giving him
spiritual
heat (Eccles.
Summa Theologica
The other work of the active life consists entirely in outward
occupation, for instance almsgiving, receiving guests, and the like,
which are less excellent than the works of contemplation, except in
cases of necessity, as stated above ([3828]Q[182], A[1]). Accordingly
the highest place in religious orders is held by those which are
directed to teaching and preaching, which, moreover, are nearest to the
episcopal perfection, even as in other things "the end of that which is
first is in conjunction with the beginning of that which is second," as
Dionysius states (Div. Nom. vii). The second place belongs to those
which are directed to contemplation, and the third to those which are
occupied with external actions.
Moreover, in each of these degrees it may be noted that one religious
order excels another through being directed to higher action in the
same genus; thus among the works of the active life it is better to
ransom captives than to receive guests, and among the works of the
contemplative life prayer is better than study. Again one will excel
another if it be directed to more of these actions than another, or if
it have statutes more adapted to the attainment of the end in view.
Reply to Objection 1: This Decretal refers to the active life as
directed to the salvation of souls.
Reply to Objection 2: Those religious orders that are established for
the purpose of military service aim more directly at shedding the
enemy's blood than at the shedding of their own, which latter is more
properly competent to martyrs. Yet there is no reason why religious of
this description should not acquire the merit of martyrdom in certain
cases, and in this respect stand higher than other religious; even as
in some cases the works of the active life take precedence of
contemplation.
Reply to Objection 3: Strictness of observances, as the Blessed Antony
remarks (Conferences of the Fathers; Coll. ii, 2), is not the chief
object of commendation in a religious order; and it is written (Is.
58:5): "Is this such a fast as I have chosen, for a man to afflict his
soul for a day? " Nevertheless it is adopted in religious life as being
necessary for taming the flesh, "which if done without discretion, is
liable to make us fail altogether," as the Blessed Antony observes.
Wherefore a religious order is not more excellent through having
stricter observances, but because its observances are directed by
greater discretion to the end of religion. Thus the taming of the flesh
is more efficaciously directed to continence by means of abstinence in
meat and drink, which pertain to hunger and thirst, than by the
privation of clothing, which pertains to cold and nakedness, or by
bodily labor.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether religious perfection is diminished by possessing something in
common?
Objection 1: It would seem that religious perfection is diminished by
possessing something in common. For our Lord said (Mat. 19:21): "If
thou wilt be perfect, go sell all [Vulg. : 'what'] thou hast and give to
the poor. " Hence it is clear that to lack worldly wealth belongs to the
perfection of Christian life. Now those who possess something in common
do not lack worldly wealth. Therefore it would seem that they do not
quite reach to the perfection of Christian life.
Objection 2: Further, the perfection of the counsels requires that one
should be without worldly solicitude; wherefore the Apostle in giving
the counsel of virginity said (1 Cor. 7:32): "I would have you to be
without solicitude. " Now it belongs to the solicitude of the present
life that certain people keep something to themselves for the morrow;
and this solicitude was forbidden His disciples by our Lord (Mat. 6:34)
saying: "Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow. " Therefore it would seem
that the perfection of Christian life is diminished by having something
in common.
Objection 3: Further, possessions held in common belong in some way to
each member of the community; wherefore Jerome (Ep. lx ad Heliod.
Episc. ) says in reference to certain people: "They are richer in the
monastery than they had been in the world; though serving the poor
Christ they have wealth which they had not while serving the rich
devil; the Church rejects them now that they are rich, who in the world
were beggars. " But it is derogatory to religious perfection that one
should possess wealth of one's own. Therefore it is also derogatory to
religious perfection to possess anything in common.
Objection 4: Further, Gregory (Dial. iii, 14) relates of a very holy
man named Isaac, that "when his disciples humbly signified that he
should accept the possessions offered to him for the use of the
monastery, he being solicitous for the safeguarding of his poverty,
held firmly to his opinion, saying: A monk who seeks earthly
possessions is no monk at all": and this refers to possessions held in
common, and which were offered him for the common use of the monastery.
Therefore it would seem destructive of religious perfection to possess
anything in common.
Objection 5: Further, our Lord in prescribing religious perfection to
His disciples, said (Mat. 10:9,10): "Do not possess gold, nor silver,
nor money in your purses, nor script for your journey. " By these words,
as Jerome says in his commentary, "He reproves those philosophers who
are commonly called Bactroperatae [*i. e. staff and scrip bearers], who
as despising the world and valuing all things at naught carried their
pantry about with them. " Therefore it would seem derogatory to
religious perfection that one should keep something whether for oneself
or for the common use.
On the contrary, Prosper [*Julianus Pomerius, among the works of
Prosper] says (De Vita Contempl. ix) and his words are quoted (XII, qu.
