No More Learning

Thus
in the glorified body the glory of the soul will be known, even as
through a crystal is known the color of a body contained in a crystal
vessel, as Gregory says on Job 28:17, "Gold or crystal cannot equal
it. "

Reply to Objection 1: Avicenna is speaking of a body that has clarity
through the nature of its component parts. It is not thus but rather by
merit of virtue that the glorified body will have clarity.

Reply to Objection 2: Gregory compares the glorified body to gold on
account of clarity, and to crystal on account of its transparency.
Wherefore seemingly we should say that they will be both transparent
and lightsome; for that a lightsome body be not transparent is owing to
the fact that the clarity of that body results from the density of the
lightsome parts, and density is opposed to transparency. Then, however,
clarity will result from another cause, as stated above: and the
density of the glorified body will not deprive it of transparency, as
neither does the density of a crystal deprive crystal.

Some, on the other hand, say that they are compared to crystal, not
because they are transparent, but on account of this likeness, for as
much as that which is enclosed in crystal is visible, so the glory of
the soul enclosed in the glorified body will not be hidden. But the
first explanation is better, because it safeguards better the dignity
of the glorified body, and is more consistent with the words of
Gregory.

Reply to Objection 3: The glory of the body will not destroy nature but
will perfect it. Wherefore the body will retain the color due to it by
reason of the nature of its component parts, but in addition to this it
will have clarity resulting from the soul's glory. Thus we see bodies
which have color by their nature aglow with the resplendence of the
sun, or from some other cause extrinsic or intrinsic.

Reply to Objection 4: Even as the clarity of glory will overflow from
the soul into the body according to the mode of the body, and is there
otherwise than in the soul, so again it will overflow into each part of
the soul according to the mode of that part. Hence it is not
unreasonable that the different parts should have clarity in different
ways, according as they are differently disposed thereto by their
nature. Nor is there any comparison with the other gifts of the body,
for the various parts of the body are not differently disposed in their
regard.
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Whether the clarity of the glorified body is visible to the non-glorified
eye?

Objection 1: It would seem that the clarity of the glorified body is
invisible to the non-glorified eye. For the visible object should be
proportionate to the sight. But a non-glorified eye is not
proportionate to see the clarity of glory, since this differs
generically from the clarity of nature. Therefore the clarity of the
glorified body will not be seen by a non-glorified eye.

Objection 2: Further, the clarity of the glorified body will be greater
than the clarity of the sun is now, since the clarity of the sun also
will then be greater than it is now, according to Is. 30:26, and the
clarity of the glorified body will be much greater still, for which
reason the sun and the entire world will receive greater clarity. Now a
non-glorified eye is unable to gaze on the very orb of the sun on
account of the greatness of its clarity. Therefore still less will it
be able to gaze on the clarity of a glorified body.

Objection 3: Further, a visible object that is opposite the eyes of the
seer must needs be seen, unless there be some lesion to the eye. But
the clarity of a glorified body that is opposite to non-glorified eyes
is not necessarily seen by them: which is evident in the case of the
disciples who saw our Lord's body after the resurrection, without
witnessing its clarity. Therefore this clarity will be invisible to a
non-glorified eye.

On the contrary, A gloss on Phil. 3:21, "Made like to the body of His
glory," says: "It will be like the clarity which He had in the
Transfiguration. " Now this clarity was seen by the non-glorified eyes
of the disciples. Therefore the clarity of the glorified body will be
visible to non-glorified eyes also.

Further, the wicked will be tortured in the judgment by seeing the
glory of the just, according to Wis. 5:2. But they would not fully see
their glory unless they gazed on their clarity. Therefore, etc.

I answer that, Some have asserted that the clarity of the glorified
body will not be visible to the non-glorified eye, except by a miracle.
But this is impossible, unless this clarity were so named equivocally,
because light by its essence has a natural tendency to move the sight,
and sight by its essence has a natural tendency to perceive light, even
as the true is in relation to the intellect, and the good to the
appetite. Wherefore if there were a sight altogether incapable of
perceiving a light, either this sight is so named equivocally, or else
this light is. This cannot be said in the point at issue, because then
nothing would be made known to us when we are told that the glorified
bodies will be lightsome: even so a person who says that a dog [*The
dog star] is in the heavens conveys no knowledge to one who knows no
other dog than the animal. Hence we must say that the clarity of a
glorified body is naturally visible to the non-glorified eye.

Reply to Objection 1: The clarity of glory will differ generically from
the clarity of nature, as to its cause, but not as to its species.
Hence just as the clarity of nature is, by reason of its species,
proportionate to the sight, so too will the clarity of glory be.

