Echec, Indeed, Phedon, Ithink it no wonder ; for
to m y mind, Socrates explain'd his Principles with a wonderful neatness, sufficient to make an impression upon any Man ofcommon Sense.
to m y mind, Socrates explain'd his Principles with a wonderful neatness, sufficient to make an impression upon any Man ofcommon Sense.
Plato - 1701 - Works - a
necessityof making a narrow Enquiryintothecause
of Generation and Corruption. If you please I'l
tellyouwhat happen'dtomeuponthislamevery matter ? and if what I fay seem useful to you, you
shall be at liberty to make use of it to support your Sentiments.
With allmy heart,faysSimmias. <Praygweearthen,faysSocrates:InmyyouthI
SocratesinhaeLan insatiable desire to learn that Science, which tisyouth, iS caii'd Natural. Historyh for I thought it was
iWe/ *somethingGreatandDivinetoknowtheCausesof vhysicks. everything,oftheirGeneration,Death,andExistence. And I fpar'd no Pains, nor omitted any Means, for trying in the first place, if (a) a certain corruption ofhotand cold,will,assome pretend,,giveBeing and Nourishmentto Animals;ifthe. Bloodmakes
theThought;ifAiror Fire,,orthe Brain alone is
the cause of our Senses, of Seeing, Hearing, Smel
ling, &c. ifMemory and Opinion take their rise
from these Senses, and if Knowledge be the result
ofMemoryandOpinion. Then Iwantedtoknow the
causesoftheirCorruption,andextendedmy curiosity
both to the Heavens and the cavities ofthe Earth,and
would fain have known the Cause ofall thePhenome
nawemeetwith. Atlast,afteragreatdealoftrou\
ble,! foundmy selfstrangelyunqualifiedforsuchEn- ' q u i r i e s ? , a n d o f t h i s I a m a b o u t t o g i v e y o u a s e n s i
ble Proof (b) This tine study made me ib blind in
(a) Socrates said he was ignorant of all these Things, be causehe knew nothingbutSecondCauses. Nowtoknow them justly, one ought to know God, and the Vertue he di splays in Nature.
(b) Its utmost reach amounts to no more than an imper fectKnowledgeofSecondCauses. Now theseSecondCauses do not lead us into the knowledge of the Essence of Things.
A
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul. 145; intheThingsIknew more evidently before^accord-~*strange
ingtomyown and otherPersonsThoughts, that iffif'i'1"
q u i t e f o r g o t a l l t h a t I h a d k n o w n u p o n s e v e r a l S u b - - p h y f y L . - jects,particularlythatofaMan'sgrowth, {"thoughtitblind,
twas evident to the whole World , that a Man '>>st'*dof grows only by eating and drinking : For Flesh jjJjJS*
beingaddedtoFlesh^BonestoBones,and allthestanding"' other Parts joyn'd to their similar Parts by Nourish- v
m e n t , ,m a k e a s m a l l B u l k t o s w e l l a n d g r o w , s o t h a t alittleManbecomeslarge. ThiswasmyThought. x Do notyouthink'twasjust?
Yes sure, replies Cebes.
Mind what follows,fays Socrates:I thought likewise that I knew the Reason why one Man is taller than another by the Head, and one Horse higherthananother:And withreferencetoplainer and more sensible Things, I thought, for Instance, that ten was more than eight, because two were added to it ; that two Cubits were larger than One, because they contain'd one half more.
And what are your present Thoughts of those Things,fays Cebes?
I am so far, replies Socrates, from
thinking that I know the Causes of all & afterwards givfS thesethings;that,whenoneis. added ***W<<>>? /**>>/<<D<<rf<<,
to one, I do not believe I can tellwhe- theritisthatveryonetowhichthe
, . ,,,,? '.
otheris added thatbecomes twojor
whethertheoneadded,andtheoneto
which the addition was made make
:wo together > For in their separate state, each of em wasoneandnottwo;andaftertheirbeing
\. Man is so far from improving his Knowledge by them, hat he must needs own his Ignorance of the Things he pre- ended to know. All Philosophers at this day know that M o u r i s l i m e n t b y t h e m e a n s o f H e a t is t h e c a u s e o f t h e g r o w t h )fanyAnimal. Butthey'reallatalosstoknowbywhat Virtue it grows or ceases to grow, and what are the limits )fitsgrowth. What;misfortuneisitforaMantoplodall lis life-time for the knowing of nothing !
K k plac'd
JSSv T fa\h tmjmanar d , when they amidnotstewboworwhy
<>>><<andonemaketwo.
? ? 146
Phedon: Or, A Dialogae
plac'donebytheother,theybecametwo. Neither canItellhow, uponthedivisionofanything,what was formerly one becomes two, from the very mi nuteofdivision:Forthat Causeisquitecontrary to that which makes one and ohe become two.
There this ohe, and this one become two, by reason
of their being plac'd near and added, the one to
the other : But, here this one Thing becomes two by
reasonofitsdivisionandseparation. Farlessdo
I pretend to know whence this one Thing comes, and
bythisMethod (i. e. byPhysicalReasons)Ican
not findouthow theleast Thing takes rife or pe- Hemeansrifhes,orhowitexists. ButwithoutsomuchCe-
rTolrfetl remony> I mix another Method ofmy own with thefirst this,forbythisIcanlearnnothing:Havingone
cau. fe,far day heard some Body reading a Book of (b) Anaxa- exhumingg0ras\ whosaidthe DivineIntellectwasthecause
*lytZ? ? L. ? f a^ Beings, and drew 'em up in their proper
ficks. ^ Ranks and Clasies? ,I was ravish'd with Joy. I
7>obUbegin-perceiv'd there was nothing more certain than this <<<>>? /"? a-Principle, that the Intellectisthe cause ofall Be- '
naxaSoras. ifigs> Fq]. jjufllythought thattMsInteUeahaving
methodis'd all Things and rank'd 'em in their Clas ses, (c) planted every Thing in the Place and Con-
( b ) ^ i n a x a g o r a s w a s t h e first t h a t s a i d t h e I n t e l l e c t o r S p i r i t of God rank'd the Parts of Matter, and put 'em in motion. And 'twasthatPrinciplethatusher'dinhisPhysicks. This fair Exordium gave Socrates occasion to think thathe would ex-M plain allthe Secrets ofNature,by unfolding the divine VertueB difplay'duponit,andassigningtheReasonswhy everyThing! wassoandso. ButthatPhilosopherdidnotkeepup'tohis first Principle ; for he wav'd the first Cause, and inhsted on second Causes, and by so doing frustrated the expectation ot hisKeaders. ' ' .
(c) Here Socrates recals us to the first Truth, that G o d cre ated allThingsgood,and intheirbestslate;accordingto Mofcs,who fays,Godsaw allThingsthathehadmade,and be laidtheywereverygood. Now inordertoknowwhy Things arethusgood,wemustenquireintothe'Nature ofthisOri ginal Goodness, and survey the sttate they were created in. What asorrythingisPhysicksthen,thatknows nothing butsecond Causes,or rather,thatdoesnotcertainlyknow tiitfe second Cause; ?
dition
? ? bf the Imhtdrtalit) bfifre Soul 147
dition that was best and most useful for it, in which itcould best do and suffer whatever the Intellect hadallottedto it*and Iapprehended thatthe re sultof this Principle, was, that the only Thing a Man ought to look for, either for himselfor others*
1 isthisbetterandmoreusefulthing:Forhavingonce found what is best and most useful, he'll necessarily know what is worst, since there is but one Know ledge both for the one and the other.
Upon this score I was infinitely glad, that I had
foundsuchaMasterasAnaxagoras^who Ihop'd
would give a satisfactory Account of the Cause of allThings? ,and would not only tellme, for In-^f"*? *. *"<<
stance, that the Earth is broad or round, but like-yftf*fophei wifeassignthe necessaryCauseobligingittobeso:0(^JH Who wouldpointouttomewhatwasbest,andatteach: thefametimegivemetounderstandwhyitwas
so. Inlikemanner, ifheaffirm'dtheSeatofthe
Earth to be in the Centre of the World, I expected -hewould give meaReasonwhyitwasso:And, after Ishould have received sufficient Instruction from him, defign'd never to admit of any other
Causefora Principle.