1, can. Expedit): "It is sufficiently clear both that for the sake of
perfection one should renounce having anything of one's own, and that
the possession of revenues, which are of course common property, is no
hindrance to the perfection of the Church. "
I answer that, As stated above ([3829]Q[184], A[3], ad 1;[3830] Q[185],
A[6], ad 1), perfection consists, essentially, not in poverty, but in
following Christ, according to the saying of Jerome (Super Matth. xix,
27): "Since it is not enough to leave all, Peter adds that which is
perfect, namely, 'We have followed Thee,'" while poverty is like an
instrument or exercise for the attainment of perfection. Hence in the
Conferences of the Fathers (Coll. i, 7) the abbot Moses says:
"Fastings, watchings, meditating on the Scriptures, poverty, and
privation of all one's possessions are not perfection, but means of
perfection. "
Now the privation of one's possessions, or poverty, is a means of
perfection, inasmuch as by doing away with riches we remove certain
obstacles to charity; and these are chiefly three. The first is the
cares which riches bring with them; wherefore our Lord said (Mat.
13:22): "That which was sown [Vulg. : 'He that received the seed'] among
thorns, is he that heareth the word, and the care of this world, and
the deceitfulness of riches, choketh up the word. " The second is the
love of riches, which increases with the possession of wealth;
wherefore Jerome says (Super Matth. xix, 23) that "since it is
difficult to despise riches when we have them, our Lord did not say:
'It is impossible for a rich man to enter the kingdom of heaven,' but:
'It is difficult. '" The third is vainglory or elation which results
from riches, according to Ps. 48:7, "They that trust in their own
strength, and glory in the multitude of their riches. "
Accordingly the first of these three cannot be altogether separated
from riches whether great or small. For man must needs take a certain
amount of care in acquiring or keeping external things. But so long as
external things are sought or possessed only in a small quantity, and
as much as is required for a mere livelihood, such like care does not
hinder one much; and consequently is not inconsistent with the
perfection of Christian life. For our Lord did not forbid all care, but
only such as is excessive and hurtful; wherefore Augustine, commenting
on Mat. 6:25, "Be not solicitous for your life, what you shall eat,"
says (De Serm. in Monte [*The words quoted are from De Operibus Monach.
xxvi]): "In saying this He does not forbid them to procure these things
in so far as they needed them, but to be intent on them, and for their
sake to do whatever they are bidden to do in preaching the Gospel. " Yet
the possession of much wealth increases the weight of care, which is a
great distraction to man's mind and hinders him from giving himself
wholly to God's service. The other two, however, namely the love of
riches and taking pride or glorying in riches, result only from an
abundance of wealth.
Nevertheless it makes a difference in this matter if riches, whether
abundant or moderate, be possessed in private or in common. For the
care that one takes of one's own wealth, pertains to love of self,
whereby a man loves himself in temporal matters; whereas the care that
is given to things held in common pertains to the love of charity which
"seeketh not her own," but looks to the common good. And since religion
is directed to the perfection of charity, and charity is perfected in
"the love of God extending to contempt of self" [*Augustine, De Civ.
Dei xiv, 28], it is contrary to religious perfection to possess
anything in private. But the care that is given to common goods may
pertain to charity, although it may prove an obstacle to some higher
act of charity, such as divine contemplation or the instructing of
one's neighbor. Hence it is evident that to have excessive riches in
common, whether in movable or in immovable property, is an obstacle to
perfection, though not absolutely incompatible with it; while it is not
an obstacle to religious perfection to have enough external things,
whether movables or immovables, as suffice for a livelihood, if we
consider poverty in relation to the common end of religious orders,
which is to devote oneself to the service of God. But if we consider
poverty in relation to the special end of any religious order, then
this end being presupposed, a greater or lesser degree of poverty is
adapted to that religious order; and each religious order will be the
more perfect in respect of poverty, according as it professes a poverty
more adapted to its end. For it is evident that for the purpose of the
outward and bodily works of the active life a man needs the assistance
of outward things, whereas few are required for contemplation. Hence
the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that "many things are needed for
action, and the more so, the greater and nobler the actions are. But
the contemplative man requires no such things for the exercise of his
act: he needs only the necessaries; other things are an obstacle to his
contemplation. " Accordingly it is clear that a religious order directed
to the bodily actions of the active life, such as soldiering or the
lodging of guests, would be imperfect if it lacked common riches;
whereas those religious orders which are directed to the contemplative
life are the more perfect, according as the poverty they profess
burdens them with less care for temporal things. And the care of
temporal things is so much a greater obstacle to religious life as the
religious life requires a greater care of spiritual things.
Now it is manifest that a religious order established for the purpose
of contemplating and of giving to others the fruits of one's
contemplation by teaching and preaching, requires greater care of
spiritual things than one that is established for contemplation only.
