of desire (kamagunas, iii. p. 6), visible things, etc. , and sexual union. This state of "thirst" or desire ends when one begins, under the influence of this desire, to search out these pleasures.
23c-d. Updddna or attachment is the state of one who runs around in search of the pleasures.
One runs everywhere in order to acquire these pleasures (v. 40). [Or rather updddna is the fourfold defilement (v. 38): the period during which this fourfold defilement is active is called updddna]. Running around in this manner
24a-b. He does actions which will have for their result future existence (bhava): this is bhava,
[Bhava signifies "aaion," for existence takes place by reason of it, bhavaty anena. ]Action done and accumulated in the search for pleasures will produce reexistence. The period during which one does this aaion
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constitutes bhava.
24c. Jati is the new reincarnation.
The five skandhas at the moment when reincarnation takes place after death isjati The "part" that receives the name of consciousness in a present existence is called jati in a future existence.
24d Old age-and-death lasts until sensation.
From jati until sensation,--which is here termed vid--there are four parts of the present existence, ndmarupa, the six ayatana, contact and sensation which are, in a future existence designated by the expression old age and death, the twelfdi part of this twelvefold series.
###
It is also said that Pratityasamutpada is fourfold: momentary or of
one moment (ksanika); prolongued (prdkarsika: extending over many
moments of many existences); serial (sdmbandhika, through the union
of causes and effects); and static (dvasthika: embracing twelve states, or
157 periods, of the five skandhas).
###
How is Pratityasamutpada momentary?
When a person in prey to the defilements commits murder, the
twelve parts are realized in one and the same moment: 1. his moha
(aberration) is ignorance (avidyd);, 2. his "volition" (cetand) are the
samskdras; 3. his distinct consciousness of a certain object is con- 158
sciousness; 4. the four skandhas coexisting with the consciousness is ndmarupa\ 5. the organs in relation to ndmarupa are the six ddyatanas\
159 6. the application of the six dyatanas is contact; 7. to experience
161 contact is sensation; 8. desire (rdga) is thirst; 9. the paryavasthdnas
associated with thirst are attachment; 10. bodily or vocal action that proceeds [from sensation or thirst] is bhava\ 11. the emersion (unmajjana=fapdda=prod\Ktion) of all these dharmas is jdti\ 12. their maturity (paripdka) is old age; and their rupture is death.
160
? It is also said thatPratityasamutpada is both momentary and serial at
the same time. The Prakarana says, "What is Pratityasamutpada} All
the conditioned (samskrta) dharmas. What are the dharmas produced
through dependence (pratityasamutpanna)} All the conditioned 162
dharmas. "
Static {avasthika) Pratityasamutpada is made up of the twelve states
(avasthd) embracing the five skandhas.
It is also prolongued (prdkarsikd), extending itself over three
consecutive existences.
Among these four, what is the type of Pratityasamutpada that the
Blessed One has here--in the Sutra ofthe Twelve Parts--the intention to teach?
163 25a. According to the School, it is static Pratityasamutpada.
According to the School the Blessed One distinguishes the twelve parts only with respect to static Pratityasamutpada.
***
But if each of the parts is a complex of the five skandhas, why use the designations "ignorance," etc. ?
Because the Sutra expresses itself in an intentional manner, whereas
164
the Abhidharma teaches the characteristics of things. On the one
hand Pratityasamutpada is given as static, prolongued, and pertaining to living beings (sattvdkhya); and on the other hand, as momentary, serial, and pertaining to both living and non-living beings (sattvdsattvdkhya).
Why does the Sutra teach Pratityasamutpada as only pertaining to living beings?
25c-d In order to have aberration cease with regard to the past, the future, and the interval in between.
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And it is for this same reason that it teaches a Pratityasamutpada in three sections.
Ignorance or aberration relating to the past, as when one asks, "Did I
exist or not exist in the past? How and as what did I exist? " Relating to
the future: 'Will I exist in the future? . . . " Relating to the interval in
between: 'What is this? How is this? What are we? What will we
165 be? "
This threefold aberration is destroyed by the teaching of the succession: ignorance. . . old age and death. For its is said in the Sutra, "Whoever, Oh Bhiksus, knows, through prajnd, Pratityasamutpada and the dharmas produced through dependence, will not turn himself towards the past by asking if he existed. . . "
According to others, the last three terms of the middle section,
--thirst, attachment, and bhava---are also taught in order to cause
aberration relating to the future to cease; for they are the causes of future
166 existence.
This twelvefold Pratityasamutpada is also threefold, defilement (klesa), action (karman), and foundation (vastu); it is twofold, cause and result.
26a-b. Three parts are defilement, two are action; seven are
167 foundation and also result.
Ignorance, thirst, and attachment are, by their nature, defilements; the samskaras and bhava are aaion; consciousness, namarupa, the six ayatana, contact, sensation,/***, and old age and death are foundation, so called because they are the support (ahaya-adhisthana) of the de- filements and aaion. The parts that are foundation are result: the five that are not foundation are cause, being both defilement and aaion in nature.
Why are cause and result taught at length in the seaion of present existence--two parts of defilement, two parts of aaion, five parts of foundation--whereas, a similar exposition is absent for the past and future?
In the future, one has two parts for result.
? 26b-c In two sections, cause and result are abbreviated, for one can infer them from the teaching of the middle.
From the teaching of the defilements, action and foundation, relating to present existence, one can deduce the complete exposition of cause and result in past and future existences. All useless descriptions should be omitted
***
But if Pratityasamutpada has only twelve parts, transmigration would have a beginning, since the cause of ignorance is not indicated; and it would have an end, since the result of old age and death is not indicated. Thus one must add new parts, and to infinity.
No, for the Blessed One has implicitly indicated the cause of ignorance and result of old age and death.
27. From defilement there arises defilement and action; from
whence foundation; from whence a new foundation and
defilement: such is the manner of existence of the parts of
168 existence or bhavdngas.
Defilement arises from defilement, as attachment arises from desire.
Action arises from defilement, as consciousness from attachment, or the samskdras from ignorance.
A foundation arises from action, as Vijnana from the samskdras\ or birth from existence.
A foundation arises from a foundation, as ndmarupa from con- sciousness;thesixdyatanasfromndmarupa. . . sensationfromcontact, or old age and death from birth.
Defilement arises from a foundation, as desire from sensation.
