No More Learning

”[149] Before Cæsar came into Gaul, the Ædui and the
Arverni were at the head of the two contending parties, each labouring
to carry the day against his rival. Soon these latter united with the
Sequani, who, jealous of the superiority of the Ædui, the allies of the
Roman people, invoked the support of Ariovistus and the Germans. By dint
of sacrifices and promises, they had succeeded in bringing them into
their territory. With this aid the Sequani had gained the victory in
several combats. [150] The Ædui had lost their nobility, a part of their
territory, nearly all their clients, and, after giving up as hostages
their children and their chiefs, they had bound themselves by oath never
to attack the Sequani, who had at length obtained the supremacy of all
Gaul. It was under these circumstances that Divitiacus had gone to Rome
to implore the succour of the Republic, but he had failed;[151] the
Senate was too much engaged with intestine quarrels to assume an
energetic attitude towards the Germans. The arrival of Cæsar was
destined to change the face of things, and restore to the allies of Rome
their old preponderance. [152]




CHAPTER III.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HELVETII.

(Year of Rome 696. )

(BOOK I. OF THE “COMMENTARIES. ”)


[Sidenote: Projects of Invasion by the Helvetii. ]

I. Cæsar, as we have seen, had received from the Senate and people a
command which comprised the two Gauls (Transalpine and Cisalpine) and
Illyria. [153] Yet the agitation which continued to reign in the Republic
was retaining him at the gates of Rome, when suddenly, towards the
spring of 696, news came that the Helvetii, returning to their old
design, were preparing to invade the Roman province. This intelligence
caused a great sensation.

The Helvetii, proud of their former exploits, confident in their
strength, and incommoded by excess of population, felt humiliated at
living in a country the limits of which had been made narrow by nature,
and for some years they meditated quitting it to repair into the south
of Gaul.

As early as 693, an ambitious chieftain, Orgetorix, found no difficulty
in inspiring them with the desire to seek elsewhere a more fertile
territory and a milder climate. They resolved to go and establish
themselves in the country of the Santones (the _Saintonge_), situated on
the shores of the ocean, to the north of the Gironde. Two years were to
be employed in preparations, and, by a solemn engagement, the departure
was fixed for the third year. But Orgetorix, sent to the neighbouring
peoples to contract alliances, conspired with two influential
personages--one of the country of the Sequani, the other of that of the
Ædui. He induced them to undertake to seize the supreme power, promised
them the assistance of the Helvetii, and persuaded them that those three
powerful nations, leagued together, would easily subjugate the whole of
Gaul. This conspiracy failed, through the death of Orgetorix, accused in
his own country of a design to usurp the sovereignty. The Helvetii
persisted, nevertheless, in their project of emigration. They collected
the greatest possible number of wagons and beasts of burden; and, in
order to destroy all idea of returning, they burnt their twelve towns,
their four hundred hamlets, and all the wheat they could not carry with
them. Each furnished himself with meal[154] for three months; and after
persuading their neighbours, the Rauraci,[155] the Tulingi, and the
Latobriges,[156] to imitate their example and follow them, and having
drawn to them those of the Boii who had moved from Noricum to the
neighbourhood of the Rhine, they fixed the rendezvous on the banks of
the Rhone for the 5th of the Calends of April (the 24th of March, the
day of the equinox). [157]

There were only two roads by which they could leave Helvetia; one
crossed the country of the Sequani, the entrance to which was defended
by a narrow and difficult defile, situated between the Rhone and the
Jura (the _Pas-de-l’Ecluse_), and where the wagons could with difficulty
pass one at a time. As this defile was commanded by a very lofty
mountain, a handful of men was sufficient to prevent the access. The
other road, less contracted and more easy, crossed the Roman province,
after having passed the Rhone, which separated the Allobroges from the
Helvetii, from Lake Léman to the Jura. Within this distance the river
was fordable in several places. [158] At Geneva, the extreme limit of the
territory of the Allobroges towards Helvetia, a bridge established a
communication between the two countries. The Helvetii decided on taking
the most convenient road; they reckoned, moreover, on the co-operation
of this neighbouring people, who, but recently subjugated, could have
but doubtful sympathies for the Romans. [159]


[Sidenote: Cæsar’s Arrival at Geneva. ]

II. Cæsar, learning that the Helvetii intended to pass through the Roman
province, left Rome hastily in the month of March, hurried by forced
marches into Transalpine Gaul, and, according to Plutarch, reached
Geneva in eight days. [160] As he had in the province only a single
legion, he ordered a levy of as many men as possible, and then destroyed
the bridge of Geneva. Informed of his arrival, the Helvetii, who were
probably not yet all assembled, sent their men of noblest rank to demand
a passage through the country of the Allobroges, promising to commit no
injury there; they had, they said, no other road to quit their country.
Cæsar was inclined to refuse their demand at once, but he called to mind
the defeat and death of the Consul L. Cassius; and wishing to obtain
time to collect the troops of which he had ordered the levy, he gave
them hopes of a favourable reply, and adjourned it to the Ides of April
(8th of April). By this delay he gained a fortnight; it was employed in
fortifying the left bank of the Rhone, between Lake Léman and the
Jura. [161] If we estimate at 5,000 men the legion which was in the
province, and at 5,000 or 6,000 the number of soldiers of the new
levies, we see that Cæsar had at his disposal, to defend the banks of
the Rhone, about 10,000 or 11,000 infantry. [162]


[Sidenote: Description of the Retrenchment of the Rhone. ]

III. The distance from Lake Léman to the Jura, following the
sinuosities of the river, is 29½ kilomètres, or 19,000 Roman paces
(_millia passuum decem novem_). [163] It is on the space comprised
between these two points that a retrenchment was raised which is called
in the “Commentaries” _murus fossaque_. This could not be a continuous
work, as the ground to be defended is intersected by rivers and ravines,
and the banks of the Rhone are almost everywhere so precipitous that it
would have been useless to fortify them. Cæsar, pressed for time, can
only have made retrenchments on the weakest points of the line where the
passage of the river was easy; indeed, this is what Dio Cassius tells
us. [164] The labours of the Romans were only supplementary, on certain
points, to the formidable natural obstacles which the Rhone presents in
the greater part of its course. The only places where an attempt could
be made to pass it, because the heights there sink towards the banks of
the river into practicable declivities, are situated opposite the modern
villages of Russin, Cartigny, Avully, Chancy, and Cologny. In these
places they cut the upper part of the slope into a perpendicular, and
afterwards hollowed a trench, the scarp of which thus gained an
elevation of sixteen feet. These works, by uniting the escarpments of
the Rhone, formed, from Geneva to the Jura, a continuous line, which
presented an impassable barrier. Behind and along this line, at certain
distances, posts and closed redoubts rendered it impregnable. (_See
Plate 3. _)[165]

This retrenchment, which required only from two to three days’ labour,
was completed when the deputies returned, at the time appointed, to hear
Cæsar’s reply. He flatly refused the passage, declaring that he would
oppose it with all his means.

