Foreign policy, finance, and mili-
tary administration provided inexhaustible material for
baiting the opposition into violent rhetoric and resolutions
passed by overwhelming majorities.
tary administration provided inexhaustible material for
baiting the opposition into violent rhetoric and resolutions
passed by overwhelming majorities.
Robertson - Bismarck
He could be the loyal servant of a king
whose office incarnated the history and character of a
specific type of State,. but to be the servant of a Parliament,
accountable to, and holding his place at the pleasure of,
a fortuitous majority of professors, lawyers, journalists,
tradesmen and tinkers, was intolerable to his aristocratic
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT
pride and independence. He would take orders from no
one save the King and God, and he served God as he served
his royal master, on terms of devotion denned and inter-
preted by himself.
On political grounds he both feared and despised his
opponents in Parliament. He told them roundly that
they were ignorant, prejudiced, unpractical--dreamers
without political sense--helpless children in affairs of
State. Had he been perfectly honest he would have added
that diplomacy, as he conceived it, could not be conducted
with the blinds up, and that no representative body of
responsible men of high character would sanction either
his principles or his methods, and that for the realisation
of his aims absolute control of all the resources of the
State and an unfettered discretion were indispensable,
and that it was easier to manipulate and hoodwink a king
than a nation and a Parliament. The reorganisation of
the army, the steady preparation for war by a militarised
bureaucracy, the budget question, the Polish problem,
the conquest of Schleswig-Holstein, the manipulation of
the European situation, the understandings with Russia
and Napoleon m. , the Italian Treaty, the breach with
Austria, the campaign and peace of 1866, and the formation
of the North German Confederation--the Bismarckian
solution of the great questions of the day--could never
have been carried out, as Bismarck carried them out, by a
minister under a system of constitutional monarchy and
responsible parliamentary government. The conscience
of Prussia and Germany in 1862 made, in Bismarck's eyes,
for political cowardice. Nor were the Germans who
created the National Union under Bennigsen as yet pre-
pared to sacrifice everything to the State as Power, and to
adopt as their sole criterion of policy the State-egoism
of an unreformed and militarised Prussia.
In 1862 Germany was ripe for great changes. Under
the pressure of the internal development, assisted by the
course of events in Europe, most notably in Italy, the
demand for the extension of political rights on Nationalist
and Liberal lines could no longer be burked or denied. It
was apparent in every quarter, and in every German State.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 126
BISMARCK
The dynasties and their ministers from Vienna to Liberal
Coburg or reactionary Hesse-Cassel were responding, re-
luctantly or readily, to the movement which had Germany
in its grip. The passionate manifestation of German
public opinion in the Polish problem, and the Schleswig-
Holstein question from 1863 to 1866, the execration which
Bismarck aroused in non-Prussian Germany, have an his-
toric and tragic significance. Bismarck had divined the
force and direction of the currents now reaching their
flood-tide, and he tacitly agreed with the leaders of the
National Union that the key of the future lay in Prussia.
The failure to secure Prussia in 1848 had destroyed the
Liberal revolution. A second failure to capture Prussia in
1863 would have the same wrecking result. And as in
1848, so now, success or failure would determine not merely
the fate of Germany and of Prussia, but the German mind
and the future development of Continental Europe.
The strength of the Liberal opposition in the Prussian
Parliament lay, first, in its devotion to constitutional law
and right; secondly, in a profound belief in the efficacy
of orderly self-government through representative insti-
tutions; thirdly, in the deep Prussian and German
patriotism of the leaders and the rank and file; fourthly,
in their insistence on the complete identity of Prussian
and German interests alike in home and foreign policy;
fifthly, in their recognition that the old order in Prussia
and Germany had failed, and would continue to fail, to
satisfy the deepest and most legitimate aspirations of the
German people, and that a new departure on new prin-
ciples was essential; and lastly, in their sympathy, partly
conscious, partly unconscious, with the great currents
and forces moving elsewhere than in Germany--in the
United States, in Great Britain, in Italy, in the Austrian
Empire, in south-eastern Europe and the Balkans, in
France, and even in Russia. It was a bitter duty for the
leaders of the opposition openly to challenge the King, but
they faced it because they had consciences and a deep love
of Prussia. The ignorance in England of the true char-
acter of the German movement, the blindness of our
statesmen, our press, and our public opinion to the signi-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 127
ficance for our nation and national destinies of the struggle
fought out between September 1862 and July 1867, were
more damning than. the lamentable division in our councils
and the fiasco of our statesmanship in Europe. In these
years Great Britain was given a matchless opportunity to
assert a moral and political ascendency, not based on power,
but on the qualities and elements of national development
of which the British State is the expression and the trustee,
and she threw it away, as she very nearly in the same epoch
threw away her birthright in the issues raised by the
American Civil War.
But the Liberal opposition had two fatal defects, which-
Bismarck with a demonic intuition fully realised. The
renunciation of reform by revolution, and of the right of
resistance, and the adhesion to procedure by purely consti-
tutional methods reduced his opponents to impotence.
Constitutional weapons are helpless against force: argu-
ment is futile against an opponent who derides the im-
potence of speeches and pamphlets. Bismarck could not
be driven from office by votes of the Lower House, but
only by a revolution. He calculated that opposition
would be confined to resolutions in the Lower House,
public meetings and the press, and that he would not be
driven to a coup d'fttat by refusal to pay illegal tazes or to
serve in an illegal army. We may be quite sure that he
would not have hesitated to employ shot and shell, but a
civil war in Prussia which would have involved the whole
of Germany and of Austria was the one thing that he knew
he need not fear. With consummate irony he subse-
quently utilised the reverence for law and order that in-
spired the constitutional party as the clinching proof that
German unity could not be achieved by any other methods
than his own. Had the men who overthrew Charles 1.
and James n. limited themselves to passive protests,
recorded in the Journals of the House of Commons, the
house of Stuart would have been reigning to-day in White-
hall, and the palace of Westminster would have been
replaced by a national memorial to Strafford and Father
Petre. But Strafford had to work with a Charles 1.
Bismarck had King William and the Prussia made by the
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 128
BISMARCK
Hohenzollern sovereigns. In the second place, the oppo-
sition were not dealing with a pure reactionary, determined
to maintain, as Nicholas 1. and Schwarzenberg had been
determined in 1848 to maintain, the status quo, and to
stamp out every obstacle to its maintenance. An infuri-
ated public opinion saw in the Minister-President the
arch-enemy of unification and the champion of Junker
particularism. It was quite wrong. Bismarck was as
profoundly convinced as every Liberal that the German
problem must be solved and on Nationalist lines; and his
conviction was steeled by the knowledge that the future
of Conservatism and Prussianism would be permanently
assured by the capacity to achieve such a solution. He was
as passionately in earnest as any Liberal in Germany, and
he despised as strongly as any Liberal the rancid reaction
of the Conservatives. In men, conscious of titanic powers,
personal ambition is an immeasurable driving force, and
everything he cared for, including his own career, was at
stake in the contest to which Bismarck now deliberately
committed himself. He meant to justify himself to the
Prussia which he loved and the Germany which so heartily
hated him. He would succeed because he must. The
one thing that divided him from the Liberals was his inter-
pretation of life, but that was vital and nothing could
bridge or obliterate it. A Prussia and a Germany such as
the Liberals desired to make, and would, unless they were
decisively defeated, succeed in making, were to Bismarck
the negation of everything that made life worth living.
At this stage in Bismarck's career two conclusions are
fairly certain. He had no cut-and-dried programme when
he came into office; his difficulties were so formidable as
to be almost insuperable. The marvellous march of
events, in which each stage seems to slip into its pre-
appointed place, stupefied not unnaturally contemporary
opinion, and has perverted both the historical and moral
judgment of German and non-German alike. The quality
and characteristics of his genius are more, not less, impres-
sive if we ignore the sequel, and endeavour patiently to
reconstruct the situation from year to year, and realise
the essential difference between an opportunism of ends
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 129
and an opportunism of means. When he repeatedly called
himself an opportunist in politics it was the latter, not the
former, that Bismarck really meant.