Since such is the manner of existence of the various parts of dependent orgination it is clear that ignorance has either a defilement or a foundation for its cause; it is clear that old age and death (=the rest of the foundation from consciousness to sensation, above, p. 404, line 6, has defilement for a result.
Thus the teaching is complete. That the Blessed One wanted to
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? illustrate this manner of existence of the parts results from the
conclusion of the Sutra, "Thus there takes place the production of this
169 great mass which is nothing but suffering. "
17 m But there is another explanation: ? a. It is said, in another Sutra,
that ignorance has incorrect judgment {ayoniso manasikdra) for its cause, and, in still another Sutra, that incorrea judgment has ignorance
172 for its cause.
Consequently ignorance is not without a cause and one avoids the objection of infinite regression.
b. But incorrea judgment is not named in the Sutra in question, the
Pratityasamutpddasffira.
Without doubt; but it is included in attachment: thus one does not
173 have to separately name it here.
This explanation is without value. How is incorrea judgment included in attachment? Indeed, it is associated (samprayukta) with attachment, but it can as equally well be associated with ignorance or with desire. Let us admit that it may be included in attachment, but can one draw from this the conclusion that the Sutra, by naming attachment, says that incorrea judgment is the cause of ignorance? In other words, I indeed hold that incorrea judgment is included in attachment; but it does not follow that the Sutra could dispense with terming it a separate part, the cause of ignorance. One could just as well omit ignorance and desire.
174
Another master speaks next. A Sutra teaches that ignorance has
175
incorrea judgment for its cause. A Sutra teaches that incorrea
judgment has ignorance for its cause and observes that it is produced at the moment of contaa, "By reason of the eye and a visible thing there is
176 produced a defiled judgment which arises from error (mohaFavidyd). "
A Sutra explains the origin of desire, "Desire arises by reason of a sensation which itself arose from a contaa wherein there is ig-
177
norance. "
from the incorrea judgment which is produced at the moment of contaa. Hence ignorance is not without a cause; there is no reason to add a new term:, incorrea judgment, the cause of ignorance, arise itself from
Hence the ignorance that coexists with sensation proceeds
? an ignorance designated as aberration (moha). [This is circular reasoning, cakraka. ]
Well and good, says the author; but this is not explained in the Prat&yasamutpddasutra and it should be explained there.
There is no reason to explain it in clearer terms, for one reaches these conclusions through reasoning. In fact, to the Arhats, sensation is not a cause of desire: from whence we conclude that sensation is a cause of desire only when it is defiled, associated with ignorance. Contact, when it is not accompanied by error, is not a cause of this defiled sensation; contact accompanied by error is not produced in an Arhat, who is free from ignorance; thus the contact that Pratityasamutpada indicates as the cause of sensation, a cause of desire, is the contact that is accompaned by ignorance. [We then have sdvidyasparfapratyaya vedana / savidyavedandpratyaya trsna: sensation conditioned by contact as- sociated with ignorance, desire conditioned by sensation associated with ignorance]. From there we again take up the reasoning indicated above: we prove that, according to the Sutra, incorrect judgment is produced at the moment of contact.
But, says the author, the idea that reasoning, supported on occasion by Sutras, permits omitting indispensable terms--in the incorrect judgment in question, with the reciprocal causality of incorrect judgment and ignorance--leads to absurdity. [One could just as well omit contact, sensation, the samskdras or birth].
The true answer to this objection--that, since there is no indication of any other parts before ignorance and beyond old age and death, samsdra is without beginning or end--is the following: the enumera- tion of the parts of dependent orgination is complete. In fact, doubt with reference to the question of knowing how present existence is conditioned by preceding existence, and how future existence is conditioned by present existence, is the only point that the Sutra wants teach: thus it says, "In order to cause error relating to the past, the future, and their interval to cease" (iii. 25c, p. 68).
***
The Blessed One said, "I shall teach you, Oh Bhiksus, Pratitya- samutpada and the dharmas produced in dependence (pratitya-
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178
samutpanna)" What difference is there between Pratityasamutpada
and these dharmas!
None, according to the Abhidharma. For, as we have seen above (p.
179 405), both are defined as being "all the conditioned dharmas. "
***
A difficulty. "All the conditioned dharmas" means the dharmas of the three periods. How can future dharmas which have not yet arisen, be termed "produced in dependence," pratityasamutpanna!
We would ask you how future dharmas which are not yet "created" (krta) are called "conditoned" (samskrta)?
Because they are "thought" (cetita) by the volition (cetand) which is 180
termed abhisamskdrikd, that is, "executing a retribution. "
But if this is so, how will future pure dharmas (the dharmas of the
Path) be conditioned?
They are thought by a good mind with a view to acquiring them.
But then Nirvana itself will be conditioned, for one desires to acquire
181 it.
When one calls future dharmas "produced in dependence," one uses
an inadequate expression, justified by the identity of nature of future
dharmas with past and present dharmas that are "produced," in the
same way that future rupa is called rupa by reason of the identity of its
nature with rupa, even though one cannot qualify it as rupyate in the 182
present.
***
What is the intention of the Sutra in distinguishing Pratitya- samutpada from the dharmas produced in dependence?
28a-b. Samutpdda is the cause, whereas samutpanna is the 183
result;
The part that is a cause is Pratityasamutpada, because, there takes place arising from it. The part that is a result is pratityasamutpanna, becauseitarose;butitisalsoPratityasamutpada, because,fromit,arising takes place. All the parts, being cause and result are at one and the same
? time both Pratityasamutpada and pratityasamutpanna. Without this distinction, nevertheless, there would be non-determination and con- fusion (avyavasthana), for a part is not Pratityasamutpada through connection to the part through connection to which it is also pratityasamutpanna. In the same way a father is father through connection to his son; and a son is son through connection to his father; in the same way cause and result, and the two banks of a river.
184
But the Sthavira Purna^a says: What is Pratityasamutpada cannot
be pratityasamutpanna. Four causes: 1. future dharmas [which are Pratityasamutpada because they are a cause of future dharmas\ but not pratityasamutpanna because they are not utpanna]; 2. the last dharmas of the Arhat [which are solely pratityasamutpanna]; 3. past and present dharmas, with the exception of the last dharmas of the Arhat, [which are both Pratityasamutpada and pratityasamutpanna]; and 4. the unconditioned dharmas, [which are neither Pratityasamutpada nor pratityasamutpanna, because they have no result and they do not arise,
ii. 55d].
