No More Learning

This
was admittedly based on that of Read and Munro, and such changes
as were introduced were not in practice important. It had been
proposed to give the force of law to these instructions by embodying
them in a regulation, but Munro advised against this in pursuance
of his policy of reserving for government the power of controlling
the collector's discretion and limiting the opportunities for the
interference of the courts. 1
Looking back across the interval traversed in this chapter we see
that by the year 1818 the administration of the Madras Presidency
had come to be quite unlike anything that could be found in the
South India of 1786. The government possessed a military force
which was without any external rival and their territories were all
but completely immune from invasion. In all districts they had
agents who were capable of supplying information and could be
trusted to carry out the instructions sent them. No inferior authority
was in a position to question their orders. The zamindars and poligars
had been reduced to subordination and their military organisation
broken up. This last was a most beneficial change. It was estimated
that at the end of the eighteenth century the southern poligars alone
maintained 100,000 armed retainers, who were employed in resisting
the central power, in making war upon one another, and in plundering
peaceable cultivators. By 1818 the poligars' retainers were hardly
anywhere a serious menace. Most of them had settled down to
cultivate the land in earnest. Those who belonged to criminal tribes
could not forsake their traditions so readily, but their activities were
no longer public and unrestrained. Though no regular police force
was in existence, the military power of the government made it easy
for the collector to maintain order by means of his revenue servants
and the village watchmen. Regular judicial courts had been set up
1 Cf. Baden-Powell, Land Systems, , 32.


## p. 481 (#509) ############################################

RESULTS
481
and were freely resorted to by those who could afford the cost of
litigation. Indeed so popular were these innovations that Munro
failed in his attempt to give new life to the village panchayat, which
could hardly survive in competition with professional lawyers and
judges. The uncertainties of the land revenue system continued but
had become less alarming. In many districts there was a fixed
maximum assessment on record. The cultivators no longer ran the
risk of being handed over to a stranger who had rented a district for
a short term of years and was anxious to see what could be made out
of it in the time allowed him. The collector was now almost as free
from legal restraint as the renter had been. But he was influenced
by longer views and feared the future effect of his current demands.
And even where the collector was too severe, there was a chance of
redress. As early as 1804 the government had overridden the Board
of Revenue and removed a collector whose assessments were inju-
diciously high. But with the strengthening of the administration had
coine a great increase in the efficiency of the assessing and collecting
agency. This had its danger, since the recognised standard of assess-
meni was still that which had been sanctioned by the practice of
Indian rulers. If the proportion of the annual crop actually taken by
the state agents was not higher than it had been in 1786, certainly it
was usually too high to allow the cultivator to accumulate stock. There
was a persistent pressure for revenue to meet the heavy military and
administrative expenses of the presidency, and no attention had been
paid to Munro's plea for a substantial reduction in the standard
assessment. Turning to the miscellaneous sources of revenue we find
that some of the most vexatious and unprofitable imposts had been
swept away but others were unnecessarily retained. The inland transit
duties had been replaced by the hardly less objectionable town duties.
The new salt monopoly was a far more powerful instrument for
raising money than the medley of systems which it replaced, and
the new stamp tax produced very considerable sums. The Company's
subjects suffered less from vexatious methods of taxation but more
money was drawn from them.
The subjugation of the poligars, the establishment of judicial
courts, and the improvement of the revenue system had absorbed the
chief of the government's energy. Little thought or money could be
spared for other matters. It was during our period that India was
converted from an exporter to an importer of cotton cloth. A French
missionary has left us a vivid description of the ruin which that revo-
lution brought upon the cloth weavers of South India, but this aspect
of the matter hardly attracted the attention of the Madras Govern-
ment. Information was gathered about the prevalence of slavery in
the Tamil country and on the west coast, but no action was taken. It
was not till 1822 that an enquiry into the state of education was set
on foot. Munro seems to have been almost the only Madras official
who had considered the advisability of employing Indian officers in
31


## p. 482 (#510) ############################################

482
MADRAS DISTRICT SYSTEM AND LAND REVENUE
positions of trust. Famines were dealt with when they came by
opening relief works and granting remissions, but the government
had not yet learnt to regard them as recurring visitations gainst
whose coming preparations should be made in advance. Even Munro
supposed that they could only arise from war or gross misgovernment,
and that there was never likely to be a succession of crop failures
bad enough to produce a famine. Some collectors, notably Place in
Chingleput, had shown great activity in repairing the irrigation
works; and for this purpose, and for the improvement of the roads
the nucleus of a public works organisation had been brought into
being. But its activities were narrowly restricted, because no
adequate funds were placed at its disposal. Much less was there any
serious thought of providing money for the construction of great new
irrigation works, though the existence of so many ancient works was
recognised as a challenge inviting honourable emulation.