No man had a clearer conception of the ends he had set
himself to achieve; no man more deliberately on principle
left the means to be determined by the conditions and
possibilities, the realities and ponderabilia, of each situation
as it arose. He was always playing for the next stroke;
but it was the stroke of the moment that exacted the con-
centration of all his powers. His freedom from scruple
was on the same titanic scale as the rest of his intellectual
gifts. His conscience never caused him one of the many
sleepless nights which the nervous torture of his brain so
abundantly produced. The fear that he had miscalcu-
lated an opponent's strength or misinterpreted the re-
sources at his disposal, that the King, the soldiers, or a
subordinate would fail him, or that he himself had let a
chance slip was with him night and day. To errors of
judgment he pleaded guilty with an engaging and disarm-
ing frankness; to the commission of wrong, never; and for
the simple reason that the ethical standards and criteria of
private life were ruled out of politics by his creed and code
of public conduct. In the sphere of statesmanship right
and wrong were decided for Bismarck by the needs and
interests of the State for whose destinies he was responsible,
and by no other considerations,-ethical or material. Hence
he did not do what he plainly regarded as wrong in order
that good might ensue; he did not salve a seared or re-
bellious conscience by the comforting illusion that ends
justify means. The methods he employed were intrin-
sically justifiable or not at all, and the appropriate tests
were drawn from the same sources as those properly appli-
cable to the ends themselves. In a dozen crucial instances
Bismarck was prouder of the methods than of the results
of his diplomacy. He scornfully rejected the white sheet
in which so many statesmen have appealed to the absolution
of a posterity, grateful for their achievements, but as per-
turbed as the statesmen themselves by the immorality of
their statecraft.
Between 1862 and 1866 . the Minister-President was a
B. 1
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 130
BISMARCK
new man in office for the first time. As with Moltke, his
collaborator of genius, the prestige and personal ascend-
ancy which he enjoyed in increasing measure after 1867
had yet to be won. The constitutional conflict imposed
a terrible responsibility. The opposition fought neither
with small nor with great, save only with the minister who
had intervened to arrest an otherwise certain triumph.
Outside Prussia, the political relations of Berlin with the
other German governments were poisoned by the fear that
his antecedents and utterances aroused. At Paris and
Petersburg he had created credits on which he intended
to draw, but Napoleon and Gortschakov were chary of
committing themselves to this audacious adventurer, whose
fortunes were in so perilous a position. At Vienna, the
Ball-Platz had good reason to know that the new Minister-
President was no friend to Austria. To London Bismarck
was an unknown quantity: in our Court, better informed,
he stirred a deep-seated and justifiable aversion. At
Berlin, the Conservatives, routed at the elections, wel-
comed the minister as an instrument to chastise democracy,
but his principles, particularly in foreign policy, caused
the gravest misgivings, and his haughty and brusque inde-
pendence alienated and offended the phalanx of the
Kreuzzeitting. The soldiers at headquarters soon dis-
covered that to Bismarck the army was an organ of the
State, not an end in itself; soldiers, in his view, were bad
masters but good servants; he had no intention of becom-
ing a political tool of the General Staff, and he brooked
no interference with the higher political direction. The
organisation of the army was the soldiers' business, policy
was his. Indeed, in 1862, began the friction between
the civil Minister-President and the army chiefs.
In a State, saturated with militarism, such as Prussia,
in which an unbroken tradition had created an ethos that
dominated the personal monarchy, a civil minister deter-
mined to control policy was bound to offend the military
chiefs, habituated to regard the claims of the army as
paramount. In Roon he had his one staunch friend. But
Roon was a soldier first and last. He had brought Bis-
marck into power to prevent Prussia from being over-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 131
whelmed 'in the sea of mud called parliamentary govern-
ment. ' Otto's conduct of affairs sorely tried Roon's loyal
affection and simple Conservative faith. For the scope and
increasing growth of Bismarck's genius were beyond the
limited political vision of Roon. Yet the friendship of
these two, Prussian in every drop of their blood--that in-
timate 'du' in their letters--dating from the hot ambitions
of youth, weathering and deepening through all the crises
of the heroic age from 1848 onwards to the grey maturity
that has achieved, warms and illumines the stark and
gnarled loneliness of Bismarck's life. His wife, his sister,
his children, Roon and the King--outside these lies a
formal waste filled with countless figures, who belong to
Bismarck, but Bismarck does not belong to them.
In 1862, everything turned on the King. The consti-
tutional conflict had flooded the royal hearth and the steps
to the throne. The Crown Prince and his circle, in close
touch with the intellectuals of Liberalism, such as M.
Duncker, Samwer, and Bernhardi, indicated unmistakably
their disagreement with the minister's policy and methods,
and their genuine fear that a reckless gambler was im-
perilling the future of the dynasty, pledging the monarchy
to an irreconcilable breach with the nation, and destroying
the moral'primacy of Prussia in Germany.
King William was, indeed, desperately unhappy; the
pressure of contradictory counsels was almost intolerable;
adjured on one side to authorise negotiations with the
Landtag over Bismarck's head, which would save his
honour, and satisfy the opposition, on the other to stand
firm and save the Crown and army from the men who in-
sulted him by accusations of violating the constitution.
Bismarck has vividly described the King's fear that he would
end like our Charles 1. on a scaffold, erected on the wreckage
of the hereditary monarchy, and his appeal to the King that
if it needs must be so, better to die at his post than sur-
render. He, at any rate, would not desert him, for he
preferred the fate of Strafford to a craven submission. It
is one of the many penalties of service under an autocracy
that the security of tenure, assured by a representative
legislature, is dependent on a single personality, and at the
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 132
BISMARCK
mercy of political intriguers, soldiers, courtiers, priests,
or women: doubly so, if that autocracy has broken with
a legislature that has challenged the royal authority.
Bismarck's management of his sovereign for six-and-twenty
years was perhaps his most consummate performance;
for he never stooped to sacrifice his own, nor demanded
the sacrifice of his master's, independence. His task was
to keep the King's feet firm on a path, the direction of
which he could not, and dare not, define; and never did
he so sorely and continuously need the magic mixture of
firmness and flexibility, inspired by an unerring intuition,
as in these first few years when he fought, dagger out of
sheath, for a cause and himself. The argument between
King and minister invariably left the final coercion to
William's conscience, vibrating to his deep sense of re-
sponsibility to the Divine Ruler for his royal duty to the
kingdom of Prussia.
The personal relations of these two, William and Bis-
marck, so momentous in their consequences on two
generations of civilised Europe, are an intensely and
infinitely human background to the grandeur and petti-
nesses of the drama in which they are the leading figures.
One example must suffice. When the Crown Prince at
Dantzig in 1863 was so deeply stirred as to indicate in a
public speech his disapproval of his father's ministry, the
wrath of the King as a soldier and as a father, boiled over.
His son was guilty of plain mutiny: he must be stripped
of his military rank and disgraced. The conciliator was
Bismarck, who had little reason for leniency on behalf of
one who desired his dismissal. He urged the Crown Prince
to admit a grave error of judgment; he begged the King
to be content with a severe reprimand* Sons, however
erring, had claims on a father's affection; the struggle
had embittered the feelings of every one, and an open
breach between the King and the heir to the throne would
cause a scandal so serious as irretrievably to damage the.
cause of the King and even of the monarchy. Bismarck's
courage won. Nor was the advice simply the adroit tactics
of an inhuman player with the human pawns in a great
game. Bismarck was capable of amazing meanness and
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 133
a card-sharper's trickery, but he was an intensely affectionate
father, and on critical occasions he could always remember
and rise to the dignity due from a great officer responsible
for a great kingdom.
The constitutional conflict that the opposition was con-
vinced would make the minister's grave of shame, proved
in the issue, as Bismarck utilised it, a weapon of victory.
The olive branch was put away for the happy day when
the foe had surrendered at discretion. Bismarck after
January 1863 rejected all compromise. A proposal en-
gineered in the autumn of that year by E. von Manteuffel,
the chief of the Military Cabinet, to accept the demand
for two years' service and obtain all the other essentials of
the rnilitary reorganisation, was rejected by Bismarck.
The army chiefs were ready to sacrifice the Minister-
President, he inferred, and possibly place a soldier at the
head of the government. Bismarck made it quite clear that
he would fight for the King to the end, but that between
his continuance in office with a free hand and surrender to
the opposition there was no practical alternative. His dis-
missal, however wrapped up or plastered over--and he
was right--meant hauling down the flag of the monarchy.
He kept the King steadily pinned to that. And as the poli-
tical difficulties steadily thickened and one storm-cloud
after another rolled up on a darkening horizon, William's
faith in the star of his Minister-President became clearer
and clearer. The success that Bismarck promised, not the
disaster predicted by his foes, was coming slowly but surely.
Meanwhile, Bismarck took care that the breach with
the opposition was widened, and that attacks on the pre-
rogative extended to every sphere of governmental action.
When the popular movement flagged, a press ordinance
muzzling the newspaper critics, the purging of the civil
service of all tainted with Liberal doctrines, an order to the
government officials to put pressure on the electors, a
fresh twist in the sharpness of the police administration,
inspired articles in unsuspected journals revealing indis-
creet threats and waste by military Hotspurs, the parade
of votes of confidence from manipulated town councils,
or alleged reports of reactionary remarks by Majesty itself,
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? >>34
BISMARCK
and the distribution of ribbons and decorations to avowed
Absolutists could always raise the necessary steam in the
boilers of Liberalism.