The Sautrantikas criticize: [All this teaching, from "Static Pratitya-
pratityasamutpanna"] --are these personal theses, fantasies, or the sense of the Sutra? You say in vain that it is the sense of the Sutra. You speak of a static Pratityasamutpada of twelve parts which are so many states {avastha) made up of the five skandhas: this is in contradiction to the Sutra wherein we read, "What is ignorance? Non-knowledge
186
relating to the past . . . " This Sutra is of explicit sense, clear
{nitartha'vibhaktartha); you cannot make it a Sutra whose sense is yet
187 to be deduced (neydrtha).
[Answer of the Sarvastivadins:] Nothing proves that this Sutra is of clear sense; the fact that it expresses itself by means of a definition does not prove anything; for the Blessed One gives definitions which solely
188 bear on the essential or major elements of the object to be defined
For example, in the Hastipodopamasutra, to the question "What is the internal earth element? ", the Blessed One answers, "The hair, the
189
body-hair, etc. " Certainly hair, etc. , are still other dharmas,--visible
things, smells, etc. ,--but the Blessed One refers to their principal element, which is the earth element. In the same way, the Blessed One designates a state in which ignorance is the major element as ignorance.
samutpada . . . (p. 405)" to "What is Pratityasamutpada cannot be 185
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? [Answer of the Sautrantikas:] This example proves nothing. In fact, in the Hastipadopamasutra, the Blessed One does not define hair, etc, by the earth element; he does not say "What is hair, etc? The earth element," in which case the definition would be incomplete. But he defines the earth element through the hair, etc; and his definition is complete, for there is no earth element in the body which is not included in the description, hair, etc In the same way, the definition of Pratityasamutpada is complete; there is nothing to add to it.
[Answer of the Sarvastivadins:] The definition given in the
Hastipadopamasutra is not complete. In fact there is earth element in 190
tears, mucus, etc, as one can see by another Sutra. Yet the earth element of tears is not indicated in the Hastipadopamasutra.
[Answer of the Sautrantikas:] Perhaps the definition of the Hastipadopamasutra is incomplete, seeing that you are able to show that there is something lacking in it. It remains for you to say what is lacking in the definitions that the Sutra gives for ignorance, etc Why define ignorance as "a state with five skandhas" by introducing heterogeneous dharmas [the five skandhas] into ignorance? One can only consider as a part of dependent orgination a dharma the existence or nonexistence of which governs the existence or nonexistence of another part. Thus a state having five parts is not a "part. " The five skandhas (sensation, etc) exist in the Arhat, but he does not possess any samskdras which could produce a consciousness part of dependent orgination, that is, a
191
punyopaga, apunyopaga, or aninjyopapaga Vijnana. And thus fol-
lowing. Hence the Sutra (note 186) is not to be taken literally.
As for the four cases of Purna^a, his first case--that the future dharmas are not "produced by dependence"--is contradicted by the Sutra which gives birth and old age and death as "produced by
dependence": "What are thepratityasamuPpannasl Ignorance. . . birth, and old age and death. " Would one say that birth and old age and death are not future states? This is to take away the three sections from the theory of Pratityasamutpada.
##*
192
Certain schools maintain that Pratityasamutpada is uncon-
ditioned iasamskrtd) because the Sutra says, "Whether the Tathagatas
? appear or not, this dharma nature of the dharmas is unchanging. " This thesis is true or false according to the manner in which one
interprets it. If one means to say that it is always by reason of ignorance,
etc, that the samskaras, etc, are produced, but not by reason of any other
thing, and not without cause; that, in this sense, Pratityasamutpada is
stable, and eternal (nitya), we approve. If one means to say that there
exists a certain eternal dharma called Pratityasamutpada, then this
opinion is inadmissible. For utpdda, production or arising, is a
characteristic of anything that is conditioned (samskrtalaksana, ii. 45c);
an eternal dharma, as arising or Pratityasamutpada would be by
supposition, cannot be a characteristic of a transitory or conditioned
thing. Moreover arising is defined as "existence succeeding upon 193
nonexistence": what relationship (abhisambandha) can one suppose exists between an unconditioned arising and ignorance, etc, a re-
%t
lationship that would permit one to say Pratityasamutpada of
ignorance, etc. ? " Finally the expression Pratityasamutpada would become absurd: since prati-itya-samutpada signifies "production by having gone to the cause" (pratyayamprapya samudbhavah), how could a dharma be both eternal and Pratityasamutpada at one and the same time?
***
194 What is the meaning of the word Pratityasamutpada?
Pratt has the sense of prapti, "to obtain, attain": the root i signifies gatiy "to go;" but with the prefix modifying the sense of the root,prati-i signifies "to attain", so pratitya signifies "having attained;" pad signifies sattdy "existence;" and following are the prefixes sam-ut, "to appear, prddubhdva" Thus Pratityasamutpada signifies "having attained ap- pearance. "
###
This explanation is not admissible; the word Pratityasamutpada is not good, [say the Grammarians]. In fact, of two actions by one and the same agent, the previous action is shown by the verb in the gerundive:
195
snatva bhunkte = "after having bathed, he ate. " Now one cannot
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196 imagine a dharma that, existing before having been produced, goes
first towards the pratyayas, and is then produced There is no action (going towards) without an agent. One can put this objection in verse: "Do you say that it goes towards the pratyayas before its production? This is inadmissible because it does not exist. Do you say that it goes and is produced at the same time? The gerundive is not justified, for the gerundive indicates priority. "
197 198
The objection of the Grammarians is without value. Let us ask
them if that which arises is present or future. "Do you say that a present thing arises? If it has not already arisen, how can it be present? If it has already arisen, how could it be reborn without being reborn indefinitely?
199
Do you say that a future thing arises? How can you attribute to that
which is future, and non-existent, the quality of agent in this action of arising? Or how can you admit an action without an agent? " Consequently we would answer the Grammarians that the dharma goes towards the pratyayas in the same condition in which, according to them, the dharma arises.
In what condition, ask the Grammarians, is the dharma to be found, in your opinion, that arises?
The dharma that arises is "the future dharma disposed to be born" 20
(utpadabhimukho'nagatah). ? So too the dharma that goes toward the pratyayas.
Yet the theory of the Grammarians and the manner in which they
oppose an agent and action, is not tenable. For them there is an agent
(kartar) which is "he who arises" (bhavitar), and an action (kriya) which
here is the action of arising (bhuti). Now one does not maintain that the
action of arising (bhuti) is distinct from the one who arises (bhavitar) (ii.
