No More Learning

of the revenues of the district in his charge together with
certain allowances, e. g. for the upkeep of a palanquin, was provided,
like the mamlatdar, with a staff of clerks and menials, who were
generally paid ten or eleven months' salary in return for a full year's
work. The reason for this short payment, which was also adopted in
the military department, is not clear. Possibly it amounted to a tacit
acknowledgment that an aggregate period of at least one or two
months in every twelve would be spent on leave or otherwise wasted,
or that petty illicit perquisites, which it would be fruitless to trace
or expose, would probably total to the amount of a month's salary.
The small territorial divisions, known as mahal or tarf, were adminis-
tered on the same lines as the mamlatdar's and kamavisdar's charges
by a non-hereditary official styled havaldar, assisted and checked by
a hereditary mazumdar (accountant) and phadnis (auditor). In each
mahal, as a rule, were stationed four additional officials of militia,
viz. the hashamnavis, who maintained a muster-roll of the villagers,
their arms, and their pay; the hasham phadnis and hasham daftardar,
who kept the accounts and wrote up the ledger of the militia, and
the hazirinavis, who maintained a muster-roll of those actually
serving in the militia. 2
The Maratha judicial system has been described as very imper-
fect, there being no rules of procedure, no regular administration of
justice, and no codified law. In both civil and criminal matters
decisions were based upon custom and upon rules or formulae
err. bodied in ancient Sanskrit compilations, like those of Manu and
Yajnavalkya. In civil cases the main object aimed at was amicable
settlement, and arbitration was therefore the first step in the disposal
of a suit. If arbitration failed, the case was transferred for decision
to a panchayat, appointed by the patel in the village and by the shete
mahajan, or leading merchant, in urban areas. An appeal lay from
the decision of a panchayat to the mamlatdar, who usually upheld the
verdict, unless the parties concerned were able to prove that the
panchayat was prejudiced or corrupt. In serious or important suits,
however, it was the duty of the mamlatdar to appoint an arbitrator
or a panchayat, the members of which were chosen by him with the
approval, and often at the suggestion, of the parties to the suit. In
1 Forrest, op. cit. pp. 294-6.
2 Sen, op. cit. p. 266.


## p. 390 (#418) ############################################

390
MARATHA ADMINISTRATION
such cases the panchayat's decision was subject to an appeal to the
Peshwa or his legal minister, the nyayadhish. The system of pancha-
yats left a good deal to be desired from the standpoint of modern legal
administration. These bodies were slow in action and uncertain in
their decisions: the attendance of the members was usually irregular,
depending as it did entirely upon the individual's sense of duty or
fear of public opinion. The powers of the panchayat were strictly
limited; it was exposed to constant obstruction; and it possessed no
authority to enforce its decisions, which were left to the mamlatdar
to carry out or neglect, as he pleased. It had likewise no power to
compel the attendance of parties and their witnesses, and depended
upon the mamlatdar or other local official to supply a petty officer for
this purpose. In cases where the members of a panchayat were nomi-
nated by the parties to a suit, they functioned rather as advocates
than as judges; and, speaking generally, the system offered consider-
able scope for partiality and corruption, which became very marked
under the rule of Baji Rao II. Yet, despite its primitive character
and its liability to be improperly influenced, the panchayat was a
popular institution, and the absence of a decision by a panchayat in
any suit was almost always regarded as complete justification for a
retrial of the issues. The fact must be admitted that among themselves,
within the confines of the self-contained ancestral village, the
peasantry did obtain a fair modicum of rude justice from the village
panchayat. What they failed to obtain either from the panchayats or
from the government was any measure of redress against the merciless
oppression of their superiors. 1
In criminal cases much the same procedure was adopted, though
a punchayat was less frequently appointed than in civil disputes. The
chief authorities were the patel in the village, the mamlatdar in the
district, the sarsubhedar in the province, and the Peshwa and his
nyayadhish at headquarters; and they administered a law which was
merely popular custom tempered by the trying officer's own ideas of
expediency. Ancient Hindu law in its criminal application had
become practically obsolete by the end of the eighteenth century,
and Mountstuart Elphinstone's opinion that "the criminal system of
the Mahrattas was in the last stage of disorder and corruption" was
fully justified by the state of the criminal law and procedure imme-
diately prior to the downfall of the last Peshwa. No regular form of
trial of accused persons was prescribed; flogging was frequently
inflicted with the object of extorting confessions of guilt; and in the
case of crimes against the state torture was usually employed. The
punishment for serious offences against the person was originally fine,
or confiscation of property, or imprisonment, the fine being propor-
tioned to the means of the offender; ? but after 1761 capital punisi-
2
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 347-79.
2 Idem, pp. 381-3.


