His stubbornen ss was rewarded in January 1917 when Wilson decided to withdraw the
expedition
unilaterally.
Revolution and War_nodrm
in, as it finally did in 1812.
On balance, however, rivalries elsewhere were an asset for the United States.
They aided the expansion of U.
S.
commerce and gave other states an incentive to stay on good terms with it.
Given the relative weak- ness of the United States during its first three decades, this was no small advantage.
The American Revolution bears more than a passing resemblance to the cases examined in chapters 3-5. Foreign responses to the revolution we? re heavily influenced by a concern for the balance of power; the Founding Fathers attributed to the revolution a universal significance, and they saw themselves as both vulnerable in the short term and destined to control a continent over time. Like other revolutionary leaders, they were suspi- cious of foreign powers and obsessed with security, and a combination of internal divisions and misperceptions helped trigger hostile spirals wnth France and England. These disputes brought the United States close to war on several occasions and might have led to open warfare in any of them. At a minimum, therefore, the American Revolution supports the claim that revolutions intensify security competition and increase the like- lihood of war.
55 QuotedinLycan,Hamilton,216. Madisonexpressedasimilarviewtenyearsearlier,say- ing, "No European nation can ever send against us such a regular army as we need fear. " Quoted in Combs, Jay Treaty, 73?
[286]
? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
Unlike revolutionary France, Russia, or Iran, however, the United States did not cross the line for nearly three decades. This anomaly is explained by the limited aims of the Founding Fathers and by the size, weakness, and ge- ographic isolation of the new nation, which combined to make the large- scale use of force either impossible or unappealing. Had the new nation bordered on the other great powers, the danger of war would have been far greater. Although this case demonstrates that revolutions do not necessarily lead to war, it is largely consistent with the theory.
THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION
Like the American Revolution, the revolution in Mexico at first appears to challenge many of the central arguments of this book. The revolution was prolonged and violent, with far-reaching effects on Mexico itself, but its in- ternational effects were relatively mild. In particular, although other states' interests were affected by the revolution, they did not see it as a major threat, and it did not Aead to war. Thus, the Mexican case presents a partial contrast to the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions.
Upon closer examination, however, the Mexican Revolution does not ! >eem quite so different. Although all-out war did not occur, U. S. troops did intervene in 1914 and 1916 and the border between the two states was the site of repeated raids and armed clashes. 56 These events brought the two states close to war in 1916, after which U. S. -Mexican relations remained troubled for nearly two decades. Most importantly, relations between the
n'volutionary government and several other states exhibited many of the same sources of conflict that were present in the French, Russian, and Iran- ian. cases. Thus, this case supports the claim that revolutions heighten secu- rity competion and increase the risk of war.
The Diplomacy of the Mexican Revolution
The Mexican Revolution began in November 1910, when a group of liberal refo ,rmers led by Francisco Madero issued a proclamation calling for the over- throw of Porfirio Diaz, the de facto dictator who had governed Mexico for nearly thirty-five years. 57 This initiative sparked a series of rural rebellions
56 In 1920, a U. S. Senate subcommittee estimated that 550 Americans had been killed in Mexico between 1911 and 1920, while U. S. armed forces had killed 541 Mexicans on Mexican soil. Hobert Freeman Smith, The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico,
1916-1 932 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 176-77.
57 On Madero and the onset of the revolution, see Stanley Ross, Francisco Madero: Apostle of
Mexican Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955); Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: Genesis u nder Madero (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952); and Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), vol. 1 .
? ? ? Revolution and War
that overwhelmed the federal army and forced Diaz into exile in April 1911. Madero became president in November, but he was unable to overcome con- servative resistance and unwilling to satisfy the demands of the rural rebels. His popularity declined, the rural rebellions resumed, and Madero was ousted and killed in a counterrevolutionary coup in February 1913.
Madero was replaced by Victoriano Huerta, a conservative general who tried to restore the Porfirian system. Pressures for change were too far ad- vanced, however, and Huerta was soon challenged by the so-called Consti- tutionalist movement, a diverse coalition that united moderate reformers such as Venustiano Carranza (its self-designated "first chief") with rural populists such as Francisco "Pancho" Villa and Emiliano Zapata. Huerta eventually faced opposition from the United States as well, as President Woodrow Wilson viewed him as an illegitimate usurper and withheld U. S. recognition. When diplomatic pressure failed to persuade Huerta to hold elections and establish a legitimate constitutional order, Wilson stepped up his own efforts to bring the dictator down. He lifted the U. S. embargo on weapons shipments to Mexico in February 1914 (allowing the Constitution-
alists to obtain arms more easily) and ordered the U. S. Marines to occupy the port of Vera Cruz in April. The latter decision triggered unexpected op- position in Mexico and the United States alike, and brought a sharp letter of protest from Carranza. 58
Huerta's resignation in July caused a brief burst of optimism, but the Constitutionalist coalition had already begun to unravel and a civil war be- tween the main revolutionary factions was underway by the fall. 59 U. S. offi- cials favored Villa at first, believing that he would win quickly and would be easier to deal with than Carranza, and hoped that a rapid end to the fighting would eliminate the need for U. S. involvement. 60 As the fighting in- tensified and Carranza gained the upper hand, however, Wilson and his aides began to worry about the safety of foreign nationals and property and acknowledged that intervention might be necessary. 61 Relations with Car-
58 See Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1 9 1 D-1 9 1 7 (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), 125 n. 41.
59 On the origins of the civil war, see Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: The Con- stitutionalist Years (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972), chap. 6; Robert E. Quirk, Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915: The Convention at Aguascalientes (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 196o); and Knight, Mexican Revolution, vol. 2, chap. 2.
60 Whereas Carranza had opposed the occupation of Vera Cruz and rejected U. S. media- tion, Villa endorsed the Vera Cruz intervention and went to some lengths to court U. S. offi- cials. See Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Strugglefor Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 251-52, 258-59; and Clarence C. Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa: A Study in Unconventional Diplomacy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), 53-55, 75-J6, 12Q-21, 128-40.