## p. 483 (#511) ############################################

CHAPTER XXVIII
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
TH
HE student of Indian history hardly needs the caution that the
British India of the earlier part of the nineteenth century was vastly
different in size and in environment from that of to-day. The boundary
to the north-west was the Satlej for. but a very short distance;
Bahawalpur and the desert bordering Rajputana lay further south;
whilst beyond the frontier were two great states, of one of which at
least little was known, the Panjab and Sind. The frontier problems
were necessarily different from those of our own time, different and
much more important. In the eighteenth century the French had.
been the great rivals of the English in the East; but their place was
now taken by Russia, a power which had natural connections with
Central Asia, and one whose mission and intentions were dreaded
and much misunderstood for the rest of the century. It is one of
the few claims to statesmanship which can be urged on behalf of
Auckland that he refused to be frightened of Russia, and that almost
alone of the men of his time he took a moderate view of what she
could do that might harm the Indian Empire.
The modern kingdom of Kabul came into existence on the break
up of the great empire of Nadir Shah, the Persian. That famous
adventurer himself came from Khorassan and when he was, perhaps
owing to Persian jealousy of the Afghans, assassinated in 1747 Ahmad
Khan of the Abdali tribe, chief of the sacred Sadozai clan, the most
important in Afghanistan, was chosen king by the revolting nation.
He changed the name of his tribe from Abdali to Durani, and after
the change was always known as Ahmad Shah Durani. Having been
crowned at Kandahar he proceeded to build up a state, understanding,
what it would have been well if the English had remembered, that
ne who would maintain any hold upon the Afghans must keep them
busy with constant warfare. He resolved that wherever there were
Afghans there should his rule extend, and so when he died in 1773
he left his family firmly established in a kingdom which, as defined
by Ferrier, was bounded on the north by the Oxus and the mountains
of Kafaristan; on the south by the sea of Oman; on the east by the
mountains of Tibet, the Satlej, and the Indus; and on the west by
Khorassan, Persia, and Kirman; and if this empire was to some extent
what Sir Henry Maine would have called a tributary empire, there
was present a strong national feeling which would keep the centre
at any rate vigorous and independent.
Ahmad Shah left eight sons, of whom he had designated the
second, Taimy: Mirza. as his successor. He was governing Herat when


## p. 484 (#512) ############################################

484
>
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
his father died, and his elder brother, Sulaiman Mirza, at once pro-
claimed himself king at Kandahar. Sulaiman had married the
daughter of Shah Wali Khan, wazir of Ahmad Shah, and this gave
him confidence. Shah Wali Khan, however, when Taimur approached,
at once deserted to him, and together with others of his party was
promptly executed. Sulaiman finding himself without sufficient
support fled to India. Taimur was now crowned, and having learned
to distrust the Duranis, though one himself, he decided to move the
seat of government from Kandahar, their city, to Kabul. Kandahar
was placed under his son, Mahmud Mirza, and his general policy
is described as one designed to curb the powers of the tribal chiefs.
Near the throne was Payandah Khan, the chief of the Barakzai tribe,
whose father had given way when Ahmad Shah was chosen king.
But Taimur though able was indolent, and his vast dominions
were, perhaps, too great a tax upon his energy. He had great difficulty
in crushing a revolt in Khorassan, which had hitherto acknowledged
the overlordship of Afghanistan, and he exercised but nominal control
over Balkh and Akhshah. In Sind he was even less successful. Ahmad
Shah had had difficulties in that country and had given the title of
Amir of Sind to one of the chiefs. This man, the head of the Kalora
tribe, was attacked in 1779 by Mir Fath 'Ali Khan, the head of the
rival tribe, the Talpura. Taimur, on being appealed to, wasted the
country round Bahawalpur and restored the Kalora amir, but the
conflict began again when he left the province; his generals were
unable to reduce the Talpuras, who were secretly helped by the
khan of Kalat, and in the end Mir Fath 'Ali Khan was made governor
of Sind on promising tribute. This was in 1786. Three years later
he threw off his allegiance and Sind was independent when Taimur
died in 1793. Afghanistan then consisted of the principalities of
Kashmir, Lahore, Peshawar, Kabul, Balkh, Kulu, Kandahar, Multan,
and Herat. Kalat, Balochistan, and Persian Khorassan acknowledged
overlordship, and there was still a claim on Sind though, as has been
said, tribute had not been paid for some years.
As Taimur left twenty-three sons there was ample scope for am.
bition; especially as they were borne of many different mothers and
divided, therefore, into corresponding groups. Nearly all the mothers
were Afghans, but three princes were by a great-granddaughter of
Nadir Shah, and two were by a Moghul princess whom Taimur had
married. Several of the sons were governors of provinces; Humayun
Mirza was' at Kandahar, and Mahmud Mirza, the second son, who
supported his elder brother, was at Herat. Abbas Mirza, the fourth,
wa: at Peshawar, and seemed the most popular candidate for the
throne. Zaman Mirza, the fifth, who actually secured it, had on his
side Payandah Khan, the chief of the Barakzais. Shuja-ul-Mulk was
at Ghazni, and Kohan Dil was in Kashmir. But the outstanding factor
in the situation was the influence of Payandah Khan, because to him
and to the Barakzais the people looked to maintain their privileges


## p. 485 (#513) ############################################

ZAMAN SHAH
485
as against their kings. When, therefore, he pronounced for Zaman
Mirza he drew with him the chief Afghan families and; what was not
to be expected, the mercenary Kizilbashis of Kabul, and decided the
preliminary election.
Zaman Shah had constant difficulties in the Panjab east of the
Indus, although he placed Lahore under Ranjit Singh, formally, in
1799; but whenever he came down to Peshawar trouble broke out
in Afghanistan, most of it of his own making. He had chosen his
wazir badly and the result was the long and tragic conflict between
the Durani chiefs, and of them principally the Barakzais and the
royal house of Sadozais, which continued for the next half century.
Payandah Khan, the head of the Barakzais, took part in a con-
spiracy in favour of Shuja-ul-mulk, Zaman's brother, and with other
important men was executed in 1799. This was the period of Zaman
Shah's glory when his descent upon India, improbable as it seems
now, was considered as a national peril by the English authorities.
Indeed it was to prevent any such movement that they turned
anxiously towards Persia, knowing that the Rohillas had invited
Zaman Shah to come in 1796 and fearing combinations of the Indian
Muhammadans in his favour. Zaman Shah had, however, work
enough at home. The Barakzai brothers, the sons of Payandah Khan,
were no less than twenty-one in number and the eldest, Fath Khan-
the kingmaker-fled into Khorassan, joined Prince Mahmud Mirza
there and persuaded him to revolt. The result was that Zaman Shah,
who was troubled with risings in Peshawar and Kashmir at the same
time, was overthrown and blinded. He fled to Herat and later to
India where he lived, a striking and pathetic figure, for many years.
Mahmud Shah who thus became the monarch of Afghanistan
(1800) soon sank into ease and indifference, forgetting that the
throne was easier to get than to keep. He sent his son Kamran Mirza
to take Peshawar from Shuja Mirza, whom Zaman Shah had made
governor, and who had now proclaimed himself king. In 1801 Shuja
Mirza was defeated by Fath Khan when marching on Kabul, and
thus Mahmud secured Peshawar, though he had the mortification of
knowing that it was only by the will of the all-powerful Barakzai
that he remained on the throne at all. A revolt of the Ghilzais, a
turbulent tribe, was suppressed in 1801. But a peaceful prince could
never hold Afghanistan, and the Kizilbashis on whom Mahmud
relied were unpopular as Shias; the annexation of Khorassan by the
Persians in 1802 weakened him; and in 1803 Shuja Mirza defeated
his army and secured the throne.
Shah Shuja was merciful and yet always unpopular. He loved
pomp, and throughout the course of his long life, which cost the
English so dear, he showed himself singularly incapable either of
understanding his own people or of attaching them to him. His great
difficulty, that of every Afghan monarch, was with the powerful