Wherefore it becomes a religious order of this kind to embrace a
poverty that burdens one with the least amount of care. Again it is
clear that to keep what one has acquired at a fitting time for one's
necessary use involves the least burden of care. Wherefore a threefold
degree of poverty corresponds to the three aforesaid degrees of
religious life. For it is fitting that a religious order which is
directed to the bodily actions of the active life should have an
abundance of riches in common; that the common possession of a
religious order directed to contemplation should be more moderate,
unless the said religious be bound, either themselves or through
others, to give hospitality or to assist the poor; and that those who
aim at giving the fruits of their contemplation to others should have
their life most exempt from external cares; this being accomplished by
their laying up the necessaries of life procured at a fitting time.
This, our Lord, the Founder of poverty, taught by His example. For He
had a purse which He entrusted to Judas, and in which were kept the
things that were offered to Him, as related in Jn. 12:6.
Nor should it be argued that Jerome (Super Matth. xvii, 26) says: "If
anyone object that Judas carried money in the purse, we answer that He
deemed it unlawful to spend the property of the poor on His own uses,"
namely by paying the tax---because among those poor His disciples held
a foremost place, and the money in Christ's purse was spent chiefly on
their needs. For it is stated (Jn. 4:8) that "His disciples were gone
into the city to buy meats," and (Jn. 13:29) that the disciples
"thought, because Judas had the purse, that Jesus had said to him: But
those things which we have need of for the festival day, or that he
should give something to the poor. " From this it is evident that to
keep money by, or any other common property for the support of
religious of the same order, or of any other poor, is in accordance
with the perfection which Christ taught by His example. Moreover, after
the resurrection, the disciples from whom all religious orders took
their origin kept the price of the lands, and distributed it according
as each one had need (Acts 4:34,35).
Reply to Objection 1: As stated above ([3831]Q[184], A[3], ad 1), this
saying of our Lord does not mean that poverty itself is perfection, but
that it is the means of perfection. Indeed, as shown above
([3832]Q[186], A[8]), it is the least of the three chief means of
perfection; since the vow of continence excels the vow of poverty, and
the vow of obedience excels them both. Since, however, the means are
sought not for their own sake, but for the sake of the end, a thing is
better, not for being a greater instrument, but for being more adapted
to the end. Thus a physician does not heal the more the more medicine
he gives, but the more the medicine is adapted to the disease.
Accordingly it does not follow that a religious order is the more
perfect, according as the poverty it professes is more perfect, but
according as its poverty is more adapted to the end both common and
special. Granted even that the religious order which exceeds others in
poverty be more perfect in so far as it is poorer, this would not make
it more perfect simply. For possibly some other religious order might
surpass it in matters relating to continence, or obedience, and thus be
more perfect simply, since to excel in better things is to be better
simply.
Reply to Objection 2: Our Lord's words (Mat. 6:34), "Be not solicitous
for tomorrow," do not mean that we are to keep nothing for the morrow;
for the Blessed Antony shows the danger of so doing, in the Conferences
of the Fathers (Coll. ii, 2), where he says: "It has been our
experience that those who have attempted to practice the privation of
all means of livelihood, so as not to have the wherewithal to procure
themselves food for one day, have been deceived so unawares that they
were unable to finish properly the work they had undertaken. " And, as
Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxiii), "if this saying of our Lord,
'Be not solicitous for tomorrow,' means that we are to lay nothing by
for the morrow, those who shut themselves up for many days from the
sight of men, and apply their whole mind to a life of prayer, will be
unable to provide themselves with these things. " Again he adds
afterwards: "Are we to suppose that the more holy they are, the less do
they resemble the birds? " And further on (De oper. Monach. xxiv): "For
if it be argued from the Gospel that they should lay nothing by, they
answer rightly: Why then did our Lord have a purse, wherein He kept the
money that was collected? Why, in days long gone by, when famine was
imminent, was grain sent to the holy fathers? Why did the apostles thus
provide for the needs of the saints? "
Accordingly the saying: "Be not solicitous for tomorrow," according to
Jerome (Super Matth. ) is to be rendered thus: "It is enough that we
think of the present; the future being uncertain, let us leave it to
God": according to Chrysostom [*Hom. xvi in the Opus Imperfectum,
falsely ascribed to St. John Chrysostom], "It is enough to endure the
toil for necessary things, labor not in excess for unnecessary things":
according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 17): "When we do any
good action, we should bear in mind not temporal things which are
denoted by the morrow, but eternal things. "
Reply to Objection 3: The saying of Jerome applies where there are
excessive riches, possessed in private as it were, or by the abuse of
which even the individual members of a community wax proud and wanton.
But they do not apply to moderate wealth, set by for the common use,
merely as a means of livelihood of which each one stands in need. For
it amounts to the same that each one makes use of things pertaining to
the necessaries of life, and that these things be set by for the common
use.