61 Wilson at fust hoped to stay out of Mexico and told a crowd in Indianapolis in January, "It isnoneofmybusines,s anditisnoneofyourbusinesshowlong[theMexicanpeople]takeinde- termining [their form of government]. . . . The country is theirs. . . . And so far as my influence
[288)
? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
ranza had been strained since Vera Cruz, and reports from confidential agents in Mexico convinced Wilson that Carranza lacked the stature or abil- ity to unify the country. 62 U. S. officials now began to press for the formation of a coalition government in Mexico, in part because this solution would allow Washington to play the rivan factions off against each other. 63 In June, Wilson issued a formal note calling for the contending factions "to act to- gether . . . for the relief and redemption of their country," and he warned that the United States might be forced to intervene "in order to help Mexico save herself. " Villa accepted Wilson's proposal but Carranza rejected it, de-
claring, "History furnishes no example in any age or any country of civil war terminating by the union of the contending parties. One or the other must triumph. "64 Wilson invited representatives from the contending fac- tions to a conference of Latin American states in August and offered the un- workable suggestion that both Villa and Carranza retire in favor of some alternative leader. The conference accomplished nothing, and a number of U. S. officials began to support the idea of a counterrevolutionary coup by a group of conservative Mexican exiles. 65 Wilson was increasingly preoccu- pied by events in Europe and concerned about German intrigues in Mexico, however, and he soon reversed course and extended de facto recognition to
Carranza in October. 66
Recognition brought a brief honeymoon between the United States and
Carranza, but lingering suspicions and misunderstandings took the two
? goes, while I am President nobody shall interfere with them. " By March, however, Wilson ad- mitted to Secretary of State Lansing, " I do not yet allow myself to think of intervention as more than a remote pJJSsibility . . . [but] the possibility is worth preparing for. " Arthur Link notes, "The stronger Carranza grew, the stronger seme ed to become the determination of the President and his advisors not to recognize [him]. " See Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 459, 464, 468.
62 In August 1915, Lansing remarked, "I doubt very much as to (Carranza's) personality being strong enough or one that would be able to restore peace in Mexico. " Quoted in P. Ed- ward Haley, Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 191C>-1917 {Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1970), 174?
63 Lansing wrrote in July, "We do not wish the Carranza faction to lbe the only one to deal with in Mexico. Carranza seems so impossible that an appearance, at least, of opposition to him will give us the opportunity to invite a compromise of factions. I think, therefore, it is politic for the time to allow Villa to obtain sufficient financial resources to remain in arms until a compromise can be effected. " Quoted in Quirk, Mexican Revolution, 285; and see also Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution {Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 300; Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 174; and Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 487.
64 Carranza's rejection led Wilson to declare, "I think I have never known of a man more impossible to deal with on human principles than this man Carranza. " For these quotations see Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 476-77, 481; and Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 165.
65 See Katz, Secret War, 303-305; and Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 471-76.
66 Wilson's decision-making is recounted in Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 48? 1. On the role of Germany in U. S. calculations, see Katz, Secret War, 301-302, and "Pancho Villa and the At- tack on Columbus, New Mexico," American Historical Review 83, no. 1 {1978), 1o8.
? ? ? Revolution and War
countries to the brink of war the following year. The catalyst was Villa, who was now convinced that Carranza had sold out to the United States. In a last-ditch attempt to revive his fortunes, Villa launched a series of attacks on U. S. citizens and property, beginning with the murder of seventeen U. S. mining engineers in January 1916 and culminating in a raid on Columbus, New Mexico in March. 67 The border region had been torn by a number of vi- olent raids and intrigues during the previous year, and Wilson now dis- patched a "Punitive Expedition" under General John J. Pershing to apprehend Villla or destroy his forces. 68
As Villa had hoped, the U. S. decision to intervene ended the rapproche- ment with Carranza and partly restored his own prestige. Wilson believed (incorrectly) that Carranza had approved the U. S. expedition, and though the Mexican leader's initial response was measured, he could not afford to be viewed as a U. S. lackey and his opposition soon stiffened. Tensions grew worse when talks between U. S. and Mexican military representa- tives failed to produce an agreement, U. S. troops clashed with a group of Mexican civilians in the village of Parral in April, and Mexican bandits at- tacked . Glen Springs, Texas in May. Wilson promptly mobilized 150,000 U. S. militiamen along the border. The U. S. Army began preparing plans for a full-scale invasion, and another skirmish between U. S. and Mexican forces at Carrizal on June 21 convinced several U. S. officials that war was imminent. 69
Both Carranza and Wilson were committed to avoiding war, however, and the crisis eased when the two leaders agreed to form a "joint commis- sion" to discuss the various points of dispute. Wilson offered to withdraw the Punitive Expedition in exchange for Mexican adherence to a series of one-sided conditions regarding border security, the protection of foreign lives and property, religious tolerance, and other domestic issues. No Mexi-
67 See Katz, "Pancho Villa and the Raid on Columbus," and Secret War, 305-3 10; and James A. Sandos, "PanC'ho Villa and American Security: Woodrow Wilson's MexicanDiplomacy Re- considered," Joumal ofLatin American Studies 13, no. 2 (1981).
68 Some of the instability along the border arose from the "Plan of San Diego," an obscure group of Mexican radicals who hoped to spark a revolt in the southwestern United States by building networks among the Mexican-American communities in southern Texas and spon- soring a numberr of cross-border raids. See Charles H. Harris III and Louis R. Sadler, "The Plan of San Diego and the Mexican-United States War Crisis of 1916: A Reexamination," His- panic-American Historical Review 58, no. 3 (1978); James A. Sandos, "The Plan of San Diego: War and. Diplomacy on the Texas Border, 1915-1916," Arizona and the West 14, no. 1 (1972); and Charles C. Cumberland, "Border Raids in the Lower Rio Grande Valley-1915,'' South- western Historical Quarterly 57, no. 3 (1954).
69 General Hugh L. Scott told Wilson that "there will be no way to stave off war, and we should at once seize all the border towns . . . and shove the Mexicans into the desert. " Simi- larly, Colonel House wrote Wilson, "I have been praying that we could get out of the Mexi- can difficulty without war, but it looks now as if it were inevitable. " Quoted in Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 203, 214.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
can leader could have accepted these terms, however, and Carranza would not even discuss them until the Punitive Expedition was gone. 7?