## p. 486 (#514) ############################################

486
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
chieftains. He made the mistake of pardoning without trusting the
great Barakzai, Fath Khan, with the result that Fath Khan stirred
up Prince Kaysar, son of Zaman Shah, who had been made governor
of Kandahar, but who was easily persuaded to try for more. This
revolt was crushed with some difficulty, Prince Kaysar being forgiven
and Fath Khan flying to Kamran Mirza, the restless son of Mahmud,
at Herat. And though Sind was reduced to obedience in 1805, new
revolts followed, Dost Muhammad Khan, afterwards so famous,
aiding his brother Fath Khan and appearing for the first time pro-
minently. Things, however, looked a little brighter in 1808, though
there was no hope of recovering the southern provinces; the Barakzais
had been checked if not conquered.
Up to the day of the Treaty of Tilsit the attention of the English
in India had had perforce to be concentrated on the Marathas, and
it was not till the early months of 1818 that the power of the con-
federacy was broken by Lord Hastings. But the direction that things
were taking was well understood and the people of Sind as well as
the Sikhs were aware that they would both sooner or later come
undier British rule unless they made a very strong attempt to prevent
it. This steady policy of concentration and annexation was inter-
rupted, but not for long, by the course of western events. The Persians
were not really strong enough to threaten India, but memories are
long in the East; Nadir Shah had been murdered in 1747, but a
movement eastward might restore some of the territory that had
been lost since his day. In 1799 Lord Wellesley sent Malcolm, one of
the ablest men of his time, to Fath 'Ali Shah who had been on the
throne at Teheran for about a year; and Malcolm arranged the two
famous treaties signed on 28 January, 1801. The first was commercial
and provided for the establishment of factories in Persia; it also
spoke of the cession of islands in the Persian Gulf to the East India
Company. The second was political, and was directed against the
aggressions of Afghanistan and the extension of French influence in
Persia. But events were more powerful than treaties. Georgia was
annexed by Russia in 1801, and the proclamations of the Russians
indicated further advances. The Persians suffered heavily in Armenia
in 1804, and the shah appealed to the French for help in 1805, as
England and Russia were for the moment on the same side. Hence
we get French influence and French officers in Teheran. Very little
resulted of a positive kind, for the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 changed
the whole position and France and Russia were now in alliance.
The government of Bengal had not cared much for Malcolm's
treaties, but its sense of the importance of the states on the frontier
to the west had increased, especially as Afghanistan became more
and more distracted. Their policy was represented by a series of
1 Aitchison. op. cit. XII, 38.


## p. 487 (#515) ############################################

MISSIONS TO PERSIA
487
>
niissions, those of Seton to Sind, Metcalfe to the Sikhs, Elphinstone
to Afghanistan, and Malcolm once more to Persia.
As Malcolm set out from Bombay Sir Harford Jones reached India
on a mission from the court of St James's to Teheran. Finding how
things were, he wisely waited till Malcolm had failed to oust the
French and then started. He was more successful than his pre-
decessor, reaching Teheran late in 1808 and satisfactorily combating
French influence; helped no doubt by the fact that the Russians
remained in Georgia, and by the certainty that if any expedition
came through Persia to India it would be Persia that would suffer
first. By the treaty of 12 March, 1809,1 the shah promised that he
would not allow any European force whatsoever to pass through
Persia towards either India or its ports. If India were attacked by
Afghanistan or any other power the shah would help, and if Persia
were attacked by a European power the English would provide either
troops or a subsidy and a loan of officers. The projected attack on the
Island of Karrak-a foolish business-was disowned. From this time
the relations with Persia were chiefly in the hands of the Foreign
Office. The only treaty that needs notice in a brief summary is that
of Teheran concluded in 1814 which, inter alia, in return for a promise
of protection, bound the Persians to attack the Afghans if they
invaded India. ?
Meanwhile the missions to the Sikhs and the Afghans had also
set out. Elphinstone's cbject was to try and get the help of the
Afghans against the French, and if necessary against the Persians,
but action was to be limited to the occasion and no troops were to
be promised. It came to very little and Elphinstone never got further
than Peshawar. A useless treaty against an imaginary Franco-Persian
combination was made on 17 June, 1809,3 but by that time Shah Shuja
had trouble to face nearer home and the mission was hurriedly sent
away
While Shah Shuja lingered at Peshawar he sent his best army
under Akram Khan into Kashmir where it was defeated. This was a
fatal blow as news arrived that Mahmud Shah and Fath Khan had
taken Kandahar. Shah Shuja was now defeated at Nimula near
Gandammak (1809) and began his years of wandering intrigue. In
1812 he was a prisoner in Kashmir; later he was at Lahore, where
Ranjit Singh took the great Durani diamond, the Koh-i-nur, from
him, and made various promises of help which he did not intend to
fulfil. After more adventures and much journeying he reached
Ludhiana in 1816 and there he remained for the time under British
protection.
Mahmud Shah owed everything to the Barakzais and for a time
2 Idem, p. 54.
1 Aitchison, op. cit. XII, 46.
3 Idem, XI, 336.


