But these, which must be taken as material conditions, that as belonging to the possibility of things themselves, they employed merely in
formal signification, as belonging to the logical requisites ' of all cognition, and yet most unguardedly changed these- criteria of thought into properties of objecft, as things
?
formal signification, as belonging to the logical requisites ' of all cognition, and yet most unguardedly changed these- criteria of thought into properties of objecft, as things
?
Kant - Critique of Pure Reason
In the first of these three classes, we consider only two conceptions; in the second, two judgments; in the third, several judgments in relation to each other.
The hypothetical proposition, " If perfect justice exists, the obstinately wicked are
punished," contains properly the relation to each other of two propositions, namely, " Perfect justice exists," and " The ob stinately wicked are punished. " Whether these propositions are in themselves true, is a question not here decided. Nothing is cogitated by means of this judgment except a certain conse quence. Finally, the disjunctive judgment contains a relation of two or more propositions to each other, --a relation not of consequence, but of logical opposition, in so far as the sphere of the one proposition excludes that of the other. But it con tains at the same time a relation of community, in so far as all the propositions taken together fill up the sphere of the cog nition. The disjunctive judgment contains, therefore, the rela tion of the parts of the whole sphere of a cognition, since the sphere of each part is a complemental part of the sphere of the other, each contributing to form the sum total of the divided cognition. Take, for example, the proposition, "The world exists either through blind chance, or through internal neces sity, or through an external cause. " Each of these propo sitions embraces a part of the sphere of our possible cognition as to the existence of a world ; all of them taken together, the whole sphere. To take the cognition out of one of these spheres, is equivalent to placing it in one of the others ; and, on the other hand, to place it in one sphere is equivalent to taking it out of the rest. There therefore, in disjunctive
? certain community of cognitions, which consists this, that they mutually exclude each other, yet thereby deter mine, as whole, the true cognition, inasmuch as, taken to gether, they make up the complete content of particular given
judgment
And this all that find necessary, for the sake of what follows, to remark in this place.
4. The modality of judgments quite peculiar function, with this distinguishing characteristic, that contributes nothing to the content of judgment (for besides quantity,
cognition.
? ? is a
I a
is
is,
a it
a
a
a
in
? THE LOGICAL rX7>>CTIO>> IN JUDGMENTS. 61
quality, and relation, there ia nothing more that constitutes the content of a judgment), but concerns itself only with the value of the copula in relation to thought in general. Pro blematical judgments are those in which the affirmation or negation is accepted as merely possible (ad libitum). In the assertorical, we regard the proposition as real (true) ; in the apodeictical, we look on it as necessary. * Thus the two
judgments (antecedens et consequent), the relation of which constitutes a hypothetical judgment, likewise those (the mem bers of the division) in whose reciprocity the disjunctive con sists, are only problematical. In the example above given, the proposition, " There exists perfect justice," is not stated assertorically, but as an ad libitum judgment, which some one may choose to adopt, and the consequence alone is assertorical. Hence such judgments may be obviously false, and yet, taken problematically, be conditions of our cognition of the truth. Thus the proposition, " The world exists only by blind chance,"
? is in the disjunctive judgment of problematical import only : that is to say, one may accept it for the moment, and it helps us (like the indication of the wrong road among all the roads that one can take) to find out the true proposition. The pro blematical proposition therefore, that which expresses ouly logical possibility (which not objective) that expresses
free choice to admit the validity of such proposition, -- merely arbitrary reception of into the understanding. The assertorical speaks of logical reality or truth as, for example, in hypothetical syllogism, the antecedens presents itself in problematical form in the major, in an assertorical form in the minor, and shows that the proposition in harmony with the laws of the understanding. The apodeictical proposition cogitates the assertorical as determined these very laws ot the understanding, consequently as affirming priori, and in this manner expresses logical necessity. Now because all here gradually incorporated with the understanding, --inas much as in the first place we judge problematically then
our judgment as true lastly, affirm as inseparably united with the understanding, that as ne
Just as thought were in the first instance function of the under- itandmy in the second, of judgment ir. the third of reason. remark which will be explained in the scuuei.
accept assertorically
cessary and apodeictical, --we may safely reckon these three functions of modality as so many momenta of thought.
? ? ;
if
it
;
is is, it
A
is,
;
a
;
*
a a
it
by is ;;a
a
itis aa
is, it
? 12 TBAN8CENDENTAI, IiOOIC.
SlCT. III. -- Of the pure Conception* of the Understanding, or Categories.
? 6.
General logic, as has been repeatedly said, makes abstrac tion of all content of cognition, and expects to receive repre sentations from some other quarter, in order, by means of ana lysis, to convert them into conceptions. On the contrary, transcendental logic has lying before it the manifold content ot a priori sensibility, which transcendental esthetic presents to it in order to give matter to the pare conceptions of the un
? without which transcendental logic would have no content, and be therefore utterly void. Now space and time contain an infinite diversity of determinations* of pure a priori intuition, but are nevertheless the condition of the mind's receptivity, under which alone it can obtain repre sentations of objects, and which, consequently, must always affect the conception of these objects. But the spontaneity of thought requires that this diversity be examined after a certain manner, received into the mind, and connected, in order after wards to forma cognition out of it. This process I call synthesis.
derstanding,
By the word synthesis, in its most general signification, I understand the process of joining different representations to each other, and of comprehending their diversity in one cog nition. This synthesis is pure when the diversity is not given empirically but a priori (as that in space and time). Our re presentations must be given previously to any analysis of them ; and no conceptions can arise, quoad their content, analytically. But the synthesis of a diversity (be it given & priori or em pirically) is the first requisite for the production of a cognition, which in its beginning, indeed, may be crude and confused, and therefore in need of analysis, --still, synthesis is that by which alone the elements of our cognitions are collected and united into a certain content, consequently it is the first thing on which we must fix our attention, if we wish to investigate the origin of our knowledge.
Synthesis, generally speaking, as we shall afterwards see, the mere operation of the imagination-- blind but indis-
Kant employs the words Mannigfattige*, Mannigfaltiglmt, indiffe rently, for the infinitude of the possible determination of matter, of aa intuition (such as that of space*. 4c. -- TV.
? ? *
a
is,
? TEE CATEGOBIES. 63
penaable function of the soul, without which we should have no cognition whatever, but of the working of which we are seldom even conscious. But to reduce this synthesis to con ceptions, is a function of the understanding, by means of which we attain to cognition, in the proper meaning of the term.
Pure synthesis, represented generally, gives us the pure conception of the understanding. But by this pure synthesis, I mean that which rests upon a basis of d priori synthetical
Thus, our numeration (and this is more observable
in large numbers) is a synthesis according to conceptions, because it takes place according to a common basis of unity
(for example, the decade). By means of this conception, therefore, the unity in the synthesis of the manifold becomes
unity.
? necessary.
By means of analysis different representations are brought
under one conception, -- an operation of which general logic treats. On the other hand, the duty of transcendental
logic is to reduce to conceptions, not representations, but the pure synthesis of representations. The first thing which must be given to us in order to the & priori cognition of all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition ; the syn
thesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the se cond ; but this gives, as yet, no cognition. The conceptions which give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetical unity, furnish the thira requisite for the cognition of an object, and these conceptions are given by the understanding.
The same function which gives unity to the different repre sentations in a judgment, gives also unity to the mere syn thesis of different representations in an intuition ; and this unity we call the pure conception of the understanding. Thus, the same understanding, and by the same operations, whereby in conceptions, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgment, introduces, by means of the synthetical unity of the manifold in intuition, a transcendental content into its representations, on which account they are called pure conceptions of the understanding, and they apply
a prim to objects, a result not within the power of general logic. *
* Only because this is beyond the sphere of logic proper. Kant's re mark is unnecessary. --Dr.
? ? ? 64 TBAXSCtlTOEKTAL LOGIC.
In this manner, there arise exactly so many pure concep
a priori to object* of intuition in general, as there are logical functions in all possible judgments. For there is no other function or faculty existing in the understanding besides those enumerated in that table. These conceptions we shall, with Aristotle, call categories, our purpose being originally identical with his,
notwithstanding the great difference in the execution. Table or the Categobies.
tions of the understanding, applying
i.
Of Quantity.
Unity. Plurality. Totality.
ii. Of Quality.
Reality. Negation. Limitation.
? HI.
Of Relation.
Of Inherence and Subsistence (substantia et accidens).
Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect).
Of Community (reciprocity between the agent and patient)
IT.
0/ Modality.
Possibility. --Impossibility. Existence. --Non-existence.
Necessity. -- Contingencc.
This, then, is a catalogue of all the originally pure concep tions of the synthesis which the understanding contains i priori, and these conceptions alone entitle it to be called a pure understanding ; inasmuch as only by them it can render the manifold of intuition conceivable, in other words, think an object of intuition. This division is made systematically from a common principle, namely, the faculty of judgment (which
is just the same as the power of thought), and has not arisen rhapsodically from a search at hap-hazard after pure concep tions, respecting the full number of which we never could be certain, inasmuch as we employ induction alone in our search, without considering that in this way we can never understand
? ? ? THE CATEGORIES.
65
wherefore precisely these conceptions, and none others ahide in the pure understanding. It was a desigu worthy of an acute thinker like Aristotle, to search for these fundamental
conceptions. * Destitute, however, of any guiding principle, he picked them up just as they occurred to him, and at first huuted out ten, which he called categories (predicaments). Afterwards he believed that he had discovered five others, wliich were added under the name of post predicaments. Bat his catalogue still remained defective. Besides, there arc to be fouud among them some of the modes of pure sensibility
(quando, ubi, situs, elsoprius,simul), and likewise an empirical conception (motus), --which can by no means belong to this ge nealogical register of the pure understanding. Moreover, there are deduced conceptions (actio, passio,) -esumerated among the original conceptions, and of the latter, some are entirely wanting.