Foreign policy, finance, and mili-
tary administration provided inexhaustible material for
baiting the opposition into violent rhetoric and resolutions
passed by overwhelming majorities. Roon's temper was
of a military shortness when he dealt, as Minister of War,
with civilian amateurs. Bismarck allowed him to provoke
quarrels in the Landtag, and then with magisterial im-
partiality, poured vitriol on the parliamentary critics.
The Minister-President proved that the Junker of 1848,
with his vivid utterance and racy brutality, was a master
of the studied insult, the barbed innuendo, the cynical
contempt, the phrase that cut down to the bone and
stuck. Indignation vexed him as a thing that is raw.
And he could lose his temper, too, when nerves and endur-
ance cracked under the burden that he carried, virtually
alone. * The House of Phrases' simply provided loqua-
cious passengers in a coach, the driving of which without
their ignorant interference imposed an almost impossible
task on the coachman. Bismarck was as little able as
Frederick the Great or Richelieu to share government
with a representative assembly. He did not understand,
or wish or try to understand, the secrets and mechanism
of a system repugnant to his feelings and a permanent
hindrance to the achievement of his ends. The time
spent in futile debates and logic-chopping controversies
was sheer waste. Every ounce of his strength, every hour
of his overworked day, were needed for the real partner in
government--the King--and the multifarious business of
the State. Not on the floor of the Landtag, but in a
correct judgment of political realities, lay the secret of
statecraft, and for the judgment of his opponents, Conser-
vative or Radical, ignorant of the European theatre of
politics, and worshippers at the shrines of all the Idols of
the Tribe and of the Market-Place, he had a pitying con-
tempt. Salvation would come from action--the patient
manoeuvring for the strategic points, and then the decisive
stroke--the State as the incarnation of power and statecraft
as the expression of its disciplined force.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 135
From the very outset he gave Germany a taste of the
'Bismarck touch. ' The constitutional and chronic im-
broglio at Hesse-Cassel was settled by a curt ultimatum.
The reactionary Elector recognised that the new minister
meant what was said and surrendered. Public opinion
was bewildered at this example of Satan rebuking Sin.
For here was a ruler advised by his reactionary minister,
Hassenpflug, in conflict with a rebel legislature over his
prerogative, and compelled to admit the claims of the
rebels by a minister who was a Prussian super-Hassenpflug.
It forgot that Hesse-Cassel was not Prussia, that the struggle
was in Bismarck's eyes a nuisance, the continuance of which
strengthened the Progressives in Berlin, and that surrender
on a word from Berlin was a proof of Prussian strength.
That strength was more effectively exemplified in the
matter of the French Commercial Treaty and the renewal
of the Zollverein's Tariff Treaty with Austria. . The
French Treaty was an important step in promoting a
better understanding between Prussia and the Second
Empire. Austria, as in 1851, desired either to break up
the Zollverein and thereby damage the political and
economic supremacy in non-Austrian Germany exercised
by Prussia, or to secure the inclusion of the Austrian
dominions in the Tariff Union on terms favourable to her
peculiar economic needs. The French Commercial Treaty
had stirred serious opposition within the Tariff Union, and
at Vienna there was good hope of driving one or other,
perhaps both, of the wedges into the Prussian system.
The foundations of Bismarck's system were threatened. In
Delbruck he had the coadjutor he needed, for Delbruck
had first-class ability and a complete mastery of the econ-
omic facts, and behind Delbruck stood Bismarck confident
in Prussia's strength. The French Commercial Treaty
must go through. Austria could renew with trifling
modifications the previous agreement. But her inclusion
in the Customs Union was impossible. And if the Zoll-
verein refused the Prussian proposals, then it must break
up. Prussia would go her own way and make her own
tariff arrangements, for she was strong enough to stand
by herself. She peremptorily refused to sacrifice her
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 136
BISMARCK
economic interests to South German particularism or
Austrian selfishness. Let the middle and petty States
choose between a Prussia which desired to be their friend
and ally and an Austria that aimed at exploiting them.
They chose. Austria secured neither the rejection of
the French Treaty, nor the dissolution of the Zollverein,
nor her inclusion within the Tariff Union. She had per-
force to accept simply a renewal of the fiscal treaty with
the Zollverein, that. included the whole of non-Austrian
Germany and as a fiscal unit to stand outside the German
ring fence. There was more in this settlement than the
incompatibility of Austrian Protectionism with German
economic development, and a correct judgment that
material interests would defeat political sentiment in the
rivalry between Prussia and Austria for the economic
leadership of the middle and petty States. Bismarck had
struck for and obtained three results. First, the inde-
pendence of Prussia; secondly, the right to settle with
France on his own terms; thirdly, clear proof that Austria
was not, properly speaking, a true German State. The
essential preliminary to a settlement of the political uni-
fication of Germany on the lines of the Small and not the
Great Germany conception was the establishment of an
economic unification which drew an unmistakable frontier
line between the Austrian Empire and the rest of the
Federal organisation. The Great Germany party, as
Bismarck fully realised, was by no means dead, either at
Berlin or outside it. The first step to the final defeat of
the Great Germans was taken with the successful con-
clusion of the complicated and highly technical nego-
tiations in economics, and Bismarck took care to indicate
a helpful moral at Paris. Prussia had deliberately pre-
ferred an arrangement with France to an arrangement
with Austria. The identity of interest, he commented,
between France and Prussia was not necessarily confined
to tariff duties and the most-favoured nation clause.
At the snarling criticism on Prussia's anti-German and
unbrotherly Prussian selfishness towards Austria Bismarck
shrugged his shoulders. It was the privilege of the de-
feated to snarl. The spring of 1863 enabled the Foreign
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 137
Office in the Wilhelmstrasse to provide Germany and
Europe with another example of Prussian independence
and egoism that stirred a tempest of denunciation.
The Polish rebellion of January, 1863, precipitated a
European crisis. The sympathy of Western and Central
Europe, alike in the governments and their people, with
the Polish effort to secure national unity and adminis-
trative autonomy--freedom as a race from Russian tyranny
--is very remarkable and profoundly significant of the grip
of Liberal and Nationalist ideals on the temper of the age.
In London, Paris, Turin, and Vienna, the Polish cause was
acclaimed with enthusiasm. The Poles were fighting for
the inalienable right of a nation to work out its salvation
and establish its civilisation as a self-governing unit in the
fraternity of European National-States. The disin-
tegrated Germany of the Federal Bund and denationalised
Austria were no whit behind the new Italy, France, and
Great Britain in their Polish sympathies. The contrast,
indeed, is striking between the manifestation in 1863 of
public opinion in Prussia and non-Prussian Germany, in
support of the Poles, and in sincere reprobation of the
terrible severity with which the defeated rising was crushed
by the Russian autocracy, and the cold-blooded equan-
imity with which Germany and the Magyarised Dual
Empire of 1876 and 1896 condoned, when they did not
positively approve, the more terrible treatment of the
Balkan Slavs and the Armenians by the Ottoman auto-
cracy. Only by such a contrast can we realise the
strength of the Liberal movement and of the moral forces
behind it, with which Bismarck wrestled in 1863, and
register in 1896 the atrophy of a nation's conscience and the
withering of its ideals, when for two generations it has
been drugged by the doctrine that the great questions of
the day can be decided only by blood and iron.
Bismarck at once recognised the gravity of the Polish
issue and the opportunity that the Polish question pro-
vided. His attitude to the problem of Poland, and Prus-
sian Poland in particular, never altered since 1848, when
he first denounced the danger of Polonism to the Prussian
State, through the Kulturkampf to the anti-Polish legis-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 138
BISMARCK
lation of his chancellorship that he left as a wasting mort-
gage to his successors. He told General Fleuiy in De-
cember, 1863, that the question was one of life and death
to Prussia: 'I would rather die,' he said, 'than permit
our position in Posen to be discussed at a European Con-
gress: I would rather cede our Rhinelands. ' He had no' .
sympathy with the Nationalist principle, outside Prussia
and Germany; it was simply a force in a political situation,
to be exploited as such; and if a force that threatened
Prussian hegemony one to be extirpated. The eighteenth-
century partitions of Poland were the well-merited fate
of a State too anarchic to resist the strength of its neigh-
bours. The dream of a reconstructed Poland on Liberal
lines in 1863 was simply a childish chimera. The inde-
pendence of Russian Poland under the suzerainty of the
Tsar would lead to a demand for the freedom of Prussian
Poland, a result absolutely fatal to the Prussian position
in the East and on the Baltic. The demand for autonomy
and political liberties sprang from the same delusions about
government that tainted the progressive and democratic
parties in Germany. Concessions to Polish demands
within Prussia were intrinsically inadmissible, and would
embarrass the good friend, Russia. The Polish rebellion
was a domestic affair of the Tsar's government, interference
with which was an impertinence that the Tsar would
justly resent.