English trans, p. 247). There is thus nothing wrong in using, of course as
ft
conventional expressions, the words, it arises, it is produced after
having gone to the pratyayas! * The meaning of the expression 201
Pratityasamutpada is as indicated in the Sutra, "If that exists, then this exists; through the arising of that, there is the arising of this. " (See below,p. 4l5) Thefirstphrase("Ifthatexists. . . ");referstopratttya,and the second ("Through the arising of that. . . ") to samutpdda.
Thereupon one can say in verse, "If you admit that it arises at first nonexistent, nonexistent it also goes to the pratyayas. If you admit that it arises at first existent, arisen, it will continue to rearise; hence there is
? recession ad infinitum; or rather we shall say that, for us also, it is 202
preexistent to its arising. " As for the gerundive, it also indicates concomitance: "Darkness, having attained the lamp, perishes," or rather: "Having bathed, he lies down.
But how can one desire a residence in hell?
[The mind of an intermediate being is troubled by lust and hatred, as we have seen, when it goes to be reincarnated in a womb. ] In the present case, an intermediate being is also troubled in mind and misunderstands. He is tormented by the cold of rain and wind: he sees a place burning
? with hot fires and through his desire for warmth, he runs there. Or he is tormented by the heat of the sun and hot winds: he sees a cold place of frozen fires, and through his desire for coolness, he runs there.
137
According to the ancient masters, he sees these things in order to
138 experience the retribution of aaions that should be retributed in hell;
he sees beings similar to him and he runs to the place where they are.
***
Intermediate heavenly beings--those who go towards a heavenly realm of rebirth--go high, like one rising up from a seat. Humans, animals, Pretas, and intermediate beings go in the manner in which humans, etc, go.
15d Beings in hell hang from their feet.
As the stanza says, "Those who insult Rsis, ascetics and penitents
139 fall into hell head first. "
***
We have said that the intermediary beings who are reincarnated in a feminine womb (jardyuja and andaja) go there troubled in mind, through their desire for sex. Is this a general rule?
No. The Sutra teaches that there are four ways to descend into, 14
(abide and leave) the womb (garbhdvakrdnti). ?
16. The first enter in full consciousness; the second, further, dwell in full consciousness; the third, further, leave in full consciousness; the fourth accomplishes all these steps with a troubled mind. Beings born from eggs are always of this last class.
The first do not dwell and do not leave in full consciousness; the second do not leave in full consciousness; the third, in all these moments,
are in full consciousness; the fourth are, in all these aaions, without full
consciousness. Here are the four garbhdvakrddntis that the author 141
teaches, in his sloka in an order different from that of the Sutra. Beings born from eggs are always troubled in mind.
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But can we say that a being born from an egg enters into a womb?
Without doubt. One who is born from an egg is now entering into a
142 womb. Or rather we have here an anticipatory designation. In the
same way that the Sutra says samskrtam abhisamskaroti, and, in the world, one says, "to cook the rice porridge," or "to grind the flour. "
***
What does the full consciousness and the absence of full con- sciousness in the entering, in the abiding, and in the leaving consist of?
A being with little merit enters because he thinks, "The wind blows, the heavens rain; it is cold; it storms; people are in an uproar," and because, wishing to avoid these wearinesses, he believes that he is entering into a shelter, a thicket, a hut of roots and leaves, or rather he takes shelter at the foot of a tree or against a wall. Then he imagines himself resting in this thicket, in this hut, and eventually leaves it. There is an error of ideas and resolution. The same for a being rich in merits, who believes he is entering a park, a garden, a palace, a terrace, or a pavilion; he believes this and he rests there and eventually leaves it.
A being who has full consciousness knows that he enters into the
143 womb, that he dwells there, and that he leaves it.
###
The Sutra also teaches
17. Three garbhavakrantis,--the Cakravartin and the two Svayambhus,--by reason of their great purity of action, of
144 knowledge, and of action and knowledge.
The two Svayambhus are the Pratyekabuddhas and the Sambuddha. All these designations are "anticipatory": one means to speak of a being, who, in this existence, will become a Cakravartin, etc.
The Cakravartin enters in full consciousness, but does not reside in full consciousness and does not leave in full consciousness. The Pratyekabuddha resides in full consciousness, but does not leave in full consciousness. The Buddha is always in full consciousness.
The first has a great outflowing of merit and he is made resplendent
? through aaions; the second has knowledge obtained through in- struction, reflection and mediation; and the third has merit, instruction, etc: both action and knowledge.
The fourth garbhdvakrdnti, that of not full consciousness, pertains to beings without great aaions and great knowledge.
###
145
The non-Buddhists, who believe in an atman, say, "If you admit
that a being (sattva) goes to another world, then the atman in which I believe is proved"
In order to refute this doarine, the author says, 146
The atman in which you believe, an entity that abandons the skandhas of one existence and takes up the skandhas of another existence, an internal agent of aaion, a Purusa,--this atman does not exist. In faa the Blessed One said, "Aaions exist, and results exist, but there is no agent who abandons these skandhas here and takes up those skandhas there, independently of the casual relationship of the dharmas. What is this causal relationship? Namely, if this exists, then that exists; through the arising of this, there is the arising of that; Pratitya- samutpada? (French trans, v. p. 57, ix. p. 260).
Is there then, ask the non-Buddhists, a type of atman that you do not negate?
18a-d. Only the skandhas, conditioned by defilement and aaion, go reincarnating themselves by means of the series of inter- mediate existences. As an example: the lamp.
We do not deny an atman that exists through designation, an atman that is only a name given to the skandhas. But far from us is the thought that the skandhas pass into another world! They are momentary, and incapable of transmigrating. We say that, in the absence of any atman, of any permanent principal, the series of conditioned skandhas, "made up" of defilements and aaions (i. l5a, on abhisamskrta), enters into the mother's womb; and that this series, from death to birth, is prolongued and displaced by a series that constitutes intermediate existence.
18a. The atman does not exist.
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19a-c. In conformity with its projecting cause the series grows gradually, and, by virtue of the defilements and actions it goes again to another world
Actions the nature of which is to be retributed in life (dyusya
karman, ii. l0a) differ according to beings: all the series of skandhas are
not then projected at the same time in the existence where they have
arisen. The series continues then to increase to the extent that it was
projeaed This growth is gradual, as Scripture teaches: "There is first
the kalala; the arbuda arises from the kalala\ the pe? in arises from the
arbuda\ the ghana arises from the pesin; and from the ghana there arises
the prasakha, hair, body-hair, the nails, etc. , and the material organs with 147
their supports. " The kalala, etc. , are the five stages of the embryo, embryo.