Reply to Objection 2: Just as a glorified body is not passible to a
passion of nature but only to a passion of the soul [*Cf. Q[82], A[1]],
so in virtue of its property of glory it acts only by the action of the
soul. Now intense clarity does not disturb the sight, in so far as it
acts by the action of the soul, for thus it rather gives delight, but
it disturbs it in so far as it acts by the action of nature by heating
and destroying the organ of sight, and by scattering the spirits*
asunder. [*"Animalem," as though it were derived from "animus"---the
mind. Cf. [5099]FS, Q[50], A[1] ,3m; [5100]FS, Q[52], A[1],3m. ] Hence,
though the clarity of a glorified body surpasses the clarity of the
sun, it does not by its nature disturb the sight but soothes it:
wherefore this clarity is compared to the jasper-stone (Apoc. 21:11).

Reply to Objection 3: The clarity of the glorified body results from
the merit of the will and therefore will be subject to the will, so as
to be seen or not seen according to its command. Therefore it will be
in the power of the glorified body to show forth its clarity or to hide
it: and this was the opinion of Praepositivus.
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Whether a glorified body will be necessarily seen by a non-glorified body?

Objection 1: It would seem that a glorified body will be necessarily
seen by a non-glorified body. For the glorified bodies will be
lightsome. Now a lightsome body reveals itself and other things.
Therefore the glorified bodies will be seen of necessity.

Objection 2: Further, every body which hides other bodies that are
behind it is necessarily perceived by the sight, from the very fact
that the other things behind it are hidden. Now the glorified body will
hide other bodies that are behind it from being seen, because it will
be a colored body. Therefore it will be seen of necessity.

Objection 3: Further, just as quantity is something in a body, so is
the quality whereby a body is seen. Now quantity will not be subject to
the will, so that the glorified body be able to be of greater or
smaller quantity. Therefore neither will the quality of visibility be
subject to the will, so that a body be able not to be seen.

On the contrary, our body will be glorified in being made like to the
body of Christ after the resurrection. Now after the resurrection
Christ's body was not necessarily seen; in fact it vanished from the
sight of the disciples at Emmaus (Lk. 24:31). Therefore neither will
the glorified body be necessarily seen.

Further, there the body will be in complete obedience to the will.
Therefore as the soul lists the body will be visible or invisible.

I answer that, A visible object is seen, inasmuch as it acts on the
sight. Now there is no change in a thing through its acting or not
acting on an external object. Wherefore a glorified body may be seen or
not seen without any property pertaining to its perfection being
changed. Consequently it will be in the power of a glorified soul for
its body to be seen or not seen, even as any other action of the body
will be in the soul's power; else the glorified body would not be a
perfectly obedient instrument of its principal agent.

Reply to Objection 1: This clarity will be obedient to the glorified
body so that this will be able to show it or hide it.

Reply to Objection 2: A body's color does not prevent its being
transparent except in so far as it affects the sight, because the sight
cannot be affected by two colors at the same time, so as to perceive
them both perfectly. But the color of the glorified body will be
completely in the power of the soul, so that it can thereby act or not
act on the sight. Hence it will be in its power to hide or not to hide
a body that is behind it.

Reply to Objection 3: Quantity is inherent to the glorified body
itself, nor would it be possible for the quantity to be altered at the
soul's bidding without the glorified body suffering some alteration
incompatible with its impassibility. Hence there is no comparison
between quantity and visibility, because even this quality whereby it
is visible cannot be removed at the soul's bidding, but the action of
that quality will be suspended, and thus the body will be hidden at the
soul's command.
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OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE BODIES OF THE DAMNED WILL RISE AGAIN (THREE
ARTICLES)

We must next consider the conditions in which the bodies of the damned
will rise again. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether the bodies of the damned will rise again with their
deformities?

(2) Whether their bodies will be corruptible?

(3) Whether they will be impassible?
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Whether the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities?

Objection 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will rise
again with their deformities. For that which was appointed as a
punishment for sin should not cease except the sin be forgiven. Now the
lack of limbs that results from mutilation, as well as all other bodily
deformities, are appointed as punishments for sin. Therefore these
deformities will not be taken away from the damned, seeing that they
will not have received the forgiveness of their sins.

Objection 2: Further, just as the saints will rise again to final
happiness, so the wicked will rise again to final unhappiness. Now when
the saints rise again nothing will be taken from them that can pertain
to their perfection, therefore nothing pertaining to the defect or
unhappiness of the wicked will be taken from them at the resurrection.
But such are their deformities. Therefore, etc.

Objection 3: Further, just as deformity is a defect of the passible
body, so is slowness of movement. Now slowness of movement will not be
taken from the bodies of the damned at the resurrection, since their
bodies will not be agile. Therefore for the same reason neither will
their deformity be taken away.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:52): "The dead shall rise
again incorruptible"; where a gloss says: "The dead, i. e. sinners, or
all the dead in general shall rise again incorruptible, i. e. without
the loss of any limbs. " Therefore the wicked will rise again without
their deformities.

Further, there will be nothing in the damned to lessen the sense of
pain. But sickness hinders the sense of pain by weakening the organ of
sense, and in like manner the lack of a limb would prevent pain from
affecting the whole body. Therefore the damned will rise again without
these defects.

