Our author also ignores the fact that the Czar
Nicholas, declared himself ready to purchase
Prussia's help in the field by surrendering Warsaw.
Nicholas, declared himself ready to purchase
Prussia's help in the field by surrendering Warsaw.
Treitschke - 1914 - His Doctrine of German Destiny
Thus
our State at the commencement of the eighteenth
century made enormous sacrifices to aid the ob-
jects of the two sea-Powers, but did not finally
gain any further advantage from this long alliance
than the right of her head to use the kingly title,
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? 280 Treitschke
and some barren laurels. The history also of the
seventy-seven year-long friendship between Prus-
sia and Russia the longest alliance which has
ever existed between two great Powers presents
many such phenomena. There were times when
German patriots were fully justified in regarding
the friendship of Russia as oppressive, nay, as
disgraceful, just as on the other hand in recent
years the great majority of educated Russians
firmly believed that their country was injured by
the Prussian alliance. But when one sums up the
results, and compares the relative position in
respect of power of the two States in 1802, when
their alliance was formed, with that in 1879, when
it was dissolved, it cannot be honestly asserted that
Prussia fared badly in this alliance.
The Russo-Prussian alliance was, as is well
known, entirely the personal work of the two
monarchs, and everyone knows how much it was
helped forward by the honest and frank friend-
ship which the King Frederick William III dis-
played towards the versatile Czar. But these
personal feelings of the King never overpowered
his sound political intelligence and his strong sense
of duty. Every new advance of historical investi-
gation only reconfirms the fact that the King was
altogether right when, unseduced by the proposals
of so many cleverer men than himself, he was only
willing to venture on the attempt at rising against
Napoleon in alliance with Russia. Without the
help of the Czar Alexander, the capture of Paris,
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 281
and the restoration of the old power of Prussia
would have been impossible. Any one who doubts
this should peruse the recently published Memoirs
of Metternich regarding the real objects of the
Vienna Court at the time i. e. , not the Memoirs
themselves with their intolerable self-glorification,
but the appended authentic official documents,
which, for the most part, plainly contradict the
vain self -eulogy of the author. At the Congress of
Vienna the two courts still continued to have a
community of interests: the Czar was obliged to
support Prussia's demands for an indemnity, if
he wished to secure for himself the possession of
Poland.
At the second Peace of Paris, on the other hand,
the interests of the two Powers came into violent
collision. The Czar had indeed favoured the
restoration of the State of Prussia, so that Russia
should be rendered impregnable through this
rampart on its most vulnerable side, but he as little
wished the rise of a completely independent self-
sufficing German power as the courts of Paris,
Vienna, and London did. Therefore, the restor-
ation of our old western frontier, which Prussia
demanded, was defeated by the united opposition
of all the Great Powers. All the courts without
exception observed with anxiety what an unsus-
pected wealth of military power little Prussia had
developed during the War of Liberation ; therefore
they all eagerly vied with one another in burying
Prussia's merits in oblivion. Whether one reads
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? 282 Treitschke
the military dispatches of Wellington and his
officers, the letters of Schwarzenberg, Metternich,
and Gentz, the semi-official writings of the Russian
military authors of that period, it is difficult to
say which of the three allies had most quickly
and completely forgotten the deeds of their Prus-
sian comrades-in-arms. Nevertheless, the alliance
with Russia and Austria was a necessity for Prussia
for it still remained the most important task of our
European policy to prevent another declaration of
war on the part of France, and the Great Alliance
actually achieved this, its first purpose. When
Austria, in 1817, rendered anxious by Alexander's
grandiose schemes, proposed to the King of Prussia
a secret offensive and defensive alliance, which in
case of need might be also directed against Russia,
Hardenberg, who in those days was thoroughly
Austrian in his sympathies, was eager to accept the
proposal. But the King acted as a Prussian, and
absolutely refused, for only the union of all three
Eastern Powers could secure to his State the safety
which he especially needed after the immense
sacrifices of the war. Yet our Baltic anonymous
author is quite wrong in so representing things
as though, in Frederick William Ill's view, the
alliance with Russia had been the only possible
one. The King knew, more thoroughly than his
present-day critic, the incalculable vicissitudes of
international relations and always kept cautiously
in view the possibility of a war against Russia.
In 1818 he surprised the Vienna Court by the
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 283
declaration that he wished also to include Posen,
East and West Prussia, in the German Confeder-
ation, because in case of a Russian attack, he
wanted to be absolutely sure of the help of Ger-
many. Frederick William held obstinately to this
idea although Hardenberg and Humboldt spoke
against it, and he did not give it up till Austria
opposed it, and thus every prospect of carrying
the proposal through in the Diet of the Confeder-
ation disappeared.
It is equally untrue that the King, as our anony-
mous author condescendingly expresses it, had
modestly renounced all wishes of bringing about
a union of the German States. His policy was
peaceful, as it was obliged to be; it shunned a
decisive contest for which at that time all the
preliminary conditions were lacking, but as soon
as affairs in the new provinces were, to some extent,
settled, he began at once to work for the com-
mercial and political unifying of Germany. In
this difficult task, which in very truth laid the
foundation for the new German Empire, Prussia en-
countered at every step the opposition of Austria,
England, and France. Russia alone among all the
Great Powers preserved a friendly neutrality.
This one fact is sufficient to justify the King in
attaching great importance to Russia's friendship.
This partiality of his, however, was by no means
blind, for nothing is more absurd than the author's
assertion that Prussia, by the mediation which
brought about the Peace of Adrianople, had merely
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? 284 Treitschke
done the Russian Court an unselfish service.
When the war of 1828 broke out, the King had
openly told the Czar that he disapproved of his
declaration of war. The next year, at the com-
mencement of the second campaign, the Euro-
pean situation assumed a very threatening aspect.
The Vienna Cabinet, alarmed in the highest degree
by the progress of the Russian arms, exerted itself
in conjunction with England to bring about a great
alliance against Russia; on the other hand the
King knew from his son-in-law's mouth (the Czar's
autograph note is still preserved in the Berlin state
archives) that there was a secret understanding
between Nicholas and Charles X of France. If
matters were allowed to go their course, there was
danger of a European war, which might oblige
Prussia to fight simultaneously against Russia
and France, and that about a question remote from
our interests. In order to avert- this danger, and
thus acting for the best for his own country, the
King resolved to act as a mediator, and brought
about a peace which, as matters then were, was
acceptable to both contending parties.
Prince Metternich was certainly alarmed at this
success of Prussian policy, and the reactionary
party in Berlin, Duke Karl of Mecklenburg,
Ancillon, Schuckmann, Knesebeck, who were all
staunch adherents of the Vienna diplomat, were
alarmed; but the ablest men at the Court, Bern-
stoff, Witzleven, Eichhorn, and above all the
younger Prince William, approved the King's
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 285
well-considered proceeding. The resolve of the
King was obviously connected with the brilliant
successes which his finance minister, Motz, had
won at the same time in the struggles of German
commercial policy. To the calm historical judg-
ment the years 1828 and 1829 appear as a fortu-
nate turning point in the history of that uneventful
period; it was the time when Prussia again began
to take up a completely independent position in
relation to the Austrian Court. Among the
liberals, indeed, who had lately been admiring the
Greeks, and now were suddenly enthusiastic for
the Turks, there arose a supplementary party-
legend, that Prussia had only undertaken the office
of mediator in order to save the Russian army from
certain destruction. This discovery, however, is
already contradicted by the calendar. On August
1 9th, Diebitch's army appeared before Adrianople;
and it was here that the victor's embarrassments
first began, and here, first, it was evident how much
his fighting power had been reduced by sickness,
and the wear and tear of the campaign. But
Prussia had commenced acting as mediator as
early as July; when General Muffling received his
instructions, the Russian army was victorious
everywhere.