Reply to Objection 4: Isaac refused to accept the offer of possessions,
because he feared lest this should lead him to have excessive wealth,
the abuse of which would be an obstacle to religious perfection. Hence
Gregory adds (Dial. iii, 14): "He was as afraid of forfeiting the
security of his poverty, as the rich miser is careful of his perishable
wealth. " It is not, however, related that he refused to accept such
things as are commonly necessary for the upkeep of life.
Reply to Objection 5: The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5,6) that bread,
wine, and the like are natural riches, while money is artificial
riches. Hence it is that certain philosophers declined to make use of
money, and employed other things, living according to nature. Wherefore
Jerome shows by the words of our Lord, Who equally forbade both, that
it comes to the same to have money and to possess other things
necessary for life. And though our Lord commanded those who were sent
to preach not to carry these things on the way, He did not forbid them
to be possessed in common. How these words of our Lord should be
understood has been shown above (Q[185], A[6] , ad 2; [3833]FS, Q[108],
A[2], ad 3).
__________________________________________________________________
Whether the religious life of those who live in community is more perfect
than that of those who lead a solitary life?
Objection 1: It would seem that the religious life of those who live in
community is more perfect than that of those who lead a solitary life.
For it is written (Eccles. 4:9): "It is better . . . that two should be
together, than one; for they have the advantage of their society. "
Therefore the religious life of those who live in community would seem
to be more perfect.
Objection 2: Further, it is written (Mat. 18:20): "Where there are two
or three gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of
them. " But nothing can be better than the fellowship of Christ.
Therefore it would seem better to live in community than in solitude.
Objection 3: Further, the vow of obedience is more excellent than the
other religious vows; and humility is most acceptable to God. Now
obedience and humility are better observed in company than in solitude;
for Jerome says (Ep. cxxv ad Rustic. Monach. ): "In solitude pride
quickly takes man unawares, he sleeps as much as he will, he does what
he likes"; whereas when instructing one who lives in community, he
says: "You may not do what you will, you must eat what you are bidden
to eat, you may possess so much as you receive, you must obey one you
prefer not to obey, you must be a servant to your brethren, you must
fear the superior of the monastery as God, love him as a father. "
Therefore it would seem that the religious life of those who live in
community is more perfect than that of those who lead a solitary life.
Objection 4: Further, our Lord said (Lk. 11:33): "No man lighteth a
candle and putteth it in a hidden place, nor under a bushel. " Now those
who lead a solitary life are seemingly in a hidden place, and to be
doing no good to any man. Therefore it would seem that their religious
life is not more perfect.
Objection 5: Further, that which is in accord with man's nature is
apparently more pertinent to the perfection of virtue. But man is
naturally a social animal, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1).
Therefore it would seem that to lead a solitary life is not more
perfect than to lead a community life.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De oper. Monach. xxiii) that "those
are holier who keep themselves aloof from the approach of all, and give
their whole mind to a life of prayer. "
I answer that, Solitude, like poverty, is not the essence of
perfection, but a means thereto. Hence in the Conferences of the
Fathers (Coll. i, 7) the Abbot Moses says that "solitude," even as
fasting and other like things, is "a sure means of acquiring purity of
heart. " Now it is evident that solitude is a means adapted not to
action but to contemplation, according to Osee 2:14, "I . . . will lead
her into solitude [Douay: 'the wilderness']; and I will speak to her
heart. " Wherefore it is not suitable to those religious orders that are
directed to the works whether corporal or spiritual of the active life;
except perhaps for a time, after the example of Christ, Who as Luke
relates (6:12), "went out into a mountain to pray; and He passed the
whole night in the prayer of God. " On the other hand, it is suitable to
those religious orders that are directed to contemplation.
It must, however, be observed that what is solitary should be
self-sufficing by itself. Now such a thing is one "that lacks nothing,"
and this belongs to the idea of a perfect thing [*Aristotle, Phys. iii,
6]. Wherefore solitude befits the contemplative who has already
attained to perfection. This happens in two ways: in one way by the
gift only of God, as in the case of John the Baptist, who was "filled
with the Holy Ghost even from his mother's womb" (Lk. 1:11), so that he
was in the desert even as a boy; in another way by the practice of
virtuous action, according to Heb. 5:14: "Strong meat is for the
perfect; for them who by custom have their senses exercised to the
discerning of good and evil. "
Now man is assisted in this practice by the fellowship of others in two
ways. First, as regards his intellect, to the effect of his being
instructed in that which he has to contemplate; wherefore Jerome says
(ad Rustic. Monach. , Ep. cxxv): "It pleases me that you have the
fellowship of holy men, and teach not yourself. Secondly, as regards
the affections, seeing that man's noisome affections are restrained by
the example and reproof which he receives from others; for as Gregory
says (Moral. xxx, 23), commenting on the words, "To whom I have given a
house in the wilderness" (Job 39:6), "What profits solitude of the
body, if solitude of the heart be lacking? " Hence a social life is
necessary for the practice of perfection. Now solitude befits those who
are already perfect; wherefore Jerome says (ad Rustic. Monach. , Ep.
cxxv): "Far from condemning the solitary life, we have often commended
it. But we wish the soldiers who pass from the monastic school to be
such as not to be deterred by the hard noviciate of the desert, and
such as have given proof of their conduct for a considerable time.