## p. 488 (#516) ############################################

488
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
he left matters in the strong hand of Fath Khan, who in turn confided
most of the governorships to his brothers, Herat only remaining in
the hands of Firoz-ud-din, the brother of Mahmud Shah. His great
helper now was his brother Dost Muhammad who, as the son of a
Kizilbashi mother, was until his talents became known but little
regarded by the Barakzais. Fath Khan asserted the Afghan supre-
macy over Sind and Balochistan. In alliance with Ranjit Singh he
,
reconquered Kashmir, which had rebelled, and made his brother
Muhammad Azim the governor there. But when he tried to avoid
paying the promised reward to the Sikhs, Ranjit Singh seized Attock
and defeated a force under Dost Muhammad.
Fath Khan, however, now entered on a disastrous undertaking.
He resolved to lead an expedition to Khorassan to clear out the
Persians there; his real motive doubtless was to obtain possession of
Herat. Dost Muhammad managed by a stratagem to get hold of the
city, killed some of its guards, and insulted the ladies of Firoz-ud-din's
harem. This roused the feelings of their relatives to madness and
Kamran Shah (son of Mahmud Shah) with the consent of his father
seized Fath Khan, blinded him and finally hacked him to pieces with
savage cruelty. This was in 1818. Dost Muhammad, who had fled
to Kashmir, raising an army with the aid of Muhammad Azim Khan,
inarched against Kabul which was held by Jahangir the son of
Kamran Shah. Mahmud Shah fled to Ghazni, and Dost Muhammad
obtained possession of the capital by the treachery of Atta Muham-
mad, whom the Barakzais promptly blinded. Soon all the country
was in Barakzai hands save Herat where were Shah Mahmud and
Prince Kamran, who acknowledged the suzerainty of Persia. There
Mahmud lived till 1829 when he died and was succeeded by Kamran.
Thus fell the empire of the Sadozais. But at first the Barakzais
were too much divided to assert any claim for themselves. Dost
Muhammad put forward Sultan 'Ali of the royal line. Muhammad
Azim Khan brought forward Shah Shuja and later Ayyab Khan,
another son of Taimur Shah. The foreign situation was serious and
after a short time Ranjit Singh acquired the right bank of the Indus
and the lordship over Peshawar, of which Sultan Muhammad (one
of Muhammad Azim's brothers) was governor, and for which he
paid tribute. The position at home seemed clearer, Muhammad Azim
holding Kabul; Dost Muhammad, Ghazni; Pir Dil Khan, Kohan
Dil Khan, and their brothers, Kandahar; Jabbar Khan, the Ghilzai
country; and over all was the puppet king Ayyab Khan. But there
were further struggles between the brothers and with Ranjit Singh,
in the course of which Muhammad Azim Khan died broken-hearted
in 1823 after Ranjit Singh's victory at Nawshahra. The leading
feature of these confused struggles was the gradual rise to power of
Dost Muhammad. He drove his brother, Sultan Muhammad, in 1826
back to Peshawar, secured Kabul, holding also Ghazni and later
Jallalabad. In considering the future policy of England in the matter


## p. 489 (#517) ############################################

RUSSIAN DESIGNS
489
we have to remember that this man, no worse if little better than his
contemporaries, had secured the throne by his own abilities; that
Shah Shuja with all the advantages that descent could give had lost
it; and that Dost Muhammad ruled for the next twelve years with
vigour and ability. He was strong enough to defeat with ease. Shah
Shuja's attempt to recover the throne in 1834, and the struggles of
that time revealed in Muhammad Akbar Khan a soldier who was to
prove of great help to his father in years to come. He strengthened
himself by crushing the Durani chieftains, and taking away their
immunities. But he had to suffer one result of the treachery of his
brothers which had been so manifest in the attempt of Shah Shuja.
Peshawar was lost for ever to the Afghan state in 1834, and even the
successful expedition of 1837, in which Dost Muhammad's son won
the battle of Jamrud (1 May), failed to retake it.
Meanwhile Russia's Eastern ambitions, shown by the annexation
of Georgia in 1801, led to a war between Russia and Persia in 1811;
ending in the Treaty of Gulistan (1813). By this Russia gained very
important additions to her territory, on the shores of the Caspian on
which Persia was to keep no more armed vessels. Persia hoped by
the aid of English officers to strengthen her army, and a certain
number were lent for the purpose; England thought that by the
Treaty of Teheran (1814) she had made Persia into a buffer state
for the defence of India. Neither result was, however, attained.
After the death of Alexander I, Shah Fath 'Ali was driven by
the fanatical excitement of his subjects to go to war again, and
hostilities began afresh in 1826. The Persians were very unfortunate;
they were defeated by the Russians at Elizabethpol and elsewhere,
and Paskievich crossed the Araxes, secured Erivan and Tabriz, and
forced the shah to conclude the humiliating Treaty of Turkomanchai
in 1828. From this time Russian influence grew in Persia, while
English influence declined.
The strength of Russia received great addition in Europe by the
conclusion of the Treaty of Adrianople. The opinion which regarded
Russia as a danger to our Indian Empire found expression in much
vague talk in England and the East; it is represented by the pamphlets
(1829) of Sir De Lacy Evans, a man of restless and enquiring mind,
which, however, secured at least one careful answer. Of similar
tendency were the writings of Dr J. McNeill, afterwards minister at
Teheran:
Lord William Bentinck left a valuable minute for Lord Auckland
on the subject of Russia's designs. At this time she was working
through Persia which seemed easier than herself trying to reduce
Khiva and Bokhara. In 1831 Abbas Mirza with it was thought)
Russian encouragement planned an expedition against Khiva, and
though this was abandoned for the moment he overran Khorassan
by the end of 1832. The Khivan scheme with possible extensions was
then taken up again, and in 1833 Muhammad Mirza, son of Abbas