Later on, also, the sober-mindedness of King
Frederick William never favoured the Czar's de-
signs against the Porte; he rather did his best
to strengthen the resisting power of the Ottoman
Empire. The only partly effective reform which
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? 286 Treitschke
the decaying Turkish State succeeded in carrying
through the reconstitution of its army was,
as is well known, the work of Prussian officers.
All the reports which the embittered scandal-
seeking opposition party of that time circulated,
regarding the influence of Russia in the domestic
concerns of Prussia, are mere inventions. The
King alone deserves blame or praise for the course
of domestic policy; his son-in-law never refused to
pay him filial reverence. Even the eccentricities
of the Berlin Court at that period, the love for
parades, the bestowing of military decorations,
which were stigmatized by the liberals as "Russian
manners," were simply due to the personal pre-
dilection of the King, and it is difficult to decide
whether Russia has learnt more in this respect
from Germany, or vice versa. During the anxious
days of the July revolution the King exhibited
again, with all his modesty, an independent and
genuinely Prussian attitude. Frederick William
resisted the legitimist outbursts of his son-in-law,
and hindered the crusade against France which
had been planned in St. Petersburg. The next
year he resisted with equal common sense the
foolish enthusiasm of the liberals for the Poles,
and by occupying the eastern frontier, assisted
in the suppression of that Polish insurrection
which was as dangerous for our Posen as for
Russian Poland. The Baltic anonymous author
conceals his vexation at this intelligent policy of
self-assertion, behind the thoughtful remark that
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 287
we had, as is well known, "paid for rendering this
assistance with the valuable life of Gneisenau. "
Should we, then, perhaps enter in our ledger on
the Russian debit side, the cholera, which swept
away our heroes?
During the whole period from 1815 to 1840, I
know only of a single fact which can be alleged to
give real occasion to the reproach that the King,
for the sake of Russia's friendship, neglected an
important interest of his State. In contrast to
the ruthless commercial policy of Russia, Prussia
showed a moderation which bordered on weakness.
But this matter, also, is not so simple as our
anonymous author thinks. He reproaches Russia
with the non-fulfilment of the Vienna Treaty of
May 3, 1815, and overlooks the fact that Prussia
herself hardly wished in earnest the carrying out
of this agreement. It was soon enough proved
that Hardenberg had been overreached at Vienna
by Prince Czartoryski. The apparently harmless
agreements regarding free transit, and free trade
with the products of all formerly Polish territories,
imposed upon our State, through which the transit
took place, only duties, without conferring any
corresponding advantages. In order to carry out
the treaty literally, Prussia would have had to
divide its Polish provinces from its other territories
by a line of custom-houses. But the Poles saw
in the treaty a welcome means of carrying their
national propaganda into our Polish territories by
settlements of commercial agents. Thus it hap-
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? 288 Treitschke
pened that Prussia, after futile negotiations,
proceeded on her own account; and by the cus-
toms law of 1818 placed her Polish territories on
precisely the same footing as her other eastern
provinces. After this necessary step, Prussia
was no more in the position to appeal successfully
to the Vienna Treaty. And what means did we,
in fact, possess to compel the neighbouring State
to give up a foolish commercial policy, which was
injurious for our own country? Only the two-
edged weapon of retaliatory duties. The relation
of the two countries assumed quite a different
aspect under Frederick William IV. It will al-
ways be one of the most bitter memories of our
history, how lacking in counsel, and wavering in
purposes the clever new King proved, in contrast
to the strong-willed Czar, how cruelly he experi-
enced, by countless failures, that in the stern
struggles for power of national life, character is
always superior to talent, and how at last, for
truth will out, he actually feared these narrow
minds. Here our author has good reason for
sharp judgments; and here also he gives us, along
with some questionable anecdotes, some reliable
matter-of-fact information regarding the history
of the confusions of 1848-50. It is quite true that
the Czar Nicholas in the autumn of 1848 asked
General Count Friedrich Dohna whether he would
not be the Prussian General Monk, and march with
the first army corps on Berlin, to restore order
there; the whole Russian army would act as his
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 289
reserve in case of need. The memories of the
Count printed from autograph, confirm the cor-
rectness of this story with the exception of some
trifling details. But even here the author cannot
rise to an unprejudiced historical estimate of the
events in question. He conceals the fact that not
only Russia but all the great Powers were against
the rise of a Prussian-German Empire. The posi-
tion which the Powers had assumed with regard
to the question of German unity had not changed
since 1814. He similarly ignores the fact that all
the great Powers opposed the liberation of Schles-
wig-Holstein ; and it is undeniable that Russia,
according to the traditions of the old diplomacy,
had better grounds to adopt such an attitude than
the other Powers. For all the cabinets believed
then decidedly although wrongly that Prussia
wished to use the struggle with Denmark as a
means of possessing herself of the Kiel harbour.
The Russian State, as a Baltic power, could not
welcome this prospect.
Russian policy, in contrast to that of England,
France, and Austria, was also peculiar in this, that
it resisted the Prussian constitutional movement.
The Czar Nicholas did not merely behave as the
head of the cause of royalty in all Europe, but
actually felt himself such; and it was precisely
this which secured him a strong following among
the Prussian conservatives. It is far from my
intention to defend, in any way, the wretched
policy which came to grief at Warsaw and Olmutz ;
19
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? 290 Treitschke
we, the old Gotha party, have all grown up as
opponents of this tendency. Meanwhile, after the
lapse of a whole generation, it seems, however, to
be time to appreciate the natural motives which
drove so many valiant patriots into the Russian
camp. It is enough to remember only the King's
ride through mutinous Berlin, the retreat of the
victorious guards before the defeated barricade-
fighters, and all the terrible humiliation which the
weakness of Frederick William IV brought on the
throne of the Hohenzollerns. The old Prussian
royalists felt as though the world were coming to
an end; they saw all that they counted most
venerable, desecrated; and amid the universal
chaos, the Czar Nicholas appeared to them to be
the last stay of monarchy. Therefore, in order to
save royalty in Prussia, they adhered to Russia.
They made a grievous error, but only blind hatred,
as with our author, can condemn them abruptly
as betrayers of their country. The head of the
pro-Russian party in Berlin was, at the beginning
of the fifties, the same Field Marshal Dohna who
had instantly rejected with Prussian pride the
above-mentioned contemptible proposal of the
Czar; of him, a diplomat said: "So long as this
old standard remains upright, I feel easy. "
Strongly conservative in political and ecclesiastical
matters though he was, this son-in-law of Scharn-
horst had never surrendered the ideal of the War
of Liberation, the hope of German unity. What
brought the noble German into the ranks of the
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 291
reactionists was certainly not regard for Russia,
but that hopeless confusion of our affairs which had
brought about such a close connexion between the
great cause of German unity and the follies of
the revolution; the imperial crown of Frankfort
seemed to him as to his King to be a couronne de
pave.
As regards the Crimean War, all unprejudiced
judges believe, nowadays, that Prussia had, as an
exception, and for once in a way undeserved good
fortune. The crushing superiority of Russia was
broken by the western Powers without our inter-
ference, and yet our friendly relations with our
eastern neighbour, which were to be so fruitful in
results for Germany's future, remained unbroken.