His stubbornen ss was rewarded in January 1917 when Wilson decided to withdraw the expedition unilaterally. Although war had been averted, the Punitive Expedition left an enduring residue of suspicion and resentment. Carranza still faced continued opposition from Villa, Zapata, and several other rebel groups, and he was understandably resentful of U. S. and British support for Manuel Pelaez, an independent landlord and rebel leader whose troops controlled the main oil fields, as well as the growing number of economic and commercial restrictions imposed on Mexico. 71 U. S. -Mexi- can relations were strained further by article 27 of the new Mexican Consti- . tution, which appeared to threaten the position of foreign investors in Mexico, particularly in the oil and mining industries. 72 Yet despite these ten-
sions (as well as opposition from U. S. business interests), Wilson decided to extend full diplomatic recognition to Carranza in August 1917, primarily to keep U. S. -Mexican relations quiet as war with Germany approached.
Carranza's stubborn defense of Mexican independence enhanced his popularity temporarily, but persistent economic problems and protracted internal opposition continued to plague his presidency. After World War I, his efforts to assert control over Mexico's raw materials led to new tensions with the United States, when a coalition of U. S. corporations, Republican congressmen, and administration officials (notably Secretary of State Lans- ing, Ambassador Henry Fletcher, and State Department official Boaz Long) launched a campaign of intimidation that brought the United States close to war with Mexico in the fall of 1919. In addition to the goal of protecting U. S. investments in Mexico, this effort reflected the U. S. desire to prevent the spread of economic nationalism in Latin America. Lansing at one point threatened direct intervention in an attempt to persuade Carranza to mod- erate his policies, but even he hoped to avoid the use of force. Moreover, al- though advocates of intervention mounted an extensive public relations effort to portray the Carranza regime as hostile and "Bolshevistic," public support for intervention remained weak. Wilson remained unconvinced
that such a course was necessary, and Lansing's various maneuvers merely
70 Among other things, the United States demanded that Mexico provide "full and ade- quate protection to the lives and property of citizens of the United States," and it reserved "the right to re-enter Mexico and to afford such protection by its military forces in the event of the Mexican government failing to do so. " See Haley, Revolution and intervention, 235-36.
71 The United States imposed export controls on Mexico that limited U. S. -Mexican trade and made it difficult for Carranza to obtain arms, and also restricted Mexican access to loans from U. S. banks. See Katz, Secret War, 515-16.
n Article27declaredthatallsubsoildepositswerethepropertyoftheMexicannationand that concessions could only be granted by the national government. Foreigners were forbid- den to acquire property in Mexico unless they registered as Mexican for purposes of owner- ship and gave up the right to seek aid from foreign governments.
? ? ? ? Revolution and War
accelerated his own departure from office. Carranza and the oil companies eventually compromised on the most important points of contention, and the crisis was over by early 1920. 73
Carranza's fatal mistake came later in the year, when he tried to prevent a popular general, Alvaro Obregon, from entering the presidential contest. The Mexican Army defected to Obregon's side, and Carranza was killed while attempting to flee to Vera Cruz. Obregon was elected president in September 1920, and although he also faced several internal challenges dur- ing his presidency, he became the first Mexican president to serve a full term since Diaz. Obregon also achieved a guarded rapprochement with the United States and helped set the stage for the final consolidation of the rev- olution under President Lazaro Cardenas.
Is the Mexican Revolu tion an Exception ?
Does the Mexican Revolution support the theory proposed in this book?
. The answer is a qualified yes. As expected, the collapse of central authority in Mexico encouraged foreign powers to intervene either to improve their own positions or to prevent other states from doing so. This tendency was most pronounced in the case of Great Britain, whose economic interests in Mexico were second only to those of the United States. Britain recognized the Huerta government in 1913 despite strong U. S. opposition, a step that a number of British officials saw as a way to protect British interests in Mex- ico and to undermine the U. S. position throughout Latin America. 74 The British retreated when events in Europe made it more important to maintam good relations with the United States, but British officials continued to in- terfere in Mexico throughout the revolutionary period. 75 British activities in Mexico were driven both by the need to protect their oil supplies and the
desire to prevent either a Mexican-German rapprochement or a unilateral
73 See Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, chaps. 6 and 7, esp. 158; and Mark T. Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution: U. S. -Mexican Relations under Wilson and Carranza (Tuc- son: University of Arizona Press, 1977), chap. 6.
74 The clearest exponent of this view was Sir Lionel Carden, who became British minister to Mexico in Oc? ober 1913- Carden recommended that Britain formally declare its opposition to U. S. policy and predicted that "by adopting such a line . . . we should leave ourselves free to afford effective protection to the great interests we have at stake which are being con- stantly imperiled by the . . . interested action of the United States; and we should regain the influence we used to have in Latin America and with it a considerable part of the trade which we have lost and are still losing. " Quoted in Katz, Secret War, 176. See also Arthur S. Link, Wil- son: The New Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 365-77; and Peter Calvert, The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914: The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pt. 2.
75 The British also discovered that the quality of the oil from their holdings in Mexico was too low to meet their naval requirements, forcing them to rely on U. S. companies and dis- couraging further confrontations with the United States.
? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
U. S. invasion that would jeopardize the British position in Mexico com- pletely. 76
U. S. policy toward the Mexican Revolution was driven by a similar desire to protect its own position and prevent other countries from improving theirs. Wilson's repeated attempts to guide the revolution stemmed in part from his belief that "European imperialism" was responsible for the insta- bility that afflicted "backward" countries such as Mexico, and he consis- tently opposed measures that might enhance European influence. n Wilson opposed Huerta in part? because he believed that foreign (i. e. , British) sup- port was keeping Huerta in power, and he denounced interference by "for- eign capitalists" in a major speech in October 1913. 78 U. S. officials favored the creation of a coalition government because it would maximize U. S. leverage, and the decision to extend de facto recognition to Carranza in Oc-
tober 1915 was largely a response to the fear of German influence? 9 The pos- sibility of a German-Mexican rapprochement also influenced the decision to intervene in 1916, and Carranza's occasional efforts to use Germany as a counterweight to the United States remained a major concern for U. S. pol- icy makers until the end of World War I.