## p. 490 (#518) ############################################

490
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
Mirza, the heir apparent, led an army which in the first instance was
to reduce. Herat.
However, in the autumn of this year Abbas Mirza
died at Meshed, and Muhammad Mirza had to withdraw to secure
his own recognition as heir to the throne. Scarcely had this been
settled by the aid of England and Russia, when Fath 'Ali Shah died
(1834) and Muhammad Mirza, who was now a close friend of Russia,
became shah of Persia. Count Simonich, the Russian agent, became
all powerful, and Ellis, who was soon to be succeeded by McNeill, the
English representative, sent home disquieting reports of the young
king's Eastern projects, including, as they did, not only the capture of
Herat but that of Kandahar also. The whole matter was very com-
plicated. The Russians were encouraging the idea of an expedition
against Herat and the English were trying to curb the shah's ambi-
tion. Kamran, however, led on by Yar Muhammad, his minister,
had given ground of offence, especially by asserting a claim to Sistan
which Persia could not allow. The Barakzai sirdars of Kandahar,
against Dost Muhammad's wish, intrigued with the shah, and the
English at one time even thought of giving active assistance in
training the amir of Afghanistan's army.
The situation in 1835 when Lord Auckland was appointed gover-
nor-general was thus very difficult. He had been chosen instead of
Lord Heytesbury by Lord Melbourne's ministry, and was regarded
as a safe man who would devote himself to the internal development
of the country rather than to the pursuit of a vigorous foreign policy.
But we must never forget in judging him that he was not his own
master. He came out as the exponent of the views of others, and the
study of his correspondence gives one the impression that, while he
undoubtedly made mistakes, his own opinions, had he dared to assert
them, were in the main more sensible and acute than those which
were dictated from home or pressed upon him by men whom he
trusted, too much in some cases, in India. The dispatch of 25 June,
1836, which was sent to him by the Secret Committee has sometimes
been forgotten, and yet it was the guide of his conduct throughout,
even perhaps when he questioned its wisdom. Attention was first
drawn to it by Sir Auckland Colvin's apologia for his father. "
Dost Muhammad already had a grievance against the English
for countenancing Shuja in 1834. Ranjit Singh, too, the ally of the
English, still kept Peshawar; the wish of the Afghan king to recover
this city is often considered unreasonable, but it was a natural object
of Afghan ambition, and Dost Muhammad had sent a protest on the
subject to Lord William Bentinck. It was no doubt this too which
induced him to send his agent to St Petersburg, whose visit sub-
sequently resulted in the mission of Vitkevich.
It must be remembered that we had an agent named Masson at
Kabul in 1836, though his position was not publicly recognised.
1 Sir Auckland Colvin, John Russell Colvin, p. 86.


## p. 491 (#519) ############################################

BURNES'S MISSION
491
Information that he gave is preserved in the India Office. Dost
Muhammad, however, in May, 1836, sent a formal ietter to Auckland
congratulating him on his arrival, speaking frankly of his difficulties
with the Sikhs, and saying that he would be guided by what Auckland
advised. In reply Auckland said that he hoped that Afghanistan
would be a flourishing and united nation; he mentioned the project
for the navigation of the Indus; and while he spoke of his intention
to send some one to discuss commercial questions at Kabul he asserted
his neutrality as to the Sikh dispute. The idea of a commercial
niission (proposed by the Secret Committee) was not new. Kaye
thinks it was suggested to Lord William Bentinck by Sir John
Malcolm, and in February, 1836, it had been mentioned at Ludhiana.
As long before as 1832 Alexander Burnes, an Indian officer of great
intelligence and enterprise, had made a famous journey through
Afghanistan and Persia, and on his return to India had been sent on
a mission to the amirs of Sind whom he persuaded to agree to a
survey of the Indus. While busy about this matter he was instructed
to undertake the commercial mission to Afghanistan.
In November, 1836, Burnes started from Bombay on his mission.
He passed through Sind and at Dehra Ghazi Khan he heard of the
battle of Jamrud, which made the task of the English more difficult
owing to their relations with Ranjit Singh; Dost Muhammad, as we
know by a letter of 30 January, 1837, had begged for English inter-
vention. Burnes journeyed through the Khaibar and on 20 September,
1837, the mission arrived at Kabul and lodged in the Bala Hissar, a
combination of palace and fortress afterwards to become so famous.
How far the idea of a commercial mission was sincere may be judged
from the correspondence that has come down to us. For instance
Auckland's letter of 6 January, 1838, is purely political, and on 26
July, 1837, Colvin had written to Burnes warning him as regards
ficace between the Sikhs and the Afghans not to enter into any
negotiations which would commit the government after the death of
Ranjit Singh or Dost Muhammad, and he adds in strange contras:
to Auckland's recent letter :
A consolidated and powerful Mahommedan State on our frontier might be
anything rather than safe and useful to us. The existing division of strength
seems far preferable, excepting as it adds to the risk of Herat's being attacked
by Persia.
Auckland's real views are to be found in a letter of 8 February, 1838,
where he favours the then divided state of Central Asia, though he
would like to see Kandahar and Herat on friendly terms. It is only
fair to add that Colvin had written to Burnes on 13 September, 1837,
to the effect that Auckland entirely approved of Burnes determination
1 Kaye, Afghan War, I, 170.
2 Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, 283 (I, 273).