I prepare some Questions, to be put to him con-
fcerningtheSun,Moon,and otherStars,inorderto know the Reasons of their Revolutions, Motions, and other Accidents, and why what each of them
? d o e s is always the best : For I could not imagine. ,
I that after he had told me, that the Intellect rank'd "them, anddrewthemupinorder,thathecou'dgiveindeed,that
me nootherreasonofthatOrderthanthis,thatitwasXw*fe&e
best. AndIflatter'dmyselfwithhopes,thatafterhe^fj^ hadaffign'dboththegeneraland particularCauses,9mthanad
he would giveme toknow, wherein the particularTnafirest Good ofeveryindividualThing,aswellasthecom-But'fVf0*
monGoodofallThingsconsists. Iwouldnothavefn*TMui;-L ? jbarted with these Hopes for all the Treasures of the
World. SoIboughthisBookswithagreatdealofIm-
? >atience;gridmade itmyBusinesstoperuse'emas Kk i ? fdori
? 148
Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
Socrates
soon as possibly I could, in order to a speedy know ledgeoftheGoodandtheEvilofallThings:But Ifound my selffrustrated ofmy mighty Hopesj for as soon as I had made a small progress in the perusal,IfoundtheAuthormade no useofthisIn tellect, and affign'd no Reason of that fine Order and Disposition ; but affign'd as Causes the Air, Whirlwinds, the Waters, and other Things equally absur'd.
ridiculesth* His whole Performance ieem'd to reach no far- ? pbysieis ther,thanifaManshouldfay,thatSocratesdoes
otfI"si a^tythe*nteHe&>andafterthat,meaningtogive TendclJfis. a Reason for all my Actions, should say, for In-
'stance, to day I am set upon my Bed,because my Body is composed of Bones and Nerves-, theBones being hard and solid, are separated by the Joints;
and the Nerves being capable to bend and unbend. ? uni. trthe themselves, tye the Bones to the Flesh, and the" ? Notionof Skin,which receivesand includesboththeoneand
<<m7<<W*the0t'ier'^at*e Bones beingdisengag'datthe 'jZsiles. 'Joints, the Nerves which bend and unbend, enable m e to fold m y Legs as you fee, and that fotiooth
isthereason thatIsitinthis Posture: Or,ifaMan pretending to assign the Cause of my present Con ferencewithyou, shouldinsistonlyupon thesecond Causes, the Voice, the Air, Hearing, and such other Things , and should take no notice of the true Cause, viz. that the Athenians thought it fit to conl demn me, and that by the same reason I thought it] fittestfor me to behere,and patiently wait the e x e c u t i o n o f - m y S e n t e n c e -, f o r I c a n s a f e l y ( a ) s w e a r that these Nerves and these Bones should long ere now have been translated to Megara, or Bceotia^ if
{a)IntheGreekitruns,ForIswearbytheDog. Lattantitu checkshimforthisOath. ButSt. Augi-stininLib. IV. Os tin trueReligion,justifieshim,asifSocratesmean'dto give thf Athenianstoknow,thatevenaDog,beingtheWorkman shiposGod, deierv'dmore Honourthan alltheIdols the' sworeby. Itmaylikewisebealledg'dthatSocratessworeb aDog, aGoose, &c. inorder to accustom Men to forbea taking the N a m e of G o d so often in vain.
th;
? ? of the Immortality ofthe Soul. 149
that had been fitter for me, and if I had not been still persuaded that it was better and fitter for m e toendurethePunishment Iam doom'd tobymy Country, than to flee like a Slave or a banish'd Person. As I take it, 'tis highly ridiculous to as sign such Causes upon such an Occasion, and to rest satisfiedin them.
If itbe replied,That without Bones and Nerves, andsuchotherThings,IcouldnotdowhatImeanTheum? fi
to do5the Allegation istrue. But itsavours^>fp*jy?
thegreatestAbsurdity, to fanfiethattheseBones ornZTthey
Nerves should be the cause of m y Actions rather are at a than thechoice ofwhat isbest;andthatmy In-fi"nd-
tellect is employed on that score : For that were to sink the Difference between the Cause-, and the Thing without which the Cause could not be such. And yet the vulgar People, who take Things by hearsay, and see by other Peoples Eyes, as if they
walk'd in thick Darkness, take the true Cause of Things to be of that Nature. Pursuant to this
Notion some surround the Earth with a Vortex that _ turns eternally round, and suppose it to be fix'd in ^s0%*fon
the Centre of the Universe : Others conceive it to osAaaxi-
be a broad and large Trough, which has the Air for menes, a- itsBaseandFoundation. AndasforthePowerofntxagoras, himwho rank'danddisposedofeveryThingtoits *? e~
best advantage that is not in their view, and they
don't believe that he's intitled to any Divine Vertjue :p>;s m 1 m They fanfie they know ofa strongerand more Ira-<<theirown mortal Atlas, more capable to support all Things Judgment, And thisgoodaadimmortalTye,thatisonlyca-01T7**, pable to unite and comprehend all Things, they take ! jTML 'ani for a Chimera. ' Weakness.
Iam notoftheirmind,butwouldwillinglylist
m y self a Disciple to any that could tell m e this
Cause,letitbewhatitwill. But,sinceIcould
not compass the knowledge of it, neither by my s e l f n o r o t h e r s ? , i f y o u p l e a s e , I ' l l g i v e y o u a n A c
count of a second Trial 1 made in order to'find it. Kk3 Iam
? ? ijo
Phedon: Or, A Dialogue
Iam verydesiroustohearit,faysCebes.
After I had wearied my self in examining all things,IthoughtitmyDutytobecautiousofal- voiding what happens to those who contemplate an Eclipse of the Sun : For they lose the fight of it, without they be so careful as to view its Reflection
in Water or any other Medium. A Bycontemplatingobjeiii Thought much like to that came into
* X Sr&Vfc m Head andIfearedIwouldlose
Mnd. * rbeyoughttobelook'd
the Eyes of the Soul, it I viewed Ob- jectswiththeEyesoftheBody, orem- pWd any0fmySensesinindeavour-
uponthoughaMedium,
W tfc*Medium>>Jfei- jngtQknQW>em> jthoughtjfbaM
M
have recourse to Reason, and contem plate the Truth of all Things as reflected from it. 'Tispossiblethe Simile I useinexplainingmy self, isnotveryiast (<z);ForImy selfcannotaffirm, that he who beholds Things in the Glass of Reason, sees 'em more by Reflection and Similitude, than he who beholds'emintheirOperations. However,theway I followed was this : From that time forward I
grounded all upon the Reason that seemed to be best, and took all for Truth, that I found confor mable to it, whether in Things or Causes. And what was not conformable I rejected, as being false. I'llexplainmy meaningmoredistinctly$forIfancy
you do not yet understand me.
I'llswear, says Cebes, I do not well understand
you.
But, after all, fays Socrates, I advance no new
thing. This is no more than what I have saida" thousand times, and particularly in the foregoing Dispute : For all that I aim at , is to demonstrate what fort of Cause this is, that I sought after so carefully: Ibegin with his Qualities, which are so much talked or, and which \ take for the Founda-
(a) H e justly checks himself: for Reasons are not like other Mediums: theygiveustoknow theEssenceofThings insome measure,whichtheOperationsdonot. . . . . . ,. 4
tlOTL
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul. i? i
tion. I say then, there is something thatisgood,fine,justandgreatofit ***immaterialande- self. If you grant me this Principle, t<<TMisi>>duush*yea>>e- Z. . *. ? 1 n. i r* r ceffaryrelationtotheIm- IhopebyittodemonstratetheCause, 2rtdityoftheSo>>i-J>>cb
andmakeouttheImmortalityofthe asaCausehutottsEffetis.
jjoul.
I grant it, says Cebes : you cannot be too quick
intersecting your Demonstration.
Mind what follows , and fee if you agree to it as. J. Take it,ifthereisany thing fine,besides fineness it self, it must be such by partaking of that firstgood:andsoofalltheotherQualities. Are
you of this Opinion ?
Iam.
I protest, cotinues Socrates,. I cannot well under- nis * *>> standalltheotherlearnedCauses, thatarecommon-Irm>
Jygivenus. ButifanyManaskmewhatmakesa
thing fine, whether the liveliness of its Colours, or
the just proportion of its Parts and the like ; I wave alltheseplausibleReasons whichserve . w onlytoconfoundme;andwithoutLe- whatcom? unicatesofthe remonyorArt,makeanswer,andper- firstfinebeing,\. e. oe- hapstoosimply,thatitsfinenessisonly cordingtotheproportionof
owingtothepresence,orapproach,or Z s ^ o / ^ X communicationoftheoriginalfineBe- prstCa>>fiosallThing,. ing, whatever be the way of that com
munication. ForIamnotyetcertaininwhatman
ner it is : I only k n o w certainly, that all these fine Things are render'd such by the presence of this fine Being. WhileIstandbythisPrinciple,IreckonI capnot be deceiv'd; and I a m perswaded, that I m a y safely make answer to all Questions whatsoever, that all fine Things owe their Fineness to the presence oftheabove-mentionedBeing. Arenotyouofthe- same mind?
Yes, sure, Soerates.