148
Then, when the embryo, this throne, is ripe, there arises within
the womb winds arisen from the maturity of action which causes the embryo to turn and places it towards the portal of its birth: it is difficult to move like a great mass of hidden impurity. Sometimes, either through the unfavorable conditions of the mother's eating, or by reason of actions, the embryo perishes. Then an expert woman, after having anointed them with all sorts of drugs, puts her hands filled with a sharpened blade into this wound hideous, bad-smelling, and wet with all sorts of impurities which is the womb. She pulls out the embryo after having cut it up limb by limb. And the series of the embryo, by virtue of aparaparyayavedaniya action (iv. 50b), goes somewhere else.
Or else the birth is fortunate. The mother and the servants take the
new-born baby into their hands which are like knives and acids for this
149 body now as sensible as an open wound One washes the child; one
nourished it with milk and fresh butter, and later with solid foods: thus
15
does he grow. By reason of this development, ? the organs mature and
the defilements enter into activity, from whence actions arise. And when the body perishes, the series passes into another existence by reason of these defilements and actions, through the medium of the intermediate existence, as mentioned previously.
151 19d. In this way the circle of existence is without beginning.
Arising by reason of the defilements and actions; defilements and actions by reason of arising; arising by reason of the defilements and
? actions: the circle of existences is thus without beginning. In order for it to begin, it would be necessary for the first item to have no cause: and if one dharma arises without a cause, then all dharmas would arise without causes. Now the determination of time and place show that a seed produces a shoot, that a fire produces cooking: hence there is no arising that does not have causes. On the other hand, the theory of a single and permanent cause has been refuted above (ii. 65): hence the cycle of existence has no beginning.
But birth, coming from causes, would not take place if its causes are destroyed, in the same way that a shoot would not arise if its seed is burned.
***
The series of skandhas develops in three existences,
20a. Pratityasamutpada or dependent orgination has twelve
152 parts in three sections or time periods.
The twelve parts of dependent origination are ignorance (avidya), the samskaras, the consciousness, namarupa, the six ayatanas, contact, sensation, desire, attachment, existence, birth, and old age and death.
20b. Two for the first, two for the third, and eight for the middle.
Ignorance and the samskdras existed in a past existence, birth and old age and death will exist in a future existence, and the eight other parts exist in the present existence.
Are the middle parts to be found in the present existence of all
153 creatures?
No, they are not. Why is this?
20c. At least to consider the series that has all of its parts.
This refers to a "complete person," aparipurin, that passes through all of the states that constitute these parts. Such persons are not beings who die before their time, [for example, in the course of their embryonic life], nor are they beings of Rupadhatu or Arupyadhatu. It is certain that the Sutra that enumerates these eight parts refers to beings in
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Kamadhatu: the Mahdniddnaparyayasutra says, "Ananda, if the con- sciousness were not to descend into the mother's w o m b . . . " {Dtgha,
ii. 63).
Pratityasamutpada can be divided into two parts: past existence (1-2) and its effects (3-7); and the causes of future existence (8-10) and future existence (11-12).
What are, in this conception of Pratityasamutpada, its different parts?
134 21a. Ignorance is, in a previous life, the state of defilement.
[Ignorance does not refer to an isolated state of ignorance, iii. p. 87, 90, v. 12, nor merely to the totality of the defilements, "all the kief as"] but rather, in a previous life, the series (with its five skandhas) which is defiled, the condition of defilement (klesa-avastha). All the defilements in fact accompany ignorance, and are activated through ignorance. In the same way, when one says that the king is coming, one understands that his courtiers are accompanying him.
21b. The samskdras are, in a previous life, the state of action. The series of the previous life, which does good, bad, or neutral
actions, constitute the samskdras.
21c. The consciousness is the skandhas at conception.
The five skandhas, in the womb, at the moment of reincarnation (pratisamdhi) or arising constitute consciousness.
21d-22a. Ndmarupa (is the series) from this moment on, until the production of the six dyatanas.
Ndmarupa is made up of the five skandhas, in the womb, from
arising, as long as the six organs are not manifested. It is proper to say,
"as long as the four organs . . . ," [for the mana-dyatana and the 155
kdya-dyatana exist from arising or conception, pratisamdhiksane]; it is now at the moment when the four organs, eye, etc. , appear that these
156 two preexisting organs are found to be "arranged" [in a group of six],
? 22b. Six ay asanas before coming together of the three or contact.
The six ayatanas are the five skandhas from the first appearance of the organs until the moment when the coming together of the organ, the object of consciousness, and the consciousness takes place.
22c-d There is sparfa, or contact, until the moment when the capacity to distinguish the cause of pleasure, of suffering, etc. , is acquired
Contact [which begins at birth] lasts until the moment when the infant becomes capable of distinguishing,"This is a cause of pleasure. . . "
23a. There is contact before sexual union.
Contact, which the Karika terms vibti, exists for as long as desire for sexual union is not in aaion. [This state is termed vedand, sensation, because one experiences the cause of vedand: it is hence avasthd vedandprakarsinl]
23b. Desire ("thirst") is the state of one who desires pleasure and sexual union.
There is then in activity concupiscence relative to the objects of desire (kamagunas, iii. p. 6), visible things, etc. , and sexual union. This state of "thirst" or desire ends when one begins, under the influence of this desire, to search out these pleasures.
23c-d. Updddna or attachment is the state of one who runs around in search of the pleasures.
One runs everywhere in order to acquire these pleasures (v. 40). [Or rather updddna is the fourfold defilement (v. 38): the period during which this fourfold defilement is active is called updddna]. Running around in this manner
24a-b. He does actions which will have for their result future existence (bhava): this is bhava,
[Bhava signifies "aaion," for existence takes place by reason of it, bhavaty anena. ]Action done and accumulated in the search for pleasures will produce reexistence. The period during which one does this aaion
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constitutes bhava.
24c. Jati is the new reincarnation.
The five skandhas at the moment when reincarnation takes place after death isjati The "part" that receives the name of consciousness in a present existence is called jati in a future existence.
24d Old age-and-death lasts until sensation.