I answer that, Deformity in the human body is of two kinds. One arises
from the lack of a limb: thus we say that a mutilated person is
deformed, because he lacks due proportion of the parts to the whole.
Deformities of this kind, without any doubt, will not be in the bodies
of the damned, since all bodies of both wicked and good will rise again
whole. Another deformity arises from the undue disposition of the
parts, by reason of undue quantity, quality, or place---which deformity
is, moreover, incompatible with due proportion of parts to whole.
Concerning these deformities and like defects such as fevers and
similar ailments which sometimes result in deformity, Augustine
remained undecided and doubtful (Enchiridion xcii) as the Master
remarks (Sent. iv, D, 44). Among modern masters, however, there are two
opinions on this point. For some say that such like deformities and
defects will remain in the bodies of the damned, because they consider
that those who are damned are sentenced to utmost unhappiness wherefrom
no affliction should be rebated. But this would seem unreasonable. For
in the restoration of the rising body we look to its natural perfection
rather than to its previous condition: wherefore those who die under
perfect age will rise again in the stature of youth, as stated above
([5101]Q[81], A[1]). Consequently those who had natural defects in the
body, or deformities resulting therefrom, will be restored without
those defects or deformities at the resurrection, unless the demerit of
sin prevent; and so if a person rise again with such defects and
deformities, this will be for his punishment. Now the mode of
punishment is according to the measure of guilt. And a sinner who is
about to be damned may be burdened with less grievous sins and yet have
deformities and defects which one who is about to be damned has not,
while burdened with more grievous sins. Wherefore if he who had
deformities in this life rise again with them, while the other who had
them not in this life, and therefore, as is clear, will rise again
without them, though deserving of greater punishment, the mode of the
punishment would not correspond to the amount of guilt; in fact it
would seem that a man is more punished on account of the pains which he
suffered in this world; which is absurd.

Hence others say with more reason, that He Who fashioned nature will
wholly restore the body's nature at the resurrection. Wherefore
whatever defect or deformity was in the body through corruption, or
weakness of nature or of natural principles (for instance fever,
purblindness, and so forth) will be entirely done away at the
resurrection: whereas those defects in the human body which are the
natural result of its natural principles, such as heaviness,
passibility, and the like, will be in the bodies of the damned, while
they will be removed from the bodies of the elect by the glory of the
resurrection.

Reply to Objection 1: Since in every tribunal punishment is inflicted
according to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the punishments which in
this temporal life are inflicted for some particular sin are themselves
temporal, and extend not beyond the term of this life. Hence although
the damned are not pardoned their sins, it does not follow that there
they will undergo the same punishments as they have in this world: but
the Divine justice demands that there they shall suffer more severe
punishment for eternity.

Reply to Objection 2: There is no parity between the good and the
wicked, because a thing can be altogether good, but not altogether
evil. Hence the final happiness of the saints requires that they should
be altogether exempt from all evil; whereas the final unhappiness of
the wicked will not exclude all good, because "if a thing be wholly
evil it destroys itself," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5). Hence
it is necessary for the good of their nature to underlie the
unhappiness of the damned, which good is the work of their perfect
Creator, Who will restore that same nature to the perfection of its
species.

Reply to Objection 3: Slowness of movement is one of those defects
which are the natural result of the principles of the human body; but
deformity is not, and consequently the comparison fails.
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Whether the bodies of the damned will be incorruptible?

Objection 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will be
corruptible. For everything composed of contraries must necessarily be
corruptible. Now the bodies of the damned will be composed of the
contraries whereof they are composed even now, else they would not be
the same, neither specifically nor, in consequence, numerically.
Therefore they will be corruptible.

Objection 2: Further, if the bodies of the damned will not be
corruptible, this will be due either to nature, or to grace, or to
glory. But it will not be by nature, since they will be of the same
nature as now; nor will it be by grace or glory, since they will lack
these things altogether. Therefore they will be corruptible.

Objection 3: Further, it would seem inconsistent to withdraw the
greatest of punishments from those who are in the highest degree of
unhappiness. Now death is the greatest of punishments, as the
Philosopher declares (Ethic. iii, 6). Therefore death should not be
withdrawn from the damned, since they are in the highest degree of
unhappiness. Therefore their bodies will be corruptible.

On the contrary, It is written (Apoc. 9:6): "In those days men shall
seek death, and shall not find it, and they shall desire to die, and
death shall fly from them. "

Further, the damned will be punished with an everlasting punishment
both in soul and body (Mat. 25:46): "These shall go into everlasting
punishment. " But this would not be possible if their bodies were
corruptible. Therefore their bodies will be incorruptible.