Even a less undecided, less inactive government
than Manteuffel's ministry could scarcely have
obtained a more favourable result than this. Our
author himself tepidly acknowledges that it was
not Prussia's duty to side with the western
Powers, and thus help on the schemes of Bona-
partism. A really brilliant statesman perhaps
might, as soon as the military forces of France were
locked up in the east, have suddenly made an
alliance with Russia, and attempted the conquest
of Schleswig-Holstein, and the solution of the
German question, without troubling himself about
mistaken public opinion. But it is obvious how
difficult this was, and how impossible for a person-
ality like the King's. Instead of quietly appreciat-
ing the difficulty of the circumstances, our author
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? 292 Treitschke
only vehemently denounces Russia's pride, and
Prussia's servility. He also again ignores the
fact that Prussia then, unfortunately, had fallen
into a state of being regarded as negligible by the
whole world, and the arrogance of the western
Powers was not less than that of Russia. Every-
one knows the letters of Prince Albert, and Napol-
eon Ill's remark, regarding the deference which
Prussia showed towards Russia; the cold disparag-
ing contempt displayed in the letters of the Prince
Consort, who was himself a German, and accus-
tomed to weigh his words carefully, is, in my
opinion, more insulting than the coarse words of
abuse which the harsh despotic Nicholas is said
to have blurted out in moments of sudden anger.
Our author also ignores the fact that the Czar
Nicholas, declared himself ready to purchase
Prussia's help in the field by surrendering Warsaw.
In the camp of the English and French allies they
were willing to pay a price also, but only offered
a slight rectification of the frontier on the left
bank of the Rhine. Which of the offers was the
more favourable?
This whole section of the book is a mixture of
truth and falsehood, of ingenious remarks and
tasteless gossip. We will give one specimen of the
author's manner of relating history. He prints
in spaced letters the following : " In February, 1864,
a Prussian State-secret the just completed plan
of mobilization was revealed to the Court of St.
Petersburg. " Then he relates how one of our
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 293
noblest patriots, a well-known writer, conveyed the
news of this betrayal, of course in perfect good faith,
to a Berlin lithographic correspondence agency;
and in consequence a secret order was issued for
the writer's arrest. I happen to be exactly
acquainted with the affair, and can confirm the
statement that the order for arrest was certainly
issued a characteristic occurrence in that time
of petty panics on the part of the police. But
more important than this secondary matter, is
the question whether that piece of information
was reliable, and whether that betrayal really took
place. The author has here again concealed
something. The report was that a brother of the
King had committed the treachery. This remark-
able disclosure, however, did not originate with any
one who was really conversant with affairs, but
with an honourable, though at the same time very
credulous and hot-headed, Liberal deputy of the
Landtag, x who had nothing to do with the Court.
Is it exaggerated loyalty when we Prussians de-
mand from the Baltic anonymous author, at
least, some attempt at a proof, before we resolve
to regard one of our royal princes as a traitor to his
country. The story simply belongs to the series
of innumerable scandals, which were only too
gladly believed by the malicious liberalism of the
fifties. It was, we must remember, the time when
Varnhagen von Ense was flourishing. In accord-
ance with the general tenor of his book, the author
1 Parliament of a single State.
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? 294 Treitschke
naturally does not relish the indisputable fact,
that the policy of Alexander II atoned for many
of the wrongs which the Czar Nicholas had com-
mitted against Germany. He seeks rather, during
this period of Russian history, to hunt up every
trace of movements hostile to Germany. It is,
for instance, a well-known fact, that after the Peace
of Paris, Russia sought for a rapprochement to
France; and it may also be safely assumed that
Prince GortschakofT, from the commencement of
his political career, regarded an alliance with
France as the most suitable for Russia. But it
is a long way from such general wishes to the acts
of State-policy. For whole decades the great
majority of French statesmen, without distinction
of party, have given a lip-adherence to the Russian
alliance; even Lamartine, the enthusiast for
freedom, spoke of this alliance as a geographical
necessity and the "cry of nature. " And yet the
course of the world's history went another way.
Then came the Polish rising of 1863. The
Court of St. Petersburg learned to know thor-
oughly the secret intrigues of Bonapartism, and
in Prussia's watchful aid found a proof of the
value of German friendship. Since then, for a
whole decade, its attitude has remained favourable
to our interests, whatever fault the Baltic anony-
mous author may find in details. Certainly it
was only the will of one man, which gave this
direction to Russian policy. The Russo- Prussian
alliance has never denied its origin; it has never
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 295
evoked a warm friendship between the two nations.
While the great majority of Germans regarded
Russian affairs with complete indifference, there
awoke in the educated circles of Russian society,
as soon as the great decisive days of our history
approached, a bitter hatred against Germany,
which increased from year to year. But that one
will, which was friendly to us, governed the Ger-
man State ;and so long as this condition lasted, the
intelligent German press was bound to treat the
neighbouring Power with forbearance. When the
Baltic author expresses contempt for our press
because of this, and blames it for want of national
pride, he merely shows that he has no comprehen-
sion for the first and most important tasks of
German policy. His thoughts continually re-
volve round Reval, Riga, and Mitau.
That the dislocation of the equilibrium among
the Baltic Powers, and the advance of Prussia in
the Cimbric peninsula must have appeared serious
matters to the St. Petersburg Court, is obvious.
But at last it let the old deeply-rooted tradition
drop, and accommodated itself with as good a
grace as possible to the fait accompli. Similarly
it is evident that the formation of the North
German Confederation could not be agreeable
to it. When the war of 1866 broke out, people at
St. Petersburg and all the other capitals of Europe
expected the probable defeat of Prussia, and at first
were seriously alarmed at the brilliant successes
of our troops. But this time also a sense of fair-
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? 296 Treitschke
ness prevailed. The Czar Alexander accepted the
new order of things in Germany, as soon as he
ascertained what schemes were cherished by the
Court of the Tuileries against the left bank of the
Rhine. In the next year, 1870, this attitude of
our friend and neighbour underwent its severest
test. Austria, Italy, and Denmark, as is well
known, were on the point of concluding an alliance
against Germany, when the strokes of Worth and
Spichern intervened. England did not dare to
forbid the French to make the attack, which a
single word from the Queen of the Seas could have
prevented, and afterwards she prolonged the war
by her sale of arms, and by the one-sided manner
in which she maintained her neutrality. The
Czar Alexander, on the other hand, greeted each
victory of his royal uncle with sincere joy. That
was the important point, and not the ill-humour
of Prince Gortschakoff, which our author depicts
with so much satisfaction. Russia was the only
great Power whose head displayed friendly senti-
ments towards us during that difficult time. And
if we wish to realize how valuable Russian friend-
ship was for us also in the following years, we must
compare the present state of things with the past.
As long as the alliance of the three Emperors lasted,
a European war was quite out of the question, for
the notorious war crisis of 1875 has in reality
never existed. Since Russia has separated from
the other two Imperial Powers, we are at any rate
within sight of the possibility of a European war,
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 297
and may perhaps be suddenly compelled to act
on two frontiers simultaneously.
The most welcome task for an author, who
openly preaches war against Russia, was obviously
to show in detail through what circumstances the
old alliance after the peace of San Stefano was
loosened and finally dissolved. I know no more
of these matters than anyone else. I only know
that in Russia there is deep vexation at the course
taken by the Berlin Congress, and that a great
deal of the blame is imputed to the German Em-
pire. I have heard of secret negotiations regard-
ing a Franco-Russian alliance, and am without
further argument convinced that Prince Bismarck
would not have given German policy its latest
direction without very solid reasons. But I have
no more exact knowledge of the matter. There-
fore it was with easily intelligible curiosity that
I began to read the last section of the book. I
hoped to learn something about the transactions
between Russia and France; I hoped to learn
whether the sentiments of the Czar Alexander
have changed, or whether that monarch does not
now more personally direct the foreign policy
of his kingdom, etc. But our author himself
knows nothing about such matters; he deceives
himself or others when he pretends to be initiated.