## p. 492 (#520) ############################################

492
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
not to allow Dost Muhammad to play off any other power against
the British.
But Burnes could not get very far. Dost Muhammad was anxious
to recover Peshawar with the aid of the British, and this Auckland
would not hear of; Burnes could only offer help in making peace.
He said that he thought that Ranjit Singh intended to make some
change in the arrangements for the control of the city; that this change
would be the work of Ranjit Singh and not of the British; and that it
would probably take the form of the city being given over to Sultan
Muhammad, Dost Muhammad's brother, to be held under the control
of the Sikhs. But, as he frankly wrote, the Afghan king would as soon
have Peshawar in the hands of the Sikhs as in those of his brother.
What he wished was to hold it himself even if he held it nominally
by paying tribute under Lahore. The British, however, were cer-
tainly not going to support Dost Muhammad as against Ranjit Singh,
and the importance of this attitude when a Russian agent arrived in
December, 1837, can readily be realised. We must not forget Burnes'
opinion expressed in his letter of 26 January, 1838, that Dost Muham-
mad was merely acting on the defensive, and that his views deserved
serious consideration. The whole letter is full of wise foresight.
There was another matter. Mr Moriarty has suggested that it was
as a counterstroke to Russian activity in Teheran that Auckland sent
Burnes to Kabul, and on his way Burnes had written to the British
minister in Persia to the effect that he would try and stop the
intrigues between the Kandahar chieftains and the Russians; he soon
found it necessary to threaten Kohan Dil Khan on the subject. Here
he had the support of Dost Muhammad, who really would have
preferred the British alliance to any other. Burnes showed this in
his letter of 23 December, 1837. 4
As Kohan Dil Khan altered his attitude and grew afraid of the
Persians Burnes hoped for a more friendly relation. So he wrote and
offered British help, to the extent of money at least, in case of attack
by the Persians, who were now, it must be remembered, besieging
Herat. Dost Muhammad was in a difficult position with regard to
Herat. The blood feud prevented his going to the rescue of Kamran,
who on the other hand talked of recovering Afghanistan if he were
successful. The Persians, too, made no secret of regarding Herat as
the first step towards the acquisition of the domain of Nadir Shah.
Burnes also said that in case of need he would go with Dost Muham-
mad to the rescue of Kandahar, and he . sent over Lieutenant Leech
who had accompanied him about the end of December, 1837.
To all this Auckland could not agree, and Macnaghten, on
2 Idem, p. 130.
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, 43.
3
Cam. Hist. For. Pol. 11, 204.
* Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, 99.


## p. 493 (#521) ############################################

BURNES'S FAILURE
493
20 January, 1838, told Burnes so. " He was to get out of his difficụlt
position in the best way he could, and if necessary, he was to tell the
chiefs that he had exceeded his instructions; and Colvin's letter of
the following day explains the position.
In the end it is said that Auckland thought that Burnes was right,
and Hobhouse, it would appear from one of his letters, thought the
same. But the result of the policy of the government of India was to
alienate all parties in Afghanistan. Dost Muhammad said that if
Sultan Muhammad held Peshawar it meant his own ruin, for he
knew that the latter was trying to arrange a combination with Shah
Shuja and the Kandahar chiefs against him. A proposal that was
put forward with the amir's consent that there should be joint rule
on the part of the amir and Sultan Muhammad over Peshawar was
rejected. Peshawar must be left to the Sikhs. And all that Auckland
had to offer in the way of restraining Ranjit Singh from attacking
Afghanistan was regarded as worth little in exchange, as it was, for
a request that Dost Muhammad would promise not to connect
himself with any other state. On 5 March, 1838, a list of demands
from the amir including a promise to protect Kabul and Kandahar
from Persia, the surrender of Peshawar by Ranjit Singh, and the
protection by the British Government of those who might return
there, supposing it were restored to Sultan Muhammad Khan, was
declined by Burnes, and after further fruitless talk Burnes left on
26 April, 1838. 2 This threw the amir into closer relations with the
Russians with whom the Kandahar brothers had agreed on terms
assuring them Ghorian as well as Herat. The Russian envoy even
hoped to open negotiations with Ranjit Singh. But Dost Muhammad
was far from satisfied.
For the moment things looked gloomy, for McNeill had found
the Russian agent, Simonich, too strong for him, and had not been
able to prevent or stop the siege of Herat. Muhammad Shah's expedi-
tion had started with the approval of the sirdars of Kandahar, and
many of the people of Herat, being Shiahs like the Persians, might
have welcomed a change of masters on religious grounds. The ruler,
Kamran Shah, was the last of the Sadozai princes to retain a throne;
but he was old and degraded, and the power was in the hands of the
wazir, Yar Muhammad Khan, one of the vilest wretches in Asia. In
the summer of 1837, then, the forces of the state had to hurry back
from Sistan because it was reported that, far from helping in the
conquest of Kandahar and Kabul for the Sadozais, the Persians were
going to begin by taking Herat for themselves. Ghorian fell into
their hands on 15 November, 1837, and on the 23rd of the same
month the famous siege of Herat began.
Eldred Pottinger, who had been sent by his uncle, the well-known
resident in Sind, was in the city, and by his energetic assistance the
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, 121.
2 For Auckland's account see idem, p. 293 sqq.