From jati until sensation,--which is here termed vid--there are four parts of the present existence, ndmarupa, the six ayatana, contact and sensation which are, in a future existence designated by the expression old age and death, the twelfdi part of this twelvefold series.
###
It is also said that Pratityasamutpada is fourfold: momentary or of
one moment (ksanika); prolongued (prdkarsika: extending over many
moments of many existences); serial (sdmbandhika, through the union
of causes and effects); and static (dvasthika: embracing twelve states, or
157 periods, of the five skandhas).
###
How is Pratityasamutpada momentary?
When a person in prey to the defilements commits murder, the
twelve parts are realized in one and the same moment: 1. his moha
(aberration) is ignorance (avidyd);, 2. his "volition" (cetand) are the
samskdras; 3. his distinct consciousness of a certain object is con- 158
sciousness; 4. the four skandhas coexisting with the consciousness is ndmarupa\ 5. the organs in relation to ndmarupa are the six ddyatanas\
159 6. the application of the six dyatanas is contact; 7. to experience
161 contact is sensation; 8. desire (rdga) is thirst; 9. the paryavasthdnas
associated with thirst are attachment; 10. bodily or vocal action that proceeds [from sensation or thirst] is bhava\ 11. the emersion (unmajjana=fapdda=prod\Ktion) of all these dharmas is jdti\ 12. their maturity (paripdka) is old age; and their rupture is death.
160
? It is also said thatPratityasamutpada is both momentary and serial at
the same time. The Prakarana says, "What is Pratityasamutpada} All
the conditioned (samskrta) dharmas. What are the dharmas produced
through dependence (pratityasamutpanna)} All the conditioned 162
dharmas. "
Static {avasthika) Pratityasamutpada is made up of the twelve states
(avasthd) embracing the five skandhas.
It is also prolongued (prdkarsikd), extending itself over three
consecutive existences.
Among these four, what is the type of Pratityasamutpada that the
Blessed One has here--in the Sutra ofthe Twelve Parts--the intention to teach?
163 25a. According to the School, it is static Pratityasamutpada.
According to the School the Blessed One distinguishes the twelve parts only with respect to static Pratityasamutpada.
***
But if each of the parts is a complex of the five skandhas, why use the designations "ignorance," etc. ?
Because the Sutra expresses itself in an intentional manner, whereas
164
the Abhidharma teaches the characteristics of things. On the one
hand Pratityasamutpada is given as static, prolongued, and pertaining to living beings (sattvdkhya); and on the other hand, as momentary, serial, and pertaining to both living and non-living beings (sattvdsattvdkhya).
Why does the Sutra teach Pratityasamutpada as only pertaining to living beings?
25c-d In order to have aberration cease with regard to the past, the future, and the interval in between.
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And it is for this same reason that it teaches a Pratityasamutpada in three sections.
Ignorance or aberration relating to the past, as when one asks, "Did I
exist or not exist in the past? How and as what did I exist? " Relating to
the future: 'Will I exist in the future? . . . " Relating to the interval in
between: 'What is this? How is this? What are we? What will we
165 be? "
This threefold aberration is destroyed by the teaching of the succession: ignorance. . . old age and death. For its is said in the Sutra, "Whoever, Oh Bhiksus, knows, through prajnd, Pratityasamutpada and the dharmas produced through dependence, will not turn himself towards the past by asking if he existed. . . "
According to others, the last three terms of the middle section,
--thirst, attachment, and bhava---are also taught in order to cause
aberration relating to the future to cease; for they are the causes of future
166 existence.
This twelvefold Pratityasamutpada is also threefold, defilement (klesa), action (karman), and foundation (vastu); it is twofold, cause and result.
26a-b. Three parts are defilement, two are action; seven are
167 foundation and also result.
Ignorance, thirst, and attachment are, by their nature, defilements; the samskaras and bhava are aaion; consciousness, namarupa, the six ayatana, contact, sensation,/***, and old age and death are foundation, so called because they are the support (ahaya-adhisthana) of the de- filements and aaion. The parts that are foundation are result: the five that are not foundation are cause, being both defilement and aaion in nature.
Why are cause and result taught at length in the seaion of present existence--two parts of defilement, two parts of aaion, five parts of foundation--whereas, a similar exposition is absent for the past and future?
In the future, one has two parts for result.
? 26b-c In two sections, cause and result are abbreviated, for one can infer them from the teaching of the middle.
From the teaching of the defilements, action and foundation, relating to present existence, one can deduce the complete exposition of cause and result in past and future existences. All useless descriptions should be omitted
***
But if Pratityasamutpada has only twelve parts, transmigration would have a beginning, since the cause of ignorance is not indicated; and it would have an end, since the result of old age and death is not indicated. Thus one must add new parts, and to infinity.
No, for the Blessed One has implicitly indicated the cause of ignorance and result of old age and death.
27. From defilement there arises defilement and action; from
whence foundation; from whence a new foundation and
defilement: such is the manner of existence of the parts of
168 existence or bhavdngas.
Defilement arises from defilement, as attachment arises from desire.
Action arises from defilement, as consciousness from attachment, or the samskdras from ignorance.
A foundation arises from action, as Vijnana from the samskdras\ or birth from existence.
A foundation arises from a foundation, as ndmarupa from con- sciousness;thesixdyatanasfromndmarupa. . . sensationfromcontact, or old age and death from birth.
Defilement arises from a foundation, as desire from sensation.
Since such is the manner of existence of the various parts of dependent orgination it is clear that ignorance has either a defilement or a foundation for its cause; it is clear that old age and death (=the rest of the foundation from consciousness to sensation, above, p. 404, line 6, has defilement for a result.
Thus the teaching is complete. That the Blessed One wanted to
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conclusion of the Sutra, "Thus there takes place the production of this
169 great mass which is nothing but suffering. "
17 m But there is another explanation: ? a. It is said, in another Sutra,
that ignorance has incorrect judgment {ayoniso manasikdra) for its cause, and, in still another Sutra, that incorrea judgment has ignorance
172 for its cause.
Consequently ignorance is not without a cause and one avoids the objection of infinite regression.
b. But incorrea judgment is not named in the Sutra in question, the
Pratityasamutpddasffira.
Without doubt; but it is included in attachment: thus one does not
173 have to separately name it here.