He only produces lengthy extracts from the Ger-
manophobe articles of the Russian press. Every
publicist who is at all an expert knows just as
many fine and pithy passages in Muscovite papers.
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? 298 Treitschke
In Hansen's Coulisses de la Diplomatic the author,
who loves historical sources of this kind, might
discover similar outpourings of Russian politicians.
But all that proves very little. The question is
much rather whether the Russian press, which, as
is well known, enjoys only a certain degree of
freedom in the two capitals and remains quite
unknown to the mass of the people, is powerful
enough to influence the course of Russia's foreign
policy. To this question the author gives no
answer.
So we lay the book aside without any informa-
tion on the present state of affairs, but not without
a feeling of shame. When two who have been
friends for many years have broken with each
other, it is not only unchivalrous for one to tax
his old companions with sins committed long ago,
but unwise; the reproach always falls back on the
reproacher. The last impression which the reader
carries away from this work is much more un-
favourable for Prussia than for Russia; therefore
even the foreign press greeted it at once with
well-deserved contempt. Anyone who believes
the author, must come to the conclusion that
King Frederick William III and his two successors,
had conducted a Russian and not a Prussian policy.
Happily this view is quite false. But we would
remind the Baltic publicist who, under the dis-
guise of a Prussian patriot, draws such a flattering
picture of our history, of an old Prussian story,
which still has its application. In the Rhine
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 299
campaign of 1793, a Prussian grenadier was
inveighing vigorously against King Frederick
William II; but when an Austrian fellow-soldier
chimed in, the Prussian gave him a box on the
ears and said: "I may talk like that, but not you;
for I am a Prussian. "
The author's remarks on the future are based
upon the tacit assumption that the European
Powers fall naturally into two groups: Austria,
England, Germany, on the one side; Italy, Russia,
and France, on the other. In the short time since
the book came out, this assumption has already
been made void; the English elections have re-
minded the world very forcibly of the instability
of grouping in the system of States. If the author
had commenced his work only four weeks later,
it would probably not have appeared in the book
market at all, or have done so in a very different
shape.
But there is one truth, though certainly no new
one, in the train of thought which is apparent in
this book; it is only too correct that hostility to
everything German is constantly on the increase
in influential Russian society. But we do not
at all believe that an intelligent Russian Gov-
ernment, not misled by the dreams of Pan-
Slavism, must necessarily cherish such a feeling
towards us. We regard a war against Russia
as a great calamity, for who, now, when the
period of colonizing absolutism lies far behind
us, can seriously wish to encumber our State
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? 300 Treitschke
with the possession of Warsaw, and with millions
of Poles and Jews? But many signs indicate that
the next great European crisis will find the Rus-
sians in the ranks of our enemies. All the more
important therefore is our newly-confirmed friend-
ship with Austria.
This alliance is, as a matter of course, sure of
the involuntary sympathy of our people; if it
endures, it may have the useful effect of strength-
ening the German element in Austria, and finally
checking the melancholy decay of our civilization
in Bohemia and Hungary, in Krain and the Tyrol.
Our interests in the East coincide, for the present,
with those of the Danube Empire. After the
occupation of Bosnia has once taken place, Austria
cannot again surrender the position she has taken
up, without preparing a triumph for our common
enemy, Pan-Slavism. Nevertheless, we cannot
join our Baltic author in prophesying that the
treaty of friendship with Austria will be as lasting
and immovable as the unity of the German Em-
pire. Germany has plenty of enemies in the
medley of peoples which exist in Austria; all the
Slavs, even the ultramontane Germans hate us;
nay more, the Magyars, our political friends,
suppress German civilization in the Saxon districts
of Transylvania, much more severely than the
Russians ever ventured to do in their Baltic pro-
vinces. It is not in our power to keep these
hostile forces for ever aloof from the guidance of
Russia. The unity of our Empire, on the other
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 301
hand, rests on our own power alone, and on the
loyalty which we owe to ourselves; therefore it
will last, whatever changes may take place among
the European alliances.
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? FREEDOM.
WHEN shall we see the last of those [timid
spirits who find it needful to increase the bur-
den of life by self-created torture, to whom every
advance of the human mind is but one sign more of
the decay of our race of the approach of the Day of
Judgment? The great majority of our contem-
poraries are again beginning, thank Heaven! to
believe quite sturdily and heartily in themselves,
yet we are weak enough to repeat some, at least,
of the gloomy predictions of those atrabilious
spirits. It has become a commonplace assumption
that all-conquering culture will at last supplant
national morality by a morality of mankind, and
transform the world into a cosmopolitan, primitive
pap. But the same law holds good of nations, as
of individuals, who show less differentiation in
childhood than in mature years. In other words,
if a people has vitality enough to keep itself and
its nationality going in the merciless race-struggle
of history, every advance in civilization will cer-
tainly bring its external life in closer contact with
other peoples, but it will bring into clearer relief
its more refined, its deeper idiosyncrasies. We all
follow the Paris fashions, we are linked with neigh-
bouring nations by a thousand different interests;
302
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? Freedom 303
yet our feelings and ideas, so far as the French and
British intellectual world is concerned, are un-
doubtedly more independent than they were seven
hundred years ago, when the peasant all over
Europe spent his life fettered by patriarchal
custom, whilst the ecclesiastic in every country
derived his knowledge from the same sources,
and the nobility of Latin Christendom created for
itself a common code of honour and morality
under the walls of Jerusalem. That lively ex-
change of ideas between nations, on which the
present generation rightly plumes itself, has never
been a mere give and take.
We are fortified in this consoling knowledge when
we see how the ideas of a German classic about
the highest object of human thought about
freedom have recently been developed in a very
individual way by two distinguished political
thinkers of France and England. When Wilhelm
von Humboldt's essay on the limits of the opera-
tions of the State appeared for the first time in
complete form, a few years ago, some sensation
was caused by that brilliant work in Germany
too. We were rejoiced to get a deeper insight
into the evolution of one of our chief men. The
more refined minds delightedly detected the
inspiring breath of the golden age of German
humanity, for it is indeed only in Schiller's nearly-
related letters on the aesthetic education of the
human race that the bright ideal of a beautiful
humanity, which fascinated Germans during that
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? 304 Treitschke
period, has been depicted with equal eloquence
and distinction. The gifted youth who had just
had his first look into the self-complacent red-
tapeism of Frederick William II 's bureaucracy,
and had turned away, chilled by its lifeless for-
malities, in order to live a life of aesthetic leisure
at home he was certainly to be forgiven for
thinking very poorly of the State. Dalberg had
asked him to write the little book a prince who
had the intention of lavishing profusely on his
country all the good things of life by means of an
administration that would know everything, and
look after everything. The young thinker em-
phasized all the more keenly the fact that the
State is nothing but an institution for purposes of
security ; that it must never again interfere, directly
or indirectly, with a nation's morals or character;
that a man was freest when the State was least
active. We, of the present generation, know only
too well that the true cause of the ruin of the old
German State was that all free minds set them-
selves in such morbid opposition to the State
that they fled from it like young Humboldt,
instead of serving it like Humboldt when grown to
a man, and elevating it by the nobility of their
free human development. The doctrine which
sees in the State merely a hindrance, a necessary
evil, seems obsolete to the German of to-day.