These fears were not entirely misplaced, as Germany also tried to exploit the turmoil in Mexico to further its own interests. The Germans' policy in Mexico initiallly aimed at protecting their investments and preserving good relations with the United States; to this end, they tried unsuccessfully to me- diate between Huerta and the United States and proposed joint intervention to restore order in 1913. After Huerta's ouster and the outbreak of World War I, however, Germany began to see the revolution primarily as a means of hindering U. S. support for Britain and France. 80 Germany deflected Car- ranza's initial inquiries about an alliance (to avoid provoking the United States), but when the onset of unrestricted submarine warfare made conflict with the United States virtually inevitable, Germany tried to entice Car-
76 "In the years 1917-18 the British were attempting to fight a three-front war in Mexico against Germany, the United States, and the Mexican nationalists. " Katz, Secret War, 464.
n See Katz, Secret War, 191-93, 222-23, 493-96.
78 The U. S. ambassador in London also warned a group of British businessmen that the United States "will warmly welcome your investments in all parts of ? he Americas on the condition that these investments do not give you control of the country in question. " Quoted in Katz, Secret War, 180; and see also Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution, B-;-9 Haley, Revolu- tion and Intervention, 108-no; and Link, New Freedom, 320.
79 As Lansing put it, "Germany does not wish to have one faction dominant in Mexico, therefore, we must recognize one. . . . Our possible relations with Germany must be our first con- sideration, and all our intercourse with Mexico must be regulated accordingly. " See Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 134 n. 59; and Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution, 3o-31?
80 German state secretary Gottlieb von Jagow remarked i n May, "It would be very desirable that America be drawn into a war and be distracted from Europe, where it tends to be pro- English. " Quoted in Katz, "Pancho Villa and the Attack on Columbus," 126.
? ? Revolution and War
ranza into attacking the United States by offering to help Mexico regain Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. 81 Like Britain and the United States, in short, German policy illustrates how intervention in a revolution can be mo- tivated by the desire to improve a state's position vis-a-vis other powers.
The Mexican case also illustrates revolutionary states' tendency to spiral with foreign powers, as was most apparent in Mexico's relations with the United States. Although leaders in both countries sought to avoid a serious conflict, a combination of legitimate differences and unfortunate misunder- standings nearly drove the two states to war in 1916 and continued to afflict U. S. -Mexican relations for many years thereafter. Tensions between the two were due partly to incompatible objectives (Wilson wanted to foster a liberal capitalist order in Mexico that would protect foreign property rights, while Carranza and his followers sought to defend Mexican autonomy and con- solidate their hold on power) and partly to more immediate conflicts of in- terest (such as the safety of U. S. citizens, the security of the border region, and Mexican efforts to tax U. S. properties). These concrete disputes were ex- acerbated by each side's propensity to exaggerate the other's hostility and to ignore how threatening its own conduct might appear. Because U. S. offi- cials disavowed any aggressive aims and genuinely believed that their ac- tions were in Mexico's best interest, they took Carranza's refusals to accept U. S. guidance as a sign of deep-seated hostility. 82 U. S. officials were upset when Carranza rejected an offer of U. S. support in 1913 and condemned the intervention at Vera Cruz in 1914, and his unwillingness to compromise led Wilson to conclude that "nothing can be done with or through the First Chief. "83 By 1917, Wilson was referring to Carranza as a "pedantic ass" and complaining that "all that [he] has said and done shows his intense resent-
? ? 81 This gambit backfired when Carranza declined the offer and British intelligence inter- cepted and released a secret German message describing their efforts. See Katz, Secret War, chaps. 9-10; and Barbara Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram (New York: Macmillan, 1? 6).
82 In 1913, Wilson declared, "We are actuated by no other motives than the betterment of the conditions ofour unfortunate neighbor, and by the sincere desire to advance the cause of human liberty. " Quoted in Link, New Freedom, 394, and see also 386-87. Two years later, Wil- son admitted, "What makes Mexico suspicious of us is that she does not believe as yet th1t we want to serve her. She believes that we want to possess her, and she has justification for the belief in the way in which some of our fellow citizens have tried to exploit her. . . . [But] I will try to serve all America, . . . by trying to serve Mexico herself. " Quoted in Haley, Revolu- tion and Intervention, 224. The U. S. belief that its actions were benevolent is also revealed in House's comment to Wilson: "Heaven knows, you have done all a man could to help the peo- ple there, and the fact that they are not able to follow your kindly lead, is no fault of yours. " Quoted in Lloyd C. Gardner, Safefor Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 66.
83 Quoted in Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 180. The image of Mexican intransigence was reinforced by Carranza's decision to close the port of Progeso (cutting off the U. S. sup- ply of sisal), his opposition to the Punitive Expedition, his refusal to discuss internal matters in the Joint Commission, his occasional attempts to use Germany as a counterweight to U. S. and British pressure, and his stubborn defense of the Constitution of 1917.
? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
ment of this Administration. "84 For their part, the Mexican revolutionaries saw U. S. interference as a direct threat to the goal of establishing Mexican sovereignty and independence, and they failed to appreciate either Wilson's altruistic motives or his reluctance to use force.
These suspicions were compounded by another familiar feature of revo- lutionary situations: namely, the difficulty of obtaining reliable information or forecasting the future course of the revolution itself. Wilson tried to alle- viate this prolblem by dispatching a series of special agents to gather infor- mation, but most of them proved to be woefully unreliable. 85 In 1913, for example, Wilson's hostility to Huerta was reinforced when special agent John Lind reported, erroneously, that British oil interests were controlling British policy and that foreign support was keeping Huerta in power, and the subsequent decision to seize Vera Cruz was based on Lind's similarly misguided assertion that the Mexicans would not oppose a U. S. landing. 86 Other U. S. attempts to predict the course of the revolution were equally un- reliable; Secretary of State Bryan stated in September 1913, "We have nearly reached the end of our trouble," and he offered an equally optimistic (and inaccurate) forecast after Huerta's departure the following year. 87 U. S. lead- ers misread the course of the civil war as well, at first expecting Villa to win quickly and discounting Carranza's chances until the latter's triumph was nearly complete. 88 Once again, this error was partially based on inaccurate
84 Quoted in Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolu tion, 64. Frustration at Mexican unwillingness to accept U. S. help was a recurring theme among U. S. officials. House remarked, "If the Mex- icans understood that our motives were unselfish, she should not object to our helping adjust her unruly household," and the chief U.