Prussia's interest must be the sole criterion of Prussia's
policy. A rebellion on her borders was a serious danger;
there were disquieting signs that the conflagration would
spread. The sooner it was stamped out the better for
every one concerned. Bismarck, in short, only cared to
extract the maximum of political advantage from an affair
which he examined with icy impartiality. The blood of
Polish martyrs, for whose sufferings he did not care a
groschen, might become the seed of Prussian domination
in Central Europe. Through General von Alvensleben
he promptly (March 8) concluded a convention with
Russia, by which the two countries undertook to establish
a military cordon on their respective frontiers in order to
stop their respective Polish subjects from aiding the rebel-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 139
lion, and to prevent the escape of rebels from lawful au-
thority. The action of the parliamentary opposition in
the Landtag only confirmed Bismarck's determination.
Interpellations, denunciations of the convention, reso-
lutions by sweeping majorities, he brushed aside as irre-
levant attempts to interfere wkh the royal right to con-
clude treaties by prerogative, and to make the foreign policy
of Prussia conform to the folly of ignorant idealists or crazy
demagogues. He told the Lower House roundly that the
making of war and treaties was the right of the Crown,
and roused its fury by the emphatic assertion that he would
make war or abstain from it without their approbation or
consent, and that his duty to his sovereign and Prussia
would never be influenced one hair's-breadth by their
votes or their attacks.
When the governments of Great Britain, France, and
Austria, under the pressure of public opinion agreed to
gresent a joint note formulating six demands 1 to the
. ussian government, and invited the concurrence of
Prussia in this diplomatic pressure, Bismarck firmly refused,
and for four chief reasons. A close understanding with
Russia was, and had long been, the sine qua non of his sys-
tem. Refusal to sign the note was the most practical
proof he could give of friendship to Russia. The aliena-
tion of Russia, still suffering from the humiliation of 1856,
and threatened with the boycott of Europe and the moral
condemnation of the civilised conscience, was for Prussia
in 1863 midsummer madness. Secondly, he disapproved of
the six demands. If Russia conceded them, the National
Union and the Radicals throughout Germany would
utilise the concession to harass the government of Prussia
already plagued with the charlatanry of Progress. Thirdly,
rejection by the Russian government of the joint note
must be followed either by more exacting pressure, and if
necessary, war, or by a painful rebuff at Petersburg.
Bismarck did not believe in a diplomacy that invited hu-
miliation, and the idea of war on behalf of the Polish rebels
1 The six points were briefly: (i) an amnesty; (2) a Polish parliament j
(3) a Polish National Executive; (4) Polish language in official communica-
tions j (5) religious freedom; (6) legal recruiting.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 140
BISMARCK
was idiotic. Fourthly, he foresaw the failure of this sin-
gular union of Great Britain, France, and Austria, and he
desired it to fail. The ill-assorted partners would quarrel,
and from their quarrel Prussia would derive advantages
that could be left for future exploitation. The separation
of Austria and of France from Russia was worth all the
joint notes and all the Polish lives in the world. As early
as I860 Bismarck had expressed the fear that France would
ally with Russia, isolate Prussia, or drive her into a hateful
dependence on Austria. He had laid it down that in a
Franco-Russian alliance Prussia must be the third member.
Great Britain could be soothed or neglected as circum-
stances indicated. The British army did not exist; and
the British fleet was useless in this business. Fortune had
now given Prussia an unexpected favour. France by her
stupid sentimentalism would alienate Russia. Prussia
could first secure Russian friendship, break up the Franco-
British entente, then work for a French benevolent neu-
trality, and Austria would be left to face an irreconcilable
Italy and an independent Prussia secure on both her
flanks. Here, indeed, was a game for the Titans.
Bismarck might well gaze into the baffling face of the
Time-spirit. The Schleswig-Holstein question was threat-
ening an ugly crisis. It is significant of the minister's
exploratory and prescient vigilance that while Nation-
alists and democrats were crying aloud for Germany and
Prussia to act, he gave no sign that he was earnestly
sounding all the depths and shallows in a rock-sown sea.
He contented himself with a pointed reminder to the
Danish government that Prussia was a signatory to the
Convention of London of 1852, and a sharp rap on the
heads of the ' noisy' journalists and politicians who desired
Prussia to go to war with all her neighbours because of
alleged grievances. Toujours en vedette! The motto of
Frederick, the Master, was more than ever the watchword.
Neither menaces nor caresses from London, Paris, and
Vienna induced Bismarck to modify his refusal to join
in the combined intervention at Petersburg and, as he
foresaw, the joint note was a complete failure. Assured
of Prussia's support, the Russian government in effect bade
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 141
the signatory Powers mind their own business, and pro-
ceeded to extinguish the rebellion in blood and flame.
Napoleon was intensely chagrined at the result, the blame
for which he threw chiefly on Great Britain. Our Foreign
Office had used the strong language that should precede
strong action, but it now covered its retreat to the wired
trenches of a good conscience in the smoke-clouds of a
parliamentary Blue-Book. At the Tuileries the need of a
real diplomatic success somewhere was being seriously
felt. Paris was seething with sentiment and ill-defined
ambition. Napoleon's disillusioned eyes turned to Berlin.
In the Wilhelmstrasse, not in the Ball-Platz, lay the keys
that could unlock the doors to the Rhine; and Napoleon
knew that the hunger of France, gnawing at the vitals of
the Second Empire, could be appeased, and only appeased,
by the Rhenish provinces.
The true author of the Polish fiasco was Bismarck. Had
he made Prussia a signatory to the Note of the Six De-
mands, the Russia of 1863, isolated and in grave difficulties,
would have been obliged to yield to the Concert of Europe.
Had Prussia been a country with responsible self-govern-
ment Bismarck must either have met the overwhelming
demand of the Landtag or been driven from office. With
Prussian support it was well within the compass of practical
diplomacy, without firing a shot, to have extorted a charter
of liberties for Russian Poland and prevented the cruelties
that added one more chapter to the blood-stained record.
The moral and political effect of such concerted action
would have been of incalculable advantage. But a Can-
ning in London or a Cavour at Berlin were needed.
Instead, there was Bismarck on the one side, and on the
other Napoleon and the clever mediocrities of the Quai
d'Orsay, the organised hypocrisy of Vienna and a Palmer-
ston, no longer the man of 1839, and permanently suspect
to a hostile court. Public opinion in Prussia and Germany
was impotent against Bismarck. While it raged, he sided
with Russia, thereby revealing to the Triple Entente that
without war they were helpless, and that the strategic
position of Prussia and the strength of the Prussian army
made the suggestion of war without Prussia ridiculous and
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 142
BISMARCK
impossible. It was in Bismarck's power, and he knew it, to
meet the storm in the last resort by an appeal to Prussia
and Germany to forget the exaggerated woes of Poland
and concentrate on the Ahab of Europe--Napoleon.
Bismarck, it must be remembered, in these years was in
a dangerous temper: he was fighting for the life, honour,
and greatness of Prussia, as he interpreted them, and he
had thrown his all into the struggle. Even more truly
than Cavour from 1852 onwards he was gambling for
tremendous stakes. Not once but fifty times in the next
few year she indicated his determination, if the gods failed
him, to move Acheron. What could not be done by the
Conservative forces, could be done by calling in the Revo-
lution. His heart within was white-hot with the same
emotion that mastered the German of his day, and no
man could let loose more skilfully the whirlwinds of
national passion, or rejoice more triumphantly in riding
the storm.
But in 1863, as always, he had himself in hand. The
hour assuredly had not come: the situation must be de-
veloped much further and with a remorseless caution.
He could not afford to make a single mistake. The Prus-
sian army was not ready. Like his diplomacy it needed
time. And it was of the essence of his system, as of
Frederick the Great's, that so far as preparation and cal-
culation could ensure it, victory must be a certainty. The
Statecraft that is Force betrays the State that is Power if
it ignores or misunderstands the character and conditions
under which Force works in the world of human things.
Bismarck had secured the friendship of Russia. His
confidence that Prussia could rely on her strength and in-
dependence had been justified. The initiative in policy,
lost in the period from 1815 to 1862, was being quietly
recovered. While the members of the temporary Triple
Entente were abusing Prussia, and still more heartily, each
other, Bismarck was drawing up an edifying balance-sheet.