## p. 494 (#522) ############################################

494
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
>
defence was maintained for many months. McNeill, the English
envoy, reached the camp on 6 April, 1838, and said that this war was
a violation of the treaty between England and Persia. His mediation
proved useless and the promises from Russia and Kandahar raised
the Persian hopes. McNeill's influence declined, and Herat was all
but taken on 24 June. Meanwhile, on 19 June, a British naval force
appeared before Karrak in the Persian Gulf and landed troops there.
McNeill at once sent word to the shah that the occupation of Herat
by the Persians would be considered as a hostile act by the English.
Colonel Stoddart, who arrived in the Persian camp on 11 August,
1838, bore the message, and the siege was raised, and by 9 September
the Persian army was on its march westward. The Russian agents
had encouraged the shah in this undertaking, but they were duly
disowned, and one of them committed suicide when he reached
St Petersburg. On 20 October, 1838, Count Nesselrode in a dispatch
to Count Pozzo di Borgo, the Russian ambassador in London, dealt
with the Persian question and the English apprehensions as to the
part Russia was playing in the matter. And Palmerston sent a very
characteristic dispatch to him on 20 December, 1838,2 followed by
a note on the whole question, to be presented to Nesselrode by Lord
Clarendon. It has been urged with some force that it was rather
difficult for England to claim the monopoly of intrigue in Central
Asia.
In India there was general unrest. Auckland was worried; he
grumbled that he had to manage affairs which ranged from Canton
to Suez, and though he was a man of peace he made the unfortunate
choice of a strong forward policy. How much the fault lay with
Macnaghten, Torrens and Colvin, whom he chiefly relied upon, will
probably never be settled, but he slowly came to a decision. Though
in 1837 he had written to Metcalfe that he had not a thought of
interfering between the Afghans and the Sikhs, by 12 May, 1838, he
had come to hold very different views. If Persia should succeed before
Herat and advance upon Eastern Afghanistan he thought that there
would be three possible courses open to him : 3
The first to confine our defensive measures to the line of the Indus, and to
leave Afghanistan to its fate; the second to attempt to save Afghanistan by
granting, succour to the existing chiefships of Caubul and Candahar; the third
to permit or to encourage the advance of Ranjit Singh's armies upon Caubul,
under counsel and restriction, and as subsidiary to his advance to organise an
expedition headed by Shah Shooja, such as I have above explained. The first
course would be absolute defeat, and would leave a free opening to Russia and
Persian intrigue upon our frontiers. The second would be only to give power
to those who feel greater animosity against the Sikhs, than they do against the
Persians, and who would probably use against the former the means placed at
their disposal; and the third course, which, in the event of the successful
resistance of Herat would appear to be 'most expedient, would, if the State
were to fall into the hands of the Persians, have yet more to recommend it,
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1839, XI,
501.
? Idem, p. 512. .
3 Kaye, I, 320.


## p. 495 (#523) ############################################

THE TRIPARTITE TREATY
496
and I cannot hesitate to say that the inclination of my opinion is, for the reasons
which will be gathered from this paper, very strongly in favour of it. . . .
With these views, as their dispatches of 24 October and 9 Novem-
ber, 1838, show, the home authorities were in accord, and though there
is little enthusiasm in their letter of 27 October to the governor-
general, they speak of the necessity of his recovering his influence.
Three days later than the date of Auckland's minute, Macnaghten
on proceeding to Lahore received instructions which suggested two
alternative courses as possible. The one was that the Sikhs should
advance on Kabul accompanied by British agents, whilst a demonstra-
tion should be made by a division of the British army occupying
Shikarpur with the Shah Shuja in their company; the British Gov-
ernment advancing him money and lending him officers. The other
was that the maharaja should take his own course against Dost
Muhammad, only using Shah Shuja if success seemed certain, and if
Shah Shuja was agreeable. The governor-general thought the former
plan the more efficient, but the second the simpler, and on the whole.
the more expedient.
There was a good deal of reconsideration, but in the end Ranjit
Singh seems to have got the better of Macnaghten. He agreed to
recognise the independence of the amirs of Sind, and withdrew his
claim to Shikarpur on receiving a money compensation. The inde-
pendence of Herat as a principle was also agreed to. But he clearly
showed that as to Afghanistan he wished to act with the British
Government and not independently. But while it seems clear that
.
Auckland had never contemplated taking the leading part in the
proceedings which were to fcllow, it is equally clear that Ranjit Singh
gradually forted him to do so; thus the Sikh secured the greatest
advantage from the bargain. We do not know all that Macnaghten
did say, but he gave it to be understood that the English would in
certain circumstances advance with their own troops in support cf
Shah Shuja. The point is a very delicate one, but it seems that
Macnaghten told Ranjit Singh, not that if Ranjit Singh would not
co-operate with Shah Shuja the English would restore him then-
selves, but that they might find it necessary to do so. This brought
Ranjit Singh round, and when he ceased to press for Jallalabad,
which he did not really want, the way was open for the famous
"Tripartite. Treaty", signed by the maharaja on 26 June, 1838. "
This treaty, which was a new and enlarged version of that made
between Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja in 1833, confirmed the maha-
raja in the possessions which he held on the banks of the Indus wi.
their dependencies, thus assuring to him Kashmir, Peshawar, Bannu,
Dehra Ismail Khan, Dehra Ghazi Khan, and Multan No one was
to cross the Indus or the Satlej without the maharaj $ permission.
As to Shikarpur and the Sind territory lying on the right bank of the
$
112 May, 1838.
2 Aitchison, op. cit. VIII, 154.


