The gross revenue of 1860–1
amounted
to £43,000,000.
Cambridge History of India - v4 - Indian Empire
The famine
was followed by searching enquiries from a commission presided over
by Sir James Lyall, ex-lieutenant-governor of the Panjab, who found
it most difficult to compare degrees of distress with those observed
· Raleigh, Lord Curzon in India, p. 386.
1
## p. 307 (#345) ############################################
THE FAMINE OF 1900
307
in previous famines as conditions had largely altered with expansion
of railways. But improved supervision and organisation had certainly
reduced the cost of relief to a figure below that which might have
been anticipated. The commission adhered largely to the views
expressed by their predecessors in 1880, suggesting alterations which
were designed to impart greater flexibility to the maxims then adopted.
They observed:
It may be said of India as a whole that of late years, owing to high prices, there
has been a considerable increase in the incomes of the landholding and cultivating
classes, and their standard of comfort and expenditure has also risen. With the rise
in transfer-value of their holdings, their credit also has expanded. During recent
famines they have shown greater powers of resistance. The poorer professional
classes suffer severely from rise of prices but do not come on relief. The wages of
day labourers and skilled artisans have no risen. The rise in prices of food has not
been accompanied by a rise in the wages of labour. On the contrary, as com-
petition falls off, the rate of wages offered falls frequently below the customary
rate. '
Before the proposals of the 1898 commission had been fully con-
sidered by the government, India was visited by a drought the greatest
in extent and intensity which she had experienced for 200 years. The
area affected amounted to over 400,000 square miles with a popula-
tion of about sixty millions, of whom twenty-five millions belonged
to British India and the remainder to Indian states. It embraced the
greater part of the Bombay Presidency, the Central Provinces, Berar
and much of the Panjab, the states of Kathiawar and Rajputana, the
Nizam's dominions, Baroda and the Central Indian principalities.
The loss in crops alone amounted to £50,000,000 in British India and
£30,000,000 in the Indian states. Water supplies shrank considerably;
and a fodder famine on an enormous scale was followed by a positive
devastation of all kinds of cattle. Some of the tracts which had suffered
in 1896–7 suffered even more now. Speaking to his legislative council
on 19 October, 1900, the viceroy estimated that one-fourth of the
entire population of India had come to a greater or less degree within
the radius of relief operations. Lord Curzon had followed relief
measures with devoted attention, touring in the worst districts of
Gujarat, one of the areas most afflicted, in the fierce heat of July, 1900.
By that time, as he said, famine had brought "its familiar attendant
Furies in its train, and cholera, dysentery and fever had fallen upon
already exhausted and enfeebled population”. ?
The relief campaign-was conducted on a very liberal scale. The
ratio of relief in June and July, 1900, was 18 per cent. in the famine-
stricken area of British India as compared with 10 per cent. in 1897;
637 public officials were specially deputed to famine duty from civil
and military cmploy; provinces not affected were scoured for the loan
of men. Revenue was freely suspended and remitted. Large loans
i Famine Commission's Report, p. 363.
• Raleigh, op. cit. pp. 375, 404. °CF. Ronaldshay, Life of Curzon, vol. 11, chap. v.
20-2
## p. 308 (#346) ############################################
308
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FAMINE POLICY
were made to the Indian states as well as to land-holders and culti-
vators in British territory. Following the advice of the 1898 com-
mission, the government adapted its relief system more dexterously
to varying circumstances. In British India there was an excess
mortality of 750,000 persons, 230,000 of whom at least died of cholera
and smallpox. Fever also claimed its victims. All the figures included
immigrants from Indian states where, in spite of many bright examples
of benevolence and humanity, the standard of relief generally was
lower than that in British territory; 140 lakhs of rupees (nearly
£1,000,000 sterling) were contributed for charitable relief, of which
881 lakhs came from the United Kingdom. In 1896–7 the United
Kingdom had given 123 out of 137 lakhs. Australia, the Straits
Settlement, Ceylon and Hongkong, the United States of America,
Berlin, had also subscribed. From the 137 lakhs distributed by the
Central Relief Committee ui went to purchasing cattle, seed and
subsistence for peasants in British territory who were not reached by
the government loans. Fifty lakhs were given for similar purposes to
the Indian states. In 1900 the rains were satisfactory; prospects
rapidly mended; revenue was remitted on a liberal scale; another
commission was appointed to investigate particular questions in
the light of recent experiences. A famine, Lord Curzon said, was a
natural visitation in its origin, but should be a very business-like
proceeding when once it had started. More should be done by way
of precaution. District programmes of relief could be prepared with
greater method and should not be considered complete until every
possible scheme of irrigation or water-storage had been examined.
So terrible an incident as this famine was “an abiding landmark in
the history of the Indian people”, and imposed very heavy responsi-
bility upon the government.
The commission then appointed met under the presidency of
Sir Anthony (afterwards Lord) MacDonnell, who had steered the
United Provinces with distinguished success through the recent
famine. Their report published in 1901 clearly summarised accepted
principles of relief, suggesting variations. They emphasised the benefits
of a policy of “moral strategy”, early ascertainment and publication
of suspensions of revenue and rents, early distribution of advances for
purchase of seed and cattle and the sinking of temporary wells. They
advocated the appointment of a famine commissioner in a province
where relief operations promised to be extensive. They recommended
stricter regulation of famine relief in certain respects, efforts to enlist
non-official assistance on a larger scale, and preference in particular
circumstances of village works to the large public works which had
hitherto been the backbone of relief schemes. These suggestions com-
mended themselves to the central government and bore fruit in the
provincial famine codes. The commission also advised a considerable
increase in rolling stock at the cost if necessary of the famine insurance
a
## p. 309 (#347) ############################################
THE MACDONNELL COMMISSION
309
grant. The railways, they said, had been unable to carry much of the
food and fodder offered to them during the famine. The central
government, however, held that possibly the unavoidable limitations
in the carrying capacity of the lines was the main cause of blocks in
traffic.
The commission dealt fully with allegations that the land-revenue
demand was excessive and gave reasons for holding it to be very low
in comparison with the share of the produce to which the government
was traditionally entitled. 1 But they considered that as the savings
of good years were often rapidly spent, more indulgence in collection
should be shown in bad years. Agricultural banks should be estab-
lished; irrigation works should be pushed on; water-storage must be
more sedulously encouraged; measures should be taken to foster
improved methods of agriculture.
The development of village credit associations and the practica-
bility of a wide extension of irrigation had already been engaging the
government's attention. No time was lost in considering and acting
on the other recommendations of the commission. Before Lord
Curzon left India he had done more to prevent and combat famine,
than any two of his predecessors or successors.
The last considerable famine of our period visited the United
Provinces in 1907-8 and disclosed some changes in economic con-
ditions. In consequence of a failure of the south-west monsoon of
1907, which averaged only one-third to one-quarter of the normal
fall and came as a climax to more than one bad or indifferent season,
the loss of autumn food grains was estimated as approximating in
value to £4,000,000. Industrial staples suffered even more. The actual
failure of the autumn harvest was greater than and that of the spring
harvest was as great as the losses in 1896–7. The range of prices was
higher. The situation was not relieved, as in 1896, by an unusually
early fall of winter rain. Yet on 25 January, 1908, the lieutenant-
governor, Sir John Hewett, was able to describe the situation in the
following terms:
Why if the provinces have suffered so much as this, do we not see the outward
signs that are associated with famine? Why are we not brought into contact with
people in a state of emaciation? Why do we not see bodies of persons in search of
work? Why do the crime statistics of the province not show a serious rise? Why
again if the calamity of to-day is so like that of eleven years ago, do we find such
a change in the statistics of famine relief? Let us compare the figures for the two
periods. By this time in 1897 there were 16 districts in which famine relief was in
full swing while 24 were under observation and test; there were 480,000 persons
actually on relief works, 43,000 on test-works, 123,000 being relieved as dependents
of workers, 98,000 in receipt of gratuitous relief in their houses and 51,000 in poor-
houses; in all some 796,000 persons were relieved. At the present time there are
311,000 persons receiving different forms of relief. There are only 13 districts that
have been declared famine districts, and the workers on relief works number
152,000. We have in districts in which test-works are opened, but these are
· Cf. resolution by the governor-general in council, 16 January, 1902, published in
the Gazette of India, 18 January, 1902.
## p. 310 (#348) ############################################
310
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FAMINE POLICY
attracting only about 5000 persons. We have 29,000 dependents of workers being
relieved on works. On the other hand we have 26 districts as compared with 34 in
1897, in which gratuitous relief is being given to persons at their homes and the
number in receipt of such relief in their homes is actually larger than it was in 1897.
The character of relief has undergone a considerable change. . . . The causes of
this change of policy must be sought for in the changed circumstances of the present
time.
The changed circumstances were mainly, these: not only had
railway mileage in the provinces increased 35 per cent. within eleven
years; not only had canal irrigation expanded to an equally marked
extent, but an established era of higher pricts had brought a con-
siderable rise in wages. Employment too had increased. Government
expenditure on all forms of public works had been very large; and
the industrial and building operations of the general public had
greatly extended. The labouring classes had become far less dependent
on agriculture than thcy had been in the past. Emigration had
very greatly increased, both overseas to British colonies and inland
to mills and factories in Calcutta and other commercial centres.
Increasing amounts of money had been received through postal orders
from abroad for payment to residents of certain eastern districts now
famine-stricken. In some districts the value of the postal orders
received from abroad exceeded the total land-revenue demand.