With regard to these, it is to be remariced, that the categories, as the true primitive conceptions of the pure understanding, have also their pure deduced conceptions, which, in a complete system of transcendental philosophy, must by no means be
* " It is a serious error to imagine that, in his Categories, Aristotle pro posed, like Kant, ' an analysis of the elements of human reason. ' The ends proposed by the two philosophers were different, even opposed. In their several Categories, Aristotle attempted a synthesis of things in their multiplicity, --a classification of objects real, but in relation to thought ; Kant, an analysis of mind in its unity, -- a dissection of thought, pure, but in relation to its objects. The predicaments of Aristotle are thus ob jective, of things as understood ; those of Kant subjective, of the mind as understanding. The former are results a posteriori --the creations of abstraction and generalisation ; the latter, anticipations a priori--the con ditions of those acts themselves. It is true, that as the one scheme exhibits the unity of thought diverging into plurality, in appliance to its objects, and as the other exhibits the multiplicity of these objects con verging towards unity by the collective determination of thought ; while, at the same time, language usually confounds the subjective and objective under a common term ;--it is certainly true, that some elements in the one table coincide in name with some ele-nents in the other. This coinci dence is, however, only equivocal. In reality, the whole Krntian cate gories must be excluded from the Aristotelic list, as entia ratumis, at notionet secunda--in short, as determinations of thought, and not genera of real things ; while the several elements would be specially excluded, as partial, privative, transcendent," &c. -- Hamilton's (Sir W. ) Sssayi and Cunwioni
? ? ? ? 66 TIUNSCENDEJTTAL LOGIC.
passed over ; though in a merely critical essay we must bo contented with the simple mention of the fact.
Let it be allowed me to call these pure, but deduced con ceptions of the understanding, the predicables* of the pure understanding, in contradistinction to predicaments. If wc are in possession of the original and primitive, the deduced and subsidiary conceptions can easily be added, and the gene alogical tree of the understanding completely delineated. As
aim is not to set forth a complete system, but merely the principles of one, I reserve this task for another time. It may be easily executed by any one who will refer to the ontological manuals, and subordinate to the category of causality, for example, the predicables of force, action, passion ; to that of community, those of presence and resistance ; to the categories of modality, those of origination, extinction, change; and so with the rest. The categories combined with the modes of pure sensibility, or with one another, afford a great num ber of deduced h priori conceptions ; a complete enumeration of which would be a useful and not unpleasant, but in this
place a perfectly dispensable occupation.
I purposely omit the definitions of the categories in this
treatise. I shall analyze these conceptions only so far at is necessary for the doctrine of method, which is to form a part of this critique. In a system of pure reason, definitions of them would be with justice demanded of me, but to give them here would only hide from our view the main aim of our investigation, at the same time raising doubts and objections, the consideration of which, without injustice to our main pur pose, may be very well postponed till another opportunity. Meanwhile, it ought to be sufficiently clear, from the little we have already said on this subject, that the formation of a complete vocabulary of pure conceptions, accompanied by all the requisite explanations, is not only a possible, but an easy undertaking. The compartments already exist ; it is only necessary to fill them up ; and a systematic topic like the
* The predicables of Kant are quite different from those of Aristotle and ancient and modern logicians. The five predicables are of a logical, and not, like thote of Kant, of a metaphysico-ontological import. They were enounced as a complete enumeration of all the possible modes of predica tion. Kant's predicables, on the contrary, do not possess this merely formal and logical character, but have a real or metaphysical content -- TV
my present
? ? ? ? THE CATEGORIES.
67
present, indicates with perfect precision the proper place to which each conception belongs, while it readily points out any that have not yet been filled up.
? 7.
Our table of the categories suggests considerations of some importance, which may perhaps have significant results in regard to the scientific form of all rational cognitions. For, that this table is useful in the theoretical part of philosophy, nay, indispensable for the sketching of the complete plan of a science, so far as that science rests upon conceptions a priori, and for dividing it mathematically, according to fixed princi ples, is most manifest from the fact that it contains all the elementary conceptions of the understanding, nay, even the form of a system of these in the understanding itself, and
? indicates all the momenta, and also the internal
consequently
arrangement of a projected speculative science, as I have else where shown. * Here follow some of these observations.
I. This table, which contains four classes of conceptions of the understanding, may, in the first instance, be divided into two classes, the first of which relates to objects of intuition -- pure as well as empirical ; the second, to the existence of these objects, either in relation to one another, or to the un derstanding.
The former of these classes of categories I would entitle the mathematical, and the latter the dynamical categories. The former, as we see, has no correlates ; these are only to ba. found in the second class. This difference must have a ground in the nature of the human understanding.
II. The number of the categories in each class is always the same, namely, three ; -- a fact which also demands some consideration, because in all other cases division h prion through conceptions is necessarily dichotomy. It is to oe added, that the third category in each triad always arises from the combination of the second with the first.
Thus Totality is nothing else but Plurality contemplated as Unity ; Limitation is merely Reality conjoined with Ne gation ; Community is the Causality of a Substance, recipro cally determining, and determined by other substances ; and
* la the " Metaphysical l'rinciples of Natural Science. "
? ? ? 68 TRAirBOMTDEKTAL LOOTO.
is nothing but Existence, which is given
finall}, Necessity
through the Possibility itself. * Let it not be supposed, how ever, that the third category is merely a deduced, and not a primitive conception of the pure understanding. For the con junction of the first and second, in order to produce the third conception, requires a particular function of the understanding, which is by no means identical with those which are exercised in the first and second. Thus, the conception of a number
to the category of Totality), is not always possible, where the conceptions of multitude and unity exifet
(for example, in the representation of the infinite). Or, if I conjoin the conception of a cause with that of a substance, it does not follow that the conception of influence, that how one substance can be the cause of something in another sub stance, will be understood from that. Thus evident, that
(which belongs
? particular act of the understanding here necessary and so in the other instances.
III. With respect to one category, namely, that of com munity, which found in the third class, not so easy as with the others to detect its accordance with the form of the disjunctive judgment which corresponds to in the table of the logical functions.
In order to assure ourselves of this accordance, we must
observe that in every disjunctive judgment, the sphere of the judgment (that the complex of all that contained
represented as whole divided into parts and, since one part cannot be contained in the other, they arc cogitated as co-ordinated with, not subordinated to each other, so that they do not determine each other unilaterally, as in linear series, but reciprocally, as in an aggregate -- one member of the division posited, all the rest are excluded and con
versely).
Now like connection cogitated in whole of things
for one thing not subordinated, as effect, to another as cause of its existence, but, on the contrary, co-ordinated con'emporaneously and reciprocally, as cause in relation to the determination of the others (for example, in body -- the parts of which mutually attract and repel each other). And
Kant's meaning is: necessary existence aa existence whosa existence given the very possibitit] of its existence. -- Jr.
? ? * is
a
:
in isis A
is
is
a
b a it
is
a
;
; a
is
is
(if
it is
it is
; in
it) is
a
a is,
;
is,
? THE CATEGORIES.
69
this is an entirely different kind of connection from that
which we find in the mere relation of the cause to the effect
(the principle to the consequence), for in such a connection
the consequence docs not iu its turn deter. uine the principle,
nud therefore docs not constitute, with the latter, a whole, --
just as the Creator does not with the world make up a whole.
The process of understanding by which it represents to itself
the sphere of a divided conception, is employed also when we
think of a thing as divisible ; and, in the same manner as the
members of the division in the former exclude one another,
and yet are connected in one sphere, so the understanding
represents to itself the parts of the latter, as having --each of
? them -- an existence (as substances), independently of the others, and yet as united in one whole.
? 8.
In the transcendental philosophy of the ancients, there
exists one more leading division, which contains pure concep tions of the understanding, and which, although not num bered among the categories, ought, according to them, as con
ceptions a priori, to be valid of objects. But in this case they would augment the number of the categories ; which cannot ? ie. These are set forth in the proposition, so renowned among the schoolmen, --'* Quodlibtt ens est unum, vebuji, BOOTH. " Now, though the inferences from this principle were mere tautological propositions, and though it is allowed
iuly by courtesy to retain a place in modern metaphysics, yet a thought which maintained itself for such a length of time, however empty it seems to be, deserves an investigation of its origin, and justifies the conjecture that it must be grounded in some law of the understanding, which, as is often the case, has only been erroneously interpreted. These pretended transcendental predicates are, in fact, nothing but logical re quisites and criteria of all cognition of objects, and they em ploy, (is the basis for this cognition, the categories of Quan
lity, namely, Unity, Plurality, and Totality.