Are net great and small things render'd such in likemanner? IfOnetoldyou,thatsuchathingis Kk 4 larger
? ? \
iji
Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
larger than another by the Head ; (a) would not you t h i n k t h e E x p r e s s i o n f a r f r o m b e i n g e x a c t ? , a n d w o u l d
not you make answer, that whatever is larger is render'd such by magnitude it self, and what is smal lerowesitslittlenesstolittlenessitself> Forifyou said, that such a thing is greater or smaller than anoi ther by the Head , I fancy you would fear bjjjg
censur'd, for making both the greater and MBer t h i n g t o b e s u c h b y t h e l a m e c a u s e ? , a n d b e a d e s , f o r
using such an Expression as seems to imply, that' the Head, which is a small part, makes the largnels of the greater, which in effect is a Monster ; for what can be more absurd than to lay, that a small Matter makesathinglarge> WouldnotyoufearsuchOb
jections>
. Yes, sure, replies Cebes, smiling.
By the same reason would not you be afrraid to say,thattenismorethaneight, andsurpassesitby two ? And would not you rather fay, that ten are morethaneightbyquantity> Inlikemanner,of two Cubits would not you fay, they are larger than One by magnitude, rather than by the half? For still there's the fame occasion of fear.
You fay well.
But when one is added to one, or a thing divided
into halfs, would not you avoid saying, that in the
former Case addition makes one and one two, and
In the latter division makes one thing become two?
Andwouldnotyouprotest,thatyouknownoother fat"r'iEf~cause of the existence of things, than the participa-
fZdlnr'up-tl0n? ftne essencethat'speculiar toevery subject'; onthefirst and consequently no other reason why one and one
Truth, viz. makes two, but the participation of duality, as one G"hi)h 1Sonekytneparticipationofunity? Wouldnotyou
"Jhsistl'anddiscard these additions, divisions and all the other
fromwhencetec answers, and leave 'em to those who know more it proceeds.
(a) So;rates does not condemn the receiv'd Expressions, but means tn shew, that they do not reach the Nature and Essence of Thiny j and, being always ty'd to Matter, cannot bear up to the true EiUnce that does all.
ofanim-
than
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul I$j
than you do ? And, for fear of your own Shadow,
as the Proverb goes, or rather of your Ignorance,
would not you confine your self to this Principle >
And, if any one attack'd it, would not you let it
stand without daigning him an answer, tillyou had
surveyed all the consequences , to fee if they are of
a. piece or not ? And if afterwards you should be
obligedtogiveareasonforthem, wouldnotyoudoa trueway
itby havingrecoursetosomeoftheseotherHypotbe-? ffi^s /<<,that should appear to be the best ; and so proceed ? *^/,e
from Hypothesis to Hypothesis, till you lighted upon something that satisfied you, as being a sure and
standing truth ? At the fame time you would be loth FortheEf- toperplexand confound allthings asthoseDilpu-feflsaremt tantsdo,whocallallthingsinquestion. 'Tistrue,{*-^*'\? he these Disputants perhaps are not much cqncern'd for ^J>>rea^4 t h e t r u t h ? , a n d b y t h u s m i n g l i n g a n d p e r p l e x i n g a l l E s s e n c e o f things by an effect of their profound knowledge, Ctutst- theycaresuretopleasethemselves. Butasforyou,
if you are true Philosophers, you'll do as I fay. Simmias and Cebes jointly replied, that he said
well.
Echec, Indeed, Phedon, Ithink it no wonder ; for
to m y mind, Socrates explain'd his Principles with a wonderful neatness, sufficient to make an impression upon any Man ofcommon Sense.
Phed. All the Audience thought the same.
E c h e c . E v e n w e , w h o h a v e it o n l y a t s e c o n d h a n d , finditso. Butwhatwassaidnext?
Phed. IfIremember right,afterthey had granted,sySpecies, that the Species of things have a realSubfistance^^T^
and that the things participating of their Nature, Tea" of' taketheirdenominationfromthem; then,Ifay,So-things. , crates interrogated Cebes, as follows : whichfrisist,
If your Principle be true, when you fay Simmiaj 2 * ^ ^ S islarger than Socrates and lesser than Phedon-, doe/<~j? " hot you imply, that both Magnitude and Littleness
are lodged at the fame time in Simmies I
Yes, repliesCebes,
? ? . . But
? ? 154 Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
*Tis only But do not you own, that this Proposition, Sinr
fZZprism ! fniaS 1S toS? er than Socrates, is not absolutely and in ? omparyon. ^ ^ ^ tsue ^ por ^jmmiai jS not bigger because he
isSimmicu, butbecauseheispossessedofmagnitude. Neither is he bigger than Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has littleness in the comparison withSimmias'smagnitude. NeitherisSim- tnias lesser than Phedon , because Phedon is Phedon, but because Phedon is big, when compared to Sim- mas, who islittle.
That's true.
Thus, contiues Socrates, Simmias is called both big and little, as being between two : By partaking of bigness he is bigger than Socrates, and by parta king likewise of littleness he is lesser than Phedon, Then he smil'd and said, Methinks I have insisted t o o l o n g u p o n t h e s e t h i n g s -, b u t I s h o n l d n o t h a v e
amus'd m y self with these large Strokes, had not it been to convince you more effectually of the truth ofmy Principle:for,asItakeit,notonlymagni t u d e it s e l f c a n n o t b e a t t h e s a m e t i m e b i g a n d s m a l l :
m meamubutbesides,themagnitudethatisinusdoesnotad- VwTcmtL mit ? ^ littlene*"s> and has no mind to be surpassed5 rUicZnt~f? x either the magnitude flees and yields its place
termen i>> when it fees its Enemy approaching, or else it va- tbefame rushesandperishesentirely,and,whenonceithas Suijea. reCeiv'dit,itdesirestocontinueasitis. AsI,for
instance,havingreceiv'dlittleness,while I am as youleeme,cannotbutbelittle: forthat,whichis big does never attempt to be little: A n d in like m a n nerlittlenessneverencroachesuponmagnitude. In, one word , any of the Contraries,, while it is what it is, is never to be found with its contrary -, but ei ther disappears or perishes when the other comes
in.
Cebes agreed to it: but one of the Company, I
forgot who, addressed, himself to Socrates thus : In theNameofalltheGods,didyounotfaycontrary to what you now advance? Did not you conclude upon this, that greater things take rise from the
lesser,
? ? roftheImmortality oftheSoul. rey
lefler, and the lefler from the greater ; and, in a word, that contraries do still produce their contra ries? Whereasnow,asItakeit,youalledge,that can neverbe.
Whereupon Socrates put his Head further out of
the Bed, and, having heard the Objection, said to
him, Indeed you do well to put us in mind of what
w e said 5 but you do not perceive the difference be tweentheformerandthelatter. Intheformerwe^ asserted, that every contrary owes itsbeingtoitsJEJSST contrary;And inthelatterweteach,thatacon-X ? . traryisnevercontrarytoitself,neitherinus normher">but
inthecourseofnature(a). Therewespokeofthings22 "" thathadcontraries,meaningtocalleveryoneose ?
embytheirproperNames:butherewe speakofm^attfa
such things as give a denomination to their Subiects u u cttd>
1can never whichwetoldyou,couldneveradmitoftheircon-T ,
trades. Then,turningtoCebes,didnotthisObie- ' ction, fays he, likewise give you some trouble >
N o , i n d e e d , S o c r a t e s ^ r e p l i e s C e b e s -, I c a n a s s u r e you, that few things are capable to trouble me at present;''
Then we are agreed upon this simple Proposition,
fays Socrates , that 1i contrary can never be contrary
toitself ' ? That's true, fays Cebes.
Butwhatdoyoufaytothis? IsColdandHeat
any thing ? '? Yes sure.
What, isitlikeSnow and Fire? No, sure, Socrates.
(a) That is there h(C) spoke of sensible things which have contranes,andarecapableofreceivingtheseclnS reri- procalJy asalittlethingbecomesbig,andabigthinglittle |utherehe speaksofthethingsthemselves,thliSflSfe' contranes such as cold and het, which give name to the laffinhAEe-odg'dia-bythe';ownnaTMe>and<<? S2 f W f recTng tl\VTC(? ntra"es,forcoldcanneverbe comeheat,norheatcold. Theyarealways-whattheyare.
i? **? i? i,i . ,. . ,;. . . '.
Then
? ? 156 Pfaedon : Or, A Dialogue
Hespeaksos Thenyouown,thatHeatisdifferentfromFire, %eu*ndlandColdfromSnow? .
tahed Without question, Socrates.
fromtheir Ibelieveyou'lllikewiseown, thatwhentheSnow subjects, receivesHeat,itisnomorewhatitwas,buteither
givesway, ordisappearsforgoodandall,whenthe Heatapproaches. InlikemannertheFirewillei ther yield or be extinguished when the Cold pre vailsuponitjforthenitcannotbeFireandCold together.