Meanwhile the Helvetii, and the people who took part in their
enterprise, had assembled on the right bank of the Rhone. When they
learnt that they must renounce the hope of quitting their country
without opposition, they resolved to open themselves a passage by
force. Several times--sometimes by day, and sometimes by night--they
crossed the Rhone, some by fording, others with the aid of boats joined
together, or of a great number of rafts of timber, and attempted to
carry the heights, but, arrested by the strength of the retrenchment
(_operis munitione_), and by the efforts and missiles of the soldiers
who hastened to the threatened points (_concursu et telis_), they
abandoned the attack. [166]


[Sidenote: The Helvetii begin their March towards the Saône. Cæsar
unites his Troops. ]

IV. The only road which now remained was that which lay across the
country of the Sequani (the Pas-de-l’Ecluse); but this narrow defile
could not be passed without the consent of its inhabitants. The Helvetii
charged the Æduan Dumnorix, the son-in-law of Orgetorix, to solicit it
for them. High in credit among the Sequani, Dumnorix obtained it; and
the two peoples entered into an engagement, one to leave the passage
free, the other to commit no disorder; and, as pledges of their
convention, they exchanged hostages. [167]

When Cæsar learned that the Helvetii were preparing to pass through the
lands of the Sequani and the Ædui on their way to the Santones, he
resolved to oppose them, unwilling to suffer the establishment of
warlike and hostile men in a fertile and open country, neighbouring upon
that of the Tolosates, which made part of the Roman province. [168]

But, as he had not at hand sufficient forces, he resolved on uniting all
the troops he could dispose of in his vast command. He entrusts,
therefore, the care of the retrenchments on the Rhone to his lieutenant
T. Labienus, hastens into Italy by forced marches, raises there in great
haste two legions (the 11th and 12th), brings from Aquileia, a town of
Illyria,[169] the three legions which were there in winter quarters (the
7th, 8th, and 9th), and, at the head of his army, takes across the Alps
(_see Plate 4_) the shortest road to Transalpine Gaul. [170] The
Centrones, the Graioceli, and the Caturiges (see _page_ 24, _note_),
posted on the heights,[171] attempt to bar his road; but he overthrows
them in several engagements, and from Ocelum (_Usseau_),[172] the
extreme point of the Cisalpine, reaches in seven days the territory of
the Vocontii, making thus about twenty-five kilomètres a day. He next
penetrates into the country of the Allobroges, then into that of the
Segusiavi, who bordered on the Roman province beyond the Rhone. [173]

These operations took two months;[174] the same time had been employed
by the Helvetii in negotiating the conditions of their passage through
the country of the Sequani, moving from the Rhone to the Saône, and
beginning to pass the latter river. They had passed the Pas-de-l’Ecluse,
followed the right bank of the Rhone as far as Culoz, then turned to the
east through Virieu-le-Grand, Tenay, and Saint-Rambert, and, thence
crossing the plains of Ambérieux, the river Ain, and the vast plateau of
the Dombes, they had arrived at the Saône, the left bank of which they
occupied from Trévoux to Villefranche. (_See Plate 4. _) The slowness of
their march need not surprise us if we consider that an agglomeration of
368,000 individuals, men, women, and children, dragging after them from
8,000 to 9,000 wagons, through a defile where carriages could only pass
one abreast, would necessarily employ several weeks in passing it. [175]
Cæsar, no doubt, calculated beforehand, with sufficient accuracy, the
time it would take them to gain the banks of the Saône; and we may
therefore suppose that, at the moment when he repaired into Italy, he
hoped to bring thence his army in time to prevent them from passing that
river.

He established his camp near the confluence of the Rhone and the Saône,
on the heights which command Sathonay; thence he could equally
manœuvre on the two banks of the Saône, take the Helvetii in flank as
they marched towards that river, or prevent them, if they crossed it,
from entering into the Roman province by the valley of the Rhone. It was
probably at this point that Labienus joined him with the troops which
had been left with him, and which raised to six the number of his
legions. His cavalry, composed principally of Ædui and men raised in the
Roman province, amounted to 4,000 men. During this time the Helvetii
were ravaging the lands of the Ambarri, those of the Ædui, and those
which the Allobroges possessed on the right bank of the Rhone. These
peoples implored the succour of Cæsar. He was quite disposed to listen
to their prayers. [176]


[Sidenote: Defeat of the Helvetii on the Saône. ]

V. The Saône, which crossed the countries of the Ædui and the
Sequani,[177] flowed, then as now, in certain places with an extreme
sluggishness. Cæsar says that people could not distinguish the direction
of the current. The Helvetii, who had not learned to make bridges,
crossed the river, between Trévoux and Villefranche, on rafts and boats
joined together. As soon as the Roman general had ascertained by his
scouts that three-quarters of the barbarians were on the other side of
the river, and the others were still on his side, he left his camp
towards midnight (_de tertia vigilia_) (_see note 1 on page 69_) with
three legions, came upon those of the Helvetii who were still on the
left bank, to the north of Trévoux, in the valley of the Formans,
towards six o’clock in the morning, after a march of eighteen
kilomètres, attacked them by surprise in the midst of the confusion of
passing the river, and slew a great number. Those who could escape
dispersed, and concealed themselves in the neighbouring forests. This
disaster fell upon the Tigurini (_the inhabitants of the Cantons of
Vaud, Friburg, and a part of the Canton of Berne_), one of the four
tribes of which the nation of the Helvetii was composed, the same which,
in an expedition out of Helvetia, had formerly slain the Consul L.
Cassius, and made his army pass under the yoke. [178]

After this combat, Cæsar, in order to pursue the other part of the
enemy’s army, and prevent its marching towards the south, threw a bridge
across the Saône, and transported his troops to the right bank. The
barques which followed him for the conveyance of provisions would
necessarily facilitate this operation. It is probable that a detachment
established in the defiles on the right bank of the Saône, at the spot
where Lyons now stands, intercepted the road which would have conducted
the Helvetii towards the Roman province. As to the three legions which
remained in the camp of Sathonay, they soon rejoined Cæsar. The
Helvetii, struck by his sudden approach, and by the rapidity with which
he had effected, in one single day, a passage which had cost them twenty
days’ labour, sent him a deputation, the chief of which, old Divico, had
commanded in the wars against Cassius. In language full of boast and
threatening, Divico reminded Cæsar of the humiliation inflicted formerly
on the Roman arms. The proconsul replied that he was not forgetful of
old affronts, but that recent injuries were sufficient motives for his
conduct. Nevertheless, he offered peace, on condition that they should
give him hostages. “The Helvetii,” replied Divico, “have learned from
their ancestors to receive, but not to give, hostages; the Romans ought
to know that. ” This proud reply closed the interview.