The American Revolution bears more than a passing resemblance to the cases examined in chapters 3-5. Foreign responses to the revolution we? re heavily influenced by a concern for the balance of power; the Founding Fathers attributed to the revolution a universal significance, and they saw themselves as both vulnerable in the short term and destined to control a continent over time. Like other revolutionary leaders, they were suspi- cious of foreign powers and obsessed with security, and a combination of internal divisions and misperceptions helped trigger hostile spirals wnth France and England. These disputes brought the United States close to war on several occasions and might have led to open warfare in any of them. At a minimum, therefore, the American Revolution supports the claim that revolutions intensify security competition and increase the like- lihood of war.
55 QuotedinLycan,Hamilton,216. Madisonexpressedasimilarviewtenyearsearlier,say- ing, "No European nation can ever send against us such a regular army as we need fear. " Quoted in Combs, Jay Treaty, 73?
[286]
? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
Unlike revolutionary France, Russia, or Iran, however, the United States did not cross the line for nearly three decades. This anomaly is explained by the limited aims of the Founding Fathers and by the size, weakness, and ge- ographic isolation of the new nation, which combined to make the large- scale use of force either impossible or unappealing. Had the new nation bordered on the other great powers, the danger of war would have been far greater. Although this case demonstrates that revolutions do not necessarily lead to war, it is largely consistent with the theory.
THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION
Like the American Revolution, the revolution in Mexico at first appears to challenge many of the central arguments of this book. The revolution was prolonged and violent, with far-reaching effects on Mexico itself, but its in- ternational effects were relatively mild. In particular, although other states' interests were affected by the revolution, they did not see it as a major threat, and it did not Aead to war. Thus, the Mexican case presents a partial contrast to the French, Russian, and Iranian revolutions.
Upon closer examination, however, the Mexican Revolution does not ! >eem quite so different. Although all-out war did not occur, U. S. troops did intervene in 1914 and 1916 and the border between the two states was the site of repeated raids and armed clashes. 56 These events brought the two states close to war in 1916, after which U. S. -Mexican relations remained troubled for nearly two decades. Most importantly, relations between the
n'volutionary government and several other states exhibited many of the same sources of conflict that were present in the French, Russian, and Iran- ian. cases. Thus, this case supports the claim that revolutions heighten secu- rity competion and increase the risk of war.
The Diplomacy of the Mexican Revolution
The Mexican Revolution began in November 1910, when a group of liberal refo ,rmers led by Francisco Madero issued a proclamation calling for the over- throw of Porfirio Diaz, the de facto dictator who had governed Mexico for nearly thirty-five years. 57 This initiative sparked a series of rural rebellions
56 In 1920, a U. S. Senate subcommittee estimated that 550 Americans had been killed in Mexico between 1911 and 1920, while U. S. armed forces had killed 541 Mexicans on Mexican soil. Hobert Freeman Smith, The United States and Revolutionary Nationalism in Mexico,
1916-1 932 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 176-77.
57 On Madero and the onset of the revolution, see Stanley Ross, Francisco Madero: Apostle of
Mexican Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955); Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: Genesis u nder Madero (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1952); and Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), vol. 1 .
? ? ? Revolution and War
that overwhelmed the federal army and forced Diaz into exile in April 1911. Madero became president in November, but he was unable to overcome con- servative resistance and unwilling to satisfy the demands of the rural rebels. His popularity declined, the rural rebellions resumed, and Madero was ousted and killed in a counterrevolutionary coup in February 1913.
Madero was replaced by Victoriano Huerta, a conservative general who tried to restore the Porfirian system. Pressures for change were too far ad- vanced, however, and Huerta was soon challenged by the so-called Consti- tutionalist movement, a diverse coalition that united moderate reformers such as Venustiano Carranza (its self-designated "first chief") with rural populists such as Francisco "Pancho" Villa and Emiliano Zapata. Huerta eventually faced opposition from the United States as well, as President Woodrow Wilson viewed him as an illegitimate usurper and withheld U. S. recognition. When diplomatic pressure failed to persuade Huerta to hold elections and establish a legitimate constitutional order, Wilson stepped up his own efforts to bring the dictator down. He lifted the U. S. embargo on weapons shipments to Mexico in February 1914 (allowing the Constitution-
alists to obtain arms more easily) and ordered the U. S. Marines to occupy the port of Vera Cruz in April. The latter decision triggered unexpected op- position in Mexico and the United States alike, and brought a sharp letter of protest from Carranza. 58
Huerta's resignation in July caused a brief burst of optimism, but the Constitutionalist coalition had already begun to unravel and a civil war be- tween the main revolutionary factions was underway by the fall. 59 U. S. offi- cials favored Villa at first, believing that he would win quickly and would be easier to deal with than Carranza, and hoped that a rapid end to the fighting would eliminate the need for U. S. involvement. 60 As the fighting in- tensified and Carranza gained the upper hand, however, Wilson and his aides began to worry about the safety of foreign nationals and property and acknowledged that intervention might be necessary. 61 Relations with Car-
58 See Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1 9 1 D-1 9 1 7 (New York: Harper and Row, 1954), 125 n. 41.
59 On the origins of the civil war, see Charles C. Cumberland, Mexican Revolution: The Con- stitutionalist Years (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1972), chap. 6; Robert E. Quirk, Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915: The Convention at Aguascalientes (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 196o); and Knight, Mexican Revolution, vol. 2, chap. 2.
60 Whereas Carranza had opposed the occupation of Vera Cruz and rejected U. S. media- tion, Villa endorsed the Vera Cruz intervention and went to some lengths to court U. S. offi- cials. See Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The Strugglefor Neutrality, 1914-1915 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 251-52, 258-59; and Clarence C. Clendenen, The United States and Pancho Villa: A Study in Unconventional Diplomacy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), 53-55, 75-J6, 12Q-21, 128-40.