## p. 391 (#419) ############################################

JUDICIAL SYSTEM
391
>
.
ment and mutilation were inflicted upon persons convicted of grievous
hurt, dacoity and theft, as well as upon those found guilty of murder
or treason. The usual methods of execution were hanging, decapi-
tation, cutting to pieces with swords, or crushing the skull with a
mallet, exception being made in the case of Brahmans, who were
poisoned or starved to death. Powers of life and death were originally
vested in the ruler only, and in the principal feudal chiefs within the
limits of their respective jagirs. In later times, however, these powers
were delegated to the sarsubhedar of a province; while throughout the
second half of the eighteenth century the mamlatdar, as head of a
district, considered himself justified in hanging a Ramosi, Bhil, or
Mang robber, without reference to higher authority. The punishment
of mutilation consisted usually in cutting off the hands or feet and
in the case of female offenders in depriving them of their nose, ears
or breasts. False evidence must often have figured in criminal er-
quiries, as it still does to some extent; and the false witness and the
fabricator of false documents were praciically immune from prose-
cution under a system which prescribed no penalty for either perjury
or forgery. The only notice taken of a case of deliberate and wholesale
fabrication of false evidence consisted of a mild reproof from the
nyayadhish.
The penalties imposed on convicted prisoners were aggravated by
the knowledge that their families were not secure from oppression;
for it was a common practice of the Maratha Government to in-
carcerate the innocent wives and children of convicts, as a warning
to other potential malefactors. The prison arrangements were primi-
tive, the only jails being rooms in some of the larger hill-forts. Here
the prisoners languish in the gravest discomfort, except on rare
occasions when they were temporarily released to enable them to
perform domestic religious ceremonies such as the sraddha. 3 It is
perhaps needless to remark that a prisoner had to pay heavily for
such temporary and occasional freedom, as well as for other minor
concessions to his comfort. Provided that he could command sufficient
funds to satisfy the avarice of his gaolers, even a long-term convict
could count upon a fairly speedy release. Even in the days of Sivaji
the power of gold to unlock the gates of hill-forts had often proved
greater than that of the sword, spear and ambush.
The district police arrangements under the Peshwas were practi-
cally identical with those that existed in the seventeenth century, and
were apparently based largely on the doctrine of setting a thief to
catch a thief. Each village maintained its own watchmen, who belonged
to the degraded Mahar or Mang tribes, under the direct control of
the patel, and remunerated them for their services with rent-free lands
а
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 393-6.
2 Tone, Institutions of the Maratha People, pp. 15-16.
8 Sen, op. cit. pp. 417-24.


## p. 392 (#420) ############################################

392
MARATHA ADMINISTRATION
and other perquisites. These watchmen were assisted in the detection
of crime by groups or gangs of hereditary criminal tribesmen, like
the Ramosis and BKils, who were attached to each village, or to a
group of villages, and resided on its ouiskirts. Each group was under
the control of its own naiks or headmen, who were answerable to the
patel for any theft or robbery committed in the village, and for any
disturbance created by their followers. The antiquity of the system
is indicated by the fact that most of these village groups of Ramosis or
Bhils received certain perquisites of long standing in return for their
services to the village, in the same way as the recognised village
servants, and they cherished their rights as ancillary watchmen and
thief-catchers, particularly in respect of some of the hill-forts, as
jealously as any village officer or village artisan.
The practical working of the system was as follows. Whenever a
crime against property occurred in a village, the Mahars or Ramosis,
as the case might be, were bound as a body to make good the value
of the stolen property, unless they succeeded in recovering the actual
goods or in tracing the offenders to another village. In the latter case
the delinquent village was forced to indemnify the owners of the
property. While this system afforded a moderate safeguard to each
village against the anti-social propensities of its own particular group
of criminal tribesmen, it failed to prevent crime and predatory
incursions by the Ramosis of other areas or by Bhils from the forest-
clad hills of the northern Deccan. It offered, moreover, unlimited
chances of subterfuge and blackmail on the part of the tribesmen
concerned. A striking example of the shortcomings of the system is
affcrded by the career of Umaji Naik, the famous Ramòsi outlaw,
who during the administration of Sir John Malcolm (1827-30) per-
petrated a long series of crimes against person and property, while
he was actually in receipt of a salary from the Bombay Government
for performing police duties in the Sasvad division of the Poona
collectorate. 2 His methods proved that there was nothing to prevent
the village police and the Ramosis combining to escape responsibility
by falsely saddling crimes upon the innocent. These watch and ward
arrangements were also of no avail in cases where the petty chiefs
and estate-holders of the Deccan plundered the villages of their rivals.
For the payment of fees and perquisites to the Ramosis or Bhils,
either by the village or by the government, was essentially a form of
blackmail, designed to secure immunity, partial or complete, from
the depredations of a body of professional criminals and freebooters,
and it naturally could not influence the intentions or actions of the
landed gentry, whenever its members chose to indulge in marauding
excursions through the countryside. Consequently, whenever serious
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 425-7.
2 Mackintosh, An Account of the Origin and Present Condition of the Tribe
of Ramossies, pp. 125-227.


## p. 393 (#421) ############################################

POLICE
393
epidemics of dacoity and other crime occurred, the government
authorities usually strengthened the village police with detachments
of sihbandis, or irregular infantry, from the neighbouring hill-forts.
The sihbandis in every district were under the control of the mamlat.
dar, and were maintained on the proceeds of a general house tax
imposed on the residents of the disturbed area. Their duty was to
support the village police under the patel and to oppose violence by
force of arms, but did not extend to the detection of crime. They were
alsc deputed to assist the village police in maintaining order at
festivals, fairs and other important social gatherings.
Under the misguided rule of Baji Rao II the district police system
was modified by the appointment of additional police officials, styled
tapasnavis, charged with the discovery and seizure of offenders. 1 These
officials were independent of the mamlatdar and other district autho-
rities, and their area of jurisdiction was not necessarily conterminous
with that of the revenue and police officials. As a class they were
shamelessly corrupt; they constantly extorted money by means of
false accusations, and were often hand in glove with avowed robbers
and outlaws. In the latter respect they were little less culpable than
the Maratha jagirdars and zamindars, who frequently offered an
asylum and protection to fugitive criminals wanted for serious crimes
in other districts.
In urban centres magisterial and police powers were vested in a
kotwal, who also performed municipal duties. He regulated prices,
took a census of the inhabitants, investigated and decided disputes
relating to immovable property, supplied labour to the government,
levied fees from professional gamblers, and, generally speaking,
performed most of the functions ascribed to the nagaraka or polica
superintendent in the Arthasastra of Kautilya. ? The best urban police
force at the close of the eighteenth century was unquestionably that
of the capital, Poona. It was composed of foot-police, mounted
patrols, and Ramosis, used principally as spies and trackers, and was
described as efficient. Opportunities for nocturnal delinquency on
the part of the inhabitants were, however, greatly lessened by a
strict curfew order which obliged everyone to remain within doors
after 10 p. m.
The Maratha army, composed of the mercenary forces of the
feudal chiefs and the regiments under the immediate command of the
Peshwa, had undergone a radical change since Sivaji's day. Originaliy
recruited from men who, though not invariably Marathas by race,
were yet united by a common bond of country and language, the
army tended, as the Maratha power spread across India, to assume
a professional rather than a national character. The real Maratha3
3
1 Forrest, op. cit. pp. 305-6.
Sen, op. cit. pp. 427-31; 522-4.
3 Idem, pp. 431-2; Tone, Institutions of the Maratha People, pp. 54-5.