Curiously enough, though, this youthful work of
Humboldt's is now being glorified by John Stuart
Mill, in his book On Liberty, and by Edward
?
our State at the commencement of the eighteenth
century made enormous sacrifices to aid the ob-
jects of the two sea-Powers, but did not finally
gain any further advantage from this long alliance
than the right of her head to use the kingly title,
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? 280 Treitschke
and some barren laurels. The history also of the
seventy-seven year-long friendship between Prus-
sia and Russia the longest alliance which has
ever existed between two great Powers presents
many such phenomena. There were times when
German patriots were fully justified in regarding
the friendship of Russia as oppressive, nay, as
disgraceful, just as on the other hand in recent
years the great majority of educated Russians
firmly believed that their country was injured by
the Prussian alliance. But when one sums up the
results, and compares the relative position in
respect of power of the two States in 1802, when
their alliance was formed, with that in 1879, when
it was dissolved, it cannot be honestly asserted that
Prussia fared badly in this alliance.
The Russo-Prussian alliance was, as is well
known, entirely the personal work of the two
monarchs, and everyone knows how much it was
helped forward by the honest and frank friend-
ship which the King Frederick William III dis-
played towards the versatile Czar. But these
personal feelings of the King never overpowered
his sound political intelligence and his strong sense
of duty. Every new advance of historical investi-
gation only reconfirms the fact that the King was
altogether right when, unseduced by the proposals
of so many cleverer men than himself, he was only
willing to venture on the attempt at rising against
Napoleon in alliance with Russia. Without the
help of the Czar Alexander, the capture of Paris,
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 281
and the restoration of the old power of Prussia
would have been impossible. Any one who doubts
this should peruse the recently published Memoirs
of Metternich regarding the real objects of the
Vienna Court at the time i. e. , not the Memoirs
themselves with their intolerable self-glorification,
but the appended authentic official documents,
which, for the most part, plainly contradict the
vain self -eulogy of the author. At the Congress of
Vienna the two courts still continued to have a
community of interests: the Czar was obliged to
support Prussia's demands for an indemnity, if
he wished to secure for himself the possession of
Poland.
At the second Peace of Paris, on the other hand,
the interests of the two Powers came into violent
collision. The Czar had indeed favoured the
restoration of the State of Prussia, so that Russia
should be rendered impregnable through this
rampart on its most vulnerable side, but he as little
wished the rise of a completely independent self-
sufficing German power as the courts of Paris,
Vienna, and London did. Therefore, the restor-
ation of our old western frontier, which Prussia
demanded, was defeated by the united opposition
of all the Great Powers. All the courts without
exception observed with anxiety what an unsus-
pected wealth of military power little Prussia had
developed during the War of Liberation ; therefore
they all eagerly vied with one another in burying
Prussia's merits in oblivion. Whether one reads
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? 282 Treitschke
the military dispatches of Wellington and his
officers, the letters of Schwarzenberg, Metternich,
and Gentz, the semi-official writings of the Russian
military authors of that period, it is difficult to
say which of the three allies had most quickly
and completely forgotten the deeds of their Prus-
sian comrades-in-arms. Nevertheless, the alliance
with Russia and Austria was a necessity for Prussia
for it still remained the most important task of our
European policy to prevent another declaration of
war on the part of France, and the Great Alliance
actually achieved this, its first purpose. When
Austria, in 1817, rendered anxious by Alexander's
grandiose schemes, proposed to the King of Prussia
a secret offensive and defensive alliance, which in
case of need might be also directed against Russia,
Hardenberg, who in those days was thoroughly
Austrian in his sympathies, was eager to accept the
proposal. But the King acted as a Prussian, and
absolutely refused, for only the union of all three
Eastern Powers could secure to his State the safety
which he especially needed after the immense
sacrifices of the war. Yet our Baltic anonymous
author is quite wrong in so representing things
as though, in Frederick William Ill's view, the
alliance with Russia had been the only possible
one. The King knew, more thoroughly than his
present-day critic, the incalculable vicissitudes of
international relations and always kept cautiously
in view the possibility of a war against Russia.
In 1818 he surprised the Vienna Court by the
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 283
declaration that he wished also to include Posen,
East and West Prussia, in the German Confeder-
ation, because in case of a Russian attack, he
wanted to be absolutely sure of the help of Ger-
many. Frederick William held obstinately to this
idea although Hardenberg and Humboldt spoke
against it, and he did not give it up till Austria
opposed it, and thus every prospect of carrying
the proposal through in the Diet of the Confeder-
ation disappeared.
It is equally untrue that the King, as our anony-
mous author condescendingly expresses it, had
modestly renounced all wishes of bringing about
a union of the German States. His policy was
peaceful, as it was obliged to be; it shunned a
decisive contest for which at that time all the
preliminary conditions were lacking, but as soon
as affairs in the new provinces were, to some extent,
settled, he began at once to work for the com-
mercial and political unifying of Germany. In
this difficult task, which in very truth laid the
foundation for the new German Empire, Prussia en-
countered at every step the opposition of Austria,
England, and France. Russia alone among all the
Great Powers preserved a friendly neutrality.
This one fact is sufficient to justify the King in
attaching great importance to Russia's friendship.
This partiality of his, however, was by no means
blind, for nothing is more absurd than the author's
assertion that Prussia, by the mediation which
brought about the Peace of Adrianople, had merely
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? 284 Treitschke
done the Russian Court an unselfish service.
When the war of 1828 broke out, the King had
openly told the Czar that he disapproved of his
declaration of war. The next year, at the com-
mencement of the second campaign, the Euro-
pean situation assumed a very threatening aspect.
The Vienna Cabinet, alarmed in the highest degree
by the progress of the Russian arms, exerted itself
in conjunction with England to bring about a great
alliance against Russia; on the other hand the
King knew from his son-in-law's mouth (the Czar's
autograph note is still preserved in the Berlin state
archives) that there was a secret understanding
between Nicholas and Charles X of France. If
matters were allowed to go their course, there was
danger of a European war, which might oblige
Prussia to fight simultaneously against Russia
and France, and that about a question remote from
our interests. In order to avert- this danger, and
thus acting for the best for his own country, the
King resolved to act as a mediator, and brought
about a peace which, as matters then were, was
acceptable to both contending parties.
Prince Metternich was certainly alarmed at this
success of Prussian policy, and the reactionary
party in Berlin, Duke Karl of Mecklenburg,
Ancillon, Schuckmann, Knesebeck, who were all
staunch adherents of the Vienna diplomat, were
alarmed; but the ablest men at the Court, Bern-
stoff, Witzleven, Eichhorn, and above all the
younger Prince William, approved the King's
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 285
well-considered proceeding. The resolve of the
King was obviously connected with the brilliant
successes which his finance minister, Motz, had
won at the same time in the struggles of German
commercial policy. To the calm historical judg-
ment the years 1828 and 1829 appear as a fortu-
nate turning point in the history of that uneventful
period; it was the time when Prussia again began
to take up a completely independent position in
relation to the Austrian Court. Among the
liberals, indeed, who had lately been admiring the
Greeks, and now were suddenly enthusiastic for
the Turks, there arose a supplementary party-
legend, that Prussia had only undertaken the office
of mediator in order to save the Russian army from
certain destruction. This discovery, however, is
already contradicted by the calendar. On August
1 9th, Diebitch's army appeared before Adrianople;
and it was here that the victor's embarrassments
first began, and here, first, it was evident how much
his fighting power had been reduced by sickness,
and the wear and tear of the campaign. But
Prussia had commenced acting as mediator as
early as July; when General Muffling received his
instructions, the Russian army was victorious
everywhere.