I answer that, Since in every movement there must needs be a principle
of movement, movement or change may be withdrawn from a movable in two
ways: first through absence of a principle of movement, secondly
through an obstacle to the principle of movement. Now corruption is a
kind of change: and consequently a body which is corruptible on account
of the nature of its principles may be rendered incorruptible in two
ways. First by the total removal of the principle which leads to
corruption, and in this way the bodies of the damned will be
incorruptible. For since the heaven is the first principle of
alteration in virtue of its local movement, and all other secondary
agents act in virtue thereof and as though moved thereby, it follows
that at the cessation of the heavenly movement there is no longer any
agent that can change the body by altering it from its natural
property. Wherefore after the resurrection, and the cessation of the
heavenly movement, there will be no quality capable of altering the
human body from its natural quality. Now corruption, like generation,
is the term of alteration. Hence the bodies of the damned will be
incorruptible, and this will serve the purpose of Divine justice, since
living for ever they will be punished for ever. This is in keeping with
the demands of Divine justice, as we shall state further on
[5102](A[3]), even as now the corruptibility of bodies serves the
purpose of Divine providence, by which through the corruption of one
thing another is generated.

Secondly, this happens through the principle of corruption being
hindered, and in this way the body of Adam was incorruptible, because
the conflicting qualities that exist in man's body were withheld by the
grace of innocence from conducing to the body's dissolution: and much
more will they be withheld in the glorified bodies, which will be
wholly subject to the spirit. Thus after the general resurrection the
two aforesaid modes of incorruptibility will be united together in the
bodies of the blessed.

Reply to Objection 1: The contraries of which bodies are composed are
conducive to corruption as secondary principles. For the first active
principle thereof is the heavenly movement: wherefore given the
movement of the heaven, it is necessary for a body composed of
contraries to be corrupted unless some more powerful cause prevent it:
whereas if the heavenly movement be withdrawn, the contraries of which
a body is composed do not suffice to cause corruption, even in
accordance with nature, as explained above. But the philosophers were
ignorant of a cessation in the heavenly movement; and consequently they
held that a body composed of contraries is without fail corrupted in
accordance with nature.

Reply to Objection 2: This incorruptibility will result from nature,
not as though there were some principle of incorruption in the bodies
of the damned, but on account of the cessation of the active principle
of corruption, as shown above.

Reply to Objection 3: Although death is simply the greatest of
punishments, yet nothing prevents death conducing, in a certain
respect, to a cessation of punishments; and consequently the removal of
death may contribute to the increase of punishment. For as the
Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), "Life is pleasant to all, for all
desire to be . . . But we must not apply this to a wicked or corrupt
life, nor one passed in sorrow. " Accordingly just as life is simply
pleasant, but not the life that is passed in sorrows, so too death,
which is the privation of life, is painful simply, and the greatest of
punishments, inasmuch as it deprives one of the primary good, namely
being, with which other things are withdrawn. But in so far as it
deprives one of a wicked life, and of such as is passed in sorrow, it
is a remedy for pains, since it puts an end to them. and consequently
the withdrawal of death leads to the increase of punishments by making
them everlasting. If however we say that death is penal by reason of
the bodily pain which the dying feel, without doubt the damned will
continue to feel a far greater pain: wherefore they are said to be in
"everlasting death," according to the Psalm (48:15): "Death shall feed
upon them. "
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Whether the bodies of the damned will be impassible?

Objection 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will be
impassible. For, according to the Philosopher (Topic. vi), "increase of
passion results in loss of substance. " Now "if a finite thing be
continually lessened, it must needs at length be done away" (Phys. i,
4). Therefore if the bodies of the damned will be passible, and will be
ever suffering, they will at length be done away and corrupted: and
this has been shown to be false [5103](A[2]). Therefore they will be
impassible.

Objection 2: Further, every agent likens the patient to itself. If then
the bodies of the damned are passive to the fire the fire will liken
them to itself. Now fire does not consume bodies except in so far as in
likening them to itself it disintegrates them. Therefore if the bodies
of the damned will be passible they will at length be consumed by the
fire, and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

Objection 3: Further, those animals, for instance the salamander, which
are said to remain living in fire without being destroyed, are not
distressed by the fire: because an animal is not distressed by bodily
pain, unless the body in some way is hurt thereby. If therefore the
bodies of the damned can, like the aforesaid animals, remain in the
fire without being corrupted, as Augustine asserts (De Civ. Dei xxi,
2,4), it would seem that they will suffer no distress there: which
would not be the case unless their bodies were impassible. Therefore,
etc.

Objection 4: Further, if the bodies of the damned be passible, the pain
resulting from their suffering, seemingly, will surpass all present
bodily pain, even as the joy of the saints will surpass all present
joy. Now in this life it sometimes happens that the soul is severed
from the body through excess of pain. Much more therefore if those
bodies will be passible, the souls will be separate from the bodies
through excess of pain, and thus those bodies will be corrupted: which
is false. Therefore those bodies will be impassible.

On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor. 15:52): "And we shall be
changed": and a gloss says: "We---the good alone---will be changed with
the unchangeableness and impassibility of glory. "

Further, even as the body co-operates with the soul in merit, so does
it co-operate in sin. Now on account of the former co-operation not
only the soul but also the body will be rewarded after the
resurrection. Therefore in like manner the bodies of the damned will be
punished; which would not be the case were they impassible. Therefore
they will be passible.