## p. 394 (#422) ############################################

394
MARATHA ADMINISTRATION
were gradually relegated almost entirely to the cavalry, in which their
horse-craft and knowledge of horse-breeding proved of the highest
value; the infantry was mostly drawn from Northern India; and the
artillery, which offered little attraction to the Maratha freebooter,
was manned and commanded by Portuguese and Indian Christians.
As has been mentioned, the military services of the various Maratha
chiefs and landholders were secured by the grant of saranjams (fiefs),
care being taken by the Peshwa and his Brahman secretariat so to
group the holdings of rival chiefs in the same area that the former
might reap full advantage from their inveterate mutual jealousies.
A hegemony founded on internal strife and dissension was not cal-
culated to give stability to the state; and ultimately the lack of
cohesion induced by this policy, coupled with the personal unpopu-
larity of the last Peshwa, contributed largely to the downfall of the
Maratha confederacy.
The Maratha state did little towards the economic improvement
of the country and the intellectual advancement of its inhabitants.
Being essentially a predatory power, it regarded itself as always in
a state of war, and a large proportion of its revenue was supplied by
marauding expeditions into the territory of its neighbours. Unlike
other ancient and contemporary Hindu governments, it constructed
no great works of public utility, and its interest in education was
confined to the annual grant of dakshina to deserving pandits and
vaids. ” In the days of Sivaji and his successors it had been one of the
duties. of the Pandit Rao to enquire into the merits and accomplish-
ments of applicants for this form of state aid and to settle in each case
the amount and character of the award. But the system had de-
generated at the opening of the nineteenth century into a form of
indiscriminate largesse to Brahmans, of whom some at least were
probably unworthy of special recognition. Some writers on Maratha
affairs have sought to discover the germ of modern postal communi-
cations in the system of intelligence maintained by the Maratha
Government. The comparison has no value, in view of the fact that,
although the jasuds (spies) and harkaras (messengers) did carry
messages and letters with astonishing rapidity throughout India, they
were primarily employed for political and military purposes, and not
for the public convenience. 3 They represented, in fact, during the
eighteenth century the official system of intelligence, which was
originally described in the Arthasastra and was perfected by Chan-
dragupta Maurya in the third century B. C.
A survey of Maratha administration must necessarily include some
account of the principal sources of the state revenues. The most
important items were the chauth (one-fourth) and sardesmukhi (the
tenth), which originally were payments in the nature of blackmail
>
2 Idem, pp. 470-2.
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 439-69.
3 Idem, pp. 469-70.


## p. 395 (#423) ############################################

LAND TENURES
395
made by districts under the government of other powers which
desired protection from plunder. While the proceeds of both levies
were reserved for the state treasury, the chauth from early days had
been sub-divided into the following shares :
(a) babti or 25 per cent. , reserved for the raja or ruler.
(b) mokasa or 66 per cent. , granted to Maratha sardars and chiefs
for the maintenance of troops.
(c) sahotra or 6 per cent. , granted to the pant sachiv.
(d) nadgaunda or 3 per cent. , awarded to various persons at the
ruler's pleasure.
This sub-division of chauth continued under the régime of the
Peshwas; and when the territories, which paid both the levies, were
finally incorporated in the Maratha dominions, the remaining three-
fourths of their revenues, after deducting the chauth, were styled
jagir and were also granted in varying proportions to different indi-
viduals. As previously stated, this system was characterised by a
multiplicity of individual claims upon the revenues of a single tract
or village, and consequently in great complication of the accounts,
which the Brahman secretariat in Poona was alone in a position to
comprehend and elucidate. During the Peshwa's rule a somewhat
similar sub-division was made of the sardesinukhi, which had origi-
nally been credited wholly to the raja, in accordance with Sivaji's
fictitious claim to be the hereditary sardesmukh of the Deccan.
The second important head of state revenue was the agricultural
assessment upon village lands, which were generally divided between
two classes of holders, the mirasdar and the upri. 2 The former, who
is supposed to have been the descendant of original settlers who
cleared the forest and first prepared the soil for agriculture, possessed
permanent proprietary rights and could not be ejected from his hold-
ing so long as his rent was paid to the government. His property was
hereditary and saleable; and even if he was dispossessed for failure
to pay the government dues, he had a right of recovery at any time
during the next thirty or forty years, on his liquidating all arrears.
The upri, on the other hand, was a stranger and tenant-at-will, who
merely rented and cultivated his fields with the permission and under
the supervision of the Peshwa's district officers. He did not enjoy
the same advantages and fixity of tenure as the mirasdar, but he was
not liable, like the latter, to sudden and arbitrary impositions, and
he bore a comparatively moderate proportion of the miscellaneous
village expenses, which included such items as the maintenance of
the village temple and the repair of the village well. Theoretically
the assessment on the village lands was supposed to be based on a
careful survey of the cultivated area, the lands themselves being
divided into three main classes. Allowance was also supposed to be
1 Sen, p. 112.
2 Idem, pp. 237-9