But these, which must be taken as material conditions, that as belonging to the possibility of things themselves, they employed merely in
formal signification, as belonging to the logical requisites ' of all cognition, and yet most unguardedly changed these- criteria of thought into properties of objecft, as things
? ? iu
is,
? 70 TRANSCENDBXTAL LOQIC.
themselves. Now, in every cognition of an object, there is unity of conception, which may be called qualitative unity, so far as by this term we understand only the unity in our connection of the manifold ; for example, unity of the theme in a play, an oration, or a story. Secondly, there is truth in respect of the deductions from it. The more true deductions we have from a given conception, the more criteria of its ob
This we might call the qualitative plurality of characteristic marks, which belong to a conception as to a common foundation, but are not cogitated as a quantity in it. Thirdly, there is perfection, -- which consists in this, that the plurality falls bacjc upon the unity of the conception, and
accords completely with that conception, and with no other. This we may denominate qualitative completeness. Hence it is evident that these logical criteria of the possibility of cog nition, are merely the three categories of Quantity modified and transformed to suit an unauthorized manner of applying them. That is to say, the three categories, in which the unity in the production of the quantum must be homogeneous throughout, are transformed solely with a view to the con nexion of heterogeneous parts of cognition in one act of con sciousness, by means of die quality of the cognition, which is the principle of that connexion. Thus the criterion of the possibility of a conception (not of its object), is the definition of in which the unity of the conception, the truth of all that may be immediately deduced from and finally, the completeness of what has been thus deduced, constitute the requisites for the reproduction of the whole conception. Thus also, the criterion or test of an hypothesis the intelligibility of the received principle of explanation, or its unity (without help from any subsidiary hypothesis),--the truth of our deduc tions from (consistency with each other and with experience), --and lastly, the completeness of theprinciple of the explanation of these deductions, which refer to neither more nor less than what was admitted in the hypothesis, restoring analytically and posteriori, what was cogitated synthetically and a priori. By the conceptions, therefore, of Unity, Truth, and Perfection, we have made no addition to the transcendental table of the categories, which complete without them. We have, on the contrary, merely employed the Ciree categories of quantity, setting n- ide t'. icir application to objects of experience, as
jective reality.
? ? ? is
h
it,
it
is it,
? DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOHIES.
71
general logical laws of the consistency of cognition with it self. *
Analttic of Conceptions.
CHAPTER II.
01 THE DEDUCTION OF THE PDKE CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNDEHSTANDING.
Sect. I. -- Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in general.
? 9.
Teachebs of jurisprudence, when speaking of rights and Claims, distinguish in a cause the question of right (quid juris) from the question of fact (quid facti), and while they demand proof of both, they giye to the proof of the former, which goes to establish right or claim in law, the name of Deduction. Now we make use of a great number of empirical conceptions, without opposition from any noe ; and consider ourselves, even without any attempt at deduction, justified in attaching to them a sense, and a supposititious signification, because we have always experience at hand to demonstrate their objective reality. There exist also, however, usurped conceptions, such as fortune, fate, which circulate with almost universal in dulgence, and yet are occasionally challenged by the ques tion, quid juris ? In such cases, we have great difficulty in discovering any deduction for these terms, inasmuch as we cannot produce any manifest ground of right, either from experience or from reason, on which the claim to employ them can be founded.
* Kant's meaning in the foregoing chapter is this :--These three con- ceptions of unity, truth, and goodness, applied as predicates to things, are the three categories of quantity under a different form. These three categories have an immediate relation to things, as phenomena ; without them we could form no conceptions of external objects. But in the above- mentioned proposition, they are changed into logical conditions of thought, and then unwittingly transformed into properties of things in themselves. These conceptions are properly logical or formal, and not metaphysical or material. The three categories are quantitative ; these conceptions, quali tative. They are logical conditions employed is metaphysical eon- ceptions, -- one of the very commonest error? in the sphere of mental science. -- TV.
? ? ? ? n TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
Among the many conceptions, wnich make up the very Tariegated web of human cognition, some are destined for pure use a priori, independent of all experience ; and their title to be so employed nlways requires a deduction, inasmuch as, to justify such use of them, proofs from experience are not sufficient ; but it is necessary to know how these concep tions can apply to objects without being derived from expe rience. I term, therefore, an explanation of the manner in which conceptions can apply a priori to objects, the transcen dental deduction of conceptions, and I distinguish it from the empirical deduction, which indicates the mode in which a conception is obtained through experience and reflection thereon ; consequently, does not concern itself with the right, but only with the fact of our obtaining conceptions in such and such a manner. We have already seen that we are in pos session of two perfectly different kinds of conceptions, which nevertheless agree with each other in this, that they botli apply to objects completely a priori. These are the concep tions of space and time as forms of sensibility, and the cate gories as pure conceptions of the understanding. To attempt an empirical deduction of either of these classes would be labour in vain, because the distinguishing characteristic of their nature consists in this, that they apply to their objects, without having borrowed anything from experience towards the representation of them. Consequently, if a deduction of these conceptions is necessary, it must always be transcen dental.
Meanwhile, with respect to these conceptions, as with respect to all our cognition, we certainly may discover in experience, if not the principle of their possibility, yet the occasioning causes * of their production. It will be found that the impressions of sense give the first occasion for bringing into action the whole faculty of cognition, and for the production of experience, which contains two very dis similar elements, namely, a matter for cognition, given by the senses, and a certain form for the arrangement of this matter, arising ou; of the inner fountain of pure intuition and thought ; and these, on occasion given by sensuous impres sions, are called into exercise and produce conceptions. Such
* Gelegenheitsursachea.
? ? ? ? DEDT/CTIOK OF THE CATEGORIES. 73
an investigation into the first efforts of our faculty of cognition to mount from particular perceptions to general conceptions,
is undoubtedly of great utility ; and we have to thank the celebrated Locke, for having first opened the way for this en
But a deduction of the pure d priori conceptions of course never can be made in this way, seeing that, in regard to their future employment, which must be entirely inde pendent of experience, they must have a far different certificate of birth to show from that of a descent from experience. This attempted physiological derivation, which cannot properly be called deduction, because it relates merely to a queesiio facli, I shall entitle an explanation of the possession of a pure cog nition. It is therefore manifest that there can caly be a tran scendental deduction of these conceptions, and by no means an empirical one ; also, that all attempts at an empirical de
duction, in regard to pure &. priori conceptions, are vain, and
can only be made by one who does not understand the alto
gether peculiar nature of these cognitions.
But although it is admitted that the only possible deduction
of pure a priori cognition is a transcendental deduction, it is not,
for that reason, perfectly manifest that such a deduction is
absolutely necessary. We have already traced to their sources the conceptions of space and time, by means of a transcen dental deduction, and we have explained and determined their objective validity t> priori. Geometry, nevertheless, advances steadily and securely in the province of pure h priori cogni tions, without needing to ask from Philosophy any certificate as to the pure and legitimate origin of its fundamental concep tion of space. But the use of the conception in this science extends only to the external world of sense, the pure form of the intuition of which is space ; and in this world, therefore, all geometrical cognition, because it is founded upon h priori intuition, posesses immediate evidence, and the objects of this cognition are given & prion (as regards their form) in intuition
by and through the cognition itself. * With the pure concep tions of Understanding, on the contrary, commences the ab-
* Kant's meaning is : The object! of cognition in Geometry, -- anirias, lines, figures, and the like,--are not different from the aet of cognition which produces them, except in thought. The object does not exist hut while we think it--docs not exist apart from our thinking it. The act of thinking and the object of thinking, are but one thing regarded from two different points ofview. --IV.
quiry.
? ? ? ? 74
TBAWBCENDEKTAL LOGIC.
solute necessity of seeking a transcendental deduction, not only of these conceptions themselves, but likewise of space, because, inasmuch as they make affirmations* concerning
not by means of the predicates of intuition and sen sibility, but of pure thought a priori, they apply to objects without any of the conditions of sensibility. Besides, not being
founded on experience, they are not presented with any object in h priori intuition upon which, antecedently to expe rience, they might base their synthesis. Hence results, not only doubt as to the objective validity and proper limits of their use, but that even our conception of space is rendered equivocal; inasmuch as we are very ready with the aid of
the categories, to carry the use of this conception beyond the conditions of sensuous intuition ;--and for this reason, we have already found a transcendental deduction of it needful. The reader, then, must be quite convinced of the absolute neces sity of a transcendental deduction, before taking a single step in the field of pure reason ; because otherwise he goes to work blindly, and after he has wandered about in all directions, returns to the state of utter ignorance from which he started. He ought, moreover, clearly to recognize beforehand, the un-
* I have been compelled to adopt a conjectural reading here. All the editions of the Critik der reinen Vernunft, both those published during Kant's lifetime, and those published by various editors after his death, have tie. . von Gegenttanden. . . . redet. But it is quite plain that the tie is the pronoun for die reine Vertttmdesbegriffe ; and we ought, there fore, to read reden. In the same sentence, all the editions (except Har- tenstein's) insert die after the first und, which makes nonsense. In page 75 also, sentence beginning "For that objectt," I have altered "tyn- thetitchen Einticht det Denkent" into " tyrUheiitchen Einheit. " And in page 77, sentence beginning, " But it it evident," vre find "die trtte Bedingung liegtn. " Some such word as mutt is plainly to be understood.
Indeed, I have not found a single edition of the Critique trust worthy. Kant must not have been very careful in his correction of the
Those published by editors after Kant's death seem in most cases to follow Kant's own editions closely. That by Rosencrantz is perhaps the best ; and he has corrected a number of Kant's errors. But although I have adopted several uncommon and also conjectural readings, I have not done ao hastily or lightly. It is only after diligent comparison of all the tditions I could gainaocesa to, that I have altered the common reaaing ; while a conjectural reading has been adopted only when it was quite clear that the reading of every edition was a misprint.
Other errors. occurring previously to those mentioned above, have been, and others after them will be, corrected ii silence. -- 2V.
objects
? press.
? ? ? DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES.
75
BToidable difficulties in his undertaking, so that he may not afterwards complain of the obscurity in which the subject itself is deeply involved, or become too soon impatient of the obstacles in his path ;--because we have a choice of only two things -- either at once to give up all pretensions to know ledge beyond the limits of possible experience, or to bring this critical investigation to completion.