I answer that, The principal cause of the bodies of the damned not
being consumed by fire will be the Divine justice by which their bodies
will be consigned to everlasting punishment. Now the Divine justice is
served also by the natural disposition, whether on the part of the
passive body or on the part of the active causes; for since passiveness
is a kind of receptiveness, there are two kinds of passion,
corresponding to two ways in which one thing is receptive of another.
For a form may be received into a subject materially according to its
natural being, just as the air receives heat from fire materially; and
corresponding to this manner of reception there is a kind of passion
which we call "passion of nature. " In another way one thing is received
into another spiritually by way of an "intention," just as the likeness
of whiteness is received into the air and in the pupil: this reception
is like that whereby the soul receives the likeness of things:
wherefore corresponding to this mode of reception is another mode of
passion which we call "passion of the soul.
" Since therefore after the
resurrection and the cessation of the heavenly movement it will be
impossible for a body to be altered by its natural quality, as stated
above [5104](A[2]), it will not be possible for any body to be passive
with a passion of nature. Consequently as regards this mode of passion
the bodies of the damned will be impassible even as they will be
incorruptible. Yet after the heaven has ceased to move, there will
still remain the passion which is after the manner of the soul, since
the air will both receive light from the sun, and will convey the
variety of colors to the sight. Wherefore in respect of this mode of
passion the bodies of the damned will be passible. But the glorified
bodies, albeit they receive something, and are in a manner patient to
sensation, will nevertheless not be passive, since they will receive
nothing to distress or hurt them, as will the bodies of the damned,
which for this reason are said to be passible.

Reply to Objection 1: The Philosopher is speaking of the passion
whereby the patient is changed from its natural disposition. But this
kind of passion will not be in the bodies of the damned, as stated
above.

Reply to Objection 2: The likeness of the agent is in the patient in
two ways. First, in the same way as in the agent, and thus it is in all
univocal agents, for instance a thing that is hot makes another thing
hot, and fire generates fire. Secondly, otherwise than in the agent,
and thus it is in all equivocal agents. In these it happens sometimes
that a form which is in the agent spiritually is received into the
patient materially: thus the form of the house built by the craftsman
is materially in itself, but spiritually in the mind of the craftsman.
On the other hand, sometimes it is in the agent materially, but is
received into the patient spiritually: thus whiteness is materially on
the wall wherein it is received, whereas it is spiritually in the pupil
and in the transferring medium. And so it is in the case at issue,
because the species which is in the fire materially is received
spiritually into the bodies of the damned; thus it is that the fire
will assimilate the bodies of the damned to itself, without consuming
them withal.

Reply to Objection 3: According to the Philosopher (De Prop. Element. ),
"no animal can live in fire. " Galen also (De simp. medic. ) says "that
there is no body which at length is not consumed by fire"; although
sometimes certain bodies may remain in fire without hurt, such as
ebony. The instance of the salamander is not altogether apposite, since
it cannot remain in the fire without being at last consumed, as do the
bodies of the damned in hell. Nor does it follow that because the
bodies of the damned suffer no corruption from the fire, they therefore
are not tormented by the fire, because the sensible object has a
natural aptitude to please or displease the senses, not only as regards
its natural action of stimulating or injuring the organ, but also as
regards its spiritual action: since when the sensible object is duly
proportionate to the sense, it pleases, whereas the contrary is the
result when it is in excess or defect. Hence subdued colors and
harmonious sounds are pleasing, whereas discordant sounds displease the
hearing.

Reply to Objection 4: Pain does not sever the soul from the body, in so
far as it is confined to a power of the soul which feels the pain, but
in so far as the passion of the soul leads to the body being changed
from its natural disposition. Thus it is that we see that through anger
the body becomes heated, and through fear, chilled: whereas after the
resurrection it will be impossible for the body to be changed from its
natural disposition, as stated above [5105](A[2]). Consequently,
however great the pain will be, it will not sever the body from the
soul.
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TREATISE ON THE LAST THINGS (QQ[86]-99)
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OF THE KNOWLEDGE WHICH, AFTER RISING AGAIN, MEN WILL HAVE AT THE JUDGMENT
CONCERNING MERITS AND DEMERITS (THREE ARTICLES)

In the next place we must treat of those things which follow the
resurrection. The first of these to be considered will be the
knowledge, which after rising again, men will have at the judgment,
concerning merits and demerits; the second will be the general judgment
itself, as also the time and place at which it will be; thirdly we
shall consider who will judge and who will be judged; fourthly we shall
treat of the form wherein the judge will come to judge; and fifthly we
shall consider what will be after the judgment, the state of the world
and of those who will have risen again.

Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether at the judgment every man will know all his sins?

(2) Whether every one will be able to read all that is on another's
conscience?

(3) Whether one will be able at one glance to see all merits and
demerits?
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Whether after the resurrection every one will know what sins he has
committed?