Nevertheless, the Helvetii appear to have been desirous of avoiding
battle, for next day they raised their camp, and, cut off from the
possibility of following the course of the Saône to proceed towards the
south, they took the easiest way to reach the country of the Santones,
by directing their march towards the sources of the Dheune and the
Bourbince. (_See Plate 4. _) This broken country, moreover, permitted
them to resist the Romans with advantage. They followed across the
mountains of Charolais the Gaulish road, on the trace of which was, no
doubt, subsequently constructed the Roman way from Lyons to Autun,
vestiges of which still exist; the latter followed the course of the
Saône as far as Belleville, where it parted from it abruptly, crossing
over the Col d’Avenas, proceeding through the valley of the Grosne to
Cluny, and continuing by Saint-Vallier to Autun. At Saint-Vallier they
would quit this road, and march towards the Loire to pass it at
Decize. [179]

Cæsar followed the Helvetii, and sent before him all his cavalry to
watch their march. These, too eager in the pursuit, came to blows with
the enemy’s cavalry in a position of disadvantage, and experienced some
loss. Proud of having repulsed 4,000 men with 500 horsemen, the Helvetii
became sufficiently emboldened to venture sometimes to harass the Roman
army. But Cæsar avoided engaging his troops; he was satisfied with
following, day by day, the enemies at a distance of five or six miles at
most (about eight kilomètres), opposing the devastations they committed
on their passage, and waiting a favourable occasion to inflict a defeat
upon them.

The two armies continued their march extremely slowly, and the days
passed without offering the desired opportunity. Meanwhile, the
provisionment of the Roman army began to inspire serious uneasiness;
wheat arrived no longer by the Saône, for Cæsar had been obliged to move
from it in order to keep up with the Helvetii. On another hand, the Ædui
delayed, under vain pretexts, sending the grain which they had promised.
The harvest, too, was not yet ripe, and even forage failed. As the day
for distribution approached, Cæsar convoked the Æduan chiefs, who were
numerous in his camp, and overwhelmed them with reproaches. One of them,
Liscus, occupied in his country the supreme magistracy, under the name
of _vergobret_; he denounced Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, as
opposing the sending of provisions; it was the same Dumnorix who had
heretofore secretly negotiated the passage of the Helvetii across the
country of the Sequani, and who, placed at the head of the Æduan
contingent, had, in the last combat, by retreating with his men, led to
the flight of the whole body of the cavalry. Cæsar sent for Divitiacus,
a man devoted to the Roman people, and revealed to him the culpable
conduct of his brother, which merited an exemplary punishment.
Divitiacus expressed the same opinion, but, in tears, implored the
pardon of Dumnorix. Cæsar granted it to him, and contented himself with
placing him under surveillance. It was, indeed, good policy not to
alienate the Æduan people by any excessive severity against a man of
power among them.

The Helvetii, after advancing northward as far as Saint-Vallier, had
turned to the west to reach the valley of the Loire. Arrived near
Issy-l’Evêque, they encamped on the banks of a tributary of the Somme,
at the foot of Mount Tauffrin, eight miles from the Roman army. Informed
of this circumstance, Cæsar judged that the moment had arrived for
attacking them by surprise, and sent to reconnoitre by what circuits the
heights might be reached. He learnt that the access was easy, and
ordered Labienus to gain, with two legions, the summit of the mountain
by bye-roads, without giving alarm to the enemy, and to wait till he
himself, marching at the head of the four other legions, by the same
road as the Helvetii, should appear near their camp; then both were to
attack them at the same time. Labienus started at midnight, taking for
guides the men who had just explored the roads. Cæsar, on his part,
began his march at two o’clock in the morning (_de quarta
vigilia_),[180] preceded by his cavalry. At the head of his scouts was
P. Considius, whose former services under L. Sylla, and subsequently
under M. Crassus, pointed him out as an experienced soldier.

At break of day Labienus occupied the heights, and Cæsar was no more
than 1,500 paces from the camp of the barbarians; the latter suspected
neither his approach nor that of his lieutenant. Suddenly Considius
arrived at full gallop to announce that the mountain of which Labienus
was to take possession was in the power of the Helvetii; he had
recognised them, he said, by their arms and their military ensigns. At
this news, Cæsar, fearing that he was not in sufficient force against
their whole army, with only four legions, chose a strong position on a
neighbouring hill, and drew up his men in order of battle. Labienus,
whose orders were not to engage in battle till he saw the troops of
Cæsar near the enemy’s camp, remained immovable, watching for him. It
was broad daylight when Cæsar learnt that his troops had made themselves
masters of the mountain, and that the Helvetii had left their camp. They
escaped him thus, through the false report of Considius, who had been
blinded by a groundless terror.

Admitting that the Helvetii had passed near Issy-l’Evêque, Mount
Tauffrin, which rises at a distance of four kilomètres to the west of
that village, answers to the conditions of the text. There is nothing to
contradict the notion that Labienus and Cæsar may have, one occupied the
summit, the other approached the enemy’s camp within 1,500 paces,
without being perceived; and the neighbouring ground presents heights
which permitted the Roman army to form in order of battle. [181]


[Sidenote: Defeat of the Helvetii near Bibracte. ]

VI. That day the Helvetii continued their advance to Remilly, on the
Alène. Since the passage of the Saône, they had marched about a
fortnight, making an average of not more than eleven or twelve
kilomètres a day. [182] According to our reckoning, it must have been the
end of the month of June. Cæsar followed the Helvetii at the usual
distance, and established his camp at three miles’ distance from theirs,
on the Cressonne, near Ternant.

Next day, as the Roman army had provisions left for no more than two
days,[183] and as, moreover, Bibracte (_Mont Beuvray_),[184] the
greatest and richest town of the Ædui, was not more than eighteen miles
(twenty-seven kilomètres) distant, Cæsar, to provision his army, turned
from the road which the Helvetii were following, and took that to
Bibracte. (_See Plate 4. _) The enemy was informed of this circumstance
by some deserters from the troop of L. Emilius, decurion[185] of the
auxiliary cavalry. Believing that the Romans were going from them
through fear, and hoping to cut them off from their provisions, they
turned back, and began to harass the rear-guard.