## p. 396 (#424) ############################################

396
MARATHA ADMINISTRATION
made for the character of the crop and the facilities existing for
irrigation, and special rates were imposed upon coconut and other
plantations and also upon waste or permanently unproductive lands.
The assessment was payable either in cash or in kind, and it was gener-
ally recognised that reinission of the assessment and advances of money
and grain (tagai) should be granted to the peasantry in seasons of
drought and distress. Theoretically, indeed, the Maratha land revenue
system was favourable to the interests of the cultivator, and under
the rule of, a Peshwa like Madhu Rao I the peasantry were probably
contented and tolerably well off. But actually the patel was the only
person who could champion the rights of the villager against the
higher official authorities, and as the latter had usually to satisfy the
demands of the government and fill their own pockets at one and the
same time, the cultivator met with much less consideration than was
due to his position in the economic sphere. Under a bad ruler like
Baji Rao II, whose administration was stained by perfidy, rapacity and
cruelty, the equitable maxims of land revenue assessment and collec-
tion were widely neglected, and the cultivator was reduced in many
cases to practical penury by the merciless exactions of the Peshwa's
Dificials. In addition to the regular village. lands, there were certain
lands which were regarded as the private property of the Peshwa.
These fell into the four-fold category of pasture, garden, orchard, and
cultivated land, and were usually let on lease to upris under the
authority of the mamlatdar or kamávisdar, who was responsible for
recovering the rental and other dues from the tenant. 1
A third item of the Maratha revenues consisted of miscellaneous
taxes, which varied in different districts. They included, inter alia,
a tax of one year's rent in ten on the lands held by the destrukh and
despande, a tax on land reserved for the village Mahars, a triennial
cess on mirasdar occupants, a tax on land irrigated from wells, a
house tax recovered from everyone except Brahmans and village
officers, an annual fee for the testing of weights and measures, a tax
on marriage and on the remarriage of widows, taxes on sheep and
she-buffaloes, a pasturage fee, a tax on melon cultivation in river
beds, a succession duty, and a town duty, including a fee of 17 per
cent. on the sale of a house. There were several other taxes and cesses
of more or less importance, as for example the bat chhapai or fee for
the stamping of cloth and other merchandise; and some of these can
be traced back to the Mauryan epoch and were probably levied by
Indian rulers at an even earlier date. In theory such taxes were to
be proportioned in their incidence to the resources of the individual;
but on the not infrequent occasions when the Maratha Government
was pressed for money, it had no scruple in levying on all landholders
a karja: patti. or jasti patti, which was generally equivalent to one
year's income of the individual tax-payer. 2
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 277-307.
2 Idem, pp. 308-14.


## p. 397 (#425) ############################################

MISCELLANEOUS REVENUES
397
The fourth source of Maratha revenue was customs duties, which
fell roughly into the two classes of mohatarfa or taxes on trades an:
professions, and jakat or duties on purchase and sale, octroi and ferry
charges. The mohatarfa, for example, included a palanquin tax on
the Kolis, a shop tax on goldsmiths, blacksmiths, shoemakers and
other retail dealers, a tax on oil mills, potter's wheels and boats, and
a professional impost of three rupees a year on the Gondhalis or wor-
shippers of the goddess Bhavani. The jakat, a term originally borrow-
ed from the Muhammadans, was collected from traders of ail castes
and sects, and was farmed out to contractors, who were often corrupt
and oppressive. It was levied separately in each district, and was divi-
ded into thalbarit or tax at the place of loading the merchandise, thal.
mod or tax at the place of-sale, and chhapa or stamping-duty. In some
places a special fee on cattle, termed shingshinyoti, was also imposed.
Remissions of jakat were sometimes granted, particularly to cultivators
who had suffered from scarcity or from the incursions of troups; but,
as a rule, every trader had to submit to the inconvenience of having
his goods stopped frequently in transit for the payment of these dues
and octroi. Elphinstone records that the system was responsible for
the appearance of a class of hundikaris or middlemen, who in return
for a lump payment undertook to arrange with the custom farmers
for the unimpeded transit of a merchant's gonds. Brahmans and
government officials were usually granted exemption from duty on
goods imported for their own consumption, just as they were exenip-
ied from the house tax and certain minor cesses.
A small revenue was derived from forests by the sale of permits
to cut timber for building or for fuel, by the sale of grass, bamboos,
fuei and wild honey, and by fees for pasturage in reserved areas
(kurans). Licences for private mints also brought some profit to the
state treasury. These licences were issued to approved goldsmiths
(sonars), who paid a varying royalty and undertook to maintain a
standard proportion of alloy, on pain of fine and forfeiture 'of licence.
At times spurious and faulty coins were put into circulation, as foi
example in the Dharwar division in 1760.
On that occasion the
Maratha Government closed all private mints in that area and esta-
blished in their stead a central inint, which charged a fee of seven
coins in every thousand. 3
The administration of justice produced a small and uncertain
amount of revenue. In civil disputes relating to money bonds, the
state claimed a fee of 25 per cent. of the amount realised; whicn
really amounted to a bribe to secure the assistance of the official who
heard the case. The general inertia of the government effectually
prevented the growth of revenue from legal fees and obliged suitors to
depend for satisfaction of their claims on private redress in the form
2 Idem, pp. 314-17.
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 321-5.
3 Idem, pp. 317:21.