Labour was yearly becoming dearer and the cultivating classes were
better off. But the high prices of food grains, while benefiting agri-
culturists, were pressing heavily upon dwellers in towns with fixed
incomes. And so it was that while the calamity of 1907–8 was far
less a labourer's famine than had been anticipated, gratuitous relief
was distributed widely in circumstances not contemplated by the
MacDonnell commission who had allowed for it only in tracts where
relief works had been started.
As soon as the failure of the monsoon became apparent, the local
government had adopted whole-heartedly the policy of moral strategy
recommended by the MacDonnell commission. The late Sir John
Campbell was appointed famine commissioner. Prompt assistance
was given by extremely liberal money advances for the preparation,
sowing and irrigation of the winter crops, and by the announcement
of large remissions and suspensions of the autumn instalments of land-
revenue. All these measures gave heart to the people, mitigated
restriction of credit, provided occupation in the villages at remunera-
tive rates of wages and prevented a rise in crime. The winter rains
arrived late; and there was a much greater and more continuous
demand for labour for irrigating the young winter crops than there
had been in 1896–7, a circumstance which contributed to keep down
the numbers on relief works. When the latter were opened, village
works managed either by district officers or by landlords, assisted by
partly repayable grants, took, as far as possible, the place of large
relief works under the management of the engineers of the public
## p. 311 (#349) ############################################
THE SCARCITY OF 1918
311
works department. When the hot weather of 1908 began every effort
was made to continue these arrangements in order to avoid the
crowding and risks of epidemic disease which large works involve and
to bring relief as near to the homes of the cultivators as possible. The
total number of persons on relief of all kinds on 14 March, 1908, at
the commencement of the spring harvest was 1,411,576 of whom
1,040,476 were on works, 369,344 were receiving gratuitous assistance
and 1756 were weavers who from the nature of their occupation
needed special kind of help. After the spring hạrvest the numbers on
relief considerably declined. The monsoon of 1908 broke early and
soon enabled operations to be closed. The provincial death-rate from
September, 1907, to July, 1908, was 36. 47 against a normal figure of
32. 59. The principal causes of death were fever, cholera, and small-
pox. The total cost of famine relief was £2,135,000. The local govern-
ment was congratulated by the central government on “the foresight
displayed at each stage, on the promptitude and efficiency of action
taken, and on the success which attended it".
The next period of stress began ten years later, when India had
reached the beginning of the fifth year of the great war. From 1913
she had been favoured by good monsoons; but in 1917 the shortage
of shipping and the shrinkage of rolling stock owing to military
demands, had produced some disastrous results. The cultivators could
not market their grain satisfactorily and had to pay dearly for im-
ported commodities such as spices, oilcloth, kcrosine and salt. In
large towns foodstuffs and indeed all commodities became much
dcarer. The position of the labouring classes deteriorated although
wages had risen. Early in 1918 came the German offensive in the
West, the raising of a large additional body of Indian troops, and a
great effort to meet the increased demand for army supplies and
munitions of war. Foodstuffs were purchased by the government on
a large scale; and before long the rise of prices was intensified by the
weakness of the south-west monsoon all over the sub-continent.
Prolonged breaks damaged the crops, and the rainfall was 19 per cent.
below the average. An extremely severe, widespread and deadly
epidemic of influenza added to general distress. From the beginning
of the war the government had been compelled to interfere with the
normal course of trade for the purpose of satisfying the needs of India,
the Empire and the Allies, of controlling dealings with neutral
countries and of prohibiting traffic with enemy countrics. Early in
November, 1918, the Armistice enabled them to apply to the relief
of distress in India machinery contrived for the purchase and ship-
ment of rice from Burma. Through the Home Government they
arranged for purchases of wheat from Australia to tide over the
interval which must elapse before the spring crops of 1919 came into
the market; and they prohibited export of food grains from India
1 See Moral and Material Progress Report, 1917-18, p. 91.
## p. 312 (#350) ############################################
312
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FAMINE POLICY
6
3
except in very small quantities and for exceptionally strong reasons.
All these measures, combined with the fact that for ten years the
monsoons had been generally kind, carried the country through a
critical time. Relief measures were taken under the Famine Codes
but never at any time did the number of relieved exceed 600,000.
Distress ended with the abundant rains of 1919. The author of India
in
1920
observes that the manner in which the crisis was surmounted
showed increased powers of resistance among the masses, although
the high range of prices must have caused much silent suffering.
Experiences since 1919 point to the conclusion that agricultural
labour is in a stronger and more independent position than it was at
the beginning of this century; but the high prices of modern times
have hit the middle or professional classes hard. “With their small
fixed incomes, their large families and their increasing expenditure,
they have of late years passed through a very disadvantageous epoch”,?
a circumstance which has stimulated political unrest.
Our tale is told. Twenty-four years ago Lord Curzon said to his
legislative council: 3
We may compete and struggle with Nature, we may prepare for her worst
assaults, and we may reduce her violence when delivered. Some day perhaps when
our railway system has overspread the entire Indian continent, when water storage
and irrigation are even further developed, when we have raised the general level
of social comfort and prosperity, and when auvancing civilisation has diffused the
lessons of thrift in domestic expenditure and greater self-denial and control, we
shall obtain the mastery. But that will not be yet. In the meantime the duty of the
government has been to profit to the full by the lessons of the latest calamity and
to take such precautionary steps over the whole field of possible action as to prepare
ourselves to combat the next.
Time has gone on since these words were uttered; the Indian railway
system has been widely extended; water-storage and irrigation have
greatly developed; in 1904 an act was passed authorising the forma-
tion of co-operative credit societies, and in 1919 there were 31,800
agricultural credit societies in British India with a total working
capital of nearly £6,000,000; provincial departments of agriculture
have for years been working with a Central Research Institute at
Pusa in Bihar to evolve and distribute better strains of existing crops;
education has become more widely diffused; emigration has lessened
the pressure on some congested areas;' altogether there is reason to
conclude that substantial progress has been made toward the goal to
which Lord Curzon directed untiring thought and endeavour. The
way, however, is difficult, for between 1881 and 1921 the population
of India rose from 253,000,000 to 319,000,000, and we cannot doubt
· See speech by the under-secretary of state for India, 8 July, 1927, Hansard, pp.
1659-60.
India in 1924-5, p. 233.
• Seventh Budget Speech, 29 March, 1905.
! Of late years, however, it has considerably declined for reasons apparent from the
publication India in 1923-4, pp. 18, 19.
• Of this total 247,000,000 belonged to British India and 72,000,000 to native states.
Between 1921 and 1931 the increase was 10-2 per cent.
## p. 313 (#351) ############################################
THE OUTLOOK
313
that it is rising still or that it will always be essentially rural. Famines
will come from time to time but will not result from a single failure
of crops, and will be rather work famines than food famines. They
will be periods of unemployment on a scale to call for statc relief;
and it will always be necessary for the state to see that the helpless and
destitute are not left to starve. But we may surely think that the day
of isolated experiments and costly blunders has for ever passed. Out
of failures and disappointments has come a broad, deliberate and
well-tested policy, a matured and effective plan of campaign. None
the less will it always be essential that such campaigns should be con-
ducted by devoted and efficient public services, by men equal not
only to the ordinary tasks of administration but to those extra tasks
which are imposed by grave emergencies. To the old battles with
famine many have devoted themselves with unsparing energy, two
notable viceroys, British and Indian officials, missionaries of various
Christian denominations. Some have fallen by the way without a
murmur. 1 May their successors carry on that high tradition!
1 "There stands by the roadside at Jubbalpore a cross with this inscription:
"To the memory of the officers of the Central Provinces who sacrificed their lives to their
duty in the struggle to save life during the great famine of 1896–1897'.
“On the reverse side are the names of five members of the Indian Civil Service, one
executive engineer, one police officer, and two licutenants of the Indian army. "
Holland, The Indian Outlook, p. 137.
a
## p. 314 (#352) ############################################
CHAPTER XVIII
THE FINANCES OF INDIA
1858-1918
The transfer of the government of India from the East India
Company to the crown brought with it wide-reaching changes in the
financial system of India. By the act of 18581 it was provided that the
expenditure of the revenues of India should be subject to the control
of the secretary of state in council, and that no grant or appropria-
tion of any part of such revenues should be made without the con-
currence of a majority of votes at the meeting of the council. Though
limited discretionary powers of incurring expenditure were delegated
to the Government of India, the regulations of this act placed on the
secretary of state and his council the final responsibility for the ad-
ministration of finances. In India, the somewhat antiquated financial
machinery had almost broken down under the strain of the Mutiny.
In the reconstruction which followed there was a noticeable tendency
to bring the organisation and procedure into closer conformity with
English practice. The management of the finances had been hitherto
in the collective charge of the governor-general and his council, who
exercised a control, that at times had not proved very effective, over
the expenditure of the presidency governments. In 1859 the first
finance minister was appointed and assumed control over all branches
of public accounts. The whole administration of finance was vested
in the central government, the provincial governments becoming, as
regards expenditure, merely administrative agencies and having no
power of spending without sanction the revenue they collected. Phe
budget system was introduced, the English model of preparing the
accounts being in general followed. The first budget was presented
for the year 1860–1 (the Indian financial year ending 31 March), to be
followed in due course by annual statements showing closed accounts.
The main preoccupations of the financial advisers of the Government
of India between the years 1859 and 1873—which forms the first
stage in the history of the period dealt with-were, after restoring
order in the public accounts, to balance income and expenditure,
and, subsequently, to meet endless demands for improved adminis-
tration and for the economic development of the country. The
Mutiny had involved the government in serious embarrassments.