Cæsar immediately led his troops to a neighbouring hill--that which
rises between the two villages called the Grand-Marié and the
Petit-Marié (_see Plate 5_)--and sent his cavalry to impede the enemies
in their march, which gave him the time to form in order of battle. He
ranged, half way up the slope of the hill, his four legions of veterans,
in three lines, and the two legions raised in the Cisalpine on the
plateau above, along with the auxiliaries, so that his infantry covered
the whole height. The heavy baggage, and the bundles (_sarcinæ_)[186]
with which the soldiers were loaded, were collected on one point, which
was defended by the troops of the reserve. While Cæsar was making these
dispositions, the Helvetii, who came followed by all their wagons,
collected them in one place; they then, in close order, drove back the
cavalry, formed in phalanxes, and, making their way up the slope of the
hill occupied by the Roman infantry, advanced against the first
line. [187]

Cæsar, to make the danger equal, and to deprive all of the possibility
of flight, sends away the horses of all the chiefs, and even his
own,[188] harangues his troops, and gives the signal for combat. The
Romans, from their elevated position, hurl the _pilum_,[189] break the
enemy’s phalanxes, and rush upon them sword in hand. The engagement
becomes general. The Helvetii soon become embarrassed in their
movements: their bucklers, pierced and nailed together by the same
_pilum_, the head of which, bending back, can no longer be withdrawn,
deprive them of the use of their left arm; most of them, after having
long agitated their arms in vain, throw down their bucklers, and fight
without them. At last, covered with wounds, they give way, and retire to
the mountain of the castle of La Garde, at a distance of about 1,000
paces; but while they are pursued, the Boii and the Tulingi, who, to the
number of about 15,000, formed the last of the hostile columns, and
composed the rear-guard, rush upon the Romans, and without halting
attack their right flank. [190] The Helvetii, who had taken refuge on the
height, perceive this movement, return to the charge, and renew the
combat. Cæsar, to meet these two attacks, effects a change of front
(_conversa signa bipartito intulerunt_) in his third line, and opposes
it to the new assailants, while the first two lines resist the Helvetii
who had already been repulsed. [191]

This double combat was long and furious. Unable to resist the
impetuosity of their adversaries, the Helvetii were obliged to retire,
as they had done before, to the mountain of the castle of La Garde; the
Boii and Tulingi towards the baggage and wagons. Such was the
intrepidity of these Gauls during the whole action, which lasted from
one o’clock in the afternoon till evening, that not one turned his back.
Far into the night there was still fighting about the baggage. The
barbarians, having made a rampart of their wagons, some threw from
above their missiles on the Romans; others, placed between the wheels,
wounded them with long pikes (_mataræ ac tragulæ_). The women and
children, too, shared desperately in the combat. [192] At the end of an
obstinate struggle, the camp and baggage were taken. The daughter and
one of the sons of Orgetorix were made prisoners.

This battle reduced the Gaulish emigration to 130,000 individuals. They
began their retreat that same evening, and, after marching without
interruption day and night, they reached on the fourth day the territory
of the Lingones, towards Tonnerre (_see Plate 4_): they had, no doubt,
passed by Moulins-en-Gilbert, Lormes, and Avallon. The Lingones were
forbidden to furnish the fugitives with provisions or succour, under
pain of being treated like them. At the end of three days, the Roman
army, having taken care of their wounded and buried the dead, marched in
pursuit of the enemy. [193]


[Sidenote: Pursuit of the Helvetii. ]

VII. The Helvetii, reduced to extremity, sent to Cæsar to treat for
their submission. The deputies met him on his march, threw themselves at
his feet, and demanded peace in the most suppliant terms. He ordered
them to say to their fellow-countrymen that they must halt on the spot
they then occupied, and await his arrival; and they obeyed. As soon as
Cæsar overtook them, he required them to deliver hostages, their arms,
and the fugitive slaves. While they were preparing to execute his
orders, night coming on, about 6,000 men of a tribe named Verbigeni
(_Soleure, Argovie, Lucerne, and part of the Canton of Berne_) fled,
either through fear that, having once delivered up their arms, they
should be massacred, or in the hope of escaping unperceived in the midst
of so great a multitude. They directed their steps towards the Rhine and
the frontiers of Germany.

On receiving news of the flight of the Verbigeni, Cæsar ordered the
peoples whose territories they would cross to stop them and bring them
back, under pain of being considered as accomplices. The fugitives were
delivered up and treated as enemies; that is, put to the sword, or sold
as slaves. As to the others, Cæsar accepted their submission: he
compelled the Helvetii, the Tulingi, and the Latobriges to return to the
localities they had abandoned, and to restore the towns and hamlets they
had burnt; and since, after having lost all their crops, they had no
more provisions of their own, the Allobroges were ordered to furnish
them with wheat. [194] These measures had for their object not to leave
Helvetia without inhabitants, as the fertility of its soil might draw
thither the Germans of the other side the Rhine, who would thus become
borderers upon the Roman province. He permitted the Boii, celebrated for
their brilliant valour, to establish themselves in the country of the
Ædui, who had asked permission to receive them. They gave them lands
between the Allier and the Loire, and soon admitted them to a share in
all their rights and privileges.

In the camp of the Helvetii were found tablets on which was written, in
Greek letters, the number of all those who had quitted their country: on
one side, the number of men capable of bearing arms; and on the other,
that of the children, old men, and women. The whole amounted to 263,000
Helvetii, 36,000 Tulingi, 14,000 Latobriges, 23,000 Rauraci, and 32,000
Boii--together, 368,000 persons, of whom 92,000 were men in a condition
to fight. According to the census ordered by Cæsar, the number of those
who returned home was 110,000. [195] The emigration was thus reduced to
less than one-third.

The locality occupied by the Helvetii when they made their submission is
unknown; yet all circumstances seem to concur in placing the theatre of
this event in the western part of the country of the Lingones. This
hypothesis appears the more reasonable, as Cæsar’s march, in the
following campaign, can only be explained by supposing him to start from
this region. We admit, then, that Cæsar received the submission of the
Helvetii on the Armançon, towards Tonnerre, and it is there that we
suppose him to have been encamped during the events upon the recital of
which we are now going to enter.