This explanation is without value. How is incorrea judgment included in attachment? Indeed, it is associated (samprayukta) with attachment, but it can as equally well be associated with ignorance or with desire. Let us admit that it may be included in attachment, but can one draw from this the conclusion that the Sutra, by naming attachment, says that incorrea judgment is the cause of ignorance? In other words, I indeed hold that incorrea judgment is included in attachment; but it does not follow that the Sutra could dispense with terming it a separate part, the cause of ignorance. One could just as well omit ignorance and desire.
174
Another master speaks next. A Sutra teaches that ignorance has
175
incorrea judgment for its cause. A Sutra teaches that incorrea
judgment has ignorance for its cause and observes that it is produced at the moment of contaa, "By reason of the eye and a visible thing there is
176 produced a defiled judgment which arises from error (mohaFavidyd). "
A Sutra explains the origin of desire, "Desire arises by reason of a sensation which itself arose from a contaa wherein there is ig-
177
norance. "
from the incorrea judgment which is produced at the moment of contaa. Hence ignorance is not without a cause; there is no reason to add a new term:, incorrea judgment, the cause of ignorance, arise itself from
Hence the ignorance that coexists with sensation proceeds
? an ignorance designated as aberration (moha). [This is circular reasoning, cakraka. ]
Well and good, says the author; but this is not explained in the Prat&yasamutpddasutra and it should be explained there.
There is no reason to explain it in clearer terms, for one reaches these conclusions through reasoning. In fact, to the Arhats, sensation is not a cause of desire: from whence we conclude that sensation is a cause of desire only when it is defiled, associated with ignorance. Contact, when it is not accompanied by error, is not a cause of this defiled sensation; contact accompanied by error is not produced in an Arhat, who is free from ignorance; thus the contact that Pratityasamutpada indicates as the cause of sensation, a cause of desire, is the contact that is accompaned by ignorance. [We then have sdvidyasparfapratyaya vedana / savidyavedandpratyaya trsna: sensation conditioned by contact as- sociated with ignorance, desire conditioned by sensation associated with ignorance]. From there we again take up the reasoning indicated above: we prove that, according to the Sutra, incorrect judgment is produced at the moment of contact.
But, says the author, the idea that reasoning, supported on occasion by Sutras, permits omitting indispensable terms--in the incorrect judgment in question, with the reciprocal causality of incorrect judgment and ignorance--leads to absurdity. [One could just as well omit contact, sensation, the samskdras or birth].
The true answer to this objection--that, since there is no indication of any other parts before ignorance and beyond old age and death, samsdra is without beginning or end--is the following: the enumera- tion of the parts of dependent orgination is complete. In fact, doubt with reference to the question of knowing how present existence is conditioned by preceding existence, and how future existence is conditioned by present existence, is the only point that the Sutra wants teach: thus it says, "In order to cause error relating to the past, the future, and their interval to cease" (iii. 25c, p. 68).
***
The Blessed One said, "I shall teach you, Oh Bhiksus, Pratitya- samutpada and the dharmas produced in dependence (pratitya-
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178
samutpanna)" What difference is there between Pratityasamutpada
and these dharmas!
None, according to the Abhidharma. For, as we have seen above (p.
179 405), both are defined as being "all the conditioned dharmas. "
***
A difficulty. "All the conditioned dharmas" means the dharmas of the three periods. How can future dharmas which have not yet arisen, be termed "produced in dependence," pratityasamutpanna!
We would ask you how future dharmas which are not yet "created" (krta) are called "conditoned" (samskrta)?
Because they are "thought" (cetita) by the volition (cetand) which is 180
termed abhisamskdrikd, that is, "executing a retribution. "
But if this is so, how will future pure dharmas (the dharmas of the
Path) be conditioned?
They are thought by a good mind with a view to acquiring them.
But then Nirvana itself will be conditioned, for one desires to acquire
181 it.
When one calls future dharmas "produced in dependence," one uses
an inadequate expression, justified by the identity of nature of future
dharmas with past and present dharmas that are "produced," in the
same way that future rupa is called rupa by reason of the identity of its
nature with rupa, even though one cannot qualify it as rupyate in the 182
present.
***
What is the intention of the Sutra in distinguishing Pratitya- samutpada from the dharmas produced in dependence?
28a-b. Samutpdda is the cause, whereas samutpanna is the 183
result;
The part that is a cause is Pratityasamutpada, because, there takes place arising from it. The part that is a result is pratityasamutpanna, becauseitarose;butitisalsoPratityasamutpada, because,fromit,arising takes place. All the parts, being cause and result are at one and the same
? time both Pratityasamutpada and pratityasamutpanna. Without this distinction, nevertheless, there would be non-determination and con- fusion (avyavasthana), for a part is not Pratityasamutpada through connection to the part through connection to which it is also pratityasamutpanna. In the same way a father is father through connection to his son; and a son is son through connection to his father; in the same way cause and result, and the two banks of a river.
184
But the Sthavira Purna^a says: What is Pratityasamutpada cannot
be pratityasamutpanna. Four causes: 1. future dharmas [which are Pratityasamutpada because they are a cause of future dharmas\ but not pratityasamutpanna because they are not utpanna]; 2. the last dharmas of the Arhat [which are solely pratityasamutpanna]; 3. past and present dharmas, with the exception of the last dharmas of the Arhat, [which are both Pratityasamutpada and pratityasamutpanna]; and 4. the unconditioned dharmas, [which are neither Pratityasamutpada nor pratityasamutpanna, because they have no result and they do not arise,
ii. 55d].
The Sautrantikas criticize: [All this teaching, from "Static Pratitya-
pratityasamutpanna"] --are these personal theses, fantasies, or the sense of the Sutra? You say in vain that it is the sense of the Sutra. You speak of a static Pratityasamutpada of twelve parts which are so many states {avastha) made up of the five skandhas: this is in contradiction to the Sutra wherein we read, "What is ignorance? Non-knowledge
186
relating to the past . . . " This Sutra is of explicit sense, clear
{nitartha'vibhaktartha); you cannot make it a Sutra whose sense is yet
187 to be deduced (neydrtha).