He could remind his royal master of two sound lessons--
the indispensability of the Crown's unfettered control of
policy, the futility of 'moral penetration,' as a solution
of European problems.
whose office incarnated the history and character of a
specific type of State,. but to be the servant of a Parliament,
accountable to, and holding his place at the pleasure of,
a fortuitous majority of professors, lawyers, journalists,
tradesmen and tinkers, was intolerable to his aristocratic
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT
pride and independence. He would take orders from no
one save the King and God, and he served God as he served
his royal master, on terms of devotion denned and inter-
preted by himself.
On political grounds he both feared and despised his
opponents in Parliament. He told them roundly that
they were ignorant, prejudiced, unpractical--dreamers
without political sense--helpless children in affairs of
State. Had he been perfectly honest he would have added
that diplomacy, as he conceived it, could not be conducted
with the blinds up, and that no representative body of
responsible men of high character would sanction either
his principles or his methods, and that for the realisation
of his aims absolute control of all the resources of the
State and an unfettered discretion were indispensable,
and that it was easier to manipulate and hoodwink a king
than a nation and a Parliament. The reorganisation of
the army, the steady preparation for war by a militarised
bureaucracy, the budget question, the Polish problem,
the conquest of Schleswig-Holstein, the manipulation of
the European situation, the understandings with Russia
and Napoleon m. , the Italian Treaty, the breach with
Austria, the campaign and peace of 1866, and the formation
of the North German Confederation--the Bismarckian
solution of the great questions of the day--could never
have been carried out, as Bismarck carried them out, by a
minister under a system of constitutional monarchy and
responsible parliamentary government. The conscience
of Prussia and Germany in 1862 made, in Bismarck's eyes,
for political cowardice. Nor were the Germans who
created the National Union under Bennigsen as yet pre-
pared to sacrifice everything to the State as Power, and to
adopt as their sole criterion of policy the State-egoism
of an unreformed and militarised Prussia.
In 1862 Germany was ripe for great changes. Under
the pressure of the internal development, assisted by the
course of events in Europe, most notably in Italy, the
demand for the extension of political rights on Nationalist
and Liberal lines could no longer be burked or denied. It
was apparent in every quarter, and in every German State.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 126
BISMARCK
The dynasties and their ministers from Vienna to Liberal
Coburg or reactionary Hesse-Cassel were responding, re-
luctantly or readily, to the movement which had Germany
in its grip. The passionate manifestation of German
public opinion in the Polish problem, and the Schleswig-
Holstein question from 1863 to 1866, the execration which
Bismarck aroused in non-Prussian Germany, have an his-
toric and tragic significance. Bismarck had divined the
force and direction of the currents now reaching their
flood-tide, and he tacitly agreed with the leaders of the
National Union that the key of the future lay in Prussia.
The failure to secure Prussia in 1848 had destroyed the
Liberal revolution. A second failure to capture Prussia in
1863 would have the same wrecking result. And as in
1848, so now, success or failure would determine not merely
the fate of Germany and of Prussia, but the German mind
and the future development of Continental Europe.
The strength of the Liberal opposition in the Prussian
Parliament lay, first, in its devotion to constitutional law
and right; secondly, in a profound belief in the efficacy
of orderly self-government through representative insti-
tutions; thirdly, in the deep Prussian and German
patriotism of the leaders and the rank and file; fourthly,
in their insistence on the complete identity of Prussian
and German interests alike in home and foreign policy;
fifthly, in their recognition that the old order in Prussia
and Germany had failed, and would continue to fail, to
satisfy the deepest and most legitimate aspirations of the
German people, and that a new departure on new prin-
ciples was essential; and lastly, in their sympathy, partly
conscious, partly unconscious, with the great currents
and forces moving elsewhere than in Germany--in the
United States, in Great Britain, in Italy, in the Austrian
Empire, in south-eastern Europe and the Balkans, in
France, and even in Russia. It was a bitter duty for the
leaders of the opposition openly to challenge the King, but
they faced it because they had consciences and a deep love
of Prussia. The ignorance in England of the true char-
acter of the German movement, the blindness of our
statesmen, our press, and our public opinion to the signi-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 127
ficance for our nation and national destinies of the struggle
fought out between September 1862 and July 1867, were
more damning than. the lamentable division in our councils
and the fiasco of our statesmanship in Europe. In these
years Great Britain was given a matchless opportunity to
assert a moral and political ascendency, not based on power,
but on the qualities and elements of national development
of which the British State is the expression and the trustee,
and she threw it away, as she very nearly in the same epoch
threw away her birthright in the issues raised by the
American Civil War.
But the Liberal opposition had two fatal defects, which-
Bismarck with a demonic intuition fully realised. The
renunciation of reform by revolution, and of the right of
resistance, and the adhesion to procedure by purely consti-
tutional methods reduced his opponents to impotence.
Constitutional weapons are helpless against force: argu-
ment is futile against an opponent who derides the im-
potence of speeches and pamphlets. Bismarck could not
be driven from office by votes of the Lower House, but
only by a revolution. He calculated that opposition
would be confined to resolutions in the Lower House,
public meetings and the press, and that he would not be
driven to a coup d'fttat by refusal to pay illegal tazes or to
serve in an illegal army. We may be quite sure that he
would not have hesitated to employ shot and shell, but a
civil war in Prussia which would have involved the whole
of Germany and of Austria was the one thing that he knew
he need not fear. With consummate irony he subse-
quently utilised the reverence for law and order that in-
spired the constitutional party as the clinching proof that
German unity could not be achieved by any other methods
than his own. Had the men who overthrew Charles 1.
and James n. limited themselves to passive protests,
recorded in the Journals of the House of Commons, the
house of Stuart would have been reigning to-day in White-
hall, and the palace of Westminster would have been
replaced by a national memorial to Strafford and Father
Petre. But Strafford had to work with a Charles 1.
Bismarck had King William and the Prussia made by the
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 128
BISMARCK
Hohenzollern sovereigns. In the second place, the oppo-
sition were not dealing with a pure reactionary, determined
to maintain, as Nicholas 1. and Schwarzenberg had been
determined in 1848 to maintain, the status quo, and to
stamp out every obstacle to its maintenance. An infuri-
ated public opinion saw in the Minister-President the
arch-enemy of unification and the champion of Junker
particularism. It was quite wrong. Bismarck was as
profoundly convinced as every Liberal that the German
problem must be solved and on Nationalist lines; and his
conviction was steeled by the knowledge that the future
of Conservatism and Prussianism would be permanently
assured by the capacity to achieve such a solution. He was
as passionately in earnest as any Liberal in Germany, and
he despised as strongly as any Liberal the rancid reaction
of the Conservatives. In men, conscious of titanic powers,
personal ambition is an immeasurable driving force, and
everything he cared for, including his own career, was at
stake in the contest to which Bismarck now deliberately
committed himself. He meant to justify himself to the
Prussia which he loved and the Germany which so heartily
hated him. He would succeed because he must. The
one thing that divided him from the Liberals was his inter-
pretation of life, but that was vital and nothing could
bridge or obliterate it. A Prussia and a Germany such as
the Liberals desired to make, and would, unless they were
decisively defeated, succeed in making, were to Bismarck
the negation of everything that made life worth living.
At this stage in Bismarck's career two conclusions are
fairly certain. He had no cut-and-dried programme when
he came into office; his difficulties were so formidable as
to be almost insuperable. The marvellous march of
events, in which each stage seems to slip into its pre-
appointed place, stupefied not unnaturally contemporary
opinion, and has perverted both the historical and moral
judgment of German and non-German alike. The quality
and characteristics of his genius are more, not less, impres-
sive if we ignore the sequel, and endeavour patiently to
reconstruct the situation from year to year, and realise
the essential difference between an opportunism of ends
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 129
and an opportunism of means. When he repeatedly called
himself an opportunist in politics it was the latter, not the
former, that Bismarck really meant.
No man had a clearer conception of the ends he had set
himself to achieve; no man more deliberately on principle
left the means to be determined by the conditions and
possibilities, the realities and ponderabilia, of each situation
as it arose. He was always playing for the next stroke;
but it was the stroke of the moment that exacted the con-
centration of all his powers. His freedom from scruple
was on the same titanic scale as the rest of his intellectual
gifts. His conscience never caused him one of the many
sleepless nights which the nervous torture of his brain so
abundantly produced. The fear that he had miscalcu-
lated an opponent's strength or misinterpreted the re-
sources at his disposal, that the King, the soldiers, or a
subordinate would fail him, or that he himself had let a
chance slip was with him night and day. To errors of
judgment he pleaded guilty with an engaging and disarm-
ing frankness; to the commission of wrong, never; and for
the simple reason that the ethical standards and criteria of
private life were ruled out of politics by his creed and code
of public conduct. In the sphere of statesmanship right
and wrong were decided for Bismarck by the needs and
interests of the State for whose destinies he was responsible,
and by no other considerations,-ethical or material. Hence
he did not do what he plainly regarded as wrong in order
that good might ensue; he did not salve a seared or re-
bellious conscience by the comforting illusion that ends
justify means. The methods he employed were intrin-
sically justifiable or not at all, and the appropriate tests
were drawn from the same sources as those properly appli-
cable to the ends themselves. In a dozen crucial instances
Bismarck was prouder of the methods than of the results
of his diplomacy. He scornfully rejected the white sheet
in which so many statesmen have appealed to the absolution
of a posterity, grateful for their achievements, but as per-
turbed as the statesmen themselves by the immorality of
their statecraft.