Later on, also, the sober-mindedness of King
Frederick William never favoured the Czar's de-
signs against the Porte; he rather did his best
to strengthen the resisting power of the Ottoman
Empire. The only partly effective reform which
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? 286 Treitschke
the decaying Turkish State succeeded in carrying
through the reconstitution of its army was,
as is well known, the work of Prussian officers.
All the reports which the embittered scandal-
seeking opposition party of that time circulated,
regarding the influence of Russia in the domestic
concerns of Prussia, are mere inventions. The
King alone deserves blame or praise for the course
of domestic policy; his son-in-law never refused to
pay him filial reverence. Even the eccentricities
of the Berlin Court at that period, the love for
parades, the bestowing of military decorations,
which were stigmatized by the liberals as "Russian
manners," were simply due to the personal pre-
dilection of the King, and it is difficult to decide
whether Russia has learnt more in this respect
from Germany, or vice versa. During the anxious
days of the July revolution the King exhibited
again, with all his modesty, an independent and
genuinely Prussian attitude. Frederick William
resisted the legitimist outbursts of his son-in-law,
and hindered the crusade against France which
had been planned in St. Petersburg. The next
year he resisted with equal common sense the
foolish enthusiasm of the liberals for the Poles,
and by occupying the eastern frontier, assisted
in the suppression of that Polish insurrection
which was as dangerous for our Posen as for
Russian Poland. The Baltic anonymous author
conceals his vexation at this intelligent policy of
self-assertion, behind the thoughtful remark that
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 287
we had, as is well known, "paid for rendering this
assistance with the valuable life of Gneisenau. "
Should we, then, perhaps enter in our ledger on
the Russian debit side, the cholera, which swept
away our heroes?
During the whole period from 1815 to 1840, I
know only of a single fact which can be alleged to
give real occasion to the reproach that the King,
for the sake of Russia's friendship, neglected an
important interest of his State. In contrast to
the ruthless commercial policy of Russia, Prussia
showed a moderation which bordered on weakness.
But this matter, also, is not so simple as our
anonymous author thinks. He reproaches Russia
with the non-fulfilment of the Vienna Treaty of
May 3, 1815, and overlooks the fact that Prussia
herself hardly wished in earnest the carrying out
of this agreement. It was soon enough proved
that Hardenberg had been overreached at Vienna
by Prince Czartoryski. The apparently harmless
agreements regarding free transit, and free trade
with the products of all formerly Polish territories,
imposed upon our State, through which the transit
took place, only duties, without conferring any
corresponding advantages. In order to carry out
the treaty literally, Prussia would have had to
divide its Polish provinces from its other territories
by a line of custom-houses. But the Poles saw
in the treaty a welcome means of carrying their
national propaganda into our Polish territories by
settlements of commercial agents. Thus it hap-
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? 288 Treitschke
pened that Prussia, after futile negotiations,
proceeded on her own account; and by the cus-
toms law of 1818 placed her Polish territories on
precisely the same footing as her other eastern
provinces. After this necessary step, Prussia
was no more in the position to appeal successfully
to the Vienna Treaty. And what means did we,
in fact, possess to compel the neighbouring State
to give up a foolish commercial policy, which was
injurious for our own country? Only the two-
edged weapon of retaliatory duties. The relation
of the two countries assumed quite a different
aspect under Frederick William IV. It will al-
ways be one of the most bitter memories of our
history, how lacking in counsel, and wavering in
purposes the clever new King proved, in contrast
to the strong-willed Czar, how cruelly he experi-
enced, by countless failures, that in the stern
struggles for power of national life, character is
always superior to talent, and how at last, for
truth will out, he actually feared these narrow
minds. Here our author has good reason for
sharp judgments; and here also he gives us, along
with some questionable anecdotes, some reliable
matter-of-fact information regarding the history
of the confusions of 1848-50. It is quite true that
the Czar Nicholas in the autumn of 1848 asked
General Count Friedrich Dohna whether he would
not be the Prussian General Monk, and march with
the first army corps on Berlin, to restore order
there; the whole Russian army would act as his
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 289
reserve in case of need. The memories of the
Count printed from autograph, confirm the cor-
rectness of this story with the exception of some
trifling details. But even here the author cannot
rise to an unprejudiced historical estimate of the
events in question. He conceals the fact that not
only Russia but all the great Powers were against
the rise of a Prussian-German Empire. The posi-
tion which the Powers had assumed with regard
to the question of German unity had not changed
since 1814. He similarly ignores the fact that all
the great Powers opposed the liberation of Schles-
wig-Holstein ; and it is undeniable that Russia,
according to the traditions of the old diplomacy,
had better grounds to adopt such an attitude than
the other Powers. For all the cabinets believed
then decidedly although wrongly that Prussia
wished to use the struggle with Denmark as a
means of possessing herself of the Kiel harbour.
The Russian State, as a Baltic power, could not
welcome this prospect.
Russian policy, in contrast to that of England,
France, and Austria, was also peculiar in this, that
it resisted the Prussian constitutional movement.
The Czar Nicholas did not merely behave as the
head of the cause of royalty in all Europe, but
actually felt himself such; and it was precisely
this which secured him a strong following among
the Prussian conservatives. It is far from my
intention to defend, in any way, the wretched
policy which came to grief at Warsaw and Olmutz ;
19
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? 290 Treitschke
we, the old Gotha party, have all grown up as
opponents of this tendency. Meanwhile, after the
lapse of a whole generation, it seems, however, to
be time to appreciate the natural motives which
drove so many valiant patriots into the Russian
camp. It is enough to remember only the King's
ride through mutinous Berlin, the retreat of the
victorious guards before the defeated barricade-
fighters, and all the terrible humiliation which the
weakness of Frederick William IV brought on the
throne of the Hohenzollerns. The old Prussian
royalists felt as though the world were coming to
an end; they saw all that they counted most
venerable, desecrated; and amid the universal
chaos, the Czar Nicholas appeared to them to be
the last stay of monarchy. Therefore, in order to
save royalty in Prussia, they adhered to Russia.
They made a grievous error, but only blind hatred,
as with our author, can condemn them abruptly
as betrayers of their country. The head of the
pro-Russian party in Berlin was, at the beginning
of the fifties, the same Field Marshal Dohna who
had instantly rejected with Prussian pride the
above-mentioned contemptible proposal of the
Czar; of him, a diplomat said: "So long as this
old standard remains upright, I feel easy. "
Strongly conservative in political and ecclesiastical
matters though he was, this son-in-law of Scharn-
horst had never surrendered the ideal of the War
of Liberation, the hope of German unity. What
brought the noble German into the ranks of the
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 291
reactionists was certainly not regard for Russia,
but that hopeless confusion of our affairs which had
brought about such a close connexion between the
great cause of German unity and the follies of
the revolution; the imperial crown of Frankfort
seemed to him as to his King to be a couronne de
pave.
As regards the Crimean War, all unprejudiced
judges believe, nowadays, that Prussia had, as an
exception, and for once in a way undeserved good
fortune. The crushing superiority of Russia was
broken by the western Powers without our inter-
ference, and yet our friendly relations with our
eastern neighbour, which were to be so fruitful in
results for Germany's future, remained unbroken.