Objection 1: It seems that after the resurrection everyone will not be
able to know all the sins he has committed. For whatever we know,
either we receive it anew through the senses, or we draw it from the
treasure house of the memory. Now after the resurrection men will be
unable to perceive their sins by means of sense, because they will be
things of the past, while sense perceives only the present: and many
sins will have escaped the sinner's memory, and he will be unable to
recall them from the treasure house of his memory. Therefore after
rising again one will not be cognizant of all the sins one has
committed.

Objection 2: Further, it is stated in the text (Sent. iv, D, 43), that
"there are certain books of the conscience, wherein each one's merits
are inscribed. " Now one cannot read a thing in a book, unless it be
marked down in the book: and sin leaves its mark upon the conscience
according to a gloss of Origen on Rom. 2:15, "Their conscience bearing
witness," etc. which mark, seemingly, is nothing else than the guilt or
stain. Since then in many persons the guilt or stain of many sins is
blotted out by grace, it would seem that one cannot read in one's
conscience all the sins one has committed: and thus the same conclusion
follows as before.

Objection 3: Further, the greater the cause the greater the effect. Now
the cause which makes us grieve for the sins which we recall to memory
is charity. Since then charity is perfect in the saints after the
resurrection, they will grieve exceedingly for their sins, if they
recall them to memory: yet this is impossible, seeing that according to
Apoc. 21:4, "Sorrow and mourning shall flee away from them. " [*The
quotation is from Is. 35:10. The text of the Apocalypse has: "Nor
mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow shall be any more. "] Therefore they
will not recall their own sins to memory.

Objection 4: Further, at the resurrection the damned will be to the
good they once did as the blessed to the sins they once committed. Now
seemingly the damned after rising again will have no knowledge of the
good they once did, since this would alleviate their pain considerably.
Neither therefore will the blessed have any knowledge of the sins they
had committed.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx) that "a kind of Divine
energy will come to our aid, so that we shall recall all of our sins to
mind. "

Further, as human judgment is to external evidence, so is the Divine
judgment to the witness of the conscience, according to 1 Kings 16:7,
"Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart. "
Now man cannot pass a perfect judgment on a matter unless evidence be
taken on all the points that need to be judged. Therefore, since the
Divine judgment is most perfect, it is necessary for the conscience to
witness to everything that has to be judged. But all works, both good
and evil, will have to be judged (2 Cor. 5:10): "We must all be
manifested before the judgment seat of Christ, that every one may
receive the proper things of the body, according as he hath done,
whether it be good or evil. " Therefore each one's conscience must needs
retain all the works he has done, whether good or evil.

I answer that, According to Rom. 2:15,16, "In the day when God shall
judge" each one's conscience will bear witness to him and his thoughts
will accuse and defend him. And since in every judicial hearing, the
witness, the accuser, and the defendant need to be acquainted with the
matter on which judgment has to be pronounced, and since at the general
judgment all the works of men will be submitted to judgment, it will
behoove every man to be cognizant then of all his works. Wherefore each
man's conscience will be as a book containing his deeds on which
judgment will be pronounced, even as in the human court of law we make
use of records. Of these books it is written in the Apocalypse (20:12):
"The books were opened: and another book was opened, which is the book
of life; and the dead were judged by those things which were written in
the books [Vulg. : 'book'], according to their works. " According to
Augustine's exposition (De Civ. Dei xx) the books which are here said
to be opened "denote the saints of the New and Old Testaments in whom
God's commandments are exemplified. " Hence Richard of St. Victor (De
judic. potest. ) says: "Their hearts will be like the code of law. " But
the book of life, of which the text goes on to speak, signifies each
one's conscience, which is said to be one single book, because the one
Divine power will cause all to recall their deeds, and this energy, in
so far as it reminds a man of his deeds, is called the "book of life"
[*Cf. [5106]FP, Q[24], A[1], ad 1]. Or else we may refer the first
books to the conscience, and by the second book we may understand the
Judge's sentence as expressed in His providence.

Reply to Objection 1: Although many merits and demerits will have
escaped our memory, yet there will be none of them but will remain
somewhat in its effect, because those merits which are not deadened
will remain in the reward accorded to them, while those that are
deadened remain in the guilt of ingratitude, which is increased through
the fact that a man sinned after receiving grace. In like manner those
demerits which are not blotted out by repentance remain in the debt of
punishment due to them, while those which have been blotted out by
repentance remain in the remembrance of repentance, which they will
recall together with their other merits. Hence in each man there will
be something whereby he will be able to recollect his deeds.
Nevertheless, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx), the Divine energy
will especially conduce to this.

Reply to Objection 2: Each one's conscience will bear certain marks of
the deeds done by him; and it does not follow that these marks are the
guilt alone, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 3: Although charity is now the cause of sorrow for
sin, yet the saints in heaven will be so full of joy, that they will
have no room for sorrow; and so they will not grieve for their sins,
but rather will they rejoice in the Divine mercy, whereby their sins
are forgiven them. Even so do the angels rejoice now in the Divine
justice whereby those whom they guard fall headlong into sin through
being abandoned by grace. and whose salvation none the less they
eagerly watch over.