Accordingly, just as that which is already perfect surpasses that which
is being schooled in perfection, so the life of the solitaries, if duly
practiced, surpasses the community life. But if it be undertaken
without the aforesaid practice, it is fraught with very great danger,
unless the grace of God supply that which others acquire by practice,
as in the case of the Blessed Antony and the Blessed Benedict.
Reply to Objection 1: Solomon shows that two are better than one, on
account of the help which one affords the other either by "lifting him"
up, or by "warming him," i. e.
giving him spiritual heat (Eccles.
4:10,11). But those who have already attained to perfection do not
require this help.
Reply to Objection 2: According to 1 Jn. 4:16, "He that abideth in
charity abideth in God and God in him. " Wherefore just as Christ is in
the midst of those who are united together in the fellowship of
brotherly love, so does He dwell in the heart of the man who devotes
himself to divine contemplation through love of God.
Reply to Objection 3: Actual obedience is required of those who need to
be schooled according to the direction of others in the attainment of
perfection; but those who are already perfect are sufficiently "led by
the spirit of God" so that they need not to obey others actually.
Nevertheless they have obedience in the preparedness of the mind.
Reply to Objection 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19), "no one
is forbidden to seek the knowledge of truth, for this pertains to a
praiseworthy leisure. " That a man be placed "on a candlestick," does
not concern him but his superiors, and "if this burden is not placed on
us," as Augustine goes on to say (De Civ. Dei xix, 19), "we must devote
ourselves to the contemplation of truth," for which purpose solitude is
most helpful. Nevertheless, those who lead a solitary life are most
useful to mankind. Hence, referring to them, Augustine says (De Morib.
Eccl. xxxi): "They dwell in the most lonely places, content to live on
water and the bread that is brought to them from time to time, enjoying
colloquy with God to whom they have adhered with a pure mind. To some
they seem to have renounced human intercourse more than is right: but
these understand not how much such men profit us by the spirit of their
prayers, what an example to us is the life of those whom we are
forbidden to see in the body. "
Reply to Objection 5: A man may lead a solitary life for two motives.
one is because he is unable, as it were, to bear with human fellowship
on account of his uncouthness of mind; and this is beast-like. The
other is with a view to adhering wholly to divine things; and this is
superhuman. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 1) that "he who
associates not with others is either a beast or a god," i. e. a godly
man.
__________________________________________________________________
OF THE ENTRANCE INTO RELIGIOUS LIFE (TEN ARTICLES)
We must now consider the entrance into religious life. Under this head
there are ten points of inquiry:
(1) Whether those who are not practiced in the observance of the
commandments should enter religion?
(2) Whether it is lawful for a person to be bound by vow to enter
religion?
(3) Whether those who are bound by vow to enter religion are bound to
fulfil their vow?
(4) Whether those who vow to enter religion are bound to remain there
in perpetuity?
(5) Whether children should be received into religion?
(6) Whether one should be withheld from entering religion through
deference to one's parents?
(7) Whether parish priests or archdeacons may enter religion?
(8) Whether one may pass from one religious order to another?
(9) Whether one ought to induce others to enter religion?
(10) Whether serious deliberation with one's relations and friends is
requisite for entrance into religion?
__________________________________________________________________
Whether those who are not practiced in keeping the commandments should enter
religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that none should enter religion but those
who are practiced in the observance of the commandments. For our Lord
gave the counsel of perfection to the young man who said that he had
kept the commandments "from his youth. " Now all religious orders
originate from Christ. Therefore it would seem that none should be
allowed to enter religion but those who are practiced in the observance
of the commandments.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Hom. xv in Ezech. , and Moral.
xxii): "No one comes suddenly to the summit; but he must make a
beginning of a good life in the smallest matters, so as to accomplish
great things. " Now the great things are the counsels which pertain to
the perfection of life, while the lesser things are the commandments
which belong to common righteousness. Therefore it would seem that one
ought not to enter religion for the purpose of keeping the counsels,
unless one be already practiced in the observance of the precepts.