Even a less undecided, less inactive government
than Manteuffel's ministry could scarcely have
obtained a more favourable result than this. Our
author himself tepidly acknowledges that it was
not Prussia's duty to side with the western
Powers, and thus help on the schemes of Bona-
partism. A really brilliant statesman perhaps
might, as soon as the military forces of France were
locked up in the east, have suddenly made an
alliance with Russia, and attempted the conquest
of Schleswig-Holstein, and the solution of the
German question, without troubling himself about
mistaken public opinion. But it is obvious how
difficult this was, and how impossible for a person-
ality like the King's. Instead of quietly appreciat-
ing the difficulty of the circumstances, our author
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? 292 Treitschke
only vehemently denounces Russia's pride, and
Prussia's servility. He also again ignores the
fact that Prussia then, unfortunately, had fallen
into a state of being regarded as negligible by the
whole world, and the arrogance of the western
Powers was not less than that of Russia. Every-
one knows the letters of Prince Albert, and Napol-
eon Ill's remark, regarding the deference which
Prussia showed towards Russia; the cold disparag-
ing contempt displayed in the letters of the Prince
Consort, who was himself a German, and accus-
tomed to weigh his words carefully, is, in my
opinion, more insulting than the coarse words of
abuse which the harsh despotic Nicholas is said
to have blurted out in moments of sudden anger.
Our author also ignores the fact that the Czar
Nicholas, declared himself ready to purchase
Prussia's help in the field by surrendering Warsaw.
In the camp of the English and French allies they
were willing to pay a price also, but only offered
a slight rectification of the frontier on the left
bank of the Rhine. Which of the offers was the
more favourable?
This whole section of the book is a mixture of
truth and falsehood, of ingenious remarks and
tasteless gossip. We will give one specimen of the
author's manner of relating history. He prints
in spaced letters the following : " In February, 1864,
a Prussian State-secret the just completed plan
of mobilization was revealed to the Court of St.
Petersburg. " Then he relates how one of our
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 293
noblest patriots, a well-known writer, conveyed the
news of this betrayal, of course in perfect good faith,
to a Berlin lithographic correspondence agency;
and in consequence a secret order was issued for
the writer's arrest. I happen to be exactly
acquainted with the affair, and can confirm the
statement that the order for arrest was certainly
issued a characteristic occurrence in that time
of petty panics on the part of the police. But
more important than this secondary matter, is
the question whether that piece of information
was reliable, and whether that betrayal really took
place. The author has here again concealed
something. The report was that a brother of the
King had committed the treachery. This remark-
able disclosure, however, did not originate with any
one who was really conversant with affairs, but
with an honourable, though at the same time very
credulous and hot-headed, Liberal deputy of the
Landtag, x who had nothing to do with the Court.
Is it exaggerated loyalty when we Prussians de-
mand from the Baltic anonymous author, at
least, some attempt at a proof, before we resolve
to regard one of our royal princes as a traitor to his
country. The story simply belongs to the series
of innumerable scandals, which were only too
gladly believed by the malicious liberalism of the
fifties. It was, we must remember, the time when
Varnhagen von Ense was flourishing. In accord-
ance with the general tenor of his book, the author
1 Parliament of a single State.
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? 294 Treitschke
naturally does not relish the indisputable fact,
that the policy of Alexander II atoned for many
of the wrongs which the Czar Nicholas had com-
mitted against Germany. He seeks rather, during
this period of Russian history, to hunt up every
trace of movements hostile to Germany. It is,
for instance, a well-known fact, that after the Peace
of Paris, Russia sought for a rapprochement to
France; and it may also be safely assumed that
Prince GortschakofT, from the commencement of
his political career, regarded an alliance with
France as the most suitable for Russia. But it
is a long way from such general wishes to the acts
of State-policy. For whole decades the great
majority of French statesmen, without distinction
of party, have given a lip-adherence to the Russian
alliance; even Lamartine, the enthusiast for
freedom, spoke of this alliance as a geographical
necessity and the "cry of nature. " And yet the
course of the world's history went another way.
Then came the Polish rising of 1863. The
Court of St. Petersburg learned to know thor-
oughly the secret intrigues of Bonapartism, and
in Prussia's watchful aid found a proof of the
value of German friendship. Since then, for a
whole decade, its attitude has remained favourable
to our interests, whatever fault the Baltic anony-
mous author may find in details. Certainly it
was only the will of one man, which gave this
direction to Russian policy. The Russo- Prussian
alliance has never denied its origin; it has never
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 295
evoked a warm friendship between the two nations.
While the great majority of Germans regarded
Russian affairs with complete indifference, there
awoke in the educated circles of Russian society,
as soon as the great decisive days of our history
approached, a bitter hatred against Germany,
which increased from year to year. But that one
will, which was friendly to us, governed the Ger-
man State ;and so long as this condition lasted, the
intelligent German press was bound to treat the
neighbouring Power with forbearance. When the
Baltic author expresses contempt for our press
because of this, and blames it for want of national
pride, he merely shows that he has no comprehen-
sion for the first and most important tasks of
German policy. His thoughts continually re-
volve round Reval, Riga, and Mitau.
That the dislocation of the equilibrium among
the Baltic Powers, and the advance of Prussia in
the Cimbric peninsula must have appeared serious
matters to the St. Petersburg Court, is obvious.
But at last it let the old deeply-rooted tradition
drop, and accommodated itself with as good a
grace as possible to the fait accompli. Similarly
it is evident that the formation of the North
German Confederation could not be agreeable
to it. When the war of 1866 broke out, people at
St. Petersburg and all the other capitals of Europe
expected the probable defeat of Prussia, and at first
were seriously alarmed at the brilliant successes
of our troops. But this time also a sense of fair-
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? 296 Treitschke
ness prevailed. The Czar Alexander accepted the
new order of things in Germany, as soon as he
ascertained what schemes were cherished by the
Court of the Tuileries against the left bank of the
Rhine. In the next year, 1870, this attitude of
our friend and neighbour underwent its severest
test. Austria, Italy, and Denmark, as is well
known, were on the point of concluding an alliance
against Germany, when the strokes of Worth and
Spichern intervened. England did not dare to
forbid the French to make the attack, which a
single word from the Queen of the Seas could have
prevented, and afterwards she prolonged the war
by her sale of arms, and by the one-sided manner
in which she maintained her neutrality. The
Czar Alexander, on the other hand, greeted each
victory of his royal uncle with sincere joy. That
was the important point, and not the ill-humour
of Prince Gortschakoff, which our author depicts
with so much satisfaction. Russia was the only
great Power whose head displayed friendly senti-
ments towards us during that difficult time. And
if we wish to realize how valuable Russian friend-
ship was for us also in the following years, we must
compare the present state of things with the past.
As long as the alliance of the three Emperors lasted,
a European war was quite out of the question, for
the notorious war crisis of 1875 has in reality
never existed. Since Russia has separated from
the other two Imperial Powers, we are at any rate
within sight of the possibility of a European war,
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 297
and may perhaps be suddenly compelled to act
on two frontiers simultaneously.
The most welcome task for an author, who
openly preaches war against Russia, was obviously
to show in detail through what circumstances the
old alliance after the peace of San Stefano was
loosened and finally dissolved. I know no more
of these matters than anyone else. I only know
that in Russia there is deep vexation at the course
taken by the Berlin Congress, and that a great
deal of the blame is imputed to the German Em-
pire. I have heard of secret negotiations regard-
ing a Franco-Russian alliance, and am without
further argument convinced that Prince Bismarck
would not have given German policy its latest
direction without very solid reasons. But I have
no more exact knowledge of the matter. There-
fore it was with easily intelligible curiosity that
I began to read the last section of the book. I
hoped to learn something about the transactions
between Russia and France; I hoped to learn
whether the sentiments of the Czar Alexander
have changed, or whether that monarch does not
now more personally direct the foreign policy
of his kingdom, etc. But our author himself
knows nothing about such matters; he deceives
himself or others when he pretends to be initiated.