Between 1862 and 1866 . the Minister-President was a
B. 1
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 130
BISMARCK
new man in office for the first time. As with Moltke, his
collaborator of genius, the prestige and personal ascend-
ancy which he enjoyed in increasing measure after 1867
had yet to be won. The constitutional conflict imposed
a terrible responsibility. The opposition fought neither
with small nor with great, save only with the minister who
had intervened to arrest an otherwise certain triumph.
Outside Prussia, the political relations of Berlin with the
other German governments were poisoned by the fear that
his antecedents and utterances aroused. At Paris and
Petersburg he had created credits on which he intended
to draw, but Napoleon and Gortschakov were chary of
committing themselves to this audacious adventurer, whose
fortunes were in so perilous a position. At Vienna, the
Ball-Platz had good reason to know that the new Minister-
President was no friend to Austria. To London Bismarck
was an unknown quantity: in our Court, better informed,
he stirred a deep-seated and justifiable aversion. At
Berlin, the Conservatives, routed at the elections, wel-
comed the minister as an instrument to chastise democracy,
but his principles, particularly in foreign policy, caused
the gravest misgivings, and his haughty and brusque inde-
pendence alienated and offended the phalanx of the
Kreuzzeitting. The soldiers at headquarters soon dis-
covered that to Bismarck the army was an organ of the
State, not an end in itself; soldiers, in his view, were bad
masters but good servants; he had no intention of becom-
ing a political tool of the General Staff, and he brooked
no interference with the higher political direction. The
organisation of the army was the soldiers' business, policy
was his. Indeed, in 1862, began the friction between
the civil Minister-President and the army chiefs.
In a State, saturated with militarism, such as Prussia,
in which an unbroken tradition had created an ethos that
dominated the personal monarchy, a civil minister deter-
mined to control policy was bound to offend the military
chiefs, habituated to regard the claims of the army as
paramount. In Roon he had his one staunch friend. But
Roon was a soldier first and last. He had brought Bis-
marck into power to prevent Prussia from being over-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 131
whelmed 'in the sea of mud called parliamentary govern-
ment. ' Otto's conduct of affairs sorely tried Roon's loyal
affection and simple Conservative faith. For the scope and
increasing growth of Bismarck's genius were beyond the
limited political vision of Roon. Yet the friendship of
these two, Prussian in every drop of their blood--that in-
timate 'du' in their letters--dating from the hot ambitions
of youth, weathering and deepening through all the crises
of the heroic age from 1848 onwards to the grey maturity
that has achieved, warms and illumines the stark and
gnarled loneliness of Bismarck's life. His wife, his sister,
his children, Roon and the King--outside these lies a
formal waste filled with countless figures, who belong to
Bismarck, but Bismarck does not belong to them.
In 1862, everything turned on the King. The consti-
tutional conflict had flooded the royal hearth and the steps
to the throne. The Crown Prince and his circle, in close
touch with the intellectuals of Liberalism, such as M.
Duncker, Samwer, and Bernhardi, indicated unmistakably
their disagreement with the minister's policy and methods,
and their genuine fear that a reckless gambler was im-
perilling the future of the dynasty, pledging the monarchy
to an irreconcilable breach with the nation, and destroying
the moral'primacy of Prussia in Germany.
King William was, indeed, desperately unhappy; the
pressure of contradictory counsels was almost intolerable;
adjured on one side to authorise negotiations with the
Landtag over Bismarck's head, which would save his
honour, and satisfy the opposition, on the other to stand
firm and save the Crown and army from the men who in-
sulted him by accusations of violating the constitution.
Bismarck has vividly described the King's fear that he would
end like our Charles 1. on a scaffold, erected on the wreckage
of the hereditary monarchy, and his appeal to the King that
if it needs must be so, better to die at his post than sur-
render. He, at any rate, would not desert him, for he
preferred the fate of Strafford to a craven submission. It
is one of the many penalties of service under an autocracy
that the security of tenure, assured by a representative
legislature, is dependent on a single personality, and at the
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 132
BISMARCK
mercy of political intriguers, soldiers, courtiers, priests,
or women: doubly so, if that autocracy has broken with
a legislature that has challenged the royal authority.
Bismarck's management of his sovereign for six-and-twenty
years was perhaps his most consummate performance;
for he never stooped to sacrifice his own, nor demanded
the sacrifice of his master's, independence. His task was
to keep the King's feet firm on a path, the direction of
which he could not, and dare not, define; and never did
he so sorely and continuously need the magic mixture of
firmness and flexibility, inspired by an unerring intuition,
as in these first few years when he fought, dagger out of
sheath, for a cause and himself. The argument between
King and minister invariably left the final coercion to
William's conscience, vibrating to his deep sense of re-
sponsibility to the Divine Ruler for his royal duty to the
kingdom of Prussia.
The personal relations of these two, William and Bis-
marck, so momentous in their consequences on two
generations of civilised Europe, are an intensely and
infinitely human background to the grandeur and petti-
nesses of the drama in which they are the leading figures.
One example must suffice. When the Crown Prince at
Dantzig in 1863 was so deeply stirred as to indicate in a
public speech his disapproval of his father's ministry, the
wrath of the King as a soldier and as a father, boiled over.
His son was guilty of plain mutiny: he must be stripped
of his military rank and disgraced. The conciliator was
Bismarck, who had little reason for leniency on behalf of
one who desired his dismissal. He urged the Crown Prince
to admit a grave error of judgment; he begged the King
to be content with a severe reprimand* Sons, however
erring, had claims on a father's affection; the struggle
had embittered the feelings of every one, and an open
breach between the King and the heir to the throne would
cause a scandal so serious as irretrievably to damage the.
cause of the King and even of the monarchy. Bismarck's
courage won. Nor was the advice simply the adroit tactics
of an inhuman player with the human pawns in a great
game. Bismarck was capable of amazing meanness and
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 133
a card-sharper's trickery, but he was an intensely affectionate
father, and on critical occasions he could always remember
and rise to the dignity due from a great officer responsible
for a great kingdom.
The constitutional conflict that the opposition was con-
vinced would make the minister's grave of shame, proved
in the issue, as Bismarck utilised it, a weapon of victory.
The olive branch was put away for the happy day when
the foe had surrendered at discretion. Bismarck after
January 1863 rejected all compromise. A proposal en-
gineered in the autumn of that year by E. von Manteuffel,
the chief of the Military Cabinet, to accept the demand
for two years' service and obtain all the other essentials of
the rnilitary reorganisation, was rejected by Bismarck.
The army chiefs were ready to sacrifice the Minister-
President, he inferred, and possibly place a soldier at the
head of the government. Bismarck made it quite clear that
he would fight for the King to the end, but that between
his continuance in office with a free hand and surrender to
the opposition there was no practical alternative. His dis-
missal, however wrapped up or plastered over--and he
was right--meant hauling down the flag of the monarchy.
He kept the King steadily pinned to that. And as the poli-
tical difficulties steadily thickened and one storm-cloud
after another rolled up on a darkening horizon, William's
faith in the star of his Minister-President became clearer
and clearer. The success that Bismarck promised, not the
disaster predicted by his foes, was coming slowly but surely.
Meanwhile, Bismarck took care that the breach with
the opposition was widened, and that attacks on the pre-
rogative extended to every sphere of governmental action.
When the popular movement flagged, a press ordinance
muzzling the newspaper critics, the purging of the civil
service of all tainted with Liberal doctrines, an order to the
government officials to put pressure on the electors, a
fresh twist in the sharpness of the police administration,
inspired articles in unsuspected journals revealing indis-
creet threats and waste by military Hotspurs, the parade
of votes of confidence from manipulated town councils,
or alleged reports of reactionary remarks by Majesty itself,
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? >>34
BISMARCK
and the distribution of ribbons and decorations to avowed
Absolutists could always raise the necessary steam in the
boilers of Liberalism.