Reply to Objection 4: The wicked will know all the good they have done,
and this will not diminish their pain; indeed, it will increase it,
because the greatest sorrow is to have lost many goods: for which
reason Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "the greatest misfortune is
to have been happy. "
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Whether every one will be able to read all that is in another's conscience?

Objection 1: It seems that it will be impossible for every one to read
all that is in another's conscience. For the knowledge of those who
rise again will not be clearer than that of the angels, equality with
whom is promised us after the resurrection (Mat. 22:30). Now angels
cannot read one another's thoughts in matters dependent on the
free-will, wherefore they need to speak in order to notify such things
to one another [*Cf. FP, Q[107]]. Therefore after rising again we shall
be unable to read what is contained in another's conscience.

Objection 2: Further, whatever is known is known either in itself, or
in its cause, or in its effect. Now the merits or demerits contained in
a person's conscience cannot be known by another in themselves, because
God alone enters the heart and reads its secrets. Neither will it be
possible for them to be known in their cause, since all will not see
God Who alone can act on the will, whence merits and demerits proceed.
Nor again will it be possible to know them from their effect, since
there will be many demerits, which through being wholly blotted out by
repentance will leave no effect remaining. Therefore it will not be
possible for every one to know all that is in another's conscience.

Objection 3: Further, Chrysostom says (Hom. xxxi in Ep. ad Hebr. ), as
we have quoted before (Sent. iv, D, 17): "If thou remember thy sins
now, and frequently confess them before Cod and beg pardon for them,
thou wilt very soon blot them out; but if thou forget them, thou wilt
then remember them unwillingly, when they will be made public, and
declared before all thy friends and foes, and in the presence of the
holy angels. " Hence it follows that this publication will be the
punishment of man's neglect in omitting to confess his sins. Therefore
the sins which a man has confessed will not be made known to others.

Objection 4: Further, it is a relief to know that one has had many
associates in sin, so that one is less ashamed thereof. If therefore
every one were to know the sin of another, each sinner's shame would be
much diminished, which is unlikely. Therefore every one will not know
the sins of all.

On the contrary, A gloss on 1 Cor. 4:5, "will . . . bring to light the
hidden things of darkness," says: "Deeds and thoughts both good and
evil will then be revealed and made known to all. "

Further, the past sins of all the good will be equally blotted out. Yet
we know the sins of some saints, for instance of Magdalen, Peter, and
David. Therefore in like manner the sins of the other elect will be
known, and much more those of the damned.

I answer that, At the last and general judgment it behooves the Divine
justice, which now is in many ways hidden, to appear evidently to all.
Now the sentence of one who condemns or rewards cannot be just, unless
it be delivered according to merits and demerits. Therefore just as it
behooves both judge and jury to know the merits of a case, in order to
deliver a just verdict, so is it necessary, in order that the sentence
appear to be just, that all who know the sentence should be acquainted
with the merits. Hence, since every one will know of his reward or
condemnation, so will every one else know of it, and consequently as
each one will recall his own merits or demerits, so will he be
cognizant of those of others. This is the more probable and more common
opinion, although the Master (Sent. iv, D, 43) says the contrary,
namely that a man's sins blotted out by repentance will not be made
known to others at the judgment. But it would follow from this that
neither would his repentance for these sins be perfectly known, which
would detract considerably from the glory of the saints and the praise
due to God for having so mercifully delivered them.

Reply to Objection 1: All the preceding merits or demerits will come to
a certain amount in the glory or unhappiness of each one rising again.
Consequently through eternal things being seen, all things in their
consciences will be visible, especially as the Divine power will
conduce to this so that the Judge's sentence may appear just to all.

Reply to Objection 2: It will be possible for a man's merits or
demerits to be made known by their effects as stated above (A[1], ad
1), or by the power of God, although the power of the created intellect
is not sufficient for this.

Reply to Objection 3: The manifestation of his sins to the confusion of
the sinner is a result of his neglect in omitting to confess them. But
that the sins of the saints be revealed cannot be to their confusion or
shame, as neither does it bring confusion to Mary Magdalen that her
sins are publicly recalled in the Church, because shame is "fear of
disgrace," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), and this will be
impossible in the blessed. But this manifestation will bring them great
glory on account of the penance they did, even as the confessor hails a
man who courageously confesses great crimes. Sins are said to be
blotted out because God sees them not for the purpose of punishing
them.

Reply to Objection 4: The sinner's confusion will not be diminished,
but on the contrary increased, through his seeing the sins of others,
for in seeing that others are blameworthy he will all the more
acknowledge himself to be blamed. For that confusion be diminished by a
cause of this kind is owing to the fact that shame regards the esteem
of men, who esteem more lightly that which is customary. But then
confusion will regard the esteem of God, which weighs every sin
according to the truth, whether it be the sin of one man or of many.
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Whether all merits and demerits, one's own as well as those of others, will
be seen by anyone at a single glance?