We have been able, with very little trouble, to make it com prehensible how the conceptions of space and time, although a priori cognitions, must necessarily apply to external ob-
independently of all experience. For inasmuch as only by means of such pure form of sensibility an object can appear to us, that be an object of empirical intuition, space and time are pure intuitions, which contain a priori the con dition of the possibility of objects as phenomena, and an
priori synthesis in these intuitions possesses objective validity.
On the other hand, the categories of the understanding do
not represent the conditions under which objects are given
to us in intuition objects can consequently appear to us without necessarily connecting themselves with these, and consequently without any necessity binding on the under standing to contain priori the conditions of these objects. Thus we find ourselves involved in difficulty which did not present itself in the sphere of sensibility, that to say, we cannot discover how the subjective conditions thought can have objective validity, in other words, can become con ditions of the possibility of all cognition of objects --for phsenomena may certainly be given to us in intuition without any help from the functions Let us take, for example, the conception of cause, which indicates peculiar kind of synthesis, namely, that with something, A, something entirely different, connected according to law. not priori manifest why phsenomena should contain anything of this kind (we are of course debarred from appealing for proof to experience, for the objective validity of this conception must be demonstrated priori), and hence remains doubtful a priori, whether such con ception be not quite void, and without any corresponding object among phenomena. For that objects of sensuous
? ? ? it
It
a a
of is ;
is h
is,
B, is
aa
a
; h
&
? 76 TBANSCEXDESTAL LOGIO.
intuition must correspond to tlic formnl conditions of sen sibility existing h priori in the mind, is quite evident, froir. the fact, that without these they could not be objects for us ; but that they must also correspond to the conditions which understanding requires for the synthetical unity 01 thought, is nn assertion, the grounds for which are not so easily to be discovered. For phenomena might be so con stituted, as not to correspond to the conditions of the unity of thought ; and all things might lie in such confusion, that, for example, nothing could be met with in the sphere of phsenomena to suggest a law of synthesis, and so cor
? to the conception of cause and effect ; so that this conception would lie quite void, null, and without significance. Phsenomena would nevertheless continue to present objects to our intuition ; for mere intuition does not in any respect stand in need of the functions of thought.
respond
Ifwc thought to free ourselves from the labour of these
investigations by saying, " Experience is constantly offering us examples of the relation of cause and effect in pheno mena, and presents us with abundant opportunity of ab stracting the conception of cause, and so at the same time of corroborating the objective validity of this conception ;" -- we should in this case be overlooking the fact, that the concep tion of cause cannot arise in this way at all ; that, on the con trary, it must either have an a priori basis in the understand ing, or be rejected as a mere chimacra. For this conception demands that something, A, should be of such a nature, that something else, B, should follow from it necessarily, and ac cording to an absolutely universal law. We may certainly collect from phsenomena a law, according to which this or that usually happens, but the element of necessity is not tc be found in it. Hence it is evident that to the synthesis of cause and effect belongs a dignity, which is utterly wanting in any empirical synthesis ; for it is no mere mechanical syn thesis, by means of addition, but a dynamical one, that is to say, the effect is not to be cogitated as merely annexed to the
cause, but aa posited by and through the cause, and resulting from it. The strict universality of this law never can be a characteristic of empirical laws, which obtain through in duction only a comparative universality, tint an extended range of practical application. But tie pure conceptions ol
? ? is,
? DEDUCTION OY THE CATEGORIES. 77
(he understanding -would entirely lose all their peculiar cha racter, if we treated them merely as the productions of ex
perience.
Tbanbition to the Tbanscendental Deduction oi hie Cateqouies.
? 10.
There are only two possible ways in which synthetical re presentation and its objects can coincide with and relate
to each other, and, as it were, meet together, blither the object alone makes the representation possible, or the representation alone makes the object possible. In the former case, the relation between them is only empirical, and
an a priori representation is impossible. And this is the case with phsenomena, as regards that in them which is refer able to mere sensation. In the latter case --although repre sentation alone (for of its causality, by means cf the will, we do not here speak,) does not produce the object as to its ex istence, it must nevertheless be a priori determinative in re gard to the object, if it is only by means of the represent ation that we can cognize any thing as an object. Now there are only two conditions of the possibility of a cognition of objects ; firstly, Intuition, by means' of which the object, though only as phsenomenon, is given ; secondly, Conception, by means of which the object which corresponds to this intuition is thought. But it is evident from what has been said on aes thetic, that the first condition, under which alone objects can be intuited, must in fact exist, as a formal basis for them, u priori in the mind. With this formal condition of sensi
bility, therefore, all phsenomena necessarily correspond, because it is only through it that they can be phenomena at all ; that can be empirically intuited and given. Now the question is,,
necessarily
? whether there do not exist priori in the mind, conceptions of understanding also, as conditions under which alone something,
not intuited, yet thought as object. If this question be answered in the affirmative, follows that all empirical cogni tion of objects is necessarily conformable to such conceptions, since, they are not presupposed, impossible that anything can be an object of experience. Now all experience contains, besidro the intuition of 'he senses through which an object
? ? is
if if
is,
it is
it
&
is
? 78 nursuM duvix logic.
given, a conception also of an object that is given in intuition. Accordingly, conceptionsof objects in general must lie as a priori conditions at the foundation of all empirical cognition ; and con
sequently, the objective validity of the categories, as a priori conceptions, will rest upon this, that experience (as far as re gards the form of thought) is possible only by their means. For in that case they apply necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, because only through them can an object of ex perience be thought.
The whole aim of the transcendental deduction of all a prion conceptions is to show that these conceptions are a priori conditions of the possibility of all experience. Conceptions
which afford us the objective foundation of the possibility of experience, are for that very reason necessary. But the analysis of the experiences in which they are met with is not deduction, but only an illustration of them, because from experience they could never derive the attribute of necessity. Without their original applicability and relation to all pos sible experience, in which all objects of cognition present themselves, the relation of the categories to objects, of what ever nature, would be quite incomprehensible.
The celebrated Locke, for want of due reflection on these points, and because he met with pure conceptions of the un derstanding in experience, sought also to deduce them from
experience, and yet proceeded so inconsequently as to attempt, with their aid, to arrive at cognitions which lie far beyond the limits of all experience. David Hume perceived that, to render this possible, it was necessary that the conceptions should have an a priori origin. But as he could not explain how it was possible that conceptions which are not connected with each other in the understanding, must nevertheless be thought as necessarily connected in the object, --and it never occurred to him that the understanding itself might, perhaps, by means of these conceptions, be the author of the experi ence in which its objects were presented to --he was forced to derive these conceptions from experience, that from
subjective necessity arising from repeated association of experiences erroneously considered to be objective, --in one word, from " habit. " But he proceeded with perfect con sequence, and declared to be impossible with such con
? ? ? it
a
is
it,
? DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOBTEB.
79
eeptions and the principles arising from them, to Dverstep the limits of experience. The empirical derivation, however, which both of these philosophers attributed to these concep tions, cannot possibly be reconciled with the fact that we do possess scientific & priori cognitions, namely, those of pure mathematics and general physics.
The former of these two celebrated men opened a wide door to extravagance --(for if reason has once undoubted righ. on its side, it will not allow itself to be confined to set limits, by vague recommendations of moderation) ; the latter gave himself up entirely to scepticism, --a natural consequence, after having discovered, as he thought, that the faculty of cognition was not trust-worthy. We now intend to make a trial whether it be not possible safely to conduct reason be tween these two rocks, to assign her determinate limits, and yet leave open for her the entire sphere of her legitimate activity.
? I shall merely premise an explanation of what the categories are. They are conceptions of an object in general, by means of which its intuition is contemplated as determined in rela tion to one of the logical functions of judgment. The fol lowing will make this plain. The function of the categorical judgment is that of the relation of subject to predicate ; for example, in the proposition, " All bodies are divisible. " But
in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding, it still remains undetermined to which of these two conceptions belongs the function of subject, and to which that of predi cate. For we could also say, " Some divisible is a body. " But the category of substance, when the conception of a body is brought under determines that and its empirical intui tion in experience must be contemplated always as subject, and never 80 were predicate. And so w th all the other cate gories.
? ? it,
;
? 8C TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
Deditction OF THE fuh;s Conceftions OF the Undeb- STANDING. '
SECTION II.
Transcendental Deduction of the pure Conceftions of tub Understanding.
? 11.
Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold repre sentations given by Sense.
Tlie manifold content in our representations can be given in an intuition which is merely sensuous --in other words, is nothing but susceptibility ; and the form of this intuition can exist h priori in our faculty of representation, without being any thing else but the mode in which the subject is affected. But the conjunction (conjunctio) of a manifold in intuition never can be given us by the senses ; it cannot therefore be contained in the pure form of sensuous intuition, for it is a spontaneous act of the faculty of representation. And as we must, to distinguish it from sensibility, entitle this facult) understanding; so all conjunction -- whether conscious or un conscious, be it of the manifold in intuition, sensuous or non- sensuous, or of several conceptions --is an act of the under standing. To this act we shall give the general appellation of synthesis, thereby to indicate, at the same time, that we cannot represent any thing as conjoined in the object without having previously conjoined it ourselves. Of all mental notions, that of conjunction is the only one which cannot be given through objects, but can be originated only by the sub ject itself, because it is an act cf its purely spontaneous activity. The reader will easily enough perceive that the possibility of conjunction must be grounded in the very nature of this act, and that it must be equally valid for all conjunction ; and that analysis, which appears to be its contrary, must, never theless, always presuppose it ; for where the understanding has not previously conjoined, it cannot dissect or analyse, because only a>> conjoined by must that which to be analysed have been given to our faculty of representation.