## p. 398 (#426) ############################################

398
MARATHA ADMINISTRATION
>
of takaza or dharna (dunning), or on patronage, which signified the
enlistment of the aid of a superior neighbour or influential friend. In
suits for partition of property worth more than 300 rupees in value,
the parties were expected to pay a fee at the rate of 10 per cent. of
the value of the property; fees were also charged in cases concerned
with maintenance or inheritance, particularly in cases in which an
applicant claimed to succeed to the estate of a childless brother. It
is not clear what proportion of the fines imposed in criminal proceed-
ings was credited to the state; but during the ministry of Nana
Phadnavis (1762-1800) the legal revenues included a considerable sum
extorted from persons suspected or found guilty of adultery.
No definite estimate of the total revenue of the Maratha state can
be given. Lord Valentia (1802-6) calculated the Feshwa's revenue at
rather more than 7,000,000 rupees; while J. Grant, writing in 1798,
estiniated the total revenue of the Maratha empire at six crores, and
the revenue of the Peshwa alone at not less than three crores of
rupees, including chauth from the Nizam, Tipu Sultan, and the Rajput
chiefs of Bundelkhand. The revenue of a state which subsists largely
on marauding excursions and blackmail, as the Maratha Government
did in the time both of Sivaji and the Peshwas, must necessarily
fluctuate; and the facts outlined in the preceding pages will serve to
indicate that, though the general principles of the domestic adminis-
tration may have been worthy of commendation, the practices of the
Maratha Government and its officials precluded all possibility of the
steady economic and educational advance of the country. Tone
records that the Maratha Government invariably anticipated its land
revenues.
These mortgages on the territorial income are negotiated by wealthy sou-
cars (between whom and the Minister there always exists a proper under-
standing), and frequently at a discount of 30 per cent. and then paid in the
inost depreciated specie.
Owing to the unsettled state of the country, the Maratha Government
preferred to raise a lump sum at enormous interest on the security
of the precarious revenue of the next two or four years, and made
little or no attempt to balance its revenue and current expenditure.
The Maratha army was organised primarily for the purpose of
plunder, and not so much for the extension of territory directly
administered; and the people were gradualiy impoverished by the
system of continuous freebooting, which the Marathas regarded as
their most important means of subsistence. The general tone of the
internal administration was not calculated to counteract to any
appreciable extent the feelings of instability and insecurity. engend-
ered among the mass of the people by the predatory activities of their
rulers. Indeed the constitution of the Maratha Government and army
was "more calculated to destroy, than to create an empire”; and the
1 Sen, op. cit. pp. 371-3.
2 Idem; pp. 342-3.


## p. 399 (#427) ############################################

PREDATORY POLICY
399
spirit which directed their external policy and their internal admi-
nistration prevented all chance of permanent improvement of the
country over which they claimed sovereign rights. There can be no
doubt that the final destruction of the Maratha political power and
the substitution of orderly government by the East India Company
were necessary, and productive of incalculable benefit to India.


## p. 400 (#428) ############################################

CHAPTER XXIV
THE CONQUEST OF CEYLON, 1795-1815
THE English had been nearly two centuries in India before Ceylon
attracted their attention. They were too much occupied with, at
first, establishing a precarious foothold, and then extending their
conquests on the continent, to trouble much about a small island so
far to the south. There had indeed been a curious attempt at inter-
course as far back as 1664, which the Dutch historian, Valentyn,
records. The king of Kandi at that period had a penchant for retaining
in captivity any Englishman he could capture—mostly castaways
from merchant-ships wrecked on the coast, and an effort was made
to negotiate with him for their release, but it was abortive, and the
curtain fell for 100 years. But towards the end of the eighteenth
century, the rivalry with the Dutch became acute, and the protection
of our communications with our Indian possessions was a question
of vital importance. Not only might the Dutch prey upon our com-
merce from their harbours in Ceylon, but there was a fear lest other
nations, tempted by the tales of the fabulous wealth that poured into
Holland from the Isle of Spices, Inight be induced to forestall us.
Indeed the French, our dangerous rivals in India, had shown signs
of this inclination a hundred years earlier, and had sent a fleet to
attack Trinkomali. Though it was repulsed, a small embassy under
de Laverolle was dispatched to Kandi to negotiate with the raja. But
the ambassador was badly chosen: his unwise and intemperate
behaviour resulted not only in the failure of the mission but in his
own imprisonment.
The first serious attempt made by the English to gain a footing was
in 1762, when Pybus was sent to Kandi to arrange a treaty with the
raja, Kirti Sri. He has left an account of his mission-subsequently
published from the records of the Madras Government-which gives
a curicus, if somewhat tedious, sketch of the state of affairs at the
Kandian court. He was admitted to the audience hall at midnight,
and ordered to pull his shoes off and hold above his head the silver
dish containing the letter for the raja. Six separate curtains, white
and red, were withdrawn, and the king was then discovered seated
on his throne, which was a large chair, handsomely carved and gilt,
which may now be seen in Windsor Castle. The envoy was forced
upon his knees and had to make endless prostrations till at last his
painful progress ended at the foot of the throne, where he presented
his credentials. He describes the elaborate costume of the monarch,
and the decorations of the hall, and adds :
I should have been well enough pleased with the appearance it made, had