61 Wilson at fust hoped to stay out of Mexico and told a crowd in Indianapolis in January, "It isnoneofmybusines,s anditisnoneofyourbusinesshowlong[theMexicanpeople]takeinde- termining [their form of government]. . . . The country is theirs. . . . And so far as my influence
[288)
? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
ranza had been strained since Vera Cruz, and reports from confidential agents in Mexico convinced Wilson that Carranza lacked the stature or abil- ity to unify the country. 62 U. S. officials now began to press for the formation of a coalition government in Mexico, in part because this solution would allow Washington to play the rivan factions off against each other. 63 In June, Wilson issued a formal note calling for the contending factions "to act to- gether . . . for the relief and redemption of their country," and he warned that the United States might be forced to intervene "in order to help Mexico save herself. " Villa accepted Wilson's proposal but Carranza rejected it, de-
claring, "History furnishes no example in any age or any country of civil war terminating by the union of the contending parties. One or the other must triumph. "64 Wilson invited representatives from the contending fac- tions to a conference of Latin American states in August and offered the un- workable suggestion that both Villa and Carranza retire in favor of some alternative leader. The conference accomplished nothing, and a number of U. S. officials began to support the idea of a counterrevolutionary coup by a group of conservative Mexican exiles. 65 Wilson was increasingly preoccu- pied by events in Europe and concerned about German intrigues in Mexico, however, and he soon reversed course and extended de facto recognition to
Carranza in October. 66
Recognition brought a brief honeymoon between the United States and
Carranza, but lingering suspicions and misunderstandings took the two
? goes, while I am President nobody shall interfere with them. " By March, however, Wilson ad- mitted to Secretary of State Lansing, " I do not yet allow myself to think of intervention as more than a remote pJJSsibility . . . [but] the possibility is worth preparing for. " Arthur Link notes, "The stronger Carranza grew, the stronger seme ed to become the determination of the President and his advisors not to recognize [him]. " See Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 459, 464, 468.
62 In August 1915, Lansing remarked, "I doubt very much as to (Carranza's) personality being strong enough or one that would be able to restore peace in Mexico. " Quoted in P. Ed- ward Haley, Revolution and Intervention: The Diplomacy of Taft and Wilson with Mexico, 191C>-1917 {Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1970), 174?
63 Lansing wrrote in July, "We do not wish the Carranza faction to lbe the only one to deal with in Mexico. Carranza seems so impossible that an appearance, at least, of opposition to him will give us the opportunity to invite a compromise of factions. I think, therefore, it is politic for the time to allow Villa to obtain sufficient financial resources to remain in arms until a compromise can be effected. " Quoted in Quirk, Mexican Revolution, 285; and see also Friedrich Katz, The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, the United States, and the Mexican Revolution {Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 300; Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 174; and Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 487.
64 Carranza's rejection led Wilson to declare, "I think I have never known of a man more impossible to deal with on human principles than this man Carranza. " For these quotations see Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 476-77, 481; and Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 165.
65 See Katz, Secret War, 303-305; and Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 471-76.
66 Wilson's decision-making is recounted in Link, Strugglefor Neutrality, 48? 1. On the role of Germany in U. S. calculations, see Katz, Secret War, 301-302, and "Pancho Villa and the At- tack on Columbus, New Mexico," American Historical Review 83, no. 1 {1978), 1o8.
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countries to the brink of war the following year. The catalyst was Villa, who was now convinced that Carranza had sold out to the United States. In a last-ditch attempt to revive his fortunes, Villa launched a series of attacks on U. S. citizens and property, beginning with the murder of seventeen U. S. mining engineers in January 1916 and culminating in a raid on Columbus, New Mexico in March. 67 The border region had been torn by a number of vi- olent raids and intrigues during the previous year, and Wilson now dis- patched a "Punitive Expedition" under General John J. Pershing to apprehend Villla or destroy his forces. 68
As Villa had hoped, the U. S. decision to intervene ended the rapproche- ment with Carranza and partly restored his own prestige. Wilson believed (incorrectly) that Carranza had approved the U. S. expedition, and though the Mexican leader's initial response was measured, he could not afford to be viewed as a U. S. lackey and his opposition soon stiffened. Tensions grew worse when talks between U. S. and Mexican military representa- tives failed to produce an agreement, U. S. troops clashed with a group of Mexican civilians in the village of Parral in April, and Mexican bandits at- tacked . Glen Springs, Texas in May. Wilson promptly mobilized 150,000 U. S. militiamen along the border. The U. S. Army began preparing plans for a full-scale invasion, and another skirmish between U. S. and Mexican forces at Carrizal on June 21 convinced several U. S. officials that war was imminent. 69
Both Carranza and Wilson were committed to avoiding war, however, and the crisis eased when the two leaders agreed to form a "joint commis- sion" to discuss the various points of dispute. Wilson offered to withdraw the Punitive Expedition in exchange for Mexican adherence to a series of one-sided conditions regarding border security, the protection of foreign lives and property, religious tolerance, and other domestic issues. No Mexi-
67 See Katz, "Pancho Villa and the Raid on Columbus," and Secret War, 305-3 10; and James A. Sandos, "PanC'ho Villa and American Security: Woodrow Wilson's MexicanDiplomacy Re- considered," Joumal ofLatin American Studies 13, no. 2 (1981).
68 Some of the instability along the border arose from the "Plan of San Diego," an obscure group of Mexican radicals who hoped to spark a revolt in the southwestern United States by building networks among the Mexican-American communities in southern Texas and spon- soring a numberr of cross-border raids. See Charles H. Harris III and Louis R. Sadler, "The Plan of San Diego and the Mexican-United States War Crisis of 1916: A Reexamination," His- panic-American Historical Review 58, no. 3 (1978); James A. Sandos, "The Plan of San Diego: War and. Diplomacy on the Texas Border, 1915-1916," Arizona and the West 14, no. 1 (1972); and Charles C. Cumberland, "Border Raids in the Lower Rio Grande Valley-1915,'' South- western Historical Quarterly 57, no. 3 (1954).
69 General Hugh L. Scott told Wilson that "there will be no way to stave off war, and we should at once seize all the border towns . . . and shove the Mexicans into the desert. " Simi- larly, Colonel House wrote Wilson, "I have been praying that we could get out of the Mexi- can difficulty without war, but it looks now as if it were inevitable. " Quoted in Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 203, 214.
? ? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
can leader could have accepted these terms, however, and Carranza would not even discuss them until the Punitive Expedition was gone. 7?