Objection 3: Further, the religious state, like the holy orders, has a
place of eminence in the Church. Now, as Gregory writes to the bishop
Siagrius [*Regist. ix, Ep. 106], "order should be observed in ascending
to orders. For he seeks a fall who aspires to mount to the summit by
overpassing the steps. " [*The rest of the quotation is from Regist. v,
Ep. 53, ad Virgil. Episc. ]. "For we are well aware that walls when
built receive not the weight of the beams until the new fabric is rid
of its moisture, lest if they should be burdened with weight before
they are seasoned they bring down the whole building" (Dist. xlviii,
can. Sicut neophytus). Therefore it would seem that one should not
enter religion unless one be practiced in the observance of the
precepts.
Objection 4: Further, a gloss on Ps. 130:2, "As a child that is weaned
is towards his mother," says: "First we are conceived in the womb of
Mother Church, by being taught the rudiments of faith. Then we are
nourished as it were in her womb, by progressing in those same
elements. Afterwards we are brought forth to the light by being
regenerated in baptism. Then the Church bears us as it were in her
hands and feeds us with milk, when after baptism we are instructed in
good works and are nourished with the milk of simple doctrine while we
progress; until having grown out of infancy we leave our mother's milk
for a father's control, that is to say, we pass from simple doctrine,
by which we are taught the Word made flesh, to the Word that was in the
beginning with God. " Afterwards it goes on to say: "For those who are
just baptized on Holy Saturday are borne in the hands of the Church as
it were and fed with milk until Pentecost, during which time nothing
arduous is prescribed, no fasts, no rising at midnight. Afterwards they
are confirmed by the Paraclete Spirit, and being weaned so to speak,
begin to fast and keep other difficult observances. Many, like the
heretics and schismatics, have perverted this order by being weaned
before the time. Hence they have come to naught. " Now this order is
apparently perverted by those who enter religion, or induce others to
enter religion, before they are practiced in the easier observance of
the commandments. Therefore they would seem to be heretics or
schismatics.
Objection 5: Further, one should proceed from that which precedes to
that which follows after. Now the commandments precede the counsels,
because they are more universal, for "the implication of the one by the
other is not convertible" [*Categor. ix], since whoever keeps the
counsels keeps the commandments, but the converse does not hold. Seeing
then that the right order requires one to pass from that which comes
first to that which comes after, it follows that one ought not to pass
to the observance of the counsels in religion, without being first of
all practiced in the observance of the commandments.
On the contrary, Matthew the publican who was not practiced in the
observance of the commandments was called by our Lord to the observance
of the counsels. For it is stated (Lk. 5:28) that "leaving all things
he . . . followed Him. " Therefore it is not necessary for a person to
be practiced in the observance of the commandments before passing to
the perfection of the counsels.
I answer that, As shown above ([3834]Q[188], A[1]), the religious state
is a spiritual schooling for the attainment of the perfection of
charity. This is accomplished through the removal of the obstacles to
perfect charity by religious observances; and these obstacles are those
things which attach man's affections to earthly things. Now the
attachment of man's affections to earthly things is not only an
obstacle to the perfection of charity, but sometimes leads to the loss
of charity, when through turning inordinately to temporal goods man
turns away from the immutable good by sinning mortally. Hence it is
evident that the observances of the religious state, while removing the
obstacles to perfect charity, remove also the occasions of sin: for
instance, it is clear that fasting, watching, obedience, and the like
withdraw man from sins of gluttony and lust and all other manner of
sins.
Consequently it is right that not only those who are practiced in the
observance of the commandments should enter religion in order to attain
to yet greater perfection, but also those who are not practiced, in
order the more easily to avoid sin and attain to perfection.
Reply to Objection 1: Jerome (Super Matth. xix, 20) says: "The young
man lies when he says: 'All these have I kept from my youth. ' For if he
had fulfilled this commandment, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
thyself,' why did he go away sad when he heard: Go, sell all thou hast
and give to the poor? " But this means that he lied as to the perfect
observance of this commandment. Hence Origen says (Tract. viii super
Matth. ) that "it is written in the Gospel according to the Hebrews that
when our Lord had said to him: 'Go, sell all thou hast,' the rich man
began to scratch his head; and that our Lord said to him: How sayest
thou: I have fulfilled the law and the prophets, seeing that it is
written in the law: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself? Behold
many of thy brethren, children of Abraham, are clothed in filth, and
die of hunger, whilst thy house is full of all manner of good things,
and nothing whatever hath passed thence to them. And thus our Lord
reproves him saying: If thou wilt be perfect, go, etc. For it is
impossible to fulfil the commandment which says, Thou shalt love thy
neighbor as thyself, and to be rich, especially to have such great
wealth. " This also refers to the perfect fulfilment of this precept. on
the other hand, it is true that he kept the commandments imperfectly
and in a general way. For perfection consists chiefly in the observance
of the precepts of charity, as stated above ([3835]Q[184], A[3]).