Some of the sources of revenue had been wholly or partially cut off,
and the heavy military expenditure had been met by constant
borrowings. In all, over £42,000,000 had been added to the debt,
1 21 & 22 Vic. c. 108.
## p. 315 (#353) ############################################
REORGANISATION
315
and the accounts statement of 1859-60 showed a deficit of £7,250,000.
The total debt, which was largely a legacy of the numerous wars in
which the East India Company had been engaged, amounted to
about £98,000,000. The state of Indian finances had excited some
apprehension in England, and it was decided to appoint an ex-
perienced English financier to their charge. The choice fell on James
Wilson, to whom the credit for the reforms carried out was largely
due. Under his guidance, drastic reductions were effected in civil
and military expenditure, while the revenues were enhanced by the
imposition of an income-tax for a period of five years. With prosperous
seasons, the finances rapidly improved and, by 1864, the deficit
disappeared from the budget.
The gross revenue of 1860–1 amounted to £43,000,000. This
income was derived largely from sources which differed materially
from those most common in European countries, a fact which ac-
counted for some of the peculiar features of Indian finance. Under
the revenue system which the government had inherited from its
predecessors the main productive sources, the land-revenue and
opium, were not derived from taxation: of the taxation heads the
chief contributory was the salt monopoly; the ordinary excise,
customs and stamps being comparatively unimportant. Direct taxa-
tion was at first only intermittently imposed. Though an income of
this nature imposed a lighter burden on the public, it was less stable
and more costly to realise than that of countries relying in a greater
measure on taxation for their revenues. The fate of the budget
depended on the course of the monsoon. If the rainfall were favour-
able, the necessarily cautious anticipations of revenue were, more than
realised: if unfavourable, the returns from heads such as land-revenue,
opium and salt fell off, and the estimated surplus was converted to
a deficit, often swollen by the extraordinary expenditure called for
by measures of famine relief.
The mainstay of the finances was the land-revenue, which, in 1860,
contributed over 40 per cent. to the total of the gross revenues. From
time immemorial the ruling power in India had been entitled to a
share in the produce of the land. Where there was an intervening
landlord, the Government of India exercised its right by taking a
portion of the rent paid by the tenant. Where the settlement was made
direct with peasant proprietors, it took, as a rule, a portion, either of
the estimated net produce of the land, or of the rental accepted as
fair for the class of soil. The land-revenue, except in permanently
settled tracts, was revised periodically, usually after thirty years, when
an assessment was imposed on land brought under cultivation in the
interim, or an enhancement made in the rate of assessment, if justified
by a rise in rents, or an increase in the value of agricultural produce.
1 Cf. Bastable, Public Finance, bk 11, chap. v.
* Baden Powell, Land Systerns of British India, vol. 11, chaps. i and ii, vol. in, chap. ii.
## p. 316 (#354) ############################################
316
THE FINANCES OF INDIA, 1858–1918
a
The position of part proprietor thus occupied, however historically
or economically justifiable, in practice exposed the state to constant
pressure to reduce its claims. The material condition of the small
holders, due mainly to the density of population and excessive sub-
division of the land, in itself called for caution in enforcing enhance-
ments. There was consequently a tendencytowards greater moderation
in revising the assessments, so as to leave in the hands of the cul-
tivators a larger portion of the profits of their holdings. Though the
income from land-revenue shows a fairly steady increase, it was not
in proportion to the rise in the rental value of the land. The ratio of
land-revenue to the total gross income of the state gradually diminished
and at the beginning of the present century had fallen to 25 per cent.
Next in importance was the opium revenue, derived from profits of
the state monopoly of the sale of the drug to China and other coun-
tries, the revenue from opium sold in India being treated as excise. 1
The receipts under the former head were of a fluctuating nature,
depending on the character of the crop in India and the price of the
drug in China. The gross income, too, was subject to material de-
ductions, arising out of the purchase of the raw article and its manu-
facture for export. Though the maintenance of the traffic in opium
with China was subject to frequent attack, it survived in much the
same form until 1907, when an agreement was entered into with the
Chinese Government under which that government undertook to
suppress the cultivation of the opium poppy within a period of ten
years, while the Government of India consented to the extinction of
the import of opium into China within the same period.
Of the revenues derived from taxation the salt duty was the most
remunerative. Being an article of local production in certain parts
of India, the tax varied in its incidence and method of collection.
With the improvement of inland communications, the diversity in
rates encouraged smuggling from lower to higher taxed areas, the
suppression of which called for a great increase in the preventive staff
and so reduced the net receipts. The problem was not satisfactorily
solved until the Government of India was able to obtain control of
the most important sources of supply in the native states. The estab-
lishment of state factories at which salt was sold at a price that in-
cluded the duty rendered it possible to abolish the expensive inland
customs line and fix a uniform rate for all India. The equalisation of
the salt duties was completed in 1882, when a single rate of Rs. 2 per
maund (82 lbs. ) was levied, representing an annual tax of about 5d.
per head of population. There were frequent fluctuations in the rate
of duty imposed, but, generally speaking, the tax was raised only in
emergencies and was one of the first to receive the benefit of an
improvement in finances.
In 1860 the customs income was derived mainly from a general
· Strachcy, Finances and Public Works of India, chap. xiv. • Idem, chaps. xiii, xv.
## p. 317 (#355) ############################################
SOURCES OF REVENUE
317
rate of 10 per cent. ad valorem on most articles imported. " A smaller
duty of 4 per cent. was levied on many articles of export. As finances
improved, the rate on imports was reduced to 7 per cent. in 1864,
and again to 5 per cent. in 1875; many exemptions being made from
time to time from export duty. With the growth of industries in India,
particularly of cotton manufacture, objections were raised in England
to the form in which this duty was levied on the ground that its
practical effect was to operate as a measure of protection in favour
of Indian manufactures and so conflicted with accepted economic
principles. The main issue was the retention of the duty on cotton
goods which, so long as the Indian home industry was undeveloped,
constituted some 60 per cent. of the total imports. The avowed policy
of the Government of India was to adopt complete freedom of import,
which was carried into effect in 1882 by the abolition of the general
import duties. It was found, however, impossible to forgo this source
of income permanently, and the customs-duties were subsequently
reimposed.
of the other heads of taxation, the stamp revenue was realised
mainly from fees levied in the form of stamps on proceedings in the
judicial courts and from stamps on commercial documents. The
excise revenue was derived from intoxicating liquors, hemp, drugs,
and opium consumed in India. In 1860 the receipts were unimportant,
only slightly exceeding a million sterling, but with morecareful adminis-
tration, excise became one of the most valuable sources of income.
In India, as in England, the income-tax was first introduced as a
temporary expedient to meet war expenses. The first general tax
was imposed in 1860 to restore the finances after the Mutiny, being
levied at the rate of 4 per cent. on all incomes of Rs. 500 or upward,
and at half that rate on incomes between Rs. 200 and Rs. 500. It was
'abolished after five years, but in 1867 bad seasons compelled a resort
to direct taxation. An experiment was made with a licence tax on
trades and professions, which was of the nature of a tax on incomes.
In this modified form the proceeds were insufficient to cover the
deficit, and in 1869 the scope of the tax was enlarged and it was
converted into a general income-tax. As finances improved, this
unpopular form of taxation was dropped. But in 1877-8 financial
difficulties again arose, and no means of raising additional revenue,
except by direct taxation, being considered practicable, it was re-
introduced by the imposition of a licence tax on trades. In 1886 a
further step was taken and a tax was imposed on all incomes derived
from sources other than agriculture. Experience had been gained to
secure the smoother working of the tax and from that time it took its
place as one of the permanent heads of revenue.
The above summary indicates the gradual evolution of the revenue
Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. rv, chap. vi.
• Strachcy, op. cit. chap. xii; Findlay-Shirras, The Science of Public Finance, chap. xxi.
## p. 318 (#356) ############################################
318
THE FINANCES OF INDIA, 1858–1918
system. Starting with a somewhat primitive system under which the
income was mainly derived from rent on land and fiscal monopolies
on opium and salt, the government was able, with the progress of the
country, to develop more elastic sources of revenue realised from
taxation, such as customs, excise and income-tax. Its general aim
being to keep down the incidence of the land-revenue and to reduce
the salt duty to as low a point as its finances permitted, the receipts
from these heads gradually came to bear a smaller proportion to the
gross revenues. As the older sources of economic revenue declined
in importance, they were supplemented by newer forms in the shape
of receipts from railways and irrigation works.
The distractions of wars by which the empire had been built up
left the East India Company little time or money to devote to the
prosecution of public works. Not till near the termination of its
existence was there any serious attempt to make good the short-
comings of the past. The succeeding government found itself faced
with the problem of bringing the country up to date in the matter of
roads, public buildings and the public utility services of a modern
state. Equally imperative was the need for protection against famine
by the construction of irrigation works. The funds required were far
beyond the scope of the ordinary revenues, and, in the absence of
private enterprise, the government was compelled to fall back on the
assistance of foreign capital. Though its fruits have been of incal-
culable benefit to the country, the public works policy imposed a
heavy strain on the finances, and the financial history of the fifty
years following the Mutiny is a record of constant struggle to meet the
obligations incurred and to maintain uninterrupted progress. Ulti-
mately, as will be shown, the commercial services were to-prove a
remunerative source of revenue.