Foreign policy, finance, and mili-
tary administration provided inexhaustible material for
baiting the opposition into violent rhetoric and resolutions
passed by overwhelming majorities. Roon's temper was
of a military shortness when he dealt, as Minister of War,
with civilian amateurs. Bismarck allowed him to provoke
quarrels in the Landtag, and then with magisterial im-
partiality, poured vitriol on the parliamentary critics.
The Minister-President proved that the Junker of 1848,
with his vivid utterance and racy brutality, was a master
of the studied insult, the barbed innuendo, the cynical
contempt, the phrase that cut down to the bone and
stuck. Indignation vexed him as a thing that is raw.
And he could lose his temper, too, when nerves and endur-
ance cracked under the burden that he carried, virtually
alone. * The House of Phrases' simply provided loqua-
cious passengers in a coach, the driving of which without
their ignorant interference imposed an almost impossible
task on the coachman. Bismarck was as little able as
Frederick the Great or Richelieu to share government
with a representative assembly. He did not understand,
or wish or try to understand, the secrets and mechanism
of a system repugnant to his feelings and a permanent
hindrance to the achievement of his ends. The time
spent in futile debates and logic-chopping controversies
was sheer waste. Every ounce of his strength, every hour
of his overworked day, were needed for the real partner in
government--the King--and the multifarious business of
the State. Not on the floor of the Landtag, but in a
correct judgment of political realities, lay the secret of
statecraft, and for the judgment of his opponents, Conser-
vative or Radical, ignorant of the European theatre of
politics, and worshippers at the shrines of all the Idols of
the Tribe and of the Market-Place, he had a pitying con-
tempt. Salvation would come from action--the patient
manoeuvring for the strategic points, and then the decisive
stroke--the State as the incarnation of power and statecraft
as the expression of its disciplined force.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 135
From the very outset he gave Germany a taste of the
'Bismarck touch. ' The constitutional and chronic im-
broglio at Hesse-Cassel was settled by a curt ultimatum.
The reactionary Elector recognised that the new minister
meant what was said and surrendered. Public opinion
was bewildered at this example of Satan rebuking Sin.
For here was a ruler advised by his reactionary minister,
Hassenpflug, in conflict with a rebel legislature over his
prerogative, and compelled to admit the claims of the
rebels by a minister who was a Prussian super-Hassenpflug.
It forgot that Hesse-Cassel was not Prussia, that the struggle
was in Bismarck's eyes a nuisance, the continuance of which
strengthened the Progressives in Berlin, and that surrender
on a word from Berlin was a proof of Prussian strength.
That strength was more effectively exemplified in the
matter of the French Commercial Treaty and the renewal
of the Zollverein's Tariff Treaty with Austria. . The
French Treaty was an important step in promoting a
better understanding between Prussia and the Second
Empire. Austria, as in 1851, desired either to break up
the Zollverein and thereby damage the political and
economic supremacy in non-Austrian Germany exercised
by Prussia, or to secure the inclusion of the Austrian
dominions in the Tariff Union on terms favourable to her
peculiar economic needs. The French Commercial Treaty
had stirred serious opposition within the Tariff Union, and
at Vienna there was good hope of driving one or other,
perhaps both, of the wedges into the Prussian system.
The foundations of Bismarck's system were threatened. In
Delbruck he had the coadjutor he needed, for Delbruck
had first-class ability and a complete mastery of the econ-
omic facts, and behind Delbruck stood Bismarck confident
in Prussia's strength. The French Commercial Treaty
must go through. Austria could renew with trifling
modifications the previous agreement. But her inclusion
in the Customs Union was impossible. And if the Zoll-
verein refused the Prussian proposals, then it must break
up. Prussia would go her own way and make her own
tariff arrangements, for she was strong enough to stand
by herself. She peremptorily refused to sacrifice her
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 136
BISMARCK
economic interests to South German particularism or
Austrian selfishness. Let the middle and petty States
choose between a Prussia which desired to be their friend
and ally and an Austria that aimed at exploiting them.
They chose. Austria secured neither the rejection of
the French Treaty, nor the dissolution of the Zollverein,
nor her inclusion within the Tariff Union. She had per-
force to accept simply a renewal of the fiscal treaty with
the Zollverein, that. included the whole of non-Austrian
Germany and as a fiscal unit to stand outside the German
ring fence. There was more in this settlement than the
incompatibility of Austrian Protectionism with German
economic development, and a correct judgment that
material interests would defeat political sentiment in the
rivalry between Prussia and Austria for the economic
leadership of the middle and petty States. Bismarck had
struck for and obtained three results. First, the inde-
pendence of Prussia; secondly, the right to settle with
France on his own terms; thirdly, clear proof that Austria
was not, properly speaking, a true German State. The
essential preliminary to a settlement of the political uni-
fication of Germany on the lines of the Small and not the
Great Germany conception was the establishment of an
economic unification which drew an unmistakable frontier
line between the Austrian Empire and the rest of the
Federal organisation. The Great Germany party, as
Bismarck fully realised, was by no means dead, either at
Berlin or outside it. The first step to the final defeat of
the Great Germans was taken with the successful con-
clusion of the complicated and highly technical nego-
tiations in economics, and Bismarck took care to indicate
a helpful moral at Paris. Prussia had deliberately pre-
ferred an arrangement with France to an arrangement
with Austria. The identity of interest, he commented,
between France and Prussia was not necessarily confined
to tariff duties and the most-favoured nation clause.
At the snarling criticism on Prussia's anti-German and
unbrotherly Prussian selfishness towards Austria Bismarck
shrugged his shoulders. It was the privilege of the de-
feated to snarl. The spring of 1863 enabled the Foreign
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 137
Office in the Wilhelmstrasse to provide Germany and
Europe with another example of Prussian independence
and egoism that stirred a tempest of denunciation.
The Polish rebellion of January, 1863, precipitated a
European crisis. The sympathy of Western and Central
Europe, alike in the governments and their people, with
the Polish effort to secure national unity and adminis-
trative autonomy--freedom as a race from Russian tyranny
--is very remarkable and profoundly significant of the grip
of Liberal and Nationalist ideals on the temper of the age.
In London, Paris, Turin, and Vienna, the Polish cause was
acclaimed with enthusiasm. The Poles were fighting for
the inalienable right of a nation to work out its salvation
and establish its civilisation as a self-governing unit in the
fraternity of European National-States. The disin-
tegrated Germany of the Federal Bund and denationalised
Austria were no whit behind the new Italy, France, and
Great Britain in their Polish sympathies. The contrast,
indeed, is striking between the manifestation in 1863 of
public opinion in Prussia and non-Prussian Germany, in
support of the Poles, and in sincere reprobation of the
terrible severity with which the defeated rising was crushed
by the Russian autocracy, and the cold-blooded equan-
imity with which Germany and the Magyarised Dual
Empire of 1876 and 1896 condoned, when they did not
positively approve, the more terrible treatment of the
Balkan Slavs and the Armenians by the Ottoman auto-
cracy. Only by such a contrast can we realise the
strength of the Liberal movement and of the moral forces
behind it, with which Bismarck wrestled in 1863, and
register in 1896 the atrophy of a nation's conscience and the
withering of its ideals, when for two generations it has
been drugged by the doctrine that the great questions of
the day can be decided only by blood and iron.
Bismarck at once recognised the gravity of the Polish
issue and the opportunity that the Polish question pro-
vided. His attitude to the problem of Poland, and Prus-
sian Poland in particular, never altered since 1848, when
he first denounced the danger of Polonism to the Prussian
State, through the Kulturkampf to the anti-Polish legis-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 138
BISMARCK
lation of his chancellorship that he left as a wasting mort-
gage to his successors. He told General Fleuiy in De-
cember, 1863, that the question was one of life and death
to Prussia: 'I would rather die,' he said, 'than permit
our position in Posen to be discussed at a European Con-
gress: I would rather cede our Rhinelands. ' He had no' .
sympathy with the Nationalist principle, outside Prussia
and Germany; it was simply a force in a political situation,
to be exploited as such; and if a force that threatened
Prussian hegemony one to be extirpated. The eighteenth-
century partitions of Poland were the well-merited fate
of a State too anarchic to resist the strength of its neigh-
bours. The dream of a reconstructed Poland on Liberal
lines in 1863 was simply a childish chimera. The inde-
pendence of Russian Poland under the suzerainty of the
Tsar would lead to a demand for the freedom of Prussian
Poland, a result absolutely fatal to the Prussian position
in the East and on the Baltic. The demand for autonomy
and political liberties sprang from the same delusions about
government that tainted the progressive and democratic
parties in Germany. Concessions to Polish demands
within Prussia were intrinsically inadmissible, and would
embarrass the good friend, Russia. The Polish rebellion
was a domestic affair of the Tsar's government, interference
with which was an impertinence that the Tsar would
justly resent.
