No More Learning

debemus quid evenire potest, quando item ab isto regimine possunt excludi
illud de quo agitur ad hoc naturaliter aliqui magnates, qui sunt ita poteutes
et universaliter tendit. " quod alios opprimerent. . . .
* Id. id. , 15: "Hoc praemisso, facio 20. Secundo est videndum de gente
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? CHAP. V. ] CIVILIANS AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE RULER. 79
says, may be either hereditary or elective, but the elective
method is alone proper for the universal monarchy--that is,
the Empire. 1 It is interesting to notice that while he
lias a great reverence for the empire, he admits that since
it ceased to be held by Italians it had fallen in their esteem. 2
Bartolus is clear that monarchy is not adapted to the small
or even to the moderately large State. He evidently thinks
that it is not suited to Italy; the question of the relation
of the city State to the Empire does not here seem to be in
his mind.
We must, however, be careful to observe that, like
Egidius,3 he very sharply distinguishes the true king from the
tyrant. The monarchy which he thinks to be good is absolute,
but it is directed to the common good of the community, while
the tyrant pursues his own advantage. And here we can see
that his judgment is quickened by his sense of the Italian
conditions.
For to Bartolus tyranny is not only a corrupt form of
government, but it is the worst of all corrupt governments.
The government of a few, or of the multitude, is corrupt
when they pursue their own advantage, but it is not so far
removed from a government for the common good as that of
? eu populo majori et in socundo gradu
uagnitudinis, tunc istos non oxpedit
regi per unum regem . . . nec expedit
regi per multitudinem, easet enim
value difficile et poriculosum tantam
multitudinem congregari. Sed istis
expedit regi per paucos, hoc est, per
divites et bonce homines illius civitatis.
. . . Sic enim regitur civitas Venetia-
rom, sio civitas Florentine. . . .
Tertio videndum ost de gente vel
populo maximo, qui est in tertio gradu
ioagnitudinis. Hoc autem fieri posset
contingere, in civitate una per se,
sed si esset civitas quae mult 13 aliis
civitatibus et provinciis dominarotur,
huic genti bonuru est regi per uno.
Hoc probatur ft. De Orig. Jur. 1. III.
5- Novissime (' Dig. ,' i. 2, 2), ubi,
aucto multum imperio Romano et
captis multis provinciis, deventum fuit
ad unum s. ad principem. Hoc etiam
probant omnos rationes, factae per
dictum fratrum Egidium, hie cessant
rationes in oppoeitum. In tanta enim
multitudine, de necessitate enim sunt
multi boni, per quos oportebit se regem
consulere et in justitiae via se ponere;
et sic de facto communiter videmus
quod tanto melius gens vel populus
regetur, quanto sub majore rege
regitur. "
1 Id. id. , 23.
1 Id. id. , 25: "Et ideo imperium
Romanorum postquam fuit ab Italicis
separatum, semper decrevit in oculis
nostris, hoc tamen absque Dei judicio
occulto factum non est. "
>> Cf. vol. v. p. 76.
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? 80
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the one man. 1 We may put it in concrete terms, the Italian
oligarchy or democracy was not so really corrupt and evil a
thing as the Italian tyranny. Bartolus adds that the corrupt
oligarchy or democracy tends to develop into a tyranny, as
they had seen in their own day, for " Italy is full of tyrants. " 2
This treatment of tyranny by Bartolus is of importance,
and we must consider it not only in the 'De Eegimine
Civitatis,' but also in another treatise, entitled 'De Tyranno. '
We have just seen that Bartolus derives from Egidius
Colonna and Aristotle the conception of the tyrant as one
who governs for his own profit and not for the good of the
community. In the treatise, 'De Tyranno,' he derives from
S. Isidore, directly or indirectly, the description of the tyrant
as that wicked king who exercises a cruel rule over his sub-
jects ;3 from S. Gregory the Great he takes his description
of the tyrant as one who governs the commonwealth but
not lawfully (non jure),* and he applies this to the case of the
King or Emperor of the Eomans; if any man seeks to obtain
that place unjustly he is properly called a tyrant. 5
1 Id. id. , 27: "Quaero enim de malis
modis regendi, quisquis sit deterior: in
hoc omnes philosophi dicunt, quod ty-
rannus est pessimus principai us, tenet
enim ultimum gradum malitiae. Item
predictus Egidius in dicto libro. dicit
enim ut dictum est, regimen ideo
dicitur bonum, quia per illud maxime
tenditur ad bonum commune. 8ed
per tyr annum maxime ab intentione
communis boni receditur, unde tyran-
nus pessimus principatus; unde si
dominentur plures, quia divites vel
boni creduntur, vel si dominetur
multitudo, quamquam ilii regentes
tendant ad proprium, et non a Deo
est, et sic est regimen malorum vel
populi perversi: tamen non tantum
receditur ab intentione communis
boni, quia ex eo quod plures sunt, ali-
quid sapit de natura communis boni.