[Sidenote: Observations. ]

VIII. The forces of the two armies opposed to each other in the battle
of Bibracte were about equal, for Cæsar had six legions--the 10th, which
he had found in the Roman province; the three old legions (7th, 8th, and
9th), which he had brought from Aquileia; and the two new ones (11th and
12th), raised in the Cisalpine. The effective force of each must have
been near the normal number of 6,000 men, for the campaign had only
begun, and their ranks must have been increased by the veterans and
volunteers of whom we have spoken in the first volume (page 456). The
number of the legionaries was thus 36,000. Adding 4,000 cavalry, raised
in the Roman province and among the Ædui, and probably 20,000
auxiliaries,[196] we shall have a total of 60,000 combatants, not
including the men attached to the machines, those conducting the
baggage, the army servants, &c. The Helvetii, on their side, did not
count more than 69,000 combatants, since, out of 92,000, they had lost
one-fourth near the Saône.
In this battle, it must be remarked, Cæsar did not employ the two
legions newly raised, which remained to guard the camp, and secure the
retreat in case of disaster. Next year he assigned the same duty to the
youngest troops. The cavalry did not pursue the enemies in their rout,
doubtless because the mountainous nature of the locality made it
impossible for it to act.




CHAPTER IV.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST ARIOVISTUS.

(Year of Rome 696. )

(BOOK I. OF THE “COMMENTARIES. ”)


[Sidenote: Seat of the Suevi and other German Tribes. ]

I. On the termination of the war against the Helvetii, the chiefs of
nearly all Celtic Gaul went to congratulate Cæsar, and thank him for
having, at the same time, avenged their old injuries, and delivered
their country from immense danger. They expressed the desire to submit
to his judgment certain affairs, and, in order to concert matters
previously, they solicited his permission to convoke a general assembly.
Cæsar gave his consent.

After the close of the deliberations, they returned, secretly and in
tears, to solicit his support against the Germans and Ariovistus, one of
their kings. These peoples were separated from the Gauls by the Rhine,
from its mouth to the Lake of Constance. Among them the Suevi occupied
the first rank. They were by much the most powerful and the most
warlike. They were said to be divided into a hundred cantons, each of
which furnished, every year, a thousand men for war and a thousand men
for agriculture, taking each other’s place alternately: the labourers
fed the soldiers. No boundary line, among the Suevi, separated the
property of the fields, which remained common, and no one could prolong
his residence on the same lands beyond a year. However, they hardly
lived upon the produce of the soil: they consumed little wheat, and
drank no wine; milk and flesh were their habitual food. When these
failed, they were fed upon grass. [197] Masters of themselves from
infancy, intrepid hunters, insensible to the inclemency of the seasons,
bathing in the cold waters of the rivers, they hardly covered a part of
their bodies with thin skins. They were savages in manners, and of
prodigious force and stature. They disdained commerce and foreign
horses, which the Gauls sought with so much care. Their own horses,
though mean-looking and ill-shaped, became indefatigable through
exercise, and fed upon brushwood. Despising the use of the saddle,
often, in engagements of cavalry, they jumped to the ground and fought
on foot: their horses were taught to remain without moving. [198] The
belief in the dogma of the immortality of the soul, strengthened in them
the contempt for life. [199] They boasted of being surrounded by immense
solitudes: this fact, as they pretended, showed that a great number of
their neighbours had not been able to resist them: and it was reported,
indeed, that on one side (towards the east) their territory was bounded,
for an extent of 600 miles, by desert plains; on the other, they
bordered upon the Ubii, their tributaries, the most civilised of the
German peoples, because their situation on the banks of the Rhine placed
them in relation with foreign merchants, and because, neighbours to the
Gauls, they had formed themselves to their manners. [200]

Two immense forests commenced not far from the Rhine, and extended, from
west to east, across Germany; these were the Hercynian and Bacenis
forests. (_See Plate 2. _) The first, beginning from the Black Forest and
the Odenwald, covered all the country situated between the Upper Danube
and the Maine, and comprised the mountains which, further towards the
east, formed the northern girdle of the basin of the Danube; that is,
the Boehmerwald, the mountains of Moravia, and the Little Carpathians.
It had a breadth which Cæsar represents by nine long days’ march. [201]
The other, of much less extent, took its rise in the forest of
Thuringia; it embraced all the mountains to the north of Bohemia, and
that long chain which separates the basins of the Oder and the Vistula
from that of the Danube.

The Suevi inhabited, to the south of the forest Bacenis, the countries
situated between the forest of Thuringia, the Boehmerwald, the Inn, and
the Black Forest, which compose, in our days, the Duchies of
Saxe-Meiningen and Saxe-Coburg, Bavaria, and the greater part of
Wurtemberg. [202] To the east of the Suevi were the Boii (_partly in
Bohemia and partly in the north-west of Austria_);[203] to the north,
the Cherusci, separated from the Suevi by the forest Bacenis; to the
west, the Marcomanni (_the upper and middle course of the Maine_) and
the Sedusii (_between the Maine and the Neckar_); to the south, the
Harudes (_on the north of the Lake of Constance_), the Tulingi, and the
Latobriges (_the southern part of the Grand Duchy of Baden_).

On the two banks of the Rhine dwelt the Rauraci (_the territory of Bâle
and part of the Brisgau_); the Triboces (_part of Alsace and of the
Grand Duchy of Baden_): on the right bank were the Nemetes (_opposite
Spire_); the Vangiones (_opposite Worms_); the Ubii, from the Odenwald
to the watershed of the Sieg and the Ruhr. To the north of the Ubii were
the Sicambri, established in Sauerland, and nearly as far as the Lippe.
Finally, the Usipetes and the Tencteri were still farther to the north,
towards the mouth of the Rhine. (_See Plate 2. _)


[Sidenote: The Gauls solicit Cæsar to come to their assistance. ]

II. The Gaulish chiefs who had come to solicit the succour of Cæsar made
the following complaints against Ariovistus:--“The German king,” they
said, “had taken advantage of the quarrels which divided the different
peoples of Gaul; called in formerly by the Arverni and the Sequani, he
had gained, with their co-operation, several victories over the Ædui, in
consequence of which the latter were subjected to the most humiliating
conditions. Shortly afterwards his yoke grew heavy on the Sequani
themselves, to such a degree that, though conquerors with him, they are
now more wretched than the vanquished Ædui. Ariovistus has seized a
third of their territory;[204] another third is on the point of being
given up, by his orders, to 24,000 Harudes, who have joined him some
months ago. There are 120,000 Germans in Gaul. The contingents of the
Suevi have already arrived on the banks of the Rhine. In a few years the
invasion of Gaul by the Germans will be general. Cæsar alone can prevent
it, by his prestige and that of the Roman name, by the force of his
arms, and by the fame of his recent victory. ”