Prussia's interest must be the sole criterion of Prussia's
policy. A rebellion on her borders was a serious danger;
there were disquieting signs that the conflagration would
spread. The sooner it was stamped out the better for
every one concerned. Bismarck, in short, only cared to
extract the maximum of political advantage from an affair
which he examined with icy impartiality. The blood of
Polish martyrs, for whose sufferings he did not care a
groschen, might become the seed of Prussian domination
in Central Europe. Through General von Alvensleben
he promptly (March 8) concluded a convention with
Russia, by which the two countries undertook to establish
a military cordon on their respective frontiers in order to
stop their respective Polish subjects from aiding the rebel-
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 139
lion, and to prevent the escape of rebels from lawful au-
thority. The action of the parliamentary opposition in
the Landtag only confirmed Bismarck's determination.
Interpellations, denunciations of the convention, reso-
lutions by sweeping majorities, he brushed aside as irre-
levant attempts to interfere wkh the royal right to con-
clude treaties by prerogative, and to make the foreign policy
of Prussia conform to the folly of ignorant idealists or crazy
demagogues. He told the Lower House roundly that the
making of war and treaties was the right of the Crown,
and roused its fury by the emphatic assertion that he would
make war or abstain from it without their approbation or
consent, and that his duty to his sovereign and Prussia
would never be influenced one hair's-breadth by their
votes or their attacks.
When the governments of Great Britain, France, and
Austria, under the pressure of public opinion agreed to
gresent a joint note formulating six demands 1 to the
. ussian government, and invited the concurrence of
Prussia in this diplomatic pressure, Bismarck firmly refused,
and for four chief reasons. A close understanding with
Russia was, and had long been, the sine qua non of his sys-
tem. Refusal to sign the note was the most practical
proof he could give of friendship to Russia. The aliena-
tion of Russia, still suffering from the humiliation of 1856,
and threatened with the boycott of Europe and the moral
condemnation of the civilised conscience, was for Prussia
in 1863 midsummer madness. Secondly, he disapproved of
the six demands. If Russia conceded them, the National
Union and the Radicals throughout Germany would
utilise the concession to harass the government of Prussia
already plagued with the charlatanry of Progress. Thirdly,
rejection by the Russian government of the joint note
must be followed either by more exacting pressure, and if
necessary, war, or by a painful rebuff at Petersburg.
Bismarck did not believe in a diplomacy that invited hu-
miliation, and the idea of war on behalf of the Polish rebels
1 The six points were briefly: (i) an amnesty; (2) a Polish parliament j
(3) a Polish National Executive; (4) Polish language in official communica-
tions j (5) religious freedom; (6) legal recruiting.
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 140
BISMARCK
was idiotic. Fourthly, he foresaw the failure of this sin-
gular union of Great Britain, France, and Austria, and he
desired it to fail. The ill-assorted partners would quarrel,
and from their quarrel Prussia would derive advantages
that could be left for future exploitation. The separation
of Austria and of France from Russia was worth all the
joint notes and all the Polish lives in the world. As early
as I860 Bismarck had expressed the fear that France would
ally with Russia, isolate Prussia, or drive her into a hateful
dependence on Austria. He had laid it down that in a
Franco-Russian alliance Prussia must be the third member.
Great Britain could be soothed or neglected as circum-
stances indicated. The British army did not exist; and
the British fleet was useless in this business. Fortune had
now given Prussia an unexpected favour. France by her
stupid sentimentalism would alienate Russia. Prussia
could first secure Russian friendship, break up the Franco-
British entente, then work for a French benevolent neu-
trality, and Austria would be left to face an irreconcilable
Italy and an independent Prussia secure on both her
flanks. Here, indeed, was a game for the Titans.
Bismarck might well gaze into the baffling face of the
Time-spirit. The Schleswig-Holstein question was threat-
ening an ugly crisis. It is significant of the minister's
exploratory and prescient vigilance that while Nation-
alists and democrats were crying aloud for Germany and
Prussia to act, he gave no sign that he was earnestly
sounding all the depths and shallows in a rock-sown sea.
He contented himself with a pointed reminder to the
Danish government that Prussia was a signatory to the
Convention of London of 1852, and a sharp rap on the
heads of the ' noisy' journalists and politicians who desired
Prussia to go to war with all her neighbours because of
alleged grievances. Toujours en vedette! The motto of
Frederick, the Master, was more than ever the watchword.
Neither menaces nor caresses from London, Paris, and
Vienna induced Bismarck to modify his refusal to join
in the combined intervention at Petersburg and, as he
foresaw, the joint note was a complete failure. Assured
of Prussia's support, the Russian government in effect bade
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? THE MINISTER-PRESIDENT 141
the signatory Powers mind their own business, and pro-
ceeded to extinguish the rebellion in blood and flame.
Napoleon was intensely chagrined at the result, the blame
for which he threw chiefly on Great Britain. Our Foreign
Office had used the strong language that should precede
strong action, but it now covered its retreat to the wired
trenches of a good conscience in the smoke-clouds of a
parliamentary Blue-Book. At the Tuileries the need of a
real diplomatic success somewhere was being seriously
felt. Paris was seething with sentiment and ill-defined
ambition. Napoleon's disillusioned eyes turned to Berlin.
In the Wilhelmstrasse, not in the Ball-Platz, lay the keys
that could unlock the doors to the Rhine; and Napoleon
knew that the hunger of France, gnawing at the vitals of
the Second Empire, could be appeased, and only appeased,
by the Rhenish provinces.
The true author of the Polish fiasco was Bismarck. Had
he made Prussia a signatory to the Note of the Six De-
mands, the Russia of 1863, isolated and in grave difficulties,
would have been obliged to yield to the Concert of Europe.
Had Prussia been a country with responsible self-govern-
ment Bismarck must either have met the overwhelming
demand of the Landtag or been driven from office. With
Prussian support it was well within the compass of practical
diplomacy, without firing a shot, to have extorted a charter
of liberties for Russian Poland and prevented the cruelties
that added one more chapter to the blood-stained record.
The moral and political effect of such concerted action
would have been of incalculable advantage. But a Can-
ning in London or a Cavour at Berlin were needed.
Instead, there was Bismarck on the one side, and on the
other Napoleon and the clever mediocrities of the Quai
d'Orsay, the organised hypocrisy of Vienna and a Palmer-
ston, no longer the man of 1839, and permanently suspect
to a hostile court. Public opinion in Prussia and Germany
was impotent against Bismarck. While it raged, he sided
with Russia, thereby revealing to the Triple Entente that
without war they were helpless, and that the strategic
position of Prussia and the strength of the Prussian army
made the suggestion of war without Prussia ridiculous and
? ? Generated for (University of Chicago) on 2014-11-14 09:47 GMT / http://hdl. handle. net/2027/mdp. 49015000251497 Public Domain in the United States, Google-digitized / http://www. hathitrust. org/access_use#pd-us-google
? 142
BISMARCK
impossible. It was in Bismarck's power, and he knew it, to
meet the storm in the last resort by an appeal to Prussia
and Germany to forget the exaggerated woes of Poland
and concentrate on the Ahab of Europe--Napoleon.
Bismarck, it must be remembered, in these years was in
a dangerous temper: he was fighting for the life, honour,
and greatness of Prussia, as he interpreted them, and he
had thrown his all into the struggle. Even more truly
than Cavour from 1852 onwards he was gambling for
tremendous stakes. Not once but fifty times in the next
few year she indicated his determination, if the gods failed
him, to move Acheron. What could not be done by the
Conservative forces, could be done by calling in the Revo-
lution. His heart within was white-hot with the same
emotion that mastered the German of his day, and no
man could let loose more skilfully the whirlwinds of
national passion, or rejoice more triumphantly in riding
the storm.
But in 1863, as always, he had himself in hand. The
hour assuredly had not come: the situation must be de-
veloped much further and with a remorseless caution.
He could not afford to make a single mistake. The Prus-
sian army was not ready. Like his diplomacy it needed
time. And it was of the essence of his system, as of
Frederick the Great's, that so far as preparation and cal-
culation could ensure it, victory must be a certainty. The
Statecraft that is Force betrays the State that is Power if
it ignores or misunderstands the character and conditions
under which Force works in the world of human things.
Bismarck had secured the friendship of Russia. His
confidence that Prussia could rely on her strength and in-
dependence had been justified. The initiative in policy,
lost in the period from 1815 to 1862, was being quietly
recovered. While the members of the temporary Triple
Entente were abusing Prussia, and still more heartily, each
other, Bismarck was drawing up an edifying balance-sheet.
He could remind his royal master of two sound lessons--
the indispensability of the Crown's unfettered control of
policy, the futility of 'moral penetration,' as a solution
of European problems.