In order to secure the essential lines of railway communication the
government, from 1853 onward, arranged for their construction
through the agency of joint-stock companies with an English domicile,
to which a guarantee was given of 5 per cent. on the capital outlay
and half the surplus profits. The primary defects of these contracts
were that the companies were relieved of responsibility for the cost of
construction and the only incentive to economy was the somewhat
remote prospect of sharing in the profits. Even allowing for the
necessity of gaining experience in railway construction in India, the
cost was high and for a number of years the payment of interest
charges imposed a considerable burden on the general revenues. In
a
all, the capital outlay on the railways guaranteed under the earlier
system amounted to some ninety-seven millions. Under the terms of
the contracts the state was able to exercise the right of purchase and
the old guaranteed railways were gradually acquired.
Strachey, op. cit. chap. vii; Chesney, Indian Polity, chaps. xviii, xix; Imp. Gaz.
vol. II, chap. vii.
1
O
## p. 319 (#357) ############################################
FINANCIAL DECENTRALISATION
319
In 1869 it was decided to embark on a policy of construction
through direct state agency, mainly with borrowed capital. Fair
progress was made with the project, but the fall in the gold value of
silver rendered the scheme abortive. The burden of paying interest
on the sterling debt began to press heavily on the state, and there was
a natural reluctance to add to these charges. Borrowings were ac-
cordingly limited to such sums as could be raised in India. But a
railway policy under which the rate of progress was determined by
annual borrowings in a limited market soon proved inadequate to the
needs of the country. It was found necessary to fall back on the
former system of inviting assistance of private companies by the offer
of guarantees, or other forms of state aid. The various contracts
differed widely in their conditions, but the terms obtained were more
favourable than in the earlier contracts. Where a guarantee was given,
the rate in no case exceeded 4 per cent. and the share in the surplus
profits payable to the companies was smaller. The construction of
railways by direct agency was not discontinued, but the tendency was
rather to employ this method for lines required for strategic purposes,
or for protection against famine.
In the construction of irrigation works, the government could look
for even less assistance from private enterprise. Nearly all the
important systems were constructed by state engineers, either from
borrowed funds, or special revenues set aside for famine insurance.
On the whole the money so spent proved a very remunerative invest-
ment, quite apart from the indirect advantages accruing to the state
in securing the land-revenue and restricting expenditure on famine
relief. But on the other side of the ledger must be set the growing
charges for interest on capital, the long delays which often supervened
before any return commensurate with the outlay was received, and,
over a series of years, the loss in exchange on the sterling portion of
the debt.
Apart from the rearrangement of the financial relations between
the central and provincial governments, there were no events of out-
standing importance prior to 1873. The system of a highly centralised
financial control, introduced under circumstances previously men-
tioned, had not becn found to work well in practice. The provincial
governments, though responsible for the collection and development
of a large part of the revenue, were allowed no discretion in incurring
expenditure, and derived no benefit from the growth of income or
economy in administration. The position they occupied was in fact
something more than that of a department and something less than
that of a government, a state of affairs which inevitably led to friction.
From the Government of India's point of view the situation was
described as one in which “the distribution of the public income
degenerated into something like a scramble, in which the most violent
Report of Indian Irrigation Commission, 1903.
1
## p. 320 (#358) ############################################
320
THE FINANCES OF INDIA, 1858–1918
had the advantage, with little attention to reason”. From the other
point of view, the Government of India, in endeavouring to control
all items of expenditure over so large a country, had assumed a task
which no central authority had the capacity or knowledge to perform.
A beginning was made in financial decentralisation in 1871, which
was further developed in 1877. The principle adopted was that certain
branches of administration, such as the postal services and railways,
should be treated as wholly imperial and their receipts taken by the
central government. That government, being responsible for the
heaviest charges on the state revenues, retained in its hands the income
from certain main heads, such as salt, opium and customs. The
revenues from other heads, viz. land-revenue, excise, stamps, forests
and registration, were shared in a proportion determined according
to the requirements of the several provinces. From the income de-
rived from their share, the latter met the expenses of the collection
of the revenues and the greater part of the expenses of their civil
administration. The financial arrangements between the central and
provincial governments were for some time subject to periodical
revision, when they were amended according to the state of the public
revenues; but, ultimately, more permanent shares in the divided
revenues were assigned to the different provinces. As originally
framed the system had nothing of a federal character about it. The
object in view was mainly to effect an administrative improvement
by relieving the central office of an impossible burden of work and
freeing the provincial governments from unnecessary interference.
The control over, finance was not surrendered, since the central
government was always at liberty to view the terms of the settlement.
Roughly, the provincial expenditure amounted to one-third of the
imperial.
Previously to 1873 currency questions had played little part in
Indian finance: from that date they dominated it. Though an attempt
had been made in 1868 to introduce the sovereign into India, it had
not proved successful and the rupee remained the basis of the currency.
Silver being received without limit when tendered for coinage at the
Indian mints, the gold value of the rupee depended on the gold price
of silver bullion. This value had continued up to 1872-3 fairly con-
stant at about 2s. , and fluctuations in exchange had been compara-
tively small. About this time, however, largely in consequence of
the demonetisation of silver, first by Germany and subsequently by
the Latin Union, the rupee exchange began to drop. Its downward
course was for some time gradual, and temporary improvements
favoured a policy of inaction. By 1885 it had fallen to an average rate
of is. 7d. From this point the decline was more rapid and by 1890
i Strachey, op. cit. chap. ix; Hunter, Life of the Earl of Mayo, vol. 11, chap. vi.
: Decentralisation Commission Report, Parl. Papers, 1907.
; Barbour, The Standard of Value, chap. xii, 1893.
## p. 321 (#359) ############################################
THE FALL IN EXCHANGE
321
it had fallen to is. 4d. For a brief period in 1891 the decision of the
United States to purchase annually large quantities of silver brought
about a sharp rise to is. 6d. , only to be followed by a reaction until,
in 1893, the average rate was in the region of is. 2d. 1 This depre-
ciation disastrously affected India's finances by increasing the cost of
making remittances to liquidate her gold obligations in England.
These consisted mainly of interest on the sterling debt, guaranteed
interest on the railways or, after their purchase, of the annuity
charges, payment fo railway stores, army charges, and furlough and
pension allowances of civil and military servants. They were defrayed
by the secretary of state's selling for sterling rupee drafts on the Indian
treasuries. But so long as the mints remained open to the free coinage
of silver, the sterling amounts obtainable at the secretary of state's
sales could not ordinarily exceed the cost of procuring silver and
remitting it to India for coinage. Each fall in the gold value of the
rupee meant proportionately increased cost in defraying the charges
to be met in England. In 1892-3, when the exchange had fallen to
IS. 2d. , the government had to pay 87,300,000 more rupees to meet its
gold obligations, amounting to £16,500,000, than would have been
required had the exchange stood at the same rate as in 1873.
It will now be convenient to outline the main events between 1873
and 1893 which moulded the course of Indian finance. During the
early part of this period India was visited by a cycle of bad seasons
which resulted in partial or total failure of the crops over wide areas
of country. Two famines, onc in Bihar and the other in Southern
India, called for expenditure on an unprecedented scale. These and
other minor disasters cost the government in relief operations, or
remission of revenue, over £15,000,000. A commission appointed in
1877 to enquire into the subject of famine relief recommended that
a sum of £1,500,000 should be set aside in prosperous years to meet
the cost of these recurring calamities, without further increase of debt.
In years free from famine, the surplus was to be devoted, either to the
paying off of existing debt, or the avoidance of debt by constructing
works, such as railways, the cost of which must otherwise have been
met by borrowing. As the condition of the finances did not admit of
the sum required being set aside from revenue, additional funds were
provided by a fresh cess on land, the imposition of a licence tax on
the trading classes, and by reducing provincial assignments. Wars,
threats of wars, and falls in exchange caused these arrangements to
break down on several occasions, but, as soon as pressure was relieved,
the grant was resumed. The operations under the famine insurance
scheme enabled the Government of India, in addition to meeting
the cost of famine relief, to spend on development projects roughly
£5,000,000 from the inception of the scheme up to 1893. During these
| Report of Indian Currency Committee (Parl. Papers, 1893, Accounts, c. 7060).
Report of Indian Famine Commission, 1878.
CHIVI
21
## p. 322 (#360) ############################################
322
THE FINANCES OF INDIA, 1858-1918
years the government was in constant financial difficulties. The
Afghan war which broke out in 1878 proved very costly. Hardly had
the situation improved, when the Government of India was called
upon, in deference to the free-trade views obtaining in England, to
abolish the duty on all imported cotton goods, the import tax on
coarser goods, which formed the main product of the Indian mills,
having been removed in 1879. With the abolition of the duty on these
goods, which provided the bulk of the customs revenue, it was im-
possible to justify the retention of the rest of the import tariff levied
on a number of miscellaneous articles, many of which yielded an
insignificant revenue. It was accordingly decided to abolish all import
duties, except those levied on articles, such as liquor and salt, which
were subject to internal taxation.
From 1885 the government was again confronted with heavy
military expenditure as a result of the threatened advance on India
by Russia, and the operations which terminated in the annexation of
Upper Burma. An increase in the strength of the army and defensive
works on the frontier entailed a steady growth in expenditure between
1886 and 1893. With the limitations imposed on the customs tariff,
it was necessary to fall back on other heads of taxation which promised
to yield the additional income required. In 1886 the licence tax was
converted to an income-tax leviable on all non-agricultural incomes
above Rs. 500, and in 1887 the salt-tax was raised from Rs.
was followed by searching enquiries from a commission presided over
by Sir James Lyall, ex-lieutenant-governor of the Panjab, who found
it most difficult to compare degrees of distress with those observed
· Raleigh, Lord Curzon in India, p. 386.