Sed si unus est tyrannus otiam recedit
a communi bono. Praetorea, sicut
virtus unita in bonum est melior, ita
unita in deterius est deterior. Tyran-
nus aui <>m est pessimus, hoc autem
est ita manifestum quod demonstra-
tionem non egot. "
? Id. id. , 29: "Item advertendum
est quod regimen plurium malorum,
vel regnum populi perversi non diu
durat, sed de facili in tyrannidem
unius deducitur, hoc enim de facto
saepius vidimus. Hoc etiam permissio
divina est, quum scriptum sit, 'Qui
regnare facit hypocritam propter pec-
cata populi'; et quia hodie Italia est
plena tyrannis. "
1 Bartolus, ' De Tyranno,' 1.
4 Id. id. , 2: "Proprie tyrannus is
dicitur qui communi reipublicae non
jure principatur. "
? Id. id. , 3: "Sicut enim rex, seu
imperator Romanorum est justus et
verus et universalis: ita si quis ilium
locum vult injuste obtincre, appellatur
? ? proprie tyrannus. "
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? CHaP, V. ] CIVILIANS AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE RTJLER. 81
In another place Bartolus says: "The tyrant may be either
'manifest' or 'veiled,'" but, what is more important, he
may be a tyrant, "ex defectu tituli " or "ex parte exercitus. "
The distinction is important, though it was not new; Aquinas
had pointed it out in his commentary on the " Sentences. " 1
When he comes to the question of tyranny "ex parte exer-
citus," he first says in general terms that the tyrant is he
who does tyrannical things--that is, things directed to his
own advantage and not that of the community,2 and then
cites from a work, which he attributes to Plutarch, 'De
Regimine Principum,' an enumeration of such actions. 3
What is the remedy against the tyrant. If he has a superior,
it is for the superior to depose him; but Bartolus interpolates
the observation that there may be occasions when the emperor
or Pope may maintain such tyrants in their position for
some grave and sufficient reason. * In another work he seems
clearly to indicate that the tyrant may rightfully be deposed,
and he cites a passage from Aquinas, to which we have often
referred, that it is not sedition to resist the tyrant. 5
It is not easy from all this to form any very olear view
as to the judgment of Bartolus with regard to the nature
of the authority of the ruler. He is clear that monarchy
1 Id. id. , 12: "Nam quidam est
tyrannus manifestus, quidam quan-
doque velatus et tacitus. Item esse
quem tyrannum manifesto contingit,
quandoque ex parte exercitus, quan-
doque ex defectu tituli. " Cf. vol. v. ,
p. >1 (S. Thomas Aquinas, 'Com-
mentary on the "Sentences," ' II. , D.
44, 2. 2).
* Id. id. , 27: "Octavo quaero do
tyranno ox parte exercitii licet habeat
jnstum titulum, minus proprie dicatur
tyrannus. . . . Dico quod isto tyran-
nus ex parte ejus qui opera tyrannica
'acit, hie ex opere ejus non cedit ad
booum commune, sed ad proprium
ipsius tyranni. "
>> Id. id. , 28, 29.
'Id. id. , 34.
* Id. , 'De Onelfis et Oebellinis,' 9:
VOL. VI.
"Ad utilitatem publicam licitum est
(i. e. , tyrannum deponere), et si per.
voniret ad actum ita quod rumor vol
tumultus irrepserit in civitate, non
incidit in legem C. de seditione, quia
licet faciat, ut diotum est; pro hoc
induco Thomas de Aquino in 2, 2, Q.
42, ad 2 in fi: (' Summa Theologica,'
2, 2, Q. 42, 2), ubi sic ait. 'Regnum
tyrannic um non est jus tum, quia non
ordinatur ad bonum commune, sed ad
bonum privatum regentis, et ideo
porturbatio hujus regni non habet
rationem seditionis, nisi forte, quando
sic inordinate perturbaretur tyranni
regnum, quod multitudo subjocta
majus damnum pateretur ex perturba-
tione sequente, quam ex tyranni
regimine. '"
Cf. vol. v. p. 92.