But the conception of conjunction includes, besides the conception of the manifold and of the synthesis of that of thf
?
punished," contains properly the relation to each other of two propositions, namely, " Perfect justice exists," and " The ob stinately wicked are punished. " Whether these propositions are in themselves true, is a question not here decided. Nothing is cogitated by means of this judgment except a certain conse quence. Finally, the disjunctive judgment contains a relation of two or more propositions to each other, --a relation not of consequence, but of logical opposition, in so far as the sphere of the one proposition excludes that of the other. But it con tains at the same time a relation of community, in so far as all the propositions taken together fill up the sphere of the cog nition. The disjunctive judgment contains, therefore, the rela tion of the parts of the whole sphere of a cognition, since the sphere of each part is a complemental part of the sphere of the other, each contributing to form the sum total of the divided cognition. Take, for example, the proposition, "The world exists either through blind chance, or through internal neces sity, or through an external cause. " Each of these propo sitions embraces a part of the sphere of our possible cognition as to the existence of a world ; all of them taken together, the whole sphere. To take the cognition out of one of these spheres, is equivalent to placing it in one of the others ; and, on the other hand, to place it in one sphere is equivalent to taking it out of the rest. There therefore, in disjunctive
? certain community of cognitions, which consists this, that they mutually exclude each other, yet thereby deter mine, as whole, the true cognition, inasmuch as, taken to gether, they make up the complete content of particular given
judgment
And this all that find necessary, for the sake of what follows, to remark in this place.
4. The modality of judgments quite peculiar function, with this distinguishing characteristic, that contributes nothing to the content of judgment (for besides quantity,
cognition.
? ? is a
I a
is
is,
a it
a
a
a
in
? THE LOGICAL rX7>>CTIO>> IN JUDGMENTS. 61
quality, and relation, there ia nothing more that constitutes the content of a judgment), but concerns itself only with the value of the copula in relation to thought in general. Pro blematical judgments are those in which the affirmation or negation is accepted as merely possible (ad libitum). In the assertorical, we regard the proposition as real (true) ; in the apodeictical, we look on it as necessary. * Thus the two
judgments (antecedens et consequent), the relation of which constitutes a hypothetical judgment, likewise those (the mem bers of the division) in whose reciprocity the disjunctive con sists, are only problematical. In the example above given, the proposition, " There exists perfect justice," is not stated assertorically, but as an ad libitum judgment, which some one may choose to adopt, and the consequence alone is assertorical. Hence such judgments may be obviously false, and yet, taken problematically, be conditions of our cognition of the truth. Thus the proposition, " The world exists only by blind chance,"
? is in the disjunctive judgment of problematical import only : that is to say, one may accept it for the moment, and it helps us (like the indication of the wrong road among all the roads that one can take) to find out the true proposition. The pro blematical proposition therefore, that which expresses ouly logical possibility (which not objective) that expresses
free choice to admit the validity of such proposition, -- merely arbitrary reception of into the understanding. The assertorical speaks of logical reality or truth as, for example, in hypothetical syllogism, the antecedens presents itself in problematical form in the major, in an assertorical form in the minor, and shows that the proposition in harmony with the laws of the understanding. The apodeictical proposition cogitates the assertorical as determined these very laws ot the understanding, consequently as affirming priori, and in this manner expresses logical necessity. Now because all here gradually incorporated with the understanding, --inas much as in the first place we judge problematically then
our judgment as true lastly, affirm as inseparably united with the understanding, that as ne
Just as thought were in the first instance function of the under- itandmy in the second, of judgment ir. the third of reason. remark which will be explained in the scuuei.
accept assertorically
cessary and apodeictical, --we may safely reckon these three functions of modality as so many momenta of thought.
? ? ;
if
it
;
is is, it
A
is,
;
a
;
*
a a
it
by is ;;a
a
itis aa
is, it
? 12 TBAN8CENDENTAI, IiOOIC.
SlCT. III. -- Of the pure Conception* of the Understanding, or Categories.
? 6.
General logic, as has been repeatedly said, makes abstrac tion of all content of cognition, and expects to receive repre sentations from some other quarter, in order, by means of ana lysis, to convert them into conceptions. On the contrary, transcendental logic has lying before it the manifold content ot a priori sensibility, which transcendental esthetic presents to it in order to give matter to the pare conceptions of the un
? without which transcendental logic would have no content, and be therefore utterly void. Now space and time contain an infinite diversity of determinations* of pure a priori intuition, but are nevertheless the condition of the mind's receptivity, under which alone it can obtain repre sentations of objects, and which, consequently, must always affect the conception of these objects. But the spontaneity of thought requires that this diversity be examined after a certain manner, received into the mind, and connected, in order after wards to forma cognition out of it. This process I call synthesis.
derstanding,
By the word synthesis, in its most general signification, I understand the process of joining different representations to each other, and of comprehending their diversity in one cog nition. This synthesis is pure when the diversity is not given empirically but a priori (as that in space and time). Our re presentations must be given previously to any analysis of them ; and no conceptions can arise, quoad their content, analytically. But the synthesis of a diversity (be it given & priori or em pirically) is the first requisite for the production of a cognition, which in its beginning, indeed, may be crude and confused, and therefore in need of analysis, --still, synthesis is that by which alone the elements of our cognitions are collected and united into a certain content, consequently it is the first thing on which we must fix our attention, if we wish to investigate the origin of our knowledge.
Synthesis, generally speaking, as we shall afterwards see, the mere operation of the imagination-- blind but indis-
Kant employs the words Mannigfattige*, Mannigfaltiglmt, indiffe rently, for the infinitude of the possible determination of matter, of aa intuition (such as that of space*. 4c. -- TV.
? ? *
a
is,
? TEE CATEGOBIES. 63
penaable function of the soul, without which we should have no cognition whatever, but of the working of which we are seldom even conscious. But to reduce this synthesis to con ceptions, is a function of the understanding, by means of which we attain to cognition, in the proper meaning of the term.
Pure synthesis, represented generally, gives us the pure conception of the understanding. But by this pure synthesis, I mean that which rests upon a basis of d priori synthetical
Thus, our numeration (and this is more observable
in large numbers) is a synthesis according to conceptions, because it takes place according to a common basis of unity
(for example, the decade). By means of this conception, therefore, the unity in the synthesis of the manifold becomes
unity.
? necessary.
By means of analysis different representations are brought
under one conception, -- an operation of which general logic treats. On the other hand, the duty of transcendental
logic is to reduce to conceptions, not representations, but the pure synthesis of representations. The first thing which must be given to us in order to the & priori cognition of all objects, is the diversity of the pure intuition ; the syn
thesis of this diversity by means of the imagination is the se cond ; but this gives, as yet, no cognition. The conceptions which give unity to this pure synthesis, and which consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetical unity, furnish the thira requisite for the cognition of an object, and these conceptions are given by the understanding.
The same function which gives unity to the different repre sentations in a judgment, gives also unity to the mere syn thesis of different representations in an intuition ; and this unity we call the pure conception of the understanding. Thus, the same understanding, and by the same operations, whereby in conceptions, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgment, introduces, by means of the synthetical unity of the manifold in intuition, a transcendental content into its representations, on which account they are called pure conceptions of the understanding, and they apply
a prim to objects, a result not within the power of general logic. *
* Only because this is beyond the sphere of logic proper. Kant's re mark is unnecessary. --Dr.
? ? ? 64 TBAXSCtlTOEKTAL LOGIC.
In this manner, there arise exactly so many pure concep
a priori to object* of intuition in general, as there are logical functions in all possible judgments. For there is no other function or faculty existing in the understanding besides those enumerated in that table. These conceptions we shall, with Aristotle, call categories, our purpose being originally identical with his,
notwithstanding the great difference in the execution. Table or the Categobies.
tions of the understanding, applying
i.
Of Quantity.
Unity. Plurality. Totality.
ii. Of Quality.
Reality. Negation. Limitation.
? HI.
Of Relation.
Of Inherence and Subsistence (substantia et accidens).
Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect).
Of Community (reciprocity between the agent and patient)
IT.
0/ Modality.
Possibility. --Impossibility. Existence. --Non-existence.
Necessity. -- Contingencc.
This, then, is a catalogue of all the originally pure concep tions of the synthesis which the understanding contains i priori, and these conceptions alone entitle it to be called a pure understanding ; inasmuch as only by them it can render the manifold of intuition conceivable, in other words, think an object of intuition. This division is made systematically from a common principle, namely, the faculty of judgment (which
is just the same as the power of thought), and has not arisen rhapsodically from a search at hap-hazard after pure concep tions, respecting the full number of which we never could be certain, inasmuch as we employ induction alone in our search, without considering that in this way we can never understand
? ? ? THE CATEGORIES.
65
wherefore precisely these conceptions, and none others ahide in the pure understanding. It was a desigu worthy of an acute thinker like Aristotle, to search for these fundamental
conceptions. * Destitute, however, of any guiding principle, he picked them up just as they occurred to him, and at first huuted out ten, which he called categories (predicaments). Afterwards he believed that he had discovered five others, wliich were added under the name of post predicaments. Bat his catalogue still remained defective. Besides, there arc to be fouud among them some of the modes of pure sensibility
(quando, ubi, situs, elsoprius,simul), and likewise an empirical conception (motus), --which can by no means belong to this ge nealogical register of the pure understanding. Moreover, there are deduced conceptions (actio, passio,) -esumerated among the original conceptions, and of the latter, some are entirely wanting.