## p. 401 (#429) ############################################

>
CAPTURE OF COLOMBO
401
I been in a more agreeable situation. At the foot of the throne knelt one of
the King's Prime Ministers, to whom he communicated what he had to say to
me, who, after prostrating himself on the ground, related it to one of the
generals who sat by me; who, after having prostrated himself, explained it to
a Malabar doctor, who told it in Malabar to my cubash, and he to me. And
this ceremony was repeated on asking every question. 1
Whether or not this somewhat tortuous method of communicaticn
led to misunderstandings, the Madras Government took no steps to
pursue the matter further then; but in 1782 war' was declared against
the Dutch, an English fleet under Hughes captured Trinkomali, anci
Hugh Boyd was sent to Kandi to solicit the raja's help against the
Dutch. The failure of Pybus's mission had left a bad impression on
the Kandian court; the raja curtly refused to negotiate; and Trinko-
mali was next year lost to the French and finally restored to the
Dutch when peace was declared. However in 1795 the Dutch were
involved in the European upheaval, and had also got into trouble
with the Kandian court; and the English determined to strike. A
force under Colonel James Stuart was dispatched to Ceylon by the
governor of Madras, and accomplished its object with an unexpected
rapidity. The Dutch had been firmly established for 140 years along
the sea coast; they had built magnificent forts--the great foriress of
Jaffna, which is little the worse for wear even to-day, was perhaps the
finest specimen—and they were a sturdy and tenacious people. But
the smaller sea-ports were easily occupied, and the garrison of Colombo
marched out without a blow. The English historian asserts that the
enemy was in a state of utter demoralisation. When the English
entered the gates of Colombo, he says,
the Duich were found by us in a state of the most infamous disorder and
drunkenness, in no discipline, no obedience, no spirit. The soldiers then awoke
to a sense of their degradation, but it was too late; they accused Van Angelbeck
of betraying them, vented loud reproaches against their commanders, and
recklessly insulted the British as they filed into the fortress, even spitiing on
them as they passed. "
On the other hand it is asserted that adequate preparations had been
made for the defence, but that the surrender was due to the treachery
of the governor. Van Angelbeck. The facts were as follows. Early
in 1795 an English agent, Hugh Cleghorn, induced the Comte de
Meuron, colonel propriétaire of the Swiss regiment of that nanie, to
transfer his regiment, then forming the chief part of the Ceylon
forces, from the Dutch to the English service. Cleghorn and de
Meuron arrived in India in the following September. Much seemed
to depend upon the conduct of Van Angelbeck. He was believed
to be an Orangist, but several of his council were strong revolution-
aries, and it was feared that precipitate action might lead to the
governor's arrest or murder. It was decided therefore to send him a
"Pybus, Mission, t. 79,
2 Percival, r. 118.
3 Thombe, Voyage aux Indes Orientales.
26


## p. 402 (#430) ############################################

402
CONQUEST OF CEYLON, 1795-1815
copy of the capitulation regarding the de Meuron regiment, with a
demand for its execution; but the news was also secretly communi-
cated to the commandant of the regiment at Colombo. Van Angelbeck,
who clearly did not intend more than a show of resistance, allowed
the regiment to depart; and, when Stuart appeared before Colombo,
surrendered it on terms. Indeed the withdrawal of the Swiss troops
left him no alternative, whatever may have been his political views.
Accordingly the British flag flew over Colombo for the first time on
16 February, 1796, and the Dutch rule was over. Most of the wealthy
folk filtered away to Batavia and elsewhere, but many of the officials
were wisely kept on to finish up the judicial and other matters in
which they were engaged.
It is open to argument whether the Portuguese or the Dutch left
the stronger mark of their rule upon the island. The Sinhalese
language was strongly affected by both. Nearly all the words con-
nected with building are of Portuguese origin, for the ancient houses
of the Sinhalese were rude and primitive structures. In the same way,
most of the words connected with the household, domestic utensils,
the kitchen, food, etc. come from the Dutch-the legacy of the
lluisvrouw. In religious influences the Portuguese were far the more
powerful, and the number of Portuguese names (bestowed at bap-
tism) still surviving among the natives is most remarkable. The
Dutch Reformed religion never got beyond the walls of the fortresses,
but they taught the natives many lessons in town planning, sanita-
tion, and the amenities of life.
"Within the castle (of Colombo)”, says a Dutch writer 3 in 1676, “there are
many pretty walks of nut-trees set in an uniform order : the strects are pleasant
walks themselves, having trees on both sides and before the houses. "
But it was by their magnificent bequest of Roman-Dutch law that
they left their most abiding mark on the island; while their zeal for
trade was a curious counterpart to the Portuguese zeal for conversion.
Nor must it be forgotten that the "burgher" (the offspring of Dutch
and native marriages) is probably the best outcome of mixed unions
to be found in the East, and the colony has good reason to be grateful
for the fine work they have accomplished in many official callings.
The transfer of power was effected without any great upheaval
and with little bloodshed, and at first it seemed likely that the future
course of events would be peaceful and prosperous. As the island had
been taken by the troops, and at the expense, of the East India Com-
pany, it was only natural that it should claim the right to administer
it; a right which it proceeded to assert, in spite of the opposition of
Pitt and Melville, who wished it to be handed over to the crown. The
1 The Cleghorn Papers, pp. 14 sqq. , 202 sqa.
? Census Report, 1911, by E. B. Denham.
3 Christopher Sweitzer's Account of Ceylon.