'Tis so, says Cebes.
There are also some contraries that not only give
,
'*Ll! i&mt^erthingsdifferentfromit,which preserve itsfi-
name to their Species -9 but likewise impart it to o-
numbers. gure and form while they have a being. For in stance, Must not an odd thing have always the fame name ?
Yes, sure.
Is that the only thing that is so called ? Or, is not
there some other thing different from it, which must needs be called by the fame name, by reason that it belongstoitsnaturenevertobewithoutodds. Fo. r
for the ter-instance, Must not the ternary number be called not narynumberQ^ byjtsownname^butlikewisebythenameof
tZ'odd anoddnumber;tho'atthefametimetobeodd and to be three are two different things? N o w such is the nature of number three, five, and all other odd numbers; each of 'em isalways odd, and yet their nature is not the fame with the nature of the odd. Inlikemanner,evennumbers,suchastwo, four, eight, are all of 'em even, tho' at the lame timetheirnatureisnotthatoftheeven. Do not
, youownthis? v? HowcanIdootherwise,Cebes?
PraymindwhatIinferfromthence. 'Tis,that not only those contraries which are incapable of re ceivingtheircontraries^butallother things which
are not opposite one to another, and yet have al
ways their contraries \ all these things, I fay, are u n c a p a b l e o f r e c e i v i n g a f o r m o p p o s i t e t o t h e i r o w n ? ,
* . , and
? ? of the Immortality of the SokU i$7
and either disappear or perish upon the appearance oftheoppositeform. Forinstance:Numberthree will sink a thousand times rather than become an evennumberwhile,itcontinuestobethree. Isit
not so?
Yes, sure, replies Cebei.
But, after aLl, fays Socrates, t w o are not contrary
to three. No, lure.
Then the contrary Species are not the only things Astwocm- that refuse admission to their contraries ; since, as ** <<>>>>? >>*
you fee, orher things that aft not contrary cannot TM J i TM abide the approach of that which has the least slia-tiJti,ty'art dow ofcontrariety. notcam*-.
That's certain. ? *>>? DoyoudesirethenthatIshoulddefine'emas
near as possible ?
Ay, withal my Heart, Socrates.
Must notContrariesbesuchthingsasgivesuchTl,edesim-
a form to that in which they are lodg'd, that it isthnfcm- not capable of giving admission to another thing that'stran"'
contrary to them ?
Howdoyoufay?
I fay as I said but now. Wherever the Idea orForm
of three is lodg'd, that thing must of necessity con tinue not only to be three but to be odd.
Whodoubtsthat?
And by consequence 'tis impossible for the Idea or Form that's contrary to its constituent Form, ever to approach.
That's a plain cafe.
Well, is not the constituent Form an odd ?
Yes.
Is not even the Form that's contrary to the odd?
Yes.
Then the Form ofeven is never lodg'd in three ? No, sure.
Then threeisuncapableofbeingeven?
Most certainly.
And that, because three is odd ?
Yes, sure N o w
? ? ij8
Phedcin:Or, A Dialogue
N o w this is the conclusion I mean'd to prove, That some things, that are not contrary to one ano- ther, are as uncapable of that other thing, as if it were truly a contrary ; as for instance, tho' three is not contrary to an even number, yet itcan never ad mitofit. Fortwobringsalwayssomethingcontrary to an odd number, like fire to cold, and several other things. Would not you agree then to this definition, that A contrary does not only refuse ad
mission to itscontrary, but likewise to that which being not contrary brings upon it something of a con trary nature, which by that fort of contrariety, de
stroys itsform *
, 1prayyouletme hearthatagain,laysCebes$for
ftis worth the while to hear it often.
I fay, number five will never be an even number -,
just as ten, which is its double, will never be oddj no more than three fourths, or a third part, or any other part of a whole will never admit of the form andideaofthewhole. Doyounotunderstandme,do youtakemeup,anddoyouagreewithwhatIfay?
I understand you ; I apprehend you to a Miracle 5 and I agree with you too.
Sinceyouunderstandme, faysSocrates;prayan- iwermeas1doyou-,thatis,answerme, notwhat t ask, but something else, according to the Idea and ExampleIhavegivenyou-,Imean, thatbesidesthe true and certainway ofanswering spoken ofalready, Ihaveyetanotherinmy viewthatspringsfrom
torthesian-thatandisfullyassure. Forinstance,ifyouask swersstill me,what itis,thatbeingintheBody, makes ithot, I ? "*e rmm I would not give you this ignorant, tho-1 sure An-
fornewque-_ i i - j T i iij siio? s,andfoswerstnat t,S"eat:butwoulddrawamoreparti-
tbtre')no cularAnswerfromwhatwehavebeenspeakingof). -nd. We an(iwouldtellyou,thatitisFire:And,ifyou
w ! hit lhould ask what il is that makes the Body fick> * re'ZrfiTM would not fay, 'twas the Disease but the Fever.
thesirstcau- I f y o u a s k m e w h a t m a k e s a N u m b e r o d d , I w o u l d fitorthe nottellyou,thatitistheodnefs,butunity,andso
("Jfri of the rest.
DoyouunderstandwhatImean? I
? ? ofthe Immortality of the Soul. ij$>>
Iunderstandyou perfectlywell, repliesCebesl
Answerme, then,continuesSocrates$what makes Redoet** theBody live? fyuseb*
TheSoul. . >*"* 1Is the Soul always the fame ? .
How shoulditbeotherwise.
Does theSoulthencarryLifealongwithitinto fill the Bodies it enters ?
Most certainly.
Is there any thing that's contrary to Life, or is there nothing ?
Yes, Death is the Contrary of Life. a, thtw
Then the Soul will never receive that which is<<>> *>mort contrarytowhatitcarriesinitsBosom? That'sa******** neceflaryConsequence from our Principles. thZ^i'edJ,
'Xis a plain Consequence, says Cebes. umthmm.
ButwhatNamedowegivetothatwhichrefuses>>w>>tiw! admission to the Idea and Form of Evenness ?
'Tisthe odd Number.
How dowecallthatwhichneverreceivesJustice, and that which never receives Good ?
The one iscalled Injustice, and the other EviL
And how do we call that which never admits of Death?
Immortal.
Does the Soul admit of Death ?
No.
(a) Then the Soul is immortaL
Most certainly.
Isthatfullydemonstrated, orwastheDemonstra
tion imperfect ?
Itisfullymade out, Socrates.
(b) If an odd Number of necessity were incorrup
tible, would not three be so too? .
0) His meaning is, that the Soul is as far from dying, a* Good from giving admission to Evil, or Justice to Injustice, <* an Odd toEven: andthattheSoulisimmortal,asne cessarily as three is odd.
(I>) If the Soul be immortal, it is incorruptible, i, t. it re sists and triumphs over all the Assaults of Death.
Whc
? ? 160
Pfiedon: Or, A Dialogue Whodoubtsit? ? ? . ? :. . . >. . -.
If whatever is without Heat were necessarily in- corruptible,wouldnotSnow, whenputt,otheFire, withdraw it self safe from the Danger? For since it cannot perisli, kmwill never receive the Heat not withstanding its being held to the Fire.
Whatyoulayistrue.
Inlikemanner, ifthatwhichisnotsusceptible of Cold, were by a natural Necessity exempted from perishing, tho1 a whole River were thrown upon the Fire, it would never go out, but, on the contrary,
. ;would come off with its full force.
There's an absolute Necessity for that, fays Ce-
ties.
? . Then of necessity we must fay the fame of what
is immortal , If that which is immortal is incorrup tible, tho' Death approach to the Soul, it shall ne ver fallin the Attack : For, as we said but now, the Soul will never receive Death, and will never die-,
j u s t as" t h r e e o r a n y o d d N u m b e r w i l l n e v e r b e e v e n ; T i r e w i l l n e v e r b e C o l d -, n o r i t s H e a t b e t u r n ' d i n t o
Coldness.
(a) Perhaps some may answer, That 'tistrue, the
odd can never become even, by the accession of what is even, while it continues odd -, but what should hinder the even to take up the room of the odd whenitcomestoperish? TothisObjection(b)it cannot be answer'd, that the odd does not perish, foritisnotincorruptible. Hadweestablish'ditsin corruptibility, we should justly have maintain'd, thatnotwithstandingtheattacksoftheeven, theodd
(a) Socratesprevents an Objection, tis. That the Soul, while it is a Soul, does not receive Death ; but, upon the approach ofDeath,itceasestobewhatitwas. Tothishegivesasa tisfactoryAnswer.