He only produces lengthy extracts from the Ger-
manophobe articles of the Russian press. Every
publicist who is at all an expert knows just as
many fine and pithy passages in Muscovite papers.
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? 298 Treitschke
In Hansen's Coulisses de la Diplomatic the author,
who loves historical sources of this kind, might
discover similar outpourings of Russian politicians.
But all that proves very little. The question is
much rather whether the Russian press, which, as
is well known, enjoys only a certain degree of
freedom in the two capitals and remains quite
unknown to the mass of the people, is powerful
enough to influence the course of Russia's foreign
policy. To this question the author gives no
answer.
So we lay the book aside without any informa-
tion on the present state of affairs, but not without
a feeling of shame. When two who have been
friends for many years have broken with each
other, it is not only unchivalrous for one to tax
his old companions with sins committed long ago,
but unwise; the reproach always falls back on the
reproacher. The last impression which the reader
carries away from this work is much more un-
favourable for Prussia than for Russia; therefore
even the foreign press greeted it at once with
well-deserved contempt. Anyone who believes
the author, must come to the conclusion that
King Frederick William III and his two successors,
had conducted a Russian and not a Prussian policy.
Happily this view is quite false. But we would
remind the Baltic publicist who, under the dis-
guise of a Prussian patriot, draws such a flattering
picture of our history, of an old Prussian story,
which still has its application. In the Rhine
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 299
campaign of 1793, a Prussian grenadier was
inveighing vigorously against King Frederick
William II; but when an Austrian fellow-soldier
chimed in, the Prussian gave him a box on the
ears and said: "I may talk like that, but not you;
for I am a Prussian. "
The author's remarks on the future are based
upon the tacit assumption that the European
Powers fall naturally into two groups: Austria,
England, Germany, on the one side; Italy, Russia,
and France, on the other. In the short time since
the book came out, this assumption has already
been made void; the English elections have re-
minded the world very forcibly of the instability
of grouping in the system of States. If the author
had commenced his work only four weeks later,
it would probably not have appeared in the book
market at all, or have done so in a very different
shape.
But there is one truth, though certainly no new
one, in the train of thought which is apparent in
this book; it is only too correct that hostility to
everything German is constantly on the increase
in influential Russian society. But we do not
at all believe that an intelligent Russian Gov-
ernment, not misled by the dreams of Pan-
Slavism, must necessarily cherish such a feeling
towards us. We regard a war against Russia
as a great calamity, for who, now, when the
period of colonizing absolutism lies far behind
us, can seriously wish to encumber our State
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? 300 Treitschke
with the possession of Warsaw, and with millions
of Poles and Jews? But many signs indicate that
the next great European crisis will find the Rus-
sians in the ranks of our enemies. All the more
important therefore is our newly-confirmed friend-
ship with Austria.
This alliance is, as a matter of course, sure of
the involuntary sympathy of our people; if it
endures, it may have the useful effect of strength-
ening the German element in Austria, and finally
checking the melancholy decay of our civilization
in Bohemia and Hungary, in Krain and the Tyrol.
Our interests in the East coincide, for the present,
with those of the Danube Empire. After the
occupation of Bosnia has once taken place, Austria
cannot again surrender the position she has taken
up, without preparing a triumph for our common
enemy, Pan-Slavism. Nevertheless, we cannot
join our Baltic author in prophesying that the
treaty of friendship with Austria will be as lasting
and immovable as the unity of the German Em-
pire. Germany has plenty of enemies in the
medley of peoples which exist in Austria; all the
Slavs, even the ultramontane Germans hate us;
nay more, the Magyars, our political friends,
suppress German civilization in the Saxon districts
of Transylvania, much more severely than the
Russians ever ventured to do in their Baltic pro-
vinces. It is not in our power to keep these
hostile forces for ever aloof from the guidance of
Russia. The unity of our Empire, on the other
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? Russian and Prussian Alliance 301
hand, rests on our own power alone, and on the
loyalty which we owe to ourselves; therefore it
will last, whatever changes may take place among
the European alliances.
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? FREEDOM.
WHEN shall we see the last of those [timid
spirits who find it needful to increase the bur-
den of life by self-created torture, to whom every
advance of the human mind is but one sign more of
the decay of our race of the approach of the Day of
Judgment? The great majority of our contem-
poraries are again beginning, thank Heaven! to
believe quite sturdily and heartily in themselves,
yet we are weak enough to repeat some, at least,
of the gloomy predictions of those atrabilious
spirits. It has become a commonplace assumption
that all-conquering culture will at last supplant
national morality by a morality of mankind, and
transform the world into a cosmopolitan, primitive
pap. But the same law holds good of nations, as
of individuals, who show less differentiation in
childhood than in mature years. In other words,
if a people has vitality enough to keep itself and
its nationality going in the merciless race-struggle
of history, every advance in civilization will cer-
tainly bring its external life in closer contact with
other peoples, but it will bring into clearer relief
its more refined, its deeper idiosyncrasies. We all
follow the Paris fashions, we are linked with neigh-
bouring nations by a thousand different interests;
302
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? Freedom 303
yet our feelings and ideas, so far as the French and
British intellectual world is concerned, are un-
doubtedly more independent than they were seven
hundred years ago, when the peasant all over
Europe spent his life fettered by patriarchal
custom, whilst the ecclesiastic in every country
derived his knowledge from the same sources,
and the nobility of Latin Christendom created for
itself a common code of honour and morality
under the walls of Jerusalem. That lively ex-
change of ideas between nations, on which the
present generation rightly plumes itself, has never
been a mere give and take.
We are fortified in this consoling knowledge when
we see how the ideas of a German classic about
the highest object of human thought about
freedom have recently been developed in a very
individual way by two distinguished political
thinkers of France and England. When Wilhelm
von Humboldt's essay on the limits of the opera-
tions of the State appeared for the first time in
complete form, a few years ago, some sensation
was caused by that brilliant work in Germany
too. We were rejoiced to get a deeper insight
into the evolution of one of our chief men. The
more refined minds delightedly detected the
inspiring breath of the golden age of German
humanity, for it is indeed only in Schiller's nearly-
related letters on the aesthetic education of the
human race that the bright ideal of a beautiful
humanity, which fascinated Germans during that
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? 304 Treitschke
period, has been depicted with equal eloquence
and distinction. The gifted youth who had just
had his first look into the self-complacent red-
tapeism of Frederick William II 's bureaucracy,
and had turned away, chilled by its lifeless for-
malities, in order to live a life of aesthetic leisure
at home he was certainly to be forgiven for
thinking very poorly of the State. Dalberg had
asked him to write the little book a prince who
had the intention of lavishing profusely on his
country all the good things of life by means of an
administration that would know everything, and
look after everything. The young thinker em-
phasized all the more keenly the fact that the
State is nothing but an institution for purposes of
security ; that it must never again interfere, directly
or indirectly, with a nation's morals or character;
that a man was freest when the State was least
active. We, of the present generation, know only
too well that the true cause of the ruin of the old
German State was that all free minds set them-
selves in such morbid opposition to the State
that they fled from it like young Humboldt,
instead of serving it like Humboldt when grown to
a man, and elevating it by the nobility of their
free human development. The doctrine which
sees in the State merely a hindrance, a necessary
evil, seems obsolete to the German of to-day.
Curiously enough, though, this youthful work of
Humboldt's is now being glorified by John Stuart
Mill, in his book On Liberty, and by Edward
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