## p. 403 (#431) ############################################

EARLY MISTAKES
403
results were lamentable. The Company selected as its representative
a Madras civilian named Andrews, who was to negotiate a treaty with
the king of Kandi, and, with plenary powers, to superintend the
revenue arrangements. He was a mari of rash and drastic measures,
utterly ignorant of the people he was sent to govern, and blind to the
fact that a newly, and barely, conquered country requires sympathy
and tactful persuasion rather than revolutionary changes. He ruth-
lessly swept away all the old customs and service tenures, and intro-
duced, without warning or preparation, the revenue system of Madras,
which meant not only taxes and duties unheard of before, but the
farming-out of those imposts to aliens from the coast of India,
"enemies to the religion of the Sinhalese, strangers to their habits,
and animated by no impulse but extortion" (Governor North). 1 They
were under inadequate supervision, and it did not take many months
to bring about the inevitable catastrophe. A fierce rebellion broke
out; the forces at the disposal of the new rulers were few; the rebels
held strong positions on the borderland between the low country and
the hills; and it was only after fierce fighting and considerable loss
of life that any headway was made against them.
This state of affairs was intolerable. Andrews was at once with-
drawn; his outrageous crew of tax-collectors was sent back to the
coast, and Pitt got his way earlier than he expected. The island was
made a crown colony, and the first governor sent out to administer
it was Frederick North, who landed in October, 1798. He was at
first placed under the orders of the governor-general of India; but
after the Treaty of Amiens four years later, this arrangement was
ended. He kept up a considerable correspondence with Lord Morn-
ington (afterwards the Marquess Wellesley), preserved in the
Wellesley MSS, and his letters throw a revealing light upon the
questionable policy he adopted. He set to work at once to abolish
the hateful taxes of his predecessor, eject the remaining Madras
civilians, and change the fiscal policy of the government by reverting
for the time to the system which the Dutch had worked upon; for
in spite of its obvious defects, it was at least familiar to the people.
Unfortunately his attention was diverted from these peaceful efforts
towards reform by a series of events at the capital of the island,
Kandi; and his method of dealing with this crisis has undoubtedly
left a stain upon his character. At the same time it may be urged
that a man must to a certain extent be judged by the standard of his
age; and it was not an age of extreme official probity or humanity.
In 1787 we find Governor Phillip, before starting for New South
Wales, deliberately suggesting in an official memorandum that, for
certain crimes,
.
1 Letter from Hon. F. North, Wellesley MSS.
2 Afterwards fifth Earl of Guildford. He was remarkable for his love of
Greece and the Greek language. He had a good deal to do with the foundation
of the Ionian University at Corfu, of which he was the first Chancellor,


## p. 404 (#432) ############################################

404
CONQUEST OF CEYLON, 1795-1815
I would wish to confine the criminal till an opportunity offered of delivering
him as a prisoner to the natives of New Zealand, and let them eat him. 1
It was not a nice age, from the modern point of view; but whether
such instances as these can excuse North for the breach of faith he
was guilty of, must be left to the judgment of the reader.
The king of Kandi died, or was deposed, in the same year as
governor North landed, and the prime minister nominated a nephew
of the queen's, Vikrama Raja Sinha, to succeed him. This was quite
in accordance with Kandian custom, and the English Government
accepted the arrangement, and prepared an embassy to the new king.
The prime minister's name was Pilamé Talawé, and he was to bulk
very large in the history of Ceylon for the next few luckless years.
He was a traitor of a not unfamiliar oriental type, and had no sooner
put his nominee on the throne than he began to conspire against him
with a view to his own advancement to the kingly dignity. He sought
a secret interview with North and explained his plans, his excuse for
his treachery being that the reigning family was of alien (i. e. South
Indian) origin, and that it was advisable to replace it by a family of
native extraction. Unfortunately North listened to the tempter; he
was anxious to get hold of Kandi, and thought he saw his chance.
After much tortuous negotiation it was finally agreed that the prime
minister should persuade the king to allow an ambassador to enter
Kandi with an armed escort, which was to be far larger than was
reported to the king; and North hoped that this "ambassador” (to
wit, his principal general) would be able to secure and hold Kandi
for the English, depose the unoffending monarch, and put Pilamé
Talawé in his place as titular monarch.
The plot fell through; for though the raja at first fell into the trap
and sanctioned the entry, the size of the escort leaked out, the other
nobles got alarmed, the king was persuaded to cancel his permission,
and the troops were mostly stopped at the boundary or led astray.
The general did indeed arrive at Kandi, but with only a handful of
men, and there was nothing for him to do but return discomfited.
But this rebuff by no means diverted the prime minister (or
adigar, as his real title was) from his intentions. After various fruitless
endeavours, he at last, in 1802, managed to effect a breach between
the Kandians and the English by causing a rich caravan, belonging
to English subjects, to be robbed by Kandian officials. This was
enough for North, who sent a large force under General Macdowall
to seize Kandi-an easy victory, as the inhabitants and the king
precipitately fled. A puppet king, Mutuswamy, with some claims
to royal blood, was placed on the throne; but it was agreed with
Pilamé Talawé that this puppet should be at once deported and that
he, the traitor, should reign in his stead. The English were sufficiently
1 Historical Records of New South Wales, vol. I, pt », p. 53.


## p. 405 (#433) ############################################

MASSACRE OF 1803
406
deluded to believe in the good faith of such a turncoat, and retired
in triumph to the coast, leaving a very small garrison (only 300
English and some native levies) behind. They had their due reward.
The adigar saw his chance, and was as ready to betray his allies the
English as his master the monarch. He calculated that by destroying
the tiny garrison and seizing the two kings, he could attain the summit
of his desires without further tedious negotiations; and proceeded to
carry out the former part of the programme. He surrounded Kandi
with sufficient troops to make resistance hopeless; he attacked and
killed many of the garrison, already decimated by disease, and called
on the remnant to surrender. Their commander, Major Davie, was
apparently not of the "bull-dog breed”. He accepted the traitor's
word that their lives should be spared, laid down his arms, and
marched out of the town on his way to Trinkomali with his sickly
following and the puppet king, Mutuswamy. But the adigar knew
well that they could not cross the large river near Kandi, as it was
swollen by floods. A party of headmen came up while they were
waiting desperately by the bank, and explained that unless Mutu-
swamy was given up, they would never be allowed to cross. Davie
was base enough to entreat the prince to agree, as the envoys had
promised that his life should be spared. The prince knew his country-
men and the adigar too well. “My god”, he exclaimed, "is it possible
that the triumphant arms of England can be so humbled as to fear
the menaces of such cowards as the Kandians? ”
Nevertheless, he was unconditionally surrendered; he stood a
mock trial with heroic restraint, answering only, "I am at the king's
mercy”; and within five minutes he met his death from the krises of
the Malay guard. His relatives and followers. were stabbed or im-
paled, and his servants were deprived of their noses and ears.
But this base act failed to save the English remnant. They were
seized by the king's troops, Major Davie was taken back to Kandi,
and the other officers and men were led two by two into a hollow
out of sight of their comrades, felled by blows inflicted by the Caffres,
and dispatched by the knives of the Kandians. One man alone
escaped from the carnage. He was found to be alive, and was twice
hung by the Kandians, but each time the rope broke. He survived
this trying ordeal, and struggled in the darkness to a hut, where a
kindly villager fed him and tended his wounds, and eventually took
him before the king, who spared his life, more probably from
superstition than humanity.
The scene of the massacre is still pointed out. "Davie's Tree"
is about three miles from Kandi, near the fatal river. The ill-starred
1 Emerson Tennent, Ceylon, II, 83.
2 See An Account of the Interior of Ceylon, by Dr Davy, a brother of the
Celebrated Şir Humphry Davy.