His stubbornen ss was rewarded in January 1917 when Wilson decided to withdraw the expedition unilaterally. Although war had been averted, the Punitive Expedition left an enduring residue of suspicion and resentment. Carranza still faced continued opposition from Villa, Zapata, and several other rebel groups, and he was understandably resentful of U. S. and British support for Manuel Pelaez, an independent landlord and rebel leader whose troops controlled the main oil fields, as well as the growing number of economic and commercial restrictions imposed on Mexico. 71 U. S. -Mexi- can relations were strained further by article 27 of the new Mexican Consti- . tution, which appeared to threaten the position of foreign investors in Mexico, particularly in the oil and mining industries. 72 Yet despite these ten-
sions (as well as opposition from U. S. business interests), Wilson decided to extend full diplomatic recognition to Carranza in August 1917, primarily to keep U. S. -Mexican relations quiet as war with Germany approached.
Carranza's stubborn defense of Mexican independence enhanced his popularity temporarily, but persistent economic problems and protracted internal opposition continued to plague his presidency. After World War I, his efforts to assert control over Mexico's raw materials led to new tensions with the United States, when a coalition of U. S. corporations, Republican congressmen, and administration officials (notably Secretary of State Lans- ing, Ambassador Henry Fletcher, and State Department official Boaz Long) launched a campaign of intimidation that brought the United States close to war with Mexico in the fall of 1919. In addition to the goal of protecting U. S. investments in Mexico, this effort reflected the U. S. desire to prevent the spread of economic nationalism in Latin America. Lansing at one point threatened direct intervention in an attempt to persuade Carranza to mod- erate his policies, but even he hoped to avoid the use of force. Moreover, al- though advocates of intervention mounted an extensive public relations effort to portray the Carranza regime as hostile and "Bolshevistic," public support for intervention remained weak. Wilson remained unconvinced
that such a course was necessary, and Lansing's various maneuvers merely
70 Among other things, the United States demanded that Mexico provide "full and ade- quate protection to the lives and property of citizens of the United States," and it reserved "the right to re-enter Mexico and to afford such protection by its military forces in the event of the Mexican government failing to do so. " See Haley, Revolution and intervention, 235-36.
71 The United States imposed export controls on Mexico that limited U. S. -Mexican trade and made it difficult for Carranza to obtain arms, and also restricted Mexican access to loans from U. S. banks. See Katz, Secret War, 515-16.
n Article27declaredthatallsubsoildepositswerethepropertyoftheMexicannationand that concessions could only be granted by the national government. Foreigners were forbid- den to acquire property in Mexico unless they registered as Mexican for purposes of owner- ship and gave up the right to seek aid from foreign governments.
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accelerated his own departure from office. Carranza and the oil companies eventually compromised on the most important points of contention, and the crisis was over by early 1920. 73
Carranza's fatal mistake came later in the year, when he tried to prevent a popular general, Alvaro Obregon, from entering the presidential contest. The Mexican Army defected to Obregon's side, and Carranza was killed while attempting to flee to Vera Cruz. Obregon was elected president in September 1920, and although he also faced several internal challenges dur- ing his presidency, he became the first Mexican president to serve a full term since Diaz. Obregon also achieved a guarded rapprochement with the United States and helped set the stage for the final consolidation of the rev- olution under President Lazaro Cardenas.
Is the Mexican Revolu tion an Exception ?
Does the Mexican Revolution support the theory proposed in this book?
. The answer is a qualified yes. As expected, the collapse of central authority in Mexico encouraged foreign powers to intervene either to improve their own positions or to prevent other states from doing so. This tendency was most pronounced in the case of Great Britain, whose economic interests in Mexico were second only to those of the United States. Britain recognized the Huerta government in 1913 despite strong U. S. opposition, a step that a number of British officials saw as a way to protect British interests in Mex- ico and to undermine the U. S. position throughout Latin America. 74 The British retreated when events in Europe made it more important to maintam good relations with the United States, but British officials continued to in- terfere in Mexico throughout the revolutionary period. 75 British activities in Mexico were driven both by the need to protect their oil supplies and the
desire to prevent either a Mexican-German rapprochement or a unilateral
73 See Smith, United States and Revolutionary Nationalism, chaps. 6 and 7, esp. 158; and Mark T. Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution: U. S. -Mexican Relations under Wilson and Carranza (Tuc- son: University of Arizona Press, 1977), chap. 6.
74 The clearest exponent of this view was Sir Lionel Carden, who became British minister to Mexico in Oc? ober 1913- Carden recommended that Britain formally declare its opposition to U. S. policy and predicted that "by adopting such a line . . . we should leave ourselves free to afford effective protection to the great interests we have at stake which are being con- stantly imperiled by the . . . interested action of the United States; and we should regain the influence we used to have in Latin America and with it a considerable part of the trade which we have lost and are still losing. " Quoted in Katz, Secret War, 176. See also Arthur S. Link, Wil- son: The New Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 365-77; and Peter Calvert, The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914: The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), pt. 2.
75 The British also discovered that the quality of the oil from their holdings in Mexico was too low to meet their naval requirements, forcing them to rely on U. S. companies and dis- couraging further confrontations with the United States.
? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
U. S. invasion that would jeopardize the British position in Mexico com- pletely. 76
U. S. policy toward the Mexican Revolution was driven by a similar desire to protect its own position and prevent other countries from improving theirs. Wilson's repeated attempts to guide the revolution stemmed in part from his belief that "European imperialism" was responsible for the insta- bility that afflicted "backward" countries such as Mexico, and he consis- tently opposed measures that might enhance European influence. n Wilson opposed Huerta in part? because he believed that foreign (i. e. , British) sup- port was keeping Huerta in power, and he denounced interference by "for- eign capitalists" in a major speech in October 1913. 78 U. S. officials favored the creation of a coalition government because it would maximize U. S. leverage, and the decision to extend de facto recognition to Carranza in Oc-
tober 1915 was largely a response to the fear of German influence? 9 The pos- sibility of a German-Mexican rapprochement also influenced the decision to intervene in 1916, and Carranza's occasional efforts to use Germany as a counterweight to the United States remained a major concern for U. S. pol- icy makers until the end of World War I.