With regard to these, it is to be remariced, that the categories, as the true primitive conceptions of the pure understanding, have also their pure deduced conceptions, which, in a complete system of transcendental philosophy, must by no means be
* " It is a serious error to imagine that, in his Categories, Aristotle pro posed, like Kant, ' an analysis of the elements of human reason. ' The ends proposed by the two philosophers were different, even opposed. In their several Categories, Aristotle attempted a synthesis of things in their multiplicity, --a classification of objects real, but in relation to thought ; Kant, an analysis of mind in its unity, -- a dissection of thought, pure, but in relation to its objects. The predicaments of Aristotle are thus ob jective, of things as understood ; those of Kant subjective, of the mind as understanding. The former are results a posteriori --the creations of abstraction and generalisation ; the latter, anticipations a priori--the con ditions of those acts themselves. It is true, that as the one scheme exhibits the unity of thought diverging into plurality, in appliance to its objects, and as the other exhibits the multiplicity of these objects con verging towards unity by the collective determination of thought ; while, at the same time, language usually confounds the subjective and objective under a common term ;--it is certainly true, that some elements in the one table coincide in name with some ele-nents in the other. This coinci dence is, however, only equivocal. In reality, the whole Krntian cate gories must be excluded from the Aristotelic list, as entia ratumis, at notionet secunda--in short, as determinations of thought, and not genera of real things ; while the several elements would be specially excluded, as partial, privative, transcendent," &c. -- Hamilton's (Sir W. ) Sssayi and Cunwioni
? ? ? ? 66 TIUNSCENDEJTTAL LOGIC.
passed over ; though in a merely critical essay we must bo contented with the simple mention of the fact.
Let it be allowed me to call these pure, but deduced con ceptions of the understanding, the predicables* of the pure understanding, in contradistinction to predicaments. If wc are in possession of the original and primitive, the deduced and subsidiary conceptions can easily be added, and the gene alogical tree of the understanding completely delineated. As
aim is not to set forth a complete system, but merely the principles of one, I reserve this task for another time. It may be easily executed by any one who will refer to the ontological manuals, and subordinate to the category of causality, for example, the predicables of force, action, passion ; to that of community, those of presence and resistance ; to the categories of modality, those of origination, extinction, change; and so with the rest. The categories combined with the modes of pure sensibility, or with one another, afford a great num ber of deduced h priori conceptions ; a complete enumeration of which would be a useful and not unpleasant, but in this
place a perfectly dispensable occupation.
I purposely omit the definitions of the categories in this
treatise. I shall analyze these conceptions only so far at is necessary for the doctrine of method, which is to form a part of this critique. In a system of pure reason, definitions of them would be with justice demanded of me, but to give them here would only hide from our view the main aim of our investigation, at the same time raising doubts and objections, the consideration of which, without injustice to our main pur pose, may be very well postponed till another opportunity. Meanwhile, it ought to be sufficiently clear, from the little we have already said on this subject, that the formation of a complete vocabulary of pure conceptions, accompanied by all the requisite explanations, is not only a possible, but an easy undertaking. The compartments already exist ; it is only necessary to fill them up ; and a systematic topic like the
* The predicables of Kant are quite different from those of Aristotle and ancient and modern logicians. The five predicables are of a logical, and not, like thote of Kant, of a metaphysico-ontological import. They were enounced as a complete enumeration of all the possible modes of predica tion. Kant's predicables, on the contrary, do not possess this merely formal and logical character, but have a real or metaphysical content -- TV
my present
? ? ? ? THE CATEGORIES.
67
present, indicates with perfect precision the proper place to which each conception belongs, while it readily points out any that have not yet been filled up.
? 7.
Our table of the categories suggests considerations of some importance, which may perhaps have significant results in regard to the scientific form of all rational cognitions. For, that this table is useful in the theoretical part of philosophy, nay, indispensable for the sketching of the complete plan of a science, so far as that science rests upon conceptions a priori, and for dividing it mathematically, according to fixed princi ples, is most manifest from the fact that it contains all the elementary conceptions of the understanding, nay, even the form of a system of these in the understanding itself, and
? indicates all the momenta, and also the internal
consequently
arrangement of a projected speculative science, as I have else where shown. * Here follow some of these observations.
I. This table, which contains four classes of conceptions of the understanding, may, in the first instance, be divided into two classes, the first of which relates to objects of intuition -- pure as well as empirical ; the second, to the existence of these objects, either in relation to one another, or to the un derstanding.
The former of these classes of categories I would entitle the mathematical, and the latter the dynamical categories. The former, as we see, has no correlates ; these are only to ba. found in the second class. This difference must have a ground in the nature of the human understanding.
II. The number of the categories in each class is always the same, namely, three ; -- a fact which also demands some consideration, because in all other cases division h prion through conceptions is necessarily dichotomy. It is to oe added, that the third category in each triad always arises from the combination of the second with the first.
Thus Totality is nothing else but Plurality contemplated as Unity ; Limitation is merely Reality conjoined with Ne gation ; Community is the Causality of a Substance, recipro cally determining, and determined by other substances ; and
* la the " Metaphysical l'rinciples of Natural Science. "
? ? ? 68 TRAirBOMTDEKTAL LOOTO.
is nothing but Existence, which is given
finall}, Necessity
through the Possibility itself. * Let it not be supposed, how ever, that the third category is merely a deduced, and not a primitive conception of the pure understanding. For the con junction of the first and second, in order to produce the third conception, requires a particular function of the understanding, which is by no means identical with those which are exercised in the first and second. Thus, the conception of a number
to the category of Totality), is not always possible, where the conceptions of multitude and unity exifet
(for example, in the representation of the infinite). Or, if I conjoin the conception of a cause with that of a substance, it does not follow that the conception of influence, that how one substance can be the cause of something in another sub stance, will be understood from that. Thus evident, that
(which belongs
? particular act of the understanding here necessary and so in the other instances.
III. With respect to one category, namely, that of com munity, which found in the third class, not so easy as with the others to detect its accordance with the form of the disjunctive judgment which corresponds to in the table of the logical functions.
In order to assure ourselves of this accordance, we must
observe that in every disjunctive judgment, the sphere of the judgment (that the complex of all that contained
represented as whole divided into parts and, since one part cannot be contained in the other, they arc cogitated as co-ordinated with, not subordinated to each other, so that they do not determine each other unilaterally, as in linear series, but reciprocally, as in an aggregate -- one member of the division posited, all the rest are excluded and con
versely).
Now like connection cogitated in whole of things
for one thing not subordinated, as effect, to another as cause of its existence, but, on the contrary, co-ordinated con'emporaneously and reciprocally, as cause in relation to the determination of the others (for example, in body -- the parts of which mutually attract and repel each other). And
Kant's meaning is: necessary existence aa existence whosa existence given the very possibitit] of its existence. -- Jr.
? ? * is
a
:
in isis A
is
is
a
b a it
is
a
;
; a
is
is
(if
it is
it is
; in
it) is
a
a is,
;
is,
? THE CATEGORIES.
69
this is an entirely different kind of connection from that
which we find in the mere relation of the cause to the effect
(the principle to the consequence), for in such a connection
the consequence docs not iu its turn deter. uine the principle,
nud therefore docs not constitute, with the latter, a whole, --
just as the Creator does not with the world make up a whole.
The process of understanding by which it represents to itself
the sphere of a divided conception, is employed also when we
think of a thing as divisible ; and, in the same manner as the
members of the division in the former exclude one another,
and yet are connected in one sphere, so the understanding
represents to itself the parts of the latter, as having --each of
? them -- an existence (as substances), independently of the others, and yet as united in one whole.
? 8.
In the transcendental philosophy of the ancients, there
exists one more leading division, which contains pure concep tions of the understanding, and which, although not num bered among the categories, ought, according to them, as con
ceptions a priori, to be valid of objects. But in this case they would augment the number of the categories ; which cannot ? ie. These are set forth in the proposition, so renowned among the schoolmen, --'* Quodlibtt ens est unum, vebuji, BOOTH. " Now, though the inferences from this principle were mere tautological propositions, and though it is allowed
iuly by courtesy to retain a place in modern metaphysics, yet a thought which maintained itself for such a length of time, however empty it seems to be, deserves an investigation of its origin, and justifies the conjecture that it must be grounded in some law of the understanding, which, as is often the case, has only been erroneously interpreted. These pretended transcendental predicates are, in fact, nothing but logical re quisites and criteria of all cognition of objects, and they em ploy, (is the basis for this cognition, the categories of Quan
lity, namely, Unity, Plurality, and Totality.