[Answer of the Sarvastivadins:] Nothing proves that this Sutra is of clear sense; the fact that it expresses itself by means of a definition does not prove anything; for the Blessed One gives definitions which solely
188 bear on the essential or major elements of the object to be defined
For example, in the Hastipodopamasutra, to the question "What is the internal earth element? ", the Blessed One answers, "The hair, the
189
body-hair, etc. " Certainly hair, etc. , are still other dharmas,--visible
things, smells, etc. ,--but the Blessed One refers to their principal element, which is the earth element. In the same way, the Blessed One designates a state in which ignorance is the major element as ignorance.
samutpada . . . (p. 405)" to "What is Pratityasamutpada cannot be 185
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? [Answer of the Sautrantikas:] This example proves nothing. In fact, in the Hastipadopamasutra, the Blessed One does not define hair, etc, by the earth element; he does not say "What is hair, etc? The earth element," in which case the definition would be incomplete. But he defines the earth element through the hair, etc; and his definition is complete, for there is no earth element in the body which is not included in the description, hair, etc In the same way, the definition of Pratityasamutpada is complete; there is nothing to add to it.
[Answer of the Sarvastivadins:] The definition given in the
Hastipadopamasutra is not complete. In fact there is earth element in 190
tears, mucus, etc, as one can see by another Sutra. Yet the earth element of tears is not indicated in the Hastipadopamasutra.
[Answer of the Sautrantikas:] Perhaps the definition of the Hastipadopamasutra is incomplete, seeing that you are able to show that there is something lacking in it. It remains for you to say what is lacking in the definitions that the Sutra gives for ignorance, etc Why define ignorance as "a state with five skandhas" by introducing heterogeneous dharmas [the five skandhas] into ignorance? One can only consider as a part of dependent orgination a dharma the existence or nonexistence of which governs the existence or nonexistence of another part. Thus a state having five parts is not a "part. " The five skandhas (sensation, etc) exist in the Arhat, but he does not possess any samskdras which could produce a consciousness part of dependent orgination, that is, a
191
punyopaga, apunyopaga, or aninjyopapaga Vijnana. And thus fol-
lowing. Hence the Sutra (note 186) is not to be taken literally.
As for the four cases of Purna^a, his first case--that the future dharmas are not "produced by dependence"--is contradicted by the Sutra which gives birth and old age and death as "produced by
dependence": "What are thepratityasamuPpannasl Ignorance. . . birth, and old age and death. " Would one say that birth and old age and death are not future states? This is to take away the three sections from the theory of Pratityasamutpada.
##*
192
Certain schools maintain that Pratityasamutpada is uncon-
ditioned iasamskrtd) because the Sutra says, "Whether the Tathagatas
? appear or not, this dharma nature of the dharmas is unchanging. " This thesis is true or false according to the manner in which one
interprets it. If one means to say that it is always by reason of ignorance,
etc, that the samskaras, etc, are produced, but not by reason of any other
thing, and not without cause; that, in this sense, Pratityasamutpada is
stable, and eternal (nitya), we approve. If one means to say that there
exists a certain eternal dharma called Pratityasamutpada, then this
opinion is inadmissible. For utpdda, production or arising, is a
characteristic of anything that is conditioned (samskrtalaksana, ii. 45c);
an eternal dharma, as arising or Pratityasamutpada would be by
supposition, cannot be a characteristic of a transitory or conditioned
thing. Moreover arising is defined as "existence succeeding upon 193
nonexistence": what relationship (abhisambandha) can one suppose exists between an unconditioned arising and ignorance, etc, a re-
%t
lationship that would permit one to say Pratityasamutpada of
ignorance, etc. ? " Finally the expression Pratityasamutpada would become absurd: since prati-itya-samutpada signifies "production by having gone to the cause" (pratyayamprapya samudbhavah), how could a dharma be both eternal and Pratityasamutpada at one and the same time?
***
194 What is the meaning of the word Pratityasamutpada?
Pratt has the sense of prapti, "to obtain, attain": the root i signifies gatiy "to go;" but with the prefix modifying the sense of the root,prati-i signifies "to attain", so pratitya signifies "having attained;" pad signifies sattdy "existence;" and following are the prefixes sam-ut, "to appear, prddubhdva" Thus Pratityasamutpada signifies "having attained ap- pearance. "
###
This explanation is not admissible; the word Pratityasamutpada is not good, [say the Grammarians]. In fact, of two actions by one and the same agent, the previous action is shown by the verb in the gerundive:
195
snatva bhunkte = "after having bathed, he ate. " Now one cannot
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196 imagine a dharma that, existing before having been produced, goes
first towards the pratyayas, and is then produced There is no action (going towards) without an agent. One can put this objection in verse: "Do you say that it goes towards the pratyayas before its production? This is inadmissible because it does not exist. Do you say that it goes and is produced at the same time? The gerundive is not justified, for the gerundive indicates priority. "
197 198
The objection of the Grammarians is without value. Let us ask
them if that which arises is present or future. "Do you say that a present thing arises? If it has not already arisen, how can it be present? If it has already arisen, how could it be reborn without being reborn indefinitely?
199
Do you say that a future thing arises? How can you attribute to that
which is future, and non-existent, the quality of agent in this action of arising? Or how can you admit an action without an agent? " Consequently we would answer the Grammarians that the dharma goes towards the pratyayas in the same condition in which, according to them, the dharma arises.
In what condition, ask the Grammarians, is the dharma to be found, in your opinion, that arises?
The dharma that arises is "the future dharma disposed to be born" 20
(utpadabhimukho'nagatah). ? So too the dharma that goes toward the pratyayas.
Yet the theory of the Grammarians and the manner in which they
oppose an agent and action, is not tenable. For them there is an agent
(kartar) which is "he who arises" (bhavitar), and an action (kriya) which
here is the action of arising (bhuti). Now one does not maintain that the
action of arising (bhuti) is distinct from the one who arises (bhavitar) (ii.
English trans, p. 247). There is thus nothing wrong in using, of course as
ft
conventional expressions, the words, it arises, it is produced after
having gone to the pratyayas! * The meaning of the expression 201
Pratityasamutpada is as indicated in the Sutra, "If that exists, then this exists; through the arising of that, there is the arising of this. " (See below,p. 4l5) Thefirstphrase("Ifthatexists. . . ");referstopratttya,and the second ("Through the arising of that. . . ") to samutpdda.
Thereupon one can say in verse, "If you admit that it arises at first nonexistent, nonexistent it also goes to the pratyayas. If you admit that it arises at first existent, arisen, it will continue to rearise; hence there is
? recession ad infinitum; or rather we shall say that, for us also, it is 202
preexistent to its arising. " As for the gerundive, it also indicates concomitance: "Darkness, having attained the lamp, perishes," or rather: "Having bathed, he lies down.