1
## p. 307 (#345) ############################################
THE FAMINE OF 1900
307
in previous famines as conditions had largely altered with expansion
of railways. But improved supervision and organisation had certainly
reduced the cost of relief to a figure below that which might have
been anticipated. The commission adhered largely to the views
expressed by their predecessors in 1880, suggesting alterations which
were designed to impart greater flexibility to the maxims then adopted.
They observed:
It may be said of India as a whole that of late years, owing to high prices, there
has been a considerable increase in the incomes of the landholding and cultivating
classes, and their standard of comfort and expenditure has also risen. With the rise
in transfer-value of their holdings, their credit also has expanded. During recent
famines they have shown greater powers of resistance. The poorer professional
classes suffer severely from rise of prices but do not come on relief. The wages of
day labourers and skilled artisans have no risen. The rise in prices of food has not
been accompanied by a rise in the wages of labour. On the contrary, as com-
petition falls off, the rate of wages offered falls frequently below the customary
rate. '
Before the proposals of the 1898 commission had been fully con-
sidered by the government, India was visited by a drought the greatest
in extent and intensity which she had experienced for 200 years. The
area affected amounted to over 400,000 square miles with a popula-
tion of about sixty millions, of whom twenty-five millions belonged
to British India and the remainder to Indian states. It embraced the
greater part of the Bombay Presidency, the Central Provinces, Berar
and much of the Panjab, the states of Kathiawar and Rajputana, the
Nizam's dominions, Baroda and the Central Indian principalities.
The loss in crops alone amounted to £50,000,000 in British India and
£30,000,000 in the Indian states. Water supplies shrank considerably;
and a fodder famine on an enormous scale was followed by a positive
devastation of all kinds of cattle. Some of the tracts which had suffered
in 1896–7 suffered even more now. Speaking to his legislative council
on 19 October, 1900, the viceroy estimated that one-fourth of the
entire population of India had come to a greater or less degree within
the radius of relief operations. Lord Curzon had followed relief
measures with devoted attention, touring in the worst districts of
Gujarat, one of the areas most afflicted, in the fierce heat of July, 1900.
By that time, as he said, famine had brought "its familiar attendant
Furies in its train, and cholera, dysentery and fever had fallen upon
already exhausted and enfeebled population”. ?
The relief campaign-was conducted on a very liberal scale. The
ratio of relief in June and July, 1900, was 18 per cent. in the famine-
stricken area of British India as compared with 10 per cent. in 1897;
637 public officials were specially deputed to famine duty from civil
and military cmploy; provinces not affected were scoured for the loan
of men. Revenue was freely suspended and remitted. Large loans
i Famine Commission's Report, p. 363.
• Raleigh, op. cit. pp. 375, 404. °CF. Ronaldshay, Life of Curzon, vol. 11, chap. v.
20-2
## p. 308 (#346) ############################################
308
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FAMINE POLICY
were made to the Indian states as well as to land-holders and culti-
vators in British territory. Following the advice of the 1898 com-
mission, the government adapted its relief system more dexterously
to varying circumstances. In British India there was an excess
mortality of 750,000 persons, 230,000 of whom at least died of cholera
and smallpox. Fever also claimed its victims. All the figures included
immigrants from Indian states where, in spite of many bright examples
of benevolence and humanity, the standard of relief generally was
lower than that in British territory; 140 lakhs of rupees (nearly
£1,000,000 sterling) were contributed for charitable relief, of which
881 lakhs came from the United Kingdom. In 1896–7 the United
Kingdom had given 123 out of 137 lakhs. Australia, the Straits
Settlement, Ceylon and Hongkong, the United States of America,
Berlin, had also subscribed. From the 137 lakhs distributed by the
Central Relief Committee ui went to purchasing cattle, seed and
subsistence for peasants in British territory who were not reached by
the government loans. Fifty lakhs were given for similar purposes to
the Indian states. In 1900 the rains were satisfactory; prospects
rapidly mended; revenue was remitted on a liberal scale; another
commission was appointed to investigate particular questions in
the light of recent experiences. A famine, Lord Curzon said, was a
natural visitation in its origin, but should be a very business-like
proceeding when once it had started. More should be done by way
of precaution. District programmes of relief could be prepared with
greater method and should not be considered complete until every
possible scheme of irrigation or water-storage had been examined.
So terrible an incident as this famine was “an abiding landmark in
the history of the Indian people”, and imposed very heavy responsi-
bility upon the government.
The commission then appointed met under the presidency of
Sir Anthony (afterwards Lord) MacDonnell, who had steered the
United Provinces with distinguished success through the recent
famine. Their report published in 1901 clearly summarised accepted
principles of relief, suggesting variations. They emphasised the benefits
of a policy of “moral strategy”, early ascertainment and publication
of suspensions of revenue and rents, early distribution of advances for
purchase of seed and cattle and the sinking of temporary wells. They
advocated the appointment of a famine commissioner in a province
where relief operations promised to be extensive. They recommended
stricter regulation of famine relief in certain respects, efforts to enlist
non-official assistance on a larger scale, and preference in particular
circumstances of village works to the large public works which had
hitherto been the backbone of relief schemes. These suggestions com-
mended themselves to the central government and bore fruit in the
provincial famine codes. The commission also advised a considerable
increase in rolling stock at the cost if necessary of the famine insurance
a
## p. 309 (#347) ############################################
THE MACDONNELL COMMISSION
309
grant. The railways, they said, had been unable to carry much of the
food and fodder offered to them during the famine. The central
government, however, held that possibly the unavoidable limitations
in the carrying capacity of the lines was the main cause of blocks in
traffic.
The commission dealt fully with allegations that the land-revenue
demand was excessive and gave reasons for holding it to be very low
in comparison with the share of the produce to which the government
was traditionally entitled. 1 But they considered that as the savings
of good years were often rapidly spent, more indulgence in collection
should be shown in bad years. Agricultural banks should be estab-
lished; irrigation works should be pushed on; water-storage must be
more sedulously encouraged; measures should be taken to foster
improved methods of agriculture.
The development of village credit associations and the practica-
bility of a wide extension of irrigation had already been engaging the
government's attention. No time was lost in considering and acting
on the other recommendations of the commission. Before Lord
Curzon left India he had done more to prevent and combat famine,
than any two of his predecessors or successors.
The last considerable famine of our period visited the United
Provinces in 1907-8 and disclosed some changes in economic con-
ditions. In consequence of a failure of the south-west monsoon of
1907, which averaged only one-third to one-quarter of the normal
fall and came as a climax to more than one bad or indifferent season,
the loss of autumn food grains was estimated as approximating in
value to £4,000,000. Industrial staples suffered even more. The actual
failure of the autumn harvest was greater than and that of the spring
harvest was as great as the losses in 1896–7. The range of prices was
higher. The situation was not relieved, as in 1896, by an unusually
early fall of winter rain. Yet on 25 January, 1908, the lieutenant-
governor, Sir John Hewett, was able to describe the situation in the
following terms:
Why if the provinces have suffered so much as this, do we not see the outward
signs that are associated with famine? Why are we not brought into contact with
people in a state of emaciation? Why do we not see bodies of persons in search of
work? Why do the crime statistics of the province not show a serious rise? Why
again if the calamity of to-day is so like that of eleven years ago, do we find such
a change in the statistics of famine relief? Let us compare the figures for the two
periods. By this time in 1897 there were 16 districts in which famine relief was in
full swing while 24 were under observation and test; there were 480,000 persons
actually on relief works, 43,000 on test-works, 123,000 being relieved as dependents
of workers, 98,000 in receipt of gratuitous relief in their houses and 51,000 in poor-
houses; in all some 796,000 persons were relieved. At the present time there are
311,000 persons receiving different forms of relief. There are only 13 districts that
have been declared famine districts, and the workers on relief works number
152,000. We have in districts in which test-works are opened, but these are
· Cf. resolution by the governor-general in council, 16 January, 1902, published in
the Gazette of India, 18 January, 1902.
## p. 310 (#348) ############################################
310
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FAMINE POLICY
attracting only about 5000 persons. We have 29,000 dependents of workers being
relieved on works. On the other hand we have 26 districts as compared with 34 in
1897, in which gratuitous relief is being given to persons at their homes and the
number in receipt of such relief in their homes is actually larger than it was in 1897.
The character of relief has undergone a considerable change. . . . The causes of
this change of policy must be sought for in the changed circumstances of the present
time.
The changed circumstances were mainly, these: not only had
railway mileage in the provinces increased 35 per cent. within eleven
years; not only had canal irrigation expanded to an equally marked
extent, but an established era of higher pricts had brought a con-
siderable rise in wages. Employment too had increased. Government
expenditure on all forms of public works had been very large; and
the industrial and building operations of the general public had
greatly extended. The labouring classes had become far less dependent
on agriculture than thcy had been in the past. Emigration had
very greatly increased, both overseas to British colonies and inland
to mills and factories in Calcutta and other commercial centres.
Increasing amounts of money had been received through postal orders
from abroad for payment to residents of certain eastern districts now
famine-stricken. In some districts the value of the postal orders
received from abroad exceeded the total land-revenue demand.