"(b) He means, that a real and sensible odd cannot become even by the arrival of an even occasioning the disappearance of the odd : for a real odd is not exempted from perishing. But the Soul is immortal, as three isodd, so that it cannot die, but continues for ever, as well as Life, Justice, the Pro portions of Numbers, an intelligible Odd, &t.
of
? ?
of Generation and Corruption. If you please I'l
tellyouwhat happen'dtomeuponthislamevery matter ? and if what I fay seem useful to you, you
shall be at liberty to make use of it to support your Sentiments.
With allmy heart,faysSimmias. <Praygweearthen,faysSocrates:InmyyouthI
SocratesinhaeLan insatiable desire to learn that Science, which tisyouth, iS caii'd Natural. Historyh for I thought it was
iWe/ *somethingGreatandDivinetoknowtheCausesof vhysicks. everything,oftheirGeneration,Death,andExistence. And I fpar'd no Pains, nor omitted any Means, for trying in the first place, if (a) a certain corruption ofhotand cold,will,assome pretend,,giveBeing and Nourishmentto Animals;ifthe. Bloodmakes
theThought;ifAiror Fire,,orthe Brain alone is
the cause of our Senses, of Seeing, Hearing, Smel
ling, &c. ifMemory and Opinion take their rise
from these Senses, and if Knowledge be the result
ofMemoryandOpinion. Then Iwantedtoknow the
causesoftheirCorruption,andextendedmy curiosity
both to the Heavens and the cavities ofthe Earth,and
would fain have known the Cause ofall thePhenome
nawemeetwith. Atlast,afteragreatdealoftrou\
ble,! foundmy selfstrangelyunqualifiedforsuchEn- ' q u i r i e s ? , a n d o f t h i s I a m a b o u t t o g i v e y o u a s e n s i
ble Proof (b) This tine study made me ib blind in
(a) Socrates said he was ignorant of all these Things, be causehe knew nothingbutSecondCauses. Nowtoknow them justly, one ought to know God, and the Vertue he di splays in Nature.
(b) Its utmost reach amounts to no more than an imper fectKnowledgeofSecondCauses. Now theseSecondCauses do not lead us into the knowledge of the Essence of Things.
A
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul. 145; intheThingsIknew more evidently before^accord-~*strange
ingtomyown and otherPersonsThoughts, that iffif'i'1"
q u i t e f o r g o t a l l t h a t I h a d k n o w n u p o n s e v e r a l S u b - - p h y f y L . - jects,particularlythatofaMan'sgrowth, {"thoughtitblind,
twas evident to the whole World , that a Man '>>st'*dof grows only by eating and drinking : For Flesh jjJjJS*
beingaddedtoFlesh^BonestoBones,and allthestanding"' other Parts joyn'd to their similar Parts by Nourish- v
m e n t , ,m a k e a s m a l l B u l k t o s w e l l a n d g r o w , s o t h a t alittleManbecomeslarge. ThiswasmyThought. x Do notyouthink'twasjust?
Yes sure, replies Cebes.
Mind what follows,fays Socrates:I thought likewise that I knew the Reason why one Man is taller than another by the Head, and one Horse higherthananother:And withreferencetoplainer and more sensible Things, I thought, for Instance, that ten was more than eight, because two were added to it ; that two Cubits were larger than One, because they contain'd one half more.
And what are your present Thoughts of those Things,fays Cebes?
I am so far, replies Socrates, from
thinking that I know the Causes of all & afterwards givfS thesethings;that,whenoneis. added ***W<<>>? /**>>/<<D<<rf<<,
to one, I do not believe I can tellwhe- theritisthatveryonetowhichthe
, . ,,,,? '.
otheris added thatbecomes twojor
whethertheoneadded,andtheoneto
which the addition was made make
:wo together > For in their separate state, each of em wasoneandnottwo;andaftertheirbeing
\. Man is so far from improving his Knowledge by them, hat he must needs own his Ignorance of the Things he pre- ended to know. All Philosophers at this day know that M o u r i s l i m e n t b y t h e m e a n s o f H e a t is t h e c a u s e o f t h e g r o w t h )fanyAnimal. Butthey'reallatalosstoknowbywhat Virtue it grows or ceases to grow, and what are the limits )fitsgrowth. What;misfortuneisitforaMantoplodall lis life-time for the knowing of nothing !
K k plac'd
JSSv T fa\h tmjmanar d , when they amidnotstewboworwhy
<>>><<andonemaketwo.
? ? 146
Phedon: Or, A Dialogae
plac'donebytheother,theybecametwo. Neither canItellhow, uponthedivisionofanything,what was formerly one becomes two, from the very mi nuteofdivision:Forthat Causeisquitecontrary to that which makes one and ohe become two.
There this ohe, and this one become two, by reason
of their being plac'd near and added, the one to
the other : But, here this one Thing becomes two by
reasonofitsdivisionandseparation. Farlessdo
I pretend to know whence this one Thing comes, and
bythisMethod (i. e. byPhysicalReasons)Ican
not findouthow theleast Thing takes rife or pe- Hemeansrifhes,orhowitexists. ButwithoutsomuchCe-
rTolrfetl remony> I mix another Method ofmy own with thefirst this,forbythisIcanlearnnothing:Havingone
cau. fe,far day heard some Body reading a Book of (b) Anaxa- exhumingg0ras\ whosaidthe DivineIntellectwasthecause
*lytZ? ? L. ? f a^ Beings, and drew 'em up in their proper
ficks. ^ Ranks and Clasies? ,I was ravish'd with Joy. I
7>obUbegin-perceiv'd there was nothing more certain than this <<<>>? /"? a-Principle, that the Intellectisthe cause ofall Be- '
naxaSoras. ifigs> Fq]. jjufllythought thattMsInteUeahaving
methodis'd all Things and rank'd 'em in their Clas ses, (c) planted every Thing in the Place and Con-
( b ) ^ i n a x a g o r a s w a s t h e first t h a t s a i d t h e I n t e l l e c t o r S p i r i t of God rank'd the Parts of Matter, and put 'em in motion. And 'twasthatPrinciplethatusher'dinhisPhysicks. This fair Exordium gave Socrates occasion to think thathe would ex-M plain allthe Secrets ofNature,by unfolding the divine VertueB difplay'duponit,andassigningtheReasonswhy everyThing! wassoandso. ButthatPhilosopherdidnotkeepup'tohis first Principle ; for he wav'd the first Cause, and inhsted on second Causes, and by so doing frustrated the expectation ot hisKeaders. ' ' .
(c) Here Socrates recals us to the first Truth, that G o d cre ated allThingsgood,and intheirbestslate;accordingto Mofcs,who fays,Godsaw allThingsthathehadmade,and be laidtheywereverygood. Now inordertoknowwhy Things arethusgood,wemustenquireintothe'Nature ofthisOri ginal Goodness, and survey the sttate they were created in. What asorrythingisPhysicksthen,thatknows nothing butsecond Causes,or rather,thatdoesnotcertainlyknow tiitfe second Cause; ?
dition
? ? bf the Imhtdrtalit) bfifre Soul 147
dition that was best and most useful for it, in which itcould best do and suffer whatever the Intellect hadallottedto it*and Iapprehended thatthe re sultof this Principle, was, that the only Thing a Man ought to look for, either for himselfor others*
1 isthisbetterandmoreusefulthing:Forhavingonce found what is best and most useful, he'll necessarily know what is worst, since there is but one Know ledge both for the one and the other.
Upon this score I was infinitely glad, that I had
foundsuchaMasterasAnaxagoras^who Ihop'd
would give a satisfactory Account of the Cause of allThings? ,and would not only tellme, for In-^f"*? *. *"<<
stance, that the Earth is broad or round, but like-yftf*fophei wifeassignthe necessaryCauseobligingittobeso:0(^JH Who wouldpointouttomewhatwasbest,andatteach: thefametimegivemetounderstandwhyitwas
so. Inlikemanner, ifheaffirm'dtheSeatofthe
Earth to be in the Centre of the World, I expected -hewould give meaReasonwhyitwasso:And, after Ishould have received sufficient Instruction from him, defign'd never to admit of any other
Causefora Principle.