Gaul thus came voluntarily, in the persons of her chiefs, to throw
herself into the arms of Cæsar, take him for the arbiter of her destiny,
and implore him to be her saviour. He spoke encouragingly, and promised
them his support. Several considerations engaged him to act upon these
complaints. He could not suffer the Ædui, allies of Rome, to be brought
under subjection by the barbarians. He saw a substantial danger for the
Republic in the numerous immigrations of fierce peoples who, once
masters of Gaul, would not fail, in imitation of the Cimbri and
Teutones, to invade the Roman province, and thence fall upon Italy.
Resolved to prevent these dangers, he proposed an interview with
Ariovistus, who was probably occupied, since the defeat of the
Helvetii, in collecting an army among the Triboci (towards
Strasburg),[205] as well to oppose the further designs of the Romans, as
to defend the part of the country of the Sequani which he had seized.
Ariovistus, it will be remembered, had been declared, under Cæsar’s
consulate, ally and friend of the Roman people; and this favour would
encourage the expectation that the head of the Germans would be willing
to treat; but he refused with disdain the proposed interview. Then Cæsar
sent messengers to him to reproach him with his ingratitude. “If
Ariovistus cares to preserve his friendship, let him make reparation for
all the injury he has inflicted upon the allies of Rome, and let him
bring no more barbarians across the Rhine; if, on the contrary, he
rejects these conditions, so many acts of violence will be punished in
virtue of the decree rendered by the Senate, under the consulate of M.
Messala and M. Piso, which authorises the governor of Gaul to do that
which he judges for the advantage of the Republic, and enjoins him to
defend the Ædui and the other allies of the Roman people. ”

By this language, Cæsar wished to show that he did not violate the law,
enacted a year before under his consulate, which forbade the governors
to leave their provinces without an order of the Senate. He purposely
appealed to an old decree, which gave unlimited powers to the governor
of Gaul, a province the importance of which had always required
exceptional laws. [206] The reply of Ariovistus was equally proud:--

“Cæsar ought to know as well as he the right of the conqueror: he admits
no interference in the treatment reserved for the vanquished; he has
himself causes of complaint against the proconsul, whose presence
diminishes his revenues; he will not restore the hostages to the Ædui;
the title of brothers and allies of the Roman people will be of little
service to them. He cares little for threats. No one has ever braved
Ariovistus with impunity. Let anybody attack him, and he will learn the
valour of a people which, for fourteen years, has never sought shelter
under a roof. ”[207]


[Sidenote: March of Cæsar upon Besançon. ]

III. This arrogant reply, and news calculated to give alarm, hastened
Cæsar’s decision. In fact, on one side the Ædui complained to him of the
devastation of their country by the Harudes; and, on the other, the
Treviri announced that the hundred cantons of the Suevi were preparing
to cross the Rhine. [208] Cæsar, wishing to prevent the junction of
these new bands with the old troops of Ariovistus, hastened the
collecting of provisions, and advanced against the Germans by forced
marches. The negotiations having probably lasted during the month of
July, it was now the beginning of August. Starting from the
neighbourhood of Tonnerre, where we have supposed he was encamped, Cæsar
followed the road subsequently replaced by a Roman way of which vestiges
are still found, and which, passing by Tanlay, Gland, Laignes, Etrochey,
and Dancevoir, led to Langres. [209] (_See Plate 4. _) After three long
days’ marches, on his arrival towards Arc-en-Barrois, he learnt that
Ariovistus was moving with all his troops to seize Besançon, the most
considerable place in Sequania, and that he had already advanced three
days’ march beyond his territory. Cæsar considered it a matter of
urgency to anticipate him, for this place was abundantly provided with
everything necessary for an army. Instead of continuing his march
towards the Rhine, by way of Vesoul, Lure, and Belfort, he advanced, day
and night, by forced marches, towards Besançon, obtained possession of
it, and placed a garrison there. [210]

The following description, given in the “Commentaries,” is still
applicable to the present town. “It was so well fortified by nature,
that it offered every facility for sustaining war. The Doubs, forming a
circle, surrounds it almost entirely, and the space of sixteen hundred
feet,[211] which is not bathed by the water, is occupied by a high
mountain, the base of which reaches, on each side, to the edge of the
river. The wall which encloses this mountain makes a citadel of it, and
connects it with the _oppidum_. ”[212]

During this rapid movement of the Roman army on Besançon, Ariovistus had
advanced very slowly. We must suppose, indeed, that he halted when he
was informed of this march; for, once obliged to abandon the hope of
taking that place, it was imprudent to separate himself any farther from
his re-enforcements, and, above all, from the Suevi, who were ready to
pass the Rhine towards Mayence, and await the Romans in the plains of
Upper Alsace, where he could advantageously make use of his numerous
cavalry.


[Sidenote: Panic in the Roman Army. ]

IV. During the few days which Cæsar passed at Besançon (the middle of
August), in order to assure himself of provisions, a general panic took
possession of his soldiers. Public rumour represented the Germans as men
of gigantic stature, of unconquerable valour, and of terrible aspect.
Now there were in the Roman army many young men without experience in
war, come from Rome, some out of friendship for Cæsar, others in the
hope of obtaining celebrity without trouble. Cæsar could not help
receiving them. It must have been difficult, indeed, for a general who
wished to preserve his friends at Rome, to defend himself against the
innumerable solicitations of influential people. [213] This panic had
begun with these volunteers; it soon gained the whole army. Every one
made his will; the least timid alleged, as an excuse for their fear, the
difficulty of the roads, the depth of the forests, the want of
provisions, the impossibility of obtaining transports, and even the
illegality of the enterprise. [214]

Cæsar, surprised at this state of feeling, called a council, to which he
admitted the centurions of all classes. He sharply reproached the
assembled chiefs with wishing to penetrate his designs, and to seek
information as to the country into which he intended to lead them. He
reminded them that their fathers, under Marius, had driven out the
Cimbri and the Teutones; that, still more recently, they had defeated
the German race in the revolt of the slaves;[215] that the Helvetii had
often beaten the Germans, and that they, in their turn, had just beaten
the Helvetii. As to those who, to disguise their fears, talk of the
difficulty of the roads and the want of food, he finds it very insolent
in them to suppose that their general will forget his duty, or to
pretend to dictate it to him. The care of the war is his business: the
Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingones will furnish wheat; in fact, it is
already ripe in the fields (_jamque esse in agris frumenta matura_). As
to the roads, they will soon have the opportunity of judging of them
themselves. He is told the soldiers will not obey, or raise the ensigns
(_signa laturi_). [216] Words like these would not shake him; the soldier
despises the voice of his chief only when the latter is, by his own
fault, abandoned by fortune or convicted of cupidity or embezzlement. As
to himself, his whole life proves his integrity; the war of the Helvetii
affords evidence of his favour with fortune; for which cause, without
delay, he will break up the camp to-morrow morning, for he is impatient
to know if, among his soldiers, fear will prevail over honour and duty.
If the army should refuse to follow him, he will start alone, with the
10th legion, of which he will make his prætorian cohort. Cæsar had
always loved this legion, and, on account of its valor, had always the
greatest confidence in it.