Wherefore in order to show that the perfection of the counsels is
useful both to the innocent and to sinners, our Lord called not only
the innocent youth but also the sinner Matthew. Yet Matthew obeyed His
call, and the youth obeyed not, because sinners are converted to the
religious life more easily than those who presume on their innocency.
It is to the former that our Lord says (Mat. 21:31): "The publicans and
the harlots shall go into the kingdom of God before you. "
Reply to Objection 2: The highest and the lowest place can be taken in
three ways. First, in reference to the same state and the same man; and
thus it is evident that no one comes to the summit suddenly, since
every man that lives aright, progresses during the whole course of his
life, so as to arrive at the summit. Secondly, in comparison with
various states; and thus he who desires to reach to a higher state need
not begin from a lower state: for instance, if a man wish to be a
cleric he need not first of all be practiced in the life of a layman.
Thirdly, in comparison with different persons; and in this way it is
clear that one man begins straightway not only from a higher state, but
even from a higher degree of holiness, than the highest degree to which
another man attains throughout his whole life. Hence Gregory says
(Dial. ii, 1): "All are agreed that the boy Benedict began at a high
degree of grace and perfection in his daily life. "
Reply to Objection 3: As stated above ([3836]Q[184], A[6]) the holy
orders prerequire holiness, whereas the religious state is a school for
the attainment of holiness. Hence the burden of orders should be laid
on the walls when these are already seasoned with holiness, whereas the
burden of religion seasons the walls, i. e. men, by drawing out the damp
of vice.
Reply to Objection 4: It is manifest from the words of this gloss that
it is chiefly a question of the order of doctrine, in so far as one has
to pass from easy matter to that which is more difficult. Hence it is
clear from what follows that the statement that certain "heretics" and
"schismatics have perverted this order" refers to the order of
doctrine. For it continues thus: "But he says that he has kept these
things, namely the aforesaid order, binding himself by an oath
[*Referring to the last words of the verse, and taking 'retributio,'
which Douay renders 'reward,' as meaning 'punishment']. Thus I was
humble not only in other things but also in knowledge, for 'I was
humbly minded'; because I was first of all fed with milk, which is the
Word made flesh, so that I grew up to partake of the bread of angels,
namely the Word that is in the beginning with God. " The example which
is given in proof, of the newly baptized not being commanded to fast
until Pentecost, shows that no difficult things are to be laid on them
as an obligation before the Holy Ghost inspires them inwardly to take
upon themselves difficult things of their own choice. Hence after
Pentecost and the receiving of the Holy Ghost the Church observes a
fast. Now the Holy Ghost, according to Ambrose (Super Luc. 1:15), "is
not confined to any particular age; He ceases not when men die, He is
not excluded from the maternal womb. " Gregory also in a homily for
Pentecost (xxx in Ev. ) says: "He fills the boy harpist and makes him a
psalmist: He fills the boy abstainer and makes him a wise judge [*Dan.
1:8-17]," and afterwards he adds: "No time is needed to learn
whatsoever He will, for He teaches the mind by the merest touch. " Again
it is written (Eccles. 8:8), "It is not in man's power to stop the
Spirit," and the Apostle admonishes us (1 Thess. 5:19): "Extinguish not
the Spirit," and (Acts 7:51) it is said against certain persons: "You
always resist the Holy Ghost. "
Reply to Objection 5: There are certain chief precepts which are the
ends, so to say, of the commandments and counsels. These are the
precepts of charity, and the counsels are directed to them, not that
these precepts cannot be observed without keeping the counsels, but
that the keeping of the counsels conduces to the better observance of
the precepts. The other precepts are secondary and are directed to the
precepts of charity; in such a way that unless one observe them it is
altogether impossible to keep the precepts of charity. Accordingly in
the intention the perfect observance of the precepts of charity
precedes the counsels, and yet sometimes it follows them in point of
time. For such is the order of the end in relation to things directed
to the end. But the observance in a general way of the precepts of
charity together with the other precepts, is compared to the counsels
as the common to the proper, because one can observe the precepts
without observing the counsels, but not vice versa. Hence the common
observance of the precepts precedes the counsels in the order of
nature; but it does not follow that it precedes them in point of time,
for a thing is not in the genus before being in one of the species. But
the observance of the precepts apart from the counsels is directed to
the observance of the precepts together with the counsels; as an
imperfect to a perfect species, even as the irrational to the rational
animal. Now the perfect is naturally prior to the imperfect, since
"nature," as Boethius says (De Consol. iii, 10), "begins with perfect
things. " And yet it is not necessary for the precepts first of all to
be observed without the counsels, and afterwards with the counsels,
just as it is not necessary for one to be an ass before being a man, or
married before being a virgin. In like manner it is not necessary for a
person first of all to keep the commandments in the world before
entering religion; especially as the worldly life does not dispose one
to religious perfection, but is more an obstacle thereto.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one ought to be bound by vow to enter religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow to
enter religion. For in making his profession a man is bound by the
religious vow. Now before profession a year of probation is allowed,
according to the rule of the Blessed Benedict (lviii) and according to
the decree of Innocent IV [*Sext. Decret. , cap. Non solum. , de Regular.
et Transeunt, ad Relig. ] who moreover forbade anyone to be bound to the
religious life by profession before completing the year of probation.