But these, which must be taken as material conditions, that as belonging to the possibility of things themselves, they employed merely in
formal signification, as belonging to the logical requisites ' of all cognition, and yet most unguardedly changed these- criteria of thought into properties of objecft, as things
? ? iu
is,
? 70 TRANSCENDBXTAL LOQIC.
themselves. Now, in every cognition of an object, there is unity of conception, which may be called qualitative unity, so far as by this term we understand only the unity in our connection of the manifold ; for example, unity of the theme in a play, an oration, or a story. Secondly, there is truth in respect of the deductions from it. The more true deductions we have from a given conception, the more criteria of its ob
This we might call the qualitative plurality of characteristic marks, which belong to a conception as to a common foundation, but are not cogitated as a quantity in it. Thirdly, there is perfection, -- which consists in this, that the plurality falls bacjc upon the unity of the conception, and
accords completely with that conception, and with no other. This we may denominate qualitative completeness. Hence it is evident that these logical criteria of the possibility of cog nition, are merely the three categories of Quantity modified and transformed to suit an unauthorized manner of applying them. That is to say, the three categories, in which the unity in the production of the quantum must be homogeneous throughout, are transformed solely with a view to the con nexion of heterogeneous parts of cognition in one act of con sciousness, by means of die quality of the cognition, which is the principle of that connexion. Thus the criterion of the possibility of a conception (not of its object), is the definition of in which the unity of the conception, the truth of all that may be immediately deduced from and finally, the completeness of what has been thus deduced, constitute the requisites for the reproduction of the whole conception. Thus also, the criterion or test of an hypothesis the intelligibility of the received principle of explanation, or its unity (without help from any subsidiary hypothesis),--the truth of our deduc tions from (consistency with each other and with experience), --and lastly, the completeness of theprinciple of the explanation of these deductions, which refer to neither more nor less than what was admitted in the hypothesis, restoring analytically and posteriori, what was cogitated synthetically and a priori. By the conceptions, therefore, of Unity, Truth, and Perfection, we have made no addition to the transcendental table of the categories, which complete without them. We have, on the contrary, merely employed the Ciree categories of quantity, setting n- ide t'. icir application to objects of experience, as
jective reality.
? ? ? is
h
it,
it
is it,
? DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOHIES.
71
general logical laws of the consistency of cognition with it self. *
Analttic of Conceptions.
CHAPTER II.
01 THE DEDUCTION OF THE PDKE CONCEPTIONS OF THE UNDEHSTANDING.
Sect. I. -- Of the Principles of a Transcendental Deduction in general.
? 9.
Teachebs of jurisprudence, when speaking of rights and Claims, distinguish in a cause the question of right (quid juris) from the question of fact (quid facti), and while they demand proof of both, they giye to the proof of the former, which goes to establish right or claim in law, the name of Deduction. Now we make use of a great number of empirical conceptions, without opposition from any noe ; and consider ourselves, even without any attempt at deduction, justified in attaching to them a sense, and a supposititious signification, because we have always experience at hand to demonstrate their objective reality. There exist also, however, usurped conceptions, such as fortune, fate, which circulate with almost universal in dulgence, and yet are occasionally challenged by the ques tion, quid juris ? In such cases, we have great difficulty in discovering any deduction for these terms, inasmuch as we cannot produce any manifest ground of right, either from experience or from reason, on which the claim to employ them can be founded.
* Kant's meaning in the foregoing chapter is this :--These three con- ceptions of unity, truth, and goodness, applied as predicates to things, are the three categories of quantity under a different form. These three categories have an immediate relation to things, as phenomena ; without them we could form no conceptions of external objects. But in the above- mentioned proposition, they are changed into logical conditions of thought, and then unwittingly transformed into properties of things in themselves. These conceptions are properly logical or formal, and not metaphysical or material. The three categories are quantitative ; these conceptions, quali tative. They are logical conditions employed is metaphysical eon- ceptions, -- one of the very commonest error? in the sphere of mental science. -- TV.
? ? ? ? n TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
Among the many conceptions, wnich make up the very Tariegated web of human cognition, some are destined for pure use a priori, independent of all experience ; and their title to be so employed nlways requires a deduction, inasmuch as, to justify such use of them, proofs from experience are not sufficient ; but it is necessary to know how these concep tions can apply to objects without being derived from expe rience. I term, therefore, an explanation of the manner in which conceptions can apply a priori to objects, the transcen dental deduction of conceptions, and I distinguish it from the empirical deduction, which indicates the mode in which a conception is obtained through experience and reflection thereon ; consequently, does not concern itself with the right, but only with the fact of our obtaining conceptions in such and such a manner. We have already seen that we are in pos session of two perfectly different kinds of conceptions, which nevertheless agree with each other in this, that they botli apply to objects completely a priori. These are the concep tions of space and time as forms of sensibility, and the cate gories as pure conceptions of the understanding. To attempt an empirical deduction of either of these classes would be labour in vain, because the distinguishing characteristic of their nature consists in this, that they apply to their objects, without having borrowed anything from experience towards the representation of them. Consequently, if a deduction of these conceptions is necessary, it must always be transcen dental.
Meanwhile, with respect to these conceptions, as with respect to all our cognition, we certainly may discover in experience, if not the principle of their possibility, yet the occasioning causes * of their production. It will be found that the impressions of sense give the first occasion for bringing into action the whole faculty of cognition, and for the production of experience, which contains two very dis similar elements, namely, a matter for cognition, given by the senses, and a certain form for the arrangement of this matter, arising ou; of the inner fountain of pure intuition and thought ; and these, on occasion given by sensuous impres sions, are called into exercise and produce conceptions. Such
* Gelegenheitsursachea.
? ? ? ? DEDT/CTIOK OF THE CATEGORIES. 73
an investigation into the first efforts of our faculty of cognition to mount from particular perceptions to general conceptions,
is undoubtedly of great utility ; and we have to thank the celebrated Locke, for having first opened the way for this en
But a deduction of the pure d priori conceptions of course never can be made in this way, seeing that, in regard to their future employment, which must be entirely inde pendent of experience, they must have a far different certificate of birth to show from that of a descent from experience. This attempted physiological derivation, which cannot properly be called deduction, because it relates merely to a queesiio facli, I shall entitle an explanation of the possession of a pure cog nition. It is therefore manifest that there can caly be a tran scendental deduction of these conceptions, and by no means an empirical one ; also, that all attempts at an empirical de
duction, in regard to pure &. priori conceptions, are vain, and
can only be made by one who does not understand the alto
gether peculiar nature of these cognitions.
But although it is admitted that the only possible deduction
of pure a priori cognition is a transcendental deduction, it is not,
for that reason, perfectly manifest that such a deduction is
absolutely necessary. We have already traced to their sources the conceptions of space and time, by means of a transcen dental deduction, and we have explained and determined their objective validity t> priori. Geometry, nevertheless, advances steadily and securely in the province of pure h priori cogni tions, without needing to ask from Philosophy any certificate as to the pure and legitimate origin of its fundamental concep tion of space. But the use of the conception in this science extends only to the external world of sense, the pure form of the intuition of which is space ; and in this world, therefore, all geometrical cognition, because it is founded upon h priori intuition, posesses immediate evidence, and the objects of this cognition are given & prion (as regards their form) in intuition
by and through the cognition itself. * With the pure concep tions of Understanding, on the contrary, commences the ab-
* Kant's meaning is : The object! of cognition in Geometry, -- anirias, lines, figures, and the like,--are not different from the aet of cognition which produces them, except in thought. The object does not exist hut while we think it--docs not exist apart from our thinking it. The act of thinking and the object of thinking, are but one thing regarded from two different points ofview. --IV.
quiry.
? ? ? ? 74
TBAWBCENDEKTAL LOGIC.
solute necessity of seeking a transcendental deduction, not only of these conceptions themselves, but likewise of space, because, inasmuch as they make affirmations* concerning
not by means of the predicates of intuition and sen sibility, but of pure thought a priori, they apply to objects without any of the conditions of sensibility. Besides, not being
founded on experience, they are not presented with any object in h priori intuition upon which, antecedently to expe rience, they might base their synthesis. Hence results, not only doubt as to the objective validity and proper limits of their use, but that even our conception of space is rendered equivocal; inasmuch as we are very ready with the aid of
the categories, to carry the use of this conception beyond the conditions of sensuous intuition ;--and for this reason, we have already found a transcendental deduction of it needful. The reader, then, must be quite convinced of the absolute neces sity of a transcendental deduction, before taking a single step in the field of pure reason ; because otherwise he goes to work blindly, and after he has wandered about in all directions, returns to the state of utter ignorance from which he started. He ought, moreover, clearly to recognize beforehand, the un-
* I have been compelled to adopt a conjectural reading here. All the editions of the Critik der reinen Vernunft, both those published during Kant's lifetime, and those published by various editors after his death, have tie. . von Gegenttanden. . . . redet. But it is quite plain that the tie is the pronoun for die reine Vertttmdesbegriffe ; and we ought, there fore, to read reden. In the same sentence, all the editions (except Har- tenstein's) insert die after the first und, which makes nonsense. In page 75 also, sentence beginning "For that objectt," I have altered "tyn- thetitchen Einticht det Denkent" into " tyrUheiitchen Einheit. " And in page 77, sentence beginning, " But it it evident," vre find "die trtte Bedingung liegtn. " Some such word as mutt is plainly to be understood.
Indeed, I have not found a single edition of the Critique trust worthy. Kant must not have been very careful in his correction of the
Those published by editors after Kant's death seem in most cases to follow Kant's own editions closely. That by Rosencrantz is perhaps the best ; and he has corrected a number of Kant's errors. But although I have adopted several uncommon and also conjectural readings, I have not done ao hastily or lightly. It is only after diligent comparison of all the tditions I could gainaocesa to, that I have altered the common reaaing ; while a conjectural reading has been adopted only when it was quite clear that the reading of every edition was a misprint.
Other errors. occurring previously to those mentioned above, have been, and others after them will be, corrected ii silence. -- 2V.
objects
? press.
? ? ? DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES.
75
BToidable difficulties in his undertaking, so that he may not afterwards complain of the obscurity in which the subject itself is deeply involved, or become too soon impatient of the obstacles in his path ;--because we have a choice of only two things -- either at once to give up all pretensions to know ledge beyond the limits of possible experience, or to bring this critical investigation to completion.
We have been able, with very little trouble, to make it com prehensible how the conceptions of space and time, although a priori cognitions, must necessarily apply to external ob-
independently of all experience. For inasmuch as only by means of such pure form of sensibility an object can appear to us, that be an object of empirical intuition, space and time are pure intuitions, which contain a priori the con dition of the possibility of objects as phenomena, and an
priori synthesis in these intuitions possesses objective validity.