I prepare some Questions, to be put to him con-
fcerningtheSun,Moon,and otherStars,inorderto know the Reasons of their Revolutions, Motions, and other Accidents, and why what each of them
? d o e s is always the best : For I could not imagine. ,
I that after he had told me, that the Intellect rank'd "them, anddrewthemupinorder,thathecou'dgiveindeed,that
me nootherreasonofthatOrderthanthis,thatitwasXw*fe&e
best. AndIflatter'dmyselfwithhopes,thatafterhe^fj^ hadaffign'dboththegeneraland particularCauses,9mthanad
he would giveme toknow, wherein the particularTnafirest Good ofeveryindividualThing,aswellasthecom-But'fVf0*
monGoodofallThingsconsists. Iwouldnothavefn*TMui;-L ? jbarted with these Hopes for all the Treasures of the
World. SoIboughthisBookswithagreatdealofIm-
? >atience;gridmade itmyBusinesstoperuse'emas Kk i ? fdori
? 148
Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
Socrates
soon as possibly I could, in order to a speedy know ledgeoftheGoodandtheEvilofallThings:But Ifound my selffrustrated ofmy mighty Hopesj for as soon as I had made a small progress in the perusal,IfoundtheAuthormade no useofthisIn tellect, and affign'd no Reason of that fine Order and Disposition ; but affign'd as Causes the Air, Whirlwinds, the Waters, and other Things equally absur'd.
ridiculesth* His whole Performance ieem'd to reach no far- ? pbysieis ther,thanifaManshouldfay,thatSocratesdoes
otfI"si a^tythe*nteHe&>andafterthat,meaningtogive TendclJfis. a Reason for all my Actions, should say, for In-
'stance, to day I am set upon my Bed,because my Body is composed of Bones and Nerves-, theBones being hard and solid, are separated by the Joints;
and the Nerves being capable to bend and unbend. ? uni. trthe themselves, tye the Bones to the Flesh, and the" ? Notionof Skin,which receivesand includesboththeoneand
<<m7<<W*the0t'ier'^at*e Bones beingdisengag'datthe 'jZsiles. 'Joints, the Nerves which bend and unbend, enable m e to fold m y Legs as you fee, and that fotiooth
isthereason thatIsitinthis Posture: Or,ifaMan pretending to assign the Cause of my present Con ferencewithyou, shouldinsistonlyupon thesecond Causes, the Voice, the Air, Hearing, and such other Things , and should take no notice of the true Cause, viz. that the Athenians thought it fit to conl demn me, and that by the same reason I thought it] fittestfor me to behere,and patiently wait the e x e c u t i o n o f - m y S e n t e n c e -, f o r I c a n s a f e l y ( a ) s w e a r that these Nerves and these Bones should long ere now have been translated to Megara, or Bceotia^ if
{a)IntheGreekitruns,ForIswearbytheDog. Lattantitu checkshimforthisOath. ButSt. Augi-stininLib. IV. Os tin trueReligion,justifieshim,asifSocratesmean'dto give thf Athenianstoknow,thatevenaDog,beingtheWorkman shiposGod, deierv'dmore Honourthan alltheIdols the' sworeby. Itmaylikewisebealledg'dthatSocratessworeb aDog, aGoose, &c. inorder to accustom Men to forbea taking the N a m e of G o d so often in vain.
th;
? ? of the Immortality ofthe Soul. 149
that had been fitter for me, and if I had not been still persuaded that it was better and fitter for m e toendurethePunishment Iam doom'd tobymy Country, than to flee like a Slave or a banish'd Person. As I take it, 'tis highly ridiculous to as sign such Causes upon such an Occasion, and to rest satisfiedin them.
If itbe replied,That without Bones and Nerves, andsuchotherThings,IcouldnotdowhatImeanTheum? fi
to do5the Allegation istrue. But itsavours^>fp*jy?
thegreatestAbsurdity, to fanfiethattheseBones ornZTthey
Nerves should be the cause of m y Actions rather are at a than thechoice ofwhat isbest;andthatmy In-fi"nd-
tellect is employed on that score : For that were to sink the Difference between the Cause-, and the Thing without which the Cause could not be such. And yet the vulgar People, who take Things by hearsay, and see by other Peoples Eyes, as if they
walk'd in thick Darkness, take the true Cause of Things to be of that Nature. Pursuant to this
Notion some surround the Earth with a Vortex that _ turns eternally round, and suppose it to be fix'd in ^s0%*fon
the Centre of the Universe : Others conceive it to osAaaxi-
be a broad and large Trough, which has the Air for menes, a- itsBaseandFoundation. AndasforthePowerofntxagoras, himwho rank'danddisposedofeveryThingtoits *? e~
best advantage that is not in their view, and they
don't believe that he's intitled to any Divine Vertjue :p>;s m 1 m They fanfie they know ofa strongerand more Ira-<<theirown mortal Atlas, more capable to support all Things Judgment, And thisgoodaadimmortalTye,thatisonlyca-01T7**, pable to unite and comprehend all Things, they take ! jTML 'ani for a Chimera. ' Weakness.
Iam notoftheirmind,butwouldwillinglylist
m y self a Disciple to any that could tell m e this
Cause,letitbewhatitwill. But,sinceIcould
not compass the knowledge of it, neither by my s e l f n o r o t h e r s ? , i f y o u p l e a s e , I ' l l g i v e y o u a n A c
count of a second Trial 1 made in order to'find it. Kk3 Iam
? ? ijo
Phedon: Or, A Dialogue
Iam verydesiroustohearit,faysCebes.
After I had wearied my self in examining all things,IthoughtitmyDutytobecautiousofal- voiding what happens to those who contemplate an Eclipse of the Sun : For they lose the fight of it, without they be so careful as to view its Reflection
in Water or any other Medium. A Bycontemplatingobjeiii Thought much like to that came into
* X Sr&Vfc m Head andIfearedIwouldlose
Mnd. * rbeyoughttobelook'd
the Eyes of the Soul, it I viewed Ob- jectswiththeEyesoftheBody, orem- pWd any0fmySensesinindeavour-
uponthoughaMedium,
W tfc*Medium>>Jfei- jngtQknQW>em> jthoughtjfbaM
M
have recourse to Reason, and contem plate the Truth of all Things as reflected from it. 'Tispossiblethe Simile I useinexplainingmy self, isnotveryiast (<z);ForImy selfcannotaffirm, that he who beholds Things in the Glass of Reason, sees 'em more by Reflection and Similitude, than he who beholds'emintheirOperations. However,theway I followed was this : From that time forward I
grounded all upon the Reason that seemed to be best, and took all for Truth, that I found confor mable to it, whether in Things or Causes. And what was not conformable I rejected, as being false. I'llexplainmy meaningmoredistinctly$forIfancy
you do not yet understand me.
I'llswear, says Cebes, I do not well understand
you.
But, after all, fays Socrates, I advance no new
thing. This is no more than what I have saida" thousand times, and particularly in the foregoing Dispute : For all that I aim at , is to demonstrate what fort of Cause this is, that I sought after so carefully: Ibegin with his Qualities, which are so much talked or, and which \ take for the Founda-
(a) H e justly checks himself: for Reasons are not like other Mediums: theygiveustoknow theEssenceofThings insome measure,whichtheOperationsdonot. . . . . . ,. 4
tlOTL
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul. i? i
tion. I say then, there is something thatisgood,fine,justandgreatofit ***immaterialande- self. If you grant me this Principle, t<<TMisi>>duush*yea>>e- Z. . *. ? 1 n. i r* r ceffaryrelationtotheIm- IhopebyittodemonstratetheCause, 2rtdityoftheSo>>i-J>>cb
andmakeouttheImmortalityofthe asaCausehutottsEffetis.
jjoul.
I grant it, says Cebes : you cannot be too quick
intersecting your Demonstration.
Mind what follows , and fee if you agree to it as. J. Take it,ifthereisany thing fine,besides fineness it self, it must be such by partaking of that firstgood:andsoofalltheotherQualities. Are
you of this Opinion ?
Iam.
I protest, cotinues Socrates,. I cannot well under- nis * *>> standalltheotherlearnedCauses, thatarecommon-Irm>
Jygivenus. ButifanyManaskmewhatmakesa
thing fine, whether the liveliness of its Colours, or
the just proportion of its Parts and the like ; I wave alltheseplausibleReasons whichserve . w onlytoconfoundme;andwithoutLe- whatcom? unicatesofthe remonyorArt,makeanswer,andper- firstfinebeing,\. e. oe- hapstoosimply,thatitsfinenessisonly cordingtotheproportionof
owingtothepresence,orapproach,or Z s ^ o / ^ X communicationoftheoriginalfineBe- prstCa>>fiosallThing,. ing, whatever be the way of that com
munication. ForIamnotyetcertaininwhatman
ner it is : I only k n o w certainly, that all these fine Things are render'd such by the presence of this fine Being. WhileIstandbythisPrinciple,IreckonI capnot be deceiv'd; and I a m perswaded, that I m a y safely make answer to all Questions whatsoever, that all fine Things owe their Fineness to the presence oftheabove-mentionedBeing. Arenotyouofthe- same mind?
Yes, sure, Soerates.