## p. 406 (#434) ############################################

406
CONQUEST OF CEYLON, 1795-1815
Major Davie met with a lingering doom. His life was spared, says
Mrs Heber in her journal, from a kind of superstitious feeling, as
being the individual with whom the treaty was made. He was
removed to Dumbara, but, owing to a plot by some Malays to carry
him off and get a reward from the English Government, he was
brought back to Kandi, suffering from ill-health, and died there in
1810. Several attempts were made by government to obtain his release,
but the king demanded a sea-port on the coast as the ransom for his
prisoner, and the negotiations broke down. He assumed the dress
and habits of the natives, from whom he is said latterly to have been
scarcely distinguishable, and if he had a defence for his conduct, he
was never able to make it known. His apparent cowardice was in
marked contrast to the heroism of two subordinate officers, whose
nan:es should be remembered. Captain Madge was in command of
a small fort named Fort Macdowall, with a tiny force at his disposal.
It was assaulted by swarms of Kandians simultaneously with the
attack on the capital, and safe conduct was offered in return for
capitulation. Captain Madge sternly refused, stood a blockade of
three days, and then cut his way out and began a masterly retreat
to Trinkomali, which he reached in safety, though his march lay
through an almost unbroken ambuscade. Ensign Grant was in charge
of a small redoubt called Dambudenia, slightly constructed of fascines
and earth, and garrisoned by fourteen convalescent Europeans and
twenty-two invalid Malays. He equally scorned the threats and
promises of the enemy, strengthened his flimsy fortifications with bags
of rice and provision stores, and sustained an almost incessant fire
from several thousand Kandians for ten days. His force was then
relieved from Colombo, and the place dismantled
Such was the result of North's disastrous policy; yet he seems to
have been fortunate enough to escape all official censure. Certainly
his letters to Lord Mornington do not show much remorse for his
crooked dealings; doubtless he had strong influence at home; and
the date alone may explain his escape, for in 1803 England was far
too deeply involved in her struggles with Napoleon to have much
time to spare for the petty squabbles of a distant and hardly-known
island.
The effects of the disastrous surrender at Kandi were immediate
and widespread. The whole island hovered on the verge of revolt, or
broke out into open hostilities; and the available British troops,
thinned by death and sickness, could do no more than repel the attacks
of the invaders; while the war between England and France made it
impossible to send reinforcements from home. The king of Kandi,
infiamed. by hatred of the English, defied the wiles of Pilamé Talawe,
and was backed by his whole people in his efforts to eject them from
Ceylon. He sent emissaries throughout the low country, inciting the
population to revolt, and led a large army to lay siege to Colombo.
But the garrison was strong enough to repel him when he was eighteen


## p. 407 (#435) ############################################

KANDLAN WAR
407
miles from his objective, and he retired to his hill-fastnesses, where
he felt himself secure. For it must be remembered that the country
was then without roads of any kind; dense forests and steep hills and
ravines guarded the approach to the capital; the damp enervating
heat of the low country and the foot-hills, and the plague of leeches
and mosquitoes, constituted an additional defence against English
soldiers, whose dress and equipment at that period were not exactly
of the kind best suited to warfare in near proximity to the equator.
An abortive attempt to attack Kandi from six different points in
1804 led to a very gallant action. The necessary orders had been
issued to the six different commanders, but it was eventually decided
that the difficulties were too great, and fresh orders were sent can-
celling the whole scheme. But the countermand failed to reach
Captain Johnston, whose original orders were to march from Batti-
caloa, join a detachment from Uva, and attack Kandi from the east.
He set out accordingly, with a force of 82 Europeans and 220 native
troops, failed to find any detachment from Uva, fought his way to
Kandi through the thick, unhealthy jungle and unknown country,
and took and occupied the capital for three days. As there was no
sign of any of the supporting contingents, he evacuated the town and
marched back to Trinkomali, with only sixteen British soldiers killed
and wounded. His march was through a continuous ambuscade; and,
besides his human foes, he had to contend with malaria, heavy rains,
bad equipment, the plague of insects and the want of provisions. He
has the credit of having performed the pluckiest military feat in the
annals of Ceylon.
A long period of sullen inaction followed, during which the
Kandian king gave way to all the worst excesses of an oriental tyrant.
The traitor adigar was detected in an attempt to assassinate the king
and met with a traitor's doom in 1812, and was succeeded by his
nephew, Eheylapola. This minister, heedless of the warning of his
uncle's fate, secretly solicited the help of the English to organise a
general revolt against the despot of the hills.