Labour was yearly becoming dearer and the cultivating classes were
better off. But the high prices of food grains, while benefiting agri-
culturists, were pressing heavily upon dwellers in towns with fixed
incomes. And so it was that while the calamity of 1907–8 was far
less a labourer's famine than had been anticipated, gratuitous relief
was distributed widely in circumstances not contemplated by the
MacDonnell commission who had allowed for it only in tracts where
relief works had been started.
As soon as the failure of the monsoon became apparent, the local
government had adopted whole-heartedly the policy of moral strategy
recommended by the MacDonnell commission. The late Sir John
Campbell was appointed famine commissioner. Prompt assistance
was given by extremely liberal money advances for the preparation,
sowing and irrigation of the winter crops, and by the announcement
of large remissions and suspensions of the autumn instalments of land-
revenue. All these measures gave heart to the people, mitigated
restriction of credit, provided occupation in the villages at remunera-
tive rates of wages and prevented a rise in crime. The winter rains
arrived late; and there was a much greater and more continuous
demand for labour for irrigating the young winter crops than there
had been in 1896–7, a circumstance which contributed to keep down
the numbers on relief works. When the latter were opened, village
works managed either by district officers or by landlords, assisted by
partly repayable grants, took, as far as possible, the place of large
relief works under the management of the engineers of the public
## p. 311 (#349) ############################################
THE SCARCITY OF 1918
311
works department. When the hot weather of 1908 began every effort
was made to continue these arrangements in order to avoid the
crowding and risks of epidemic disease which large works involve and
to bring relief as near to the homes of the cultivators as possible. The
total number of persons on relief of all kinds on 14 March, 1908, at
the commencement of the spring harvest was 1,411,576 of whom
1,040,476 were on works, 369,344 were receiving gratuitous assistance
and 1756 were weavers who from the nature of their occupation
needed special kind of help. After the spring hạrvest the numbers on
relief considerably declined. The monsoon of 1908 broke early and
soon enabled operations to be closed. The provincial death-rate from
September, 1907, to July, 1908, was 36. 47 against a normal figure of
32. 59. The principal causes of death were fever, cholera, and small-
pox. The total cost of famine relief was £2,135,000. The local govern-
ment was congratulated by the central government on “the foresight
displayed at each stage, on the promptitude and efficiency of action
taken, and on the success which attended it".
The next period of stress began ten years later, when India had
reached the beginning of the fifth year of the great war. From 1913
she had been favoured by good monsoons; but in 1917 the shortage
of shipping and the shrinkage of rolling stock owing to military
demands, had produced some disastrous results. The cultivators could
not market their grain satisfactorily and had to pay dearly for im-
ported commodities such as spices, oilcloth, kcrosine and salt. In
large towns foodstuffs and indeed all commodities became much
dcarer. The position of the labouring classes deteriorated although
wages had risen. Early in 1918 came the German offensive in the
West, the raising of a large additional body of Indian troops, and a
great effort to meet the increased demand for army supplies and
munitions of war. Foodstuffs were purchased by the government on
a large scale; and before long the rise of prices was intensified by the
weakness of the south-west monsoon all over the sub-continent.
Prolonged breaks damaged the crops, and the rainfall was 19 per cent.
below the average. An extremely severe, widespread and deadly
epidemic of influenza added to general distress. From the beginning
of the war the government had been compelled to interfere with the
normal course of trade for the purpose of satisfying the needs of India,
the Empire and the Allies, of controlling dealings with neutral
countries and of prohibiting traffic with enemy countrics. Early in
November, 1918, the Armistice enabled them to apply to the relief
of distress in India machinery contrived for the purchase and ship-
ment of rice from Burma. Through the Home Government they
arranged for purchases of wheat from Australia to tide over the
interval which must elapse before the spring crops of 1919 came into
the market; and they prohibited export of food grains from India
1 See Moral and Material Progress Report, 1917-18, p. 91.
## p. 312 (#350) ############################################
312
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FAMINE POLICY
6
3
except in very small quantities and for exceptionally strong reasons.
All these measures, combined with the fact that for ten years the
monsoons had been generally kind, carried the country through a
critical time. Relief measures were taken under the Famine Codes
but never at any time did the number of relieved exceed 600,000.
Distress ended with the abundant rains of 1919. The author of India
in
1920
observes that the manner in which the crisis was surmounted
showed increased powers of resistance among the masses, although
the high range of prices must have caused much silent suffering.
Experiences since 1919 point to the conclusion that agricultural
labour is in a stronger and more independent position than it was at
the beginning of this century; but the high prices of modern times
have hit the middle or professional classes hard. “With their small
fixed incomes, their large families and their increasing expenditure,
they have of late years passed through a very disadvantageous epoch”,?
a circumstance which has stimulated political unrest.
Our tale is told. Twenty-four years ago Lord Curzon said to his
legislative council: 3
We may compete and struggle with Nature, we may prepare for her worst
assaults, and we may reduce her violence when delivered. Some day perhaps when
our railway system has overspread the entire Indian continent, when water storage
and irrigation are even further developed, when we have raised the general level
of social comfort and prosperity, and when auvancing civilisation has diffused the
lessons of thrift in domestic expenditure and greater self-denial and control, we
shall obtain the mastery. But that will not be yet. In the meantime the duty of the
government has been to profit to the full by the lessons of the latest calamity and
to take such precautionary steps over the whole field of possible action as to prepare
ourselves to combat the next.
Time has gone on since these words were uttered; the Indian railway
system has been widely extended; water-storage and irrigation have
greatly developed; in 1904 an act was passed authorising the forma-
tion of co-operative credit societies, and in 1919 there were 31,800
agricultural credit societies in British India with a total working
capital of nearly £6,000,000; provincial departments of agriculture
have for years been working with a Central Research Institute at
Pusa in Bihar to evolve and distribute better strains of existing crops;
education has become more widely diffused; emigration has lessened
the pressure on some congested areas;' altogether there is reason to
conclude that substantial progress has been made toward the goal to
which Lord Curzon directed untiring thought and endeavour. The
way, however, is difficult, for between 1881 and 1921 the population
of India rose from 253,000,000 to 319,000,000, and we cannot doubt
· See speech by the under-secretary of state for India, 8 July, 1927, Hansard, pp.
1659-60.
India in 1924-5, p. 233.
• Seventh Budget Speech, 29 March, 1905.
! Of late years, however, it has considerably declined for reasons apparent from the
publication India in 1923-4, pp. 18, 19.
• Of this total 247,000,000 belonged to British India and 72,000,000 to native states.
Between 1921 and 1931 the increase was 10-2 per cent.
## p. 313 (#351) ############################################
THE OUTLOOK
313
that it is rising still or that it will always be essentially rural. Famines
will come from time to time but will not result from a single failure
of crops, and will be rather work famines than food famines. They
will be periods of unemployment on a scale to call for statc relief;
and it will always be necessary for the state to see that the helpless and
destitute are not left to starve. But we may surely think that the day
of isolated experiments and costly blunders has for ever passed. Out
of failures and disappointments has come a broad, deliberate and
well-tested policy, a matured and effective plan of campaign. None
the less will it always be essential that such campaigns should be con-
ducted by devoted and efficient public services, by men equal not
only to the ordinary tasks of administration but to those extra tasks
which are imposed by grave emergencies. To the old battles with
famine many have devoted themselves with unsparing energy, two
notable viceroys, British and Indian officials, missionaries of various
Christian denominations. Some have fallen by the way without a
murmur. 1 May their successors carry on that high tradition!
1 "There stands by the roadside at Jubbalpore a cross with this inscription:
"To the memory of the officers of the Central Provinces who sacrificed their lives to their
duty in the struggle to save life during the great famine of 1896–1897'.
“On the reverse side are the names of five members of the Indian Civil Service, one
executive engineer, one police officer, and two licutenants of the Indian army. "
Holland, The Indian Outlook, p. 137.
a
## p. 314 (#352) ############################################
CHAPTER XVIII
THE FINANCES OF INDIA
1858-1918
The transfer of the government of India from the East India
Company to the crown brought with it wide-reaching changes in the
financial system of India. By the act of 18581 it was provided that the
expenditure of the revenues of India should be subject to the control
of the secretary of state in council, and that no grant or appropria-
tion of any part of such revenues should be made without the con-
currence of a majority of votes at the meeting of the council. Though
limited discretionary powers of incurring expenditure were delegated
to the Government of India, the regulations of this act placed on the
secretary of state and his council the final responsibility for the ad-
ministration of finances. In India, the somewhat antiquated financial
machinery had almost broken down under the strain of the Mutiny.
In the reconstruction which followed there was a noticeable tendency
to bring the organisation and procedure into closer conformity with
English practice. The management of the finances had been hitherto
in the collective charge of the governor-general and his council, who
exercised a control, that at times had not proved very effective, over
the expenditure of the presidency governments. In 1859 the first
finance minister was appointed and assumed control over all branches
of public accounts. The whole administration of finance was vested
in the central government, the provincial governments becoming, as
regards expenditure, merely administrative agencies and having no
power of spending without sanction the revenue they collected. Phe
budget system was introduced, the English model of preparing the
accounts being in general followed. The first budget was presented
for the year 1860–1 (the Indian financial year ending 31 March), to be
followed in due course by annual statements showing closed accounts.
The main preoccupations of the financial advisers of the Government
of India between the years 1859 and 1873—which forms the first
stage in the history of the period dealt with-were, after restoring
order in the public accounts, to balance income and expenditure,
and, subsequently, to meet endless demands for improved adminis-
tration and for the economic development of the country. The
Mutiny had involved the government in serious embarrassments.