F
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? 82
[PABT I.
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is not proper to the Italian city, but he seems to incline to
the view, which he may have derived from Egidius Eomanus,
that it is suited to the great monarchies, that is to Northern
and Western Europe; his hatred of the tyrant may be
interpreted as related to these as well as to Italy.
We turn from Bartolus to his great contemporary Baldus.
He says in one place, but merely incidentally, that a good
king is better than a good law. 1 In another place he
says that the emperor is called a king because he rules
others, and is ruled by no one, though he rules himself by
the advice of the wise men. All kings have supreme juris-
diction in their kingdom, and there is no appeal from their
judgment, for their judgments are accepted as law; their
"bene placitum " is subject to no law. 2
We may compare a passage in his Commentary on the
Code in which he discusses the question whether the prince
is bound by the law. Baldus says that the passage in
the Code on which he is commenting means that he should
live according to the law "de debito honestatis," but this
must not be taken too precisely. The supreme and absolute
power of the prince is not under the law; the words of
the Code must therefore be taken as referring to the
ordinary power of the prince, not to his absolute power.
While the emperor's authority is derived from the "lex
regia," it must be borne in mind that this "lex regia" was
promulgated by the divine will (nutu divino), and therefore
the empire is said to be immediately from God. It should be
1 Baldus, 'Commentary on Digest'
(fol. 10, v. ): "Et melius est bonus
rex quam bona lex. ''
* Id. id. : 'Proemium' (fol. 2, v. ):
"Item nota quod imperator Caesar
dicitur Hex . . . ot a nemino regitur
. . . Consilio tamen prudentum se
regit et gubernat. . . . Item nota
quod hoc est commune jus omnium
rogum quod a regia maiestatis sententia
non appellatur; nimirum quia ejus
definitiva sententia in regno suo pro
lege habetur, et sic nemo posset in
melius commutare.
Item in regno suo
faabet supremam jurisdictionem . . .
cum manu omnia gubernet . . . bene-
placitum nulli legi subiaceat . . .
Etiam si unus rex teneat in feudum
regnum suum alio rege. Nam eo ipso
quod intitulatur rex, habet supremam
potestatem in subditos, nec enim
minor est rex praefecto praetorio, a
cujus sententia non appellatur. "
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? CHAP. V. ] CIVILIANS AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE RULER. 83
observed, however, that after all this Baldus adds that he is
a good ruler who desires that God and the laws should rule,
and this is why the emperor says that he subjects his "prin-
cipals" to the laws. 1
In a work of Jason de Mayno, an important civilian of
the fifteenth century ('Comm. on Digest,' i. 4. 1), we have
found an important reference to Baldus as having said that
the Pope and the Prince can do anything "supra ius, et
contra ius, et extra ius. " Unfortunately Jason gives no
indication of the place from which he cites this.
'What are we to understand by all this? Baldus thinks that
a good prince is better than a good law; he admits, and indeed
is clear, that a good prince should normally respect the law. ,
but he is also clear that he is not, strictly speaking, under the
law, and he suggests an important distinction between the
ordinary and the absolute power of the prince.
We might then incline to the conclusion that the theory of
monarchy of these great civilians of the fourteenth century
was very different from that of the normal theoretical and
constitutional tradition of the Middle Ages and of the four-
teenth century, but before we draw such a conclusion we must
remember some other aspects of their theory which we have
already considered. We have already dealt with their dis-
cussion of the question whether indeed the prince was the
sole source of law, and have seen that with respect to the
custom of the people they are at least hesitating and
uncertain,2 and we must remember that other question
1 Id. id. , 'Commentary on Code,' i.
14, 4 (fol. 55, v. ): "Princeps debet
vivere secundum leges, quia ex lege
eiusdem pendit auctoritas. - Intellige
quod istud verbum debet intelligi de
debito honestatis quae summa debet
*Me in principe, sed non intelligitur
precise; quia suprema et absoluta
potestas principis non est sub lege,
undo lex ista babet respectum ad
potostatem ordinariam, non ad postes-
taiem absolutam . . . nota quod im-
perator dicit se esse lcgibus alligatum,
et hoc ex benignitate non ex necessi-
tate. Secundo, nota, quod auctoritas
imperatoris pendit ex lege regia, quae
fuit nutu Divino promulgata et ideo
imperium dicitur esse immediate a Deo
. . . Quarto nota quod ille bene prin-
cipatur qui vult principari Deum et
leges, unde dicit imperator se submittere
principatum suum legibus. "
>> Confer p. 16.