## p. 496 (#524) ############################################

496
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
Indus, Shah Shuja would agree to what might be determined between
the maharaja and the British. Should the maharaja require any of
the shah's troops to carry out the object of the treaty they were to
be sent, and in the same way Muhammadan troops were to be sent
by the maharaja as far as Kabul. The shah was to give up all claim
on Sindh, which was to belong to the amirs for ever, on such money
payment being made by the amirs as should be decided by the British
and handed over to the maharaja. Payment was to be made by the
shah to the maharaja of two lakhs a year under the guarantee of the
British Government in return for the assistance furnished. When the
shah should have established his authority in Afghanistan he would
not molest his nephew in Herat. The shah bound himself and his
successors not to enter into any negotiations with any foreign state
without the consent of the British and the Sikh governments.
Such was the treaty Auckland before signing it sent it to Shah
Shuja at Ludhiana by the hands of Macnaghten, Wade and Mackeson,
who arrived there on 15 July, 1838. The shah objected to various
articles. He secured, however, various assurances from the British
Government, and on 17 July, 1838, the mission left Ludhiana with
the signed treaty.
Kaye has pointed out that there were three different ideas as to
the projected invasion. Auckland originally wished it to be under-
taken by the Sikhs, aided perhaps by some Afghan levies. Even in the
negotiations with Shah Shuja the project only took the form of an
alliance which the British guaranteed, Shah Shuja, and the Sikhs
each marching into the country his own way. And Shah Shuja
evidently thought that he would take the leading part himself. But
when the matter was finally deliberated at Simla, it was settled,
possibly against the better judgment of Auckland, that the British
should do the work. There was to be a great army employed and it
was to be the force that would set Shah Shuja on the throne. Probably
Macnaghten knew that the maharaja wished to do as little as possible
in the matter; Auckland did not want to displease the maharaja.
We do not know what Burnes advised. He joined Macnaghten at
Lahore when it was too late to oppose the policy of the treaty, and
he certainly told Ranjit Singh that the restoration of Shah Shuja
would be to his advantage. His real opinion is probably to be found
in his well-known letter of 2 June, 1838 :
It remains to be reconsidered why we cannot act with Dost Mahomed.
He is a man of undoubted ability, and has at heart high opinions of the British
nation; and if half you must do for others were done for him, and offers made
which he could see conduced to his interests, he would abandon Persia and
Russia tomorrow. It may be said that that opportunity has been given to him;
but I would rather discuss this in person. with you, for I think there is much
to be said for him. Government have admitted that at best he had but a
hoice of difficulties; and it should not be forgotten that we promised nothing,
and Persia and Russia held out a great deal. 1
1 Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, 251.


## p. 497 (#525) ############################################

THE ARMY OF THE INDUS
497
And on 22 July he wrote to his brother, "I am not sorry to see Dost
Mahomed ousted by another hand than mine". He was not like Wade
in favour of a turbulent Afghanistan where tribe. constantly fought
with tribe :
"Divide et iinpera”, he wrote, “is a temporising creed at any time; and if
the Afghans are united, we and they bid defiance to Persia, and instead of
distant relations we have everything under our eye, and a steadily progressing
influence all along the Indus. ”
Sir Henry Fane, the commander-in-chief, had given very sensible
advice in 1837 :
Every advance you might make beyond the Sutlej to the Westward in my
opinion adds to your military weakness. . . . If you want your Empire to expand,
expand it over Oudh or over Gwalior, and the remains of the Mahratta Empire.
Make yourselves completely sovereigns of all within your bounds. But let
alone the far West.
The selection of Shah Shuja overlooked the claims of Kamran
Shah and made it certain that if Afghanistan was to be a buffer state
of any value we should have to help in reducing Herat also. And
there were not wanting far-seeing critics who realised that active
interference in Afghanistan must necessarily involve the taking of the
Punjab, at all events on the death of Ranjit Singh if not earlier.
However, the decision was taken; it was justified to the directors in
the dispatch of 13 August; and orders were issued for the assembling
of a great army to march upon Kandahar in the ensuing cold weather.
Auckland's frame of mind may be judged from his letter to Hobhouse
of 23 August, 1838 :
I am sensible that my trans-Indus arrangements are in many points open
to objection but I had no time to pause, there was no choice but between them
and the more objectionable danger of remaining passive and a friendly power
and intimate connection in Afghanistan, a peaceful alliance with Lahore and
an established influence in Sinde are objects for which some hazard may well
be ruin.
In the important letter of 13 August, 1838, Auckland gives a long
and clear account of the negotiations with Ranjit Singh. ”
The army of the Indus, which was to rendezvous at Karnal, was
to consist of a brigade of artillery, a brigade of cavalry, and five
brigades of infantry. It was to assemble under Sir Henry Fane with
whom were to serve many officers of great distinction. Another army
under Sir John Keane was to proceed via Bombay and Sind. The
shah's army was being raised at Ludhiana, and it was rapidly losing
its importance. The Sikh force was to move by Peshawar. Mac-
naghten, an unfortunate choice, was the political officer, and under
him, not wholly to his own satisfaction, was Burnes, who now went
away to arrange for the passage of troops through Sind, for the main
army as well as that from Bombay was to go that way. It ought to
1 Brit, Mus. Add. MSS, 37694, f. 21.
2 Parliamentary Papers, 1859 (2), XXV, 294.
32


## p. 498 (#526) ############################################

498
AFGHANISTAN, RUSSIA AND PERSIA
be remembered that Macnaghten wished Pottinger to be appointed
and only accepted the post himself under pressure.
On 1 October, 1838, the governor-general issued from Simla a
long manifesto dealing with the origin and causes of the war and the
policy of the British Government in regard to the whole business.
It was a clever attempt to justify the action of the government, but
it was open to serious criticism. Its greatest fault was that it made
out no sort of case for attacking Dost Muhammad and did not do
justice to the difficult position in which that ruler was placed. Perfect
frankness would have been better, and Auckland seems to have felt
this as he says to Hobhouse (13 October, 1838) in writing about the
manifesto:
It will be for others to judge of my case and I will say nothing of it except'
that I could have made it stronger if I had not had the fear of Downing Street
before my eyes, and thought it right to avoid any direct allusion to Russia.
But I have no want of sufficient grounds of quarrel with Persia, etc. . . . 1
But however ill-advised Auckland may have been, he was carrying
out, in part at least, the wishes of the home authorities.