Some of the sources of revenue had been wholly or partially cut off,
and the heavy military expenditure had been met by constant
borrowings. In all, over £42,000,000 had been added to the debt,
1 21 & 22 Vic. c. 108.
## p. 315 (#353) ############################################
REORGANISATION
315
and the accounts statement of 1859-60 showed a deficit of £7,250,000.
The total debt, which was largely a legacy of the numerous wars in
which the East India Company had been engaged, amounted to
about £98,000,000. The state of Indian finances had excited some
apprehension in England, and it was decided to appoint an ex-
perienced English financier to their charge. The choice fell on James
Wilson, to whom the credit for the reforms carried out was largely
due. Under his guidance, drastic reductions were effected in civil
and military expenditure, while the revenues were enhanced by the
imposition of an income-tax for a period of five years. With prosperous
seasons, the finances rapidly improved and, by 1864, the deficit
disappeared from the budget.
The gross revenue of 1860–1 amounted to £43,000,000. This
income was derived largely from sources which differed materially
from those most common in European countries, a fact which ac-
counted for some of the peculiar features of Indian finance. Under
the revenue system which the government had inherited from its
predecessors the main productive sources, the land-revenue and
opium, were not derived from taxation: of the taxation heads the
chief contributory was the salt monopoly; the ordinary excise,
customs and stamps being comparatively unimportant. Direct taxa-
tion was at first only intermittently imposed. Though an income of
this nature imposed a lighter burden on the public, it was less stable
and more costly to realise than that of countries relying in a greater
measure on taxation for their revenues. The fate of the budget
depended on the course of the monsoon. If the rainfall were favour-
able, the necessarily cautious anticipations of revenue were, more than
realised: if unfavourable, the returns from heads such as land-revenue,
opium and salt fell off, and the estimated surplus was converted to
a deficit, often swollen by the extraordinary expenditure called for
by measures of famine relief.
The mainstay of the finances was the land-revenue, which, in 1860,
contributed over 40 per cent. to the total of the gross revenues. From
time immemorial the ruling power in India had been entitled to a
share in the produce of the land. Where there was an intervening
landlord, the Government of India exercised its right by taking a
portion of the rent paid by the tenant. Where the settlement was made
direct with peasant proprietors, it took, as a rule, a portion, either of
the estimated net produce of the land, or of the rental accepted as
fair for the class of soil. The land-revenue, except in permanently
settled tracts, was revised periodically, usually after thirty years, when
an assessment was imposed on land brought under cultivation in the
interim, or an enhancement made in the rate of assessment, if justified
by a rise in rents, or an increase in the value of agricultural produce.
1 Cf. Bastable, Public Finance, bk 11, chap. v.
* Baden Powell, Land Systerns of British India, vol. 11, chaps. i and ii, vol. in, chap. ii.
## p. 316 (#354) ############################################
316
THE FINANCES OF INDIA, 1858–1918
a
The position of part proprietor thus occupied, however historically
or economically justifiable, in practice exposed the state to constant
pressure to reduce its claims. The material condition of the small
holders, due mainly to the density of population and excessive sub-
division of the land, in itself called for caution in enforcing enhance-
ments. There was consequently a tendencytowards greater moderation
in revising the assessments, so as to leave in the hands of the cul-
tivators a larger portion of the profits of their holdings. Though the
income from land-revenue shows a fairly steady increase, it was not
in proportion to the rise in the rental value of the land. The ratio of
land-revenue to the total gross income of the state gradually diminished
and at the beginning of the present century had fallen to 25 per cent.
Next in importance was the opium revenue, derived from profits of
the state monopoly of the sale of the drug to China and other coun-
tries, the revenue from opium sold in India being treated as excise. 1
The receipts under the former head were of a fluctuating nature,
depending on the character of the crop in India and the price of the
drug in China. The gross income, too, was subject to material de-
ductions, arising out of the purchase of the raw article and its manu-
facture for export. Though the maintenance of the traffic in opium
with China was subject to frequent attack, it survived in much the
same form until 1907, when an agreement was entered into with the
Chinese Government under which that government undertook to
suppress the cultivation of the opium poppy within a period of ten
years, while the Government of India consented to the extinction of
the import of opium into China within the same period.
Of the revenues derived from taxation the salt duty was the most
remunerative. Being an article of local production in certain parts
of India, the tax varied in its incidence and method of collection.
With the improvement of inland communications, the diversity in
rates encouraged smuggling from lower to higher taxed areas, the
suppression of which called for a great increase in the preventive staff
and so reduced the net receipts. The problem was not satisfactorily
solved until the Government of India was able to obtain control of
the most important sources of supply in the native states. The estab-
lishment of state factories at which salt was sold at a price that in-
cluded the duty rendered it possible to abolish the expensive inland
customs line and fix a uniform rate for all India. The equalisation of
the salt duties was completed in 1882, when a single rate of Rs. 2 per
maund (82 lbs. ) was levied, representing an annual tax of about 5d.
per head of population. There were frequent fluctuations in the rate
of duty imposed, but, generally speaking, the tax was raised only in
emergencies and was one of the first to receive the benefit of an
improvement in finances.
In 1860 the customs income was derived mainly from a general
· Strachcy, Finances and Public Works of India, chap. xiv. • Idem, chaps. xiii, xv.
## p. 317 (#355) ############################################
SOURCES OF REVENUE
317
rate of 10 per cent. ad valorem on most articles imported. " A smaller
duty of 4 per cent. was levied on many articles of export. As finances
improved, the rate on imports was reduced to 7 per cent. in 1864,
and again to 5 per cent. in 1875; many exemptions being made from
time to time from export duty. With the growth of industries in India,
particularly of cotton manufacture, objections were raised in England
to the form in which this duty was levied on the ground that its
practical effect was to operate as a measure of protection in favour
of Indian manufactures and so conflicted with accepted economic
principles. The main issue was the retention of the duty on cotton
goods which, so long as the Indian home industry was undeveloped,
constituted some 60 per cent. of the total imports. The avowed policy
of the Government of India was to adopt complete freedom of import,
which was carried into effect in 1882 by the abolition of the general
import duties. It was found, however, impossible to forgo this source
of income permanently, and the customs-duties were subsequently
reimposed.
of the other heads of taxation, the stamp revenue was realised
mainly from fees levied in the form of stamps on proceedings in the
judicial courts and from stamps on commercial documents. The
excise revenue was derived from intoxicating liquors, hemp, drugs,
and opium consumed in India. In 1860 the receipts were unimportant,
only slightly exceeding a million sterling, but with morecareful adminis-
tration, excise became one of the most valuable sources of income.
In India, as in England, the income-tax was first introduced as a
temporary expedient to meet war expenses. The first general tax
was imposed in 1860 to restore the finances after the Mutiny, being
levied at the rate of 4 per cent. on all incomes of Rs. 500 or upward,
and at half that rate on incomes between Rs. 200 and Rs. 500. It was
'abolished after five years, but in 1867 bad seasons compelled a resort
to direct taxation. An experiment was made with a licence tax on
trades and professions, which was of the nature of a tax on incomes.
In this modified form the proceeds were insufficient to cover the
deficit, and in 1869 the scope of the tax was enlarged and it was
converted into a general income-tax. As finances improved, this
unpopular form of taxation was dropped. But in 1877-8 financial
difficulties again arose, and no means of raising additional revenue,
except by direct taxation, being considered practicable, it was re-
introduced by the imposition of a licence tax on trades. In 1886 a
further step was taken and a tax was imposed on all incomes derived
from sources other than agriculture. Experience had been gained to
secure the smoother working of the tax and from that time it took its
place as one of the permanent heads of revenue.
The above summary indicates the gradual evolution of the revenue
Imperial Gazetteer of India, vol. rv, chap. vi.
• Strachcy, op. cit. chap. xii; Findlay-Shirras, The Science of Public Finance, chap. xxi.
## p. 318 (#356) ############################################
318
THE FINANCES OF INDIA, 1858–1918
system. Starting with a somewhat primitive system under which the
income was mainly derived from rent on land and fiscal monopolies
on opium and salt, the government was able, with the progress of the
country, to develop more elastic sources of revenue realised from
taxation, such as customs, excise and income-tax. Its general aim
being to keep down the incidence of the land-revenue and to reduce
the salt duty to as low a point as its finances permitted, the receipts
from these heads gradually came to bear a smaller proportion to the
gross revenues. As the older sources of economic revenue declined
in importance, they were supplemented by newer forms in the shape
of receipts from railways and irrigation works.
The distractions of wars by which the empire had been built up
left the East India Company little time or money to devote to the
prosecution of public works. Not till near the termination of its
existence was there any serious attempt to make good the short-
comings of the past. The succeeding government found itself faced
with the problem of bringing the country up to date in the matter of
roads, public buildings and the public utility services of a modern
state. Equally imperative was the need for protection against famine
by the construction of irrigation works. The funds required were far
beyond the scope of the ordinary revenues, and, in the absence of
private enterprise, the government was compelled to fall back on the
assistance of foreign capital. Though its fruits have been of incal-
culable benefit to the country, the public works policy imposed a
heavy strain on the finances, and the financial history of the fifty
years following the Mutiny is a record of constant struggle to meet the
obligations incurred and to maintain uninterrupted progress. Ulti-
mately, as will be shown, the commercial services were to-prove a
remunerative source of revenue.