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? 84
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of the legal or quasi-legal relation of the prince to his sub-
jects--that is, the conception that the prince may enter into
relations with his subjects which are of a contractual nature,
and that these are binding both on himself and on his
successors. We have already discussed this question,1 and
here therefore we only cite again the words in which Baldus
gives his interpretation of the passage in which Cynus had
dealt with it. Cynus had said (but it is not really clear
whether it is the opinion of Cynus or of Guido de Suza)
that if the emperor had made peace or a "capitulum" with
his subjects for the public good, this was binding even on his
successor. 2 As we have pointed out, this is clearly related
(by Baldus) to feudal principles.
There is yet another very important limitation upon the
authority of the prince which is discussed by these civilians.
Cynus says, very dogmatically, that the prince cannot lawfully
(de jure) take away a man's private property without cause.
He can undoubtedly do so "de facto," and his order should
be obeyed, for it must always be supposed that he is acting
for some just reason; but it cannot be doubted that he com-
mits a sin if he does it without cause. 3 Jac. Butrigarius sets
out a somewhat curious view that the emperor can take away
any man's property for proper reasons (ex causa), but not
without reason; but this is not due to a defect of authority,
but because he had said that he would not do it. *
1 Confer pp. 15, 20.
* Baldus, 'Commentary on Code,' i. ,
14, 4 (fol. 55, v. ): "Dominus Cynus
dicit quod si istud pactum ha bet in se
justitiam naturalem et cquitatem, quod
istud pactum est servandum, si im -
perator facit pacem vel capitulum cum
subjectis, propter generale et publicum
bonum, quod ista non dsbrant infringi
per successorem, nisi ex parte sub-
ditorum intervenisset dolus vel fraus. "
* Cynus, 'Commentary on Code,'
Rubric i. , 19 (fol. 36. 3) (Code, i. , 19,7):
"Secundo casu, scilicet, quando vult
mihi tollere dominium rei meae, sine
aliqua causa de mundo; si quaeritur
utrum possit de facto? Non est
dubium. Sed utrum possit de jure et
de potestate sibi per jura concessa,
in veritate non potest. . . . Sed tamen,
quantum ad observantiam qualiter
cunque scribat, debet servari, nam
semper rescriptum suum supponimus
ex justa causa interpositum. Et talis
presumptio est violenta in persona
principis; ut supra dixi in proxima
questione. Negari tamen non potest
quod, si mihi rem meam auferat sine
causa, quod ipse peccat.
* Jacobus Butrigarius, 'Thesaurus
Legum,' i. , 14, 3, 12: "Item opp:
quod imperator non possit quem
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? CHAP. V. ] CIVILIANS AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE RULER. 85
Bartolus, referring to some statement of Jo. Butrigarius
that the prince could take away a man's property without
cause, says flatly that this is not true. The prince cannot
take away a man's property unjustly, for the prince holds his
jurisdiction from God. God gave him jurisdiction, but not
the power of taking away what belonged to another man
without reason. 1
Baldus cites the "Gloss " as saying that the prince cannot
by his rescript take away a man's property without proper
cause. 2 He seems to imply in this passage that private pro-
perty belongs to the "jus gentium," but in commenting on
the 'Digest' he says that it reallybelongs to the "jus naturale,"
meaning by this that law which properly belongs to human
nature. 3 When he deals with property under feudal law he is
even more explicit. He asks whether the emperor can deprive
a vassal of his fief without a definitely proved offence, and he
cites the "Gloss" as saying that this is not "reason," for
good and natural laws bind the prince and natural law is
stronger than the "Principatus. " * And in another place he
privare do dominio rei suae. . . . ut 1. 11, fl. Do Leg. Eodom modo, si
vellet auferre mihi dominium rei
meae injuste, non posset, quia princeps
habet jurisdictionem a Deo. . . . Sed
Deufl dedit ei jurisdictionem, non po-
testatem auforendi alienum indebito. "
* Baldus, 'Commentary on Code,'
i. , 19 (fol. 68, 2): "Tertio querunt
doctores nunquid imperator potest
reecribere contra jus gentium. Gi:
videtur dice re quod non: unde per
rescriptum principis non potest alicui
sine causa auffcrri dominium; sed
cum aliquali bene potest. "
1 Id. , 'Commentary on Digest,' i. ,
1, 5 (fol. 11, 2): "Opponitur tertio,
dicitur hio quod dominia sunt distinct a
de jure gentium. Contra, imo, de
jure naturali. . . . Sol: Hie ponitur
jus naturale pro jure propriae nature
humane, i. e. , pro jure gentium vel pro
, ut hie, favore publicae
utilitatis, sine causa non posset ut ibi;
imo puto quod ubicunque princeps non
errat in facto, et refert ibi contra jus
aliquid, quod valeat rescriptum; nam
quod ipse non possit aliquem privare re
sua, non est ex defect u pot est at is suae,
sed ideo quia dixit se nolle hoc face re. "
1 Bartolus, 'Commentary on Code,'
i. , 25, 6, 2: "Dominus Jo. But. dice-
bat simpliciter quod princeps potest
auferre mihi dominium rei meae sine
ah qua causa. Nam ejus potestas, et
potest as istarum legum, quae hoc
prohibent, procedit a pari potent ia:
ergo sicut potest istas leges tollere,
eodem modo possit dare alteri dominium
rei meae sine causa.