Are net great and small things render'd such in likemanner? IfOnetoldyou,thatsuchathingis Kk 4 larger
? ? \
iji
Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
larger than another by the Head ; (a) would not you t h i n k t h e E x p r e s s i o n f a r f r o m b e i n g e x a c t ? , a n d w o u l d
not you make answer, that whatever is larger is render'd such by magnitude it self, and what is smal lerowesitslittlenesstolittlenessitself> Forifyou said, that such a thing is greater or smaller than anoi ther by the Head , I fancy you would fear bjjjg
censur'd, for making both the greater and MBer t h i n g t o b e s u c h b y t h e l a m e c a u s e ? , a n d b e a d e s , f o r
using such an Expression as seems to imply, that' the Head, which is a small part, makes the largnels of the greater, which in effect is a Monster ; for what can be more absurd than to lay, that a small Matter makesathinglarge> WouldnotyoufearsuchOb
jections>
. Yes, sure, replies Cebes, smiling.
By the same reason would not you be afrraid to say,thattenismorethaneight, andsurpassesitby two ? And would not you rather fay, that ten are morethaneightbyquantity> Inlikemanner,of two Cubits would not you fay, they are larger than One by magnitude, rather than by the half? For still there's the fame occasion of fear.
You fay well.
But when one is added to one, or a thing divided
into halfs, would not you avoid saying, that in the
former Case addition makes one and one two, and
In the latter division makes one thing become two?
Andwouldnotyouprotest,thatyouknownoother fat"r'iEf~cause of the existence of things, than the participa-
fZdlnr'up-tl0n? ftne essencethat'speculiar toevery subject'; onthefirst and consequently no other reason why one and one
Truth, viz. makes two, but the participation of duality, as one G"hi)h 1Sonekytneparticipationofunity? Wouldnotyou
"Jhsistl'anddiscard these additions, divisions and all the other
fromwhencetec answers, and leave 'em to those who know more it proceeds.
(a) So;rates does not condemn the receiv'd Expressions, but means tn shew, that they do not reach the Nature and Essence of Thiny j and, being always ty'd to Matter, cannot bear up to the true EiUnce that does all.
ofanim-
than
? ? of the Immortality of the Soul I$j
than you do ? And, for fear of your own Shadow,
as the Proverb goes, or rather of your Ignorance,
would not you confine your self to this Principle >
And, if any one attack'd it, would not you let it
stand without daigning him an answer, tillyou had
surveyed all the consequences , to fee if they are of
a. piece or not ? And if afterwards you should be
obligedtogiveareasonforthem, wouldnotyoudoa trueway
itby havingrecoursetosomeoftheseotherHypotbe-? ffi^s /<<,that should appear to be the best ; and so proceed ? *^/,e
from Hypothesis to Hypothesis, till you lighted upon something that satisfied you, as being a sure and
standing truth ? At the fame time you would be loth FortheEf- toperplexand confound allthings asthoseDilpu-feflsaremt tantsdo,whocallallthingsinquestion. 'Tistrue,{*-^*'\? he these Disputants perhaps are not much cqncern'd for ^J>>rea^4 t h e t r u t h ? , a n d b y t h u s m i n g l i n g a n d p e r p l e x i n g a l l E s s e n c e o f things by an effect of their profound knowledge, Ctutst- theycaresuretopleasethemselves. Butasforyou,
if you are true Philosophers, you'll do as I fay. Simmias and Cebes jointly replied, that he said
well.
Echec, Indeed, Phedon, Ithink it no wonder ; for
to m y mind, Socrates explain'd his Principles with a wonderful neatness, sufficient to make an impression upon any Man ofcommon Sense.
Phed. All the Audience thought the same.
E c h e c . E v e n w e , w h o h a v e it o n l y a t s e c o n d h a n d , finditso. Butwhatwassaidnext?
Phed. IfIremember right,afterthey had granted,sySpecies, that the Species of things have a realSubfistance^^T^
and that the things participating of their Nature, Tea" of' taketheirdenominationfromthem; then,Ifay,So-things. , crates interrogated Cebes, as follows : whichfrisist,
If your Principle be true, when you fay Simmiaj 2 * ^ ^ S islarger than Socrates and lesser than Phedon-, doe/<~j? " hot you imply, that both Magnitude and Littleness
are lodged at the fame time in Simmies I
Yes, repliesCebes,
? ? . . But
? ? 154 Phedon : Or, A Dialogue
*Tis only But do not you own, that this Proposition, Sinr
fZZprism ! fniaS 1S toS? er than Socrates, is not absolutely and in ? omparyon. ^ ^ ^ tsue ^ por ^jmmiai jS not bigger because he
isSimmicu, butbecauseheispossessedofmagnitude. Neither is he bigger than Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has littleness in the comparison withSimmias'smagnitude. NeitherisSim- tnias lesser than Phedon , because Phedon is Phedon, but because Phedon is big, when compared to Sim- mas, who islittle.
That's true.
Thus, contiues Socrates, Simmias is called both big and little, as being between two : By partaking of bigness he is bigger than Socrates, and by parta king likewise of littleness he is lesser than Phedon, Then he smil'd and said, Methinks I have insisted t o o l o n g u p o n t h e s e t h i n g s -, b u t I s h o n l d n o t h a v e
amus'd m y self with these large Strokes, had not it been to convince you more effectually of the truth ofmy Principle:for,asItakeit,notonlymagni t u d e it s e l f c a n n o t b e a t t h e s a m e t i m e b i g a n d s m a l l :
m meamubutbesides,themagnitudethatisinusdoesnotad- VwTcmtL mit ? ^ littlene*"s> and has no mind to be surpassed5 rUicZnt~f? x either the magnitude flees and yields its place
termen i>> when it fees its Enemy approaching, or else it va- tbefame rushesandperishesentirely,and,whenonceithas Suijea. reCeiv'dit,itdesirestocontinueasitis. AsI,for
instance,havingreceiv'dlittleness,while I am as youleeme,cannotbutbelittle: forthat,whichis big does never attempt to be little: A n d in like m a n nerlittlenessneverencroachesuponmagnitude. In, one word , any of the Contraries,, while it is what it is, is never to be found with its contrary -, but ei ther disappears or perishes when the other comes
in.
Cebes agreed to it: but one of the Company, I
forgot who, addressed, himself to Socrates thus : In theNameofalltheGods,didyounotfaycontrary to what you now advance? Did not you conclude upon this, that greater things take rise from the
lesser,
? ? roftheImmortality oftheSoul. rey
lefler, and the lefler from the greater ; and, in a word, that contraries do still produce their contra ries? Whereasnow,asItakeit,youalledge,that can neverbe.
Whereupon Socrates put his Head further out of
the Bed, and, having heard the Objection, said to
him, Indeed you do well to put us in mind of what
w e said 5 but you do not perceive the difference be tweentheformerandthelatter. Intheformerwe^ asserted, that every contrary owes itsbeingtoitsJEJSST contrary;And inthelatterweteach,thatacon-X ? . traryisnevercontrarytoitself,neitherinus normher">but
inthecourseofnature(a). Therewespokeofthings22 "" thathadcontraries,meaningtocalleveryoneose ?
embytheirproperNames:butherewe speakofm^attfa
such things as give a denomination to their Subiects u u cttd>
1can never whichwetoldyou,couldneveradmitoftheircon-T ,
trades. Then,turningtoCebes,didnotthisObie- ' ction, fays he, likewise give you some trouble >
N o , i n d e e d , S o c r a t e s ^ r e p l i e s C e b e s -, I c a n a s s u r e you, that few things are capable to trouble me at present;''
Then we are agreed upon this simple Proposition,
fays Socrates , that 1i contrary can never be contrary
toitself ' ? That's true, fays Cebes.
Butwhatdoyoufaytothis? IsColdandHeat
any thing ? '? Yes sure.
What, isitlikeSnow and Fire? No, sure, Socrates.
(a) That is there h(C) spoke of sensible things which have contranes,andarecapableofreceivingtheseclnS reri- procalJy asalittlethingbecomesbig,andabigthinglittle |utherehe speaksofthethingsthemselves,thliSflSfe' contranes such as cold and het, which give name to the laffinhAEe-odg'dia-bythe';ownnaTMe>and<<? S2 f W f recTng tl\VTC(? ntra"es,forcoldcanneverbe comeheat,norheatcold. Theyarealways-whattheyare.
i? **? i? i,i . ,. . ,;. . . '.
Then
? ? 156 Pfaedon : Or, A Dialogue
Hespeaksos Thenyouown,thatHeatisdifferentfromFire, %eu*ndlandColdfromSnow? .
tahed Without question, Socrates.
fromtheir Ibelieveyou'lllikewiseown, thatwhentheSnow subjects, receivesHeat,itisnomorewhatitwas,buteither
givesway, ordisappearsforgoodandall,whenthe Heatapproaches. InlikemannertheFirewillei ther yield or be extinguished when the Cold pre vailsuponitjforthenitcannotbeFireandCold together.
'Tis so, says Cebes.