In order to secure the essential lines of railway communication the
government, from 1853 onward, arranged for their construction
through the agency of joint-stock companies with an English domicile,
to which a guarantee was given of 5 per cent. on the capital outlay
and half the surplus profits. The primary defects of these contracts
were that the companies were relieved of responsibility for the cost of
construction and the only incentive to economy was the somewhat
remote prospect of sharing in the profits. Even allowing for the
necessity of gaining experience in railway construction in India, the
cost was high and for a number of years the payment of interest
charges imposed a considerable burden on the general revenues. In
a
all, the capital outlay on the railways guaranteed under the earlier
system amounted to some ninety-seven millions. Under the terms of
the contracts the state was able to exercise the right of purchase and
the old guaranteed railways were gradually acquired.
Strachey, op. cit. chap. vii; Chesney, Indian Polity, chaps. xviii, xix; Imp. Gaz.
vol. II, chap. vii.
1
O
## p. 319 (#357) ############################################
FINANCIAL DECENTRALISATION
319
In 1869 it was decided to embark on a policy of construction
through direct state agency, mainly with borrowed capital. Fair
progress was made with the project, but the fall in the gold value of
silver rendered the scheme abortive. The burden of paying interest
on the sterling debt began to press heavily on the state, and there was
a natural reluctance to add to these charges. Borrowings were ac-
cordingly limited to such sums as could be raised in India. But a
railway policy under which the rate of progress was determined by
annual borrowings in a limited market soon proved inadequate to the
needs of the country. It was found necessary to fall back on the
former system of inviting assistance of private companies by the offer
of guarantees, or other forms of state aid. The various contracts
differed widely in their conditions, but the terms obtained were more
favourable than in the earlier contracts. Where a guarantee was given,
the rate in no case exceeded 4 per cent. and the share in the surplus
profits payable to the companies was smaller. The construction of
railways by direct agency was not discontinued, but the tendency was
rather to employ this method for lines required for strategic purposes,
or for protection against famine.
In the construction of irrigation works, the government could look
for even less assistance from private enterprise. Nearly all the
important systems were constructed by state engineers, either from
borrowed funds, or special revenues set aside for famine insurance.
On the whole the money so spent proved a very remunerative invest-
ment, quite apart from the indirect advantages accruing to the state
in securing the land-revenue and restricting expenditure on famine
relief. But on the other side of the ledger must be set the growing
charges for interest on capital, the long delays which often supervened
before any return commensurate with the outlay was received, and,
over a series of years, the loss in exchange on the sterling portion of
the debt.
Apart from the rearrangement of the financial relations between
the central and provincial governments, there were no events of out-
standing importance prior to 1873. The system of a highly centralised
financial control, introduced under circumstances previously men-
tioned, had not becn found to work well in practice. The provincial
governments, though responsible for the collection and development
of a large part of the revenue, were allowed no discretion in incurring
expenditure, and derived no benefit from the growth of income or
economy in administration. The position they occupied was in fact
something more than that of a department and something less than
that of a government, a state of affairs which inevitably led to friction.
From the Government of India's point of view the situation was
described as one in which “the distribution of the public income
degenerated into something like a scramble, in which the most violent
Report of Indian Irrigation Commission, 1903.
1
## p. 320 (#358) ############################################
320
THE FINANCES OF INDIA, 1858–1918
had the advantage, with little attention to reason”. From the other
point of view, the Government of India, in endeavouring to control
all items of expenditure over so large a country, had assumed a task
which no central authority had the capacity or knowledge to perform.
A beginning was made in financial decentralisation in 1871, which
was further developed in 1877. The principle adopted was that certain
branches of administration, such as the postal services and railways,
should be treated as wholly imperial and their receipts taken by the
central government. That government, being responsible for the
heaviest charges on the state revenues, retained in its hands the income
from certain main heads, such as salt, opium and customs. The
revenues from other heads, viz. land-revenue, excise, stamps, forests
and registration, were shared in a proportion determined according
to the requirements of the several provinces. From the income de-
rived from their share, the latter met the expenses of the collection
of the revenues and the greater part of the expenses of their civil
administration. The financial arrangements between the central and
provincial governments were for some time subject to periodical
revision, when they were amended according to the state of the public
revenues; but, ultimately, more permanent shares in the divided
revenues were assigned to the different provinces. As originally
framed the system had nothing of a federal character about it. The
object in view was mainly to effect an administrative improvement
by relieving the central office of an impossible burden of work and
freeing the provincial governments from unnecessary interference.
The control over, finance was not surrendered, since the central
government was always at liberty to view the terms of the settlement.
Roughly, the provincial expenditure amounted to one-third of the
imperial.
Previously to 1873 currency questions had played little part in
Indian finance: from that date they dominated it. Though an attempt
had been made in 1868 to introduce the sovereign into India, it had
not proved successful and the rupee remained the basis of the currency.
Silver being received without limit when tendered for coinage at the
Indian mints, the gold value of the rupee depended on the gold price
of silver bullion. This value had continued up to 1872-3 fairly con-
stant at about 2s. , and fluctuations in exchange had been compara-
tively small. About this time, however, largely in consequence of
the demonetisation of silver, first by Germany and subsequently by
the Latin Union, the rupee exchange began to drop. Its downward
course was for some time gradual, and temporary improvements
favoured a policy of inaction. By 1885 it had fallen to an average rate
of is. 7d. From this point the decline was more rapid and by 1890
i Strachey, op. cit. chap. ix; Hunter, Life of the Earl of Mayo, vol. 11, chap. vi.
: Decentralisation Commission Report, Parl. Papers, 1907.
; Barbour, The Standard of Value, chap. xii, 1893.
## p. 321 (#359) ############################################
THE FALL IN EXCHANGE
321
it had fallen to is. 4d. For a brief period in 1891 the decision of the
United States to purchase annually large quantities of silver brought
about a sharp rise to is. 6d. , only to be followed by a reaction until,
in 1893, the average rate was in the region of is. 2d. 1 This depre-
ciation disastrously affected India's finances by increasing the cost of
making remittances to liquidate her gold obligations in England.
These consisted mainly of interest on the sterling debt, guaranteed
interest on the railways or, after their purchase, of the annuity
charges, payment fo railway stores, army charges, and furlough and
pension allowances of civil and military servants. They were defrayed
by the secretary of state's selling for sterling rupee drafts on the Indian
treasuries. But so long as the mints remained open to the free coinage
of silver, the sterling amounts obtainable at the secretary of state's
sales could not ordinarily exceed the cost of procuring silver and
remitting it to India for coinage. Each fall in the gold value of the
rupee meant proportionately increased cost in defraying the charges
to be met in England. In 1892-3, when the exchange had fallen to
IS. 2d. , the government had to pay 87,300,000 more rupees to meet its
gold obligations, amounting to £16,500,000, than would have been
required had the exchange stood at the same rate as in 1873.
It will now be convenient to outline the main events between 1873
and 1893 which moulded the course of Indian finance. During the
early part of this period India was visited by a cycle of bad seasons
which resulted in partial or total failure of the crops over wide areas
of country. Two famines, onc in Bihar and the other in Southern
India, called for expenditure on an unprecedented scale. These and
other minor disasters cost the government in relief operations, or
remission of revenue, over £15,000,000. A commission appointed in
1877 to enquire into the subject of famine relief recommended that
a sum of £1,500,000 should be set aside in prosperous years to meet
the cost of these recurring calamities, without further increase of debt.
In years free from famine, the surplus was to be devoted, either to the
paying off of existing debt, or the avoidance of debt by constructing
works, such as railways, the cost of which must otherwise have been
met by borrowing. As the condition of the finances did not admit of
the sum required being set aside from revenue, additional funds were
provided by a fresh cess on land, the imposition of a licence tax on
the trading classes, and by reducing provincial assignments. Wars,
threats of wars, and falls in exchange caused these arrangements to
break down on several occasions, but, as soon as pressure was relieved,
the grant was resumed. The operations under the famine insurance
scheme enabled the Government of India, in addition to meeting
the cost of famine relief, to spend on development projects roughly
£5,000,000 from the inception of the scheme up to 1893. During these
| Report of Indian Currency Committee (Parl. Papers, 1893, Accounts, c. 7060).
Report of Indian Famine Commission, 1878.
CHIVI
21
## p. 322 (#360) ############################################
322
THE FINANCES OF INDIA, 1858-1918
years the government was in constant financial difficulties. The
Afghan war which broke out in 1878 proved very costly. Hardly had
the situation improved, when the Government of India was called
upon, in deference to the free-trade views obtaining in England, to
abolish the duty on all imported cotton goods, the import tax on
coarser goods, which formed the main product of the Indian mills,
having been removed in 1879. With the abolition of the duty on these
goods, which provided the bulk of the customs revenue, it was im-
possible to justify the retention of the rest of the import tariff levied
on a number of miscellaneous articles, many of which yielded an
insignificant revenue. It was accordingly decided to abolish all import
duties, except those levied on articles, such as liquor and salt, which
were subject to internal taxation.
From 1885 the government was again confronted with heavy
military expenditure as a result of the threatened advance on India
by Russia, and the operations which terminated in the annexation of
Upper Burma. An increase in the strength of the army and defensive
works on the frontier entailed a steady growth in expenditure between
1886 and 1893. With the limitations imposed on the customs tariff,
it was necessary to fall back on other heads of taxation which promised
to yield the additional income required. In 1886 the licence tax was
converted to an income-tax leviable on all non-agricultural incomes
above Rs. 500, and in 1887 the salt-tax was raised from Rs.