On the other hand, the categories of the understanding do
not represent the conditions under which objects are given
to us in intuition objects can consequently appear to us without necessarily connecting themselves with these, and consequently without any necessity binding on the under standing to contain priori the conditions of these objects. Thus we find ourselves involved in difficulty which did not present itself in the sphere of sensibility, that to say, we cannot discover how the subjective conditions thought can have objective validity, in other words, can become con ditions of the possibility of all cognition of objects --for phsenomena may certainly be given to us in intuition without any help from the functions Let us take, for example, the conception of cause, which indicates peculiar kind of synthesis, namely, that with something, A, something entirely different, connected according to law. not priori manifest why phsenomena should contain anything of this kind (we are of course debarred from appealing for proof to experience, for the objective validity of this conception must be demonstrated priori), and hence remains doubtful a priori, whether such con ception be not quite void, and without any corresponding object among phenomena. For that objects of sensuous
? ? ? it
It
a a
of is ;
is h
is,
B, is
aa
a
; h
&
? 76 TBANSCEXDESTAL LOGIO.
intuition must correspond to tlic formnl conditions of sen sibility existing h priori in the mind, is quite evident, froir. the fact, that without these they could not be objects for us ; but that they must also correspond to the conditions which understanding requires for the synthetical unity 01 thought, is nn assertion, the grounds for which are not so easily to be discovered. For phenomena might be so con stituted, as not to correspond to the conditions of the unity of thought ; and all things might lie in such confusion, that, for example, nothing could be met with in the sphere of phsenomena to suggest a law of synthesis, and so cor
? to the conception of cause and effect ; so that this conception would lie quite void, null, and without significance. Phsenomena would nevertheless continue to present objects to our intuition ; for mere intuition does not in any respect stand in need of the functions of thought.
respond
Ifwc thought to free ourselves from the labour of these
investigations by saying, " Experience is constantly offering us examples of the relation of cause and effect in pheno mena, and presents us with abundant opportunity of ab stracting the conception of cause, and so at the same time of corroborating the objective validity of this conception ;" -- we should in this case be overlooking the fact, that the concep tion of cause cannot arise in this way at all ; that, on the con trary, it must either have an a priori basis in the understand ing, or be rejected as a mere chimacra. For this conception demands that something, A, should be of such a nature, that something else, B, should follow from it necessarily, and ac cording to an absolutely universal law. We may certainly collect from phsenomena a law, according to which this or that usually happens, but the element of necessity is not tc be found in it. Hence it is evident that to the synthesis of cause and effect belongs a dignity, which is utterly wanting in any empirical synthesis ; for it is no mere mechanical syn thesis, by means of addition, but a dynamical one, that is to say, the effect is not to be cogitated as merely annexed to the
cause, but aa posited by and through the cause, and resulting from it. The strict universality of this law never can be a characteristic of empirical laws, which obtain through in duction only a comparative universality, tint an extended range of practical application. But tie pure conceptions ol
? ? is,
? DEDUCTION OY THE CATEGORIES. 77
(he understanding -would entirely lose all their peculiar cha racter, if we treated them merely as the productions of ex
perience.
Tbanbition to the Tbanscendental Deduction oi hie Cateqouies.
? 10.
There are only two possible ways in which synthetical re presentation and its objects can coincide with and relate
to each other, and, as it were, meet together, blither the object alone makes the representation possible, or the representation alone makes the object possible. In the former case, the relation between them is only empirical, and
an a priori representation is impossible. And this is the case with phsenomena, as regards that in them which is refer able to mere sensation. In the latter case --although repre sentation alone (for of its causality, by means cf the will, we do not here speak,) does not produce the object as to its ex istence, it must nevertheless be a priori determinative in re gard to the object, if it is only by means of the represent ation that we can cognize any thing as an object. Now there are only two conditions of the possibility of a cognition of objects ; firstly, Intuition, by means' of which the object, though only as phsenomenon, is given ; secondly, Conception, by means of which the object which corresponds to this intuition is thought. But it is evident from what has been said on aes thetic, that the first condition, under which alone objects can be intuited, must in fact exist, as a formal basis for them, u priori in the mind. With this formal condition of sensi
bility, therefore, all phsenomena necessarily correspond, because it is only through it that they can be phenomena at all ; that can be empirically intuited and given. Now the question is,,
necessarily
? whether there do not exist priori in the mind, conceptions of understanding also, as conditions under which alone something,
not intuited, yet thought as object. If this question be answered in the affirmative, follows that all empirical cogni tion of objects is necessarily conformable to such conceptions, since, they are not presupposed, impossible that anything can be an object of experience. Now all experience contains, besidro the intuition of 'he senses through which an object
? ? is
if if
is,
it is
it
&
is
? 78 nursuM duvix logic.
given, a conception also of an object that is given in intuition. Accordingly, conceptionsof objects in general must lie as a priori conditions at the foundation of all empirical cognition ; and con
sequently, the objective validity of the categories, as a priori conceptions, will rest upon this, that experience (as far as re gards the form of thought) is possible only by their means. For in that case they apply necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, because only through them can an object of ex perience be thought.
The whole aim of the transcendental deduction of all a prion conceptions is to show that these conceptions are a priori conditions of the possibility of all experience. Conceptions
which afford us the objective foundation of the possibility of experience, are for that very reason necessary. But the analysis of the experiences in which they are met with is not deduction, but only an illustration of them, because from experience they could never derive the attribute of necessity. Without their original applicability and relation to all pos sible experience, in which all objects of cognition present themselves, the relation of the categories to objects, of what ever nature, would be quite incomprehensible.
The celebrated Locke, for want of due reflection on these points, and because he met with pure conceptions of the un derstanding in experience, sought also to deduce them from
experience, and yet proceeded so inconsequently as to attempt, with their aid, to arrive at cognitions which lie far beyond the limits of all experience. David Hume perceived that, to render this possible, it was necessary that the conceptions should have an a priori origin. But as he could not explain how it was possible that conceptions which are not connected with each other in the understanding, must nevertheless be thought as necessarily connected in the object, --and it never occurred to him that the understanding itself might, perhaps, by means of these conceptions, be the author of the experi ence in which its objects were presented to --he was forced to derive these conceptions from experience, that from
subjective necessity arising from repeated association of experiences erroneously considered to be objective, --in one word, from " habit. " But he proceeded with perfect con sequence, and declared to be impossible with such con
? ? ? it
a
is
it,
? DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGOBTEB.
79
eeptions and the principles arising from them, to Dverstep the limits of experience. The empirical derivation, however, which both of these philosophers attributed to these concep tions, cannot possibly be reconciled with the fact that we do possess scientific & priori cognitions, namely, those of pure mathematics and general physics.
The former of these two celebrated men opened a wide door to extravagance --(for if reason has once undoubted righ. on its side, it will not allow itself to be confined to set limits, by vague recommendations of moderation) ; the latter gave himself up entirely to scepticism, --a natural consequence, after having discovered, as he thought, that the faculty of cognition was not trust-worthy. We now intend to make a trial whether it be not possible safely to conduct reason be tween these two rocks, to assign her determinate limits, and yet leave open for her the entire sphere of her legitimate activity.
? I shall merely premise an explanation of what the categories are. They are conceptions of an object in general, by means of which its intuition is contemplated as determined in rela tion to one of the logical functions of judgment. The fol lowing will make this plain. The function of the categorical judgment is that of the relation of subject to predicate ; for example, in the proposition, " All bodies are divisible. " But
in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding, it still remains undetermined to which of these two conceptions belongs the function of subject, and to which that of predi cate. For we could also say, " Some divisible is a body. " But the category of substance, when the conception of a body is brought under determines that and its empirical intui tion in experience must be contemplated always as subject, and never 80 were predicate. And so w th all the other cate gories.
? ? it,
;
? 8C TRANSCENDENTAL LOGIC.
Deditction OF THE fuh;s Conceftions OF the Undeb- STANDING. '
SECTION II.
Transcendental Deduction of the pure Conceftions of tub Understanding.
? 11.
Of the Possibility of a Conjunction of the manifold repre sentations given by Sense.
Tlie manifold content in our representations can be given in an intuition which is merely sensuous --in other words, is nothing but susceptibility ; and the form of this intuition can exist h priori in our faculty of representation, without being any thing else but the mode in which the subject is affected. But the conjunction (conjunctio) of a manifold in intuition never can be given us by the senses ; it cannot therefore be contained in the pure form of sensuous intuition, for it is a spontaneous act of the faculty of representation. And as we must, to distinguish it from sensibility, entitle this facult) understanding; so all conjunction -- whether conscious or un conscious, be it of the manifold in intuition, sensuous or non- sensuous, or of several conceptions --is an act of the under standing. To this act we shall give the general appellation of synthesis, thereby to indicate, at the same time, that we cannot represent any thing as conjoined in the object without having previously conjoined it ourselves. Of all mental notions, that of conjunction is the only one which cannot be given through objects, but can be originated only by the sub ject itself, because it is an act cf its purely spontaneous activity. The reader will easily enough perceive that the possibility of conjunction must be grounded in the very nature of this act, and that it must be equally valid for all conjunction ; and that analysis, which appears to be its contrary, must, never theless, always presuppose it ; for where the understanding has not previously conjoined, it cannot dissect or analyse, because only a>> conjoined by must that which to be analysed have been given to our faculty of representation.
But the conception of conjunction includes, besides the conception of the manifold and of the synthesis of that of thf
?