These fears were not entirely misplaced, as Germany also tried to exploit the turmoil in Mexico to further its own interests. The Germans' policy in Mexico initiallly aimed at protecting their investments and preserving good relations with the United States; to this end, they tried unsuccessfully to me- diate between Huerta and the United States and proposed joint intervention to restore order in 1913. After Huerta's ouster and the outbreak of World War I, however, Germany began to see the revolution primarily as a means of hindering U. S. support for Britain and France. 80 Germany deflected Car- ranza's initial inquiries about an alliance (to avoid provoking the United States), but when the onset of unrestricted submarine warfare made conflict with the United States virtually inevitable, Germany tried to entice Car-
76 "In the years 1917-18 the British were attempting to fight a three-front war in Mexico against Germany, the United States, and the Mexican nationalists. " Katz, Secret War, 464.
n See Katz, Secret War, 191-93, 222-23, 493-96.
78 The U. S. ambassador in London also warned a group of British businessmen that the United States "will warmly welcome your investments in all parts of ? he Americas on the condition that these investments do not give you control of the country in question. " Quoted in Katz, Secret War, 180; and see also Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution, B-;-9 Haley, Revolu- tion and Intervention, 108-no; and Link, New Freedom, 320.
79 As Lansing put it, "Germany does not wish to have one faction dominant in Mexico, therefore, we must recognize one. . . . Our possible relations with Germany must be our first con- sideration, and all our intercourse with Mexico must be regulated accordingly. " See Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 134 n. 59; and Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolution, 3o-31?
80 German state secretary Gottlieb von Jagow remarked i n May, "It would be very desirable that America be drawn into a war and be distracted from Europe, where it tends to be pro- English. " Quoted in Katz, "Pancho Villa and the Attack on Columbus," 126.
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ranza into attacking the United States by offering to help Mexico regain Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. 81 Like Britain and the United States, in short, German policy illustrates how intervention in a revolution can be mo- tivated by the desire to improve a state's position vis-a-vis other powers.
The Mexican case also illustrates revolutionary states' tendency to spiral with foreign powers, as was most apparent in Mexico's relations with the United States. Although leaders in both countries sought to avoid a serious conflict, a combination of legitimate differences and unfortunate misunder- standings nearly drove the two states to war in 1916 and continued to afflict U. S. -Mexican relations for many years thereafter. Tensions between the two were due partly to incompatible objectives (Wilson wanted to foster a liberal capitalist order in Mexico that would protect foreign property rights, while Carranza and his followers sought to defend Mexican autonomy and con- solidate their hold on power) and partly to more immediate conflicts of in- terest (such as the safety of U. S. citizens, the security of the border region, and Mexican efforts to tax U. S. properties). These concrete disputes were ex- acerbated by each side's propensity to exaggerate the other's hostility and to ignore how threatening its own conduct might appear. Because U. S. offi- cials disavowed any aggressive aims and genuinely believed that their ac- tions were in Mexico's best interest, they took Carranza's refusals to accept U. S. guidance as a sign of deep-seated hostility. 82 U. S. officials were upset when Carranza rejected an offer of U. S. support in 1913 and condemned the intervention at Vera Cruz in 1914, and his unwillingness to compromise led Wilson to conclude that "nothing can be done with or through the First Chief. "83 By 1917, Wilson was referring to Carranza as a "pedantic ass" and complaining that "all that [he] has said and done shows his intense resent-
? ? 81 This gambit backfired when Carranza declined the offer and British intelligence inter- cepted and released a secret German message describing their efforts. See Katz, Secret War, chaps. 9-10; and Barbara Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram (New York: Macmillan, 1? 6).
82 In 1913, Wilson declared, "We are actuated by no other motives than the betterment of the conditions ofour unfortunate neighbor, and by the sincere desire to advance the cause of human liberty. " Quoted in Link, New Freedom, 394, and see also 386-87. Two years later, Wil- son admitted, "What makes Mexico suspicious of us is that she does not believe as yet th1t we want to serve her. She believes that we want to possess her, and she has justification for the belief in the way in which some of our fellow citizens have tried to exploit her. . . . [But] I will try to serve all America, . . . by trying to serve Mexico herself. " Quoted in Haley, Revolu- tion and Intervention, 224. The U. S. belief that its actions were benevolent is also revealed in House's comment to Wilson: "Heaven knows, you have done all a man could to help the peo- ple there, and the fact that they are not able to follow your kindly lead, is no fault of yours. " Quoted in Lloyd C. Gardner, Safefor Democracy: The Anglo-American Response to Revolution, 1913-1923 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 66.
83 Quoted in Haley, Revolution and Intervention, 180. The image of Mexican intransigence was reinforced by Carranza's decision to close the port of Progeso (cutting off the U. S. sup- ply of sisal), his opposition to the Punitive Expedition, his refusal to discuss internal matters in the Joint Commission, his occasional attempts to use Germany as a counterweight to U. S. and British pressure, and his stubborn defense of the Constitution of 1917.
? ? The American, Mexican, Turkish, and Chinese Revolutions
ment of this Administration. "84 For their part, the Mexican revolutionaries saw U. S. interference as a direct threat to the goal of establishing Mexican sovereignty and independence, and they failed to appreciate either Wilson's altruistic motives or his reluctance to use force.
These suspicions were compounded by another familiar feature of revo- lutionary situations: namely, the difficulty of obtaining reliable information or forecasting the future course of the revolution itself. Wilson tried to alle- viate this prolblem by dispatching a series of special agents to gather infor- mation, but most of them proved to be woefully unreliable. 85 In 1913, for example, Wilson's hostility to Huerta was reinforced when special agent John Lind reported, erroneously, that British oil interests were controlling British policy and that foreign support was keeping Huerta in power, and the subsequent decision to seize Vera Cruz was based on Lind's similarly misguided assertion that the Mexicans would not oppose a U. S. landing. 86 Other U. S. attempts to predict the course of the revolution were equally un- reliable; Secretary of State Bryan stated in September 1913, "We have nearly reached the end of our trouble," and he offered an equally optimistic (and inaccurate) forecast after Huerta's departure the following year. 87 U. S. lead- ers misread the course of the civil war as well, at first expecting Villa to win quickly and discounting Carranza's chances until the latter's triumph was nearly complete. 88 Once again, this error was partially based on inaccurate
84 Quoted in Gilderhus, Diplomacy and Revolu tion, 64. Frustration at Mexican unwillingness to accept U. S. help was a recurring theme among U. S. officials. House remarked, "If the Mex- icans understood that our motives were unselfish, she should not object to our helping adjust her unruly household," and the chief U.