Quod puto non esse verum, nam
princeps non potest facere unam legem
quae continet unum inhonestum vel
nam est contra substantiam
Nam est lex sanctio sancta,
jubens honest a et prohibens contraria,
1 Id. , 'Super Feudis' (fol. 9, 2):
"Quaero numquid imperator posset
? ? disvestiro vassallum sine conviota
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? 8G
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even deals with this in relation to taxation, and, while he seems
to think that the prince has the right to impose a " collecta " on
his subjects and that they are bound by " natural obligation"
to pay this if it is useful for the service and necessity of the
commonwealth, they are not bound by "natural obligation"
to do this if the tax is levied merely by the arbitrary will of
the prince. 1
Joannes Faber, an important French civilian, in one
passage says that the prince can take away a man's property
for some definite cause, but the person to whom he may
give it has not a just title before God unless there was a
just cause--i. e. , for the action of the prince. 2 Finally,
Angel o de Perusia, a civilian of the later part of the four-
teenth century, says plainly that the prince cannot take
away a man's property without cause, and he refers for a
full discussion to the passage of Cynus just quoted. 3
It may possibly appear that this is not a sufficiently im-
portant point to deal with so fully, but that is a mistake.
For it will be evident, on a little reflection, that the principle
of the civUians is clearly related to, if not identical with, the
more precisely stated principle that the king cannot proceed
against a man's property except by process of law. *
"We return to one very important question: What did the
oulpa 7 Respondit glossa quod non
est ratio: quia bonae et naturales
consuetudines ligant principem, quia
potentius est jus naturale quam
principatus. "
1 Id. , 'Commentary on Digest,' i.
1, 5 (fol. 11, v. ): "Decimo quaeritur
ei princeps imponit subditis colloctam;
utrum ex hoc oritur obligatio naturalis;
et dio quod si ooncernit reipublicae
utilitatem et necessitatem, quod tunc
sic . . . sed solius principis effren-
atam voluntatem, tunc non oritur
obligatio naturalis. "
2 Joannes Faber,' In Quatuor Libros
Institutionum' i. , 2 (fol. 8): "Quid
si (princeps) rescribat in posseeeorio.
. . . Dico ergo quod princeps ex causa
possit tollere dominium, dum tamen
faciat ex certa scientia. . . . Caveat
tamen de conscientia, ut forte sciens
et recipiens non habeat justum titulum
quoad Deum: nisi subisset causa vera
justa: et princeps male informatus
debet revocare, facta informatione. "
>> Angelo de Perusia, 'Super Codi-
cem,'' De rei vindicatione,' Lex xii. (fol.
62): "In tex. ibi, ex nostro rescripto;
et sic patet per principem non auforri
alteri dominium per rescriptum, cum
sit de jure gentium, nulla causa sub-
sistonte, alias secus; ut plene disputa-
tur per Cynum in 1. Rescripta, s. si
contra jus vel uti. pub. "
? Cf. chap. 4. For the opinions of
the earlier civilians, see vol. ii. p. 72.
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? CHAP, V. ] CIVILIANS AND THE AUTHORITY OF THE RULER.