There are also some contraries that not only give
,
'*Ll! i&mt^erthingsdifferentfromit,which preserve itsfi-
name to their Species -9 but likewise impart it to o-
numbers. gure and form while they have a being. For in stance, Must not an odd thing have always the fame name ?
Yes, sure.
Is that the only thing that is so called ? Or, is not
there some other thing different from it, which must needs be called by the fame name, by reason that it belongstoitsnaturenevertobewithoutodds. Fo. r
for the ter-instance, Must not the ternary number be called not narynumberQ^ byjtsownname^butlikewisebythenameof
tZ'odd anoddnumber;tho'atthefametimetobeodd and to be three are two different things? N o w such is the nature of number three, five, and all other odd numbers; each of 'em isalways odd, and yet their nature is not the fame with the nature of the odd. Inlikemanner,evennumbers,suchastwo, four, eight, are all of 'em even, tho' at the lame timetheirnatureisnotthatoftheeven. Do not
, youownthis? v? HowcanIdootherwise,Cebes?
PraymindwhatIinferfromthence. 'Tis,that not only those contraries which are incapable of re ceivingtheircontraries^butallother things which
are not opposite one to another, and yet have al
ways their contraries \ all these things, I fay, are u n c a p a b l e o f r e c e i v i n g a f o r m o p p o s i t e t o t h e i r o w n ? ,
* . , and
? ? of the Immortality of the SokU i$7
and either disappear or perish upon the appearance oftheoppositeform. Forinstance:Numberthree will sink a thousand times rather than become an evennumberwhile,itcontinuestobethree. Isit
not so?
Yes, sure, replies Cebei.
But, after aLl, fays Socrates, t w o are not contrary
to three. No, lure.
Then the contrary Species are not the only things Astwocm- that refuse admission to their contraries ; since, as ** <<>>>>? >>*
you fee, orher things that aft not contrary cannot TM J i TM abide the approach of that which has the least slia-tiJti,ty'art dow ofcontrariety. notcam*-.
That's certain. ? *>>? DoyoudesirethenthatIshoulddefine'emas
near as possible ?
Ay, withal my Heart, Socrates.
Must notContrariesbesuchthingsasgivesuchTl,edesim-
a form to that in which they are lodg'd, that it isthnfcm- not capable of giving admission to another thing that'stran"'
contrary to them ?
Howdoyoufay?
I fay as I said but now. Wherever the Idea orForm
of three is lodg'd, that thing must of necessity con tinue not only to be three but to be odd.
Whodoubtsthat?
And by consequence 'tis impossible for the Idea or Form that's contrary to its constituent Form, ever to approach.
That's a plain cafe.
Well, is not the constituent Form an odd ?
Yes.
Is not even the Form that's contrary to the odd?
Yes.
Then the Form ofeven is never lodg'd in three ? No, sure.
Then threeisuncapableofbeingeven?
Most certainly.
And that, because three is odd ?
Yes, sure N o w
? ? ij8
Phedcin:Or, A Dialogue
N o w this is the conclusion I mean'd to prove, That some things, that are not contrary to one ano- ther, are as uncapable of that other thing, as if it were truly a contrary ; as for instance, tho' three is not contrary to an even number, yet itcan never ad mitofit. Fortwobringsalwayssomethingcontrary to an odd number, like fire to cold, and several other things. Would not you agree then to this definition, that A contrary does not only refuse ad
mission to itscontrary, but likewise to that which being not contrary brings upon it something of a con trary nature, which by that fort of contrariety, de
stroys itsform *
, 1prayyouletme hearthatagain,laysCebes$for
ftis worth the while to hear it often.
I fay, number five will never be an even number -,
just as ten, which is its double, will never be oddj no more than three fourths, or a third part, or any other part of a whole will never admit of the form andideaofthewhole. Doyounotunderstandme,do youtakemeup,anddoyouagreewithwhatIfay?
I understand you ; I apprehend you to a Miracle 5 and I agree with you too.
Sinceyouunderstandme, faysSocrates;prayan- iwermeas1doyou-,thatis,answerme, notwhat t ask, but something else, according to the Idea and ExampleIhavegivenyou-,Imean, thatbesidesthe true and certainway ofanswering spoken ofalready, Ihaveyetanotherinmy viewthatspringsfrom
torthesian-thatandisfullyassure. Forinstance,ifyouask swersstill me,what itis,thatbeingintheBody, makes ithot, I ? "*e rmm I would not give you this ignorant, tho-1 sure An-
fornewque-_ i i - j T i iij siio? s,andfoswerstnat t,S"eat:butwoulddrawamoreparti-
tbtre')no cularAnswerfromwhatwehavebeenspeakingof). -nd. We an(iwouldtellyou,thatitisFire:And,ifyou
w ! hit lhould ask what il is that makes the Body fick> * re'ZrfiTM would not fay, 'twas the Disease but the Fever.
thesirstcau- I f y o u a s k m e w h a t m a k e s a N u m b e r o d d , I w o u l d fitorthe nottellyou,thatitistheodnefs,butunity,andso
("Jfri of the rest.
DoyouunderstandwhatImean? I
? ? ofthe Immortality of the Soul. ij$>>
Iunderstandyou perfectlywell, repliesCebesl
Answerme, then,continuesSocrates$what makes Redoet** theBody live? fyuseb*
TheSoul. . >*"* 1Is the Soul always the fame ? .
How shoulditbeotherwise.
Does theSoulthencarryLifealongwithitinto fill the Bodies it enters ?
Most certainly.
Is there any thing that's contrary to Life, or is there nothing ?
Yes, Death is the Contrary of Life. a, thtw
Then the Soul will never receive that which is<<>> *>mort contrarytowhatitcarriesinitsBosom? That'sa******** neceflaryConsequence from our Principles. thZ^i'edJ,
'Xis a plain Consequence, says Cebes. umthmm.
ButwhatNamedowegivetothatwhichrefuses>>w>>tiw! admission to the Idea and Form of Evenness ?
'Tisthe odd Number.
How dowecallthatwhichneverreceivesJustice, and that which never receives Good ?
The one iscalled Injustice, and the other EviL
And how do we call that which never admits of Death?
Immortal.
Does the Soul admit of Death ?
No.
(a) Then the Soul is immortaL
Most certainly.
Isthatfullydemonstrated, orwastheDemonstra
tion imperfect ?
Itisfullymade out, Socrates.
(b) If an odd Number of necessity were incorrup
tible, would not three be so too? .
0) His meaning is, that the Soul is as far from dying, a* Good from giving admission to Evil, or Justice to Injustice, <* an Odd toEven: andthattheSoulisimmortal,asne cessarily as three is odd.
(I>) If the Soul be immortal, it is incorruptible, i, t. it re sists and triumphs over all the Assaults of Death.
Whc
? ? 160
Pfiedon: Or, A Dialogue Whodoubtsit? ? ? . ? :. . . >. . -.
If whatever is without Heat were necessarily in- corruptible,wouldnotSnow, whenputt,otheFire, withdraw it self safe from the Danger? For since it cannot perisli, kmwill never receive the Heat not withstanding its being held to the Fire.
Whatyoulayistrue.
Inlikemanner, ifthatwhichisnotsusceptible of Cold, were by a natural Necessity exempted from perishing, tho1 a whole River were thrown upon the Fire, it would never go out, but, on the contrary,
. ;would come off with its full force.
There's an absolute Necessity for that, fays Ce-
ties.
? . Then of necessity we must fay the fame of what
is immortal , If that which is immortal is incorrup tible, tho' Death approach to the Soul, it shall ne ver fallin the Attack : For, as we said but now, the Soul will never receive Death, and will never die-,
j u s t as" t h r e e o r a n y o d d N u m b e r w i l l n e v e r b e e v e n ; T i r e w i l l n e v e r b e C o l d -, n o r i t s H e a t b e t u r n ' d i n t o
Coldness.
(a) Perhaps some may answer, That 'tistrue, the
odd can never become even, by the accession of what is even, while it continues odd -, but what should hinder the even to take up the room of the odd whenitcomestoperish? TothisObjection(b)it cannot be answer'd, that the odd does not perish, foritisnotincorruptible. Hadweestablish'ditsin corruptibility, we should justly have maintain'd, thatnotwithstandingtheattacksoftheeven, theodd
(a) Socratesprevents an Objection, tis. That the Soul, while it is a Soul, does not receive Death ; but, upon the approach ofDeath,itceasestobewhatitwas. Tothishegivesasa tisfactoryAnswer.
"(b) He means, that a real and sensible odd cannot become even by the arrival of an even occasioning the disappearance of the odd : for a real odd is not exempted from perishing. But the Soul is immortal, as three isodd, so that it cannot die, but continues for ever, as well as Life, Justice, the Pro portions of Numbers, an intelligible Odd, &t.
of
? ?