This language, in which, without having recourse to the rigours of
discipline, Cæsar appealed to the honour of his soldiers, exciting at
the same time the emulation both of those whom he loaded with praise
and of those whose services he affected to disdain,--this proud
assertion of his right to command produced a wonderful revolution in the
minds of the men, and inspired the troops with great ardour for
fighting. The 10th legion first charged its tribunes to thank him for
the good opinion he had expressed towards them, and declared that they
were ready to march. The other legions then sent their excuses by their
tribunes and centurions of the first class, denied their hesitations and
fears, and pretended that they had never given any judgment upon the
war, as that appertained only to the general. [217]


[Sidenote: March towards the Valley of the Rhine. ]

V. This agitation having been calmed, Cæsar sought information
concerning the roads from Divitiacus, who, of all the Gauls, inspired
him with the greatest amount of confidence. In order to proceed from
Besançon to the valley of the Rhine, to meet Ariovistus, the Roman army
had to cross the northern part of the Jura chain. This country is
composed of two very distinct parts. The first comprises the valley of
the Doubs from Besançon to Montbéliard, the valley of the Oignon, and
the intermediate country, a mountainous district, broken, much covered
with wood, and, without doubt, at the time of Cæsar’s war in Gaul, more
difficult than at present. The other part, which begins at the bold
elbow made by the Doubs near Montbéliard, is composed of lengthened
undulations, which diminish gradually, until they are lost in the plains
of the Rhine. It is much less wooded than the first, and offers easier
communications. (_See Plate 4. _)

Cæsar, as he had announced, started early on the morrow of the day on
which he had thus addressed his officers, and, determined on conducting
his army through an open country, he turned the mountainous and
difficult region just described, thus making a circuit of more than
fifty miles (seventy-five kilomètres),[218] which is represented by a
semi-circumference, the diameter of which would be the line drawn from
Besançon to Arcey. It follows the present road from Besançon to Vesoul
as far as Pennesières, and continues by Vallerois-le-Bois and
Villersexel to Arcey. He could perform this distance in four days; then
he resumed, on leaving Arcey, the direct road from Besançon to the Rhine
by Belfort and Cernay.

On the seventh day of a march uninterrupted since leaving Besançon, he
learnt by his scouts that the troops of Ariovistus were at a distance of
not more than twenty-four miles (36 kilomètres).

Supposing 20 kilomètres for the day’s march, the Roman army would have
travelled over 140 kilomètres in seven days, and would have arrived on
the Thur, near Cernay. (By the road indicated, the distance from
Besançon to the Thur is about 140 kilomètres. ) At this moment,
Ariovistus would have been encamped at 36 kilomètres from the Romans, to
the north, near Colmar.

Informed of the arrival of Cæsar, Ariovistus sent him word “that he
consented to an interview, now that the Roman general had come near, and
that there was no longer any danger for him in going to him. ” Cæsar did
not reject this overture, supposing that Ariovistus had returned to more
reasonable sentiments.

The interview was fixed for the fifth day following. [219] In the
interval, while there was a frequent exchange of messages, Ariovistus,
who feared some ambuscade, stipulated, as an express condition, that
Cæsar should bring with him no foot soldiers, but that, on both sides,
they should confine themselves to an escort of cavalry. The latter,
unwilling to furnish any pretext for a rupture, consented; but, not
daring to entrust his personal safety to the Gaulish cavalry, he mounted
on their horses men of the 10th legion, which gave rise to this jocular
saying of one of the soldiers: “Cæsar goes beyond his promise; he was to
make us prætorians, and he makes us knights. ”[220]


[Sidenote: Interview between Cæsar and Ariovistus. ]

VI. Between the two armies extended a vast plain, that which is crossed
by the Ill and the Thur. A tolerably large knoll rose in it at a nearly
equal distance from either camp. [221] This was the place of meeting of
the two chieftains. Cæsar posted his mounted legion at 200 paces from
the knoll, and the cavalry of Ariovistus stood at the same distance. The
latter demanded that the interview should take place on horseback, and
that each of the two chiefs should be accompanied only by ten horsemen.
When they met, Cæsar reminded Ariovistus of his favours, of those of the
Senate, of the interest which the Republic felt in the Ædui, of that
constant policy of the Roman people which, far from suffering the
abasement of its allies, sought incessantly their elevation. He repeated
his first conditions.

Ariovistus, instead of accepting them, put forward his own claims: “He
had only crossed the Rhine at the prayer of the Gauls; the lands which
he was accused of having seized, had been ceded to him; he had
subsequently been attacked, and had scattered his enemies; if he has
sought the friendship of the Roman people, it is in the hope of
benefiting by it; if it becomes prejudicial to him, he renounces it; if
he has carried so many Germans into Gaul, it is for his personal safety;
the part he occupies belongs to him, as that occupied by the Romans
belongs to them; his rights of conquest are older than those of the
Roman army, which had never passed the limits of the province. Cæsar is
only in Gaul to ruin it. If he does not withdraw from it, he will regard
him as an enemy, and he is certain that by his death he shall gain the
gratitude of a great number of the first and most illustrious personages
in Rome. They have informed him by their messengers that, at this price,
he would gain their good-will and friendship. But if he be left in free
possession of Gaul, he will assist in all the wars that Cæsar may
undertake. ”

Cæsar insisted on the arguments he had already advanced: “It was not one
of the principles of the Republic to abandon its allies; he did not
consider that Gaul belonged to Ariovistus any more than to the Roman
people. When formerly Q. Fabius Maximus vanquished the Arverni and the
Ruteni, Rome pardoned them, and neither reduced them to provinces nor
imposed tribute upon them. If, then, priority of conquest be invoked,
the claims of the Romans to the empire of Gaul are the most just; and if
it be thought preferable to refer to the Senate, Gaul ought to be free,
since, after victory, the Senate had willed that she should preserve her
own laws. ”

During this conversation, information was brought to Cæsar that the
cavalry of Ariovistus were approaching the knoll, and were throwing
stones and darts at the Romans. Cæsar immediately broke up the
conference, withdrew to his escort, and forbade them to return the
attack, not from fear of an engagement with his favourite legion, but in
order to avoid, in case he should defeat his enemies, the suspicion that
he might have taken advantage of their good faith to surprise them in an
interview. Nevertheless, the arrogance of Ariovistus, the disloyal
attack of his cavalry, and the rupture of the conference, were soon
known, and excited the ardour and impatience of the Roman troops.