Therefore it would seem that much less ought anyone while yet in the
world to be bound by vow to enter religion.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory says (Regist. xi, Ep. 15): Jews "should
be persuaded to be converted, not by compulsion but of their own free
will" (Dist. xlv, can. De Judaeis). Now one is compelled to fulfil what
one has vowed. Therefore no one should be bound by vow to enter
religion.
Objection 3: Further, no one should give another an occasion of
falling; wherefore it is written (Ex. 21:33,34): "If a man open a pit .
. . and an ox or an ass fall into it, the owner of the pit shall pay
the price of the beasts. " Now through being bound by vow to enter
religion it often happens that people fall into despair and various
sins. Therefore it would seem that one ought not to be bound by vow to
enter religion.
On the contrary, It is written, (Ps. 75:12): "Vow ye, and pay to the
Lord your God"; and a gloss of Augustine says that "some vows concern
the individual, such as vows of chastity, virginity, and the like. "
Consequently Holy Scripture invites us to vow these things. But Holy
Scripture invites us only to that which is better. Therefore it is
better to bind oneself by vow to enter religion.
I answer that, As stated above ([3837]Q[88], A[6]), when we were
treating of vows, one and the same work done in fulfilment of a vow is
more praiseworthy than if it be done apart from a vow, both because to
vow is an act of religion, which has a certain pre-eminence among the
virtues, and because a vow strengthens a man's will to do good; and
just as a sin is more grievous through proceeding from a will obstinate
in evil, so a good work is the more praiseworthy through proceeding
from a will confirmed in good by means of a vow. Therefore it is in
itself praiseworthy to bind oneself by vow to enter religion.
Reply to Objection 1: The religious vow is twofold. One is the solemn
vow which makes a man a monk or a brother in some other religious
order. This is called the profession, and such a vow should be preceded
by a year's probation, as the objection proves. The other is the simple
vow which does not make a man a monk or a religious, but only binds him
to enter religion, and such a vow need not be preceded by a year's
probation.
Reply to Objection 2: The words quoted from Gregory must be understood
as referring to absolute violence. But the compulsion arising from the
obligation of a vow is not absolute necessity, but a necessity of end,
because after such a vow one cannot attain to the end of salvation
unless one fulfil that vow. Such a necessity is not to be avoided;
indeed, as Augustine says (Ep. cxxvii ad Armentar. et Paulin. ), "happy
is the necessity that compels us to better things. "
Reply to Objection 3: The vow to enter religion is a strengthening of
the will for better things, and consequently, considered in itself,
instead of giving a man an occasion of falling, withdraws him from it.
But if one who breaks a vow falls more grievously, this does not
derogate from the goodness of the vow, as neither does it derogate from
the goodness of Baptism that some sin more grievously after being
baptized.
__________________________________________________________________
Whether one who is bound by a vow to enter religion is under an obligation
of entering religion?
Objection 1: It would seem that one who is bound by the vow to enter
religion is not under an obligation of entering religion. For it is
said in the Decretals (XVII, qu. ii, can. Consaldus): "Consaldus, a
priest under pressure of sickness and emotional fervour, promised to
become a monk. He did not, however, bind himself to a monastery or
abbot; nor did he commit his promise to writing, but he renounced his
benefice in the hands of a notary; and when he was restored to health
he refused to become a monk. " And afterwards it is added: "We adjudge
and by apostolic authority we command that the aforesaid priest be
admitted to his benefice and sacred duties, and that he be allowed to
retain them in peace. " Now this would not be if he were bound to enter
religion. Therefore it would seem that one is not bound to keep one's
vow of entering religion.
Objection 2: Further, no one is bound to do what is not in his power.
Now it is not in a person's power to enter religion, since this depends
on the consent of those whom he wishes to join. Therefore it would seem
that a man is not obliged to fulfil the vow by which he bound himself
to enter religion.
Objection 3: Further, a less useful vow cannot remit a more useful one.
Now the fulfilment of a vow to enter religion might hinder the
fulfilment of a vow to take up the cross in defense of the Holy Land;
and the latter apparently is the more useful vow, since thereby a man
obtains the forgiveness of his sins. Therefore it would seem that the
vow by which a man has bound himself to enter religion is not
necessarily to be fulfilled.
On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. 5:3): "If thou hast vowed
anything to God, defer not to pay it, for an unfaithful and foolish
promise displeaseth him"; and a gloss on Ps.