Objection 1: It would seem that not all merits and demerits, one's own
as well as those of others, will be seen by anyone at a single glance.
For things considered singly are not seen at one glance. Now the damned
will consider their sins singly and will bewail them, wherefore they
say (Wis. 5:8): "What hath pride profited us? " Therefore they will not
see them all at a glance.

Objection 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii) that "we do not
arrive at understanding several things at the same time. " Now merits
and demerits, both our own and those of others, will not be visible
save to the intellect. Therefore it will be impossible for them all to
be seen at the same time.

Objection 3: Further, the intellect of the damned after the
resurrection will not be clearer than the intellect of the blessed and
of the angels is now, as to the natural knowledge whereby they know
things by innate species. Now by such knowledge the angels do not see
several things at the same time. Therefore neither will the damned be
able then to see all their deeds at the same time.

On the contrary, A gloss on Job 8:22, "They . . . shall be clothed with
confusion," says: "As soon as they shall see the Judge, all their evil
deeds will stand before their eyes. " Now they will see the Judge
suddenly. Therefore in like manner will they see the evil they have
done, and for the same reason all others.

Further, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx) considers it unfitting that at the
judgment a material book should be read containing the deeds of each
individual written therein, for the reason that it would be impossible
to measure the size of such a book, or the time it would take to read.
But in like manner it would be impossible to estimate the length of
time one would require in order to consider all one's merits and
demerits and those of others, if one saw these various things one after
the other. Therefore we must admit that each one sees them all at the
same time.

I answer that, There are two opinions on this question. For some say
that one will see all merits and demerits, both one's own and those of
others, at the same time in an instant. This is easily credible with
regard to the blessed, since they will see all things in the Word: and
consequently it is not unreasonable that they should see several things
at the same time. But with regard to the damned, a difficulty presents
itself, since their intellect is not raised so that they can see God
and all else in Him. Wherefore others say that the wicked will see all
their sins and those of others generically at the same time: and this
suffices for the accusation or absolution necessary for the judgment;
but that they will not see them all down to each single one at the same
time. But neither does this seem consonant with the words of Augustine
(De Civ. Dei xx), who says that they will count them all with one
glance of the mind; and what is known generically is not counted. Hence
we may choose a middle way, by holding that they will consider each sin
not instantaneously, but in a very short time, the Divine power coming
to their aid. This agrees with the saying of Augustine (De Civ. Dei xx)
that "they will be discerned with wondrous rapidity. " Nor is this
impossible, since in a space of time, however short, is potentially an
infinite number of instants. This suffices for the replies to the
objections on either side of the question.
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OF THE GENERAL JUDGMENT, AS TO THE TIME AND PLACE AT WHICH IT WILL BE (FOUR
ARTICLES)

We must next consider the general judgment, as to the time and place at
which it will be. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there will be a general judgment?

(2) Whether as regards the debate it will be conducted by word of
mouth?

(3) Whether it will take place at an unknown time?

(4) Whether it will take place in the valley of Josaphat?
__________________________________________________________________

Whether there will be a general judgment?

Objection 1: It would seem that there will not be a general judgment.
For according to Nahum 1:9, following the Septuagint version, "God will
not judge the same thing a second time. " But God judges now of mans'
every work, by assigning punishments and rewards to each one after
death, and also by rewarding and punishing certain ones in this life
for their good or evil deeds. Therefore it would seem that there will
be no other judgment.

Objection 2: Further, in no judicial inquiry is the sentence carried
cut before judgment is pronounced. But the sentence of the Divine
judgment on man regards the acquisition of the kingdom or exclusion
from the kingdom (Mat. 25:34, 41). Therefore since some obtain
possession of the kingdom now, and some are excluded from it for ever,
it would seem that there will be no other judgment.

Objection 3: Further, the reason why certain things are submitted to
judgment is that we may come to a decision about them. Now before the
end of the world each of the damned is awarded his damnation, and each
of the blessed his beatitude. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, It is written (Mat. 12:41): "The men of Nineve shall
rise in judgment with this generation, and shall condemn it. " Therefore
there will be a judgment after the resurrection.

Further, it is written (Jn. 5:29): "They that have done good things
shall come forth unto the resurrection of life, but they that have done
evil, unto the resurrection of judgment. " Therefore it would seem that
after the resurrection there will be a judgment.

I answer that, Just as operation refers to the beginning wherefrom
things receive their being, so judgment belongs to the term, wherein
they are brought to their end. Now we distinguish a twofold operation
in God. One is that whereby He first gave things their being, by
fashioning their nature and by establishing the distinctions which
contribute to the perfection thereof: from this work God is stated to
have rested (Gn. 2:2). His other operation is that whereby He works in
governing creatures; and of this it is written (Jn. 5:17): "My Father
worketh until now; and I work. " Hence we distinguish in Him a twofold
judgment, but in the reverse order. One corresponds to the work of
governance which cannot be without judgment: and by this judgment each
one is judged individually according to his works, not only as adapted
to himself, but also as adapted to the government of the universe.
Hence one man's reward is delayed for the good of others (Heb.