Two days afterwards, Ariovistus made a proposal for a renewal of the
conference, or for the sending to him of one of Cæsar’s lieutenants.
Cæsar refused, the more so because, the day before, the Germans had
again advanced and thrown their missiles at the Romans, and that thus
his lieutenant would not have been safe from the attacks of the
barbarians. He thought it more prudent to send as his deputy Valerius
Procillus, the son of a Gaul who had become a Roman citizen, who spoke
the Celtic language, and who was on familiar terms with Ariovistus, and
M. Mettius, with whom the German king was bound by the rights of
hospitality. They had hardly entered the camp of Ariovistus, when he
ordered them to be thrown into fetters, under pretence that they were
spies. [222]


[Sidenote: Movements of the two Armies. ]

VII. The same day, the German king broke up his camp and took another
position at the foot of the Vosges (_sub monte_), at a distance of 6,000
paces from that of Cæsar, between Soultz and Feldkirch, not far from the
Lauch. (_See Plate 6. _) Next day he crossed the Thur, near its
confluence with the Ill, ascended the left banks of the Ill and the
Doller, and only halted at Reiningen, after having gone two miles (three
kilomètres) beyond the Roman camp. By this manœuvre, Ariovistus cut
off Cæsar’s communication with Sequania and the Æduan country, but he
left open the communications with the country of the Leuci and the
Lingones. [223] (_See the Map of Gaul, 2. _) The two armies thus encamped
at a short distance from each other. During the five following days,
Cæsar drew out his troops each day, and formed them in order of battle
at the head of his camp (_pro castris suas copias produxit_), but was
not able to provoke the Germans to fight; all hostility was limited to
cavalry skirmishes, in which the latter were much practised. To 6,000
horsemen was joined an equal number of picked men on foot, among whom
each horseman had chosen one to watch over him in combat. According to
circumstances, the horsemen fell back upon the footmen, or the latter
advanced to their assistance. Such was their agility, that they kept up
with the horses, running and holding by the mane. [224]

Cæsar, seeing that Ariovistus persisted in shutting himself up in his
camp and intercepting his communications, sought to re-establish them,
chose an advantageous position about 600 paces (900 mètres) beyond that
occupied by the Germans, and led thither his army drawn up in three
lines. He kept the first and second under arms, and employed the third
on the retrenchments. The spot on which he established himself is
perhaps the eminence situated on the Little Doller, to the north of
Schweighausen. Ariovistus sent thither about 16,000 of his light troops
and all his cavalry, to intimidate the Romans and impede the works.
Nevertheless, the third line continued them, and the two others repelled
the attack. The camp once fortified, Cæsar left in it two legions and a
part of the auxiliaries, and took back the four others to the principal
camp. The two Roman camps were 3,600 mètres distant from each other.

Hitherto Cæsar had been satisfied with drawing out his troops and
backing them upon his retrenchments; the next day, persisting in his
tactics (_instituto suo_) of trying to provoke Ariovistus to fight, he
drew them up at a certain distance in advance of the principal camp, and
placed them in order of battle (_paulum a majoribus castris progressus,
aciem instruxit_). In spite of this advanced position (_ne tum
quidem_), Ariovistus persisted in not coming out. The Roman army
re-entered the camp towards midday, and a part of the German troops
immediately attacked the small camp. Both armies fought resolutely till
evening, and there were many wounded on both sides. Astonished at seeing
that, in spite of this engagement, Ariovistus still avoided a general
battle, Cæsar interrogated the prisoners, and learnt that the matrons
charged with consulting destiny had declared that the Germans could not
be conquerors if they fought before the new moon. [225]


[Sidenote: Battle against the Germans. ]

VIII. Next day, leaving a sufficient guard in the two camps, Cæsar
placed all his auxiliaries in view of the enemy, in advance of the
smaller camp; the number of the legionaries being less than that of the
Germans, he sought to conceal his inferiority from the enemy by
displaying other troops. While the Germans took these auxiliaries for
the two legions which occupied the lesser camp, the latter left it by
the Decuman gate, and, unperceived, went to rejoin the other four. Then
Cæsar drew up his six legions in three lines, and, marching forward, he
led them up to the enemy’s camp (_usque ad castra hostium accessit_).
This offensive movement allowed the Germans no longer the choice of
avoiding battle: they quitted their camp, descended into the plain,[226]
drew up in line, by order of nations, at equal intervals--Harudes,
Marcomanni, Suevi, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, and Sedusii; and, to
deprive themselves of all possibility of flight, inclosed themselves on
the sides and in the rear by a circuit of carriages and wagons, on which
they placed their women: dishevelled and in tears, these implored the
warriors, as they marched to the battle, not to deliver them in slavery
to the Romans. In this position, the Roman army faced the east, and the
German army the west, and their lines extended over a space now partly
covered by the forest of Nonnenbruch. [227]

Cæsar, still more to animate his soldiers, determined to give them
witnesses worthy of their courage, and placed at the head of each legion
either one of his lieutenants or his quæstor. [228] He led the attack in
person, with his right wing, on the side where the Germans seemed
weakest. The signal given, the legions dash forward; the enemy, on his
side, rushes to the encounter. On both sides the impetuosity is so great
that the Romans, not having time to use the _pilum_, throw it away, and
fight hand to hand with the sword. But the Germans, according to their
custom, to resist an attack of this kind, form rapidly in phalanxes of
three or four hundred men,[229] and cover their bare heads with their
bucklers. They are pressed so close together, that even when dead they
still remain standing. [230] Such was the ardour of the legionaries, that
many rushed upon these sort of tortoises, tearing away the bucklers, and
striking the enemies from above. [231] The short and sharp-pointed swords
of the Romans had the advantage over the long swords of the
Germans. [232] Nevertheless, according to Appian, the legions owed their
victory chiefly to the superiority of their tactics and the steadiness
with which they kept their ranks. [233] Ariovistus’s left did not resist
long; but while it was driven back and put to flight, the right, forming
in deep masses, pressed the Romans hard. Young P. Crassus, commander of
the cavalry placed at a distance from the thick of the battle, and
better placed to judge of its incidents, perceived this, sent the third
line to the succour of the wavering legions, and restored the combat.
Soon Ariovistus’s right was obliged to give way in its turn; the rout
then became general, and the Germans desisted from flight only when they
reached the Rhine, fifty miles from the field of battle. [234] They
descended, no doubt, the valley of the Ill as far as Rhinau, thus
retracing a part of the road by which they had come. (_See Plate 4. _)
Cæsar sent his cavalry after them; all who were overtaken were cut to
pieces; the rest attempted to swim across the river, or sought safety in
boats. Among the latter was Ariovistus, who threw himself into a
boat[235] he found attached to the bank. According to Plutarch and
Appian,[236] 80,000 men perished in the combat and during the pursuit.